# Vital City > New York City News, Policy Analysis, Data & Urban Affairs Public Ghost content for AI and LLM tooling. This file includes a bounded export of public pages first, then recent public posts. Append `.md` to any post or page URL to get the content in Markdown (for example, `/example-post.md`). ## Pages ### The Journal URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/ Last updated: 2026-02-25T12:45:10.000Z _No content available._ ### Culture URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/culture/ Last updated: 2025-11-13T14:50:58.000Z _No content available._ ### Charts & Data Stories URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/data/ Last updated: 2025-11-13T14:50:17.000Z _No content available._ ### Historical Crime Explorer URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/explorer/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T13:41:51.000Z Find more of Vital City’s charts and data stories [here](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/data/). Read our latest analysis of New York City crime trends [here](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-in-new-york-city-trends-statistics). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/02/Treemap-desktop-5.jpg) ### Contributors URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/ Last updated: 2025-12-16T14:48:59.000Z _No content available._ ### About Us URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/about/ Last updated: 2026-01-23T14:54:59.000Z ### Vital City seeks to improve civic life by finding great ideas and innovative research and making them available — and understandable — to those who shape urban policy. We also make relevant data accessible to anyone who wants to get a better understanding of how cities work, because we believe an informed citizenry is a crucial pillar of a healthy democracy. Through a policy journal, special reports, data analysis, public convenings and more, Vital City creates space for a broad range of political perspectives to engage in civil conversation — and to share new ideas and enlightening data about how to promote thriving cities. Our work is motivated by our love for New York City, our belief in the power of evidence and our optimism about the future of cities. Vital City is underwritten by the Achelis & Bodman Foundation, Arnold Ventures, Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Public Welfare Foundation, Charles H. Revson Foundation, Teagle Foundation, Tiger Foundation and Tow Foundation, as well as by contributions from individual donors and readers. We are housed at Columbia Law School and the Fund for the City of New York serves as our fiscal sponsor. ### Nuts and Bolts: Solving Gun Cases URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issue-5/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T16:44:13.000Z _No content available._ ### On Drugs URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issue-6/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:36.000Z How substance use shapes the city ### Crime: What Happened in 2023, and What 2024 May Bring URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-in-2023-and-2024/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:36.000Z Breaking down New York City's — and America's — trends in violence and victimization ### How Many People Should New York City's Jails Hold? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-many-people-should-new-york-citys-jails-hold/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T18:17:36.000Z _No content available._ ### Does Evidence Matter? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issue-7/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T20:49:09.000Z Research meets the real world ### Congestion Pricing URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/congestion-pricing/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T18:15:48.000Z _No content available._ ### Is the Urban Doom Loop for Real? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issue-8/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:35.000Z The death and life of great American cities (again) ### The Subway URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issue-9/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:35.000Z Building better transit ### Inside Rikers URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/inside-rikers-jails-can-be-safer-and-more-humane/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:35.000Z Jails can be safer and more humane ### The Case Against Eric Adams & Co. URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-case-against-eric-adams-corruption-issue/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:35.000Z Considering the fix the mayor (and the city) are in, from many angles ### Crime: Looking Back at 2024, and Ahead to 2025 URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-looking-back-at-2024-and-ahead-to-2025/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:35.000Z Breaking down New York City's, and the nation's, trends in violence and disorder ### Big-City Corruption URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issue-10/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:35.000Z Why does it persist? And does anyone know how to solve it? ### Nonprofits and the City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issue-11/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:35.000Z Do nonprofits have too much power — or not enough? ### What Makes Cities Tick URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-makes-cities-tick/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:38:34.000Z Vital City at Three ## Posts ### The Origins of ‘Lived Experience’ URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-origins-of-lived-eexperience/ Last updated: 2026-07-10T14:28:45.000Z Perhaps you’ve noticed the phrase in the Mamdani administration’s press releases: “lived experience.” A program for peer-led recovery claims to bring “[a level of trust and lived experience that can make the difference between isolation and engagement](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mayor-mamdani-invests--12-million-to-expand-peer-led-substance-u?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).” Commissioner of the Mayor’s Office for People With Disabilities Nisha Agarwal has “[irreplicable insight that comes with lived experience](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/02/mayor-mamdani-announces-key-appointments-to-three-city-agencies-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).” Rebecca Jones Gaston, the Commissioner of the Administration of Children’s Services, promises to partner with “[those with lived experience](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani-appoints-rebecca-jones-gaston-as-commissioner-of-t?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” to improve the city’s children’s services. Mamdani is far from the only New York City mayor to embrace the term. Bill de Blasio and Eric Adams’ teams also used the expression. On the national level, [Kamala Harris claimed](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/joe-biden-democratic-presidential-candidate-kamala-harris-60-mintues-interview-norah-odonnell-2020-10-25/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2020 that she would share with Joe Biden her “lived experience, as it relates to any issue that we confront.” For as long as I have heard the phrase, it has perplexed me. What confused me was not the appeal to experience, but rather the addition of the “lived” prefix. Isn’t all experience inherently lived? Why, instead of saying “from my experience,” were people suddenly saying, “from my lived experience”? The intent seems to be to convey the prioritization of lives too often ignored by those who make public policy. But where did this phrase come from? The answer: 19th-century German phenomenology, a branch of philosophy that seeks to understand people’s subjective experiences. So how did this phrase travel from turn-of-the-century Berlin to 21st-century New York City? The first step is understanding the phrase’s linguistic origins. Its clunkiness — the “lived” prefix to experience — is the result of translation. The term “lived experience” is a translation of the German word *erlebnis*. German has two words for “experience,” each corresponding to subtle differences in how English speakers use the word. [According to Merriam-Webster](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/experience?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the noun “experience” is defined as: 1. Practical knowledge, skill, or practice gained from direct observation of or participation in events or in a particular activity. 2. Something personally encountered, undergone, or lived through. The first definition corresponds to the German word *erfahrung*, which contains the root *fahren*, which means “to journey.” *Erfahrung* represents how experience is used when one says, “The professor is very wise because he has a lot of experience.” The second definition maps onto *erlebnis*, with the root *leben*, meaning life. *Erlebnis* is something that you live through, not cumulative experience. It would be used to say something like, “She wants to have the experience of going to a theme park.” In the late 19th century, *erlebnis* became a key concept in German philosophy. Philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey was the first to popularize the phrase. In his works about the difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences (what today roughly maps onto the distinctions we make between the humanities and social sciences), Dilthey argued that the human sciences should not be understood through pure reason. Instead, scholars should take into account *erlebnis*, or how humans subjectively experience the world. When translating Dilthey’s works into English, translators added the adjective “lived” to “experience” in order to distinguish *erlebnis* from *erfahung*. In the early 20th century, Dilthey’s work inspired the philosophical movement of phenomenology, which explored the nature of subjective human consciousness. It employed Dilthey’s concept of *erlebnis*. German phenomenologists simply used the word *erlebnis*, while French phenomenologists used the phrase *l’expérience vécue* — in English, “the lived experience.” Through a subset of French phenomenologists, the French formulation of “lived experience” became tied to the study of marginalized identities. Jean Paul Sartre employed the idea in relation to Jews in “Anti-Semite and Jew”; Franz Fanon wrote about “the lived experience of the black man” in “Black Skin, White Masks.” In “The Second Sex,” Simone de Beauvoir wrote about how women’s “lived experience” influences their own self-image as weak and inferior to men. De Beauvoir wrote that lived experience demonstrates how one’s self-conception is not fixed, but rather constructed through engagement with the world. Through the 1980s, it was mainly philosophers who used the idea of “lived experience.” Then, in the 1990s, social science disciplines began more widely adopting the phrase. Though it appears in a wide range of studies — such as on the “[lived experiences of persons with heart transplantation](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147956324002036?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” or “[the lived experience of feeling very tired](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0894318403256417?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” — it became particularly popular as a corrective, focusing on groups with a history of having been ignored in research and policy. The 2024 book “[Disrupting the Academy with Lived Experience-Led Knowledge](https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/disrupting-the-academy-with-lived-experience-led-knowledge?ref=vitalcitynyc.org),” by University of New South Wales professors Maree Higgins and Caroline Linnette, says “when lived experience experts lead the way, their knowledge of how to address social injustices can enrich, transform and decolonise research, teaching and advocacy.” Mahmood Mamdani, the Columbia professor and scholar of postcolonialism who also happens to be the father of Zohran Mamdani, uses the concept in his own work. Over roughly the past decade, the phrase has taken on a new moral weight. While it used to mostly be an analytical tool, denoting an exploration of how experiences shape understanding, many now use it as something else entirely. Now, “lived experience” is often cited as a source of information to be held in the highest regard, trumping other data and evidence. The phrase has only grown in popularity. Compare it to another piece of philosophical jargon, “intersubjectivity.” While the two words were found with identical frequency in books in 1980, “lived experience” now appears more than three times as much as “intersubjectivity.” The phrase is so common that, as per Google’s Books Ngram Viewer, [it appears more than “brunch” and “selfie” in books, though still slightly less than “podcast](https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=lived+experience%2Cbrunch%2Cselfie%2Cpodcast&year%5Fstart=2000&year%5Fend=2022&corpus=en&smoothing=3&case%5Finsensitive=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org).” Not everyone embraces the new usage. [Naomi Schafer Riley](https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-problem-with-lived-experience/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a child welfare researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, worries about the focus on lived experience in policymaking. It’s possible that the people sharing their lived experiences may be self-selecting subset of those who feel comfortable sharing the de vogue opinion. Additionally, lived experiences — as those like Dilthey and de Beauvoir knew — are subjective, because humans’ perception of reality is never 100% accurate. Still, for the politicians and civil servants who use the phrase, “lived experience” is always due the utmost respect. At his nomination, Mamdani’s Taxi and Limousine commissioner, Midori Valdivia, said as much: “no amount of degrees or meetings in boardrooms compare to the day-to-day lived experience of being a transportation family.” In other words, past jobs may give a policymaker experience in the professional sense, or *erfahrung*, to serve the public. But what is equally if not more valuable is having a shared “lived experience,” or *erlebnis*, with those whom they are tasked with serving. ### Cities Aren’t Putting Police Officers Where They’re Needed Most URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/cities-arent-putting-police-officers-where-theyre-needed-most/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T14:00:48.000Z Big city police departments have struggled to hire enough police officers for years. But while these officer shortages are a problem, they’re also unevenly distributed across neighborhoods. In Chicago and Washington, DC, the most violent neighborhoods also have the greatest officer shortages. Even New York, which pioneered Jack Maple’s “[cops on the dots](https://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/caseconsortium/casestudies/127/casestudy/www/layout/case%5Fid%5F127%5Fid%5F886.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” strategy in the early 1990s, has huge disparities in staffing by borough. That leaves too many cops worked to the bone, and residents with far less protection than they deserve. We could do a much better job putting officers where they’re needed most. That would make cities safer, and have enormous benefits for our most vulnerable neighborhoods. It would also make it easier to ensure that officers spend time proactively engaging with the communities they’re supposed to protect, rather than simply jumping from crisis to crisis. ### Violence is concentrated, but cops are not In most cities, a small number of blocks account for a disproportionate share of violence. Concentrating officers on these “hotspots,” at the times when violence is most likely to occur, can have a significant impact on safety. [Systematic reviews](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8356500/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#cl21046-sec-0360) of published studies show that these efforts drive meaningful reductions in overall crime. Crucially, the most effective forms of hotspot policing involve “problem-oriented policing” interventions, where officers dedicate time to understand and proactively address crime, rather than simply focus on incident response. A [2020 review](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/cl2.1089?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of high-quality studies on problem-oriented policing interventions found that they delivered a 34% reduction in crime and disorder, on average. But hotspot policing isn’t very effective if departments don’t put officers in the hotspots. In Chicago, for example, violence is heavily concentrated in a subset of the city’s South and West Side neighborhoods, but the police force is spread more evenly across the city. The result is a yawning imbalance in resources relative to need. On the North Side, there are generally between 30 and 60 patrol officers on staff in each police district for every reported homicide (data for all the cities and districts referenced in this article [is available here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1A--8bjY5Kv5DeqgeOHMt85T%5FQhNymXO9/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=108294813592245621314&rtpof=true&sd=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). The city’s best-staffed district, which covers Wrigleyville and Lincoln Park, among other neighborhoods, had 94 patrol officers per homicide last year. But across Chicago’s South and West Sides, most districts report fewer than 15\. The worst-staffed district, South Chicago, has just 6.4\. There are more officers per capita in South and West Side neighborhoods, but those numbers pale in comparison to the need. The results are predictable. Officers in high-violence neighborhoods are worked to the bone, with little time for the sort of proactive engagement necessary to drive down crime. Residents [suspect](https://www.injusticewatch.org/criminal-courts/police/2024/911-calls-response-delayed-traffic-stops/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that emergency response times are slower, and are less likely to call 911 in the first place. Chicago tries to close the gap by surging specialized tactical teams into high-violence neighborhoods. But as a [2017 Department of Justice investigation found](https://www.justice.gov/d9/chicago%5Ffindings%5F1-13-17.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), those tactical teams are rarely equipped (or instructed) to engage with neighborhood problems. Instead, they roll in to make arrests (or traffic stops, as the case may be). Unsurprisingly, residents are more likely to see unfamiliar, non-uniformed officers as an occupying force rather than partners in public safety. In a particularly twisted outcome, [Chicago’s Inspector General found](https://news.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/Chicago-Police-Department-911-Response-Time-Data-Collection-and-Reporting-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that because residents in high-violence neighborhoods believe that police will only show up in a timely fashion if there’s a threat of violence, some callers will falsely report the presence of guns in order to accelerate response times. These gaps shrink (but do not disappear) when analyzing the ratio of officers per major crime or officers per call for service. But homicides are the right place to start. They matter more than assaults or burglaries. And because homicides come with a body and are matched against death records, they are [almost always captured](https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ntmh.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in crime statistics. By contrast, [just 40%](https://counciloncj.org/when-crime-statistics-diverge/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of other violent crimes are reported to law enforcement. That’s in part because residents in some neighborhoods don’t believe that police will respond in a timely fashion. A neighborhood with a high homicide rate but low robbery rate isn’t safe – it’s a neighborhood where residents have given up reporting robberies. Fortunately, in spite of this problem Chicago’s murder rate has declined dramatically in the last few years, falling [9% in 2024](https://citythatworks.substack.com/p/scoreboard-how-did-chicago-do-in?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and a whopping [27% in 2025](https://citythatworks.substack.com/p/scoreboard-how-did-chicago-do-in-8a9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The city’s ongoing officer misallocation represents additional low-hanging fruit. Moving more officers to high-violence neighborhoods is one of the best tools the city has to continue to drive down violence in the coming years. ### Big cities aren’t protecting the neighborhoods that need it most Notably, this dynamic is not unique to Chicago. Relatively few departments publish their staffing data by district, but stark gaps emerge in many of the departments that do. Washington, DC, has 11 times more officers per homicide in its 2nd police district (59) than it does in its 7th (5.4). In New York, the relatively low level of homicides per precinct make a similar analysis difficult. But a similar pattern emerges at the borough level. Even as the city touts its [zone-based strategy](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nypd-zone-strategy-crime-drop-analysis/) of officer allocation, at the borough level there is an eight-fold gap between the ratio of officers per homicide in the Bronx (29) and Staten Island, which reports an extraordinary 244 officers per homicide. Keen observers will see another pattern in the data. For the cities with the three biggest staffing gaps, the districts with the highest levels of staffing are generally in the whitest and often wealthiest parts of town, including far Northwest DC (DC’s 2nd district), Chicago’s North Side, and the New York boroughs of Staten Island and Manhattan. The districts with the lowest levels of staffing are all in heavily or majority Black neighborhoods, including parts of Chicago’s South and West Sides, Southeast DC (which is covered by DC’s 7th district), and the Bronx. And while Philadelphia doesn’t release its district-level staffing, the City Controller there identified a similar pattern [in a 2022 study](https://controller.phila.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/PPD-Review-Final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Left-wing critics of policing are right about one thing: In city after city, we have prioritized white lives over Black ones. But that’s not because we have too many police officers — it’s because we fail to use those officers to protect Black neighborhoods. Crucially, a greater presence of uniformed patrol officers, charged with working regular beats and getting to know their neighborhoods, could also do much to repair police-community relations. Officers who look and act like part of the community are a lot more likely to build trust – especially if it’s an explicit part of their job. And residents are more likely to call 911 when they think they’ll get a timely response. ### This is a political problem Police departments know this. In Chicago, at least [four separate workforce allocation studies](https://chicagoreader.com/news/police-study-consent-decree/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have come to the same conclusion since 2010\. The executive summary for a fifth such study was recently released, noting that the Department needs to either reallocate or hire [270 patrol officers](https://www.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/WFA-ES.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to protect neighborhoods with the highest levels of violence. The problem is that pulling officers out of safer neighborhoods is likely to provoke pushback — especially when those neighborhoods tend to be wealthier and whiter. And it’s reasonable for everyone to want a baseline level of safety, regardless of how many murders happened on their street last year. But this is an opportunity to exercise some political courage. The murder rate is one of the most important things that voters grade politicians on. And crime rarely respects political boundaries. Disrupting networks of criminal activity in high-violence neighborhoods is likely to deliver more safety citywide. There are also opportunities to add officers to understaffed neighborhoods without draining them from safer ones. A good first step would be to cut down on the number of centralized and tactical units, releasing them back into uniformed patrol in the neighborhoods where they’re needed most. That’s just the start. Far too many departments still have sworn officers, writing parking tickets and working desk jobs in HR and IT. The [Police Executive Research Forum](https://www.policeforum.org/assets/Civilianization.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) notes that this can not only free up officer capacity, but also help control costs and improve service. And most departments have just scratched the surface here. As Jeff Asher noted for The Argument earlier this year, when New Orleans [hired a private contractor](https://www.theargumentmag.com/p/cities-cant-find-enough-cops-heres?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to respond to noninjury traffic accidents, emergency response times plummeted and homicide clearance rates improved. Officers are one of a city’s most valuable resources. They have to be put where they can be most useful, trained and held accountable for their performance, and then re-allocated as patterns of violence change. That won’t be easy. But the recent fall in violent crime has given cities time and space to make structural reforms. If we take advantage of this moment, we can secure safer streets and far more protection for the neighborhoods that need it most. ### Expert Advice for Mamdani’s Commission on Government Efficiency URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/expert-advice-for-mamdanis-commission-on-government-efficiency/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T14:00:58.000Z *Zohran Mamdani's Commission on Government Efficiency, known as COGE, has a deceptively modest mandate: put proposals on the November ballot that will speed up infrastructure projects, deliver city services faster and give agencies room to do their jobs. The harder question underneath is whether any of that is achievable — whether a big, blue, heavily regulated city like New York can be governed well, and whether the machinery of government can be bent toward a mayor's priorities instead of swallowing them. The commission expects working recommendations by the end of July and proposals before voters in November. That's a short runway for a large ambition.* *So Vital City convened people who have actually run and studied that machinery up close. Moderating was our founder, Elizabeth Glazer, a former federal prosecutor who oversaw criminal justice policy for a New York mayor and governor. Around the table: Sarah Feinberg, who led New York City Transit through the pandemic; Robert Gordon, a federal budget and government-performance veteran; Maria Torres-Springer, a former first deputy mayor now president of the Revson Foundation; Polly Trottenberg, the city's former transportation commissioner and now dean of NYU's Wagner School; David Schleicher, a Yale Law scholar of city governance and finance; Michael Samuelian of Cornell Tech's Urban Tech Hub; and Carl Weisbrod, a veteran of city government — founding president of the Economic Development Corporation and head of the Department of City Planning, as well as a member of two recent charter commissions.* *We weren't after consensus or a tidy reform agenda but unglamorous ideas that might really move the needle: the procurement fix, the data-sharing rule, the civil-service hiring fix. What follows is a condensed and edited transcript of the conversation.* **Elizabeth Glazer:** I almost feel we could spend the whole hour on today's news — the indictment of former Mayor Eric Adams' chief of staff, Frank Carone — and it bears directly on our topic, because it makes the questions at stake for COGE so vivid. Are blue cities governable? Can governance and operations actually drive a leader's priorities, or are we condemned to performance politics? And can anything make cities resistant to corruption, given the real price we already pay, in layers of regulation, for the pursuit of absolute integrity? The charter is hardly the only place to make a city more efficient, but it's where we'll start. David, take us in. **David Schleicher:** My first question is simply: What problem is COGE addressing? I'd argue New York City government is, in many ways, the worst in America at translating tax dollars into services. It isn't true of every service, and the services aren't low-quality — but in terms of the tax price of services, New York is at or near the bottom. So one idea: build comparative effectiveness into the comptroller's audit function and every agency's reporting — require agencies to report how they're doing relative to other cities. Call it a pushback on New York's parochialism. Of course we're different — a costlier labor market, a costlier housing market — but forcing officials to ask whether they're doing as well as Philadelphia or Boston, and encoding that comparison in the charter, would make government study its own effectiveness. If the point is to show whether government is excellent, in Mamdani's word, that's where I'd start. **Elizabeth Glazer:** So the charter is singularly lacking in any mechanism or standard for performance. David's idea fits a bigger question: how do you drive performance at all? Polly, you ran a capital-intensive agency — reactions? **Polly Trottenberg:** Without passing the buck, I'd say that so many of the factors driving our costs sat a level of government above us. City and state procurement law drove much of the cost bloat, as did an extraordinarily convoluted, redundant oversight structure. So I wouldn't leave the report card only at the agency level.tI has to be owned at the city and state level too. I wouldn't want agencies hit with "Why aren't you as cheap as Boston?" — and I don't even know that Boston is cheap. "What can the Council, the mayor and Albany do to help city government operate efficiently?" is at least as deep a question. > New York City government is, in many ways, the worst in America at translating tax dollars into services. **Sarah Feinberg:** I'm with David on where you get the most bang for the buck, and with Polly that if we try to solve it where it can't be solved, we'll just frustrate everyone. My idea is close to David's: be far more transparent about what the city spends and where the money goes — post the labor contracts, make them searchable, do a genuine deep dive on where specific taxpayer dollars land. And it's so rare to get something on the ballot. We don't get many bites at this apple, so we should ask what we actually want voters to see. **Elizabeth Glazer:** Maria — as a former first deputy mayor who's held nearly every job — what do you make of how the city can drive performance? **Maria Torres-Springer:** What I struggle with in every charter commission is that the charter can only do so much to fix very large problems. We should still spend time on tangible things that can go on the ballot. But the idea I keep coming back to is a recurring government capacity review — a charter-level mechanism to answer one question: can government actually deliver? We spend enormous time debating what government should do and far too little on whether it has the capacity to do it. There's precedent: a [past charter commission created a racial equity commission and a cost-of-living index](https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/11666-new-york-city-voters-approve-racial-justice-ballot-measures?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), setting a permanent management discipline in the charter. Could we do the same for capacity? Every four years, review and publish on our core operating systems — to my mind, procurement, workforce modernization, technology and capital project delivery. It wouldn't judge whether the policies are good; it would force government to say whether it can deliver, and to own plans to close the gaps. This isn't novel — the [U.K. ran cabinet-level capability reviews starting in 2005](https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/assessment-of-the-capability-review-programme/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), focused not on policy but on execution and management quality. The fair critique is that there are already too many plans and commissions, and I live that. But we measure so much in government — what we spend, where, how long it takes — and none of it tells us whether government is getting stronger or weaker. Search, sort and filter the full New York City Charter. [Open full screen ↗](https://joshgreenman1973.github.io/nyc-charter-explorer/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Elizabeth Glazer:** Put more flesh on it — take one area. What would you actually measure? And is every four years too slow? **Maria Torres-Springer:** Maybe every three. Four at least guarantees no administration finishes a term without answering for its capacity to execute. For workforce, you'd track vacancy rates, time-to-hire, critical-skills shortages, retention. On capital delivery, schedule performance and cost overruns. On technology, legacy-system modernization and digital-service quality. You'd have to do the painstaking work of defining the measures and the staffing, and there isn't time before the end of July — so what goes to voters is the larger discipline, not the metrics. **Robert Gordon:** I'd pick up on workforce, where there's a nearer-term item for voters: a body focused specifically on building the workforce to deliver for New Yorkers. New York is an outlier, and not in a good way. Vacancy rates are about double what they were before the pandemic. Time-to-hire for civil service runs 14 to 15 months from exam to job. The city still leans on dated civil-service exams for a huge range of white-collar positions, a restrictive "rule of three" that limits hiring managers, and thousands of job classifications — far more than other cities — which makes moving up needlessly complicated. And pay for jobs the city desperately needs isn't competitive. The usual fix is workarounds for your top priorities, which gets you those priorities but not a well-functioning city. A time-bound commission, with labor at the table, could get a lot done. > We spend enormous time debating what government should do and far too little on whether it has the capacity to do it. **Michael Samuelian:** To build on Robert and Maria: How does the city embrace the gig economy? How many of your kids want to work anywhere for 30 years? We created the [Urban Innovation Fellows program](https://urban.tech.cornell.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), placing talented people in government for two years — Cornell could hire and place them in four months, which is mind-boggling, because it's a workaround, and the city has relied on workarounds for two decades. When I worked for City Planning, I was hired through the Economic Development Corporation because City Planning couldn't hire me fast enough. Imagine a corps doing two- or three-year tours, like Teach For America for government — better talent, quickly and nimbly. And think about a digital-first charter: every agency offering a fully digital option, so no one's forced to show up in person. One more, from [a report we put out five years ago](https://tech.cornell.edu/news/cornell-techs-urban-tech-hub-releases-final-rebooting-nyc-report/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — "tell us once" government: a shared database so residents aren't giving the city the same information over and over, which forces agencies to share data and strips out friction that falls hardest on the most vulnerable. **Carl Weisbrod:** Maria and I may be the only two here who've run both a city agency and an off-budget agency, and the difference is enormous. An Economic Development Corporation's (EDC) ability to handle procurement and capital delivery simply doesn't compare to a city agency's — which is exactly why city agencies turn to EDC to deliver their capital programs, faster and cheaper. That's not about personnel; it's about process. So one big question is how you migrate the strengths of an off-budget agency into the on-budget ones. A lot of people here have touched on how: civil service and work-rule reform, and procurement change to the extent it can be done at the city level. The third goes to Maria's point about measurement — take the [Mayor's Management Report](https://www.nyc.gov/site/operations/reports/mmr.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (MMR) and give it real teeth. The MMR began in the 1970s, and it began with teeth: a permanent, essentially apolitical staff of technocrats who used it to reform agency processes. Today it tells us police or fire response times went up or down, and that's about it. It's used to report, not to manage — and the only way to change that is with serious, permanent staff that transcends administrations. > The Mayor's Management Report measures activity, not outcomes — it's like a lamp that isn't plugged in. **Polly Trottenberg:** I'll be the procurement and capital-delivery person, since that's where I lived. People constantly said to me as transportation commissioner, "If only you could do what the School Construction Authority can do." My question was always: why can't I? Rather than slowly migrating powers to the other capital agencies, we should start from the premise that every agency should be able to procure and hire and do what an EDC or School Construction Authority can — and note both of those still have plenty of checks; they're not as freewheeling as you'd think. On the Mayor's Management Report: I think we track far too many things. My old agency had something like 80 indicators, and there were real perverse incentives in how they got tracked. The classic is miles of roadway paved: because you had to hit an annual target, it pushed my crews toward the roads easiest to resurface — which is why the Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) Drive went unpaved for years, since it took forever and cost five times as much. It's an important tool; I just don't want to fetishize it. **Elizabeth Glazer:** It measures activity, not outcomes — it's like a lamp that isn't plugged in. **Maria Torres-Springer:** The MMR tries to answer "What did agencies do this year?" rather than "What are the biggest problems, why are they happening, and what will we do about them?" To make it a management tool, it needs to focus on the real cross-agency priorities — if every administration named the 20 things that truly matter and explained why they weren't working, it becomes something a senior leader might actually wrestle with. And it still has to cover the plumbing: procurement, technology, workforce. Maybe the tool we already have just gets reformed rather than replaced — but there has to be a mandated review, so the plumbing isn't left to a few people's heroics. **David Schleicher:** There have been two silos of ideas here: information-forcing and executive authority. On information-forcing — the MMR — two things. It should focus on outcomes, not effort: the greatest information-forcing tool the city ever produced is [CompStat](https://compstat.nypdonline.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Whatever the cheating around the edges, I know how many murders happen each day and whether they're rising or falling — that's good for the public, good internally, and it creates the right incentives. And it should focus on cost: how much are you spending to achieve these ends? On executive authority — what Carl and Polly raised — one idea, which I think was raised at a public meeting, is increasing the mayor's rulemaking authority: writing a strong, [Chevron-style deference](https://www.dlapiper.com/en-us/insights/publications/2024/06/chevron-overruled-in-loper-bright-v-raimondo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into the charter for rules created by city agencies, so courts can't as easily second-guess them. Two buckets, and you can design either one in different ways. **Carl Weisbrod:** Polly's idea — taking all construction out of the city agencies, EDC and the School Construction Authority and putting it into one big construction agency, in effect abolishing EDC — would save the city enormous money and time, if it's run as a genuinely efficient entity. We don't appreciate how little we know about the value we get for our capital dollars. Putting it all in one place — which under current law would have to be off-budget, but mayor-controlled — would add real efficiency. **Elizabeth Glazer:** It would also put every project in one place — $18 billion for jails, billions more for housing — so we could finally see what we're spending our capital budget on, and how we decide. **David Schleicher:** It also hits something the transit-construction reports keep finding: agencies effectively taxing other agencies. The Marron Institute's [report on the Second Avenue Subway](https://transitcosts.com/transit-costs-study-final-report/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found a huge share of the cost overruns came from inter-agency fighting over who's responsible for what. **Polly Trottenberg:** The other bite at the apple is simply that whatever off-budget agencies are allowed to do, there's no reason on-budget agencies shouldn't. There's no underlying logic to the distinction — people accumulated all these complicated steps that, as the School Construction Authority shows, aren't necessary. **Carl Weisbrod:** But that requires changes in state law on so many levels. **Polly Trottenberg:** It does — and this is something I hit constantly at the Department of Transportation (DOT). A lot of it runs through Albany: civil service, procurement. I fought a lonely battle in Albany for years just to get the city a limited amount of design-build on bridge construction. A preposterous waste of time and energy. > Every agency should be able to procure and hire and do what an EDC or School Construction Authority can. **Maria Torres-Springer:** That's where I'd push. When I was a policy analyst — my first government job — a construction commission recommended a super construction authority, so this idea is 25 years old. You'd have to believe whatever gets stood up off-budget would survive the Albany gauntlet and not end up a watered-down version only marginally better than the Department of Design and Construction (DDC). But built with the right tools and flexibility, it would obviate DDC and the separate construction arms of every agency. **Robert Gordon:** The point about the powers off-budget agencies have, which the rest of government lacks, is powerful and true at every level. On the transportation thread: that Second Avenue report also has an extended discussion of reliance on outside contractors as a driver of huge costs — tied directly to the inability to hire inside government. You end up paying three, four, five times more for a contractor's time than to bring that talent in-house. That's both a striking fact and a rationale for fixing government hiring. **Polly Trottenberg:** Picking up the Albany thread: I'd make a strong pitch for bringing Albany colleagues into this conversation. It's a great moment — the mayor arrives with a lot of popularity and influence. It isn't charter reform, but it would be the moment to circle back on procurement, capital projects and civil service. The city owns a piece and the state owns a piece. **Elizabeth Glazer:** Let me put in my own two cents on the river running through several of these. There's data — the access within every agency to see where the problems are, whether it's serious mental illness or crime. The time spent hacking through a jungle of internal data-sharing agreements is absurd; it's been solved elsewhere. Another: Should the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issue a standing instruction that whenever money is set aside for a pilot, there's an assessment of how it went? Otherwise you get a barnacled accumulation of projects you can never pull back and never replicate. And one more: we spend billions settling claims, and no one ever asks what the Law Department is doing. Some kind of ClaimStat — do all those claims add up to systemic failure? — so the department isn't simply making the donuts. **Carl Weisbrod:** You touched on OMB. I give it enormous credit for keeping the city's fiscal house in order for half a century. But it's also a priesthood, especially on the capital budget, which has never been properly analyzed from the outside. The starting point is always the baseline — there's no notion of zero-based budgeting on the capital side. **Elizabeth Glazer:** A thousand percent. There's a micro penny-pinching that sidesteps the real question: what does an agency actually need to be effective, and are we allocating people and money to get there? OMB could be a real force for good. **Michael Samuelian:** Agencies are not good at sharing data with one another, and we have a frontline view of forcing that sharing. Standardize the data, share it, and you can do almost anything with it. New York's open data law was ahead of its time on sharing data publicly, but it's been frozen in amber since. Marry that to David's point on the MMR and make it about service delivery: the MMR shouldn't be about the mayor; it should be about whether residents are getting services on time. We build our systems to protect bureaucrats, not to serve residents — we should be thinking about the user experience (UX) of government. And if someone successfully pilots a service, they should be able to sell it to other agencies immediately. **Elizabeth Glazer:** It's all about the plumbing, and the charter is about the bones. So many of the results you want depend not on how one agency operates but on how agencies operate together — and cross-agency coordination is exactly where the performance work has to live. **Polly Trottenberg:** One more on the Law Department. A huge source of payouts is trip-and-falls on sidewalks. At one point the Law Department wanted us to shave tree roots and patch bumpy spots. My answer was: can I see the data? — both for the places that genuinely needed repair and to spot patterns, certain neighborhoods or certain lawyers bringing trip-and-fall cases the city just settles. Their answer was, essentially, "No data." I was ready to roll up my sleeves and find savings — the city pays out hundreds of millions on these — but I couldn't without data. There's a desperate need for transparency and actionable data across city agencies. **Elizabeth Glazer:** And think about bad-actor employees — the enormous claims now coming in, the assaults at Rikers, the police-misconduct cases, much of which might have been caught in advance. **David Schleicher:** One theme here is that it's good when the mayor has more control and there are fewer rules — that's the separate-agencies point. But information can constrain as well as formal rules: requiring you to report on things is a different kind of check than making you follow complicated procedures. So there's a natural pairing — a more powerful mayoralty combined with strong information-forcing. You remove certain checks, but add ways for the public to do the checking. That's how a lot of governments work; Britain has both a lot of executive authority and a lot of information-forcing. **Polly Trottenberg:** We keep picking on the Law Department, but the city does produce a lot of now-searchable information — I was there when we were aggressively digitizing and trying to make things findable. **David Schleicher:** The city is actually one of the best in the world at producing information — crime data especially. That was one of the great Bloomberg innovations. **Polly Trottenberg:** I wouldn't describe all of this as mayoral power. Some of it is, but a lot is just encrusted process and over-lawyering. Clearing that out doesn't let the mayor get away with more; it just makes things easier to do. I used to joke, though I meant it: if you wanted to build something major in New York and let the natural processes run their course, it would never get done — you had to be in hands-on problem-solving mode the whole way. It's less about giving the mayor grand new powers than clearing the gunk so he can do what he's supposed to do. **David Schleicher:** But the gunk is legislative — it's laws passed by the legislature. **Polly Trottenberg:** Some of it. Some is legal, some procedural, some City Council, some Albany. **Elizabeth Glazer:** And Carl, and maybe many of you, would say that if you actually want to get something done as an agency head, you keep your head down and avoid City Hall. > The Council has nothing like a Congressional Budget Office to score legislation. **Polly Trottenberg:** On policymaking, maybe — but to build a major bridge, City Hall mostly just wants you to do it competently. Let me toss in one more idea, picking up Carl's point about OMB: I have a student who wrote [a piece on the City Council's unfunded mandates](https://thebiggerapple.manhattan.institute/p/nyc-keeps-passing-laws-it-cant-afford?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and it blew my mind. The Council has nothing like a Congressional Budget Office to score legislation. At the federal level, contentious as it is, every bill gets a nonpartisan, permanent group of professionals doing its best to estimate long-term costs. The Council has nothing comparable. **David Schleicher:** That might be the single best piece of civic infrastructure — and we lack it outside government too. You get occasional reports from the [Citizens Budget Commission](https://cbcny.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but Washington has the [Congressional Budget Office](https://www.cbo.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the Yale Budget Lab, a dozen others. There's nothing comparable at the local level. **Polly Trottenberg:** It's Tal Roded, one of my most brilliant students, who wrote it. It resonated because the Council passed the [streets master plan](https://intro.nyc/local-laws/2019-195?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and I had to testify endlessly: you didn't give me the money, the people I could hire quickly or the facilities, you didn't clear the community-board process — and now you're mad I didn't deliver. That might be a charter reform: a serious, permanent, nonpartisan group, at the Council or city OMB, to score this. Social services is another area drowning in unfunded mandates. It's better for everyone to understand the math of what they're asking for, because too often they don't have to own it. **David Schleicher:** You could do it inside an agency, or give it to one of the other charter entities — require the comptroller, say, to issue a cost report before any legislation passes. It's not strange to have an independent entity do the scoring, at some remove from the legislative process. **Polly Trottenberg:** I have a lot of issues with how the comptroller's office is set up — it's highly politicized, and I don't think it's a good model. In other governments, the financial-oversight agencies aren't run by people who aspire to run for president. It creates real political misincentives. **David Schleicher:** Separate local executives are probably a bad idea in general — we arguably shouldn't have a comptroller or a public advocate at all. But if we're going to have them, we can at least give them real responsibilities, because right now they're jobs without clear purposes. **Polly Trottenberg:** We do need serious scoring of city legislation; how you do it is the question. I won't claim the CBO produces fiscal discipline — we're the government with a multi-trillion-dollar deficit — but it produces fiscal knowledge. People find ways around it, but to some degree they have to own what things cost. **David Schleicher:** I agree. The hard question is whether a scoring agency sits with the mayor or apart from him — an executive agency or a legislative one. That's the complicated part. **Polly Trottenberg:** Rereading the charter, I keep thinking: so many agencies, so many offices. Don't create anything new — merge some, and make better use of what you've got. **David Schleicher:** One principle should be to make the charter shorter. Being efficient includes cleaning up the charter itself. **Elizabeth Glazer:** Love it — the same way one way to reform the MMR is to cap it at 15 pages, no more than three results per agency. **Polly Trottenberg:** For DOT, maybe you track 15 or 20, but 85 is goofy. **Elizabeth Glazer:** Ridiculous. Thank you all — a rich discussion, and we'll torture you again soon. --- ## Ideas that surfaced in this session **Comparative-effectiveness reporting.** Require the comptroller's audit function and every agency to report their performance against peer cities, forcing New York to confront whether it's actually delivering value for its tax dollars rather than assuming its scale and complexity excuse underperformance. **Radical spending transparency.** Post labor contracts and city spending data in searchable form so voters can actually see where their money goes. **Recurring government capacity review.** Add a charter-mandated review (every 3–4 years) assessing whether government has the operational capacity to deliver — covering procurement, workforce, technology and capital delivery. **A workforce modernization commission.** Create a time-bound commission, with labor included, to fix outdated civil-service exams, the restrictive "rule of three" hiring rule, excessive job classifications, and noncompetitive pay. **Gig-economy/rotational talent pipeline.** Build a Teach-For-America-style rotational corps for short-term government tours, make every agency service available fully digitally. **Migrate off-budget agency powers to on-budget agencies.** Since off-budget entities like the EDC and School Construction Authority can procure and deliver capital projects faster and cheaper than city agencies, extend those same procurement and hiring powers citywide. **Consolidate construction authority**. Merge all city construction functions (EDC, School Construction Authority, agency-level construction arms) into one off-budget, mayor-controlled entity, an idea with 25-year-old roots in a prior charter commission proposal. **Reform the Mayor's Management Report.** Give the MMR real teeth again by staffing it with permanent, apolitical technocrats (as in its 1970s origins); focus it on outcomes and cost rather than activity counts; and cap its length to avoid perverse incentives. **Create** **stronger mayoral rulemaking authority.** Write language into the charter clarifying the precise role of agency rulemaking, reducing the ability of courts to second-guess executive rules. **Centralize data-sharing across agencies**. Resolve the tangle of internal data-sharing agreements between agencies (e.g., on mental illness, crime) and standardize open data practices, which have stagnated since New York's early leadership on the issue. **Write an Office of Management and Budget pilot-program accountability rule.** Require OMB to mandate an objective assessment whenever it funds a pilot program, preventing an unreviewed accumulation of one-off projects. **Create "ClaimStat" for the Law Department**. Systematically analyze the city's legal settlement claims (which run into the billions) to detect patterns of systemic failure rather than treating each claim in isolation. **Move to zero-based capital budgeting**. Challenge OMB's practice of always starting from prior-year baselines on the capital budget. **Create an independent legislative cost-scoring body.** Create a permanent, nonpartisan entity — modeled loosely on the Congressional Budget Office — to score the fiscal impact of City Council legislation before passage. **Shrink and consolidate the charter itself.** Rather than creating new offices or commissions, merge redundant existing ones and shorten the charter document as a matter of principle, treating textual bloat as its own inefficiency. ### The Right Path to a More Efficient New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-right-path-to-better-government-coge-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T14:00:08.000Z I want to tell you about something called the windshield survey. Every two years, teams of New York City Department of Transportation inspectors drive along the city’s 6,000+ miles of streets and manually assign pavement condition scores to what they see, which then inform which streets get prioritized for repair. It has always been a deliberate and somewhat subjective practice, but it worked well enough. Then two things changed: the roads began carrying more and heavier vehicles, and climate change intensified. Road deterioration now accelerates faster than a two-year inspection cycle can keep up with, and a process that was once adequate has become a liability. One of the fellows in the program that I oversee at Cornell Tech — the [Urban Innovation Fellowship](https://urbaninnovationfellows.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — is now implementing a computer vision solution at DOT that processes high-resolution street imagery with AI. It compresses that two-year inspection cycle to six months (and one day, that may be even less). This approach will produce more consistent results, and will eventually support a comprehensive digital inventory of roadway markings the City doesn't currently have. The tech isn’t new — it has existed for years, and DOT staff have wanted to use it for years. What is new is having a skilled person with the right mandate, embedded in the right place, with enough time to earn the trust of the people who actually run the streets. This is one of the many stories the new Commission on Government Efficiency needs to hear, because it reveals something a charter commission can easily miss: that the path to government efficiency runs through people and capacity, not just rules and regulations. COGE is Mayor Zohran Mamdani's newly-formed Charter Revision Commission, charged with reviewing the New York City Charter and recommending reforms for the November ballot. Its first public hearings, focused on infrastructure, small business and government technology, began in June. ### COGE, not DOGE. Mamdani was right to name this the Commission on Government Efficiency. Not because the contrast to Elon Musk's DOGE is clever — though it is — but because he's right that government efficiency is a necessary component of good governance, regardless of your politics. The Commission’s chair, Patrick Gaspard, made this connection explicit at the Commission's opening meeting. "While this is a commission on efficiency," he said, "efficiency is not the end goal. Efficiency is in the service of affordable housing, affordable childcare. It's in the service of mass transit that works well." The mayor himself made the same point more [concretely](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mamdani-administration-releases--speed--reforms-to-deliver-affor?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): two-year delays in affordable housing construction, the seven-month average lag between construction completion and tenant move-in, and eight-month permitting backlogs are not abstract bureaucratic failures. They're the reason apartments don't get built. At the Department of Buildings, he noted, only six people can approve permits for housing. Six! "That is not a recipe for being able to build enough housing to keep up with our ambitions for the City." This same logic runs through every agency with a role in delivering the Mayor's ambitious agenda. You can't run universal childcare through a hiring process that takes nine months from offer to start. You can't fight climate change through procurement rules that make it nearly impossible for City agencies to work with the startups developing the technologies we need. ### Necessary but not sufficient. But if COGE only focuses on rules changes, which is mostly what charter commissions do, it will miss the deeper problem. New York City government isn't just over-regulated. It's also under-resourced in ways charter revisions can’t fix on their own. Certainly, there are rules worth changing: outdated procurement requirements, [civil service classifications that predate the smartphone](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-mamdani-ny-civil-service-system/), and hiring timelines that would make any private-sector recruiter flinch. But as Commission member Kathy Wylde observed at that first meeting, there is "no philosophical fix" for these problems. The work is "in the weeds," and it is "grinding." Rule changes are necessary but not sufficient. The City also needs to *build* technical capacity inside agencies, talent pipelines that civil service pay scales can't support alone, and cross-agency knowledge networks that the current siloed structure actively works against. The Urban Innovation Fellowship was designed to do exactly that. Over the past year and a half, seven fellows embedded directly in seven City agencies (alongside some truly remarkable full-time agency employees) have been doing the painstaking work of building innovation capacity where services are actually delivered. What we've found is that the hunger for this kind of support is real and too often unmet. There's a persistent assumption in government reform that the most important decisions happen at the top of the org chart. And that by electing the right leaders, we can fix what the last person failed to. Maybe that's where the power is. But it's not necessarily where the work happens. The work happens at the Department of Environmental Protection, which manages 6,800 miles of water mains, many of them more than 80 years old. And at the Department of Sanitation, which oversees the collection of 44 million pounds of trash every day. And in the Sustainability office of the City Housing Authority, trying to decarbonize the largest public housing system in North America. And, yes, at the DOT, driving every single street on a two-year cycle. More than 300,000 City employees work across 50-plus agencies delivering services to New Yorkers daily, while City Hall itself employs roughly 300 people. The innovation signal that comes from City Hall weakens the further it travels from the executive suite. There are tech-savvy people in or near the Mayor's Office. Fewer at the agency level, and fewer still inside the divisions where the actual decisions get made: which data to collect, which processes to automate, which vendors to call. That gap is what the Fellowship exists to address. Our fellows certainly bring unique skills to their projects, but they also bring a fresh perspective to problems that have bedeviled the public sector for years. For example, our Mayor's Office of Contract Services fellow redesigned procurement workflows that had been largely unchanged for decades. Some timelines are now 75% shorter, not through deregulation but through common-sense, human-centered process design. That kind of work requires someone with enough expertise to spot the bottleneck and enough credibility to persuade agency staff to try something new. Our NYCHA fellow identified wastewater heat recovery as a viable technology for decarbonizing domestic hot water, secured grant funding from the State, and will soon launch a demonstration project that could scale across hundreds of similar buildings. This technology has been around for years, but nobody had done the work of putting all the necessary pieces together. (You can read about these and other fellows’ projects in greater detail in our [interim report](https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/sites.coecis.cornell.edu/dist/4/371/files/2026/03/UTH-Urban-Innovation-Fellowship-Interim-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).) Charter reform alone wouldn't have been enough to make any of this happen. It required skilled people embedded in agencies, building trust with civil servants who already understood the problems, and bringing outside expertise to bear in a way that produced solutions neither side would have reached alone. ### Yeah, a commission’s cool. But have you tried a permanent office? Charter reform and executive action can create some of the conditions for change. But conditions alone won't deliver it. Someone has to own it. And right now, nobody does. The reforms above, and the slew of smart reforms the Commission is sure to propose, aren't necessarily new ideas. They are the kinds of ideas that smart people in government have been advocating for years. And they’re the kinds of reforms that happen in fits and starts. Meaningful reform keeps happening in disparate corners of government, piecemeal, without an overarching strategy and without anyone with the authority to push through solutions that span agencies. Flagship programs succeed when senior leaders babysit them, or when enough political attention gets focused on a specific initiative to force the system to respond. But as Jennifer Pahlka, author of Recoding America, [has written](https://statesforum.substack.com/p/making-government-work-for-the-people?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that is not the same as fixing the system. The goal has to be: "let's not just fix it for my pet project. Let's fix it globally." So COGE should recommend more than charter amendments. It should recommend the creation of a Mayor's Office of Government Transformation, an empowered City Hall team with one job: to close the gap between policy intent and operational reality across all of City government. Modeled on the Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability that drove the first PlaNYC, it should sit in the First Deputy Mayor's portfolio for real coordinating authority across agencies, and once the work of the Commission is done, COGE’s Executive Director, Ann Cheng, should become the head of this new Office. It should find chokepoints, pilot solutions in a few agencies, measure results, and scale what works. And it should have actual authority to act, not just recommend. Because an office that can only recommend becomes just another study group, and the City already has enough of those. There are 300,000 people who show up every day to make this city run. They know their systems, their communities, what's broken, and often how to fix it (or at least, how to work around what’s broken). What they need are the tools, the talent, and the room to act on what they know. ### A Striving Government for a Thriving City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-striving-government-for-a-thriving-city-coge-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T14:00:06.000Z For many New Yorkers, government inefficiency is a personal experience. It is the months an apartment building [waits](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-housing-permits-fast-track-construction-mamdani/) for a permit — a delay that shows up later in higher rents. It is the extra time a family spends in a shelter because an [intractable process](https://www.thecityreporter.nyc/2026/04/10/affordable-housing-crisis-vacant-units-delay/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) cannot get them into an available home. It is sidewalk sheds that [sit](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/government-improvements-mamdani-can-tackle-in-the-first-100-days) for years and road [repairs](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-first-100-days-scorecard-nyc/) that never come. It is unanswered 311 requests and energy costs that ratchet up while clean energy sits untapped. When the City lets inertia get the best of it, residents suffer through lost time and higher costs — or are forced out due to high costs and a lack of services. Judging both by what he says and his actions thus far, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani understands that a better-functioning government is necessary. He also understands that for voters to trust him with higher taxes and more ambitious programs, they need to see a government capable of delivering what it is already assigned. His Commission on Government Efficiency — a charter revision commission that follows in the footsteps of his SPEED Task Force on housing production, the naming of Chief Savings Officers to deliver efficiency in agencies, and more — is his latest effort to shake New York out of its inertia. We testified before the commission and came away encouraged. The commissioners, a diverse group that brings deep expertise, pushed on the substance, and the staff is eager to engage ambitiously with big ideas. ### Powers and limits of the charter The City Charter is often referred to as New York City’s constitution, but it’s less powerful than that and easier to change. The charter is a creature of the state, which means that it cannot override (and indeed can be overridden by) the state Constitution and state law. Within the city, the parts of the charter that establish the framework for city government (i.e., what offices exist and how we elect them) require a referendum (usually proposed by a [charter reform commission](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/charter-revision-politics-nyc-primer/)) to change (e.g., the city eliminated the Board of Estimates in 1989 after the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional). Within those margins, the Council can change the charter on its own (e.g., by changing the responsibilities of a department). Within city government and politics, though, charter reform commissions have an interesting role. The commissioners are often (but not always) less bound by the traditional stakeholders of city politics as they do not have to be reelected and the brief nature of the assignment tends to bring an air of creativity that is not always present in permanent legislative bodies (even if they may have the same or greater power). Last year's charter commission is a good example. The commission's [final report](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) put five amendments before voters last November, four of which passed. The outcomes that those amendments sought — faster City approvals and a fairer distribution of housing — likely could have been pursued through legislation, but the Council, and indeed state legislature, had been obstacles for years. The charter gave reform a path that bypassed member deference (the practice of voting with the member affected by zoning change or project siting, which often resulted in blocked projects) and put the question to voters directly. That combination of a big change that powerful incumbents may resent can be the sweet spot for COGE. ### Our proposals Abundance is about making it easier, faster, and cheaper to build what New Yorkers need, primarily housing, faster transit, and clean energy. We see government capacity as essential to an [abundance agenda](https://www.abundanceny.org/agenda?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) because of what it unlocks. To name a few examples: a government that spends less time hiring can spend more time delivering services; reducing the cost of a new subway station can enable the MTA ton extend subways further on the same budget; and private developers can build faster when we find ways to reduce friction in builders’ interactions with the government. For too long, government at all levels has insisted that all kinds of projects need to follow the same approval processes and that process should be as strenuous as what we would have the biggest, most complex and most odious project go through. For the smaller, simpler, clearly beneficial projects, we simply shrug and explain that’s how it is. But it doesn’t need to be. The City can change the rules to benefit projects that we decide that we want more of — electric vehicle chargers, solar panels, and bike lanes — and keep hurdles for projects that we do not prioritize. The government, democratically elected, can express an opinion on what to build via the process it does or does not require. Here are seven proposals that we think would meaningfully improve how the government works that would be worth a charter amendment to achieve. - **Require the mayor to submit a five-year government workforce plan, modeled on the capital strategy.** More than [13,000 city jobs](https://www.amny.com/politics/nyc-government-job-vacancies-budget-crisis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) sat vacant as of January 2026\. The Department of Buildings (DOB) and the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), each critical for solving the housing crisis, had vacancies above 10%. The path from a civil service exam to a start date can [run well past a year](https://nysfocus.com/2026/02/11/mamdani-civil-service-exams-hiring?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Those gaps are filled through overtime that has [climbed](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/a-framework-for-structural-nypd-overtime-reform/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to $2.71 billion and outside contracts that have [reached](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2024/07/dinapoli-nyc-contract-spending-rises-7-billion-fy-2019?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 22% of operating expenses, both substantially up from what they were 10 years ago. The capital strategy is a 10-year plan of what major projects the city intends to build and where; funding for the plan is approved by the council as part of the budget and informed by community boards citywide. By requiring the mayor to submit a workforce plan covering hiring targets, hiring and management process reform, and training, the charter would create a regular checkpoint to modernize hiring rules, inform the city’s collective bargaining strategy, and staff the administration's policy goals. The federal government builds the staffing actions into its biggest programs — changing hiring rules for the Biden Administration's [infrastructure bill](https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2022/02/infrastructure-law-will-require-thousands-new-feds-and-biden-team-giving-special-permission-hire-them-quickly/361464/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [CHIPS and Science Act](https://www.factorysettings.org/p/hiring-damned-if-you-do-damned-if?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and more generally to meet the unique hiring needs of [disaster recovery](https://www.fema.gov/careers/paths/core?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Further, the state's NY HELPS program — by which the Civil Service Commission has waived exams and streamlined hiring for state and local government (by opt-in) positions, which the City can and should also opt into — has [demonstrated](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-creates-more-opportunities-access-state-jobs-allowing-work-experience?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that hiring flexibility works without the corruption [critics predicted](https://www.pef.org/articles/news/pef-opposes-civil-service-plan-to-make-40-more-titles-eligible-for-ny-helps/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). - **Modernize the Department of Buildings by granting it singular permitting and inspection authority and giving it the ability to change the building code through rulemaking.** Between 2010 and 2023, a new building of five or more units [took](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about 18 months to permit, with four years often passing between filing and occupancy — time owners spent paying taxes, debt service, and insurance on a project that is not making money. One project may need permits from DOB, the Fire Department, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Department of Parks and Recreation, and HPD, each on its own clock. The mayor's [SPEED Task Force](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mamdani-administration-releases--speed--reforms-to-deliver-affor?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) released a roadmap for progress, but bigger change is required. Agencies with charter authority to run permitting operations will not relinquish that power voluntarily. San Francisco consolidated intake and [recorded](https://www.sf.gov/news--28-decrease-processing-time-over-counter-building-permits-speed-construction?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a 28% drop in processing time. As for the building code, New York already [amends its construction code](https://dos.ny.gov/code/code-development?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by rule everywhere in the state other than the city. - **Consolidate clean energy permitting — rooftop and community solar, battery storage, heat pumps, and interconnection sign-offs — in a single office at the Department of Environmental Protection.** Installing a heat pump or battery storage system can [require](https://citylimits.org/bill-promises-to-make-it-easier-for-new-yorkers-to-install-rooftop-solar-panels/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) sign-offs from DOB, the Fire Department, and Con Edison — each on its own clock. New York carries [among the highest residential electricity rates](https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/new-yorks-electricity-prices-among-the-highest-in-the-country/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the country, and fragmented permitting suppresses the distributed generation that would add supply and lower bills. The state showed the single-forum model works for large projects through the Office of Renewable Energy [Siting](https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Clean-Energy-Siting-Resources/Siting-for-Large-Scale-Renewables/Office-of-Renewable-Energy-Siting?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [extended](https://www.cullenllp.com/blog/new-yorks-rapid-act-intended-to-accelerate-the-environmental-review-and-permitting-process-for-siting-both-renewable-energy-and-electric-transmission-line-projects/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) it to transmission through the RAPID Act. We can make similar progress in the city by centralizing the permitting process for these projects, which may also lead to streamlining with Con Edison too. - **Speed the city's own capital projects through the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) — waiving review for projects at or below $5 million and expediting it in districts that do not have their fair share of a given facility type.** Last year, voters approved streamlining ULURP reviews for housing projects and specifically for projects in areas that have not built their share of affordable housing. This proposal applies that logic to public capital projects. City projects must go through ULURP, which [lasts](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at least seven months, and means that New Yorkers must wait for the simplest minor projects, e.g., a new water fountain or public bathroom. By waiving ULURP for minor city projects ($5 million is roughly the [median](https://www.nyc.gov/site/capitalprojects/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) project size), we can get these smaller projects done faster and focus limited public attention on bigger issues. Further, the City has a fair share framework that does roughly what you would expect it to do — direct that things New Yorkers want (e.g., parks) and things they don’t want, but the city needs (e.g., garbage truck garages) are fairly distributed. However, multiple audits have [found](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/fair-share-siting-new-york-citys-municipal-facilities/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the framework is not enforced. The expedited ULURP process introduced by last year’s charter reforms presents an enforcement mechanism that the commission should use. - **Improve procurement by raising the small-purchase threshold and clarifying that the mayor is in the driver’s seat.** New York City registered more than $42 billion in contracts in fiscal year 2025, [spread](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/citys-contracts-spending-hit-record-for-adams-admin-nearly-13k-contracts-for-total-of-42-45b/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across nearly 13,000 individual procurements, and a dense set of rules set by the Procurement Policy Board and the charter govern how those dollars can be spent. The small purchase threshold — below which agencies can buy without formal competition — has sat at $100,000 since the 1989 charter and has not been adjusted for inflation. Routine purchases get routed through a pipeline built for major contracts, tying up agency time and contributing to a payment backlog the comptroller [found](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-lander-spotlights-nonprofit-payment-delays-in-follow-up-report-launches-audits-of-3-agencies-with-worst-delays/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) tops $1 billion in unpaid invoices. Reform proposals wait for the Procurement Policy Board (PPB), which [does not meet](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-lander-proposes-procurement-reforms-to-fight-corruption-improve-transparency-and-support-mwbes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on any regular schedule and has often lacked clear direction. The federal government’s equivalent to the small purchase threshold is now at $350,000 and is tied to inflation. Doing the same for the City — and giving the mayor the ability to act when the PPB is silent, subject to its override — would free agencies to focus oversight where it belongs. - **Amend the charter to direct the Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC) to weigh housing impact when it designates historic districts and approves apartment consolidations.** The 2025 Charter Revision Commission[ examined](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/2025-Charter-Revision-Commission-Preliminary-Report-DIGITAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) historic districts, which[ cover](https://www.nyc.gov/site/lpc/designations/maps.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) much of Manhattan — about 30% of its lots — and add barriers to new housing. Research by the National Bureau of Economic Research and New York University's Furman Center[ found](https://www.nber.org/papers/w20446?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that historic designation cuts new construction by about 14 units a year citywide and 22 in Manhattan, where it forecloses the redevelopment of low-rise lots into denser housing. Further, studies show that since 1950, New York City has[ lost](https://www.thecityreporter.nyc/2023/08/24/100k-apartments-lost-to-house-conversions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) more than 100,000 homes through apartment consolidation — the combining of units into larger ones — which occurs more frequently in historic districts. As pro-housing advocacy group Open New York has[ argued](https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/nyc-charter-revision-commission/2025-02-11-0500-pm-brooklyn-public-input-session-on-housing-and-land-use/chapter/testimony-by-annemarie-gray-executive-director-from-open-new-york-on-specific-charter-reform-proposals-for-housing-equity/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), an amendment could require the LPC, in consultation with the City Planning Commission, to analyze the housing impact of proposed districts in low-growth neighborhoods and to weigh neighborhood-wide effects when approving consolidations in landmarked buildings. The residents of historic districts are[ disproportionately](https://furmancenter.org/thestoop/entry/how-can-historic-preservation-be-more-inclusive?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) white and college-educated, and a process that now passes over housing tradeoffs would have to reckon with them—producing fewer designations in low-growth neighborhoods and more in places that carry their share. Other states have moved the same way, with California[ allowing](https://cayimby.org/legislation/ab-1061/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) new construction in historic districts without a discretionary hearing where no contributing structure is altered and Washington[ requiring](https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1801300?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) owner consent for most new designations on residential parcels. - **Reform approval processes so electric vehicle (EV) chargers and outdoor dining can be deployed at scale.** The city has a[ goal](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/electrifying-new-york-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of rolling out 10,000 EV chargers by 2030, but as of January 2026, the city had installed only 92 curbside chargers while EV registrations[ grew](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mamdani-administration-opens-electric-vehicle-fast-charging-stat?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 14% year over year. Part of what is holding us back is that the charter requires a revocable consent (a formal OK from the City that can be taken back anytime) for streetside chargers, or any private object put in the public right of way. The problem for EV charger companies, according to [testimony](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) provided to last year’s charter revision commission, is that while the company works with building owners to access their spare electricity on a compensated basis, it is the building owner and not the charger company who must apply for the revocable consent, which introduces a high barrier of complexity for deploying at scale. The revocable consent regime is inconsistent in other areas too. Sidewalk cafes are [exempt](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from standard revocable consent review while [roadway dining](https://www.openplans.org/curbside-dining?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is not, illustrating the inconsistent ways we manage public space. The permanent Dining Out NYC program for outdoor dining [requires](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/04/23/2852/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a revocable consent and a license, which could take five months or more to approve. An amendment could allow for citywide permits for routine infrastructure in the public right of way and introduce more consistency in the case-by-case revocable consent process for sidewalk and in-street dining. Other cities have moved faster on EV chargers by decoupling charging from property ownership. Portland[ adopted](https://www.portland.gov/transportation/electric-vehicles/ev-charging-row?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a right-of-way policy in 2023 that lets companies install curbside chargers under a master lease—one permit per site — and Seattle has[ run](https://seattle.gov/documents/departments/sdot/newmobilityprogram/evcrow%5Fevaluation%5Freport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a similar pilot. We are excited about the work COGE is undertaking. The commission does not have much time — proposals must be ready by the end of July to make the November ballot. Still, if there is more work to do, the commission can continue its work through next year (which we hope they do). Given the potential for impact on the lives of real New Yorkers, we hope this commission remains ambitious. ### What Has Mamdani Done So Far? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-has-mamdani-done-so-far/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T21:12:40.000Z During last year’s campaign, many raised questions about what a Democratic Socialist assemblyman with no management experience could accomplish as mayor of the nation’s largest city. Six months into his term, 34-year-old Zohran Mamdani has overseen some notable achievements. He has [lowered crime rates](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR009/nypd-fewest-murders-shooting-incidents-shooting-victims-recorded-history-the?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), won legislative concessions for two of his top priorities in Albany, delivered a rent freeze (through the Rent Guidelines Board he largely appoints) on regulated apartments, and eked out a budget hours before its deadline, while welcoming hundreds of thousands of sports-crazed revelers from around the world into city streets this summer without major incidents. He’s won praise among many who see housing production as key to delivering a more affordable city by releasing a robust “Block by Block” plan to encourage construction as well as identifying ways to speed permitting approvals. These are just plans, of course; the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Mamdani’s job-approval ratings have steadily climbed since January, up to 58% among city residents while only 26% disapproved of his performance, according to a June Siena College [poll](https://sri.siena.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/SNY-June-2026-Poll-Release-6-25-26-FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Along with the accomplishments have come setbacks. Gov. Kathy Hochul refused to raise taxes on the wealthy, one of Mamdani’s core campaign promises, and Mamdani’s proposal to make buses free has stalled at the state level. He has been criticized from the left for attempting to increase police headcount while doing little to reform the NYPD even as his promise of a counterweight to police power in the shape of a Department of Community Safety is extraordinarily modestly funded and oddly constructed, almost as if the intention is to drain it of power. And he has raised hackles from the right for not installing barriers outside synagogues besieged by demonstrators, removing traffic lanes, moving to establish city-run grocery stores and overseeing a city budget that’s grown to a record $126 billion. New York’s job growth remains [sluggish](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/02/nyregion/mamdani-jobs-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and he still hasn’t hired a leader to head up the city’s Economic Development Corporation. But delivering his administration's priorities to make New York more affordable, speed up buses, lower crime, and ensure every New Yorker has access to free childcare and a high-quality education won’t be easy going forward. ### The budget Two weeks after the mayor’s inauguration, newly elected City Comptroller Mark Levine warned that the city faced a [$12.6](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-16/nyc-s-new-comptroller-sounds-alarm-on-two-year-deficit-of-12-6-billion?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) billion budget deficit over the next two years, far larger than had been previously disclosed. In his first budget address, Mamdani blamed his predecessor for creating the crisis through “[systematically underbudgeted services](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-details--adams-budget-crisis-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” and called on the state to [increase income and corporate taxes](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/28/zohran-mamdani-taxes-nyc-rich-budget.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the wealthiest New Yorkers to close the gap. But Gov. Hochul, who was facing re-election in November, flatly [refused](https://abc7ny.com/post/ny-gov-kathy-hochul-increase-income-tax-balance-new-yorks-260b-budget-proposal/18438102/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to raise taxes. Instead, she pitched in [$1.5 billion](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/02/mayor-mamdani-and-governor-hochul-announce--1-5-billion-to-help-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in state aid in February, which included funding for universal childcare, then [boosted the total package](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2026/05/12/how-mamdanis-new-budget-plan-relies-heavily-on-hochuls-help/90046506007/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [$8 billion](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-and-mayor-mamdani-announce-additional-aid-and-state-actions-stabilize-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) four months later. Mamdani also received permission from the state to [delay](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/05/mamdanis-counting-pension-restructuring-balance-budget-will-unions-let-happen/413539/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) public pension contributions through 2037 instead of 2032, saving an estimated [$2.2 billion](https://www.centernyc.org/reports-briefs/2026/5/21/using-the-pension-fund-to-close-the-citys-budget-gap?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a highly controversial maneuver that budget watchdogs decried as a “[gimmick](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/12/nyregion/mamdani-budget-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” that echoed the deferred maintenance that led to the city’s 1975 fiscal crisis. There were more tough calls to make ahead. By early May, Mamdani [proposed](https://gothamist.com/news/mayor-mamdani-pitches-over-1-billion-in-housing-education-cuts-to-fill-budget-hole?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) several measures to trim the remainder of the deficit by reducing spending on tuition for students with disabilities, [delaying](https://gothamist.com/news/mayor-mamdani-pitches-over-1-billion-in-housing-education-cuts-to-fill-budget-hole?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a law requiring lower class sizes in city public schools and curbing the planned expansion of a rental assistance voucher program known as City Fighting Homelessness and Eviction Prevention Supplement (CityFHEPS), a program whose budget had ballooned from $25 million in 2019 to [$1.6 billion](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/cityfheps-testimony-cap-vouchers-sustainable-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by 2026 and could cost as much as [$4.7 billion](https://gothamist.com/news/mamdani-fights-rental-assistance-expansion-continuing-adams-clash-with-nyc-council?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to run by 2030, according to the Citizens Budget Commission. The clash over the voucher program [threatened to derail](https://citylimits.org/city-budget-deal-on-hold-over-cityfheps-housing-voucher-expansion/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the budget. The Council had passed a law in 2023 increasing eligibility for CityFHEPS, then [sued](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2024/02/council-authorizes-lawsuit-over-cityfheps-housing-voucher-expansion/394048/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the Adams administration in 2024 when the city would not implement it. Mamdani had promised during his campaign to expand the city’s social safety net but reversed his position, arguing that its rising costs were unaffordable. In the end, Council leaders won a concession from the mayor for the City to spend [$175 million](https://gothamist.com/news/mayor-mamdani-and-city-council-strike-budget-deal-that-expands-housing-vouchers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the program this year, and $125 million the following year, lower than the $300 million they requested. Both sides also agreed to [settle](https://queenseagle.com/all/2026/7/1/mayor-council-settle-housing-voucher-lawsuit-and-pass-125-billion-budget?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the CityFHEPS lawsuit and the mayor increased the next year’s general reserve by $350 million, but did nothing to address the structural flaws within the voucher program. Mamdani praised the budget as a “new era of fiscal health” and a model of how to invest in the city’s future, but city leaders did little to curb spending obligations over the long run as the budget deficit was expected to jump to [$6.4 billion](https://x.com/C%5FSommerfeldt/status/2072114591711019027?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) next year. Budget watchdogs are worried. “Yes, next year is balanced, but the gap is closed mainly with one-shots, short-term savings, and cost shifts to future taxpayers, leaving the city to face a gaping hole next year and undue stress in the years after,” Andrew Rein, president of the Citizens Budget Commission, said in a statement. “Still the budget is unprepared for a slowdown or recession: The Rainy Day Fund is far too small and next year’s budget cushion remains slim.” ### Policing and community safety Mamdani made his most consequential personnel decision in November when he [announced that he would retain Jessica Tisch as police commissioner](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mamdani-keep-jessica-tisch-nypd-commissioner-rcna244769?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Some questioned how the pair, who seemed to have [little in common](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-jessica-tisch-nypd.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) beyond their ages and a desire to [root out](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/15/nyregion/nypd-comissioner-jessica-tisch.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) public corruption, could work together. But in the intervening months, the partnership has managed to make the city safer despite [predictions](https://www.mediamatters.org/fox-news/despite-right-wing-media-fearmongering-crime-record-low-mamdanis-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the contrary. The city has [recorded](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-in-new-york-city-midyear-the-big-picture/) the fewest murders and shootings since 1993 over the first half of the year. Major crime fell 5.9% during the first six months of the year compared with the same period last year, the largest mid-year decline since 2009\. Murders fell 25.6%, burglaries dropped 16.3% and robberies tumbled 11.7%. However, felony assaults rose 0.3% compared with last year. In the meantime, many of Mamdani’s ambitious public safety reforms have not materialized. He vowed to [disband](https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/mamdani-nypd-stategic-response-group-srg-nyc/6451490/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the Strategic Response Group, a counterterrorism unit that responds to mass demonstrations and has been accused of unlawful detentions, but Tisch has kept it [operating](https://www.cityandstateny.com/personality/2026/04/nyc-power-100-event-tisch-commends-mamdani-leading-srg/413191/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). His idea to create the Department of Community Safety, a [city agency](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2026/02/mamdani-has-lot-explaining-do-his-department-community-safety/411181/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that responds to mental health-related 911 calls with social workers instead of cops, stalled in the City Council. Instead, he settled for [creating](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/18/nyregion/mamdani-department-community-safety-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a smaller $260 million office, overseen by the city’s first-ever deputy mayor for community safety, through an executive order. Tisch may also have succeeded at convincing Mamdani to avoid making major changes. Mamdani had pledged to [eliminate](https://nypost.com/2025/09/03/opinion/a-zohran-win-could-end-the-nypds-gang-database-and-crime-spikes-that-hit-minorities-most/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the NYPD’s gang database but signaled he may [keep](https://gothamist.com/news/mayor-mamdani-signals-openness-to-nypd-gang-database-citing-reforms?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) it after police officials [promised](https://www.thecityreporter.nyc/2026/04/28/nypd-gang-database-reforms-mamdani-jessica-tisch/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to make reforms. And police overtime costs, which he sought to [curb](https://nypost.com/2026/01/23/us-news/nypd-ordered-to-cut-back-on-overtime-under-mamdani/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), are proving more difficult to control. Overtime will once again soar past [$1 billion](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/13/nypd-little-progress-reducing-overtime-mamdani-pledge-00919750?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) this fiscal year and show no sign of abating as Tisch told City Council members the department would spend [$92 million](https://www.amny.com/news/nypd-long-shifts-overtime-summer-events-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) funding 12-hour shifts during the World Cup, America’s 250th celebrations, and the NBA finals. But the police commissioner has not gotten everything she wanted either. Mamdani floated hiring 580 additional cops in a budget proposal, increasing its headcount to [35,555](https://thechiefleader.com/stories/mamdani-backs-hiring-of-580-cops-amid-crime-drop,56781?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), until the city’s Democratic Socialist chapter and other progressive groups [denounced](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/06/nyc-dsa-chides-mamdani-increasing-nypd-headcount/414172/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the move and the mayor left it out of his final budget agreement. Mamdani and Tisch will have to figure out how to staff several specialized departments as a wave of senior officers file their retirement papers in the coming years. ### Housing Mamdani gained traction in the election with voters not only because of his charisma and energetic campaigning, but because he vowed to address the cost-of-living crisis by freezing rents and building more affordable homes. He fulfilled one of his earliest pledges when the Rent Guidelines Board [approved](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/25/us/new-york-city-rent-board-approves-freeze?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) zero percent increases for one- and two-year leases for one million rent-regulated homes on June 25. It was one of his easiest promises to keep. The mayor alone cannot control the costs of rent-stabilized leases, but he does have the power to appoint a [majority](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/02/mayor-mamdani-announces-six-appointees-to-the-rent-guidelines-bo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of members on the nine-member panel who share his policy goals. (Mayor Adams [appointed](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2025/12/19/adams-appoints-four-to-rent-guidelines-board-weeks-before-mamdani-transition?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) four members to the RGB days before his term ended to thwart Mamdani’s plan, but some of them [declined to serve](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2025/12/31/eric-adams-loses-rent-guidelines-board-appointee/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). The move could have unintended consequences. Landlords of rent-stabilized buildings cannot count on higher revenues from rents to pay for repairs of their aging properties even as the board found their operating costs and expenses rose [5.3](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2026/06/25/nyc-rgb-approves-rent-freeze/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)%. Some investors have already [exited the market](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-29/sergey-brin-s-steep-loss-highlights-new-york-landlords-pain?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Creating enough units to keep pace with the city’s insatiable [housing demand](https://cbcny.org/building-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) won’t happen overnight. But in May, the mayor unveiled his “Block by Block” proposal to build [200,000](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mayor-mamdani-releases--block-by-block--the-housing-plan-for-a-n?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) affordable homes and preserve another 200,000 over the next 10 years. That includes [16,000](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2026/05/5-things-know-about-mamdanis-big-housing-plan/413771/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) new apartments over the next two fiscal years, with 30% dedicated to households earning less than 30% of the area median income and another 20% for those earning between 31% and 50% of the area median income. To get to that benchmark, Mamdani proposed spending [$22 billion](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/26/nyregion/mamdani-housing-plan-nycha.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in capital investment over the next five years, including $5.6 billion on public housing, and rezoning large swaths of the city, especially near transit hubs. He announced his first major rezoning target would be Brooklyn’s [commercial corridors](https://gothamist.com/news/mamdani-eyes-sweeping-housing-plan-for-blocks-south-of-brooklyns-prospect-park?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) south of Prospect Park close to the future Interborough Express train line, while [reviving plans](https://qns.com/2026/03/mamdani-sunnyside-yards-mixed-reactions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to deck and develop the Sunnyside Yards site in Queens. Mamdani can also credit the former mayor and current governor for giving him new tools to speed up housing development. Last fall, voters passed three [ballot initiatives](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/politics/2025/10/17/november-ballot-housing-measures-explained?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) written by Adams’ Charter Revision Commission that established faster approvals for publicly financed projects, expedited land use reviews for smaller ones and created an affordable housing appeals board for developers whose projects were rejected by the City Council. This year, Hochul included revisions to New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) in the state budget that would [exempt most projects](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/let-them-build-governor-hochul-signs-legislation-delivers-generational-reforms-make-it-easier?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) up to 250 units in much of the city, and up to 500 units in high-density areas from undergoing a lengthy review. ### Transportation While it’s much more modest, Mamdani has also made some progress on his [pledge](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/03/nyregion/new-york-mamdani-free-bus.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to speed up the city’s [notoriously slow buses](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/traffic%5Fand%5Ftransit/2025/02/07/report-finds-city-bus-service-slowest-in-country?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and eliminate their fares. His administration has prioritized advancing several dedicated busway proposals along congested corridors, including [34th Street](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/02/nyregion/mamdani-bus-lane-34th-manhattan.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Madison Avenue](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pr2026/fast-buses-mamdani-moves-forward-madison-ave-bus-lane.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Sixth Avenue](https://www.chelseanewsny.com/news/mamdani-proposes-further-expansion-of-6th-ave-bike-lanes-bus-lanes-IJ5975785?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Manhattan, [Flatbush Avenue](https://www.6sqft.com/city-to-restart-flatbush-avenue-redesign-this-month/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Kings Highway](https://www.brooklynpaper.com/pols-slam-city-over-bus-lane-plan-for-kings-highway/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Brooklyn, and [East Fordham Road](http://cbsnews.com/newyork/news/blocked-bus-lanes-on-fordham-road-prompt-proposal-from-dot-locals-say-it-will-hurt-business/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the Bronx, allowing buses and emergency vehicles to move more quickly through traffic. Ahead of the World Cup, Mamdani unveiled a [plan](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/05/13/mamdani-laguardia-queens-bus-lane?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for a center-running bus lane on Broadway in Queens from 69th Street to Roosevelt Avenue, allowing the Q70 to make faster trips between the subway and LaGuardia Airport. And on match days, the Mamdani administration [barred cars](https://www.amny.com/news/mamdani-world-cup-traffic-42nd-street-shuttle/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and restricted trucks on 42nd Street, converting the crosstown route into a [corridor](https://nypost.com/2026/05/29/us-news/nyc-will-cut-off-traffic-during-2026-world-cup-games-with-amped-up-gridlock-alert/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for local MTA buses and shuttles taking fans to New Jersey, and closed some roads near Penn Station. Offering free fares has been a much harder lift. Mamdani [acknowledged](https://nypost.com/2026/04/08/us-news/zohran-mamdani-backs-down-on-campaign-promise-of-free-nyc-buses/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in April he could not eliminate city bus fares, a proposal that could cost [$800 million](https://nypost.com/2026/02/20/us-news/mamdani-shortchanges-mta-in-preliminary-budget-while-pushing-free-buses/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) per year in lost fare revenue, and he attempted to bring back a [free bus pilot program](https://www.politico.com/newsletters/new-york-playbook/2026/04/08/fast-free-and-not-yet-00863106?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). State lawmakers wouldn’t commit to a pilot in this year’s budget, but Mamdani and the City Council reached a [deal](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/30/nyregion/nyc-fair-fares-transit-discounts.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the city budget to expand the city’s Fair Fares program, offering half-price subway and bus fares to New Yorkers earning up to 200% of the federal poverty level. That would increase the number of people who qualify for the program from 960,000 to 1.3 million. ### Childcare The high cost of childcare is one of the [top reasons](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2025/10/22/nyc-families-flee-child-care-school-crisis-mamdani-agenda/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) compelling families to leave New York City, so it made sense for Mamdani to make it a [centerpiece](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/25/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-free-child-care-nyc-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of his affordability agenda. The number of households with three or more children fell [17%](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/10/nyregion/why-families-are-leaving-new-york-city.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over the past decade. That’s no surprise as the median rent of apartments with three or more bedrooms clocked in at $4,764 earlier this year, according to [Realtor.com](http://realtor.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), while the average cost of childcare ranged from [$1,000 to $1,700](https://tootris.com/edu/blog/parents/the-cost-of-child-care-in-new-york-a-breakdown-for-2021/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) per month depending on the age of the child. After winning the Democratic primary last year, Mamdani [began working](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/23/how-child-care-gave-hochul-and-mamdani-common-ground-and-political-cover-00740985?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with Hochul to invest in a free childcare program for 2,000 2-year-olds while expanding the city’s existing 3-K program. Hochul also agreed to fund an expansion of the 2-Care program next year for 10,000 youngsters. They unveiled their $1.7 billion [plan](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani---governor-hochul-to-launch-free-child-care-for-tw?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in January and announced the [launch](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-and-mayor-mamdani-announce-launch-citys-2-k-application-process?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of applications for the first 2,000 seats in June. But City Hall has [struggled](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/29/mamdani-is-touting-universal-child-care-he-still-needs-to-find-staffers-to-run-it-00940868?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to find enough childcare workers to fill the demanding, low-wage jobs necessary to run the program, or set aside funding to ensure they will be paid beyond the next two years. The city’s Department of Education has encountered other challenges managing the city’s school system. Enrollment fell by [22,000](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2026/06/22/hold-harmless-costs-grow-enrollment-losses-continue/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) between the 2024-25 and 2025-26 school years, which prompted the city to spend $290 million next year as part of its “hold harmless” policy to prevent budget cuts at schools that have lost students. Its enrollment could drop by another 20,000 students, according to NYCDOE [projections](https://infohub.nyced.org/reports/financial/financial-data-and-reports/sy-2026-27-final-enrollment-projections?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Meanwhile, schools chancellor Kamar Samuels is being investigated by the Special Commissioner of Investigation for his role in authorizing a [$180,000 no-bid contract](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/09/nyregion/nyc-chancellor-contract-investigation.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for foreign language instructors while he was Manhattan District 3 superintendent. The contract award appeared to skirt the department’s extensive procurement rules. Samuels’ approach to the use of artificial intelligence has also received pushback. In March, he issued [guidance](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/24/nyregion/ai-nyc-classes-grades.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) allowing AI to help craft lesson plans and conduct research but could not use it to grade tests or discipline a student. But the department received [6,500](https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/general/nyc-delays-school-ai-guidance-after-backlash/ar-AA26OttK?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) comments on the proposal and City Council members urged Samuels and the mayor’s office to [pause](https://www.nydailynews.com/2026/06/24/nyc-schools-delay-release-ai-playbook-guide-classroom-use/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the guidelines citing concerns about AI’s effect on mental health. ### Running the city The mayor has repeatedly spoken about the importance of getting the basic mechanics of government to work better. When a winter storm buried the city’s sidewalks and bus stops in two feet of snow in February, he offered to pay temporary shovelers [$30 an hour](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/politics/2026/02/24/mayor-mamdani-tackles-second-winter-storm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to clear them. By the spring, he led a pothole blitz, filling [100,000](https://abc7ny.com/post/mayor-zohran-mamdani-marks-100000th-filled-pothole-100-days-administration/18848998/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) asphalt divots by early April, including a [notorious dip](https://www.amny.com/news/mamdani-dot-delancey-street-wiliamsburg-bridge-bike-lane/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the Delancey Street entrance to the Williamsburg Bridge that cyclists have complained about for years. And he has created a Charter Revision Commission called the Commission on Government Efficiency, which he tasked with finding ways to make government work better for New Yorkers to put before voters on the November ballot. What does it all add up to? In three or four years, will New Yorkers be living in a more affordable city, one that’s safer and more prosperous and governed well? That remains to be seen. ### Crime in New York City Midyear: The Big Picture URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-in-new-york-city-midyear-the-big-picture/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T17:38:10.000Z New York City reached the midpoint of 2026 with one of its strongest first-half declines in major crime in two decades. But not all the news is good news. Murders and shootings led the way, both falling to their lowest midyear levels in decades. The city recorded 119 murders through late June, 9.8% below the previous midyear low set in 2017\. Shooting incidents fell to 318, 3.3% below the previous low, set just last year. Major crime fell 5.9% compared with the same period last year, the third-largest midyear decline on a percentage basis since 2006, behind only 2009 and 2007\. The drop was especially pronounced for several high-profile offenses: murders fell 25.6%, the largest first-half decline since 2006; burglaries fell 16.3%, the second-largest decline over that period; and robberies fell 11.7%, the third-largest decline since 2006\. Of the seven categories of crime considered “major” (murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny of motor vehicle), every one fell except rape and felony assault. The rape increase may not reflect a true rise. New York broadened its legal definition of rape in 2024 to include more offenses, which can push reported counts up on its own, but felony assault rose 0.3% since last year. The longer view is less rosy. Compared with 2019, before the pandemic, major crime is still up about 25%. Every category except murders and shootings remains above prepandemic levels. While most crime categories are slowly bending back toward prepandemic levels, felony assault is a stark exception. It has now risen for six straight years and sits 47.7% above its 2019 level. Misdemeanor assault, a lower-level assault category, also increased, rising 1.8% from 22,146 to 22,535 complaints, [according to Compstat 2.0](https://compstat.nypdonline.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The gap shows up plainly in daily crime rates. Before the pandemic, the city averaged about 55 felony assaults a day. In 2026, it is averaging more than 80\. Grand larceny remains the most common major crime by far, with nearly 120 occurring per day. By contrast, murders and shootings are relatively rare and concentrated: the city now averages 1.8 shootings and 0.7 murders a day. The declines in murder and shootings matter, but they are small in absolute terms. The city recorded 11 fewer shootings and 41 fewer murders than at this point last year, against thousands of felony assaults and more than 20,000 grand larcenies. And another feature affects the impact of these crimes on the lives of New Yorkers: murders and shootings are highly concentrated by geography, while assaults and larcenies are geographically dispersed citywide. The decline in major crime was not evenly distributed across the city. The Bronx saw the largest decrease, with major crime down 11.6%, nearly twice the citywide decline of 5.8%. Manhattan also outpaced the citywide trend, while Brooklyn saw a slightly smaller decline. Queens and Staten Island were essentially unchanged from last year. But even after that drop, the Bronx continues a decades-long pattern as the borough with the highest crime rate in both categories. Its YTD major crime rate stands at 449.8 per 100,000 residents, ahead of Manhattan at 388.7, Brooklyn at 244.1, Queens at 238.9 and Staten Island at 149.8\. For violent crime the Bronx rate stands at 216.2 per 100,000, ahead of Manhattan at 114.4, Brooklyn at 106.4, Queens at 87.5 and Staten Island at 63.6. At the precinct level, a few areas stand out. The 83rd Precinct, in Bushwick, has had the largest percentage increase in major crime, rising 31.6%, or 224 additional incidents, from 2025\. The 113th Precinct, in South Jamaica, has also seen a notable increase, up 22.4%, or 124 additional incidents. By contrast, the 70th Precinct, in Flatbush, has had the largest percentage decline, with major crime falling 28.6%, or 206 fewer incidents. In absolute terms, the 43rd Precinct, in Soundview has seen the largest decrease, with 368 fewer major crimes. Crime in the transit system held roughly steady. Major crime on subways and buses was essentially flat, with 1,085 reported incidents in 2026 against 1,093 in 2025\. The mix shifted, though. As is usually the case underground, most major crimes were robberies, felony assaults or grand larcenies. Robbery rose 9.6%t and felony assault rose 4.4%, while grand larceny fell 7.2%. The rarest events moved in small numbers: Murders on transit rose from two to four, and reported rapes fell from six to three from 2025 to 2026. This is a preliminary summary, published with data available at publication. The up-to-date data released by the Police Department (in its CompStat reports) is limited: It reports the counts of major crimes, as well as the counts of some misdemeanors and shootings. The more detailed data (NYPD's year-to-date complaint file on NYC Open Data with information on the date, location, offense and basic victim and suspect information) is what permits trend analysis by neighborhood and demographics. But this information is released on a lag and is not available today. Our full midyear report will follow once that is made public. *This analysis covers Jan. 1 through June 28 for each year. Figures for 2026 and 2025 come from NYPD CompStat and are preliminary and* [*subject to revision*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/real-crime-numbers-nyc-nypd/)*. Historical comparisons use the NYPD complaint files, current and historic, via NYC Open Data. Crimes are counted by report date. New York broadened its legal definition of rape in 2024, so reported increases may not reflect a true rise.* ### Assessing Mamdani Six Months In URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/assessing-mamdani-six-months-in/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T17:39:18.000Z Elected officials — executives especially — are typically two things at once. They’re politicians who run for office, usually because they want attention and validation and power. And they’re leaders responsible for the actual functioning of whatever they run. It’s still early in Zohran Mamdani’s mayoralty, but now that we’re six months in, it’s worth taking a measure of his performance on both fronts. ### Mamdani as politician Politically, Zohran Mamdani is a generational talent. His charisma is off the charts. His instincts are usually impeccable (setting aside [his failed threat to raise property taxes](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/25/nyregion/mamdani-property-tax-increase.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) if he didn’t get his way on taxing the wealthy). There aren’t enough superlatives to describe it. But there are tangible metrics to help measure an elected official’s political performance. **Polling** is obviously the one metric relied on traditionally to see how much a politician is liked. The most recent poll from [Siena in June had him at 58% approval, 26% disapproval](https://sri.siena.edu/2026/06/25/hochul-favorability-approval-ratings-edge-up-as-does-her-general-election-lead-over-blakeman-now-52-32-from-49-33/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) among city voters. In a world where everyone is miserable about everything, those are very good numbers (by comparison, [de Blasio was at 50% ](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20140826/BLOGS04/140829889/de-blasio-s-approval-rating-is-steady-at-50-poll-says/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)approval in an August 2014 Quinnipiac poll and Adams was at 43% approval in a [May 2022 Quinnipiac poll](https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3865&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). **Social media** is where Mamdani really shines. Shortly after he was elected in November, he had around 7.5 million followers on Instagram. Today, it’s well over [11 million](https://socialblade.com/instagram/user/zohrankmamdani?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That’s beyond incredible and, for a politician, his following on platforms like Tik Tok and X are also astronomical. Most of his followers are likely not in New York, which means that we could see a world where he remains a strong national endorser and fundraiser for far-left candidates for years to come even if his approval ratings locally fall (and they almost certainly will, because gravity almost always sets in for any mayor). Mamdani actively [endorsed multiple candidates](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/mamdani-tests-his-political-clout-in-new-yorks-primary-as-he-looks-to-reshape-the-democratic-party?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in last week’s congressional primaries so **the performance of his preferred candidates** is another good way to assess his political acumen and skill. Here too he gets a 10/10\. He supported Brad Lander, Claire Valdez and Darializa Avila Chevalier and they all won. He is a major leader in the Democratic Party nationally, full stop. Another way to judge Mamdani’s political performance is how his agenda fared in **Albany**. Overall, I think he did okay. His biggest priority — an [income tax increase on the richest New Yorkers — did not come to pass](https://nysfocus.com/2026/05/29/new-york-final-state-budget-2026-funding-guide-hochul?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Nor did a corporate tax increase. He didn’t get free buses or funding for universal child care. But he didn’t come up empty-handed. Gov. Kathy Hochul, who was already a strong proponent of subsidizing child care, announced a roughly $1.2 billion expansion of City-funded child care soon after Mamdani took office. While she probably would have done it no matter who became mayor, his strong support certainly didn’t hurt. Mamdani also helped the City net roughly $8 billion in additional state assistance over two fiscal years in new funding for Albany to help balance the budget, which is significant. The [pied-a-terre tax](https://gothamist.com/news/did-mamdanis-tax-the-rich-video-outside-a-billionaires-nyc-penthouse-cross-a-line?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that Mamdani and Hochul agreed to is not a massive revenue generator ([the Comptroller estimates realistically $340 million to $380 million](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-pied-a-terre-tax-and-its-potential-revenues/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) but by picking a fight with hedge fund manager [Ken Griffin](https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/ken-griffin-fires-back-mamdani-says-business-leaders-must-fight-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Mamdani was able to turn a meager win into something that excited his base (even if it winds up costing New York City 15,000 new jobs in a time of already sluggish job growth because Griffin has rightfully threatened to move the project to Miami). And while there’s far less substantive engagement between a city and the federal government, Mamdani has [charmed Trump](https://abcnews.com/Politics/mamdani-made-new-york-city-hall-influence-grow/story?id=133974954&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and arguably, that has prevented Trump from doing bad things to New York City. That said, Trump’s very complicated relationship and history with our city mean Mamdani is just one contributing factor at most — and Trump is so mercurial, we never really know where he stands. The final way to assess Mamdani’s political performance is his ability to deliver on his [**campaign promises**](https://mamdanitracker.nyc/promises?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The challenge here is that Mamdani’s narrative was pretty deceptive from day one. [Many of the things he promised the mayor doesn’t have the power to deliver](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdanis-real-world-constraints/) and because most people don’t know the breakdown of jurisdiction over each issue between the City and the State, they assumed he could actually do the things he promised to do. But obviously, we don’t have free buses. There is no income tax increase. There are two City-owned grocery stores underway, with a ludicrous request [of $70 million](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/18/nyregion/mamdani-grocery-store-bronx-hunts-point.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to construct them, even though one won’t be ready till 2029\. And the rent freeze will happen, but de Blasio did it three times in his eight-year tenure and no one thinks housing is any more affordable than it used to be (and many voters didn’t and still don’t realize it only applies to a subset of apartments that aren’t theirs). On Israel, Mamdani used the issue — which is a litmus test for many younger voters on the left with strong views about the war in Gaza — as a tool to get elected and he continues to drive the fervor. It clearly resonates with his base, locally and nationally. His obsession with and constant excoriation of Israel could become too big of a distraction that takes away from his actual job — but we’re not there yet. So that’s my assessment of Mamdani the politician. What about Mamdani the leader? ### Mamdani as mayor Being a mayor is unique. Unlike a legislator at any level, you actually run things. Unlike a governor, much of your work is tangible and felt by your constituents — how safe are the streets, how effective are the schools, how clean are the parks. And the paradox for Mamdani is that being a great politician and being a great leader often conflict. Making your base happy keeps you strong politically, but that sometimes comes at the expense of the people you’re supposed to represent. Mamdani’s biggest success by far is **policing**. By choosing [not to fire Jessica Tisch](https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/19/politics/jessica-tisch-zohran-mamdani-nypd?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as commissioner, Mamdani ensured that NYPD would have a highly effective leader who is mainly immune from politics. The police force itself is depleted; Tisch needs a lot more resources and more cops, and that’s hard to do both during a budget crisis and when many in Mamdani’s base want to abolish policing altogether. But so far, her performance has been excellent, [with overall major crime down 5.3% and murders down 28%](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR006/nypd-fewest-murders-shooting-incidents-recorded-history-first-three-months-the?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The **budget,** on the other hand — probably the single biggest test of a mayor’s management chops — is a mess. Mamdani’s declaration of success may have played well on social media, but the reality is very, very different. Facing a [roughly $6 billion deficit](https://groundworkcollaborative.org/work/closing-the-gap-why-new-york-city-needs-a-millionaires-tax/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Mamdani is solving the problem through [a series of gimmicks and bailouts](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-hochul-nyc-budget-bailout/) — most of which won’t be available next year to close an even bigger gap. Yes, he appointed [savings officers at the agencies](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/05/mamdani-proposes-1247b-executive-budget-no-gap/413486/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — but that will take time and only matters if they’re both empowered to suggest politically unpopular budget cuts and those suggestions are then actually implemented. While, to his credit, he did present a reasonably honest accounting of costs, this was not a budget that did much heavy lifting, took on many serious issues, effected much actual change, or created much political risk. There is ample room for savings in the existing budget. There’s no way that a struggling school system that fails hundreds of thousands of kids cannot find real savings in a current [$43 billion budget](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamar%5FSamuels?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). More money clearly is not the answer and funding schools with [declining enrollment](https://nypost.com/2026/04/06/opinion/how-to-cut-nycs-insane-38b-school-budget-down-to-size/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as if they had more kids than they actually do is Soviet-style logic. A mayor truly intent on finding more efficiency in government could push to use AI to replace tens of thousands of city workers who perform functions like procurement, licensing, permitting, compliance, facilities management and data management. That could save several billion dollars a year. These types of ideas are politically difficult. They violate the orthodoxy of the far left that spending is equivalent to results. They lead to the removal of thousands of patronage hires, many from the de Blasio era. Mamdani seems to prefer to keep his coalition happy rather than making tough choices. **Economic development** is somehow even worse. When the deputy mayor for economic justice [testified before the City Council](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/02/nyregion/mamdani-jobs-nyc.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about the administration’s progress on job creation to date, all she could point to was a plan to build a City-owned grocery store and modular public bathrooms. No matter how much you want to demonize capitalism and turn toward socialism, New York City is the business capital of the world and all of Mamdani’s spending and programs rely on collecting more taxes, not less. That means having businesses stay here, pay people more and hire more people. The mayor truly does not seem to understand that — or if he does, he doesn’t seem to want the public to understand that he understands. Apart from a few perfunctory meetings with some CEOs, there’s no serious relationship building with the business community. There’s no serious attempt to do anything to help businesses create new jobs. They can’t even [find someone to run the Economic Development Corporation](https://www.cityandstateny.com/personality/2026/03/mamdanis-deputy-mayor-julie-su-didnt-officially-start-until-week/411934/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Amid [poor job growth](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/02/nyregion/mamdani-jobs-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and a relatively high local unemployment rate, treating economic development like an afterthought or treating businesses as inherently evil is not a good way to create jobs people need or to make New York City more affordable. Mamdani won on a message of **affordability**. So far, we haven’t seen much of it. His ideas — free buses, child care, rent — may be good public policy in some cases, but they’re not actually making anything more affordable yet. Take the City-run grocery stores, which have gotten a good deal of Mamdani’s attention thus far for reasons that are difficult to comprehend. He can use taxpayer money to make food cheaper but only by taking it away from something else. He has no control over commodity prices or tariffs or the supply chain or harvests or inflation. And that’s to say nothing about the fact that five stores will reach few people — but will create tough, arguably unfair competition with local businesses struggling to stay afloat. Or take free buses. Making them free doesn’t actually make them free. The state still has to spend the same money to operate them. It’s just a funding transfer. Left pocket/right pocket math might improve fairness if you consider meeting the demands of his base as justice, but it has nothing to do with actually reducing prices. And if the goal is true justice and redistribution of wealth, the majority of Mamdani’s core base are well above the 50th percentile of wealth and should be paying higher taxes and getting fewer government subsidies. They’re not the victims of capitalism, they’re the beneficiaries. **Operationally**, some of Mamdani’s appointments to run agencies like the Departments of Transportation, Sanitation and Buildings seem strong. The City says it has filled [100,000 potholes](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani-fills-100-000th-pothole-in-first-100-days?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since Mamdani took office. That’s great. The creation of a [dynamic Mayor’s Management Report](https://dmmr.nyc.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is also a good idea. There are other good ideas around [scaffolding](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mayor-mamdani-launches-new-efforts-to-take-sidewalk-sheds-down--?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [public lighting](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-first-100-days-scorecard-nyc/) and [curb management](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani-launches-office-of-curb-management-at-nyc-dot-to-m?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and they took an innovative approach to [snow removal](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-visits-snow-melting-location--updates-new-yorkers-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And when the actual MMR comes out in September, we’ll have a better sense of how the operations team is doing, assuming they report the numbers honestly. Anecdotally, everyone has their own opinion as to whether the city feels clean and well-run. To me, the city doesn’t feel particularly clean, and it doesn’t feel particularly dirty. Traffic feels the same as always. So we’ll see what the numbers say and if the ideas become reality and then tangibly improve things. There are also some **accomplishments** that might not be all that notable but it feels only fair to mention them anyway. [Consumer and tenant protection actions have yielded about $44 million](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dca/news/032-26/mayor-mamdani-secures-9-3-million-workers-delivers-sweeping-protections-first-100-days?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in various restitutions. That’s an infinitesimal amount in a local economy with a [gross city product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy%5Fof%5FNew%5FYork%5FCity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of roughly $1.35 trillion (and the region’s is $2.6 trillion), but I guess it’s something. City Hall also formed some task forces. And his housing team has at least begun work on making it easier and cheaper to build affordable housing. Hopefully it continues, and hopefully Mamdani is willing to defy traditionally far-left priorities like extensive community review or only using union labor to make building affordable housing actually feasible. There’s no evidence whatsoever that Mamdani even cares about **schools**, let alone that he’s done anything serious to make them better. The [chancellor is under investigation for allegedly awarding sketchy contracts.](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2026/06/18/schools-chancellor-kamar-samuels-contract-allegations-higlight-broken-system/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) But that’s a red herring. What matters is that [a fifth](https://equity.nyc.gov/domains/education/four-year-high-school-graduation-rate?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of our kids don’t graduate. That [only half](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/state-agencies/audits/pdf/sga-2026-25f12.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who do are college ready. That the system has 127,000 fewer kids since COVID and yet has zero ability to use a smaller system to provide a better education or find savings. Mamdani’s budget for schools throws an additional $3 billion at the problem without any meaningful reforms under the same failed theory that more money is always the solution to everything. It isn’t in this case and if more of the same is the best he can do, the kids of this city are in trouble. Mamdani’s **choices** as a leader are often troubling. When you refuse to break up homeless encampments based on ideology and [18 people die during a terrible cold spell](https://nypost.com/2026/01/28/opinion/killed-by-kindness-homeless-freeze-to-death-because-mamdani-wont-force-them-off-streets/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that’s really, really bad. When you stop [Citi Bike from meaningful age verification](https://technosports.co.in/nyc-citi-bike-age-verification-guidelines/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) because you think facial recognition is racist, you’re putting coffee-shop ideology ahead of the safety of actual kids. When you publicly humiliate Ken Griffin and risk 15,000 new jobs so that you can look better to your base, that’s bad. When you successfully take out members of the congressional delegation with seniority who can deliver more federal funding for your city, that’s both bad and stupid. Overall, it’s not clear he realizes that being a leader means doing things that are unpopular simply because they’re right. And as far as his **team** goes, it seems mixed. He has some talented people in City Hall and some talented commissioners. And I don’t think it’s automatically bad to have lots of very young people or very hardcore ideologues around. But if they confuse actual governing with Instagram likes, that’s a serious misunderstanding of the job. It’s not clear to me that the team at City Hall can differentiate between the means and the ends. And if everyone is constantly engaged in groupthink and no one pushes the mayor outside his comfort zone, that’s a major issue. The lack of diversity among his core team is also a significant concern. For a movement that cares so much about justice and redistribution, to have so few African Americans and Latinos in power seems very problematic. ### The upshot Add it all up, and so far, Mamdani’s mostly an extreme version of what we see from a lot of elected officials: absolutely great on politics but generally lacking on both tangible accomplishments and on leadership that requires political sacrifice. If his goal is to be a truly great mayor, it means ensuring Tisch has the support and resources she needs, regardless of what supporters who distrust or even revile the police may say. It means not making operational decisions based on politics and ideology. It means focusing on execution and results and not just more slogans and spending. It means being serious about the budget and making truly hard, often unpopular choices. It means taking jobs and the economy seriously. It means actually prioritizing the education of kids rather than just paying lip service and placating the adults in the system. It means seeing the job itself as more than movement building and Instagram-following. Can he do all of this? I’m not sure he has it in him. But as someone who loves this city, I certainly hope he does. ### The History That Was Made at Bowling Green URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-history-that-was-made-at-bowling-green/ Last updated: 2026-06-29T19:44:41.000Z The Declaration of Independence may have been written, edited, discussed, and signed in Philadelphia 250 years ago, but when it came to turning words into action, it was made in New York. New York City’s America 250 story might have begun on July 4, 1776, but while John Hancock and his smaller-print cohorts endorsed the Declaration that day and 12 of the 13 colonies voted “yes,” New York abstained. Something about waiting for instructions from home. Five days later, with or without our seal of approval, one of the quickly printed copies of the Declaration made its way to Manhattan. And on July 9, General George Washington himself ordered that it be read aloud to the assembled troops massed to hold this island for the newborn country. The reading of the Declaration at what is now City Hall Park caused a sensation. We don’t know for certain whether it was its promise of freedom — all (white) men created equal — or its infuriating litany of crimes against the colonies by the English King. Whatever inflamed them, these New Yorkers stampeded downtown toward the Battery, arousing fellow New Yorkers along the way. By the time they reached Bowling Green, the city’s oldest park, they had come up with a plan: to rid the green of every vestige of British rule. And they would start with the 4,000-pound, monumental equestrian statue of King George III that had loomed over the neighborhood for six years. The statue was made of gold — or so it long seemed as it glinted in the sunshine. In truth, it was molded of lead, painted over with a coat of gilding, as if concealing the rot. (Sound familiar?) There was no stopping the revolutionaries. They swarmed through the park gates, lassoed the metal horse and rider with ropes, and sent the statue crashing down. Not yet content, the crowd turned a symbolic gesture into a practical one. Perhaps this crumpled lead could now be melted down to make bullets to fight the very oppressors who had erected it. So it was out with the axes and hammers, smashing what was left of the effigy to bits. In those days, the main posts of the iron fencing around Bowling Green Park featured their own royal adornments: little gold crowns to signal that a king pranced within. In a final gesture of defiance, the patriots sawed off those ornaments, too. The other morning, I headed down there myself from City Hall Park to film a segment with NY1 News. Here, I unexpectedly encountered Robert Tierney, former chair of the New York Landmarks Commission, enjoying the now-peaceful site between downtown appointments. Just north, tourists were clamoring for selfies with the banal bronze Wall Street bull crouching on nearby Wall Street, oblivious to the real deal a few blocks away. “Bob,” is this fence really the original, I asked? “I believe it is,” said the landmarks expert. “Repaired here and there, but still standing.” “So, this is the actual landmark of the first act of defiance of the American Revolution.” “That’s right,” Tierney agreed. Then we looked around, squinting at the skyscrapers that now block the sun, and tried imagining the 1776 crowd, the fury, the courage, the small scale of the young city. Most of all the statue that wasn’t there. And the thrilling opening act of the American Revolution here. With many scenes to follow. The British were not about to abandon the greatest natural harbor in the New World. Before long, ships laden with British soldiers sailed into Manhattan and took back the streets. George Washington tried putting up a fight in Brooklyn but fell back toward the East River. Only the cover of fog and darkness enabled his troops to escape back to Manhattan by boat. For a while, they held another line of defense far uptown, but that effort collapsed as well. Washington and what remained of the Continental Army fled to New Jersey to fight another day. New York remained an occupied city for the rest of the war. It was a friendly occupation for the pro-British Tories who stayed behind and thrived, delighted that their treasonous neighbors had departed. But higher powers intervened. Rampant disease went largely untreated. A huge fire in September leveled as many as 1,000 buildings. And British ships anchored on the Brooklyn side began taking on patriot prisoners, confining them in such brutal conditions below decks that some 15,000 died of illness or malnutrition before the war ended—more than perished on the battlefields of the Revolution. Not until November 21, 1783 — seven years after one George came tumbling down at Bowling Gree n— did the British finally abandon New York, allowing the other George to return in triumph. For generations, the event was celebrated as a municipal holiday — Evacuation Day — suspended only when it was subsumed by Thanksgiving. If we look hard, we can still glimpse vestiges of New York’s defiant patriotism: Alexander Hamilton’s grave at Trinity Church; nearby St. Paul’s, where Washington worshipped; the Morris-Jumel Mansion in Harlem, which he briefly used as a headquarters; and the “African Burial Ground” on Duane and Elk Streets — then outside the city limits — where enslaved and free Black New Yorkers were once carted off for internment. Of course, Bowling Green Park still stands near the shoreline. Benches still invite leisurely contemplation. The mammoth statue that no longer looms over visitors casts its own kind of imagined shadow. Uptown, at the recently and brilliantly expanded New York Historical, the new Tang Galleries feature a sound-and-light show that reimagines the big 1776 takedown. In perhaps the earliest example of New York attitude, the topplers preserved the horse’s tail — and here it rests in the museum, a final in-your-face to Mad King George. Paintings and engravings of the statue-toppling survive, too, but they are unreliable. Some show men and women hauling it down together, implying a social equality that did not exist. One depicts an American Indian looking on, perhaps only to symbolize the mixed emotions of the original inhabitants watching yet another set of white colonizers claiming their onetime land. Yet another image suggests that the actual work of hauling down the statue had fallen to enslaved Africans, the bitterest irony of all, since people of color would be denied the guarantees of the Declaration for another four score and seven years. We haven’t lost our taste for iconoclasm. In recent years, statues of Confederates (Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, and Stonewall Jackson) and so-called colonizers (Christopher Columbus) have come tumbling down, too. A few years back, the City Council voted to banish the statue of the author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, that had long graced City Hall. Adopted by the New York Historical, it now anchors the installation in Tang Hall. Now, President Trump is threatening to build a new National Garden of American Heroes cluttered with effigies of celebrities of his choosing (most already honored elsewhere). It makes far more sense this Independence Day to remember precisely what it means to create — and erase — heroic statuary. The removal of George III from Bowling Green once sparked a titanic fight for liberty. Contemplating its absence can still inspire New Yorkers — far more than new statues can — to fight for freedom deferred, delayed and denied. ### New York: The Revolutionary City We Forgot URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-the-revolutionary-city-we-forgot/ Last updated: 2026-06-29T19:44:13.000Z New York has a Revolutionary War problem. Boston has the Freedom Trail. Philadelphia has Independence Hall. Both cities preserved enough of their 18th-century streetscapes that visitors can still imagine the American Revolution unfolding around them. New York preserved almost none of it. The largest city in British North America, the site of the war's longest military occupation, the strategic obsession of both George Washington and the British Empire, and the nation's first capital somehow became the American city least able to see its own Revolutionary past. Yet New York's inability to preserve that past may be making it the most interesting place in America to commemorate the nation's 250th birthday. As America turns 250, the city's missing Revolutionary landscape is forcing historians, educators, museums, and technologists to develop new ways of recovering a past that can no longer be experienced through preservation alone. The answer starts with understanding what was actually lost and why it matters. The British occupation of New York lasted seven years, from 1776 until Evacuation Day in 1783\. For nearly the entire war, Manhattan served as the headquarters of British military operations in North America. The Crown was forced to garrison thousands of imperial troops on a single island for nearly the entire duration of the conflict, tying down enormous resources that could not be deployed elsewhere. New York was not a side theater. It was the center of gravity. The struggle for control of the city shaped campaigns stretching from Canada to the Carolinas. And when independence finally came, the serious work of building a republic didn't begin on the banks of the Potomac. New York City had served as the seat of government under the Articles of Confederation since 1785\. When the new constitutional government came into being in 1789, it was inaugurated here: George Washington took the oath of office at Federal Hall on Wall Street, and the first Congress debated and sent the Bill of Rights to the states from the same building. The capital moved to Philadelphia in 1790, but the republic's first acts happened in Lower Manhattan. Yet unlike Boston or Philadelphia, New York rarely presents itself through that history. Part of the reason is practical. The city changed too quickly. Fires, immigration, industrialization, real estate development, and relentless infrastructure investment transformed the landscape. Colonial New York was not preserved – it was absorbed and buried. New York is a city that has always been more interested in building the future than memorializing the past. The result is that even many lifelong New Yorkers have little sense that their city stood at the center of the Revolutionary War. But that absence may be creating an unexpected opportunity. Across the city, institutions are experimenting with new ways of recovering a lost urban landscape. This summer, visitors can encounter Revolutionary New York through exhibitions, harbor events, public programs, walking tours, and digital experiences. Advances in digital modeling, mobile computing, and augmented reality have made it possible to reconstruct parts of the lost city in ways that would have been prohibitively expensive only a decade ago. At the Museum of the City of New York, [The Occupied City](https://www.mcny.org/exhibition/occupied-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) uses computer-generated reconstructions to help visitors explore the streets, waterfronts, and marketplaces of colonial New York. Sail250 is bringing tall ships and international visitors into New York Harbor, echoing earlier anniversary commemorations while introducing a new generation to the city's maritime history. Some of the most intriguing efforts, however, are happening outside museum walls. Through our work at the [Gotham Center for New York City History](https://www.gothamcenter.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [NYC Revolutionary Trail](https://nycrevolutionarytrail.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we have spent years confronting a basic challenge: How do you teach Revolutionary New York when there are few remnants of that time left to see? The question becomes especially urgent in classrooms across the CUNY system. Our students come from every corner of the world. Many are first-generation Americans, the children of immigrants, who did not arrive here with inherited family narratives about the founding or access to preserved colonial neighborhoods. For them, New York’s revolutionary history is largely invisible. If a 21st-century office tower stands on top of an 18th-century street, the answer cannot simply be to point at a plaque and ask people to imagine harder. New York demands something more. This summer, the Gotham Center is launching [Echoes of Revolution](https://www.echoesofrevolution.com/nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), an augmented reality walking tour of Lower Manhattan built on the same spatial mechanics as Pokémon Go and the historical environments of Assassin's Creed III. A student or a visitor can stand at Bowling Green, hold up a smartphone, and watch the gilded lead equestrian statue of King George III materialize on its marble pedestal, the same statue that New Yorkers tore down with ropes on the night of July 9, 1776, hours after Washington's troops heard the Declaration of Independence read aloud for the first time. Elsewhere, users can explore colonial waterfronts, military installations, and domestic spaces that disappeared generations ago. The modern skyline recedes. The buried city returns. The goal is not nostalgia. It is orientation. 0:00 /0:56 1× Echoes of Revolution teaser video. **Credit: Ubisoft & Sugar Creative* New Yorkers walk across some of the most consequential sites in American history every day without knowing it. The augmented reality tour makes those invisible landscapes visible again. That is a genuinely different model from what Boston or Philadelphia offers. Those cities demonstrate what preservation can achieve when a society decides, early enough, that a landscape is worth protecting. New York demonstrates something else: what becomes possible when a city that doesn't preserve its past is forced to find new ways of transmitting it. The challenge extends beyond the Revolution. New York is constantly negotiating the relationship between memory and change. Every generation inherits a city rebuilt by the generation before it. The question is never whether the city should change; change is New York's defining characteristic and always has been. The question is how to carry historical understanding forward inside a place that refuses to stand still. That is why New York's approach to the 250th anniversary may prove especially relevant, and not just for New York. Cities across the country face versions of the same problem: a past no longer visible in the landscape, a population that didn't grow up within the founding narrative, and a need to find new methods of transmission that go beyond preservation and plaques. ![Echoes of Revolution in downtown Manhattan.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/4-EoR_NYC_FireSuspects_Landscape.png) Echoes of Revolution in downtown Manhattan. **Credit: Ubisoft & Sugar Creative* New York may simply be further along the curve. What is becoming a challenge for many American cities has been a reality here for generations. The Revolution helped create modern New York. Now New York is helping to create new ways of experiencing the Revolution, ways that don't require cobblestones, that can follow people into neighborhoods where the 18th century isn't on display, and that can reach students who arrived here from elsewhere and are still learning what it means to be part of this place. For a city often accused of forgetting its past, that may be the most revolutionary thing of all. ### After the Rent Freeze: What Happens to New York City’s Regulated Housing Stock Now and in the Future URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-rent-freeze-conversation/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T17:40:21.000Z *Friday, June 26, Vital City hosted a conversation about what comes next for New York City’s rent-stabilized housing — and for tenants and landlords more broadly — in the wake of the rent freeze championed by Mayor Zohran Mamdani. The night before our event, the Rent Guidelines Board* [*voted to freeze rents on the city’s rent-stabilized apartments*](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/25/nyregion/nyc-rent-freeze-vote-mamdani.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, delivering on Mamdani’s campaign promise.* *The cheering in the room was real, but so was the harder morning-after question about the ramifications of preventing any rent increases on rent-regulated units at a time when property taxes, energy costs, insurance costs and other outlays are rising.* *The question turns out to have very different answers depending on which building you’re standing in. A unit in a mostly market-rate building is not a unit in a 100-year-old walk-up that depends entirely on stabilized rents to pay its bills, and treating the two the same is how good intentions curdle into deferred maintenance, distress and the kind of disinvestment New York spent the 1970s learning to regret.* *To sort out where the freeze helps, where it hurts, and most importantly what policy proposals city and state leaders should pursue next, Vital City contributing writer Errol Louis sat down with three people who have thought long and hard about these tradeoffs: Rent Guidelines Board member and NYU Stern economist Arpit Gupta, who cast the RGB’s lone dissenting vote; Michelle de la Uz of the Fifth Avenue Committee, who builds and operates the affordable housing in question; and Howard Slatkin of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council.* *This transcript has been edited for length and clarity. Video of the full conversation is posted above.* **Errol Louis:** Welcome to “After the Freeze: What’s Next for New York City Housing,” presented by Vital City, which seeks to improve civic life by finding great ideas and innovative research and making them available and understandable to those who shape urban policy. I’m Errol Louis, political anchor at Spectrum News NY1 and a contributing writer for Vital City. We’re glad to have a chance to talk about this issue right after it became newly relevant, following last night’s vote of the [Rent Guidelines Board](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). For the next hour, I’ll be talking with some interesting people who have interesting things to say. We’ll talk for a bit, and then we’ll invite you to join in using the Q&A function at the bottom of your screen. Joining us this morning are Arpit Gupta, a Rent Guidelines Board member and an associate professor of finance at NYU Stern; Michelle de la Uz, executive director of the [Fifth Avenue Committee](https://fifthave.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a nonprofit community development corporation that develops, preserves and manages affordable housing and community facilities; and Howard Slatkin, executive director of the [Citizens Housing and Planning Council](https://chpcny.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a research and policy organization focused on housing, zoning and neighborhood planning across the five boroughs. Welcome, and thank you all for joining us. I want to jump right in with you, Mr. Gupta, because you were, as they say, in the room where it happened. What was it like being at that fairly raucous hearing last night? **Arpit Gupta:** It’s similar to every year, to be honest, especially for the final vote. We have hundreds of people in the room, and the venue was at capacity. The owner member sitting next to me made a prepared statement, and I couldn’t hear a word of it from a foot away. So it’s a very raucous moment, and I understand it’s a great experience for many tenants. I appreciate the energy everyone brings to the process. **Errol Louis:** Does the board meet or have discussions between these public hearings? **Arpit Gupta:** We do. There’s a requirement that any discussion involving five or more members be reported to the public, so we have a lot of discussions involving four or fewer people. **Errol Louis:** And one last scene-setting question: Has it occurred to the chair that they could keep order in the room at some of these hearings? **Arpit Gupta:** I can’t speak for chairs in past years. I imagine the thought has occurred to them, but it’s a real challenge to find a way of doing so while respecting the democratic process and people’s rights to free assembly and speech. **Errol Louis:** Fair enough. Let’s get into the substance, then. As a board member, what’s your understanding of the legal requirement to balance the data and the other factors — the overall economy, tenants’ ability to pay, affordability concerns — against the hard data about the cost of operating a rent-stabilized building? **Arpit Gupta:** We have a very broad mandate. The board’s enabling statute sets out three basic things for us to look at. The first pertains to building and housing conditions. The second relates to cost-of-living measures. The third is essentially other data the board wants to consider. So even the conventional framing of what the RGB does — balancing affordability for tenants against cost pressures for owners — is interpreted primarily out of that third leg of the mandate, along with the cost-of-living indices. The statute doesn’t give us that much to work with, and the courts have interpreted quite liberally the ability of boards like ours to weigh the data and balance the competing interests we’re meant to serve. **Errol Louis:** Michelle, in your capacity as a longtime builder and operator of affordable housing, what have costs been like in recent years? We keep hearing from the apartment associations and other landlord groups that expenses have been skyrocketing while rents have not. From your point of view, what’s the situation? **Michelle de la Uz:** Thanks for having me. There’s no question that the cost of owning and operating housing, including affordable housing, has gone up. Insurance costs in particular — we’ve heard a lot about this — have risen anywhere from 25% to more than 200%, depending on the property, and there’s concern they’re going even higher for 100% affordable projects. Water and sewer rates have also gone up. That’s been our experience. **Errol Louis:** And to the extent that we now have this freeze in place, how will it affect your ability to do your work? Do you have buildings that will be affected? **Michelle de la Uz:** We do. Tenants need housing — they need affordable housing — and owners need rents to pay the bills associated with maintaining the properties. The challenge is that people’s incomes have not kept pace with the cost of living. We definitely have properties that will be challenged, and quite honestly already have been challenged, in terms of paying our mortgages. For context: all of our units are rent-regulated, and they’re also under regulatory agreement with the city or state of New York. So we have a belt-and-suspenders approach to ensuring affordability, and all of our tenants are low- and moderate-income. Any rent increase is a real challenge for them — but all of our properties are underwritten by government to assume revenue, meaning rents, increases of 2% a year, and expense increases of 3% a year. We’ve seen expenses go up well beyond 3%, certain categories even more. Meanwhile the revenue side, especially with this rent freeze, will be flat. That said, we understand why our tenants can’t support paying more. And we know there needs to be another public-policy solution to help address our cost needs as owners. **Errol Louis:** We’re definitely going to get to that. But in the short term, after a vote like last night’s, do you contact the city and say, listen, the assumptions under which we struck our deal no longer hold — **Michelle de la Uz:** We’ve already contacted the city. They know. **Errol Louis:** Seriously, though, what do they say? Much of the impetus for last night’s vote came from City Hall. **Michelle de la Uz:** They knew this going in, and I think they recognize the strain it’s going to place on those of us who own 100% affordable housing for low-income tenants. They recently launched a set of new programs to help owners and managers of affordable housing address some of the gaps that exist — not just because of the RGB vote, but because of other strains that go beyond it. Even absent any rent increase, we’ve had tenants falling behind, especially since COVID. We have higher arrears rates than we used to, and housing court is taking longer to resolve cases, with a backlog at the city’s HRA office. Meanwhile, our lenders still expect their mortgages, Con Edison and National Grid expect to be paid, DEP expects to be paid, and our insurers all expect to be paid — and must be, if you don’t want to default. We’re committed to preserving our affordable housing in perpetuity, but the math is getting harder. **Errol Louis:** Howard Slatkin, balancing all these competing needs to make sure we have a stable, if not expanding, stock of affordable housing is something you spend a lot of time thinking about. How important is the distinction between “good” landlords and “bad” landlords? Are the motivations as important as the market forces? **Howard Slatkin:** I think the outcomes are what’s important. The goal for landlords’ responsibility should be to deliver quality, sound, well-maintained housing for residents — which is what we all think residents deserve. The challenge is that owners have different pools of resources to do that with. As I’ve said before, a good landlord who’s broke can’t really be a good landlord. You can have all the good intentions in the world, but without the resources to deliver maintenance and services, you won’t be a good landlord to your tenants despite those intentions. The thing we like to highlight is that rent is two things at once, and we have to keep both in mind. The RGB process is almost the opposite of that — it’s basically an either/or decision. Rent is an expense for tenants; it’s the biggest household expense for most renters in New York City. But it’s also the primary source of operating revenue for the buildings they live in. So when you shortchange that, it comes back to tenants too. They live in the consequences of whether their buildings are adequately funded. That’s what makes getting this set of policies right so important. **Errol Louis:** Is the issue that rent is due every 30 days, but the effects of an underfunded building won’t be felt for months or even years? **Howard Slatkin:** That’s certainly part of it, though sometimes the effects come faster than that. What you can see in the data that some portfolio managers have shared is that, because of all the bills Michelle just ran through — utilities, taxes, the mortgage, none of which are optional — the thing that gets shortchanged is the physical investment in the buildings, especially the non-emergency work that can be put off. Those things pile up and turn into bigger bills down the road. One data point I find instructive: the [Community Preservation Corporation](https://communityp.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) put out a brief on its rent-stabilized portfolio in New York. Over five years, operating expenses increased 27% while rents increased only 11% — and every category of operating expense rose except one: repairs and maintenance. That’s worrisome, because it means that, by covering all the non-optional obligations, things that really shouldn’t be optional are becoming optional for people managing affordable buildings. **Errol Louis:** Michelle, ultimately the HPD inspectors come knocking, right? Maintenance isn’t really optional. **Michelle de la Uz:** That’s right. We have an obligation to provide habitable apartments and properties, so it’s not optional. But it’s what Howard is describing: you might take longer to get an extra bid, to find a vendor willing to do the same work for less, you stretch the timeline. That’s not something we want to do, and we avoid it, but the reality exists. This is why owners of regulated affordable housing have been alarmed for more than a year — going back to the prior administration, even when the RGB was voting for increases. We were seeing expenses rise at an alarming rate and rent collections come in below historical norms. There’s an existential crisis on the affordable-housing side. The city has invested billions of dollars in affordable housing for low- and moderate-income tenants, and for our regulated stock we don’t pay property taxes, unlike the for-profit-owned rent-stabilized stock. We’ve been saying for a while that we’re not on a good trajectory. If we don’t invest in this housing stock, the buildings will suffer, the tenants will suffer, and the investment the city has made over generations is at risk. The whole vision of an inclusive city, where people of all races and incomes can survive and thrive, is at risk. So we need a variety of public-policy solutions. That said, we know tenants right now — especially low- and moderate-income tenants — cannot afford more. They’re at a breaking point. Add what’s happening with cuts to SNAP and Medicaid and new requirements there, and you reach a breaking point. I think that’s why you saw the fervor last night. For tenants in rent-stabilized housing across the city, this is potentially a question of survival. **Errol Louis:** Arpit, Mumbai is often cited as a worst-case scenario, from more than half a century ago. From an economist’s point of view, explain the nightmare we want to avoid. **Arpit Gupta:** Let me take an example closer to home: the New York of the 1970s and ’80s, when we had massive distress in the rent-stabilized segment. The Bronx was burning. We saw widespread distress among owners and steep declines in housing value. This was also the period when rent stabilization began. It ultimately led to roughly 100,000 units coming under city control through in rem foreclosure — essentially because the buildings couldn’t generate the revenue to pay their taxes. Today that’s more commonly done through tax-lien sales. But in that period, the city took just under 100,000 units that were unaffordable for private owners to operate into government hands, with the intention of running them as affordable housing. And the conventional wisdom is that it didn’t go well. So when we talk about the bad scenario, the worry is tangible. You have, as Michelle put it so well, a cap and a freeze on the revenue you can bring in, while costs are not capped. This whole system is frustrating to sit in the middle of, because it’s pitched as owner versus renter — but the government is in the background controlling all of it. The government controls insurance regulation, which drives the liability exposure and lawsuits spiking insurance rates. It controls property taxes, which Michelle doesn’t pay on her units but which account for about 31% of expenses for rent-stabilized buildings overall. The [Furman Center](https://furmancenter.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has done great work showing the inequitable burden property taxes place on rental housing generally, and rent-stabilized housing in particular. The Water Board is government-controlled too. So the government controls most of the costs owners face — and then it stands up this board and gives us a mandate to translate those government-set costs into burdens on tenants. We get caught in the middle. The risk is that if the board sets rent adjustments one way while government does not control costs, costs keep rising, revenues are frozen, and a number of these buildings become unviable. It starts, as Howard said, with deferred maintenance — and the Furman Center has highlighted that we’re already seeing the beginnings of it. That leads to violations and building-condition problems that HPD can try to address in the short run, but only so far. Then you get failures to pay lenders. The nonprofit lenders tell us that maybe a third of rent-stabilized buildings in their portfolios currently don’t have the cash flow to pay their mortgages. They’re dipping into reserves to do so, and once those run out, the buildings go into distress and foreclosure. Eventually the property taxes don’t get paid, it lands in government hands, and you get either government control, as in the ’80s, or tax-lien sales. This also changes who owns the buildings. The landlords who would buy distressed rent-stabilized properties may not be the same kind of landlord we’ve had — I worry they’d be much more extractive. So there are real, tangible concerns about the future of rent-stabilized housing in a world of capped revenue and uncapped costs. **Errol Louis:** It’s interesting that you say “the government,” but this new city government was voted in by the people. As is often the case in a democracy, we have to look at each other and take some responsibility. Arpit, you cast the only dissenting vote last night. Even taking into account what you just said, what were you trying to convey with that vote? **Arpit Gupta:** I wasn’t trying to convey anything beyond doing the job. We have a mandate to execute, which has been interpreted as balancing competing interests. I’m just trying to do my best in public service to make what I think is the best decision in the interest of the public I represent as a public member. I’d be entirely in favor of a rent freeze if it came under conditions that warranted it. This isn’t widely known, but the rent freezes under the de Blasio administration happened either under the extraordinary conditions of COVID, or, in an earlier instance, when the commensurate measure the board uses to track cost changes over time was actually negative — prices were falling — largely because energy costs were declining. In that case, the freeze was a positive adjustment relative to building costs. So rent freezes, even rollbacks, are completely within the board’s mandate and judgment if costs are under control. And the city can control a lot of these costs. It’s entirely open to the administration to say, “We’re cutting property taxes, we’re capping insurance expenses,” as it has plans to do, in ways that would justify a freeze or a reduction. But the data we were presented this year showed those cost-containment efforts still incomplete, and a cost picture for owners that is quite high across every category. To freeze rents under those conditions presents a real challenge. I certainly acknowledge, as Michelle pointed out, that tenants face substantial hardship too. It’s no easy task to ask hundreds of tenants who come to us in public testimony to bear more. I’m very cognizant of that, and my hope is that we find better solutions. A [piece that just went up on Vital City today](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-rent-freeze-agenda-nyc/) tries to advocate for programs that strike a better balance — protecting and capping rental expenses for low-income tenants without defunding buildings, which leads to the drastic outcomes we’ve seen here before. **Errol Louis:** Right. **Michelle de la Uz:** And there is one cost that, at least, local government doesn’t control — the cost of debt, for the for-profit owners of rent-stabilized housing that isn’t otherwise regulated. And it’s important to recognize that the rent-stabilized stock is not homogeneous. You need policy solutions crafted to its different segments. Some owners bought rent-stabilized properties in a low-interest-rate environment that has since changed, expecting external circumstances that didn’t hold. In some cases they over-leveraged and are now stuck. A building with a few rent-stabilized units that’s mostly market-rate is very different from a building that’s entirely rent-stabilized with very low-income tenants. A lot of our rent-stabilized buildings date to the 1920s — they’re 100 years old, walk-ups. We also have newer affordable housing. The needs are very different. **Howard Slatkin:** Let me piggyback on that. I was describing the finances of rent-stabilized buildings recently and said it’s a bit like describing NBA basketball in New York as a general proposition. You can say it’s the greatest year ever — but you still have the Nets. And I’m a Nets fan, to be clear. The point is that rent-stabilized housing is very far from being one thing. Michelle named the most important distinction: there are buildings that are entirely stabilized, where the building’s income comes entirely from stabilized units. When rents are frozen, those revenues are frozen accordingly. Then there’s another third or so of the stock that sits in buildings that are mostly market-rate, which puts those units in a completely different financial position. When you average the two, you get the Bill Gates-walks-into-a-room problem — everyone’s income goes up on average, but it doesn’t change what’s happening in the 100% affordable subsidized stock, or in the pre-1974 stock that’s almost entirely still rent-stabilized. That’s where you need specific public policy targeted at the revenue problem. **Arpit Gupta:** I completely agree with that characterization, and I think it sheds light on something people find confusing. They hear from politicians that profits went up 6% or 10% this year, and if you’re a tenant whose building conditions are bad, you reasonably wonder where the money is going. I understand the concern. But that 6% or 10% is an average of two opposite trajectories. The part of the stock mixed in with market-rate units — because of regulatory abatements, or because some units were deregulated over time — is doing fine; those buildings are seeing record profits. The remaining half of the stock that is 90%-plus rent-stabilized is seeing declining profits and declining valuations. So we need different tools for them. In [my Vital City piece](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-rent-freeze-agenda-nyc/) I think a lot about how to make more of the stock resemble that mixed stock, which I think makes for a much more resilient housing stock. **Errol Louis:** Everyone should read the Vital City article he’s referring to — I found it very helpful. Let’s go deeper into solutions. There are well over 100 people on this webinar, many of them journalists, and the public discussion is happening right now. Michelle, what are the two or three things government should focus on to move the needle, now that we have this new playing field with a two-year freeze? **Michelle de la Uz:** A few things affect affordability. One is rental subsidy for eligible tenants. Only about one in four people eligible for [Section 8](https://www.hud.gov/helping-americans/housing-choice-vouchers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) actually receive it in our city. The state has stepped up recently on rental subsidy, but the need outstrips the supply, and there’s real concern about the hole it could create in the city’s budget. Still, providing rental subsidy at scale for people who need it is one solution. Another is workforce development. We train more than a thousand people a year and place them in living-wage jobs. A big part of this is that wages haven’t kept up, so we need to train people for the jobs of today and tomorrow and help raise their incomes. And for those of us who own and manage regulated affordable housing: we’re no longer in a low-interest-rate environment, so we need to revisit our underwriting and pay down some debt — release these properties from debt obligations, because the math, as they say, ain’t math-ing. **Errol Louis:** Howard, give us some solutions. **Howard Slatkin:** I’ll build on Michelle’s list, which covers the essential components. First, we need a concerted set of policies to keep costs down, and that’s hard because it’s a collection of individual issues — wrangling insurance rates through various reforms, water-rate assistance for affordable housing (which was increased this year, but more is needed). DEP has to cover the cost of operating the water system and faces a similar bind, while affordable-housing operators have no new revenue to pay higher water rates. There are also the administrative costs that jump out of the Community Preservation Corporation’s analysis — the cost of navigating code enforcement, which is important but can be cumbersome and inefficient. Second — and I’ll admit I haven’t yet read Arpit’s piece, so any overlap is just great minds thinking alike — we should take the tenant-facing half of rent and address it separately from the building-revenue half. Look at solutions that reduce a tenant’s responsibility for rent without reducing the flow of revenue to the building. That includes the supply of Section 8 vouchers, which isn’t where we’d like it, and [CityFHEPS](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hra/help/cityfheps.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which helps tenants pay the rent needed to keep the building operating. It’s powerful, and it’s costly, so we have to maximize our ability to deliver it. There are also programs that already exist — [SCRIE](https://access.nyc.gov/programs/senior-citizens-rent-increase-exemption-scrie/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [DRIE](https://access.nyc.gov/programs/disability-rent-increase-exemption-drie/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the rent-increase exemptions for senior citizens and people with disabilities. They’re effectively a rent freeze for people who qualify with incomes below a certain level. The state legislature just expanded eligibility from $50,000 to $75,000 in income, which is great. The idea is that if you have people who can’t afford an increase, you address their need specifically without taking revenue from the building — because those programs issue the landlord a rent-abatement credit in the amount of the increase, as if the rent had gone up, while the tenant doesn’t pay it. Those are the kinds of solutions we need to look at, because as long as costs keep drifting out of line with people’s ability to pay, this problem only gets worse. **Errol Louis:** Arpit, talk about some of what’s in your article, because you’re on a similar track — more means-testing, more tightly focusing where subsidy and support go. **Arpit Gupta:** Absolutely, and I’ll talk about SCRIE to make this concrete. With a program like Section 8, you cover essentially the entire rent for the tenant, which is powerful but very costly. It’s a funded program, so people line up, some get vouchers, and many don’t. The city programs like SCRIE cover only the incremental increase. That provides stability — households can plan for what their rent will be — and it’s a lighter-touch intervention. So I advocate expanding SCRIE-style protection, including a new program for low-income renters who aren’t elderly or disabled. That’s one pillar: protecting the lowest-income households. A couple of others. Given the heterogeneity in the stock, the guidelines should be tailored rather than one-size-fits-all. There are many ways to do this; the way I prefer is to condition the rent-guideline increase on building conditions. This follows testimony from hundreds of tenants who told me the same thing: if you’re a slumlord, you get a rent freeze, while if you operate your building well, with no violations and no eligibility for the city’s [Alternative Enforcement Program](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/alternative-enforcement-program-aep.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which targets the worst violators, you’d get a different adjustment. Tying the adjustment to conditions does a few necessary things. It aligns incentives for proper maintenance. It ensures the worst actors get a worse deal. And, more importantly, it creates an incentive, because with rent-stabilized housing there’s a line out the door for every unit, so an owner can get away with deferring repairs since the tenant is effectively stuck in place. Separate guidelines keyed to building conditions would push against that. The third, longer-term direction is to make more of the affordable stock look like that mixed-income stock. We have a couple of existing templates. There’s a program called [Mix and Match](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/mixed-income-program-mix-match.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that ensures a building has tenants at different levels of ability to pay. There are new NYCHA developments — in Chelsea, for example — that combine market-rate and public-housing units in the same complex. My idea is to make this happen for more rent-stabilized buildings. You might have a stabilized building with certain vacancies and convert some toward market rate in exchange for deeper affordability on other vacant units, preserving building-level affordability while giving owners flexibility. You could add density on rent-stabilized properties and make the incremental units market-rate, providing the ballast to improve conditions for existing tenants. These solutions are better socially — there’s a lot of evidence that mixed-income buildings produce better outcomes — and financially, because the surest way to make these buildings less dependent on what the RGB decides is to give them a separate revenue source from market-rate tenants who cross-subsidize the lower-income ones. If more buildings looked like that, we could also have more rent freezes in the future, because not all of a building’s revenue would depend on the RGB. **Errol Louis:** I liked the part of your article where you talked about pairing apartments within a building — a market-rate unit alongside a subsidized or stabilized one. We have dozens of questions coming in, and I urge people to use the Q&A function. Let me start reading them. Here’s one from Ilan: The mayor told us there’s a city fund to help cover expenses when rents don’t match them. Any idea what it is? Michelle, do you know about this? **Michelle de la Uz:** For those of us who own the regulated stock, it’s part of that TOOLS package to help preserve existing affordable housing that’s rent-stabilized and under regulatory agreement. Howard may be aware of something broader, but that’s what I’m tracking — and we’re eager to apply. I understand things start next month. **Errol Louis:** Every so often we report on a relief fund nobody has applied for, because it doesn’t quite match people’s needs — **Michelle de la Uz:** Yes. I’m forgetting the name, but I think that was for vacant apartments in need of upgrades, with a certain amount of money attached. **Howard Slatkin:** I’m not up on the latest there. It was an effort to get at units that needed capital investment and would otherwise not return to the market — an outcome nobody wants. Setting that aside, there’s a broader set of tools worth emphasizing. The state recently reauthorized the [J-51](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/tax-incentives-j-51.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) tax incentive for the preservation and rehabilitation of existing housing, which is important, and the City Council needs to authorize it and get it running so the city has that tool. At the same time, none of us wants to reach the point where distress gets beyond what can be handled building by building. If individual buildings come in and work out their finances with the city, that’s great — but there are a lot of buildings. There are almost half a million units in the pre-1974 rent-stabilized stock alone, and there aren’t going to be 400,000 preservation agreements. At some point you have to address these issues at scale, not through one-off arrangements. It’ll take a combination of tools in the toolkit to get there. **Errol Louis:** Here’s a question about last night from Jay: Why didn’t we see multiple proposals, as in past years? Arpit? **Arpit Gupta:** There was a consensus among the other board members about the proposal to be passed, so the board moved ahead with that one. **Errol Louis:** Is the assumption that you have until next year to see how this works, or are there interim decisions the board can make? **Arpit Gupta:** We have a season — we start around March and go through this final vote, and now we’re done. The remaining board will reconvene next year, and we’ll see where things stand. **Errol Louis:** This is from Adam Daly at amNewYork: Christina Smith alleged in her resignation letter that the board’s outcome was predetermined and that questions about the RGB’s data and methodology went unanswered. Do you agree with any part of that? What was your understanding of whether the board weighed the cost data before the vote, and did Smith raise concerns internally before resigning? **Arpit Gupta:** One thing I can say is that, unlike in some previous years, I observed no interference by the administration in individual members’ decisions. I have to credit the administration on that independence, and I have to credit the professional, hardworking staff who provided excellent data and services. I stand firmly on those two points. As we discussed earlier, how to interpret the mandate is largely a matter of discretion left to the board. That said, I hear where Christina is coming from in her frustration about what we do as a society if we have a board able to systematically set these adjustments through a freeze. The mayor, as you know, campaigned on four years of freezes. Will we keep freezing for four years regardless of cost? Everyone agrees we need costs to come down — but the city faces fiscal constraints. If we do all the things we’re discussing — property-tax cuts, more vouchers — that pulls resources from other parts of government. So what actually happens when the rubber hits the road and costs stay elevated while the resources aren’t there? How does Michelle underwrite her properties? If you’re a lender, what do you put down for future rent adjustments? There are real procedural questions about a body, appointed by a mayoral appointee, making decisions that become very challenging for everyone to live with. I hope we find solutions before then. **Howard Slatkin:** I know this wasn’t the question, but I’d be remiss not to add my two cents: we should get beyond the gladiatorial spectacle of the Rent Guidelines Board and to the policy issues underneath it. A lot of what Arpit just said gestures at that. The RGB is not in a position to fix the affordability crisis. It has a mandate and has to decide within the parameters it’s given, and that alone will never solve the crisis. It’s the other issues we’re discussing that have to be layered on. We obviously need to pay attention to the RGB process, but we shouldn’t limit our imagination to the decisions before that board. **Michelle de la Uz:** Can I pick up on that? I hear you on the gladiatorial spectacle, but I’d love — and Fifth Avenue Committee and Neighbors Helping Neighbors, our affiliate, had tenants in the room — to say that this was historic for them. They’ve been fighting for this; it affects their daily lives. What the RGB hearing process does is make tangible how public policy shapes people’s lives, because they get to participate every year and they understand how it works. I wish other democratic processes were as well understood by everyday people. If we could bottle that energy and bring it to Washington, we’d have dramatically different outcomes. We saw some of it in action in Tuesday’s primary here in New York City. We need that level of civic engagement at every level, all the time. It’s hard to sustain, but it’s what we need to address the other policy problems we’re discussing — because ultimately this is about political will and investment at scale, and that comes only with the kind of pressure we see at the RGB applied to other areas where people are suffering. **Errol Louis:** Speaking of vouchers, the City Council is battling right now to finish the budget, and one proposal on the table would expand the CityFHEPS program so that perhaps 20,000 more people could get vouchers. Michelle, thinking of you as a landlord more than as an advocate, would that help? **Michelle de la Uz:** Absolutely. We have people who’d be eligible but, for lack of additional resources, aren’t receiving it yet. **Errol Louis:** Howard, the budgetary question is that CityFHEPS is expanding at about 4% a month, so the cost of the program would double — it’s around $1.74 billion now — and there are deficits ahead if expansion continues unchecked. **Howard Slatkin:** There’s a budgetary question underlying all of this, and trade-offs embedded in it. But vouchers are a great example of a solution worth the cost. Section 8 is an incredibly powerful tool for aligning the interests of tenants and landlords — everyone wants the full rent paid and the paperwork moving so you can recertify every year. The availability of those funding sources to support building revenue and keep people securely housed is enormously powerful. For budgetary and other reasons, we should also look at solutions like the SCRIE expansion Arpit mentioned. We’ve recommended the same — extending SCRIE-style protection to a category of lower-income residents — because it addresses stability. It’s not as powerful as a voucher, but it’s far less costly and could be scaled more broadly. Balancing those tools is an important piece of this. **Errol Louis:** Howard, was your organization on record for, against, or seeking amendments to the [2019 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act](https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/articles/2019/new-rights-tenants-housing-stability-and-tenant-protection-act-2019-1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? The apartment association points to it as a key piece — to put it simply for the audience, it closed off vacancy-deregulation provisions that had long been in place. Landlord groups say it made it impossible for many units to become profitable. **Howard Slatkin:** That precedes my time at the organization, but my understanding is that we didn’t take a position. To be clear, we’re not a landlord organization; we’re a housing-policy organization more broadly. That said, there have clearly been consequences of the 2019 HSTPA — some unintended, some untenable — that need to be addressed. Embedded in all of this is the challenge of having to address both sides of the issue. One unfortunate consequence of a rent freeze can be seen in a building full of low-income seniors, where everyone has a Section 8 voucher to make up the difference between what they can pay and what it costs to operate the building. With a rent freeze, those tenants wouldn’t pay an increase no matter what — and their rent was already effectively frozen for them. But absent a freeze, if rents went up 2%, the building would receive 2% more per apartment from the federal government. With a freeze, you don’t get that. The rent is now frozen for the building too. That’s a consequence of the one-size-fits-all shape of the rent laws and the way they apply across every category of housing. We need to think creatively about sustaining revenue to those buildings in particular — the ones we spent billions of public dollars to create as long-term, sustainable affordable housing — and be partners in keeping them going. **Errol Louis:** I should mention that Arpit Gupta has had to step away — we knew we wouldn’t have him for the full hour — and we thank him for his time. Michelle, do we need to think differently as a city about all of this? A theme throughout this hour has been that there’s far more complexity than our current structure for setting affordable-rent policy takes into account. We have new digital tools, we have AI — the catch-all answer to everything — but we do have the ability to build more nuance into our policy, don’t we? **Michelle de la Uz:** We do. To the mayor’s credit, the housing plan — “block by block,” as the deputy mayor has described it — is an all-of-the-above approach. There’s an acknowledgment that building and preserving 200,000 units of affordable housing each will take multiple tools. I think we’re clear on the need and aligned on the ambition. My concern is whether we have the funding to realize it. There’s a lot of political will, and quite a bit of alignment on the all-of-the-above approach. There’s also a sense of urgency among those of us who already own and manage affordable and rent-stabilized housing that we need these solutions yesterday, and at scale. That’s where the alignment isn’t there yet. **Errol Louis:** On the credit side, some banks — Signature Bank, New York Community Bank — have voluntarily or involuntarily exited the affordable-housing lending business. Have other players stepped up? Is there relief or innovation there you’d recommend? **Michelle de la Uz:** The Community Preservation Corporation did step up in acquiring the Signature portfolio. I’d love to see the philanthropic community come together with government to create a multibillion-dollar fund that provides blended, lower-interest debt, so we could swap out higher-interest debt on our affordable properties for lower-interest debt — but at scale, in the billions. **Errol Louis:** What would that enable you to do? **Michelle de la Uz:** What I just described. We have permanent mortgages on affordable housing at 6% or 7%. Bringing that down to 4% or 5% would meaningfully improve cash flow and help us address property needs. I’d also point to the underwriting assumptions. When Fifth Avenue Committee goes to the city to build affordable housing, the assumptions are 95% rent collection a month, 90% occupancy, 2% annual increases in income, and 3% annual increases in expenses. Those numbers are a fantasy right now. We need to reset them to the new norm. **Errol Louis:** Exactly. **Michelle de la Uz:** I’d like to deal with reality. I call myself a pragmatic progressive — let’s achieve the same goals, but realistically, together. We need to adjust these expectations to realize the same vision. **Errol Louis:** Howard, your thoughts? **Howard Slatkin:** I want to add to Michelle’s point about scale, and raise a caution that’s shouting in my head. We have many segments of the housing stock that will need help, and we can’t forget the long queue of obligations already in front of us. We have our public-housing stock, where we’re partway through a massive generational reinvestment — through [RAD](https://www.hud.gov/hud-partners/rad?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), through [PACT](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycha/about/pact.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and through the [Preservation Trust](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycha/about/public-housing-preservation-trust.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — to recapitalize buildings neglected for decades. We can’t shift resources away from that. We have the [Mitchell-Lama](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/mitchell-lama-program.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) stock, which is in many ways a cautionary tale. You can find buildings there that had rents frozen for seven, 10, 12 years and then faced massive increases at the end — not only huge and dislocating for tenants, but higher than what you’d have needed had you simply sustained revenue along the way, because of the accumulated disinvestment and the big capital needs that piled up. So we have that stock to assist, and the stock Michelle is partly responsible for, and that doesn’t even cover the private, unsubsidized rent-stabilized stock. My concern is that even after we marshal the resources for the buildings the government has direct financial obligations to as a partner, there’s the private stock that may also need resources — and, as you noted, private lending isn’t growing in that space. When you stack multiple years of a rent freeze on top of that, the terms on which an owner can secure a loan become that much less favorable. That’s going to be challenging. **Errol Louis:** That brings us to the end of our time. To Seth and others who asked whether the conversation will be available afterward: an enthusiastic yes. Go to the Vital City site, where it’ll be posted. For now, I want to thank Michelle de la Uz, Howard Slatkin and Arpit Gupta for a great discussion. I learned a lot, and I think our viewers did too. Keep watching this space — meaning Vital City — for an ongoing conversation as we get closer to a sustainable housing policy, which we all agree New York badly needs. Thank you all for joining us. ### After the Mamdani Rent Freeze URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-rent-freeze-agenda-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-26T13:22:35.000Z The Rent Guidelines Board, on which I serve, has just voted to freeze rents on New York City’s roughly 1 million rent-stabilized apartments, fulfilling a key campaign promise by Mayor Zohran Mamdani. This settles what will happen to rents this October, but raises the question of whether the rent-stabilized stock is still going to be standing, habitable and occupied in 2046\. On its current trajectory, a large share of it will not be — especially if Mamdani and his appointees on the Board follow through on the mayor’s pledge to freeze rents every year of his term. One mistake we often make with rent-stabilized housing is to talk about it like it’s a single thing. This stock is at least two things headed in opposite directions. The first part of the rent-stabilized stock is mixed buildings: units with regulated rents which sit alongside market-rate units. This happens when rent-stabilized units are deregulated over the decades, or in newer apartments built with tax incentives which mixed these two units from the beginning. There are roughly 200,000 such units. When operating costs rise for these buildings, as they have risen relentlessly in recent years due to the increasing price of insurance, taxes, energy and labor, the market units absorb the shock and cross-subsidize the regulated ones. A rent freeze on the owners of these buildings pinches the owners at the margin, but does not really threaten their existence. A recent Moody’s report [affirmed](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/03/nyregion/rent-freeze-nyc-moodys-landlords.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the financial health of these buildings even with a rent freeze. The distress is instead entirely contained elsewhere. The second type of rent-stabilized building is entirely or almost entirely rent-stabilized. These buildings were typically built before 1974 and are located outside of lower Manhattan, disproportionately in the Bronx, Upper Manhattan, and central Brooklyn; they became rent-stabilized in their entirety after the passage of Rent Stabilization Laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The NYU Furman Center [refers](https://www.furmancenter.org/publication/understanding-different-segments-of-new-york-citys-rent-stabilized-housing-stock/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to these as the “legacy 90%+” segment. They count roughly 456,000 of these units, close to half of the stabilized stock. These buildings have no market cushion to absorb costs, with the below-median rent buildings within this segment facing particularly dire financial pressure. And, after New York State’s 2019 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act stripped out landlords’ ability to raise rents between tenants, high rent deregulation, and the ability to increase rents to help pay for substantial capital improvements, the Rent Guidelines Board became essentially the only way these buildings have of raising revenue. The numbers on these buildings have gone from worrying to alarming. The Community Preservation Corporation, a substantial nonprofit lender to rent-stabilized buildings, [estimates](https://communityp.com/insights/nyc-rent-regulated-portfolio-data-2026/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that it costs $1,250 per month to run an older multifamily building, while the Rent Guidelines Board’s data puts the median collected rent in pre-1974, fully stabilized buildings at $1,343 citywide, and just $1,212 in the Bronx. This leaves just a minimal financial cushion before debt service on the buildings and negative cash flows in the Bronx. The Citizens Budget Commission [estimates](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/how-nyc-can-better-track-condition-rent-stabilized-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the nominal net operating income in pre-1974 stabilized buildings outside Core Manhattan fell 9% between 2020 and 2023, even as it rose for buildings in the first category of rent-stabilized buildings, those with market-rate offsets. We already see disturbing signs of these crushing economics. The Furman Center has [highlighted](https://www.furmancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ee-legacy/Preservation%5FChallenges%5FRGB%5Ftestimony%5FVersion%5FIII%5FApril%5F10%5F040925%5Frevised%5F041825%5F%281%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) lower spending on maintenance over the years, as owners cut back on these buildings. Especially worrying is the number of stabilized units registered as vacant with the State, [which rose](https://gothamist.com/news/57000-rent-stabilized-apartments-sat-empty-in-nyc-housing-agency-says?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from around 49,000 in April 2024 to over 57,000 in April 2025\. Some of these vacant units reflect normal turnover and new buildings in lease-up, but the risk is that a growing number of them describe apartments for which renovation costs exceed any income the unit can legally generate. In other words, they’re apartments that it simply doesn’t make any financial sense for the landlords to keep inhabited. This represents a huge loss of naturally occurring affordable units unavailable to tenants, and, if it persists, offsets the supply increases the city can achieve elsewhere. Both parts of the stabilized stock — one half with a natural shock absorber in the form of market-rate units, and another which has essentially no other way to make up the gap — are hit with the same freeze. For the latter, the system risks entering a doom loop: Costs keep going up and revenue does not, so maintenance is the only margin left to cut until conditions decay and the units exit through vacancy, deterioration and ultimately a lien sale or in rem foreclosure until the apartment becomes property of the state. The lesson from the 1970s Bronx is that this process can happen faster than you think. The average sale price of buildings with any rent-stabilized units [declined](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-MSR.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from $398,181 in 2019 to $289,478 in 2025 (a 28% decrease) and was just $146,038 for pre-1974 buildings with at least 50% stabilized tenants. Many advocates and politicians like to quote statistics that show that profits on rent-stabilized buildings as a whole have risen. While technically true, this estimate is misleading about a large segment of the stock. In reality, the mixed buildings have done quite well, while the pre-1974, highly stabilized segment of the stock has seen substantially deteriorating financial conditions. This diverging status makes it even harder to impose one-size-fits-all solutions to the entire stock of rent-stabilized housing. City subsidies can arrest this decline, but at the cost of diverting financial resources that could be otherwise deployed for means-tested housing vouchers or expanding the supply of affordable housing. This diagnosis tells us that the part of the stabilized stock that works well financially is mixed-income buildings, because internal cross-subsidy is the cheapest affordable financing tool we have. These buildings also work socially. A [deep](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-04996-4?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [body of research](https://opportunityinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/HopeVI%5FPaper.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) finds that economically integrated buildings and neighborhoods produce better outcomes for low-income kids than concentrated low-income housing, however well-maintained. Income-segregated buildings, whether in NYCHA or rent-stabilized housing, represent both a long-term fiscal drag as well as bad social architecture. The agenda to fix this situation should therefore be to deliberately convert more of this distressed monoculture into mixed-income units while protecting sitting tenants. What would that look like? **Allow limited vacancy resets, but in a mix-and-match way**. The 2019 reforms ended the vacancy bonus, which was misused to harass tenants out and lift the building out of rent regulation entirely. But there is a better design. Give fully stabilized buildings a building-level affordability budget, expressed in Area Median Income (AMI) bands. This is the standard metric for housing affordability set by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. For 2025, the threshold is $145,800 for a three-person family in the NYC metro area, so a housing unit “at 30% of AMI” is reserved for a household earning $43,700. The idea is to enforce affordability by first translating existing rents into the AMI bands they correspond to, and treat this as a fixed affordability budget the building must stay within. Within that envelope, an owner may reset a vacant unit to market, but only within limits so that another vacant unit must be repriced to deep affordability. Imagine a 100-unit, pre-1974 building in the Bronx that is fully stabilized and losing money. Suppose its rents cluster in the low bands: say 20 units at or below 30% of AMI, another 50 between 30% and 40%, 25 between 40% and 60%, and a handful above that. Seventy of the hundred units are affordable at 40% of AMI or less, while the median collected rent sits around $1,300, and operating costs now surpass this number. A vacancy opens in a unit renting at roughly 35% of AMI ($1,250). Under today's rules, the owner must re-rent at the same regulated rent, and the building continues to face losses. Under this proposed framework, the owner may instead reset that unit closer to market — say 80% of AMI, or $2,900 — but only by pairing it with a deepening: A separate vacant unit currently renting at 55% of AMI ($2,000) is permanently repriced down to 28% of AMI ($1,000). The owner nets about $650 a month on the pair, addressing the building's gap, while the tenant population gets access to a new, deeply affordable housing unit. And most importantly, the gain makes it viable for the two units to reach tenants in the first place, while they may remain persistently vacant absent any policy change. This process would basically replicate the basic economics at play in buildings with inclusionary zoning or “mix and match” programs administered by HPD. Owners gain because they are able to recoup more on a vacant unit, which will help pull some of the 57,000 units back to the market. However, any gains there will be offset by deep affordability gains on other units, which helps tenants. Compliance could run on the same principle as the conditions-based guideline proposed below: Resets are audited annually against the covenant and frozen in buildings that fall into serious disrepair, so the new revenue is always contingent on the building holding up its end. An alternative, as former Rent Guidelines Board member Alex Armlovich [has suggested](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/2002515029891940684?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), would be to set a weighted average AMI for the building’s entire rent roll, so that new vacancies would be able to convert to higher rents only if they do not cause the building to exceed a certain average rent level, relative to local incomes. While both approaches can work, NYC faces a critical shortage of deeply affordable housing units, and given high construction costs faces few routes to generating more. Therefore, pairing deep affordability with some higher-value units generates a real public benefit while ensuring the buildings stay solvent. However, the AMI-weighted average version is a reasonable option as well, and the two options could even be combined. **Let stabilized buildings build up**. Currently, rent-stabilized units are [much less likely](https://vrollet.github.io/files/city%5Fstructure.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to be redeveloped. Some of the legacy stock sits on land zoned for more than what is currently built. We can pair upzonings along the lines of City of Yes targeted at the distressed stabilized stock, with an as-of-right pathway to add floors, infill development with potential teardowns, or rear additions to generate new market-rate units. These market-rate units would then become a cross-subsidy for rent-stabilized units. This would yield a rare housing win, which can add supply and preserve affordability at the same time. This would follow the playbook in NYCHA, where the Mamdani administration is aggressively pursuing developmental paths that add more market-rate housing on NYCHA campuses, with the funding used to address capital shortfalls on public housing in areas such as the RAD-PACT redevelopment at NYCHA’s Fulton Elliot Chelsea houses. The same basic formula can apply for rent-stabilized buildings, too. The current pathway for demolition or substantial rehabilitation is severe, and is commonly viewed as a negative event to avoid, rather than a pathway to preservation. It typically requires a stringent set of requirements, pre-approved demolition plans, removing the entire building including the foundation and stipends to displaced tenants equaling six times the average rent of non-regulated vacant units. The process for getting a demolition approved through DHCR typically takes so long that some owners pay buyouts [far exceeding these amounts](https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/demolition-rent-stabilized-buyout-relocation-landlord-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). One change that could make this process easier is to let owners temporarily relocate tenants during construction, with a guaranteed right to return at the same stabilized rent once the work is done. This is the same approach NYCHA uses when a development undergoes substantial redevelopment. The 57,000 vacant rent-stabilized units could help serve as an important flex space to host rent-stabilized tenants while their buildings are under renovation. An additional change necessary for this policy to work is to allow newly created units in what are now fully rent-stabilized buildings to become market-rate themselves. This is essential to generate additional revenue and cross-subsidy, but existing law requires that new units be pulled into stabilization. **Fix the property tax.** This is a big one, and it’s essential. Many renters in rent-stabilized units face poor and worsening housing conditions, and rightfully question where their rent checks are going. The answer, in many cases, is to the government: property taxes are by far the largest component of building expenses, accounting for around 31% of rental payments. The Furman Center has done a great job at [documenting](https://www.furmancenter.org/soc-report/state-of-the-city-2025/nycs-property-tax-system/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the inherent inequities in the tax system for multifamily buildings, with rentals paying a far higher tax rate than single-family homes, and rent-stabilized units having the worst tax treatment of all. That’s truly regressive, given that renters have incomes half that of owners, on [average](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A broader property tax system to fix these inequities would be wonderful — and would provide the genuine cost decrease to justify a rent freeze. But if a broader fix cannot be worked out, the Furman Center highlighted one issue in particular that needs to be addressed. The City’s Department of Finance applies standardized expense ratios. This means that rent-stabilized units nearing the doom loop actually have steadily rising property tax bills even as their true profits dwindle. This issue has crept up on the city as expense ratios have steadily risen. But the good news is that it can be fixed by the City on its own, without the broader discussions with Albany that have to take place for broader property tax reform. This could be done, as the Furman Center suggests, by the Department of Finance creating a distinct subcategory for 90% stabilized buildings and creating a specific expense cap for this segment, recognizing the higher genuine costs these owners face. **Create an as-of-right conversion to “affordable” status**. Many of the issues at the heart of the distressed rent-stabilized stock stem from its peculiar status. Despite the fact that these units house low-income tenants at below-market rate, they receive none of the tax relief or rental support the City routinely extends to housing formally designated as “affordable.” A standing pathway to convert them could close this gap. Article XI of the Private Housing Finance Law allows the City to trade a property tax exemption for a binding affordability commitment. This means that owners get a break in these expenses, but must pass this along to renters. Somewhat confusingly, “affordability” is distinct from stabilization. Rent stabilization only regulates the rate of increase in rents, but says nothing about the level that rents start at or about the characteristics of who lives in the unit. A stabilized rent can be $1,200 or $3,400, and be rented out to a household earning minimum wage or over six figures (30% of rent-stabilized residents [currently fall](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the six-figure category). Affordability status instead regulates the level of rents as a fraction of the Area Median Income, is typically accompanied by income eligibility rules over who is allowed to move in, and is structured to allow access by housing voucher recipients also allows for access by voucher holder recipients, who bring excess income to owners on top of typical rents. In exchange, affordable buildings receive favorable property tax treatment. These buildings are therefore more financially viable for owners, while at the same time better targeted to needy renters. The problem is that this process for becoming an affordable building runs through a discretionary, case-by-case approach that few owners have been able to navigate. A standardized as-of-right swap would change that. It would allow for distressed assets to convert themselves into permanently affordable, voucher-accessible housing. This could happen without requiring a costly third-party transfer agreement that commonly costs the City a multiple of the building’s value. **Rebuild J-51 as a preservation finance tool**. A major toolkit for helping to finance capital improvements on buildings was the ability to raise rents when making Major Capital Improvements (covering building-wide systems like roofs or boilers) or Individual Apartment Improvements (covering in-unit upgrades like kitchens or baths). Both let landlords recover those costs by charging rents above the Rent Guidelines Board’s annual limits. The 2019 rent law change limited these tools substantially, stretching MCI recoupment, imposing a 2% annual cap, and making the increases temporary. IAIs were capped at $15,000 over 15 years, an amortized limit of $89 a month, across no more than three improvements. Subsequent amendments have slightly limited these limits, but the basic limits remain. These tools had a downside for tenants: Capital costs were passed to tenants as permanent rent changes. But removing their viability has left buildings without viable financing vehicles to pay for upkeep. The right design here would offer generous tax abatement policies that lower existing property taxes in exchange for investments in building-system replacement, but without passing on increases as rents. This is how the J-51 program currently works, making it the right tool for the job. This provides targeted capital relief to landowners in exchange for a property tax abatement, which lowers costs for landowners, without rental increases. **Rent freezes for tenants**. New York City already has two programs that freeze rents for tenants regardless of what happens to building-level rents: one, called SCRIE, freezes rents for low-income seniors, while DRIE freezes them for low-income tenants with disabilities — protecting the finances of vulnerable households while still allowing landlords to raise rents on households with the ability to pay. We should add a third component: a freeze for *all low-income households* in *all stabilized units*, regardless of age or disability status. Exactly because rent stabilization has no inherent income targeting, a more targeted and means-tested rent freeze program would protect the most vulnerable tenants. This design would offer existing tenants the stability that rent freezes promise, without defunding buildings. By only freezing the incremental increase in rents, this program would also be much cheaper than open-ended housing vouchers. **Condition the guideline on building conditions**. Finally, the rental adjustment process itself needs a change to address building conditions. The underlying issue with the current system is that rental adjustments are unconditional: A slumlord who allows the building to fall apart collects the same rental increases as a property owner who successfully upkeeps the building. This is important because we see neglect concentrating in the highly-stabilized, pre-1974 segment of the stock. The pre-1974, highly rent-stabilized segment has more building violations, an indication of worse building conditions. These buildings have more violations when the fraction of stabilized apartments is higher. For many tenant advocates, the poor conditions in these buildings are a sign of owner greed. However, this building stock has lower violations the higher the fraction of market rate units. The reason is that the basic economics of maintenance rely on the difference between what a unit could fetch on the open market and what the owner is legally allowed to charge. Owners face large incentives in market-rate units for proper upkeep because failing to do so loses tenants and revenue. Quality and cash flows move together, so maintenance pays for itself. Rent stabilization breaks this link. Because the rent is fixed by the guidelines regardless of the unit’s condition, and because the below-market rents lock the tenants in place, stabilized tenants are captive. Even well-intentioned owners face a reality in this scenario that the cash flows to pay for upkeep are limited and tenants will not leave even if they fail to upkeep. Adding market-rate units in the building is a partial discipline on owners. In a mixed building, some share of tenants do pay for quality and will leave if the boiler fails or the lobby crumbles — so the owner has both the revenue and the reason to keep the building up, and that upkeep spills over onto the regulated units sharing the same roof and pipes. However, this incentive by itself is insufficient, especially in the fully stabilized buildings. For these units, it is critical to use regulatory tools to achieve the same incentives for building maintenance that prevail in the open market. The cleanest way to operationalize this is to tie eligibility for the rental guidelines increase to a reliable, already-existing distress signal: enrollment or eligibility for the city's Alternative Enforcement Program. AEP is HPD's enforcement tool for the worst-maintained buildings in the city. The city defines objective eligibility criteria based on the ratio of open hazardous (class "B") and immediately hazardous (class "C") code violations issued over the preceding five years, plus unpaid emergency-repair charges. A building that winds up in this poor condition would forfeit its guideline increase until it cures the conditions and is discharged. This shift would amount to a rent freeze for slumlords, and would build a maintenance incentive directly into rent stabilization: letting a building decay would now cost an owner real revenue, year after year, until the violations are fixed. ### What’s at stake The city’s rent stabilization system represents a unique legacy of affordable housing in a dense urban environment. It would be a tremendous housing failure to let this stock fall into deep disrepair and neglect, the consequences of which will be felt first and foremost by tenants themselves. At the same time, we must recognize that the political demand for a freeze exists because tenants in the legacy stock pay more and more every year for buildings that are getting worse because the system offers owners no revenue beyond rent increases from tenants. A rent freeze addresses tenant affordability in the short-run, but aggravates the long-term channel of viability. The agenda outlined here addresses the underlying problem in rent-stabilized housing by fixing the cause: giving every distressed unit a new revenue source in the form of new market units, tax breaks, or vouchers to generate economic and social diversity across this stock. Doing so will not require repealing the state’s 2019 rent reforms, litigating the freeze or displacing a single existing tenant. The only question is whether the City can act now, while the distress is evident and there is still time to shore up building health, or whether we will have to wait for a rerun of the Bronx in the 1970s to learn the lesson a second time. ### Darializa Avila Chevalier, Claire Valdez, Brad Lander, Zohran Mamdani and New York URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/darializa-avila-chevalier-claire-valdez-brad-lander-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T17:35:50.000Z What are we to make of the primary election wins of Darliaza Avila Chevalier, Claire Valdez and Brad Lander in New York? Six months after Zohran Mamdani became mayor, is it a new socialist dawn in America’s largest city? No — but I see at least five big lessons. ### Mamdani’s support matters. A lot. (In a primary. And in New York City.) The system that [unfortunately](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/imagine-a-real-new-york-mayoral-election/) prevails in House races across America is that candidates compete in low-turnout, closed primaries in Democratic or Republican districts made overwhelmingly safe thanks to aggressive partisan gerrymandering. This rewards candidates who play to the far left or the far right. (In the 2026 midterms, [fewer than a fifth](https://gothamist.com/news/voter-data-shows-lower-turnout-but-pockets-of-engagement-boosted-insurgent-candidates?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of Democratic voters in these districts cast ballots.) Candidates further to the left have a natural advantage in heavily partisan New York City districts, with one big caveat: Incumbents typically start out with a certain reflexive support among their constituents. This year, Mamdani — who has star power, charisma and intense popularity, especially among the city’s most progressive residents — made the bold (and according to many in the chattering class, foolish) decision to back two young Democratic Socialists against far more established politicians with strong progressive track records. There’s little question Chevalier and Valdez would have struggled mightily against Rep. Adriano Espaillat, the incumbent congressman, and Antonio Reynoso, the sitting borough president, if not for Mamdani’s relentless and effective boosterism on social media and on the streets, including creative and compelling ads during the Knicks’ finals run. The caveat here is that these three districts are among the furthest left-leaning in America. If a Chevalier-style candidate had been running in NY-12, where Micah Lasher prevailed over Alex Bores and many others, it’s unlikely he or she would’ve broken through even with Mamdani’s support. That is doubly or even triply true of districts outside the deepest-blue big cities. That said, is it fair to write off the Democratic Socialist victories as only the result of support from young, well-educated, wealthier transplants? No. While Chevalier and Valdez, like Mamdani last year, were backed more by these groups than by others, [they had a reasonably broad base of support from all types of voters](https://x.com/galendruke/status/2069870895351615677?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Chevalier, for instance, seems to have [won more black voters than Espaillat](https://x.com/MichaelLangeNYC/status/2070149166739738995?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While it’s important to keep the low turnout in mind and to understand that Democratic Socialism may be more popular among relatively well-to-do voters than among the working class and poor people it purports to champion, it’s [unhelpful and oversimplifying to suggest that these candidates only won thanks to one type of voter](https://votehub.com/2026/06/24/mamdanis-moment-new-york-primary-postmortem/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ### Never underestimate candidate quality. Say what you will about Darializa Avila Chevalier — and I’ll say some unkind but true things about her in a minute — she’s a talent. She communicates clearly and in language that resonates with many voters. That doesn’t entirely come through in [the transcript of the New York Editorial Board interview](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/p/darializa-avila-chevalier-on-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that I helped conduct with her, but it was definitely felt in the room. Chevalier was up against a five-term incumbent who had all the endorsements you could ask for but no special political skills. (Indeed, Reynoso had every endorsement under the sun from unions, proof that license to print dozens of labor logos on your direct mail doesn’t count for much, nor does access to what was once considered a difference-making get-out-the-vote operation.) While there was no similarly clear gulf in candidate quality between Valdez and Reynoso, Valdez had a special capacity to connect with young people in her district, many of whom came from other parts of the country looking to make it and are struggling to stay afloat here. Put a dud Socialist in her place and Reynoso may well have won. Something similar could be said of Lander’s defeat of Goldman. The incumbent comes across as a smart, dedicated public servant — but not as someone especially agile or compelling. And his ties to the district are much weaker than Lander’s; people in Brownstone Brooklyn have been seeing Lander on ballots for City Council, comptroller and mayor for many years now. Lander’s voice may drip with sanctimony, but he ran with more passion. He was both for and against more than Goldman, who struggled to communicate what his campaign was really about. ### To the furthest left voters, Israel-Gaza is about much more than just the Mideast. This brings us to Israel and Gaza. Growing numbers of Democrats are appalled by the reflexive U.S. establishment support of Israel amidst its continued brutal military campaign against Palestinians. As Dan Goldman found out, this anger extends even to Democrats who’ve spoken out against the Netanyahu government and attempted to impose consequences on Israel for overreaching. It glows so hot that, in the minds of some sizable number of New Yorkers, it justifies a local coffee shop [shaming Goldman and refusing to take his money](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jun/23/new-york-lawmaker-cafe-banned-pro-israel-view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for allegedly being a genocide apologist. Among small but growing numbers of leftists, mostly but not only young people, support for Israel as a Jewish state — Zionism — is itself disqualifying, an original sin. Other than the support of Mamdani, that’s the clearest thread uniting the big wins of Valdez, Chevalier and Lander. It’s unlikely that Israel and Gaza will prove as potent a political motivator as, say, [immigration policy](https://www.compactmag.com/article/mamdani-is-trumpifying-the-democrats/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which shapes every aspect of American life. But there’s no question that it is serving as a litmus test in safe Democratic districts in New York and elsewhere. That’s not only because voters increasingly side with Palestinians, but because support for Israel and Zionism is viewed as a broader proxy for establishmentarianism. There’s some truth to this; the strength of the Israel-U.S. relationship isn’t unrelated to the fact that some Jewish New Yorkers and Americans are wealthy, prominent and powerful. The moment you write that, it [begins to sound anti-Semitic](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/18/aipac-looms-large-ahead-of-new-york-primaries-00967068?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and to some on the left, a general suspicion of Jews’ influence certainly does enter the calculus. But step back and it makes perfect sense for idealistic voters who are throwing off establishment politics to connect a perceived failure of the governing class to serve the needs of working people to the continued sending of billions of dollars to a close ally they believe is perpetrating a genocide. ### It helps to stand for something. Democratic Socialism has never been my cup of coffee — but in a low-turnout primary in which many of those motivated to turn out are eager to bring the fight to Donald Trump, it can connect, in part, because the candidates who support it can speak loudly and clearly about what they’re for. They want health care for all, decommodified housing, much higher taxes on the wealthy, much more government spending, strong limitations on corporate power and more. They want ICE to be abolished, full stop. They want much more school spending, [a funny thing to demand](https://joshgreenman.substack.com/p/zohran-mamdani-radical?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in a city that already spends [$40,000 per pupil](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/04/new-york-city-schools-budget/686971/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that’s struggling to abide by a costly, unfunded and arbitrary class-size reduction mandate and that [holds schools harmless when they lose enrollment](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2026/06/22/hold-harmless-costs-grow-enrollment-losses-continue/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). So the clarity of their message may not make much sense, but it can resonate when the alternative rhetoric sounds like a muddle. What this means to someone like me, who generally sides with more pragmatic Democrats, is that the party's moderates need to articulate an affirmative agenda in compelling terms. Can mainstream Democrats unite around a persuasive, easy-to-understand agenda to grow and strengthen American families? To make housing more plentiful and easier to build? To answer worries about AI? ([Bernie Sanders’ call](https://www.sanders.senate.gov/press-releases/news-sanders-introduces-legislation-to-create-7-trillion-ai-sovereign-wealth-fund/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to give the public a 50% stake in the largest AI companies by creating a sovereign wealth fund, one especially interesting proposal, [has the approval of Micah Lasher, who won the NY-12 primary against Alex Bores, who foregrounded AI in his campaign](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/p/micah-lasher-on-housing-immigration?utm%5Fsource=post-email-title&publication%5Fid=3498939&post%5Fid=201160075&utm%5Fcampaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=2ihec2&triedRedirect=true&utm%5Fmedium=email).) Something else? We haven’t seen such an agenda emerge yet. ### Chevalier will be a political liability to national Democrats. We don’t know exactly what type of congresswoman Chevalier will be. She’s just 32\. But all signals are that the Ph.D. student in sociology will be every bit as potent an avatar for what conservatives and independents across the country see as loony leftism as someone like Marjorie Taylor Greene has been for the excesses of far-right ideology. In [that New York Editorial Board interview](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/p/darializa-avila-chevalier-on-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we asked Chevalier under what conditions she thought it was OK to deport people. Her answer was absolute: Deportations are never okay, not even of violent criminals. We also asked her whether murderers should serve time in prison. She refused to say yes; in her world, we must build a utopian society in which nobody hurts anyone. (She’s also for abolishing police, a topic we didn’t get to in our hourlong sitdown.) The point is that it’s well and good for the far left to exult when they manage to get their candidates into office. But it remains to be seen what actual difference the back-bench House presence of someone like Chevalier (or, to a lesser extent, Valdez) will make in the lives of their constituents. And politically speaking, if history is any judge, there’s likely to be an equal and opposite reaction to their ascent. ### The Myth of Millionaire Flight URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-myth-of-millionaire-flight/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T16:59:32.000Z --- *New York might be next in a growing line of states adopting millionaire taxes — and the same old fear comes with it: tax the rich too hard and they'll leave, taking their businesses and their tax revenue with them. Cristobal Young, an economic sociologist at Cornell, has spent over twenty years testing that fear against actual IRS data, going back to New Jersey's first millionaire tax fight in 2004\. His finding, consistently: millionaires barely move at all, and when they do, it's rarely for tax reasons. Jamie talks with Young about why a wealth tax on people like Elon Musk might be worth the administrative headache and why — twenty years in — the deepest driver of where people live still isn't the tax code.* *You can listen to the podcast on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-myth-of-millionaire-flight/id1794619189?i=1000773984795&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/16oKy9GpqpHNFQYQMwLClB?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### What AI Can Do for Cities URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/josh-tyrangiel-interview-ai-city-government/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T14:50:04.000Z *Most human intelligence about artificial intelligence falls into one of two camps. The accelerationists promise that AI will cure cancer, fix the climate and usher in a golden age. The doomers warn that it will eliminate our jobs, hollow out our institutions and possibly even end the species.* *Josh Tyrangiel — a longtime journalist who is now a writer at The Atlantic — went looking for the people in between. His new book,* [*“AI for Good: How Real People Are Using Artificial Intelligence to Fix Things That Matter,”*](https://www.amazon.com/AI-Good-People-Artificial-Intelligence/dp/1668082500?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *reports from inside the Cleveland Clinic, the IRS, a school district in Indiana and a Pentagon war room. The people are doctors, teachers, engineers and civil servants trying to use AI to reduce the friction of real institutions — messy data, misaligned incentives and bureaucracies built decades before the technology existed.* *We asked Tyrangiel to walk us through what he found, and what it means for New York. Among other things, the conversation touched on classroom rules and the temptation of cheating; lessons that the IRS, of all places, has to offer city government; and whether AI can finally unstick the permitting process.* *Tyrangiel is an optimist, but a chastened one. He has been through enough technology cycles to know that passivity in the face of a powerful new tool tends to produce the worst version of them. The work, he argues, is to be neither dazzled nor afraid — but to insist that human judgment stay in the loop.* *The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity.* --- **Vital City:** The conversation around AI is polarized, like so many other things. Your book is an attempt to weigh both sides of the debate, but you ultimately come out with a fairly positive read of what the technology can accomplish. Can you talk about why you came down there and whether you struggled with that conclusion? **Josh Tyrangiel:** I approached the whole thing from a place of detachment, because that's what a good journalist is supposed to do. On the accelerationist utopian side, inevitably I heard that we were on the verge of an incredible breakthrough. Our lives were going to be so much richer and so much better, cancer was going to get cured, climate change was going to be mitigated. At a certain point, it was clear this had become a kind of dogma. So I would say, "Tell me more about how the cancer curing is going to happen." You'd find they actually hadn't thought about that. It was just their plucked example of how much better things would be. Then I would talk to people who were like, "You have no idea. You better pick a side. You have to come with me if you want to live." — basically quoting The Terminator. I thought, oh, boy. Both sides might be right, but my hunch, having been through one or two of these moments before, is that the answer's somewhere in the middle, and that we may not be dealing with a deity, but we may be dealing with something a lot better than the other software we've seen. So my goal was to get as far away as possible from the extremes and figure out how people are using the technology right now, to make the things that I care about better — the lives of my family and my children, the health of the republic, the quality of life of all the people around me. Naturally, that meant going into healthcare and hospitals, education, government agencies and human connection. **Vital City:** The two extremes seem to agree on one thing: This is really powerful technology, and it's going to mean massive change. **Josh Tyrangiel:** I do think the technology itself is incredibly powerful. I also think it's important to parse what that power is. The name "artificial intelligence" is very deceptive. What this actually is, is human intelligence on steroids. It’s taking tons of data created by human beings and processing it at speeds and at a volume that human beings simply can't. It's going to take us some time to adjust to how that works. There are downsides. People are very impressed with speed, but speed isn't always quality. Even now, you'll get hallucinations, and those can be meaningful if they turn up in the wrong documents — health studies, legal documents. You're also not getting real-time feedback from human beings into the state of our systems and the states of our needs and desires. It's almost like this abstracted power right now, and it's very seductive. But that doesn't mean it arrives without complications, and it doesn't mean there's no place for humans in managing it and bringing it into the systems and institutions we care about. **Vital City:** It's not just speed — it's the authoritativeness of presentation. It can produce things that just look so good, so polished. **Josh Tyrangiel:** Yes, It produces results that convey an aura of certainty. Part of that is the programming, and part is just the speed. It produces so fast that you're like, "Wow." But we need this kind of secondary response, which is, okay, how good is this really? The trick is dazzling, but you have to sit there for a minute and process it with your own brain to understand where it's maybe a little less dazzling than it may have seemed. That's going to take years of adjustment. **Vital City:** You spend a lot of time in the book on the use and misuse of AI in education. Public education has so many tech failures littered through its recent history. Already we've seen a number of AI failures, but we've also seen some qualified successes. As the New York City Department of Education or any other department of education thinks about how to actually use the technology, what level of concern should they have? Should they look at this like a threat? A tool? Something else? **Josh Tyrangiel:** They should look at it as both. It's a threat in that if you've structured your curriculum solely to assess credentials, you have to know that every student out there has the ability to fake their way to a credential. So there needs to be a wholesale examination inside of education: What are we doing here? You've already seen a rise in blue books and oral exams — those changes will probably continue. I also think there needs to be some questioning about what the function of the classroom is. Is it merely to get a student to a credential, or do we want to focus on identity formation, on teaching kids who they are in relation to the world? Should we be changing the criteria for what the classroom is about — from "You've got to get to this number on a quiz," to a deeper form of moral and intellectual education? **Vital City:** I saw something the other day on social media saying that the acquisition of knowledge in the age of AI is going to distinguish kids from one another — that AI is so authoritative-seeming that you need actual grounding to know when to take it seriously and when not, and the only thing that gives you that is knowledge. Do you buy that the rise of AI actually places a premium on knowledge acquisition in K–12 education, or is that just spin? **Josh Tyrangiel:** I don't know, honestly. It's too early to tell. What we're going to see is the high flyers are going to be just fine. The self-motivated kids are going to use these tools to get themselves higher up and learn more. The risk, as always, is in the middle and the bottom of the class. The temptation to use these tools to just get by is going to be off the charts, and all of us can relate to that. We all have something that feels like drudgery in our lives, and we'd love to find hacks to get away from it. The vulnerability of those kids to missing out on the experience of struggle and of practice is significant. What I discovered in my reporting is that when you take an AI tool like Khanmigo — an AI tutor that’s a joint venture between Khan Academy and OpenAI and you just put it into schools in front of students, the reaction's sort of like, "Mm, I have lots of software." They've got laptops and open tabs, and this is just one more thing. The only difference is that it won't give you the answer. The tool was designed in the style of a tutor, and it's supposed to bring you along at your own skill level, in the proximal zone of development. So if a kid is a high flyer and wants practice, it's great. There aren't that many high flyers. But what I did see is that teachers were able to use the tool in far more productive, and in some cases, really revolutionary ways. At its heart, it's an LLM designed to the curriculum of your district. I watched a couple of teachers who had come to the realization through COVID that standing in front of the classroom, broadcasting knowledge to their students and then assessing their receptivity to it, is really not working anymore. Kids are distracted. Kids learn in very different ways. So they reinvented their teaching styles on the fly, and turned things into all sorts of collaborative labs, assessments through group conversation. That kind of transition ordinarily takes years of trial and error but some of these teachers are using Khanmigo to do it the day before class or between classes. Not every teacher. But some have begun to figure out that the tool is far more powerful for them than it is for their students. The teachers' union today put out a statement basically saying they want no AI tools in schools, particularly in younger grades. I get it. We're going to see a series of pendulum-swinging responses over the next couple of years: let's ban it all, let's bring it back, let's find a middle ground. But what I saw left me pretty hopeful that AI can help teachers change things. **Vital City:** If you had to write a rule for how students should or shouldn't be able to interact with AI in the classroom, would you write a rigid rule at this point, or would it be more flexible? **Josh Tyrangiel:** You'd have to be flexible, because we just don't know enough. First of all, every superintendent will tell you they have no idea what can happen in an individual classroom. l think the variation from classroom to classroom and teacher to teacher is a feature, not a bug. If we look at it that way, maybe we can rapidly figure out what's working. You don't want to treat your schools as laboratories haphazardly. So much of ed tech, to me — the flagrant disregard for what's actually supposed to happen in the classroom in service of somebody's brilliant tech idea — is just appalling. That's why it fails, time and again. You design a system and expect the students and teachers to adjust to it, as opposed to having a system that works at the rhythm of the classroom. If I were in the very challenging job of designing AI policy for education, I'd say we need a systematic way of experimenting and rapidly apprehending what works in what classes, so we have examples. In this Indiana school district I visited — it's small, run by a ferocious superintendent — she was committed to two things. One, rapid experimentation: getting AI into the classroom so that students understood it was there, so that teachers understood it was there, so that they felt like they weren't King Canute holding back the waves. Two, a massive commitment to professional development, where teachers come in and say, "I learned this, and it does this really, really well. And oh, by the way, it does this kind of poorly, so I adjusted my class." That is a lot to expect of teachers and of kids. When we talk about the current environment where people really resent AI, I think a large part of the reason, justifiably, is that this tech has arrived and we're all being told, "Change everything." It's hard to change everything. I like the way I do certain things in my life. At the same time, we kind of have to rise to the challenge, because if we don't, we now have 25 years of experience that teaches us that when you're passive in the wave of technology, you generally get the worst out of it. Social media — we were all so optimistic, we were all so dazzled and we ended up with crap that undermined the republic. I know it stinks to have to adjust and change who you are, but there is upside here, and leadership has to be ready to motivate people, to incentivize people to actually use it for the good — because otherwise we know what the bad looks like. **Vital City:** Let's transition to government service delivery more broadly. There are fears that AI's going to replace white-collar jobs, knowledge jobs, en masse. There are also hopes that AI can make taxpayer dollars go further. That's actually a version of the same idea — maybe we don't need 300,000, or however many, New York City public employees if 250,000 equipped with AI tools can do the job as well. What is the right way to strike a balance here? We don’t want to strike fear in the hearts of every public service employee that their job is on the chopping block, but we do want to find efficiencies and maybe even help government do better. **Josh Tyrangiel:** It's hard to call out the IRS as a paragon of wise management when it comes to technology. But I did a ton of reporting around what the IRS was up to with its technology stack. There are certain rules the federal government has about tasks that are inherently governmental. They have so many regulations around what they can do, and they also have so much political pressure, because so many elected members and so many voters actually don't want the IRS to be successful. But what they were able to carry out, very quietly, was to explain to the thousands of engineers inside the IRS that these tools were important. They were going to make their lives easier. They were going to make the IRS function better. They were going to open up possibilities for more pride in the organization — that by using tools that could do the work faster and cleaner, and they'd create a better customer experience. They oriented people around two things. One, used properly, the tools were going to be successful. Two — and this is true for everything I explored — none of this stuff works without humans in the loop. One of the great myths of AI is that you just roll it out, it works itself into the enterprise or into the corporation, and all of a sudden everything's great. It turns out that's just not true. All of this stuff needs really wise Sherpas — first to get it accepted into the organization and into its systems, but then to calibrate how people use it. **Vital City:** Stephen Goldsmith [wrote a piece for Vital City saying that "accountable discretion" is the model](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-government-ai-accountability-discretion/) — that AI actually makes it possible for a bureaucrat, who once upon a time simply had an enormous stack of rules to follow, to have a more flexible way of navigating them, with a lot of information that can lead to smarter human judgment. **Josh Tyrangiel:** I think that's right. When you look at New York City, it's largely governed by massive stacks of paper, some of them dating back 100 years or more. For a lot of employees in city agencies, most of what they're doing is consulting a different kind of code. The law is a kind of code. Regulations are a kind of code. For people to dive into this antiquated code and then figure out how it applies to the real world is very complicated. The reason AI is so powerful with things like the law and regs and tax is it's basically the same thing — a series of rules. So it can manage document comparison. It can take a permit application, look at the law as currently stated, and give you a recommendation rather quickly. What it can't do is know the details. It can't know little things about the geography. It can't walk the street. There are all these ways where the discretion of the employee becomes so much more valuable and the drudgery is outsourced. It's not going to be true in every case, and I'm very sensitive to the fact that some people feed their families based on their tolerance for drudgery, and we want to be careful about that. But what I saw time and again is that the tech is more than ready to help us improve government. I don't sense yet that leadership understands that and is willing to have the pretty complicated conversations with employees about how we're going to navigate this together. But I'm very convinced the technology can do the job. **Vital City:** If the government is making a decision on a potential sanction — or for permission to do something — that involves 20 or 25 steps, and at step 17 the AI makes an error, how would we know, if humans aren't checking every step of the way? And if they are checking, doesn’t that defeat the purpose of AI? **Josh Tyrangiel:** You're baselining your expectation on a perfect human system. What we've seen in the federal government is that [a very high rate of food stamp applications were rejected incorrectly](https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/caper?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as recently as a couple of years ago. So can we get better than that? I think we can. You're not going to have a perfect system. You are always going to have errors within AI. There's no question about it. But you can certainly reduce them, and I also think you can reduce the time to judgment. In New York City, every single person complains about permitting, no matter what business they're in — from food carts to buildings. Everybody has the same experience: the paperwork is cumbersome, often they need expediters and a single mistake will slow the process or send it back to the beginning. There's really no reason we cannot take everything we know about permitting and create a portal for people to test out their initial pass, so they can find out what errors they made — or may possibly have made — before submission. If we can get better, cleaner paperwork to the people making decisions about permits, think about the thousands of hours saved. Think about the productivity, the speed to building, the bias toward action, as opposed to this pervasive air of entropy. It’s true that we're going to have some errors with AI. But we have errors now. **Vital City:** In New York City today, we have a transit system that, by law and contract, requires two people to run every single subway train. At the same time, we have Waymo trying to get in on the streets, which uses zero people in every car. A lot of people who worry about congestion have very well-intentioned objections to Waymo's entry. They argue Waymo could be dangerous — even though plenty of research says that driverless cars are safer than cars driven by people. Should New York lift its current ban on driverless cars? And if it does, what's the path? **Josh Tyrangiel:** It's a big question, and the answer comes down to one word: politics. Politics doesn't have to be rational, and oftentimes the lack of rationality is helpful — because New York is a vibe. The mayor's top job is to understand the vibe. If what the politician understands is, "Oh, there is resentment, rational or irrational, to these cars with no drivers, but people are comfortable with two operators on every train, even though trains all around the world operate with zero conductors" — that's where the system collides with the human beings. That's why so much of this really revolves around the people doing the work. The tech is complicated. But what human beings do is assess the other human beings on the other side of the equation. When we look at these labs, we ask, "Do I trust Sam Altman? Do I trust him more than Dario Amodei?" It's natural for us to focus on those human beings in making our judgment about the tech, in the same way that it will be natural for politicians to focus on the human beings if they implement the regulations. Whether we want it or not, human-centered AI is still going to have to be the answer, because you can't just plug this stuff in and expect it to work. So the burden is going to be on people's assessment of the tolerance for change, of the appetite for change. **Vital City:** What does the right balance look like on the roads? If you save some number of lives by replacing human-driven cars with driverless cars, that's a good thing. On the other hand, maybe you've lost a much larger number of driver jobs. How do you put those inputs in and figure out whether it's a good or a bad thing? **Josh Tyrangiel:** Some of this is economics. When we get this kind of general purpose technology and this much change, ideally it comes in at a pace at which you can maximize the economic benefit while minimizing the harm. The benefit in this case being greater productivity; the harm being mass displacement of labor. It's really hard to do, because we live in a capitalist system where there are a lot of incentives to get the drivers out, because drivers are a cost center. For the city, that's a disaster — tens of thousands of jobs. Across the country, multi-millions. So we want this to happen at a natural rate of adjustment, so that people's lives aren't so displaced. But there are two forces at work: the people who are actually doing this work and who are going to have to change, and the people forcing the change upon the country. I hate to keep reverting to politics, but it's our best hope for managing this change. We know what happens if the tech guys are left to their own devices. They're going to force change, and we've had 25 years, particularly in this century, of watching the consequences. People are very, very angry about it. What I would expect — and we've already seen some of this in the city, but I would expect it nationally — is that AI, as it pervades the economy, is going to be the number one issue, possibly as soon as 2026, certainly by 2028\. People are beginning to understand just how many ripple effects it has. When it comes to good policy, I think we have good answers to how we might want to implement it. But it is going to run into the brick wall of human beings, and for that it requires knowledgeable politicians. --- *Disclosure: Josh Tyrangiel's wife and partner, Sarah Feinberg, is the former president of New York City Transit.* ### Taxing Land: An Old Idea is New Again URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/value-capture-land-tax-transit-funding-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T15:59:27.000Z The state budget provisions for funding New York City’s ambitious transit projects contain references to financing models that may sound exotic, like “value capture” and a “land tax.” But the underlying concept is remarkably simple: When a city builds a new subway line, property values go up. So why not ask the adjacent private landowners to help pay for the projects that are creating so much wealth? The idea of value capture — the recovery of a portion of increased private property values that are generated by public investments — has been around for centuries, and is widely in use in Europe, Asia and Latin America. It is getting fresh consideration after it was revealed earlier this month that New York State’s FY 2027 budget included proposals to use alternative funding mechanisms to build two new transit projects: the next stage of the Second Avenue subway along Manhattan’s Upper East Side (estimated cost: $7 billion), and the Interborough Express or IBX (estimated cost: $5.5 billion), running from Brooklyn to Queens, which would be the city’s first new end-to-end rapid transit line in almost a century. With federal funding in doubt, government agencies have been empowered to “capture” the added value that the IBX and the Second Avenue subway extension will create. The mechanisms that would be used, according to an analysis by [The Niskanen Center](https://www.niskanencenter.org/new-york-state-authorizes-a-land-value-tax-that-could-provide-billions-for-transit-investment/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), include new taxes that the City can impose on property owners along the new transit lines, especially at the stations: special transit assessments — a kind of real estate surcharge in designated zones along a transit corridor — and a version of the [land value tax](https://www.lincolninst.edu/pt-br/publications/articles/land-value-taxation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which takes into account the positive impact that public investments have on the value of privately owned urban land. Essentially, property on land near the new transit line will automatically be assessed at a higher rate. The stepped-up tax revenue would go directly to pay for the rail lines themselves, potentially representing billions in funding not otherwise available. Acknowledging the true interplay between infrastructure and real estate is the fiscal equivalent of saying the quiet part out loud. For the most part, landowners over time have enjoyed a free ride as they benefit from the government’s provision of streets, water and sewer, railroads and highways. With land value capture (generally a one-time charge on new development to pay for a specific project) or the land tax (a more permanent system of assessing land, whether it’s developed or not), the private sector pays a modest portion of that public investment. It’s an honest and transparent recognition of what actually happens once the tunnels are bored and the turnstiles are spinning. There are few certainties in life, but the essential premise of value capture — that transportation infrastructure will enhance property values for adjacent landowners — is about as close to a sure thing as it gets. Extensive empirical evidence underscores what is understood intuitively. The increase in value is known as the land value increment, and it can be measured. In the 2020 study [“Take the Q Train,”](https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-papers/take-q-train/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) originally published as a working paper by our institute, economists Arpit Gupta, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Constantine Kontokosta found that property values jumped 8% in the initial phase of the Second Avenue subway extension — a higher increase than in other parts of the Upper East Side without direct access to transit. The grand total was $5.5 billion in “uplift,” an apt term for the prosperity that public investment brings. That would be enough to pay for the $4.5 billion two-mile extension from 63rd to 96th Street — with $1 billion left over. The Q train project is just the latest demonstration of how increases in property value can be recovered. At the Lincoln Institute, we’ve been studying value capture and the land tax for decades. These financing tools have been successfully implemented all [around the world](https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/2022-07-new-compendium-60-countries-land-value-capture-fund-infrastructure/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to pay for major transportation projects: - **United Kingdom**. The city of London established a series of property tax and development [surcharges](about:blank) to help pay for the $20 billion Crossrail (Elizabeth Line) — a cross-cutting and inter-connecting transit service similar to the proposed IBX in New York City — on the premise that increased mobility was an economic boost for not only adjacent commercial and residential development but virtually all businesses across the city. - **Asia**. Widely used in Japan, Hong Kong and elsewhere and known as the [Rail plus Property model](https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/the-rail-plus-property-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), land value capture has been providing billions for transportation projects throughout Asia and Australia. Hong Kong’s transit agency, the MTR Corporation (MTRC) acquires development rights for land above and around transit stations, builds mixed-use transit-oriented development projects itself, and thus captures the surge in land value prompted by new railway lines. - **Latin America.** In Brazil, São Paulo auctions building rights to developers and the proceeds are used to fund transit and other amenities; in Bogotá, Colombia and the southern Brazilian city of Curitiba, special fees called betterment levies, applied to landowners and developers in upzoned areas around stations, have helped pay for Bus Rapid Transit systems. In the U.S., the adoption of these financial instruments has been a little slower, but nonetheless some version of value capture (and to a lesser extent the land tax, most recently proposed in [Detroit](https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/other/split-rate-property-taxation-in-detroit/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) has been instituted with great success. The extension of the No. 7 subway line in Manhattan, including new stations, was partially funded through a kind of pre-payment of property taxes by the developers of Hudson Yards on Manhattan’s West Side waterfront. In Massachusetts, developers have made agreements to help build station facilities along the Green Line extension through Somerville and at a redeveloped industrial site called Assembly Square along the Orange Line; the New Balance shoe company financed a commuter rail station in Allston-Brighton. In the early 20th century in the U.S., the connection between transportation and land use was so obvious, landowners and developers financed their own trolley lines to bring people and businesses to the new frontier of “streetcar suburbs.” Though the private companies rushed to hand the operation of the new routes back over to government to run, they well understood the essential value capture proposition: Building transit lines is what makes development so lucrative. Governments and public authorities do all the building these days, boring tunnels and laying down tracks, often in challenging conditions in the existing urban landscape. In value capture, the public sector simply asks the private sector to chip in. Value capture has been used in other circumstances besides funding transit. Private landowners reap financial benefits when a new public park is built, for example. At a basic level, when local government approves a major zoning change, that itself instantly increases land and property values. A number of financing mechanisms are based on the premise that public investments and actions are inextricably linked with private profit, including direct charges for building rights, density bonuses, betterment contributions, exactions and impact fees and Business Improvement Districts. Far from a newfangled public finance strategy, value capture has a long and interesting history through centuries of city-building, beginning with the construction of aqueducts in ancient Rome, and continuing with Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann’s redevelopment of Paris, where a portion of real estate profits helped fund monuments and public squares. The concept is also inherent in the writing of political economist Henry George, who argued that the staggering wealth being accrued by landowners was “unearned” profits — not due to anything they did, but rather directly attributed to the government actions and public investments that created value for their property. In today’s tumultuous public finance environment, the value capture-land value tax approach is worth a look by state and local governments searching for ways to fund transit, including in those places where other methods of raising revenue have not been popular — a rejected gas and payroll tax in [Oregon](https://www.opb.org/article/2026/06/02/transportation-funding-oregon-workgroup/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, or the [“car tab”](https://www.theurbanist.org/wilson-proposes-doubling-seattle-transit-measure-to-expand-bus-frequencies/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) surcharge on private automobiles in Washington state. And while voters have been willing to agree to small increases in the sales tax to fund transit, most notably in [Denver](https://5280.com/how-denvers-public-transportation-projects-do-and-dont-get-funded/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but also in [California](https://www.kqed.org/news/12085563/early-returns-show-strong-support-for-smart-tax-extension-in-sonoma-marin?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and many other jurisdictions, hikes in a tax that all consumers pay regardless of whether they use the transit systems cannot likely go on indefinitely. In embracing this simple and elegant funding mechanism, New York will be in good company — joining cities around the world that recognize the virtuous cycle of bold public investments in transportation infrastructure and sustained economic success. ### Put a Price on Street Parking, Generate Billions URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/street-parking-charge-transit-funding-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T17:23:23.000Z New York’s transportation politics have entered a new era. After years of debate, congestion pricing has demonstrated that there are [public benefits](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/less-traffic-better-transit-its-first-anniversary-governor-hochul-celebrates-transformational?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to charging for the use of scarce street space. Yet one of the city’s largest transportation subsidies remains almost untouched: curb parking. Across most of New York City, public land worth billions is still given away for free to store private cars. This implicit subsidy privileges drivers, contributes to congestion and curb overcrowding and leaves substantial public revenue untapped even as the Metropolitan Transit Authority faces persistent [funding gaps](https://joshgreenman1973.github.io/experiments/nyc-parking-revenue/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). New York City’s finances are under pressure; its curb parking is a major opportunity. While revenue should be seen as a byproduct of [better curb management](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308904293%5FThe%5FRight%5FPrice%5Ffor%5FCurb%5FParking?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), rather than the main goal, the fiscal upside is hard to ignore. According to transportation engineer Sam Schwartz (no relation), chair of the [Transportation Research Program at Roosevelt House](https://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/sam-schwartz-transportation-research-program-sstrp/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the city has over one million curb spaces that are free to use, for practically unlimited amounts of time. (Sam Schwartz’s estimate of one million spaces is based on his experience as New York City’s traffic commissioner and subtracts curb space in illegal zones, i.e. bus lanes, No Standing areas, curb cuts, space around hydrants and areas where there would be little or no demand for parking. Previous attempts to count the number of spaces, which have put the number at closer to 3 million, set a theoretical limit based on linear curb space.) Charging an average of just $35 per space per week — the most you would pay in a week for unlimited transit — could generate nearly $2 billion annually. That’s more than [three times the revenue](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/less-traffic-better-transit-its-first-anniversary-governor-hochul-celebrates-transformational?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the City’s new congestion pricing program. Mayor Zohran Mamdani campaigned on a platform of economic justice. While it’s not the only reason to change parking policy, charging for curb space aligns with that goal. Fewer than half of New York City households own a car, and throughout the city, car-owning households have [nearly twice the median income](https://www.hunterurban.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Car-Light-NYC-Infographics-May-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of non-car households. By keeping curb parking free, the City gives up revenue that could support public services for everyone and instead delivers a multi-million-dollar subsidy that lets wealthier residents store their cars. A famous [study](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0739456X221141317?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#fn7-0739456X221141317) of Manhattan’s Upper West Side by Donald Shoup, the UCLA professor whose research inspired the creation of the [Center for Parking Policy](https://its.ucla.edu/programs/parking-center/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), estimated that free curb parking amounts to a subsidy of over $9,000 per parking space per year. But there is only one space for every 18 residents, so not everyone benefits, and those who do are disproportionately affluent. Only 27% of households own a car, and their average income is about $200,000, [compared with](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0739456X221141317?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#fn7-0739456X221141317) $105,000 for households without cars. It may help to think about it this way. Imagine the City proposed using public money to reimburse people for renting a parking space in a private garage. Most people would see that as inappropriate. But keeping curb parking free has the same effect; it’s just less visible. Free parking mostly benefits people who are not poor, and most low-income residents get no benefit. Free curb parking is more than a fiscal issue. As highlighted in a recent [New York Times article](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/06/09/nyregion/nyc-street-parking.html?smid=nytcore-android-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it also shapes how streets function. When street parking is free or underpriced relative to nearby garages, drivers often circle the area waiting for a curb space to open up. This [cruising](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856421001105?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) wastes drivers’ time and adds to traffic congestion for everyone on the road. Full curbs also lead to double parking and illegal stopping in loading areas and red zones, which slows traffic and creates risks for pedestrians, cyclists and other drivers. Regardless of the many benefits for cities on the whole of charging for street parking — and even for drivers, many of whom appreciate more efficient allocation of parking spaces — many drivers balk at the possibility of paying to park. However, [support can grow](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2210539517301244?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when revenues are clearly reinvested in services people value. In Portland, for example, parking revenues fund [“transportation wallets”](https://www.portland.gov/transportation/wallet?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that residents and employees can use for transit, bike share, car share and other mobility options. For low-income residents who rely on cars, the City might choose to offer targeted support. For example, Vancouver now charges [market-rate prices for parking permits](https://vancouver.ca/streets-transportation/west-end-parking-non-market-rates.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#fees) in its West End neighborhood but offers discounts for legacy permit holders and low-income residents. New York already adjusts [transit fares](https://www.nyc.gov/site/fairfares/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [congestion pricing](https://www.mta.info/fares-tolls/tolls/congestion-relief-zone/discounts-exemptions/low-income-discount-plan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) based on income, and parking policy could follow a similar approach. Every square foot of curb space reflects a policy choice. Right now, New York is choosing to subsidize private car storage even as it struggles to fund public transit. With its new [Office of Curb Management](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani-launches-office-of-curb-management-at-nyc-dot-to-m?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the City has an opening to rethink the curb and recognize the high costs of free parking. To illustrate the opportunity cost of the status quo and situate curb management within the broader transportation landscape, Vital City consulted with parking experts to develop a [revenue calculator](https://joshgreenman1973.github.io/experiments/nyc-parking-revenue/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that shows the revenue potential of different curb management strategies, highlights what the revenue could fund, and compares curb pricing approaches across peer cities. ### New York is the Town and the Team is the Knicks URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/knicks-champions-new-york-why-it-matters/ Last updated: 2026-06-22T18:45:19.000Z Tragedy, it had come to seem, was the only thing that could bring us together: One recalls, say, New Yorkers lining up to donate blood and food and clothing after 9/11, or banging pots each evening to honor our front-line medical workers during the pandemic. New York, apparently, was simply too large, too various, too set against itself in a thousand different ways to allow for the possibility of collective euphoria. That truism was decisively disproved late in the evening of June 13, 2026, when the New York Knicks defeated the San Antonio Spurs to win their first National Basketball Association championship since 1973, and New York City burst into paroxysms of unfettered joy not seen since perhaps [the celebrations of V-J Day](https://www.life.com/history/v-j-day-kiss-times-square/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The Knicks’ hold on New York is unique among the major sports, in that the city’s love for the team is both intense and nearly universal. For every Yankees fan who attends a victory parade, after all, a Mets fan stays home, muttering darkly about the Evil Empire; much the same is true in football, where the Jersey-based Giants and Jets grudgingly share a home in the manner of rivalrous siblings. In pro basketball, though, the Knicks’ only immediate competitors are the arriviste Nets, born not in the city but on Long Island, who decamped to New Jersey in 1977 only to return three decades later, like so many other regretful suburbanites, to a newly gentrified downtown Brooklyn, where they maintain an uneasy relationship with even their own modest fan base. While that other city game, stickball, has gone the way of [skelly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skully%5F%28game%29?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and chocolate malteds, basketball courts are still everywhere in New York, pick-up games played daily in gyms and playgrounds and schoolyards, on asphalt and concrete and polished parquet, with backboards made of glass or wood or sheet metal and the rims [often missing their nets](https://www.thecityreporter.nyc/2026/06/04/basketball-nets-playground-parks-hoops-parks/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The open-air courts on West 4th Street (“The Cage”) have now become something of a tourist attraction, and the Harlem-based summer tournament founded in 1950 by a city parks employee named Holcombe Rucker is a national phenomenon, the games attended by celebrities and NBA players alike. No court, however, is as celebrated as that of Madison Square Garden, the arena that has been known as “the Mecca of basketball” ever since the 1930s, when college basketball teams from around the country aspired to receive an invitation to one of the Garden’s prestigious weekend triple-headers, much as actors working on a new play in a community theater somewhere might dream of taking it to Broadway. Ever since the glorious championship years of 1970 and 1973, a Knicks game at Madison Square Garden has had the captivating, slightly louche glamour of a Sinatra concert or heavyweight prize fight. George Lois, the legendary ad man on whom Don Draper is said to have been based, owned four season tickets on the baseline. Nearer to center court was Woody Allen — the pre-scandal Woody Allen, that is, in the years when a new film of his premiering at the Beekman or the Ziegfeld was a big deal. Elliott Gould was a Garden regular, as was Zero Mostel, and William Goldman, the writer of many great films including “Marathon Man”; often on game nights the star of that film, Dustin Hoffman, could also be found sitting behind the Knicks bench. These days, celebrity row has diversified and now features Spike Lee (of course), as well as actors such as John Leguizamo, Tracy Morgan and Chris Rock, alongside hip-hop stars including Busta Rhymes, Fat Joe and Jay-Z. So it’s not at all surprising that it is the Knicks, rather than one of the city’s other sports teams, who are name-checked again and again in rap lyrics. This was true from the very beginning of the genre, in 1979’s “Rapper’s Delight,” when Big Bank Hank of the Sugarhill Gang rapped, So after school I take a dip in the pool, which is really on the wall / I got a color TV so I can see the Knicks play basketball*.* Later came Knicks shout-outs from, among others, Kurtis Blow, Doug E. Fresh, Beastie Boys, Lauryn Hill, Notorious B.I.G. and A Tribe Called Quest, who summed things up in their song “One Two Sh\*t”: *Money on my mind so never mind a trick / New York is the town and the team is the Knicks*. Rory Sparrow, Marvin Webster, Eddy Curry, Cleanthony Early, Kevin Knox, Maciej Lampe, Antonio McDyess, Iman Shumpert, Elfrid Payton, Immanuel Quickley: On and on the names toll in the minds of Knicks fans, like the casualty rolls of ill-fated battles. In each of these players (and innumerable others), we once invested our hopes, however briefly or foolishly, telling ourselves that perhaps, somehow, this year would be different. Much of the time, though, the Knicks were simply not very good; In the 23 seasons preceding the 2026 championship, they failed to qualify for the playoffs 16 times. For a while in the 1990s, a title seemed within reach; yet each time, deep into a playoff run, they were thwarted by the likes of a Michael Jordan, a Reggie Miller, a Hakeem Olajuwon or a Tim Duncan, but more than anything by their own mistakes. In 1993, in the Eastern Conference championship against the Chicago Bulls, Charles Smith — all 6-foot-10 of him — failed to sink a game-winning put-in under the basket not once or even twice, but four times; the next year, in Game 7 of the NBA Finals against the Houston Rockets, the Knicks’ long-range bomber, John Starks, shot 2 for 18, missing all 11 of his three-point attempts; the year after that, in Game 7 against the Indiana Pacers, the outstanding center Patrick Ewing missed a last-second finger roll that normally he would make in his sleep. Those were excellent Knicks teams, admirable in many ways, but they were not precisely lovable. There was something a bit blundering about them; they were too reliant on sheer physicality, too focused on toughness at the expense of intelligence, too primed for a fight. Just the opposite was true of the 2025-2026 edition of the Knicks, who, if anything, were criticized for being too soft, too passive, lacking the killer instinct necessary to win at the highest levels. Yet after an up-and-down season in which they finished third in their conference, these Knicks seemed all at once to find themselves in the playoffs. Suddenly the ball movement was crisp, the spacing impeccable, the team defense smothering. It was basketball of a kind we had not seen before. (Watching the Knicks dismantle the Cleveland Cavaliers in the Eastern Conference finals, one television commentator said that he felt he was watching an instructional video.) Across the entire postseason — during which they lost only three games, by a combined margin of six points — the Knicks accumulated a total point differential of +283 — not just the highest in the history of the franchise, but the highest in all of NBA postseason history, shattering the previous record set in 2017 by the Golden State Warriors’ so-called “super-team,” by 53 points. During one especially remarkable stretch, the Knicks won 13 straight playoff games, against the toughest competition the NBA had to offer. Even years from now, in recalling this championship team, we will still thrill to the silky grace of Mikal Bridges’ jumper, with its unusual, slightly off-center release; the astonishingly deft three-point shooting of the seven-footer Karl-Anthony Towns; Josh Hart’s lunch-pail rebounding, and his careening coast-to-coast rambles, and his half-playful, half-aggrieved sneer when contesting a referee’s whistle (much like Kevin McHale before him, Hart seems to believe that he has never committed a foul in his NBA career); the playground bravado of Brooklyn-born Jose Alvarado, whose quick hands on defense earned him the moniker “Grand Theft” Alvarado, much as Walt Frazier was called “Clyde” after the celebrated bank robber Clyde Barrow; and the unassuming all-around brilliance of OG Anunoby, whose midseason arrival in December 2023 seemed to unlock the excellence of this team, as the midseason trade for Dave DeBusschere in December 1968 had for the earlier champions. New York City has fallen in love with each of these players, and several others to boot, but of course it has fallen most deeply, irreversibly in love with the captain, Jalen Brunson, who is a spellbinding point guard and clutch player of a sort we have not seen since the days of the great Frazier. We watch awestruck as Brunson sacrifices his body again and again, hurling himself toward the rim against much larger defenders; or as he delivers an advanced geometry lesson in the branch of sphere and backboard; or, perhaps most mesmerizingly, as he simply holds the ball at the top of the key, surveying the court with the silent cool of Alain Delon’s hitman in “Le Samouraï.” “This team that we’re looking at now, it didn’t remind me of the ‘90s Knicks,” said Chuck D of Public Enemy, who has been a fan since 1967\. “That was a different squad. This squad reminds me of the Knicks I grew up with. It was like we had stars and superstars, but they all played as one.” Unselfishness, intelligence, nerve, discipline, resilience: these are the qualities that we recognize in this team, and which enabled it to overcome double-digit deficits in all four of the victories against San Antonio, including the most remarkable one of all, Game 4, when OG Anunoby’s flying tip-in after a Brunson miss capped a comeback of 29 points — the largest comeback in NBA Finals history, and one that seemed to leave even the Knicks themselves stunned, grasping for words in post-game interviews. After Anunoby’s heroics that night a friend texted me, without hyperbole: “There will be a lot of babies born in New York named Ogugua.” Before the San Antonio series began, a 23-year-old Bengali immigrant from Jamaica, Queens, named MD Ahnaf Hossain composed an ingenious quatrain that instantly went viral: *My mayor is Muslim,* *My bagels are Jewish,* *My Christian Dior,* *The Knicks in four!* “I grew up with Jews, Muslims, Haitians, Pakistanis, Bengalis,” Hossain explained to the Washington Post. “I just had to bring everyone together.” All through the playoffs, New Yorkers did watch the games together, in bars and backyards and bowling alleys, in Radio City Music Hall and Wollman Rink and outside the Garden itself. And then at the end of the last game, nearing midnight, when the final buzzer sounded and the championship was ours, the celebrations went on in every neighborhood of the city, a mad exhilarating crush of strangers bouncing up and down in the streets, crowding onto fire escapes and clinging to light posts and scaffolds, jubilantly belting out “Go NY Go” and “Empire State of Mind” beneath impromptu fireworks displays. On social media, New Yorkers posted and re-posted the clip of the amazing final seconds, when television announcer Mike Breen exclaimed, “It’s over! It’s over! Knick fans, this is not a dream! Your long, long wait has ended! Go ahead and cry — after 53 years, the Knicks are NBA champions once again!” Fifty-three years ago, of course, was a dismal moment in the city’s history; in 1973 the coming fiscal crisis could already be sensed on the horizon, foretold in thickly graffitied subway cars and triple-locked doors. Those championship Knicks teams seemed to offer an escape from daily realities, their brilliance and glamour hearkening back to a better time, when New Yorkers could proclaim their city, without fear of contradiction, the greatest in the world. Today’s city, for all its problems, feels entirely different. Our new mayor, Zohran Mamdani, who is riding a wave of popularity, is not a Democratic hack but a democratic socialist; he is also, like so many others in the city, an immigrant, and a Knicks fan to boot. As deft a political communicator as there is anywhere today, Mamdani has attached himself to this team. He appeared at numerous events this spring wearing a Knicks jersey over his own politician’s suit, and cut a TV ad in which he draped his favored congressional candidates in Knicks blue and orange and declared, “This is our team. This is our year.” Unlike 1973, today the central issues facing New York involve not a lack of resources but an unfair allocation of them; ours is not a city abandoned by the well-to-do, but rather one that has been too freely given over to billionaires. Fortunately, in addressing these issues we will not have to depend on the clubhouse politicians and money managers and demagogues who dominated New York politics in the 70s. “So often,” Mayor Mamdani declared during the team’s City Hall victory celebration, “when this city comes together it is because we are forced to, by a moment of tragedy or adversity. What a gift it is to be brought together by pure, unfiltered joy. For as long as we live, we will remember this feeling of a city together, a city alive, a city overcome by happiness.” *A city overcome by happiness*: Fifty-three years ago, the idea was virtually unthinkable. Today’s Knicks champions seem to represent not a turning away from present-day realities, as in 1973, but rather a turning *toward*: toward the possibility of a better future, of a freer, more just city — an improbable outcome, to be certain, but surely not as improbable as the 0.4% chance that oddsmakers gave the Knicks of winning Game 4 when they were down by 29 points. Yet the Knicks did win that game, of course, through the most improbable combination of skill, fortitude and teamwork, as well as a fair dose of luck, in so defying the oddsmakers and inscribing their names in the history books. Jalen Brunson, on whom our hopes have so often depended, misses the three-point jumper, but now comes OG Anunoby hurtling in unchecked from the sideline, rising free to the hoop, and this time, after so very long, the shot goes in. ## Please support our work. The article you just read took hours of research, editing and careful analysis. That costs money. Your gift will help Vital City expand our operational capacity and publish more of the practical policy ideas that are cited by decision-makers, used in college classrooms and referenced on the campaign trail. ### Why This Knicks Championship Means So Much URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-knicks-nba-championship/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T16:45:34.000Z [Five hundred seventy-seven](https://www.nycgovparks.org/facilities/basketball?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That’s the number of public outdoor basketball courts in New York City. If you factor in private gyms, high school gyms and community centers, the number of places to hoop in the city skyrockets to [well over 1,800](https://x.com/nycbbhistory/status/1924749853994975293?lang=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). With courts nearly everywhere and a rich history of playground legends, there’s no sport that is as synonymous with a city as basketball is with New York City. Don’t get me wrong, other cities like Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles and Seattle have all impacted the game and produced legendary pros. But no city can say that its connection to basketball runs so deep that it helped to reimagine how one of the game’s positions is played. No city except New York. “It had to be a point guard,” said Kazeem Famuyide, the co-host of [“7PM in Brooklyn”](https://www.youtube.com/@7PMinBrooklyn?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with famed New York Knicks legend Carmelo Anthony, and co-host of Hot 97’s “Mornings with Mero.” “We'd wished for so many players to be our savior. But for this city, it had to be a point guard. A point guard that is doubted. It had to be this way.” Famuyide is absolutely right. This story of the Knicks rising back to championship prominence would’ve been sweet had Patrick Ewing, Allan Houston, Latrell Sprewell, Carmelo or any other star player since 1973 led the team to a title. But it makes this victory especially poetic that it was Jalen Brunson, an undersized, underrated and often overlooked point guard — whose father was on the last Knicks team to reach the NBA Finals in 1999 — who restored glory back to The Big Apple. Because if basketball is what we do, point guards are how we do it. For those not fully in the know, there’s [a movie that explains the impact](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdKARK2z9-k&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New York City players have had on the position. Elite point guard play has always been part of the equation for Knicks championship success. Before Hall of Famer Walt “Clyde” Frazier was a famed announcer, he was getting buckets in Orange and Blue, leading the Knicks to titles over the Los Angeles Lakers in 1970 and 1973\. But the search for a leader at that spot left the team without guidance, direction or focus. Until now. Brunson now wields the power of the Point God in NYC. Along with Karl-Anthony Towns, a fellow New Jersey native, Josh Hart, Miles Bridges and the hero of game four, OG Anunoby, they’re a team full of counted-out overachievers that the city has embraced as its own. They also happen to have one of our own on the roster. “I don't know a lot of Puerto Ricans in the NBA like that,” said Randy J. Cruz, co-owner of the Hoops in the Sun basketball tournament, of Knicks guard Jose Alvarado. “There have definitely been some over the years, but especially him being here in New York is just phenomenal, man. I’m proud of that kid. Him being a New York City kid, born and raised, playing at Christ the King, and working and grinding his way to find a spot on the Knicks. Now he gets to call himself a champion. He earned that. He deserved that. And, you know, he just put on for the Boricuas.” Having a Brooklyn-born talent on the roster is just one of the improbable storylines that makes this Knicks team so lovable. Not only do they play an exciting style of basketball, but they also have the deepest alumni section in the NBA. Legends like Ewing, Sprewell, John Starks and beloved players like J.R. Smith and Iman Shumpert came out to support this year’s team. The feeling is that once you play in the jersey, you’re a Knick for life. It's the kind of loyalty and commitment that matters to true fans. Scott Williams, co-owner of downtown bar Las’ Lap, says his journey as a Knicks fan began at age 6\. Williams, who attended Game 3 of the NBA Finals, was fully confident this team could do it. But what he couldn’t predict is what it would do to the city. “They’ve definitely brought the community together,” Williams said. “It was really awesome to see. Whether you’re at a bar with a random group of people around you or you're just walking down the street, everyone's just like, ‘Yo, lets go Knicks.’” That positivity has touched Knicks fans of all backgrounds and all ages. “Me and my husband are huge Knicks fans, so if the game's on, everyone's watching at the same time,” said Mylean Rulloda, whose [3-year-old daughter Rya](https://www.instagram.com/p/DZOEuQekgsG/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) became the star of the “Always Knicks” campaign. “Rya just gravitated towards Brunson for some reason. She became obsessed with him even before I gave her the little doll, and then once I gave her a doll, that's it, it was over. She just loves him.” Brunson’s BFF being a doll-totting toddler who can’t wait to [show the Knicks captain](https://www.instagram.com/p/DSkb8SjEdOf/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) her team-inspired nails symbolizes the emergence of a new generation of Knicks fans that doesn’t remember the excitement of the Larry Johnson four-point play or Houston’s game-winner against the Miami Heat — or the pain of John Starks going 2-for-18 or the Bulls stopping Charles Smith over, and over, and over, and over again at the rim. It isn’t necessary to go through decades of near misses to appreciate this Knicks team. Brielle Bennett, a freshman guard from Brooklyn’s Nazareth High School and the storied Exodus AAU program, says that the lesson she has taken from this Knicks team is to never give up. “Even after Josh Hart missed that layup, they kept playing. They didn't give up even though they were still down. That was a huge part in them winning. That just speaks for itself. And now that the Knicks won, it's just gonna add even more confidence to us and more pride to us. Being able to call our hometown team the champions in the NBA.” That swagger and energy will likely trickle down to players at all levels of NYC’s hoops pyramid. “I think \[the Knicks winning\] plays a part in the hypeness going into the summer,” said Brian Gardenhire, founder of LES Express basketball tournament. “New York City street basketball is its own entity, right? But with tourists and celebrities who enjoy streetball as well, and even with the NBA players, I think this championship only broadens its horizons and elevates it because there's just so much excitement.” New Yorkers have proven for the last 53 years that they will support the Knicks through ups and downs. But *this* Knicks team, led by a humble, hardworking star and made up of players from different backgrounds who are bonded through hard work, will forever be beloved because it embodies so much of what makes New York great. “The pandemic really took some level of community away from New York City,” said Famuyide. “This playoff run was the first time since before 2020 that I can remember enjoying one thing with an entire city. This level of community is something that we've really missed and we’ve got to thank these Knicks for it, man. It really goes to show you that this is a basketball city which loves the game and what this Knicks team represents.” ### Sustaining the Joyful City: A New York City Social Infrastructure Agenda URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/social-infrastructure-nyc-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T21:04:34.000Z On Saturday, the New York Knicks won the NBA Championship, and the people of New York City experienced a weekend of collective effervescence and joy. Great athletes created the extraordinary moment. But so did the city’s open, accessible and welcoming public spaces — the sidewalks, streets, parks and plazas that gave everyone a place to gather and celebrate in a communal environment. Now, New York City faces an urgent and important question: How can we make the joyful, affordable and communal city real and sustainable? What can urban policy do to help? Nearly 20 years ago, New York City took a step in the right direction by reimagining sidewalks and streets. Janette Sadik-Khan and the city Department of Transportation she led released [World Class Streets](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pr2008/pr08%5F049.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the city's first comprehensive public realm strategy, arguing that streets were not simply conduits for vehicles but places for public life. (This was developed with Gehl Studio, where one of us works.) With startling speed and efficiency, New York City pedestrianized Times Square and parts of Broadway, created neighborhood plazas across the five boroughs and built its first lasting physically separated bike lane. The changes — while heavily contested, especially in the early days — validated the principle that streets belong to people, inspired a generation of planners to reimagine the city and sparked a wave of public space development that has transformed the urban environment. In 2026, however, New York City faces challenges — from climate vulnerability to housing instability, from eroding civic trust to social inequality — that require more than street design. We propose something more ambitious: treating the entire public realm as essential “social infrastructure.” What is social infrastructure? We define it as the physical places that shape our capacity to interact. Think, for instance, of sidewalks, schoolyards, swimming pools, parks, playgrounds, libraries, plazas and recreation centers. These are not mere amenities. Public gathering places, large and small, are critical parts of the city that support human health, social cohesion, mutual aid networks and democratic life. While it might not have been at the center of his campaign, social infrastructure is the key to accomplishing many of Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s goals, from increasing civic engagement to improving affordability and making everyday life more meaningful and fun. Investing in it — by building great new gathering places, as well as fixing up old ones — is one of the most important things the current administration can do. ### “Desire lines” For the past two years, we led a team of social scientists from New York University’s Institute for Public Knowledge and designers from Gehl in [a major study](https://www.gehlpeople.com/knowledge-hub/publications/social-infrastructure-is-essential-infrastructure/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of social infrastructure across three distinctive places: Flatbush, the Lower East Side and Poughkeepsie. While New York City benefits from a longstanding network of libraries, parks, recreation centers, streets and community organizations, uneven investment, fragmented management and decades of underfunding have limited its potential. Some neighborhoods, like the Lower East Side, enjoy a dense and connected network of spaces, while others, like Flatbush, face gaps in access, quality, comfort and connectivity. While there is a need to build more spaces, we found real opportunities to strengthen existing networks by building safe and convenient connections between sites, improving indoor facilities to make them more comfortable, expanding programming and adapting popular sites for an age of climate extremes. New Yorkers are already creating social infrastructure where they can. What is often missing is the supporting infrastructure that makes these spaces comfortable, safe and usable. Consider, for instance, how much the City could do to create cooler public gathering places for residents in ecologically exposed areas. In our research, we found that on a typical summer Saturday, along a 1.3-mile stretch of Flatbush Ave, more than 200 people per hour lingered throughout the day, despite no formal seating, limited shade and heavy traffic. One in five people had improvised their own seating, carrying plastic chairs to sidewalks and propping stools in tree beds. On this popular commercial corridor, there is ample room for misting systems, trees and artificial canopies, and places for people to gather and sit. These quotidian actions are what urban designers refer to as “desire lines.” They tell us what people want — a rest during a long commute, or a breath of fresh air outside their apartment, or a social setting that is neither work nor home. These needs will continue to exist no matter how much people use social media and AI. Indeed, for many, isolating technological tools have only underscored the importance of being around other people in the flesh. Demand for social infrastructure is not limited to streets. [The Center for an Urban Future](https://nycfuture.org/research/putting-the-rec-back-in-nyc-parks-recreation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) documented what happens when recreation programming, staffing and facilities are allowed to erode: Neighborhoods lose some of their most accessible places for gathering, learning and play. Our research found that a lack of quality indoor spaces leads young people to stay at home or engage in unsafe activity. ### Why social infrastructure now Our current research builds on Eric’s longstanding work on social infrastructure, explained in books like “Heat Wave,” “Palaces for the People” and “2020.” For two decades, Eric’s research has demonstrated that the physical places shaping our shared life — parks, libraries, community centers, streets — influence whether societies are resilient or fragile. When those systems are strong, people form bonds of trust and social support. When they deteriorate, communities become brittle and crises hit harder. The 1995 Chicago heat wave, [which killed hundreds of isolated people](https://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/443213in.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), was not simply a weather event. It was a social infrastructure failure. New York is facing its own slow-moving version of that emergency. [Social disconnection and loneliness are now public health problems](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/about/press/pr2024/nyc-releases-first-ever-state-of-mental-health-report.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Nationwide, [trust in institutions is declining](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2024/jun/11/trust-us-institutions?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [Housing is unaffordable for a growing share of the population](https://www.nyc.gov/site/housing/about/problem.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [Climate shocks are intensifying](https://www.nycgovparks.org/learn/sustainability/cooling-our-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — with extreme precipitation events causing catastrophic flooding and record-breaking heat forecast for this summer … and every summer for the rest of our lives. Addressing these problems requires allocating more financial resources and coordinated, cross-departmental planning to build new and maintain and upgrade the social infrastructure that exists, from social housing to soccer fields and branch libraries. Social infrastructure makes it easier to build stronger social bonds. When it’s accessible to everyone and programmed to make a variety of people feel that they belong, it can even bridge social divisions. Part of our research involved a 23-question survey administered to visitors of 21 social infrastructure sites to understand the types and depth of social connections formed at each site. Across the 1,100 people surveyed, more than 80% reported feeling a sense of belonging in these spaces, more than 70% said people there were willing to help one another and more than 60% said spending time there made them feel less isolated. More than 50% reported cross-racial or cross-ethnic interactions at social infrastructure sites and more than 35% reported cross-class interactions. The patterns vary across neighborhoods. Flatbush residents report exceptionally high levels of familiarity: 84% reported recognizing at least a few other people at social infrastructure sites, the highest rate of any study area. Yet fewer than half reported gathering with people they knew or participating in activities with others, suggesting a neighborhood rich in casual connection but lacking places that support deeper social life. In a segregated city, these patterns stand out, suggesting building blocks for the kind of everyday cultural life that helps democracy work. ### What implementation looks like New York does not need to invent a social infrastructure agenda from scratch. Many of its agencies, from parks and cultural affairs to transportation and health, are already focused on creating places for people to gather and connect. A recent initiative by the [Urban Design Forum, the Public Space Partners Survey](https://urbandesignforum.org/initiative/public-space-partners-survey/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#overview), found that approximately 8,000 organizations exist across New York City to care for public spaces. The City has many of the ingredients. What it lacks is a strategy that treats social connection as a public outcome worthy of investment. Many of Mamdani’s [most active volunteers found that the connections that the campaign fostered were an antidote to the loneliness pandemic](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/04/nyregion/mamdani-young-voters.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Now that he’s in office, this could be a more permanent outlet to foster the opportunities to be social that younger generations are looking for. A practical governing framework for social infrastructure would have six core priorities. **First, supercharge the library.** Libraries may be the city's most powerful and underutilized social infrastructure asset. In our study, they stood out for the diversity of users by age, their ability to make people feel safe and their capacity to promote interactions among people with different backgrounds. Yet many branches continue to operate with limited staffing, aging facilities and insufficient programming. New York City’s branch libraries are amazing resources for everyone who spends time here. But they could be so much more! A social infrastructure agenda would treat libraries less as service providers and more as civic hubs. That means expanded hours, upgraded facilities, outdoor gathering space, more programmed events, and strategic co-location with housing, recreation and community services. [Libraries are already](https://www.planning.org/blog/9305577/how-libraries-became-community-resilience-hubs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) trusted places where residents go for mutual aid during crises. Equipping them with backup power generators, wireless mesh networks and more reliable HVAC systems will give everyone, in every neighborhood, a better chance to get through hard times. New York has already begun moving in this direction through projects that pair new affordable housing development with opportunities to co-locate with and/or renovate existing libraries — [and the City Council has a new push to do this even more](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2026/06/11/3135/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The opportunity now is to make that model standard practice rather than the exception. **Second, reinvest in recreation and play.** Findings from our research as well as [The Center for an Urban Future's “Putting the Rec Back in NYC Parks”](https://nycfuture.org/research/putting-the-rec-back-in-nyc-parks-recreation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) reveal a city searching for places to gather. Recreation centers, pools, playgrounds, athletic facilities and parks help meet that demand before it spills onto streets that were never designed to carry the entire burden of civic life. As an example, at Tompkins Square Skatepark, we found not only recreation but informal support networks, where participants shared job leads, helped one another through addiction and offered temporary support during periods of housing instability. [Putting the Rec Back in NYC Parks](https://nycfuture.org/research/putting-the-rec-back-in-nyc-parks-recreation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) documented the consequences of decades of uneven investment in recreation infrastructure. A social infrastructure framework suggests that recreation should be viewed not as a discretionary amenity but as essential civic infrastructure. The success of a recreation center can be measured by participation rates as well as by its contribution to neighborhood connection, belonging and public life via self-reporting through surveys. **Third, make public spaces comfortable in a changing climate.** Climate resilience and social resilience are increasingly the same project. Shade, tree canopy, seating, cooling, public bathrooms, water access and weather protection should be treated as core infrastructure rather than optional amenities. Public spaces cannot function as gathering places if they are uncomfortable or unsafe for large portions of the year. While this is of concern to all of New York, this is particularly relevant for New York neighborhoods facing extreme heat and limited open space, such as those identified by the [NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s (DOHMH) Heat Vulnerability Index (HVI)](https://www.nyc.gov/content/climate/pages/extreme-heat?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The HVI shows neighborhoods whose residents are more at risk for dying during and immediately following extreme heat due to a range of social and environmental factors that contribute to neighborhood heat risk, such as surface temperature, green space, access to home air conditioning and the percentage of residents who are low-income or identify as Black. Investments in trees, shade structures, cooling corridors, green infrastructure and public amenities simultaneously advance climate adaptation and social connection and equity. The same bench, tree, or fountain can serve both goals at once. **Fourth, transform streets into social connectors.** This is where the legacy of “World Class Streets” remains most relevant. Nearly 20 years ago, New York demonstrated that streets could be more than traffic corridors. Now, we can formally recognize that streets are also social infrastructure. Open Streets, plazas, sidewalks, protected bike lanes and neighborhood commercial corridors can improve mobility as well as opportunities for lingering, interaction and community life. The Flatbush findings show that New Yorkers are already using streets this way. Policy needs to catch up with reality. That means permanent Open Streets, expanded seating, safer crossings, flexible curb space, public bathrooms and investments in corridors where residents have few alternatives for gathering. **Fifth, invest in stewardship and community capacity.** A library, park or plaza is only as effective as the institutions that animate and maintain it**.** The [Design Trust's Untapped](https://www.designtrust.org/projects/untaped/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) finds that the challenge is not simply building more spaces. It is identifying where opportunities to allow people to steward them exist. This requires a different approach to public investment. In addition to capital construction, the City, with public-private partnerships, should contribute more to the operational needs of stewardship organizations (streamlined permitting, funding for salaries, insurance, overhead) who activate public space every day. Social infrastructure succeeds when communities have the resources to steward it. **Sixth, assess neighborhood needs and fill gaps.** New York brings systematic rigor to planning transportation, schools and utilities, yet applies no equivalent discipline to social connection. A social infrastructure agenda would change that — beginning by mapping neighborhoods through a different lens: Where are the physical places — the libraries, rec centers and gathering places — that bring people together? What are the social outcomes we want to measure — children playing, seniors being active and connecting, New Yorkers connecting across differences? Which neighborhoods have strong networks, and which are operating with critical gaps? That mapping would feed into a citywide strategy, a successor to “World Class Streets*,*”that places social infrastructure gaps alongside housing insecurity, heat vulnerability and access inequities. This could serve as a governing framework driving capital budgets and agency coordination. It could also link housing policy directly to social infrastructure investments. Mayor Mamdani's [Block by Block](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mayor-mamdani-releases--block-by-block--the-housing-plan-for-a-n?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) housing strategy rightly frames affordability as inseparable from neighborhood quality. Large rezonings should carry social infrastructure requirements alongside housing production goals. The success of a housing strategy should be measured not only by units produced, but by the social life those neighborhoods can sustain. This mapping approach could be folded into the “micro plans” outlined in [Block by Block](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mayor-mamdani-releases--block-by-block--the-housing-plan-for-a-n?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ### The governance challenge The primary challenge is not recognizing the importance of social infrastructure. New York already contains thousands of organizations, public agencies, libraries, parks, cultural institutions, community groups and public space stewards working toward the same goals. The challenge is governance: organizing these actors around shared outcomes, stable funding and long-term stewardship. Public realm responsibilities remain fragmented across agencies with competing mandates and capital cycles. Our research suggests that New York's problem is less a shortage of committed actors than a shortage of coordination. Social infrastructure responsibilities are spread across parks, libraries, transportation, housing, schools, nonprofits, conservancies, community organizations and business improvement districts. The result is a system that relies on extraordinary effort from individual organizations but lacks a governing framework capable of sustaining the network as a whole. Former Mayor Adams named the city’s first-ever public realm officer, recognizing the cross-sectoral leadership needed for this major task and city asset, but structurally [the position lacked authority and was eliminated in the current administration](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/02/17/jersey-city-shows-why-nyc-needs-a-real-chief-public-realm-officer?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Maintenance and programming funding has been reduced for years. For example, research by the [Center for an Urban Future](https://nycfuture.org/research/putting-the-rec-back-in-nyc-parks-recreation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that since 1964 there has been a 66% decline in the NYC Parks’ recreation division workforce. And communities — especially low-income communities that have watched public investment accelerate displacement — may see public realm improvements as harbingers of gentrification if it is not clear how existing community needs are being addressed. The question is not whether cities should invest in social infrastructure. The question is how they do so in ways that allow existing residents to remain and benefit from the value those investments create. These concerns should be incorporated into a social infrastructure agenda to ensure sites are treated as community assets, or essential public goods. Just [as housing policy increasingly recognizes that production and preservation must go hand in hand](https://www.nlc.org/article/2026/04/16/expanding-housing-supply-while-avoiding-displacement/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), social infrastructure investments should be paired with preservation strategies that help existing residents remain in place and share in the benefits of neighborhood improvement. Community governance and genuine stewardship partnerships with local organizations are not add-ons. They are the difference between infrastructure that serves a neighborhood and infrastructure that might seem created for newer residents and not longstanding New Yorkers. Investments in parks, libraries, public spaces and cultural facilities should be accompanied by investments in housing preservation, tenant protections, community ownership and small-business stability, [increasingly cited as tools](https://www.nlc.org/article/2026/04/16/expanding-housing-supply-while-avoiding-displacement/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in national anti-displacement conversations. New York is already experimenting with this approach. Mayor Mamdani's housing agenda pairs new housing production with tenant protections, preservation of existing affordable housing, stronger enforcement against negligent landlords and mechanisms intended to help residents remain in place as neighborhoods change. Protecting neighborhood identity requires more than preventing residential displacement. As groups like [Municipal Art Society (MAS)](https://www.mas.org/initiatives/enduring-culture/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Public Works Partners ](https://publicworkspartners.com/resilient-roots-strategies-for-sustaining-neighborhood-identity-amid-gentrification/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)have documented, it also means sustaining the organizations, businesses, cultural institutions and social networks that give neighborhoods their character and provide the social infrastructure residents rely on. The ideas advanced in the [Center for an Urban Future's “Real Estate for Parks”](https://nycfuture.org/research/real-estate-for-parks?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) report point toward a broader principle: Growth should help fund the public realm that makes growth successful. The same research also outlines best practice from outside of New York and recommendations for investment funds. Development contributions tied not only to open space but to broader neighborhood social infrastructure needs. The goal is to make social infrastructure a predictable part of city-building rather than an afterthought. New York should treat anti-displacement as a core component of social infrastructure governance. Every major social infrastructure investment should be accompanied by a neighborhood preservation strategy that identifies residents, businesses and community institutions at risk and aligns housing, economic development and community stewardship tools accordingly. ### The next step The question is no longer whether [social infrastructure matters](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/557044/palaces-for-the-people-by-eric-klinenberg/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The evidence — from New York to [London](https://www.bennettschool.cam.ac.uk/research/research-projects/measuring-social-and-cultural-infrastructure/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [Cape Town to Brazil](https://www.gehlpeople.com/projects/social-infrastructure/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — is overwhelming. New Yorkers demonstrate its value every day in the ways they use public space, often despite its limitations. New York does not lack cultural organizations or civic ambition. What it lacks is a governing framework that treats these assets as a connected system and social connection as a public outcome. The challenge is not convincing the City to care. It is giving the City the institutional capacity to deliver, coordinate and sustain the social infrastructure it already knows it needs with the same seriousness it brings to housing, transportation and utilities. The goal is not simply to create more desirable neighborhoods. It is to ensure that the people who make neighborhoods desirable can continue to live, work, gather and belong there. Nearly 20 years after World Class Streets, and a few days after a celebration that inspired everyone, New York is ready for the next step: building a city where belonging is not improvised against the odds but designed in from the start. *This essay builds on a collaborative research report developed by a core team across IPK and Gehl: Eric, Julia and Eamon O’Connor, Candice Ji, Precious Ndukuba and Michael Koncewicz, Matthew Wolfe and Nan Feng. See the full report,* [*Social Infrastructure is Essential Infrastructure*](https://issuu.com/gehlarchitects/docs/ipkxgehl%5Fsocial%5Finfrastructure%5Fis%5Fessential%5Finfras?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Use AI to Analyze Bodyworn Camera Footage URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/use-ai-to-analyze-bodyworn-camera-footage/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T14:53:08.000Z When a federal court found that the NYPD engaged in unconstitutional stop-and-frisk practices in 2013, it appointed a monitor to oversee reforms to these practices within the department and to ensure compliance with reforms that the ruling set in motion. These reforms include, for instance, ensuring that officers only conduct stops when they have articulable reasonable suspicion, that race is not improperly used as a justification or a basis for disparate treatment and that such interactions are properly documented. In the 13 years since, although the department has made progress, fully achieving these goals has remained elusive and the monitor’s repeated findings have underscored the department’s failures to reach full compliance on these critical issues. This slow and uneven progress is similar to other large departments under monitorships requiring complex sets of reforms. It’s no surprise. Large departments are being asked to demonstrate — and those responsible for oversight are being asked to verify — substantive progress in the behavior of thousands of officers across millions of interactions with the public. The tools at their disposal include interviews, ride-alongs, documentation reviews and [statistical analyses of administrative records like stop reports](https://www.nypdmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/2024.04.11-927-1-Twentieth-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), all of which provide a critical window into the problem. In the modern era where virtually all officers wear body-worn cameras (BWCs), random audits of BWC footage have now become a vital tool that offers the closest look at the reality on the ground — an actual glimpse into face-to-face interactions between officers and the public. Yet in the largest department in the country, where even a monitor making a herculean effort can manually review only a couple thousand videos out of the nearly five million recorded each year, a glimpse is all that anyone can hope for. We don’t need to accept this as the best we can do. With the advent of new technologies, body-worn camera footage can be put to much better use for departments and the people they serve. We are computational social scientists who developed AI-based tools capable of reviewing body-worn camera footage with a high level of accuracy at an unprecedented scale. Since 2021, we have worked with NYPD’s independent monitor, now Mylan Denerstein, to apply these techniques to footage in order to evaluate street stops. [Our report](https://www.nypdmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026.04.29-983-Letter-and-Stanford-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), recently submitted to the court, details the ongoing challenges the department faces when it comes to constitutional compliance. But more importantly for the future of the NYPD and policing in America writ large, it also demonstrates a promising path forward for using AI-powered tools to improve accountability, community trust and the effectiveness of reforms in police departments across the country. Unlike many AI tools that have become controversial — from face recognition technology to drones to risk assessment tools — police body-worn cameras enjoy overwhelming public support. In fact, the cameras have a nearly 90% approval rating. Across the political spectrum, people see these cameras as essential tools for accountability and transparency. Here, we showcase how the footage from these cameras could be used to help address two particularly thorny problems in New York City: underdocumentation and the legality of consent searches. ### Underdocumentation and constitutionality When NYPD officers detain someone in an investigative encounter, that interaction graduates from an encounter to a “stop” where the person is not free to leave. This is an important legal distinction when it comes to the detainee’s rights, and one that the officer is required to document. Officers can only detain someone when they have individualized reasonable suspicion that that person has committed or will commit a crime. Because the context of a police-civilian engagement is so important, underreporting and mislabeling of stops is one of the key areas where constitutional compliance — and community trust — can erode. Incidents that feel like stops in every practical sense to the civilian, but that are never documented as such, are a blind spot for the department and the monitor alike; constitutional rights may be violated, and in an endless sea of everyday encounters, no one would know where to check. Audits by the NYPD’s Monitor Team have shed light on the potential scale of the problem, with manual reviews finding underreporting rates of [27% to 41% in recent years](https://www.nypdmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2026.02.26-979-Monitors-Twenty-Ninth-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — with specialized units that engage in proactive stops, frisks, and searches, such as the NYPD’s Neighborhood Safety Teams, underreporting rates are above 50%. But as with all manual reviews of body camera footage, these audits are necessarily random and sporadic. The monitor has no way of knowing which encounters to look at to find those most likely to have been mislabeled. To address this issue, we analyzed a set of 2,858 encounters that the Monitor Team, along with retired court judges, had already audited. We used their expert judgments to train machine learning models to predict, for a given piece of footage, whether it is likely to be a stop in which someone is detained or merely an encounter in which they are legally free to leave. By parsing the language of officers and civilians in each video, these models were able to accurately distinguish between stops and mere encounters about 80% of the time. We were able to repeat this process using judges’ analyses of whether officers’ behavior during stops was constitutional — for instance, whether stops were conducted with reasonable suspicion, whether frisks and searches were conducted appropriately and so on — we trained our models, set them to work on a sample of known stops and came out with an accuracy rate of over 70%. Of course, accuracy rates in the 70s and 80s will still produce plenty of false positives and negatives. But the purpose and potential of these models is not to replace human judgment on matters of constitutionality. What accuracy rates this high *can* do is dramatically narrow the pool of footage the department and Monitor needs to comb through by hand in order to find, assess and learn from likely episodes of underdocumentation. That could be enormously helpful in two ways. First, it opens the potential for targeted audits. Rather than randomly grabbing a handful from the haystack and hoping to find a few needles, our models could quickly analyze millions of videos tagged as non-stop investigative encounters and point auditors directly to the specific encounters most likely to have been mislabeled. Our evidence suggests that review of even the top 1% of videos by model probability would likely uncover thousands of undocumented stops per month with very high auditing hit rates — a shortcut that could save departments and monitors significant time and resources. Second, these models can provide a quantitative representation of encounters that has never existed before — in essence, a way of scoring language to measure elements like how “stop-like” an interaction seems and how constitutional an officer’s word choice feels. We found in the data that linguistic indicators for non-constitutionality include pointed questions like “why you running,” “what you got,” and “\[got nothing/anything\] on you,” as well as commands such as “stop” and “don’t reach.” These words themselves don’t constitute non-constitutional behavior, but measured in aggregate are predictive of non-constitutional behavior like stops conducted without reasonable suspicion. Metrics for scoring language in this way are enormously valuable for uncovering language patterns that departments can learn from and use as the basis for officer training. For example, our model quantified significant racial disparities bearing on Fourteenth Amendment concerns: The language officers use in non-stop interactions with Black and Hispanic civilians is about 5 to 11% closer to resembling language used in stops. Specifically, given only the language appearing in the footage, our trained models’ estimates of the probability that a given low-level interaction was a stop were on average 5-11% higher when the civilians in the interaction were Black or Hispanic. This suggests that, even in low-level police encounters, NYPD interactions with Black and Hispanic civilians take on a more “stop-like” tenor, raising questions about whether a reasonable person in such encounters would understand they were free to leave. Our findings for the constitutionality of officers’ behavior during stops were perhaps more concerning. When we examined *correctly* documented stops — those most likely to be reviewed because they’ve been accurately labeled as more significant — we found little to no evidence of racial disparity in officers’ constitutional behavior. It was only when we examined stops that had been mislabeled as more casual encounters, the kind of videos that typically fall through the cracks of review, that we found large racial disparities: The model's estimated probability of non-compliance was 16% to 26% higher for stops of Black and Hispanic civilians. This finding further emphasizes the urgent need for departments seeking to root out racial disparities and 14th Amendment violations to improve documentation compliance. ### Quantifying the explicitness of consent search requests The second major category of constitutional compliance our models could be helpful in transforming involves civilians’ consent to being searched. The Fourth Amendment guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Given this, where officers rely on consent to justify a search, that consent must be voluntary. Whether a person’s consent to a search is voluntary under the Fourth Amendment can depend in significant part on what officers say — including whether they clearly communicate the nature of the request and whether their words indicate that the civilian has a meaningful opportunity to refuse. We used computational tools to analyze the language NYPD officers used to obtain consent for searches in 2023, representing 1,770 encounters and 3,695 associated videos. Our goal was to measure the prevalence of explicit consent language and the clarity of officers’ requests. We began by asking a simple question: When an officer documents a request for consent to search, do the words “consent” or “search” appear in the transcript at any point for any video associated with the encounter? We were surprised to find just how rare these critical words were: “Search” was mentioned in only 46% of these encounters, and “consent” in only 13%. When we manually reviewed a sample of these instances, we found that less than half represented genuine requests to search — in many cases, the words “search” and “consent” were being used to reference past searches or proactive refusals of consent by civilians rather than as a legitimate means of initiating a search. The NYPD Patrol Guide offers suggested phrasing for officers to use when seeking a consent search: “I can only search you if you consent. Do you understand? May I search you?” But our analysis found that documented consent search requests contained the phrases “consent,” “search,” and “you understand” in only 3% of interactions — and the exact phrasing suggested by the Patrol Guide never occurs. Taken together, our fundamental finding is that consent searches in which officers clearly and explicitly request consent are exceedingly rare. If officers are not using explicit terms to request consent, what *do* they say? We identified two prominent alternatives: requests using forms of “can I check” appear in 37% of consent search interactions, and those using forms of “do you mind” in 17%. While “search” carries specific legal and constitutional meanings, it’s also a word that civilians are likely to ascribe some weight to — a softer word like “check” is more nebulous, and could very well minimize and obscure the nature of what the officer is seeking to do. By the same token, “do you mind” questions create ambiguity almost by definition: To “mind” is to ask that something not take place, so a civilian might need to say “yes” to decline. On the other hand, we find that in real interactions, people often also reply to such questions with “no” to signal that they want to reject the underlying request to search. This ambiguity could be entirely avoided with greater clarity in the phrasing of requests. Just as we found in cases of mislabeling stops, we discovered measurable racial differences in how officers seek consent for searches. “Do you mind”-style questions appear in about 20% of interactions with Black civilians as compared with only 15% of interactions with civilians of other races. Moreover, we found that Black and Hispanic civilians heard 20% more commands in general throughout these consent search interactions, which may contribute to an atmosphere in which a civilian feels they have less agency and are therefore less free to decline a search. These estimates are all likely conservative due to the potential for underreporting of consent search interactions — another issue which could be addressed by using predictive models to trawl the data at scale and unearth the likeliest mislabeled consent searches. Overall, we believe that our findings could be instrumental in helping the NYPD to pinpoint opportunities for reform, pursue those reforms more effectively and expend far fewer resources while doing so. ### Merging technology and policy change Predictive modeling of underdocumentation and compliance could have compounding benefits — a ripple effect for departments, monitors and the communities they serve. Targeted sampling could save valuable time for auditors (even as random audits remain a useful tool to establish baseline rates). Freeing up humans to evaluate the likeliest problem areas would allow them to learn more, faster. Language patterns revealed by the models could inform more targeted and effective officer training that is backed by real data. Those trainings could in turn be evaluated for their effectiveness by measuring whether troubling language patterns change. Even officers’ awareness that their mislabeling of stops or lax language initiating consent searches is more likely to be flagged for review could create a self-correcting effect that changes behaviors and contributes to better outcomes. More broadly applied, AI-based tools offer the first opportunity to truly measure — quantifiably and at scale — which policy changes are actually being implemented on the ground, and ultimately which are most effective at improving constitutional policing, public trust and officer safety. The fact that these insights can be generated from already-existing body camera footage at a relatively low cost makes them a potentially game-changing asset for police departments — an unprecedented in-house capacity to track and tackle issues, measure geographic hotspots and trends over time and shed light on any key metric of interest. The infrastructure and technology to support these kinds of analyses is already in place — the only barrier that remains is the will of local leaders. New York is in many ways uniquely positioned to lead the way for the nation on this front: Due to the How Many Stops Act, implemented starting in July 2024, the NYPD already collects more detailed information about encounters with the public than perhaps the majority of departments nationwide. As the largest department in the country, New York has a golden opportunity to set the standard for the use of AI for accountability and transparency. At a time when police retirements are at record highs and recruitment is at record lows — when both officer wellness and public trust in law enforcement are issues of urgent concern — this new technology holds the potential to shift the dynamic. A clear, comprehensive, data-driven view into the realities of policing can be a launching pad for changes that make the profession safer, more responsive and more constitutionally sound, instilling greater trust in policing among the community in turn. ### Pelé and New York URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/pele-nyc-cosmos-soccer/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T14:39:43.000Z On July 19, the FIFA World Cup Final will take place at MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey. A little over 50 years ago, on the same site, there was a different stadium and a different team playing there, But something just as momentous happened: the birth of a sporting phenomenon that helped America fall in love with soccer. And it was all thanks to one man — Pelé. A three-time World Cup winner with Brazil, the man born Edson Arantes do Nascimento, was known across the world as being the greatest player that had ever graced a soccer pitch and now he was here in America, a country whose indifference to the sport couldn’t have been more pronounced. [When Pelé first stepped onto the field for the barely-known New York Cosmos in 1975, American soccer changed overnight](https://americanhistory.si.edu/explore/stories/pele-and-rise-american-league-soccer?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The Brazilian icon arrived in a country where his sport existed largely on the margins, competing for attention against more established, mainstream sports. Within months, crowds that had rarely paid attention to soccer were flocking to see the three-time World Cup winner in action and the Cosmos, a club going nowhere fast, soon became a cultural event. Celebrities filled the stands, television cameras followed their every move and soccer suddenly occupied a place in the national conversation in a manner not dissimilar to Lionel Messi’s arrival at Inter Miami in 2023. Until Pelé arrived in 1975, the game the rest of the world called “football” had been dying a slow and largely unnoticed death in America. Indeed, in the five years that the North American Soccer League had existed, it had singularly failed to ignite any public interest in a sport that most every other country on the planet clutched to their hearts. Even before the NASL began, the odds were stacked against pro soccer succeeding, especially when faced with the hegemony of baseball and the other kind of football. Certainly, the massed ranks of the nation’s press seemed dead set against giving it any kind of opportunity to flourish. In 1968, for example, the San Francisco Examiner wrote despairingly of soccer’s influence around the world: “In Europe, as in South America, they go raving mad over the game. Pray that it doesn’t happen here.” Even in New York City, perhaps the most ethnically diverse metropolis on earth, there appeared to be little appetite for the game, with the city’s soccer franchise, the New York Cosmos, “drawing less than the skin flicks on Eighth Avenue,” according to one of the Cosmos players, Shep Messing. But the turning point came when global entertainment giant Warner Communications acquired the Cosmos and put its visionary chairman, Steve Ross, in charge. Ross didn’t know a goalkeeper from a zookeeper, but he was determined to break the Cosmos — and soccer itself — in the United States. Prior to the change, the team had been little more than a ragtag assembly of part-timers, students and foreigners who played their games at Downing Stadium, a crumbling wreck of a site under the Triborough Bridge at Randall’s Island. Now, with the financial might of Warner Communications behind them, the Cosmos were transformed from a team on the brink of collapse to one with lofty ambitions, one of which, ridiculously, was signing 34-year-old Pelé, the greatest soccer player that the world had ever seen and who had recently retired from playing. In basketball terms, it was like a 40-year-old Michael Jordan coming out of retirement to play for a Turkish basketball team nobody had ever heard of. The idea came from the Cosmos’ general manager, Englishman Clive Toye. “There was only player in the world who could break through this crust of indifference — and that was Pelé,” he said. The idea appealed to Steve Ross, a man drawn inexorably to star names and supersized personalities. So began a four-year, 300,000-mile odyssey for Toye, where he pursued the Brazilian around the world as though he were a fugitive, eager to lure him out of retirement and back on the football pitch. There were meetings in London, Frankfurt and Toronto, in Santos and Sao Paolo, none of which yielded the result Toye wanted. It was only when Pelé’s financial woes caught up with him in late 1974 that Toye’s hand was suddenly strengthened. Waylaid by a succession of bad business deals and poor legal advice, the player was in dire need of money and the Cosmos, thanks to the deep pockets of Warner, had bags of it. The deal Toye finally struck with Pelé guaranteed the player more money in three years than he had earned in his entire playing career with Santos – nearly $3 million (around $18 million today). Not only was it a world record package but it was over twice that what the rest of the Cosmos squad earned combined. Add in two homes, one in Manhattan and one in Connecticut, a lavish office at Rockefeller Plaza and guaranteed spots for his children at the city’s top schools, and Pelé’s compensation package was staggering by the standards of any era. The Cosmos management also went out of their way to ensure Pelé paid as little tax as possible, preparing a succession of contracts for him, with just one having any mention of soccer in it. Aside from the three-year playing deal, there was a 10-year deal for the global marketing rights to the Pelé name and likeness and a 14-year PR contract for Warner Communications. One agreement even had his position within the corporation as that of a “Recording Artist”. But it wasn’t just money that tempted Pelé. When Clive Toye made his sales pitch to Pelé, he convinced him not to join one of the big European clubs, like Juventus in Italy or Spain’s Real Madrid, that had been keen to secure his services. “I said if you go there, all you can do is win another championship. If you come here, you can win a country. “He and he alone could do something no one had ever done and bring soccer to the mainstream.” Those dreams would go through the nation’s largest city during one of its most difficult periods. [In the fall of 1975, New York was a city on the brink.](https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/a-crisis-without-keynes-the-1975-new-york-city-fiscal-crisis-revisited?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Mayor Abe Beame’s administration had overseen the city’s worst-ever fiscal crisis, with thousands of city workers and public-sector workers laid off, wages frozen and essential capital improvement projects shelved indefinitely. With the city on the verge of bankruptcy, Beame had been left with no option but to seek financial assistance from President Gerald Ford. [Just a couple of weeks after Pelé’s unveiling as a Cosmos player at the 21 Club on June 10, 1975](https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/11/archives/pele-signs-with-cosmos-soccer-has-arrived-here-pele-signs-cosmos.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Beame and New York got their response from the White House, a rejection that gave rise to the famous Daily News headline: “Ford To City: Drop Dead.” ([The actual history](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/drop-dead-city-review/) is [a bit more complicated](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-came-after-1975-new-york-fiscal-crisis/), but that’s a story for another essay.) Even as the city spiraled, the Cosmos, now with the world’s greatest ever player on their roster, went stratospheric. They moved into the revamped Yankee Stadium and then, in 1977, moved into Giants Stadium in East Rutherford, where, against the Fort Lauderdale Strikers on August 14, 1977, [they pulled in a new NASL record attendance of 77,691](https://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/15/archives/cosmos-triumph-at-giants-stadium-before-record-soccer-crowd-of.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Uniquely, the Cosmos blended sport and celebrity culture — Mick Jagger, Andy Warhol, Robert Redford and Muhammad Ali were all regular attendees. In disco-era New York, they had managed to take soccer beyond the confines of the stadium. For the players, that invariably meant jumping in limos and heading straight to legendary super club Studio 54 after the final whistle, where they could skip the queues and get the party started. There were drugs on the dance floor, sex in the toilets and the Cosmos in the VIP section. As team captain Werner Ritter said: “That club was one of the home bases for the players. It was pretty standard Cosmos treatment. The mob would part, the velvety ropes come open and you’d be taken into a VIP room there. We got superstar treatment.” [Pelé’s part-missionary, part-mercenary Cosmos career finally came to an end on October 1, 1977.](https://www.espn.co.uk/football/story/%5F/id/37534292/farewell-king-remembering-pele-final-game-40-years-ago?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) In a farewell game at Giants Stadium against Santos, he played one half of the match for the Cosmos and the other for the only other club he had ever played for. As the game drew to an emotional end, the heavens opened over the stadium, drenching the 75,000 in attendance.The following day, a Brazilian newspaper ran the headline: ‘Even The Sky Was Crying’. The Cosmos without Pelé were a different matter entirely. Devoid of his box-office appeal, the club floundered. [In 1985, with interest waning and crowds a tiny fraction of what they used to be, the Cosmos folded](https://www.ussoccerhistory.org/the-sad-end-of-the-original-nasl-cosmos/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). For the most part, the NASL had been like building a house and starting with the light fittings; the stars were there before the infrastructure, the marketing before the grassroots and the entertainment before the sustainability. For a time, it worked. But when the novelty wore off, the cracks that had always existed became impossible to ignore. Fast forward half a century. The NASL is long gone, but it has been replaced by a new league, Major League Soccer (MLS), that has benefited enormously from learning the lessons of the Cosmos era. Rather than relying exclusively on imported stars, the league has invested heavily in soccer-specific stadiums, youth academies, training facilities and expansion markets with committed ownership groups. Growth has often been slower than supporters would like, but it has been built on firmer ground. The Cosmos believed stars would create a soccer culture; MLS has spent the last three decades trying to build the culture first and let the stars enhance it rather than define it. Since the demise of the Cosmos, MLS has driven a steady rise in soccer participation and fandom in New York City through the establishment of clubs like New York Red Bulls, New York City FC and the latest iteration of the New York Cosmos. Regular top-flight matches, youth academies, and community outreach programs have helped embed the sport more deeply in the city’s sporting culture and increased grassroots uptake across all age groups. Over the past 20 years, for example, [K–12 soccer in New York has grown mainly through a mix of community programs, after-school initiatives and youth club development pathways](https://www.usyouthsoccer.org/programs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Key successes include the NYC Soccer Initiative, which has built mini-pitches and expanded access to the sport in underserved neighborhoods, and Soccer for Success, a large after-school program serving thousands of children with both soccer training and life-skills education. Alongside these, clubs such as Downtown United, Asphalt Green and FC Harlem have strengthened organized youth development, while MLS-linked pathways like the New York Red Bulls Academy have created clearer routes into elite and professional soccer. And so, as the United States prepares to host the biggest World Cup in history, soccer is no longer a source of mockery and befuddlement among domestic sports fans. In 1975, American soccer relied on one iconic player to capture the nation's imagination. In 2026, it will showcase a more mature soccer ecosystem that includes professional clubs across the country, booming youth participation, dedicated stadiums and a generation of homegrown talent competing at the highest levels of the sport across the world. Half a century after Pelé transformed a struggling team into a genuine cultural sensation, American soccer finds itself back in New Jersey again, preparing for another historic moment. The difference is that this time, the game is no longer trying to introduce itself. It has, finally, put down roots. ### The Knicks, the Hooligans and the Cops URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/knicks-hooligans-nypd/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T14:56:13.000Z When I was a New York City cop, I would always wish the Yankees bad luck in the playoffs. It wasn’t just my family’s lineage as Mets fans and the vengeful suffering that wrought; in the small corner of my mind that concerned baseball, it would always be 1986 and the Mets would be world champions. I had been a rookie officer in Brooklyn when the Yankees won the World Series in 1998, and we were deployed to Bay Ridge to quell the “celebrations.” We chased violent drunks around all night as they tried to destroy whatever could be lifted, thrown or stomped on, fought with each other for no reason, and sped up and down the avenues hanging out of cars, screaming. As cops, we were either curmudgeons telling people to stop being so damn happy, or we were going toe-to-toe with the U.S. version of soccer hooligans. I will never forget the sight that night of a couch coming out of the window of a third-floor apartment, on fire. I took no special joy in chasing frenzied sports fans down the street with my baton cocked over my head. So, selfishly, I hoped the Yankees lost. This kind of cop logic was on full display this week when the Knicks came back from a 29-point deficit that left them a game away from winning the NBA Finals for the first time in 53 years. A flurry of terrible calls by the refs early on left millions of fans furious and thousands on the verge of a riot. The improbable turnaround that followed catalyzed this energy into a drunken melee on a grand scale, the pointlessness of which was on display in the destruction of a yellow taxi. The car wasn’t symbolic of the referees who made the abominable calls, nor was it the team cab of the San Antonio Spurs. It was a car driven by someone whose livelihood has been mostly supplanted by Uber and Lyft drivers, who will soon enough be replaced by robots. It was pure felony criminal mischief. As the majority of fans celebrated lawfully, some [fought each other and destroyed street signs, magazine bins and store windows](https://sports.yahoo.com/articles/knicks-fans-assault-police-destroy-035507962.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [Dozens were arrested](https://abc7ny.com/post/dozens-arrested-outside-madison-square-garden-perimeter-celebrations-turn-rowdy/19274965/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and [10 police officers were injured](https://wsvn.com/sports/56-taken-into-custody-10-officers-injured-after-knicks-game-4-chaos-near-msg/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In advance of the next game — Saturday night, in San Antonio — the NYPD has ordered thousands of extra officers to come in on their day off. In the grand scheme of enforcing social cooperation in public spaces, the crowds that celebrate historic sports victories deserve a lot of leeway. When I was the commander of the West Village’s police precinct in 2011, New York state legalized gay marriage, and I let an ecstatic crowd block traffic and sidewalks, drink in the street and make a deafening amount of noise for hours, all in violation of the law. It was a momentous night in one of the world's epicenters of gay rights, a dream come true for so many people. Sports aren’t the same as human equality, but in the same way, the city needs to loosen the normal standards of disorderly conduct when New York’s beloved Knicks tee up to win the championship for the first time in most of our lives. This doesn’t mean it should be a free-for-all, and it’s the job of policing to prevent that. New Year's Eve at Times Square, nearly all parades and countless political protests end without incident because they are well policed from the outset, [long before a tipping point takes hold](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-nypd-snowball-fight-police-arrest/), setting a standard that nearly everyone respects. Where the biggest crowds will form during a game isn’t a mystery, and the police have the prerogative of setting up pens, controlling access, regulating traffic, staying highly visible and dispersing crowds shortly after the game ends. Mobile field forces can respond to disorder throughout the city and swiftly make arrests before the violent energy of small groups becomes contagious. This point is critical, because what we saw after the last Knicks game had a classic hallmark of a riot: a group of people eager to use the cover of a big, emotional crowd to engage in violence and property crime. Then, other people, riled up but followers by nature, take the cue and join in only because they have an example to follow. When police come in fast and take the opportunists away in handcuffs, it chastens the crowd and shows followers what the boundaries are. In the way that going after the biggest bully in the playground keeps the wannabe bullies at bay, aggressively policing the first people who test the NYPD’s limits will keep the rest of the crowd on the right side of a raucous celebration. Then there is the timeless New York City wisdom of knowing when to stay home. If a sea of drunken, screaming young men isn’t your thing, then many parts of the city will be off-limits on Saturday night. Basketball is one of our most accessible sports, cutting across race, class and geography in a profound way, so this type of forbearance is a small sacrifice for the greater civic moment. And if the track record of the city’s teams is any indication, it won’t become a habitual ask. There is one critical thing to remember in all of this: Unlike the violence at a political protest, a night of sports mayhem doesn’t run the risk of going on day after day, or metastasizing over time. The violence of the sports fan isn’t the violence of the revolutionary. Nobody comes out the day after a team wins to riot again, and if they did, nobody else would get swept up and join them. This is a temporary disorder born of joy and catharsis, not a license to take it to the streets again tomorrow. So regardless of how the Knicks do, their worst-behaving fans are a time-limited problem. Now free from the burden of policing New York City, I hope the Knicks win (but still not the Yankees). If they do, destructive opportunists will try to play their hand, and I hope they get summarily arrested. I hope the people caught up in the moment control themselves, sleep it off, wake up feeling vaguely embarrassed, and tell their grandchildren about it one day. I hope New York City police do what they often excel at: controlling a huge, historic event that consumes the city for a night. I will be staying home. ### Borrow and Steal: The Art of Reinvention in Nantes URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nantes-tourism-culture-sophie-levy-interview/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T15:08:54.000Z [Vital City](https://soundcloud.com/vital-city-604970448?ref=vitalcitynyc.org "Vital City") · [Borrow and Steal: The Art of Reinvention in Nantes](https://soundcloud.com/vital-city-604970448/borrow-and-steal-the-art-of?ref=vitalcitynyc.org "Borrow and Steal: The Art of Reinvention in Nantes") --- *This is the third installment of Borrow and Steal, our monthly interview series profiling evidence-backed urban policy ideas from around the world — and the practitioners who have translated them into reality.* *Our interview today is with Sophie Lévy, the executive director of* [*Le Voyage à Nantes*](https://www.levoyageanantes.fr/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, the City of Nantes’ official tourism body, which is responsible for promoting the city*’*s unique cultural scene.* *In the 1980s, Nantes — with a metro area population of approximately 1 million — was a depressed post-industrial French city on the Loire River, facing nearly* [*a 20% unemployment rate*](https://www.theaou.org/resources/nantes-france?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*. Today, not only does it have one of the lowest regional unemployment rates in France, but some have called it* [*“Europe’s loopiest city,”*](https://www.thetimes.com/travel/destinations/uk-travel/england/london-travel/nantes-the-loopiest-city-in-france-mqpr6k6zjh8?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *for the* [*surrealist open-air art*](https://www.wallpaper.com/art/nantes-cements-itself-as-the-epicentre-of-eccentricity-with-art-festival-le-voyage-a-nantes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *that occupies its public spaces. Its annual summer arts festival,* [*Le Voyage à Nantes*](https://www.levoyageanantes.fr/le-voyage-en-ete/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, draws* [*2 million visitors*](https://metropole.nantes.fr/actualites/2023/attractivite-tourisme/bilan-voyage-nantes-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *from across Europe — which, relative to its population, is comparable in scale to the* [*Edinburgh Fringe*](https://www.edfringe.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, widely considered one of the most extraordinary concentrations of cultural tourism in the world.* *Nantes’ transformation is remarkable in part because it was achieved without an anchor cultural institution — defying the conventional wisdom of how most cities approach cultural spending. Specifically in the 2000s, dozens of cities tried to replicate what*’*s known as the* [*Bilbao Effect*](https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/creating-the-bilbao-effect?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*: drop a flagship museum (the* [*Guggenheim Bilbao*](https://www.guggenheim-bilbao.eus/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*) by a starchitect (*[*Frank Gehry*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank%5FGehry?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*) into a struggling post-industrial neighborhood, and watch tourists flood in. The model has since* [*been criticized*](https://www.academia.edu/62938135/The%5FFading%5FAway%5Fof%5Fthe%5FBilbao%5FEffect%5FBilbao%5FDenver%5FHelsinki%5FAbu%5FDhabi?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *as a “Bilbao myth” in that it is expensive, top-down and hard to replicate.* *In our interview, Sophie explains how Nantes-style planning — distributed, free, public-space programming — provides a more accessible and enduring alternative. She dives into the political history and the organizational machinery that sustains Nantes’ cultural scene, and its economic impacts. She also reflects on what American cities — where per-resident arts spending is a fraction of the French norm — might realistically borrow from the model.* --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/La_fac--ade_de_la_Cigale_-Le_Voyage_a--_Nantes_2014-_-14912325131-.jpg) **Local businesses can opt to have their facade signage redesigned as part of the Le Voyage à Nantes programming.* Photo by Jean-Pierre Dalbéra **Cara Eckholm:** Sophie, thank you for joining. If you could start by taking us back to the 1980s — what was Nantes like then, and how did the city [decide to bet its future](https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0752/14/4/97?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on arts programming? **Sophie Lévy:** I wasn’t in Nantes at the time, so I’m working from what I’ve heard. In the 1980s, the city faced a double economic crisis. The first was the collapse of shipbuilding — Nantes sits at the beginning of an estuary, and boat construction had been central to the city’s economy. The second was the decline of the textile industry in the south of the city. Both together drove unemployment sharply upward, and the city became known as *la belle endormie* — the beautiful sleeping city. There are roughly three pillars that stabilize a city: political, economic and cultural. The economy was in bad shape. There was also a political shift. The previous right-wing mayor had a tendency to cut expenses and treated culture as a luxury. [Jean-Marc Ayrault](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Marc%5FAyrault?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), who won the city in the late 1980s, came in with the conviction that culture could be a genuine tool to enliven — to create a form of renaissance for the city. That was a core part of his platform. He’d met [Jean Blaise](https://luma.org/en/arles/artists-thinkers-a-z/jean-blaise?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a theater director, earlier on. Blaise had been invited to create a lively theatrical scene with a large portion of outdoor productions in one of Nantes's suburbs. That gave them the idea that bringing culture to people — through the streets and squares of the city — could signal that the city was awakening to something new. Ayrault won the town hall on that idea, and he began developing it through different forms across the 1990s, always adapting the form of the initiative to the period. The first step was a Biennale built around performing arts — *art vivant* — bringing artists from partner cities like Buenos Aires into Nantes and staging performances over a month, often in abandoned factories or outdoor spaces, not traditional theaters. The second step was [Estuaire](https://www.levoyageanantes.fr/estuaire/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): commissioning monumental artworks along the Loire River between Nantes and Saint-Nazaire, physically embodying the historical, economic and geographic link between the two cities. They did that three times, every other year. The third step was [Le Lieu Unique](https://www.lelieuunique.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a multidisciplinary cultural center in the renovated LU biscuit factory: exhibitions, concerts, a bar, something like a smaller [Centre Pompidou](https://www.centrepompidou.fr/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or [Barbican](https://www.barbican.org.uk/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And the fourth step, in 2012, was Le Voyage à Nantes itself. **Cara Eckholm:** Just for context: Mayor Ayrault served from 1989 to 2012 before becoming President of France, right? A remarkably long run for seeing a vision through. **Sophie Lévy:** Prime minister, not president. **Cara Eckholm:** Right, prime minister. How did Nantes transform during that period beyond the cultural investments? **Sophie Lévy:** The cultural story is the visible one, but there was a parallel economic strategy. Nantes already had strong universities and *grandes écoles* — graduate schools for engineers, doctors and other disciplines — so employers could find well-trained people there. The city also had improving transportation. The [TGV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TGV?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) between Nantes and Paris opened in 1989, which helped, though many regions of France benefited from additional TGV connections, so that wasn’t unique to Nantes. What really distinguished it was the combination of geographic quality of life — great light, proximity to the sea and nature, easy access to the countryside — and the strength of the education system. The city created an agency specifically to attract companies that didn't need to be in Paris — firms in health, pharmaceuticals, electronics and services that could function perfectly well elsewhere, as long as they could find educated graduates and lower rents for office space. Over time, a lot of headquarters for these service-sector companies relocated to Nantes. Culture was part of what made that pitch work. The liveliness of the arts scene changed the city’s image, which helped attract the high-profile talent these companies needed to recruit. It became a virtuous cycle — economy, politics and culture reinforcing one another. Today, the average age of a Nantes resident is [around 35](https://ugeo.urbistat.com/AdminStat/en/fr/demografia/dati-sintesi/nantes/20069319/4?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which is young by French standards. You can have a full life — education, family, culture — without the hassle and cost of Paris. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/7712245598_fc4601f52a.jpg) **A floating, faux, facade by Leandro Erlich erected in the Place du Bouffay.* Photo by Jean-Pierre Dalbéra **Cara Eckholm:** In the opening I mentioned the Bilbao Effect — the model of dropping an anchor cultural institution by a starchitect into a struggling post-industrial neighborhood. It worked for Bilbao, but there are [many other places where the effect did not pan out](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-12-21/frank-gehry-s-guggenheim-museum-bilbao-unleashed-a-wave-of-speculation?embedded-checkout=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Reflecting back on 30 years, how did Nantes think about the trade-off of investing into an anchor center relative to investing across the city? **Sophie Lévy:** I wasn’t in those debates, but I can speak to what I’ve observed elsewhere. I lived in Lille and watched the [Louvre-Lens](https://www.louvrelens.fr/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) phenomenon develop. I also witnessed the [Centre Pompidou Metz](https://www.centrepompidou-metz.fr/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In both cases, you have a major cultural brand transplanted into a struggling post-industrial city. In Lens especially, it really does feel like a spaceship that has arrived from the sky onto a city with deep poverty and serious economic problems. It’s a beautiful initiative — a little bubble of what humanity can produce — but it will be a long time before it has a real impact on the rest of the city, because you have to build so much around it. You have schools to create, a population with low literacy — the Louvre can’t do it all. Nantes took a different view. The assessment was: We have a castle and a Museum of Fine Arts. We have a base. Rather than import a big trademark, let’s invest in what’s already here — give the Museum of Fine Arts more budget to collect contemporary work, fully renovate the castle, build from the ground up. Jean-Marc Ayrault saw what the strengths already were, and decided to make those strengths visible to the rest of France and Europe rather than import something that might feel like a satellite landed from another world. **Cara Eckholm:** When I was in Nantes, I confess I didn’t have time to visit the Museum of Fine Arts or do a formal tour of the castle. But what really struck me was how much art was woven into the experience of walking around the city. Can you talk through how the art is organized, and some of your favorite pieces? **Sophie Lévy:** That's really the mission Le Voyage à Nantes was created to fulfill. The idea was that cultural institutions matter, but they should be complemented by art that’s visible in the city — reaching a broader audience more directly. Starting in 2012, every summer the festival installs 10 to 20 monumental works throughout the city, some temporary, some designed from the start to be permanent. Over the years, that has built up into what we call the [Green Line](https://www.levoyageanantes.fr/en/itineraries/walk-the-green-line/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a literal green line painted on the sidewalks that guides visitors from one work to the next. Some stops are heritage sites, like the castle or a historic church. Others are works commissioned by Le Voyage à Nantes. All of them are site-specific, made by living artists, created for Nantes rather than simply brought in. The effect is almost surrealist — an element of surprise at every corner, art completely blended into the urban experience. What I often say is that Nantes didn’t have an Eiffel Tower, and that turned out to be its great advantage. Because there was no dominant symbol to work around, everything remained possible. Cities like Dijon have extraordinary medieval architecture, centuries of history — but that legacy leaves less room for invention and for new artists. When you have a great past, it's hard to get people interested in the present. Nantes had a castle, but not the most impressive one along the Loire Valley. It had a Museum of Fine Arts, but an average one by French standards. It didn’t have a signature dish. Depending on who you asked, it was a sea city or a country city, a left city or a right city — sometimes considered religious, sometimes secular. Everything was true, and nothing was definitive. That floating identity, which once seemed like a weakness, turned out to be a canvas. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/Nantes_-_European_Thousand-Arms_Classical_Sculpture_-_20230716.jpg) **European Thousand-Arms Classical Sculpture, a 46 foot by 16 foot installation, on one of Nantes’ main shopping straights.* Photo by Romain D C **Cara Eckholm:** What is the identity today, after 30 years of deliberately constructing one? **Sophie Lévy:** The Ayrault era was really about repair. Nantes had accumulated a lot of trauma. In the 1920s, portions of the river running through the city were filled in — what had once been a city of waterways, almost like Venice, lost that character. Then in 1943, a large portion was destroyed by Allied bombing — perhaps half or two-thirds of the city. Then the economic crises. And there’s also the history of the slave trade: Nantes was one of the principal French ports for the [Atlantic slave trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History%5Fof%5FNantes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#Slave%5Ftrade) in the 18th century, and the fortune of Nantes was partly built on that. Ayrault decided that the past had to be confronted directly — that you could use all of it, not to forget but to turn yourself toward the present. He wanted to repair the scars without erasing them. The current mayor, [Johanna Rolland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johanna%5FRolland?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — who was born in 1979, making her one of the youngest major-city mayors in France — has shifted the frame. Her era is about preparation rather than repair: preparing Nantes for the ecological transition, for the present century. Her phrase is *la ville du vivant et des imaginaires* — the city of the living and of the imaginations. And when you look at Nantes's cultural history, that surrealist thread is real. [Jules Verne](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules%5FVerne?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was from Nantes. [Jacques Demy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques%5FDemy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was from Nantes. The poet [Julien Gracq ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julien%5FGracq?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)was associated with the city. The great photographer [Claude Cahun](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude%5FCahun?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). There’s a long-running science fiction literature festival. There has always been this passion for imagination — for the power of the human mind to reinvent the world. In 2029, Nantes is opening a new museum called *La Cité des Imaginaires* — the City of the Imaginations — which will bring together the Jules Verne archives and explore the intersection of art and imaginative thinking. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/14713888587_f8d9496ded-1.jpg) **Surrealist créatures by Claude Ponti laze around in the Jardin Des Plantes.* Photo by Jean-Pierre Dalbéra **Cara Eckholm:** It’s funny that a mayor born in ‘79 is considered young — we have a 34-year-old mayor in New York. But I definitely saw the Surrealism when I was walking through the city. Can you explain what Le Voyage à Nantes actually is as an organization? **Sophie Lévy:** It's a large and complex public entity — I’m still mapping it since I arrived, because it's many different things that were brought together. The [Château des Ducs de Bretagne](https://www.chateaunantes.fr/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — the castle which is also a history museum — is managed by Le Voyage à Nantes. [Les Machines de l'Île](https://www.lesmachines-nantes.fr/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is managed by Le Voyage à Nantes. That’s the project you may have heard of: a theater company that decided to build enormous mechanical animals. The centerpiece is a giant elephant, made of steel, wood, and leather, that walks through the city and can carry riders inside it. Its trunk can spray water. There are also monkeys, an ant, and many others installations — all interactive, all extraordinary as both sculpture and engineering. They're based on the Île de Nantes, the island where shipbuilding once happened, which is itself one of the great urban renewal stories of the transformation. Then there’s the city’s tourism office, which sits within Le Voyage à Nantes. And there’s the summer arts festival itself — the annual installation of new works across the city. We’ve also added a winter event, the *Voyage en Hiver*, in which artists are commissioned to animate the city during the Christmas season. That actually grew from a request by downtown shopkeepers, who had seen the summer programming drive foot traffic and asked us for something at Christmas to increase their seasonal draw. So it means they understand the impact, even if it’s hard to measure precisely. **Cara Eckholm:** Let's talk about tourism. Nantes essentially had [no leisure tourism industry before 2000](https://www.theaou.org/resources/nantes-france?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What do the numbers look like today? **Sophie Lévy:** Overnight stays in the city grew by roughly 42% between 2012 and 2019\. Then COVID interrupted that, and we’ve since recovered to 2019 levels. Business travel — what the French call *tourisme d*’*affaires* — has always existed in Nantes, but leisure tourism is recent. All of the programming has had a significant impact, not just on visitor numbers but on the city’s overall image abroad. The City now has approximately [3.5M overnight stays. ](https://metropole.nantes.fr/ma-ville-ma-metropole/competences/competence-tourisme?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) This year we launched an observatory of tourism to start measuring this more rigorously. Three legs: We’ll track attendance and visitor origins using mobile data; we've implemented a booking plugin across many metropolitan hotels so we can see trends in real time; and we’re establishing a partnership with one of the major banks to analyze credit card spending, which will let us understand how much day-trippers and overnight visitors actually spend. **Cara Eckholm:** What does the budget of Le Voyage à Nantes look like, and what does the city see in return? **Sophie Lévy:** The annual budget across all the elements I’ve described is around €36 million. Two-thirds come from public funding. One-third comes from earned revenue — primarily ticket sales from the castle, Les Machines and some cruise experiences we manage. But the economic impact extends well beyond what comes back to us directly. Hotels, restaurants, retail — that flows through the broader economy, not back to the organization. The fact that downtown merchants came to Le Voyage à Nantes asking for a winter event tells you they understand that the programming is driving their revenues, even when it’s hard to quantify. **Cara Eckholm:** I did some back of the envelope math: Nantes spends [roughly 6%](https://metropole.nantes.fr/ma-ville-ma-metropole/nantes-et-ses-11-quartiers/la-ville-de-nantes-comment-ca-marche/les-finances-de-la-ville-de-nantes/budget-2024-de-la-ville-de-nantes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of its municipal budget on culture — about €116 per resident, which is an extremely normal number in France, but an eye-watering number for cities in the US. American cities typically spend a tiny fraction of that per resident, rarely breaking 0.5% of the budget. In New York we spend roughly $36 per resident, which is considered incredibly generous, or [0.3% of the city budget](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/content/publications/2025-november-painting-the-towns-budget?ref=hyperallergic.com). (It’s admittedly a bit hard to compare apples-to-apples as a percentage basis, as French municipal budgets don’t include education spending.) I am wondering: what is the cultural money actually spent on, and how do you muster the political will to sustain a relatively high level of spending across different administrations? **Sophie Lévy:** I don't have the detailed line-item breakdown, but the spending covers institutions — orchestras, an opera, three or four museums — as well as events like [La Folle Journée](https://www.follejournee.fr/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a week-long classical music festival, and the [Festival des Bords de l'Erdre](https://www.festival-bords-erdre.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), an outdoor jazz festival. Cumulatively, that all adds up. As for the political will: The city has seen enough evidence of the multiple returns — economic, social, and in terms of pure quality of life — to sustain the commitment across changes in administration. In France, at least from my experience, culture is understood as a powerful source of social cohesion. People's sense of attachment to a city, their desire to live there together, is inseparable from what they can experience culturally. That calculus is different from the American model, where the funding of the arts works in a completely different way. ### Making the Shade URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/adam-lubinsky-interview/ Last updated: 2026-06-12T22:52:11.000Z --- *Trees are infrastructure. They cool streets during heat waves, soak up stormwater, clean the air and, as most New Yorkers know, make neighborhoods better places to live. But that infrastructure is unevenly distributed: economically underprivileged areas have roughly 19% canopy coverage, while wealthier areas reach 26%. In this episode of "After Hours with Jamie Rubin," Jamie talks with Adam Lubinsky, a partner at WXY architecture + urban design and one of the architects of New York's first-ever Urban Forest Plan, about how the city intends to grow its canopy from about 23% to 30% by 2040 — by preserving the trees it has, planting many more in the right places and turning New Yorkers into stewards of the 7 million trees already here. As always, can listen to this episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/trees-nyc-s-living-infrastructure/id1794619189?i=1000771969624&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/5Eu36lCwk3MjBHJMROGbjc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* --- **Jamie:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. **Jamie:** When most New Yorkers think about the city's infrastructure, they think about subways, roads, bridges, maybe the sewer system. They almost surely don't think about the trees that surround them. But trees shape life in New York City in ways that are very easy to overlook. They're living, breathing infrastructure that cools the city during heat waves, improves air quality, absorbs stormwater, and of course makes streets more pleasant to walk down and neighborhoods nicer to live in — unless you happen to live near one of those horrible ginkgo trees. **Jamie:** In April, New York City released its first-ever Urban Forest Plan, a roadmap to increase tree canopy across the five boroughs from around 23% of the city's acreage today to 30% by 2040\. While that may not sound like a big shift, if you take into account how geographically enormous the city is, it's a very ambitious goal. I sat down with Adam Lubinsky, a partner at WXY Studio, who worked, along with many others, to bring this plan to life. We talked about how the city can get to 30% tree coverage by preserving the current canopy, planting still more trees, and engaging New Yorkers as stewards of the existing urban forest. **Jamie:** The conversation, like everything else in New York City, isn't just about the trees. It turned out to be a lot about climate adaptation, environmental justice, and public health — and above all, it's about who this city really exists for. It's about who gets shade, who doesn't, and what kind of city we're building for the people who are going to live here for the decades to come. **Jamie:** Adam, thank you for being here. **Adam:** Great to be here. **Jamie:** Before we get into the project you worked on, tell me briefly what it is that you do. **Adam:** I'm a principal at a firm called WXY, based here in New York City. **Jamie:** If I were a young person looking for a job and my last name started with a Z, I would come straight to your place — I figure I'd have a clear shot to the top. They need a Z. So, WXY — what kind of firm is it? **Adam:** We're an architecture, planning, and urban design firm focused on not just buildings or plans, but really the public life of New York City. We spend a lot of time working with city agencies and community-based organizations on what it takes to make New York a dynamic, equitable, and healthy city. The Urban Forest Plan is exactly the kind of project we love to dig into — thinking about city systems, what it takes to change things on the ground, and how to put that into action. **Jamie:** What's your favorite project you've worked on? **Adam:** We just helped the city launch its program to set up ADUs — accessory dwelling units — in people's backyards. It's been really fascinating to think through not just how to show people what they can do with their backyard space, but how to make sure they understand the zoning, how to budget for it, where it's permitted. We've also been working on affordable housing in the Bronx — a project called The Peninsula, which is being built on the site of the old Spofford Juvenile Detention Center. That's going to become 800 units of affordable housing, plus workspace and open space. **Jamie:** Excellent. So let's turn to your most recent project: the Urban Forest Plan. How did it come to be? **Adam:** Its origins go back to 2023, when the city released its PlaNYC update — the periodic citywide climate plan. In that plan, the city set out an ambition to reach 30% forest canopy across all five boroughs. That was backed up by Local Law 148, which the City Council passed, mandating that an urban forest plan be produced every 10 years laying out how to get there. So we produced the inaugural Urban Forest Plan for New York City. **Jamie:** And when was the final report released? **Adam:** It was released during Earth Week — late April of this year. **Jamie:** And where would someone find it, if they wanted to read it — as I have? **Adam:** It's on the city's website, under the Mayor's Office of Climate and Environmental Justice. **Jamie:** We'll post a link in our show notes. Now, people my age remember Bette Midler and the Bloomberg administration's MillionTreesNYC campaign. This plan is something quite different — more organized, coordinated, strategic, goal-oriented. What were the goals beyond city beautification? **Adam:** MillionTreesNYC was a huge and important effort. But one of the clear realizations coming out of it was that it wasn't just about putting new trees in the ground — it required a much more in-depth strategy. At the highest level, our goals were threefold: preserving the tree canopy we already have, planting significantly more trees and thinking carefully about where and how, and stewarding the urban forest by pulling in people at every level — education, community engagement, care over the full life of a tree. **Jamie:** We're at about 23% covered now, is that right? **Adam:** We're at 23.4%, as of 2021, based on LiDAR data — planes that flew over the city and produced laser mapping of the entire canopy. Our goal is to reach 30% by 2040. **Jamie:** Do you know how many acres the city covers in total? **Adam:** We have about 45,000 acres of urban forest right now. Multiply that by just over four and you get the total acreage of New York City. **Jamie:** How much of that 45,000 acres is in actual parks versus the broader urban landscape? **Adam:** Parks manages almost 50% of our urban canopy *\[editor's note: Lubinsky later corrected himself; the Parks Department actually manages 54% of the city's urban canopy\]* — just over half of that is within parks themselves, and just under half is on streets and other areas that Parks is responsible for. Parks is by far the biggest player in all of this. **Jamie:** So if I walk across the Great Lawn in Central Park — does that count as canopy? **Adam:** No. Canopy refers specifically to the area covered from above by trees. The Great Lawn is green space, but it's not canopy. That's not to devalue it — but trees bring a whole different set of benefits. **Jamie:** And those benefits go well beyond what most people think about. Cooling is one that hasn't gotten nearly enough attention — until recently, when you start seeing those brutal heat waves. We have literal shade deserts in this city. **Adam:** Absolutely. Carbon storage is a huge one. Stormwater filtration — trees absorb runoff and keep pollutants out of our waterways. Biodiversity, especially for pollinators. And then there are the less obvious ones: measurable reductions in stress, which in turn have real health benefits — reduced rates of cardiac disease, stroke, asthma, and improvements in physical fitness. The full picture of what we get from urban canopy is really remarkable. **Jamie:** And where else would the raccoons live? **Adam:** Exactly. I see them quite a bit, actually. **Jamie:** The only thing scarier to me than the raccoons are the beavers — but that's a different podcast. One more thing on the numbers: you were saying two-thirds of the canopy is on public property and one-third on private? **Adam:** That's right. And one of the things the plan tries to do is reach all the different stakeholders and property owners responsible for different parts of the urban forest — not just Parks, but NYCHA, state and federal landholders, private campuses, cemeteries, and the backyards and front yards of one- and two-family homes. **Jamie:** How do you go about incentivizing the private sector? And what do you do about other government agencies that have no particular expertise in canopy management and no dedicated funding for it? My obligatory example is NYCHA — a ton of green space, amazing that it's stayed green at all. **Adam:** NYCHA has about 1,000 acres of canopy and no full-time staff dedicated to their trees. There are a lot of volunteer friends groups doing stewarding work, which is valuable. But one of the plan's recommendations is to explore having Parks take on responsibility for the care of canopy on NYCHA campuses. We went through the data very carefully — I don't think anyone has mapped it this precisely before — and divided the canopy by ownership type, looking at what's on NYCHA, what's federal or state, what's on private campuses and cemeteries, what's in backyards. That granularity lets us target recommendations to the right stakeholders. For some parcels the answer is a transfer to Parks. For private owners, it starts with guidance — helping people understand that the tree they think they need to take down for safety reasons might actually be manageable with some expert advice. **Jamie:** You can certainly incentivize ground-up developers to plant. But what about developers who encounter existing trees on a site they've already been permitted to build on? **Adam:** That's the harder question. New York doesn't have what several other cities have — tree protection ordinances. Washington, D.C., for example, has long-standing statutes protecting trees. Figuring out how to put something like that in place here is complicated given the current pressure on housing supply. The plan does include a recommendation to work through what that could look like — whether it's a contribution to a dedicated tree fund, a replanting requirement, or something else. It's on the table. **Jamie:** So as of now, a developer who has a building permit doesn't need any additional permission to remove trees on the site? **Adam:** That's right. That's one of the complexities. We also look at how HPD can play a role, particularly around affordable housing development. There are a number of areas where the plan says: we need to take a deeper look. **Jamie:** Let's talk about the demographics of the canopy. Where is it distributed — and where isn't it? **Adam:** The citywide average is 23.4%. Environmental justice areas are at 19%. Non-EJ areas are at 26%. Roughly 40% of the city's land area falls into environmental justice categories, so you can see clearly that canopy is less abundant where it's most needed. The most direct path to improving that is through the public realm — streets, sidewalks, parks. At the borough level, Brooklyn used to have the least canopy in the city. Over the last 20 years it's essentially pulled even with Queens, both sitting just over 19%. And if you look by property type, the only category where canopy has actually been declining is one- and two-family homes. **Jamie:** Any intuition about why? **Adam:** We don't have complete data on that. But some of it is concern about trees falling on homes — climate change is affecting soil conditions and storm intensity in ways that make people feel more exposed. It's a range of factors. But increasing canopy on those properties is a significant opportunity. **Jamie:** You'd think homeowners who are solely responsible for their own grounds would feel more stewardship instinct. But I guess if they decide the tree has to come down, there's nobody stopping them. **Adam:** I think it largely comes down to a set of concerns about trees. And it's worth noting that in places like Staten Island, one- and two-family neighborhoods still have substantial coverage. It's really about where canopy is expanding versus contracting, and making sure we're addressing both. **Jamie:** I can't let you go without asking about specific tree species. The trees in my neighborhood with the little pods that fall and smell absolutely terrible — those are ginkgos, right? **Adam:** Yes, that would be the ginkgo. **Jamie:** Why are they here, and how do we replace them? **Adam:** I'm not the best person to make the case against the ginkgo — I actually have what I believe is one of the tallest ginkgo trees in New York City right behind my house. I'd estimate it at 70 to 80 feet. But I will say the city is actively looking at diversifying the tree palette, including toward species with broader canopy coverage. The most common tree in New York's parks and on its streets right now is the London plane tree. A couple of previously common species are no longer being planted at all — Norway maples and Callery pears are both out, partly due to climate concerns. There's a real repositioning underway in how we think about street trees and park trees, to make sure they're hardy enough for a changing climate, native where possible, and optimized for canopy and biodiversity. **Jamie:** I'm not afraid to say I hate the ginkgo tree. The ginkgo fan club can send me all the hate mail they want. What city should we be aspiring to in terms of canopy percentage? **Adam:** It's a great question. I lived in London for a while, and you'd think of it as a green city — but London is actually at 21% canopy, below us. So we're already ahead of London. I think one way to frame the aspiration is getting to one tree per person. We have about seven million trees right now. Getting our count up so every New Yorker can claim a tree — that would be something. **Jamie:** We tend to think of this as a climate problem, an environmental problem, an aesthetic problem. But it's a government problem first and foremost. None of this happens if the city doesn't decide to play a role it largely hasn't played before, outside of Parks. **Adam:** Making sure we have the right leadership structure in place is critical. The Mayor's Office of Climate and Environmental Justice will be the agency lead. And every other city agency will have a designated canopy steward — someone who may have another primary role, but who is clearly responsible for trees within their agency. That kind of coordination is essential to actually pulling this off. There are a lot of different nuts we're trying to crack. I'm trying to use as many tree metaphors as possible. **Jamie:** Ginkgo nuts. **Adam:** Getting into the weeds. **Jamie:** It's a great report. The work is spectacular, and I know it took a year and a half. The nice thing is that it was started under Mayor Adams and announced under Mayor Mamdani — and the new administration is clearly taking it seriously. Adam, thank you for being here. We'll look forward to hearing how it goes. **Adam:** Great to be here. Really enjoyed it. Thank you. **Jamie:** Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### Economic Growth vs. Economic Justice: A False Choice URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-economic-development-mamdani-administration/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:34:32.000Z Moments after capping off his victory, Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani [promised](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/nov/05/zohran-mamdani-victory-speech-transcript?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to enact “the most ambitious agenda to tackle the cost-of-living crisis that this city has seen since the days of Fiorello La Guardia.” His vision resonated deeply with millions of New Yorkers, who have high expectations for what he can achieve in office. How he will realize these goals, however, remains an open question, particularly as it relates to an overarching economic development strategy. Many in the mayor’s base find growth itself — making the city more hospitable to businesses so they can settle and grow here — problematic or antithetical to delivering economic justice. That’s a false view, but it is also true that a commitment to growth does not guarantee widespread prosperity. Critical to understanding what can be accomplished in New York is acknowledging the limitations of city government, which has limited control over the macroeconomy, federal and state policy and private-sector decision-making. The two of us understand this well. We developed and implemented an economic strategy for another ambitious, progressive mayor: Bill de Blasio, whom Mamdani has [described](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/10/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-interview.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as the best mayor of his lifetime because he “showcased the ability of city government to meet the needs of New Yorkers.” Those needs are extensive and expensive, including providing high-quality education and childcare; affordable mass transit; a healthy environment; and recreational, cultural and green spaces that make living here joyful and desirable. Woven through those objectives is Mamdani’s core promise: to deliver an economy that works for all New Yorkers and can fund robust social services. That was also the de Blasio promise. Our strategy flowed from the belief that being pro-growth is a prerequisite to delivering on bold agendas and supporting equitable outcomes. It doesn’t just create jobs and expand the tax base, it avoids a self-reinforcing downward spiral in which residents leave New York, leading to declining tax revenue, eroding social services and confidence — causing still more population decline. New Yorkers from the 1970s remember this well. Mamdani should develop an economic platform rooted in three pillars: investing in infrastructure, incentivizing private sector investment and fostering talent pipelines to fuel high-growth industries. He should thread equity throughout, carefully weighing impacts to ensure that opportunity, resources and wealth are shared across communities and racial and gender lines. By doing this, he can demonstrate that economic growth is not at odds with economic justice. Just as it’s true that a key component of how to bring down the cost of housing is to produce more of it, the way to make prosperity more widely accessible is to double down on New York’s dynamism. That is the playbook for New York to remain a thriving economic capital — and to achieve an agenda [many](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdanis-real-world-constraints/) consider unrealistic. ### 1) Investing in infrastructure Investing in infrastructure is both a core government responsibility and a powerful economic accelerant. When the City builds and supports physical infrastructure, private capital follows with new jobs, new vertical development and an expanded tax base. Two examples from our experience show how this works in practice: NYC Ferry and Long Island City. **NYC Ferry** The idea behind the NYC Ferry was simple: serve as a connective tissue across our waterfronts, providing commuters in transit-starved neighborhoods with new public transportation and helping to unlock the promise of the City’s transforming waterfronts. We built the Ferry system from the ground up using only City financial and agency resources (along with rider fares). Nearly a decade in, it is far exceeding expectations. The network now spans 70 nautical miles with 25 landings and served a record [7.4 million passengers](https://edc.nyc/press-release/nyc-ferry-celebrates-50-millionth-rider?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) last year — far [above](about:blank) pre-COVID levels. Tte system also has the [lowest](https://edc.nyc/press-release/nyc-ferry-celebrates-50-millionth-rider?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) subsidy-per-rider of any comparable municipal ferry operation. That alone is worth cheering, but the lesson is broader than just transit: The City’s investment laid the foundation for more dynamic neighborhoods. As it moved toward launch, residential construction [increased by 6%](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20160603/OPINION/160539978/new-york-city-s-ferry-expansion-heralds-waterfront-boom/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) within a quarter mile of ferry slips, and commercial construction increased by 3% — creating jobs and economic activity in waterfront neighborhoods. Those neighborhoods are still seeing benefits, exemplified by how [healthcare workers at hospitals on the Upper East Side](https://www.6sqft.com/new-commute-new-demand-nyc-ferry-fuels-housing-boom-on-the-waterfront/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) started moving to Astoria to find more space and affordability — and enjoy a five-minute commute to East 90th St. **Long Island City** Investment in horizontal “hard” infrastructure also enables vertical growth. Consider Long Island City, where aging infrastructure was devised to support an industrial district that had shrunk for decades. It was our job to revitalize that infrastructure to lay the foundation for a modern mixed-use community. The headline infrastructure investment was the de Blasio administration’s [$99 million](https://www.nycgovparks.org/parks/hunters-point-south-park/pressrelease/21586?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) commitment to the second phase of Hunter’s Point South’s waterfront park — concurrent with leveraging City-owned property for 5,000 units of new housing, 3,000 of which are permanently affordable. The 11-acre park is now [unrecognizable](https://edc.nyc/project/hunters-point-south?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from what it once was, with newly created wetlands, green space and public amenities like pedestrian and bike pathways, playgrounds, picnic areas and permanent art installations by local artists. Less sexy, but arguably more important, was our $180 million Long Island City Investment Strategy, which funded new sewers and water mains, street reconstruction and other improvements to support the neighborhood’s revitalization. The private sector took notice, making major investments to [create millions of square feet](https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tishman-speyer-moving-ahead-with-construction-of-11-million-square-foot-office-and-retail-project-in-long-island-city-300296431.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of new office and retail space, bringing thousands of permanent jobs to the area. Progress continues. A large swath of Long Island City was recently rezoned, further advancing its transformation into a thriving mixed-use hub and deepening the economic growth pattern. And, of course, Hunter’s Point South is getting a [new and improved ferry slip](https://edc.nyc/project/hunters-point-south-ferry-landing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). With the constraints on the capital budget and the focus the Mayor is rightly putting on supporting an ambitious Housing Plan, it is imperative that the Administration also make longer-term, strategic investments in hard infrastructure. Although focusing on “state of good repair” is necessary to assure the CIty literally functions, we need to think and act ambitiously in order to grow the economy. ### 2) Catalyzing private sector activity New York’s dynamic economy relies in part on its concentration of Fortune 500 headquarters and a thriving start-up ecosystem. Startups and large corporations serve as a magnet for sustained population growth and help provide reliable customers for restaurants, theaters and small businesses. Being pro-business does not require handouts to large companies. But it does often require using the tools of governors to facilitate economic activity. Most businesses need a physical footprint. By keeping them in New York, we can help maintain a local spirit of innovation and create a durable economy over the long-term. Two examples from our experience — the East Midtown rezoning and the revitalization of the Brooklyn Navy Yard — demonstrate the benefits to the City from being proactively “pro-business.” **270 Park Avenue** Consider 270 Park Avenue, JP Morgan Chase’s soaring new tower above Grand Central Terminal. For some, it may seem a monument to wealth, or the sort of development activity City Hall should eschew. Untrue. This decades-long commitment from one of the nation’s top employers created a sustainable, healthy work environment for [14,000 New Yorkers](https://www.jpmorganchase.com/newsroom/press-releases/2022/jpmorgan-chase-unveils-plans-for-new-global-headquarters-building-in-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across the income spectrum and generated 8,000 jobs for members of 40 labor unions during construction. This single building is projected to generate [$74.6 million](https://commercialobserver.com/2026/01/new-assessment-roll-means-higher-taxes-are-on-the-way/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in FY26 taxes to the City of New York — the [equivalent](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/06/30/2915/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the City’s total support for cultural organizations this year, demonstrating that even one individual project can have a significant impact on the City’s bottom line. At scale, this sort of activity helps the City grow and expand its tax roll, providing funding necessary to deliver the services New Yorkers expect. It did not happen by accident or by offering Chase any financial incentives. 270 Park was the first major project approved under the [2017 East Midtown rezoning](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/nyregion/new-york-city-council-approves-rezoning-plan-for-midtown-manhattan.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), employing the City’s land-use powers to grow and modernize its largest business district. And because our agenda was focused on assuring that the growth generated by new development activity did not just inure to the private sector, the new zoning was structured to make sure there were demonstrable improvements made to the public realm, including support for struggling landmarks. In developing 270 Park Avenue, JP Morgan contributed [$42 million](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/real-estate/city-council-approves-jpmorgan-chase-midtown-east-tower/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to a public improvement fund, created an outdoor public plaza and bought air rights from St. Bartholomew’s, among others. 270 Park is one example, but New York is [filled](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20160505/REAL%5FESTATE/160509908/mayor-bill-de-blasio-de-blasio-welcomes-google-to-pier-57/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with [similar](https://www.kpf.com/story/one-vanderbilt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) success stories. **Brooklyn Navy Yard** The City itself owns real estate assets and has a significant role to play in providing physical space for businesses. The Brooklyn Navy Yard — a long-underutilized, environmentally compromised parcel of City-owned land — is a textbook example of how New York can use its assets and capital to drive growth, create jobs and foster an equitable educational environment. Multiple administrations made capital investments in the redevelopment of the Navy Yard despite pressure to sell parts of the Yard, or re-zone for residential use. Maintaining that commitment to use the Yard to support businesses growing, the de Blasio administration invested [$140 million](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141117/REAL%5FESTATE/141119861/city-to-invest-140m-in-brooklyn-navy-yard/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into [Building 77](https://bklyner.com/opening-of-building-77-brings-new-manufacturing-space-to-brooklyn-navy-yard/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), creating a new “affordable” tech and manufacturing hub for New Yorkers. Today, more than 13,000 employees across 550 businesses and 17 industries [work at the Navy Yard](https://www.brooklynnavyyard.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/BNY%5FFY-25-BNYDC-Impact-Report%5FDigital%5FV8.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), earning an average hourly wage of $39 — or $81,000 annualized. Nearly half (45%) of these ventures are Minority- and Women-Owned Business Enterprises. And, through the [Brooklyn STEAM Center](https://www.bkreader.com/policy-government/brooklyn-steam-center-expands-with-six-new-career-pathways-for-high-school-students-11407360?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), high school students have earned 2,200 industry certifications, completed 1,400 college credits and received more than $1.4 million in paid internships. This collective investment [allowed companies](https://www.brooklynnavyyard.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/BNY%5FFY-25-BNYDC-Impact-Report%5FDigital%5FV8.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) like 10xBeta to evolve from a small, prototyping studio into a nationally recognized biomedical company that produced portable ventilators during COVID and is now delivering mobile, hospital-level care in rural areas. ### 3) Fostering a talent pipeline The City also plays a critical role in fostering talent pipelines for emerging industries and high-growth fields. During de Blasio’s two terms, we prioritized the tech sector, as we concurrently heard from private-sector leaders that they needed more tech talent and from educational institutions that they lacked the resources to train it. In practice, this took several forms. We helped lay the groundwork for more robust tech education opportunities at our public universities so that students of all backgrounds had the skills to break into the industry more broadly and made strategic targeted investments into the tech-heavy life sciences industry. **Leveraging Higher Education to Promote Job Growth** After convening CUNY presidents and provosts, we [launched a $20 million CUNY 2x Tech program](https://www.cs.csi.cuny.edu/cuny2x.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to help build the capacity of their Computer Science departments. As one campus-level program manager told the [Center for an Urban Future](https://nycfuture.org/research/doubling-down-on-cuny-2x-tech?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the program “really elevated the type of jobs graduates are getting…our graduates are getting positions in places like Amazon, Google and some of the big banks and insurance companies.” Another [called](https://nycfuture.org/research/doubling-down-on-cuny-2x-tech?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) it “the best thing to ever happen to that department, and I’ve been there for 30 years.” We also fostered the [next generation](https://edc.nyc/program/cyber-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of cybersecurity professionals, recognizing that the nascent industry should not be dominated by other cities when its largest and most important customers are based here. Through [CyberNYC](https://edc.nyc/program/cyber-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we paired New Yorkers with paid internships, created a bootcamp to upskill workers looking to break into cybersecurity and launched a Master’s program with the City College of New York that takes just three semesters and costs less than $20,000. This has contributed to a vibrant and thriving sector overall, with [more than](https://edc.nyc/ai-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 25,000 tech-enabled startups in New York and [a 146% increase](https://nycfuture.org/research/doubling-down-on-cuny-2x-tech?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in tech jobs from 2010 to 2022. **LifeSciNY** Leveraging the City’s network of world-class academic and healthcare institutions, we made a [$1.1 billion public investment](https://lifesci.nyc/about-lifesci-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#why) into the life sciences industry designed to spur research, support a talent pipeline via CUNY and other local universities and create the specialized physical spaces the sector needed to grow. This investment paid off. New York’s life sciences industry now encompasses approximately 20,000 jobs across 500 R&D stage companies and 3.5 million square feet of space. This includes advanced facilities like [CZ Biohub New York](https://biohub.org/news/investigators-immune-system-research-improve-human-health/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the [Joint Center for Engineering and Precision Medicine](https://www.mountsinai.org/about/newsroom/2022/rensselaer-polytechnic-institute-and-the-icahn-school-of-medicine-at-mount-sinai-announce-a-joint-center-for-engineering-and-precision-medicine-in-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by Mount Sinai and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and [Lab of the Future](https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/deerfield-management-announces-25m-grant-from-new-york-state-and-empire-state-development-to-build-a-lab-of-the-future-at-healthcare-innovation-campus-cure-301784600.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by Deerfield, where emerging technologies are applied to health outcomes. Students are also benefiting. Over 220 companies have participated in the program’s internship program, benefiting 950 interns – with [nearly half](https://lifesci.nyc/internship?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) leveraging that opportunity into a longer internship or full-time role. Today, New York has one of the [largest life sciences economies](https://lifesci.nyc/about-lifesci-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#talent) in the United States. --- This is not to say that we got everything right. Mayor Mamdani should evaluate and improve upon our record. That said, the core principles guiding our economic development strategy remain sound, and as the data shows, contributed to a growing economy with equitable results. While there are many factors, our policies and investments contributed to higher wages for workers through an increased minimum wage alongside record job growth, a City GDP that grew faster than national averages and a poverty rate that declined 12.7% from 2013-2019 and lifted 521,000 people out of poverty. These economic successes resulted in Moody’s upgrading our general obligation bonds to its highest-ever rating of Aa1 in 2019, specifically citing the strength and diversification of the economy as a key factor in the upgrade. In other words, growth and being “pro-business” can be leveraged in support of progressive values – and despite the rhetoric of how hostile Mamdani is to big corporations, there is evidence he understands this. He flew to D.C. to [pitch](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/27/nyregion/sunnyside-yard-mamdani-trump.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) President Trump on a bold, ambitious plan to create a new affordable mixed-use neighborhood over Sunnyside Yards, potentially activating a plan we oversaw. It is expensive and complex and will require partnering with large private-sector companies. But the concept is exactly right: make long-term, large-scale public investments in infrastructure to create and catalyze new mixed-income housing, while providing educational, employment, commercial, recreational and transportation opportunities for New Yorkers today and tomorrow. The good news for Mayor Mamdani? Developing Sunnyside Yards will only work if the City plays an active, leading role. And there is a long body of evidence to suggest that when New York City takes the reins, growth follows – with benefits not just for titans of industry, but for every resident who calls our great city home. ### Before You Surcharge the Penthouse, Fix the Foundation URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-pied-a-terre-surchage-property-tax/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:34:59.000Z After Mayor Zohran Mamdani's first-choice new tax on the wealthy failed to gain traction in Albany, the Legislature and Governor Kathy Hochul agreed to a different approach — a new tax aimed at homes, co-ops and condos valued at or above $1 million when owners have a separate primary residence outside of New York City. Sold as a way to make absentee billionaires pay their share, the pied-à-terre surcharge passed as part of this year's budget and takes effect July 1\. The politics are easy: who could object to asking the owner of a $20 million apartment who doesn't actually live there to pay about $200,000 a year in surcharge? (As you'll see, the math is more complicated than that — but the politics is what got the law passed.) The policy is harder. Because the new tax sits on top of a property tax system that almost everyone, across decades and administrations, agrees is inaccurate and unfair, it will not land cleanly where it is aimed. To see why, you have to understand a little about how the city values property in the first place. ### A quick primer Property taxes on homes, apartment buildings, commercial properties and more are the single biggest source of revenue for the City of New York, generating about $38 billion annually. Every year, the city’s Department of Finance estimates the market value of more than a million properties, and property tax bills flow from those estimates. Houses — the one-, two-, and three-family homes the city calls Class 1 — are valued by looking at what comparable homes sell for. That is roughly how most people imagine property valuation and taxation is supposed to work. Co-ops and condos, which make up just over 30% of the city’s housing stock, are different. By state law, the city may not value them by their sale prices. Instead, it values them by the income a comparable rental building would generate — the “income approach.” This is not a loophole or a mistake; it is the method state law requires, and it is a legitimate way to measure a building’s economic value as housing rather than as a speculative asset. But it produces values far below what these apartments actually sell for. A condominium that would fetch $18 million on the market may carry a Finance value closer to $3 million. Multiply that across the luxury market and you get the central oddity the new tax had to work around: many of the very second homes the tax means to reach are, on the city’s books, worth a small fraction of their sale price. Real Property Tax Law § 581, enacted in the early 1980s as part of a state effort to encourage homeownership in a city that mostly rented, requires the income approach precisely so that converting a rental building to a co-op or condo — a conversion that thousands of units underwent back then — does not trigger a steep assessment jump, thereby pricing out the residents. The law separately protects rental buildings from being assessed on what they would be worth if converted. Both decisions are defensible, even logical. The problem is how the city has executed the law — particularly its longstanding choice to use rents from regulated buildings rather than market-rate ones as comparables even for properties that would never have been rent-regulated. This produces values whose relationship to actual market value varies unevenly across buildings and neighborhoods. The City does this because it dampens the volatility of property tax bills for regulated tenants — but it widens the already yawning gap between what a co-op or condo is worth and the rate at which it is taxed. The one-to-three-family houses where most homeowners live, which are taxed a different way, have their own version of the same problem. State law requires these “Class 1” properties to be assessed at a uniform percentage of their full value, and separately limits how quickly assessments can rise. They can go up no more than 6% in any one year or 20% over five years. Again, both rules are defensible on their own terms. Again, the problem is the city’s execution. For decades, Finance has set the uniform percentage in ways that produce assessments that vary widely across neighborhoods even for comparable houses. The property tax is perverse and illogical in many more ways than these, but these explain some of its biggest problems — and why the tax’s burden disproportionately falls on owners and tenants who can least afford it. The 2024 Court of Appeals decision in *Tax Equity Now NY LLC v. City of New York* (I am policy director of Tax Equity Now) held that the two requirements can operate together, and that the city must assign the same assessment for properties with the same market value. That decision opened a path the city can take on its own authority, without waiting for state legislation. If the city actually attempted to value properties in a more disciplined way, it wouldn’t fix all of these distortions entirely, but it would move things decidedly in the right direction. That gap — between what an apartment would sell for and what the city says it is worth — is the key to everything that follows. ### What the tax does, and what it can reasonably be expected to do The new surcharge is meant to apply only to homes that are *not* a primary residence and that are above a specified value threshold. For houses, that’s $5 million. For co-ops and condos, the tax arrives in two phases. This gets complicated, but stick with me. In the first two years, the city uses its existing income-approach values, but applies high rates to compensate — 4%, 5.25%, or 6.5% — and sets the entry threshold at a $1 million in Finance value, enough to capture apartments whose true sale value is much higher, like that condo that would fetch $20 million on the market. Beginning in 2028, the city is supposed to switch to valuing co-ops and condos by comparable sales, drop the threshold to a uniform $5 million of sale value, and apply the same lower rates that houses pay (0.8% to 1.3%). The shift brings the surcharge closer to actual sale prices and lets the city drop the awkward high-rate-low-base mechanic of Phase 1\. Whether the new approach is itself a sound way to value housing is a separate question — sale prices and market value are not identical, and a properly executed income approach (using market-rate rather than regulated rents) could produce values that consistently track actual worth without rewarding speculation. Whether the city can actually build the unit-level sales-based valuation system the second phase requires is yet another question — and one of several the law leaves open, like whether every co-op and condo unit will be revalued or only those flagged for surcharge in the first place. What can the tax reasonably be expected to do? It will raise money — though probably less than the $500 million the state projects. As the city comptroller has pointed out, owners can respond by selling, renting their places out, or moving in, and that will likely result in lower collections. The tax will fall most heavily, in dollar terms, on the ultra-high-end absentee owners the politics describe. And in its second phase it will, for the first time, try to attach a sales-based number to luxury co-ops and condos — a small preview of the broader valuation reform advocates have sought for years. But here is where to be careful. ### Beware the unintended consequences **The first two years run on a number everyone agrees is wrong.** Phase one taxes apartments on the income-approach value — the very figure that critics, reformers and litigation (including a case the state’s highest court allowed to proceed in 2024) have long called inaccurate. The high 4-to-6.5% rates for co-ops and condos are an attempt to back into a fair result from an unfair number. Sometimes that will overshoot; sometimes it will miss. And because the income-approach value depends on *which* rental buildings the city chooses as comparables, the universe isn’t even stable: if Finance were to use higher market-rate rents as comparables — which it is permitted to do — more apartments would cross the $1 million line, pulling in owners who weren’t there the year before. There’s a lot of play in the joints. **With co-ops — a common type of home in New York but one that people across the country are often unfamiliar with, whereby all the owners in a building have shares in a corporation — it’s especially complicated.** First, in Phase One, the law takes the whole building’s value and splits it by the apartment’s share of the co-op’s stock. But co-op shares were set by the building’s developer, usually by square footage and location — not by market value. So the split does not track what individual apartments are actually worth. The owner of a modest lower-floor unit can be assigned a share of building value out of all proportion to what their apartment would sell for — and a mixed-use building with valuable ground-floor retail can see that commercial value spread across the residential apartments above. Second, in Phase Two the question is whether the city will value each apartment directly from its own comparable sales, or value the whole building by sales and then divide it up the same imperfect way. The statute doesn’t say, and the answer determines whether Phase Two will fix the allocation problem or simply re-create it on a bigger number. Third — and most worrying — the law makes the co-op *corporation* the city’s collection agent, responsible for collecting the surcharge from individual shareholders. That’s risky because most proprietary leases let a co-op allocate charges only by shares, and an unpaid surcharge becomes a lien on the *entire building*, exposing every shareholder to one owner’s non-payment. That is a genuine legal tangle the statute leaves for others to untie. **The method of valuation in the law’s second phase makes more sense, but it’s still flawed.** A sale price, which is what the law uses as the denominator to tax, and “market value” are not identical. When a single apartment sells for more than $200 million, that tells you what one extraordinarily motivated buyer would pay; with all due respect to the parties, it is not the price a rational buyer would pay, and it is not “market value” in the sense the law means — the price a typical willing buyer would pay a typical willing seller, neither under compulsion. Using a sale like that to value the apartments around it doesn’t measure their worth; it imports a premium that has nothing to do with them. Assigning values correctly would mean screening out the outliers and the non-arm’s-length deals — painstaking, unit-by-unit appraisal work the city does not currently do for co-ops and condos at all. Is the city prepared to take this on? It’s an open question. **The administrative lift is enormous, and the clock is unforgiving.** Building a defensible, sales-based valuation system for tens of thousands of co-op and condo units — on top of producing the regular assessment roll — is a multi-year undertaking, not a two-year one. Meanwhile, the first year’s mechanics are brutally tight: the city must flag non-primary homes and notify owners by August 30, 2026, with the first bill due January 1, 2027 — and the law says that even if the notice never reaches you, you still owe the tax. Expect confusion, expect a wave of challenges, and expect a Tax Commission that is already busy to strain under them. The Department of Finance issued draft rules at the end of May, with public comments due July 9\. The draft addresses some of the questions raised above — making clear, for example, that family LLC and family trust ownership structures qualify for the family-member exemption — but leaves others unresolved, including how Phase Two will identify which apartments to revalue, how the law applies to combined cooperative units, and whether and how it reaches institutional housing. The final rules will shape much of what this surcharge actually becomes. **The surcharge’s reach into institutional property is another seam worth watching.** There’s yet another potential land mine in the new law. The surcharge may apply to properties that are currently exempt under a section of the law known as 420-a — university faculty housing, hospital residential property, religious institution clergy housing, foundation-owned residences — depending on how aggressively the city interprets the statute. Foreign government property is protected by federal treaty obligations, but the rest is genuinely uncertain. What this means is that a surcharge initially framed as reaching wealthy individuals with second homes could, under aggressive interpretation, extend to institutional housing the legislature likely did not mean to target. The new administration has signaled an interest in expanding the institutional tax base; whether and how that interest shapes this surcharge’s rulemaking is one of the questions that will define what it actually becomes. ### Fix the foundation None of this is an argument against asking absent owners of luxury homes to contribute more. It is about sequencing and priorities. We keep trying to bolt targeted fixes onto a property tax system whose basic foundation we have refused to repair. This is a system that values identical neighbors differently, that taxes a Brooklyn rowhouse and a Park Avenue co-op on wholly different logics, and that has resisted serious reform for 40 years. The pied-à-terre tax inherits all of that. In its first phase it runs on values whose relationship to actual market prices varies in ways that no one defends; in its second, it depends on a valuation system the city has not built. The mayor says he is committed to property tax reform. We’ve heard mayors say as much many times, but they never get around to it because the politics are so thorny. But that remains the necessary work — and as the Court of Appeals has now made clear, much of it can be done under the city’s own authority. A surcharge layered on an uneven base will produce results that are arbitrary in ways that have little to do with who is, and isn’t, paying their fair share — and arbitrariness, in taxation, is its own kind of unfairness. As this piece goes to press, the city has agreed in *TENNY v. City of New York* to enter a court-mediated settlement process aimed at the very implementation issues raised here — how the city values property, whether it can administer Class 1 assessments uniformly, how the income approach is executed for co-ops and condos. The agreement is a meaningful opening. Whether it produces real reform will depend on what the mediation actually delivers. Either way, the surcharge will continue to be administered on the existing foundation while that conversation unfolds — which makes how the foundation gets repaired even more important, not less. I grew up in public housing in Brooklyn and later spent seven years running the department that values every property in this city. From both vantage points, the lesson is the same: a tax system earns trust by being fair. Get the foundation right, and a second-home surcharge could sit on it cleanly. Skip that step, and we will spend the next five years litigating the difference. --- **Disclosure:* Martha Stark is policy director of Tax Equity Now New York (TENNY), the coalition whose litigation produced the 2024 Court of Appeals decision discussed above. She also advises clients and represents property owners in New York City property tax matters.* ### How New York City Can Come Out a Winner in the AI Age URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/ai-economic-opportunities-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:35:24.000Z In May, New York City’s comptroller, Mark Levine, put hard numbers to a worry that has been hanging over the city’s economic landscape. [His report](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/ai-and-new-york-citys-fiscal-future?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) modeled five ways, ranging from optimistic to dire, that artificial intelligence could reshape the local economy. In the worst case, the private sector could lose over 100,000 jobs by 2027, which would cost the City billions in foregone revenue. Levine is right to focus on New York City’s unique exposure to AI. The city is focused on knowledge-intensive white-collar work, and many workers do the exact same routine knowledge tasks AI is learning to master. But the report also points out something more hopeful: Levine notes the city is already home to hundreds of firms competing to make New York “the capital of applied AI.” This is the real opportunity. New York City will not win the battle for AI by simply bracing for impact or racing to the bottom to attract firms through tax breaks for data centers. The city is unlikely to overtake San Francisco in the race to develop frontier models or Northern Virginia in being home to GPU clusters. New York City can capture the highest-value AI jobs by becoming the key hub for what the industry calls the “application layer” for AI. This is where AI’s capabilities meet the demands of real-world industries, most of all in regulated sectors. Think using AI to reshape law, finance, medicine, real estate, media, insurance and other sectors. These are all sectors where New York City already has an unmatched level of density and agglomeration of talent, where the economic value of AI will ultimately be realized. The opportunity for New York lies in becoming the primary destination for firms seeking to build the plumbing and deployment for AI across these different domains. This is where the high-paying jobs of the future are likely to be located, and hence New York City’s future tax base. ### Applications, not wrappers The hard part about building the economy around AI applications is avoiding what technology experts refer to as the “wrapper” trap. A wrapper is a company that only provides a minimal interface bolted on top of a technology built by OpenAI or Google. These firms have multiplied since the arrival of ChatGPT: Think of the wave of “chat with your document” tools or one-click “AI assistant” applications. These companies tend to have no real defense against future innovation. The moment a major lab improves its base model to tackle the same use case, or a hobbyist spins up a free open-source version over a weekend, the wrapper’s business model collapses. New York’s strategy should explicitly not be about attracting or subsidizing these firms. There’s a more durable type of company that uses AI to build something genuinely valuable. Which firms survive as the underlying AI models keep getting better and better? There are two defensible advantages: regulation and proprietary data. Regulation sounds like a burden for firms, but here it can be a critical advantage. The best AI models can offer great legal and medical advice. But they cannot offer attorney-client privilege or prescribe a drug an insurer will reimburse. Industries built on licensing, liability and compliance have built-in natural barriers that a better AI model alone is not going to take down. The second key advantage is having access to unique or niche data. A firm that sits on its own information AI labs cannot touch now possesses a critical advantage. These can consist of their own records, information about customers or their own history and decisions over time. These firms are in a position to build a huge advantage by putting AI to work on data competitors do not have access to. These two advantages compound. A firm that successfully runs AI inside its own high-stakes operation throws out still more internal data in the process, which regulation then keeps out of the hands of a competitor. This lead will compound over time. ### What do these opportunities look like? Here’s how this might play out in a field like finance. Private equity firms, hedge funds and investment banks are already deploying novel AI applications that interact with their trade executions, deal decisions, risk management and regulatory reporting. These are all areas where errors have enormous consequences and deep access to proprietary internal data — like the firm’s trading history, the record of how they have accepted or turned down deal opportunities, and private client data — is the baseline cost of entry. The firms that win the AI race will combine AI with human judgment to decide on execution and catch errors, taking advantage of data no one else has. The blend of data and talent to do this exists in New York and almost nowhere else. New York has many other centers of excellence that can follow this same format. In medicine, the city is home to many forefront medical centers, among them NYU Langone, Mount Sinai, NewYork-Presbyterian/Weill Cornell and Memorial Sloan Kettering. These hospital systems are all experimenting with ways to incorporate AI intelligently in their clinical workflows. The role of regulation here — everything from the FDA’s regulatory requirements to malpractice insurance requirements to federal privacy laws — will help ensure that these jobs and tasks are going to remain durable and not be completely replaced. Even radiology, a job many AI experts predicted would become obsolete as technology got better and better at reading X-rays, has remained resilient as medical professionals remain a credentialed specialty. Instead, these systems are likely to expand to take on new roles and tasks that require both technical and medical expertise. Legal and compliance firms, a stronghold in the city, are another example of the potential for AI enhancement. The white-collar firms that survive will be able to build upon their existing legal datasets to map and understand legal precedents and vulnerabilities as well as tackle novel issues around cybersecurity and alignment risks. The people who can build and validate these systems should also live overwhelmingly in New York. A common thread through these examples is the deployment of AI in high-stakes, regulated settings to generate more data and more accurate models that drive future business value. Every time a clinical AI application processes a case and receives clinical feedback, it fuels a virtuous cycle. Better deployments lead to better algorithms, which generate more feedback. This loop compounds as firms deploy more AI inside of protected, proprietary environments, which ultimately generates a deeper competitive moat. It’s a promising path for AI as a competitive advantage for New York City. ### What the City should do To some degree, AI in New York City will evolve along the lines I’ve described whether or not government does anything. So what should the City and State do? The critical context here is that New York is looking at stagnation in well-paying white-collar jobs. As the state comptroller has shown in [a recent report](https://dingo.telicon.com/NY/library/2026/20260407ZZ.PDF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), nearly all job growth in New York since the COVID-19 pandemic has been concentrated in a single sector: “health care and social assistance,” which generated 253,100 net new jobs. If you remove these positions, New York City’s private-sector job growth was negative. Two of the highest-paid sectors, “finance and insurance” and “information,” combined generated just 26,000 new jobs. This makes the city strategically vulnerable around a valuable set of white-collar jobs. Together with Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, I have referred to the [urban doom loop](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/cause-to-worry-reason-to-act/) as the challenge of coping with dynamic responses from a smaller set of employed workers. While the full scope of AI-related impacts on white-collar employment is yet to be seen, the risk is that AI simply automates a large chunk of professional work just as we saw with the automation and outsourcing of blue-collar work, which led directly to the fiscal crisis of the 1970s. Just as the city came out of that period with a renewed focus on new jobs and occupations (at that time, the focus was on the very white-collar professions that are now squarely in the targets of AI companies), today we should be proactive in advance of technological shifts to secure a future for novel economic tasks and occupations. Securing the AI application layer is a strategy that leverages New York’s existing advantages to ensure they remain relevant in a more AI-oriented world. The City’s policy should be oriented around three approaches: strengthening access to domain-specific data, strengthening access to talent and space and helping institutional customers adopt new tools. What will those strategies look like? **Data-sharing frameworks.** New York City alone generates an enormous amount of structured data — building inspection reports, permit applications, transit operations, public health surveillance and so forth. While some of these data are made available through the City’s Open Data platform, much of it remains inaccessible or in formats that are challenging to use. So the industrial policy for New York starts with the City itself. It should first make publicly accessible as much data as it can, in the form of a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that agents can access. In layman’s terms, MCP is a bridge between AI models and external data sources, making it easy for them to talk to one another. Additionally, the City should make available other controlled-access data, modeled, for instance, on the U.S. Census Bureau’s [Federal Statistical Research Data Centers](https://www.census.gov/about/adrm/fsrdc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which let AI firms work with city data under privacy restrictions. This would provide the raw data for application-layer products in government technology, property technology and urban analytics. The City should then lead the way in extending this approach to private-sector data. The City government can facilitate data-sharing agreements between academic medical centers (for clinical AI), between financial and fintech firms (for compliance AI) and between housing agencies and proptech firms. There is no need here for the City to build its own tools or models. Instead, the government can simply lower the transaction costs of data access that helps firms develop and scale their solutions. In medicine, this might mean that the City helps negotiate an agreement that lets startups train diagnostic tools on de-identified records pooled across multiple hospital systems. These are the kind of niche data that provide a critical edge, but that privacy rules alone might keep locked up in distinct silos upon which no one hospital is able to fully capitalize. **Talent programs.** The growth of the application layer requires people who can combine technical fluency with domain knowledge. New York City’s universities are well placed to produce this talent, but the existing pipelines are too narrow. To prepare for future jobs, the City should pair with and nudge local universities to offer additional joint degrees, certification programs and lifelong-learning initiatives. There may also be a need for mid-career programs for displaced white-collar workers to retrain and retool themselves. Imagine a degree or certificate in AI and law or AI for clinical operations. Application-layer firms will also need space in which to operate. Since Manhattan’s office vacancy remains elevated in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise of the work-from-home economy, the City should help convert Class B and Class C office space into subsidized lab and incubator space for firms located near industries they serve, modeled, for instance, on the [M-CORE program](https://edc.nyc/program/manhattan-commercial-revitalization-m-core?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which supports upgrading of commercial office space. The New York City Economic Development Corporation’s [NYC AI Nexus program](https://edc.nyc/program/nyc-ai-nexus?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which provides venture support and accelerator programs for early-stage AI firms, offers another model of how to foster collaboration and integration between AI firms, investors and others. **City procurement.** Finally, there is room here to use City procurement much more intelligently. The government is one of the largest institutional buyers in the area. Committing to AI-enabled procurement in building inspection, permit review and benefits administration, among other functions, would ensure a guaranteed first customer for application-layer startups. To do this would require that the City also remove certain roadblocks and prohibitions to the deployment of AI in government and partner with employees and labor unions to do so. While challenging, being a leader itself in the deployment of AI can help push the City’s ecosystem in this direction. Even as it helps some firms scale up, the City should work hard not to subsidize the wrong firms, the dreaded “picking of winners and losers.” A range of firms is likely to succeed in the application layer. This includes OpenAI, Anthropic and Google themselves, as they add functionality that directly connects their models to enterprise customers. It also includes the large companies that themselves find new ways to monetize existing proprietary datasets and workflows. And of course, many new startups will successfully build additional innovative AI-first strategies to grow and scale, as some will fail. The City should encourage all of these sets of firms to grow. **Regulatory frameworks.** Finally, another dimension in which the City can help establish a framework for AI firms to flourish is through the development of regulatory guidelines. The City was an early mover here, releasing the [AI Action Plan](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/oti/downloads/pdf/reports/artificial-intelligence-action-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in October 2023 through the New York City Office of Technology and Innovation. A clear set of regulatory requirements can actually help firms facilitate further growth and innovation, if the regulations provide clear safe harbor against litigation risk. For example, if the City set a clear bias and auditing standard for the use of AI in lending and gave firms that meet that standard some protection against discrimination suits, lenders would know the rules before they build, rather than having to guess where that legal line is. ### The bigger picture The competition for AI jobs is sometimes viewed as a frantic fight to pay billion-dollar salaries for the very highest-paid talent in frontier labs, or an attempt to build wrapper models on top of foundational models. Neither approach is sustainable for a city of the scale and depth of New York. There will ultimately only be a few thousand AI researchers working to build the latest frontier models, but in doing so, they will continue to disrupt the wrapper firms. The potential for New York is instead to focus on the firms with the best strategies to meaningfully deploy AI in the sectors of finance, health care, law, insurance, real estate and media. The regulatory restrictions and existing data moat will ensure that firms that succeed in these areas are going to require hybrid expertise of domain as well as institutional knowledge. This is the sweet spot in which New York City is well poised to excel. In seizing this opportunity, New York has the potential to remain a global center for white-collar and professional work. The AI economy is unlikely to be geographically distributed the same way the pre-AI knowledge economy was. If foundational models continue to absorb routine cognitive tasks, the work that remains will concentrate in a handful of cities that already have the institutional density to support it. There may only be room for a few such hubs globally. New York is the natural candidate to be one of them, if we play our cards right. ### The Prosperity Equation URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-housing-affordability-economic-mobility/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:35:46.000Z How do we make New York City housing more affordable? As [“Block by Block,”](https://www.nyc.gov/content/dam/nycgov/nyc-main/pdf/2026/block-by-block-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the recently released Mamdani administration’s housing plan underscores, housing is one of the most pressing issues of our time, and one on which everyone has an opinion: Freeze rents, subsidize rents, protect tenants, support landlords, build more, create new housing models, speed processes and so on. But we too rarely talk about people and the resources they have to spend on housing, despite the fact that housing affordability and the crisis New York City faces are a function of both cost and income. There is no economic justice without safe, quality, affordable housing — and there is no durable housing stability without economic justice and rising incomes. “Block by Block” notes that there is no “singular solution” and that an “all of the above” approach is warranted. That “all of the above” approach to true affordability must include driving incomes up, enacting better tenant protections and holding costs down. These are not separate policy lanes. The Mamdani administration has the mandate, and New York City already has the assets — and many of the tools — to treat them together and ensure New York remains a globally competitive city where housing is affordable and prosperity is increasingly shared. ### The plight of renters New York is [a city of renters](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/spotlight-new-york-citys-homeowner-housing-market/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with almost 70% of households renting their homes, compared to 30% nationally. Rental housing is quite literally a contract between landlord and tenant. For the housing itself to be sustainable, tenants need to pay rent, but that can be impossible when incomes are stagnating while costs go up. In New York, rent collection in affordable housing [has dropped almost 5% since 2017](https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/Distress-in-NY-Affordable-Housing-Stock.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the share of projects with rent collections under 80% has more than tripled. Rental arrears not only put specific households at risk of eviction but also impact housing conditions for everyone in the building, as landlords have fewer resources to maintain properties. Many of these tenants are not paying their rent because they simply lack the resources to cover all living costs. For decades, across the United States, wages for low- and middle-income workers [have failed to keep pace](https://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with the cost of living. Productivity has grown steadily since the 1970s, while real wages for the bottom half of earners have remained largely flat, meaning workers are producing more but taking home proportionally less. In high-cost cities like New York, this national trend is dramatically amplified: The gap between what working families earn and what it costs to live, eat, commute and raise children is not a marginal inconvenience; it is a structural crisis. According to the New York City True Cost of Living report, 62% of city residents, or more than 5 million people, [do not have the resources to cover basic costs](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/equity/downloads/pdf/2026%20NYC%20TCOL%20Measure%5F4%206%2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Affordable housing is supposed to solve at least a piece of this problem. At move-in, most tenants pay no more than 30% of their income in rent. But nationally, 40% of residents in Low-Income Housing Tax Credit properties [are rent-burdened](https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Links%5FBetween%5FAffordable%5FHousing%5Fand%5FEconomic%5FMobility%5F.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), suggesting that, even in affordable housing, rents regularly rise faster than income. This is a crosscutting challenge. Certainly, low-wage workers, who tend to be concentrated in health care, food service and personal care, are particularly vulnerable. Too many of these workers lack benefits, face irregular hours and cycle through job and housing instability. Nationally, more than 50% of affordable housing tenants lack health insurance, almost 50% have no paid time off, more than 40% have jobs that do not pay overtime, and about 25% do not have regular working hours. But the issue is not limited to the lowest-income households. [According to the New York City Comptroller’s Office](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-state-of-job-quality-in-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), 62% of New Yorkers are economically insecure; only 1 in 3 hold a “good job” with benefits and family-sustaining wages. Housing costs, childcare, health care and transportation have all outpaced wage growth, leaving low- and middle-income families in a permanent state of economic precarity even when they are fully employed. This is a reality that [disproportionately affects people of color and women](https://robinhood.org/reports/poverty-tracker-annual-report-vol-8/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), who are more likely to live in poverty. Because rent payments can be deferred without immediate consequences to the household, this is becoming an increasingly frequent trade-off. We can expect rent collections to suffer as long as a significant number of tenants struggle without enough income to make ends meet. ### Changing course This trade-off between rent and other living expenses — and the associated harm to both low-wage workers and the housing sector — is not inevitable. We can build off our local strengths to foster income growth. First and foremost, we have [a diversified economy](https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/regional%5Feconomy/charts/Regional%5FNYC?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Page%201,diminished%20somewhat%20in%20relative%20importance) that is [projected to grow](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/nycs-economy-and-prospects/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — albeit slowly, given the overall weak U.S. economy. And while the proliferation of AI is likely to disrupt entry-level job markets, key priorities of the Mamdani administration — particularly increased development of affordable housing and universal childcare — are likely to create additional job opportunities in construction, property management/maintenance and education, all of which will require human workers. In particular, the groundbreaking commitment to new construction made in the administration’s “Block by Block” plan will create tens of thousands of jobs. Second, New York City’s complex public-private workforce-development sector already serves many New Yorkers. Multiple agencies, including Small Business Services (SBS), Human Resources Administration (HRA), the Department of Youth and Community Development, the Department of Parks and Recreation and the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) operate targeted programs. New York City Public Schools, the City University of New York (CUNY) and the State University of New York (SUNY), serving over 1.5 million New Yorkers daily, have ramped up a focus on career readiness and student career success over the past five years. Hundreds of nonprofits add depth and expertise in specific areas, including industry, population and neighborhood. All of these agencies, institutions and organizations manage complex funding and regulations. The New York City Office of Talent and Workforce Development was established to coordinate this vast ecosystem to fight fragmentation and meet diverse needs. It recently reconstituted the Workforce Development Board and Workforce Development Council, uniting leaders from industry, education, nonprofits, associations and philanthropy for essential public-private partnerships. The city’s size and complexity require coordination, capacity and expertise at the mayoral level to leverage and braid together the multiple public and private funding sources and stakeholders to ensure the needs of both New York City’s workers and employers are well served. A stronger system would work with New Yorkers to deliver these resources using a shared lifelong career-development framework that looks at a person’s needs depending on their time in life, circumstances, interests and experience. The framework could build on [CareerReady NYC](https://www.nyc.gov/site/youthemployment/initiatives/careerready-nyc.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), developed under the de Blasio administration — taking into account the many lessons learned from talent-development providers who support targeted populations and industries — to better position New York City students to launch successfully into careers. A lifelong career-development framework could serve as the shared operating system to deliver the right level of support through the best entity or entities at specific points in life: school-based career exposure, postsecondary pathways or workforce training matched to employer needs, plus childcare, language access, flexible schedules and credentials for better jobs. For example, New York City Public Schools initiatives like [FutureReadyNYC](https://futureready.nyc/web/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Career Readiness and Modern Youth Apprenticeship](https://www.schools.nyc.gov/learning/student-journey/career-connected-learning/career-readiness-and-modern-youth-apprenticeship?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are redesigning the high school experience to include career-readiness curriculum, school-supported work-based learning opportunities and apprenticeships. The Mamdani administration’s expansion of early childhood education supports working parents during their early and mid-careers or while they participate in paid [training opportunities](https://www.nyc.gov/employment/guide-pages/apprenticeships-training?service=apprenticeships-training&&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) funded through City programs. Technology like the City’s [Workforce Data Portal](https://workforcedata.nyc.gov/en/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) can be expanded to track the many programs, monitor spending against outcomes, spot gaps/overlaps and guide smarter allocation for an integrated, accountable ecosystem focused on results. For people with low incomes or affordable housing tenants, this means meeting people where they are with the resources they need to advance at every stage. The pieces are ready; it just takes coordination and investment. Third, New York City’s annual budget of over $100 billion can be leveraged in multiple ways to increase opportunities for low-income New Yorkers. Thanks to the passage of a State law in 2024, New York City has [strong community hiring mandates](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/communityhiring/downloads/pdf/Community-Hiring-Rules.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); most vendors with City contracts for construction, human services, professional services and standard services are required to hire individuals who are low-income or who live in low-income communities. The existing community hiring requirements went into effect in January 2025 and, once fully resourced and implemented, promise to be a powerful tool for economic advancement. New York City also needs to consider local employment placement and mobility as central goals of its economic development incentives and capital investments. We need to ask not only “How many jobs were created?” but also “How are New Yorkers getting those jobs, keeping them, earning enough to live here and building toward something more?” This reframes the City’s entire economic development and capital investment apparatus around a single North Star: Are all New Yorkers, especially those in low-wage, benefit-poor jobs, measurably better off? Urgency can be an asset here. At the federal level, House Resolution 1 imposed new work requirements on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid recipients. Without action, these requirements create real risks for low-income households and could easily leave many substantially worse off. But given that this is now law, we should use the opportunity to link recipients to career-path jobs. The moment is now to make relatively small investments to better coordinate the system and target resources rather than risk the significant downstream costs of inaction. As technology and AI result in rapid changes to the labor market, jobs are moving to other markets, requiring more experience or being replaced altogether. Without a nimble, continuously improving talent-development ecosystem that can proactively anticipate changes, plan for the future and smartly invest resources, New Yorkers — especially low-income renters — risk unemployment, underemployment and working in jobs that don’t keep up with the cost of their rents. This puts more buildings at risk, increases demand for benefits and results in fewer resources to build new and preserve existing affordable housing. ### Ten next steps It will take time to create a unified framework for career development that addresses the full scope of low-wage workers’ needs — and the challenge of accessing key resources in this climate. For the near term, we offer a 10-point plan on specific steps the City and its partners can take. **1\. Streamline access to and implementation of the City's workforce development programs** to make it easier for job seekers to access training and placement support and reduce redundancy across programs. As noted, a half-dozen different City agencies and our publicly supported educational institutions are involved in workforce development. Individuals in need of support can struggle to connect with the right agency, and the fragmentation contributes to both gaps and overlaps in services. As part of this process, formally elevate, fully staff and fund the Office of Talent and Workforce Development to coordinate the multiple systems and sectors. This is a mayoral office with explicit cross-agency authority and strong private and nonprofit relationships, and it can think holistically about how best to connect housing, education, workforce and economic development into a single, accountable strategy and career-development framework. With the mandate and partnership of the Workforce Development Board and Council, the City can align curriculum, credentials, hiring pipelines and initiatives across City agencies, CUNY, SUNY, Public Schools, labor, community-based organizations and industry to create a more effective, cost-efficient talent-development system with better outcomes. **2\. Prioritize and expand talent-development programs**,such as apprenticeships, that provide pathways to quality jobs and living-wage careers, rather than rapid attachment to jobs that have limited opportunities for advancement and don’t result in industry-valued credentials and transferable skills. To realize this goal will require, wherever possible, providing people with stipends or wages as well as other support while they are in training so they don’t have to choose between acquiring the skills they need and paying rent. **3\. Expand and enforce community hiring mandates** across all major City contracts — with benchmarks tied to resident outcomes such as wages, benefits, retention and advancement — leveraging the City’s purchasing power as a direct tool for closing the wage gap in the communities that need it most. Expand the mandate to include City loans as well as contracts to capture Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) and key New York City Economic Development Corporation (EDC) projects. **4\. Create and expand public-private training programs**,including apprenticeships, to position low-income residents for jobs, beginning with mayoral priority fields, particularly housing development, operations and early childhood education. Employers should be involved in shaping these programs to ensure viability. [An analysis of SBS training programs](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/evidence/nyc%5Froi%5Freport%5Fbrief%5Ffinal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) released in 2020 showed the 10-year ROIs for participants, taxpayers and society were, respectively, $292.68, $2.02 and $18.80 for every dollar spent on workforce development — making investing in training a very cost-effective economic development strategy. **5\. Invest in HRA and NYCHA career-services programs** and hold providers accountable for connecting public-benefit recipients to career-path jobs rather than simply the bare minimum engagement to maintain benefits. Work with the New York State Department of Health to set up a Medicaid work program that also prioritizes “good jobs” and encourages greater integration with SBS’s Workforce 1 system. **6\. Leverage the City as an employer.** Public-sector jobs have historically been a pathway to economic growth. Although starting salaries may be low, City jobs typically have good benefits and opportunities for advancement. The City has an aging workforce; for example, at the New York City Department of Social Services, 40% of staff are 55 or older. Over the coming years, the City will need to hire to maintain services. There is an opportunity to work with City unions to educate and prepare diverse communities for civil service exams, building on existing initiatives such as CUNY Civil Service Pathways and the new civil service youth apprenticeship title. **7\. Focus on ensuring students launch successfully into careers** and hold our educational institutions accountable to this goal. This includes providing academic credit for learning that happens in the workplace and leveraging summers for students as paid work-based learning opportunities. For example, summer work, including Summer Youth Employment Program placements, should explicitly link to career ladders, stackable credentials and promising pathways so that summer employment builds transferable skills and professional networks, rather than being a one-time transaction. **8\. Center affordable housing residents in workforce strategy.** Partner with NYCHA, HPD, HRA, the New York City Housing Development Corporation and affordable housing providers to embed career-pathway services directly into buildings where the wage gap is most concentrated; this is where housing and income policy must meet in practice, not just in principle. The administration’s ambitious “Block by Block” plan recognizes the importance of tenants and tenant organizing, which can serve as a platform to support workforce engagement. **9\. Establish talent outcomes as the central goal of economic development.** Reorient EDC investments, sector partnerships and City contract incentives around whether New Yorkers are obtaining quality jobs with living wages and benefits. The measure of success is not job creation in the abstract but whether the wage-cost gap is closing for working New Yorkers; this concept was developed in the “Green Economy Action Plan” released by the City in 2024. **10\. Invest in and expand data tools and reporting** needed to track progress and make strategy changes as needed: a. Create a transparent inventory of all publicly funded talent-development programs and initiatives that includes navigation support for New Yorkers seeking opportunity and industry seeking workers. b. Develop a borough-level income-mobility index tracking wage growth, benefits access and advancement among low- and middle-income New Yorkers, making the wage-cost gap visible, measurable and politically accountable. c. Establish a Shared Prosperity Dashboard that is publicly accessible and regularly updated, tracking rent burden in affordable housing, income growth, benefits access and workforce-credential attainment side-by-side, to understand and invest in what works, increase accountability and innovate to improve outcomes. We cannot solve housing affordability or address the instability facing both tenants and landlords without tackling income. The traditional focus on rent levels as the sole driver of housing affordability has helped create the challenges facing the affordable housing stock today. The false choice between “pro-business” and “pro-worker” is counterproductive and prevents the public-private partnerships that are critical for a robust, globally competitive economy, especially if we are seeking shared prosperity. In 2026, a diverse, skilled and stably housed talent pool is itself a competitive advantage, because global companies choose cities where they can find and keep talent that can afford to live and grow there. The New Yorkers living in affordable housing who are multilingual, resilient, community-rooted and motivated are not a social-services challenge; they are overlooked talent in which New York City needs to invest. Investing in the career growth of low-income tenants helps these families thrive, improves the stability of affordable housing, creates a skilled talent pool for employers and reduces the demand for public benefits. The health of both our residents and our housing, not to mention our city, depends on thinking beyond rents and reducing costs when it comes to affordability. ### Economic Justice Starts With Young People URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/economic-justice-youth-workforce-development-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:36:06.000Z The idea of “economic justice” in New York City, at its core, means ensuring every New Yorker is able to afford their life and make decisions about their future free from financial burden. Planning for a family, enrolling in school, buying a home, going on vacation and starting a business are attainable goals — provided people have a clear financial path enabled by the City’s investments in policies and programs that prioritize their financial security. Economic justice is not an antibusiness ideology without practical application. It is measurable economic infrastructure that establishes the foundation from which New Yorkers can live the lives they desire, and it begins with an investment in young people. New York City is home to City University of New York (CUNY), which is often cited as an engine for economic mobility for young people. [Six senior colleges and six community colleges](https://www.cuny.edu/news/new-study-confirms-cunys-power-as-national-engine-of-economic-mobility/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) rank among the top in the nation for their ability to lift low-income New Yorkers into the middle class, so CUNY must be at the table in any discussion about economic justice. The university provides an affordable education to its students, with two-thirds attending for free and [80% graduating with no debt](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-second-consecutive-increase-student-enrollment-city-university-new?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And programs like CUNY Beyond and CUNY 2X Tech are aligning career skills and internship opportunities with undergraduate programs to ensure students are prepared to enter the workforce after they graduate. These successes notwithstanding, rising costs and a changing labor market threaten young New Yorkers’ ability to afford to live here. Since 2019, housing, grocery and childcare costs have gone up an [average of 23%](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2026-02/NYCEDC-2025-State-of-NYC-Economy%5F2-12-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and entry-level job postings have [declined 37%](https://nycfuture.org/research/from-degree-to-career?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since 2022\. The Mamdani administration has already laid out ambitious plans to expand childcare and affordable housing and establish City-owned grocery stores. The administration should have the same ambition in the realm of economic justice. By developing a strategy that prioritizes worker protection and creates pathways to a financially sustainable future for every young person in every borough, the City can help ensure New Yorkers are not left behind in this constantly changing labor market. What signs have we seen so far? In a [conversation with Gothamist](https://gothamist.com/news/nycs-top-economic-agency-still-leaderless-under-mamdani-business-leaders-are-worried?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Julie Su, the City’s first-ever deputy mayor for economic justice, mentioned the Brooklyn Navy Yard as a successful model for economic development. Her enthusiasm is understandable. If you tour the Brooklyn Navy Yard this summer, you are likely to run into one of the many Brooklyn-based college interns working at a small or medium-sized business operating across the industrial park. You’ll be taken to Newlab, a venture platform supporting critical technology startups at the forefront of innovation. And high school students from the Brooklyn STEAM Center, on break from their summer projects, will be at lunch at Rustik or Russ & Daughters as you walk through the food hall on the main floor of the campus’s largest building. The Brooklyn Navy Yard has built the model by reimagining a 300-acre former naval shipyard into an innovation campus that houses hundreds of businesses, connects community members with jobs and, through work-based learning and internships, gives the next generation a head start in launching their careers. On their own, each of these components is a successful program. Together, they actualize a vision for economic justice that can make New York City one of the most economically mobile cities in America. The work starts in schools, but right now there are countless gaps that young people fall through. Every year, about 75,000 New York City Public Schools students enter ninth grade. Just 81% (much higher than it used to be, but down 2% from 2025) of those students graduate from high school, with a smaller cohort matriculating into and completing college. Even fewer will graduate college having completed a paid internship (the Center for an Urban Future estimates that only [12% of CUNY undergraduates do](https://nycfuture.org/research/investing-in-cuny-to-expand-pathways-to-careers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). In a city with a $127 billion budget and access to some of the largest private-sector institutions in the world, there is no reason for thousands of students to graduate each year without having a paid professional experience. Moreover, there is no excuse for our high school graduation rate to drop, even by 2%, from one year to the next. The education pipeline is often seen as separate from fiscal discussions. But with the Navy Yard as the blueprint, we can ensure that similar economic development projects throughout the five boroughs pave the way for economic success for students as they go through the education system. We wouldn’t be starting from scratch. The New York City Economic Development Corporation’s (EDC’s) portfolio has no shortage of projects on the right track if smartly woven together with the education system. In Manhattan, SPARC Kips Bay will bring life science, health care and public health education and jobs to the Hunter College Brookdale campus. The project will include a new public high school next to several CUNY campuses, an NYC Health + Hospitals outpatient care and training center, and other research and community investments. Brooklyn’s Sunset Park is primed for redevelopment; the Brooklyn Army Terminal, South Brooklyn Marine Terminal and MADE Bush Terminal are receiving millions of dollars to incubate startups and prepare for New York City’s first offshore wind project. Jamaica, Queens, can look forward to housing, education and job development through the Jamaica Neighborhood Plan, JFK Airport redevelopment that will bring 15,000 jobs to the area, and, building on the success of its Brooklyn forebear, a Queens STEAM Center. The Hunts Point Peninsula and Kingsbridge Armory plans promise improvements to historically underinvested regions of the Bronx, and Staten Island’s North Shore Action Plan will add residential, commercial and educational resources across 20 acres of waterfront. Aligning with economic justice will require each of these projects to coordinate how young people will participate in the economic activity generated from the millions of dollars of investment. EDC’s Economic Mobility Networks are already doing some of this work in Sunset Park, Kips Bay and Hunts Point, but additional coordination with New York City Public Schools, CUNY and workforce-development organizations across city agencies will be needed to create a talent pipeline that will reap benefits from these projects for years to come. It is not enough to focus on education and economic development. Young people and adults, regardless of their education level, may need to access one of many workforce-development providers for additional training, wraparound services or help finding a job. Today, workforce development is divided across various City agencies, with few accountability structures. In a [Crain’s op-ed](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/op-ed/op-ed-you-cant-deliver-economic-justice-without-employers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) earlier this year, Greg Morris and Kathy Wylde suggested building a sister entity to EDC, a Workforce Development Corporation. This organization would bring workforce-development functions across City agencies together, enabling the City to house workforce accountability under one roof, with identifiable owners who could report on outcomes that touch economic justice. If Workforce1 Career Centers are understaffed, Summer Youth Employment Program participation drops or we lose apprenticeships in priority neighborhoods, the Workforce Development Corporation would be responsible for working with the responsible agency owner to correct the issue. This isn’t only about yielding better economic results for individuals and families. When a ninth grader’s journey from high school to financial security drives the long-term fiscal health of our city, we embrace a new way of understanding our economy. Every day now, we hear from tech leaders who predict that the majority of white-collar jobs will be eliminated by AI. They would have us believe that, in a couple of years, humans won’t be needed to do most of the jobs we do today. Fortunately, we can determine the future we want. While CEOs and analysts predict a future led by AI, we can choose to prioritize our cities, our neighborhoods and all of the people in them. ### Build Wealth, Not Just Wages URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-workforce-development-wealth-gap/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:36:35.000Z Nearly two-thirds of New Yorkers are unable to meet the city’s cost of living — coming up $40,000 shy annually on average. So, though they’re living in New York, they’re digging themselves into a financial hole as they do. So says the [NYC True Cost of Living Measure](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/equity/downloads/pdf/2026%20NYC%20TCOL%20Measure%5F4%206%2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) report released in March by the New York City Mayor’s Office of Equity & Racial Justice. Most families strain to afford basic costs like housing, transportation, childcare, food and savings. Three-quarters of Latino New Yorkers struggle to afford these fundamental necessities, compared to one-third of white New Yorkers. These are not individual failures; these are systemic issues. So what do we do about an economy where a breakfast staple like juice [costs $9 per carton](https://www.keyfood.com/search/products?q=orange%20juice&productId=016300168203&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and such basics are out of reach for more than half of the city’s population? Workforce development is a partial answer. [New York City’s $640 million workforce development system](https://nycetc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Putting-Our-Dollars-to-Work%5FMarch-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is designed to build shared prosperity for residents and employers alike. Broadly overseen by the Mayor’s Office of Talent and Workforce Development, it is a complex network of public, private and nonprofit actors that coordinate to recruit, train and place youth and adult job seekers in local jobs. The system serves hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers each year, placing them in roles in health care, technology, sustainable infrastructure and more — a significant feat in a city where [nearly one-fifth of adults over 25 lack a high school diploma or equivalency](https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newyorkcitynewyork/PST120224?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Starting wages, however, can be low, and retention rates can be uneven. The problem is that the traditional “pathways” model of workforce development on which the system is built — in which workers must climb a ladder to economic security — relies on precarious employment and volatile earnings, reinforcing asset poverty. Earnings do not translate to wealth, so workers see temporary gains rather than durable assets. This volatility plays out along racial lines. In 2023, the [median incomes for white and Black New Yorkers](https://www.neilsberg.com/insights/new-york-ny-median-household-income-by-race/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) were approximately $108,000 and $60,000, respectively. At the wage level, [the Black-white gap was $16 per hour](https://www.nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/wages-median?geo=07000000003651000&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2022\. Even among the City’s municipal workforce, where greater parity might be expected, disparities still exist, [with workers of color earning 84 cents per dollar compared to white workers](https://council.nyc.gov/data/wp-content/uploads/sites/73/2024/04/PayDisparitiesReport2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Consequently, racial wealth disparities are compounded and vast. Compared to white New Yorkers, [whose median wealth is $320,000](https://robinhood.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PT%5FRacial%5FWealth-Gap%5F1.21%5Frev%5FFINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Black residents hold a median $2,800 in wealth; for Latino New Yorkers, the median is $0\. A system that targets income alone is insufficient to bring asset equity to New Yorkers. Yet the current workforce development system measures its success in wages, not wealth. It proposes that, through the traditional model, individuals will access jobs with family-sustaining wages, benefits and advancement opportunities. But prosperity implies more than a paycheck. It points to a more durable construct — one that can fundamentally reshape an individual’s life from living on the margins to living abundantly. While a worker’s earnings can transform their life and should not be dismissed, income is highly volatile — especially in this increasingly unsettled economy — and therefore cannot provide lasting economic security. The traditional model of employer-centered workforce development does little to combat racialized asset poverty. In today’s employer-demand-driven model, wages are consumed by basic needs, and workers become asset-poor and unable to withstand financial shocks or achieve intergenerational wealth. Too often, workers become chronically reliant on the workforce system for entry-level employment, reentering the cycle of precarity and asset poverty. This model cannot close racial wealth gaps. Focusing on wealth pathways would mean taking a different approach — aligning workforce development to wealth as an outcome. A home is the greatest asset most individuals will own in their lifetime, but only one-quarter of Black and less than one-fifth of Latino New Yorkers own their homes, [compared to nearly half of white New Yorkers](https://robinhood.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PT%5FRacial%5FWealth-Gap%5F1.21%5Frev%5FFINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Homeownership should not be a pipe dream for New Yorkers of color. A focus on wealth pathways would incentivize employers to adopt [evidence-based strategies to increase homeownership](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/black-homeownership-framework.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including automated savings, homeowner education and down-payment assistance programs. This approach also expands access to employment benefits like [retirement accounts and life insurance policies](https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/how-states-and-cities-can-support-wealth-building-next-generation-black-families?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Workforce developers should prioritize filling demand for employers who provide the conditions for asset-building, while the City should encourage businesses to offer financial assets. Shared prosperity should be more than a policy slogan. Simultaneously, government should focus on addressing inequitable asset markets that, both currently and historically, have acted as barriers to wealth-building for people of color. This includes [greater support for community development financial institutions (CDFIs) and Black-led banks and credit unions](https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/significantly-increase-access-capital-communities-color-we-need-support-black-banks-and-all-cdfis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which are linked to increased Black wealth-building. These tools would work in support of, not simply in addition to, workforce development outcomes. As a homegrown strategy, New York City’s [Workforce Data Portal](https://workforcedata.nyc.gov/en?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a ready-made foundation for tracking wealth outcomes. Developed by the [Mayor’s Office for Economic Opportunity](https://www.nyc.gov/site/opportunity/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the portal standardizes and makes public workforce development outcomes ranging from clients served to full-time placements, credential attainment and job continuity after two years. While it is a sophisticated workforce measurement system, the portal primarily tracks labor-market outcomes rather than wealth outcomes. Expanding the Workforce Data Portal to include measures of financial security and asset accumulation would allow the City to assess whether workforce investments are producing durable economic mobility rather than temporary earnings gains for New Yorkers of color. Connecticut’s [Wealth Accelerator](https://www.wealthacceleratorct.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)mirrors what an asset-forward strategy could resemble, albeit on a smaller scale. The Wealth Accelerator mobilizes resources toward the common goal of closing racial wealth gaps for low- and moderate-income families by scaling wealth-building solutions. Through its Cash Catalyst, the program’s signature $500,000 Baby Bond initiative, the Wealth Accelerator is testing what it means to provide assets alongside social services — an approach that flips the pathways model on its head. At present, several national workforce organizations, including [Jobs for the Future](https://www.jff.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Shift Work Forward](https://shiftworkforward.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), have been working with cities to define quality jobs and partner with employers that provide competitive pay, benefits and advancement opportunities. New York City could be at the forefront of defining quality jobs as those that not only provide short-term gains but build long-term asset pathways such as retirement contributions, emergency savings programs, homeownership assistance and employee ownership opportunities. Closing racial wealth gaps will require incentivizing employers to provide jobs that not only *lead* to wealth pathways, but *are* pathways to economic security. The True Cost of Living in New York City makes it evident that income isn’t enough. To truly make it in this city requires maintaining a baseline savings rate that breaks the paycheck-to-paycheck cycle and allows New Yorkers to begin building a financial buffer. [Even as some workforce leaders have begun to question the mayor’s economic strategy](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/29/nyregion/mamdani-edc-economy-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City has an opportunity. Mamdani, still early in his first term, appointed a deputy mayor for economic justice — the first role of its kind in New York City. Appointee Julie Su’s remit is to measurably improve the lives of New Yorkers and oversee the Mayor’s Office of Talent and Workforce Development, among other responsibilities. Her resume includes serving as the acting secretary of labor in the Biden administration. Among her priorities, Su has listed promoting worker and consumer protections, increasing access to childcare and transportation, and making sure working-class New Yorkers can enjoy the city’s cultural assets. While these priorities are important, they overlook a key institution: Reforming the City’s misaligned workforce development system must be a priority if the administration is to ensure that basic ease is not a luxury. New Yorkers shouldn’t just tread water. Government needs to help them swim. ### The Job That's Taking Over New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/home-care-job-growth-problems-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:32:04.000Z When The New York Times interviewed random commuters at Columbus Circle in 2024 (for [a story](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/nyregion/migrant-children-selling-candy-subway-laws.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about children selling candy in the subway) two out of the three people quoted happened to have the same occupation. It was a telling coincidence, because they were both home health aides — the low-paid, mostly taxpayer-financed jobs that are taking over New York City's economy. Employment in the city's home care industry has [more than doubled](https://data.bls.gov/multi-screen?survey=sm&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over the past decade to 546,000\. It now accounts for one in nine members of the workforce. Home health aides have become by far the most common occupation in New York, outnumbering retail clerks by roughly three-to-one. Many of these aides unquestionably do vital work. Their help with the basic daily tasks of the elderly and infirm — helping them bathe, eat, go to the bathroom, take their medications, get out of bed — makes it possible for thousands of New Yorkers to survive outside of institutions. Yet over the past decade, the ranks of home health aides in New York City have ballooned out of all proportion to the size of New York's elderly population, or any other available benchmark of need. From 2014 to 2024, the number of city residents aged 65 or older grew by 35%, according to the Census Bureau. Over the same period, the city's home health workforce soared by 131%, or almost four times as fast, [according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://data.bls.gov/multi-screen?survey=sm&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Is that because all those aging New Yorkers needed disproportionately that much more help at home? Seems unlikely. Home care has been growing in the rest of the country, too, but at nowhere near the same rate. As of this year, New York City's home care industry employs 361 workers for every 1,000 residents over 65\. The national average is 88\. There's no obvious reason why the city's population would need such a disproportionate level of help. According to the Census Bureau, the share of the city's population who are over 65, and the share of under-65 people with disabilities, are both lower than the norm. These statistics should set off two sets of alarm bells for New York's leaders. First, they raise obvious concern that Medicaid, the state-run health plan that pays for most home care, is being overused, abused or defrauded — at considerable cost to taxpayers. Non-institutional long-term care, which is what home health aides represent, is the fastest-growing expense for Medicaid. It currently accounts for roughly one-third of New York's $111 billion Medicaid budget, which is by far the costliest in the U.S. on a per-capita basis. Albany leaders sometimes defend this spending as a worthwhile investment to keep disabled people in the community — but it doesn't seem to be working. As of 2024, 2.6% of elderly New York City residents lived in nursing homes. The national rate is 2.0%. The second cause for alarm is what the job numbers reveal about the city's economy. Home health has accounted for more than half of its employment growth since 2014 and *all* of its net growth since 2019\. The seemingly bottomless supply of these low-paying jobs has kept the unemployment rate down, but it also helps to explain why inflation-adjusted average wages have been dropping in the city since the pandemic, even as they have improved nationwide. The broader field of healthcare has traditionally been a strong point for the city and its economy. A concentration of world-renowned hospitals and medical schools have pioneered life-saving breakthroughs while also supporting thousands of jobs for doctors, nurses and other professionals who typically command high salaries. They also have helped make New York City, for many, a nice place to retire. Although [hospital employment](https://data.bls.gov/multi-screen?survey=sm&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) dipped during the pandemic, it now stands 16% higher than in 2019, compared to a mere 4% increase for all categories of employment. Yet the rebound for hospitals pales in comparison to the 54% growth in home care jobs since 2019\. For these workers, wages lie at the other end of the spectrum — [typically about $20 ](https://data.bls.gov/oes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/area/3600000/2025)an hour, or $3 above the minimum. The conditions in these jobs can be challenging. In some cases, aides work 24-hour shifts but get paid for only 13, on the assumption that they are sleeping or eating for the rest of the time. Aides and activists recently staged a [hunger strike in support of a City Council bill](https://www.thecityreporter.nyc/2026/04/16/hunger-strike-home-care-24-hour-menin-council-labor-protections/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that would ban that unusual policy. Critics warned that such a ban would run afoul of state and federal payment policies, and that attempting to enforce it could strand clients without necessary care. At the same time, most home care jobs require [minimal training](https://www.health.ny.gov/facilities/home%5Fcare/professional.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and no prior experience, making them an attractive option — or at least a viable option — for recent immigrants and others with limited education or English skills. What is going on? Why is this sector within a sector surging, and what might be done to correct this problematic shift in the city's economy? The answers trace largely to Medicaid policies set in Albany. In the middle of the past decade, during former Gov. Andrew Cuomo's first term, the state made two big choices that compounded the state's already heavy investment in home care. First, it put Medicaid home care mostly under the control of companies known as [managed long-term care plans](https://www.health.ny.gov/health%5Fcare/managed%5Fcare/mltc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which were supposed to find efficiencies but also had a financial incentive to boost enrollment. Second, the state loosened the eligibility rules for an option known as the [Consumer-Directed Personal Assistance Program](https://www.health.ny.gov/health%5Fcare/medicaid/program/longterm/cdpap/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), CDPAP, in which disabled people could directly hire their own caregivers, including friends and family members, instead of going through an agency. Officials believed this would save money compared to traditional home care, but it proved to be unexpectedly popular. These changes to CDPAP triggered the formation of hundreds of businesses known as "fiscal intermediaries," which handled payroll processing for recipients. These companies recruited customers with advertising on subways and television and helped them sign up for Medicaid coverage. Enrollment and spending [boomed](https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/medicaid-benefit-doubles-in-4-years/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). State officials sought to corral the program, but their efforts were sporadic and halting. They tried to restrict the advertising, only to be [sued in federal court](https://www.nyhealthlawblog.com/2018/11/14/newly-enacted-consumer-directed-personal-assistance-program-advertisement-regulation-challenged-in-federal-court/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They tightened eligibility rules, only to have the federal government [freeze those reforms ](https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/beyond-a-bailout-new-york-needs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)during the pandemic emergency. After Gov. Kathy Hochul took over, she vowed to tackle what she [described as a "racket."](https://homehealthcarenews.com/2024/07/new-york-governor-kathy-hochul-calls-states-self-directed-care-program-a-racket/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Her solution was to [consolidate CDPAP](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-next-steps-plans-strengthen-home-care-services-new-yorkers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) under a single statewide fiscal intermediary. While this held the promise of administrative efficiency, it also put hundreds of thousands of caregivers under the auspices of a single employer. This paved the way for them[ to be organized](https://prod.crainsnewyork.com/health-pulse/1199seiu-begins-organizing-cdpap-workers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the powerful union 1199 SEIU, which will now have a vested interest in seeing the program grow further. The outlier scale of New York's home care has caught the attention of the Trump administration, which sees it as an example of broader fraud, waste and abuse in Medicaid. A federal crackdown on the program may soon force a reckoning in Albany. For now, though, many city and state policymakers remain complacent, if not outright oblivious, about this massive and costly conundrum. The New York Caring Majority, which advocates on behalf of disabled people and their caregivers, [asserts](https://www.nycaringmajority.org/our-campaign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that New York's home care industry has "the worst worker shortage in the U.S." – even as the city's per capita employment level is more than four times the national average. Scholars from Manhattan's Weill Cornell Medical School recently [published a study](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2849348?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#xd%5Fco%5Ff=ZGMyODZhYTYtN2ZiMS00NjE4LTkyNGQtNjFlNjY2MDQ4YTkw~) analyzing the "challenges accessing home care" among Medicaid beneficiaries in New York. The study deplored the "complexities" of the process without so much as mentioning, let alone explaining, the city's off-the-charts enrollment and employment levels. A first step toward a more sustainable home care program would be understanding how the city came to be such an outlier. New York needs a clear-eyed analysis of who is getting which services and why, and how its rules and policies diverge from national norms. The city's unhealthy overdependence on home health jobs is putting immense strain on taxpayers and distorting the city's economy while seemingly failing at its primary goal, which is to keep disabled people out of institutions. A city that counts on home health jobs for the majority of its employment growth is a city doomed to decline. Until city and state leaders grapple with those realities, they cannot hope to change them. ### The Affordability Conundrum URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-affordability-conundrum-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T20:02:11.000Z Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s election demonstrated that, for many voters, affordability is New York City’s biggest issue. Mamdani was elected on promises to lower the share of income families have to spend on [rent](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mayor-mamdani-releases--block-by-block--the-housing-plan-for-a-n?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [childcare](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mayor-mamdani-advances-new-york-city-s-first-free-child-care-pro?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), provide cheaper [public transit](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/07/nyregion/nyc-free-bus-fair-fares.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and improve access to [low-cost groceries](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani-announces-la-marqueta-as-first-site-identified-for?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Affordability is clearly top of mind for many middle-income New Yorkers — but it’s a tough goal for a city government. Tackling affordability for middle-income residents at the city level is challenging for two reasons. First, the City has only partial control of the underlying demand and supply factors that drive affordability. Second, the law of 100% makes addressing affordability across goods and services that vary not only in price but also in other dimensions well-nigh impossible. Mayor Mamdani leads a city, not a country. That means that he doesn’t control the single biggest element of demand — the size of the city’s population. If the mayor succeeds in making New York a better place to live (let’s say that’s the effect of delivering free buses and cheaper groceries, less crime and more art), new people are likely to move in and current residents are less likely to move out. Between 2010 and 2020, for example, the city’s [population increased by nearly 630,000](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2023/12/changing-face-post-pandemic-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That’s the equivalent of adding two-thirds of the population of Austin, Texas — often hailed as a beacon of affordability — in just a decade. Adding people to the city, whether through more stayers, more in-migrants or more births than deaths among residents, raises demands for housing as well as childcare and transportation services. Research shows that increased demands for housing, such as [those induced by migration](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347406420%5FEffects%5Fof%5FImmigration%5Fon%5FLocal%5FHousing%5FMarkets?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), raise home prices and rents (though, of course, migration also brings many benefits). In other words, making New York City a more desirable place to live will make it less affordable. This problem is best understood by looking at its reverse — the effect of city shrinkage on housing affordability. The [most affordable cities](https://www.redfin.com/blog/most-affordable-cities-in-the-us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the U.S. are those in the Rust Belt, cities that have lost substantial population relatively recently. In general, population size and rents travel together. New York became less affordable precisely because it became more attractive. The government of New York doesn’t fully control the supply of core goods and services — including housing — either. The City can certainly try to remove impediments to construction, although large-scale construction in dense places is inherently challenging, but it has no control over housing affordability in the City’s suburbs and commuter regions. About [one million people commute](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/planning-level/housing-economy/nyc-ins-and-out-of-commuting.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the City each day, from across a three-state commuting shed. The supply of housing and other services in that commuting shed acts — as a safety valve or a pressure cooker — on the New York City supply. Between 2010 and 2020, the shed acted as a safety valve. As housing in New York City became more expensive, people moved to the suburbs (from within the city and elsewhere). New York’s housing stock grew by 7.3%,but the increases in Jersey City (18%), Bayonne (14%), Newark (9%) and Stamford (10%) were even greater. These four cities alone added about 40,000 housing units between 2010 and 2020 and had population and housing growth 15% as large as New York City itself. New York’s affordability agenda depends on decisions made throughout the tristate area (and even beyond). The other problem is that affordability, especially for the kinds of goods and services the mayor is targeting, is a slippery goal. By construction, household spending always adds up to 100% of expenditures (note that some income isn’t spent but goes to savings and taxes). Reducing unit prices for basic, core needs such as housing, food and transportation will allow people to spend a greater share of their income on less essential “wants.” But because there is so much potential for variation in the quality of those core needs (think square feet of living space, strawberries in January or power windows) much of that increased spending will typically be devoted to improvements in the quality of core goods themselves. In this way, a reduction in the price of housing could lead to an increase in the share of expenditures devoted to housing. The key point is that a larger share of spending on some good or service isn’t always bad; sometimes it’s a byproduct of improved standards of living and happier citizens. To better understand this paradox, it’s useful to contrast gas or food and housing (or health care). Right now, many Americans are very unhappy about the affordability of gasoline. That’s easy to track: Gas, pretty much, is gas. Similarly, the U.S. government has a way of defining the affordability of food based on the [Thrifty Food Plan](https://www.fns.usda.gov/research/cnpp/usda-food-plans?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), originally developed back in 1975\. Nutritional needs haven’t changed much since then, though the plan was modified in 2021 to reflect changes in how families today prepare food. The picture for housing (or health care or transportation), however, looks quite different. Households today are smaller than in the past, and [square footage per capita](https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/Manhattan%5FDensities%5FHigh%5FRes,%5F1%5FJanuary%5F2015.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has increased. People expect more comfort and privacy. New Yorkers no longer sleep on mattresses outdoors in the summer. All New York City apartments [will have air conditioning by 2030](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6788510&GUID=156F95BB-CA74-44F3-A07B-A0E54EA0C10F&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and most do already. People will pay more for housing near parks, in low-crime areas, close to transit, with good restaurants nearby or even near their friends. If people move to be nearer to those good things, their rent will be higher. Efforts to reduce housing prices may lead people to live with fewer housemates, in larger units, with more amenities, and spend just as much, or even more, on rent. That doesn’t mean that housing has become less affordable. The potential for substitution between money costs and other aspects of goods or services makes it particularly hard to change spending shares. When prices of some goods decline in relative terms, people reshuffle their spending and buy more of the others. That’s apparent in comparisons of how New Yorkers spent their money over time. The share of our spending on core goods and services in total has hardly changed, but the distribution across core goods and services has. Back in 2004, New Yorkers devoted a larger share of their budgets to food, transportation and apparel and a smaller share to housing and health care than New York City residents do today, reflecting the much greater improvements in the quality of housing and health care that they now consume. It’s also clear when we look across the country that people in different cities prioritize their spending differently. Let’s compare spending shares on food, housing and transportation in New York City to spending shares in other large U.S. cities. In each of these very distinct cities, residents devote about 65% of their expenditures to food, housing and transportation, leaving 35% for all other spending. Food costs are quite comparable. But the division of expenditures between transportation and housing varies a lot. It’s not a coincidence that New York is both transportation-cheap and housing-expensive — or that the pattern in Houston is the reverse. When costs of apparel, food or transportation fall (in relative terms), residents shift their spending. They might spend more on entertainment or pensions (the 35% of “other” spending), but the cross-time and cross-city comparisons suggest that it more often goes toward improving the quality of core goods. Reducing the cost of childcare allows people to spend more of their income on more comfortable, well-located housing. Lowering subway fares means people can spend more on groceries. That doesn’t mean they’ve become worse off. Nostalgia is a poor policy goal when standards are changing. Middle-class housing in New York was not more affordable when high crime kept prices low and most units did not have [air conditioners](https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or [dishwashers](https://www2.census.gov/prod2/ahsscan/h170-9153.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), food was not more affordable when [fresh berries and ripe tomatoes](https://www.thepacker.com/news/industry/century-produce-first-aisle-department?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) were unavailable in the winter, and health care was not more affordable when the standard treatment for heart attacks was [bed rest](https://www.heart.org/en/news/2024/02/15/the-presidential-heart-attack-that-changed-america?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In sum, New York City’s government should do everything it can to reduce the cost of living. Removing unnecessary barriers to construction, taking on overpriced monopolies and helping out low-income residents are all worthwhile goals. But short of making city life undesirable, it’s going to be hard to come through on the affordability promise itself. ### New York City’s Job Growth Has a Quality Problem URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-job-quality-problem/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:32:29.000Z The numbers are so large that one can lose perspective: There are nearly [4.9 million jobs based in New York City](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/newsletter/new-york-by-the-numbers-monthly-economic-and-fiscal-outlook-no-110-february-2026/?emci=b19dc444-2c08-f111-832e-0022482a9733&emdi=d9d5f2ba-5b08-f111-832e-0022482a9733&ceid=6228085&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), of which about 4.2 million are in the private sector. Yet in 2025, the city only added [33,400 new private-sector jobs](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2026-01/NYCEDC-NYC-Economic-Snapshot-January-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a rate of growth that amounts to 0.8%. While this rate is better than the [national gain of 0.3% for the same period](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/what-is-going-on-with-nyc-jobs/?emci=693dd8e5-3a13-f111-a69a-000d3a57593f&emdi=b67b1170-4713-f111-a69a-000d3a57593f&ceid=6228085&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it was driven entirely by a single sector: health care and social assistance. Further, through the first half of 2025, there were [4,600 fewer businesses](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2026-01/NYCEDC-NYC-Economic-Snapshot-January-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than the previous year, accompanied by the lowest business formation for a quarter in five years. This is a story that’s barely told, but it could shape the future of New York as much as any other. It’s imperative that we understand why the city’s job creation engine is sputtering and take decisive action to rev it up. Anemic jobs growth and business contraction affect the City’s budget, restricting public service programs and funding for agencies through reduced tax revenues. It also makes it harder for current residents to find new jobs that allow them to afford living here, and prevents potential residents from finding gainful employment sufficient to move here. The subsequent population stagnation further restricts business formation, tax revenues and the City budget. Look past the headline jobs numbers, and the story becomes even more worrisome. While New York City has long been known as the finance capital of the world, it has also been the home of a diverse collection of people and jobs in a wide range of sectors. Yet in recent years, job growth in the metro area has been concentrated in just a handful of industries: health care, social services, and leisure and hospitality. Remove the health care and social assistance sector, and employment in the city is [at its lowest level since mid-2022](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/what-is-going-on-with-nyc-jobs/?emci=693dd8e5-3a13-f111-a69a-000d3a57593f&emdi=b67b1170-4713-f111-a69a-000d3a57593f&ceid=6228085&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In fact, remove just the health care and social assistance sector from the picture, and New York City’s job growth in 2025 was actually negative. Nearly all new jobs in the region have been home health care aides, a role that tends to pay less and provide few benefits. An overreliance on such a narrow slice of work makes the city particularly vulnerable to economic shocks or pullbacks in these industries. How serious is the problem, really, and what should we do about it? The centrality of health jobs to the economy isn’t a new phenomenon. Nearly all job growth in New York City since the COVID-19 pandemic has been in the health sector. If you remove the 253,000 net new jobs added to the city’s care workforce between early 2020 and August 2025, as a whole, the city’s private sector lost jobs. [Analysis by the City’s Economic Development Corporation](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2025-12/NYCEDC-2025-State-of-NYC-Economy%5F12-12-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) fleshes out the picture, showing that postpandemic job growth has concentrated almost entirely in low-wage jobs. This is in stark contrast to previous job growth, which was more balanced with mid- and high-wage jobs. While there is an argument that any employment is better than unemployment, many of the positions that make up care economy jobs are not what the Office of the Comptroller itself classifies as “good jobs.” In May 2025, then-City Comptroller Brad Lander [released a report](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-state-of-job-quality-in-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) containing a rubric for judging the quality of a job based on four conditions: whether the job 1.) pays a living wage, 2.) offers full-time and year-round employment, 3.) provides employer-sponsored health insurance, and 4.) avoids physically demanding or hazardous conditions unless those conditions are offset by higher pay. The idea is that a job meeting these criteria is a “good job” in that it at least “meets a basic set of conditions for economic security and workplace standards.” Based on these criteria, only one-third of New York City residents have been working in good jobs over the past few years. The comptroller’s report said this about the types of health care and social assistance jobs driving employment growth: “Despite employing hundreds of thousands of workers, these occupations offer minimal access to living wages, benefits, or year-round stability. Their persistently low performance underscores how many of the city’s essential workers remain trapped in low-quality employment.” The sectors with the lowest share of good jobs, according to Lander? Personal care, food preparation and serving, and health care support. Two of those three are care-economy jobs, representing over 350,000 New York City workers today, with an average share of good jobs around 5%. All this means that the majority of new jobs added since 2020, and a growing proportion of the city’s overall job base, are jobs of poor quality by the Comptroller’s Office standards. To be clear, this doesn’t mean that care work is not valuable work (in fact, it fulfills some of the most valuable needs for society), nor does it mean that the City should discourage job growth in these sectors. It simply means New York should think and act strategically to diversify job growth by nurturing and attracting employers that complement the growth in the care economy. At the same time, reforms should be pursued to make health care and social assistance jobs more desirable and financially rewarding. ### How does job growth concentrating in care work affect the City’s finances? On the surface, it’s apparent why job growth concentrating in low-paying sectors would be bad for the City’s budget. Less income for residents means less revenue from income taxes collected and less disposable income to be spent on consumption, which means less sales-tax revenue. In fact, personal income-tax revenue is forecast to be among the [slowest-growing tax revenue sources](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/content/publications/2025-december-analysis-of-the-november-2025-financial-plan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for New York City over the next few years. But the problem goes even deeper than that. Not only are the industries where job growth has occurred in recent years the ones providing fewer benefits, but a large portion of these jobs also provide an income below the poverty line ([just above $47,000 in 2023](https://robinhood.org/news/robin-hood-annual-poverty-tracker-report-shows-25-overall-poverty-rate-in-new-york-city-climbing-beyond-record-highs-observed-in-2022/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), by Robin Hood’s measure). The combination of few benefits and low pay means that the government itself must often step in to both provide workers’ health insurance and help cover the cost of living. Programs like CityFHEPS (the City Fighting Homelessness and Eviction Prevention Supplement), which provide housing vouchers for eligible residents, cost the City [upward of $1 billion in 2025](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/25/nyregion/mamdani-budget-cuts.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and are only growing. The municipal budget gets constrained on both ends, with lower income-tax receipts from workers who earn less and higher safety-net expenditures for workers who can’t afford to live in the city without assistance. While many of these low-income workers may receive their health insurance from Medicaid or through the Affordable Care Act, where the federal government covers part or all of the cost, the State and City chip in too. With the federal government abdicating safety-net funding in recent years, the financial burden for the City is likely to increase. ### What can New York do to attract better and more diverse jobs? Not all is doom and gloom for the city’s labor market. The metro area still holds several key advantages that can be utilized to attract more jobs. These include a world-leading financial system with plenty of capital ready to invest, world-class research universities, a top-tier creative and media industry ecosystem and an enormous, growing market for climate and transportation infrastructure. New York should establish new public initiatives to deploy these structural advantages in order to diversify and expand the jobs base. These new initiatives could follow the example of the [Economic Mobility Networks](https://edc.nyc/press-release/nycedc-launches-first-ever-economic-mobility-networks-connect-sunset-park-hunts-point?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program launched by the City’s Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) in 2025\. Worryingly, we are now four months into the Mamdani administration without a new head for NYCEDC being appointed by the mayor, [nor a detailed jobs plan](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/02/nyregion/mamdani-jobs-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); appointing an effective leader here would help direct the city’s economic growth. Additional programs launched by City government, in partnership with both private and public organizations, should focus on the following areas: **Leading in tech and applied AI** The technology sector sits among the highest-income employment in New York City’s labor market, and the funding spigot has been on full blast. As [NYCEDC’s State of the Economy 2025 report](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2025-12/NYCEDC-2025-State-of-NYC-Economy%5F12-12-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) puts it, “New York City-based companies raised $67 billion in venture capital funding from 2022-2024 — 11.0% of nationwide funding. … The number of Tech establishments rose 15.8% from 2022 to 2024, during which time the number of establishments in the private sector grew by only 2.0%.” A note of caution here: This tremendous capital growth in the city’s tech sector has not been matched by labor growth. Employment in tech has stagnated since the COVID-19 pandemic. The City needs to prioritize attracting and developing more of these high-paying, high-benefit, high-productivity jobs so that, as the sector’s capital funding grows, so does the opportunity for residents to work in tech. One great example is [AI Nexus](https://edc.nyc/program/nyc-ai-nexus?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a partnership between NYCEDC and private companies to locate startup accelerators here and expand the region’s AI business ecosystem. New York should pull all its levers to attract employment in tech, from expanding university-industry partnerships like Cornell Tech to working with federal offices to build out targeted high-skill visa programs. **Growing the life-sciences sector** Just like the tech sector, life sciences has seen a huge boom in investment and new businesses but little accompanying job growth since 2022\. NYCEDC and local universities have been investing in the sector through programs like The Science Park and Research Campus (SPARC) at Kips Bay. [SPARC](https://edc.nyc/project/sparc-kips-bay?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a full city block being converted into a life-sciences jobs and education campus combining CUNY colleges with private biotech towers. Backed by $1.6 billion in City and State funds and $2 billion in private investment, the project is expected to generate $42 billion in economic impact over 30 years. If things go as hoped, the public investment for this project will be returned by just over one year of the expected impact. New York City must continue supporting its university research centers and advocate for funds from the State while seeking new sources to replace federal funding cuts. Assisting the development of new labs and research centers and incentivizing researchers to relocate to the city can accelerate workforce development here. **Building the green economy** Another potential opportunity is in climate technologies, a fast-growing sector that will provide significant investment and employment opportunities for years to come. Just as with the above sectors, the trend in climate tech has been a growth of funding while job growth has stagnated. Recent federal funding cuts and regulatory changes by the Trump administration also present significant headwinds for green technologies. The Brooklyn Navy Yard project is one example in this space of combining new technology with climate-focused initiatives, such as [Blue Highways](https://edc.nyc/press-release/nycedc-nyc-dot-launch-blue-highways-action-plan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to transform land use and create new jobs. [Blue Highways](https://edc.nyc/blue-highways?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) activates the waterfront for sustainable logistics and manufacturing, making New York City more resilient to supply-chain disruptions and tapping into the city’s origins as a port town. Rebuilding New York City’s shipping and manufacturing industries could create thousands of middle-income jobs in the trades while also providing clean energy and a resilient supply chain. While tech, life sciences and climate technology represent a small share of New York’s GDP today, [they are leaders in driving the city’s growth](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2025-12/NYCEDC-2025-State-of-NYC-Economy%5F12-12-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Ultimately, the City will have to pursue all these initiatives on a much grander scale to build a labor force with higher-quality jobs. The good news is that money poured into such job creation programs frequently returns multiple times the investment. While pursuing these new types of work, the City should not disregard or discourage care-economy or tourist-economy job growth, or growth in any other sector with lower-wage jobs. The economy needs to be well-rounded, with a wide range of opportunities for people with different skill sets and backgrounds. But today, the balance is out of whack. To continue funding safety-net programs for lower-income New Yorkers and guard against economic shocks, it’s necessary to nurture more businesses and industries with a higher concentration of higher-income opportunities. ### Whither Wall Street? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/wall-street-future-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:30:10.000Z Just before the turn of the millennium, the then-mayor of New York City, Rudy Giuliani, [announced](https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/23/nyregion/city-and-state-agree-to-900-million-deal-to-keep-new-york-stock-exchange.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a “Christmas gift to the city”: a $900 million incentive package to the New York Stock Exchange. The deal was classic corporate socialism: an array of tax breaks as well as the purchase and transfer of a city block — part-occupied by a newly converted apartment building — so that the NYSE could build a supertall tower to expand its operations and stop [threatening to leave](https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/08/nyregion/stock-exchange-on-wall-street-offered-a-home-in-new-jersey.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for New Jersey. Giuliani was only the latest elected official to fret that without the aid of state capitalism, “Wall Street” would leave Wall Street. More than three decades earlier, then-Gov. Nelson Rockefeller and his brother, Chase Manhattan Bank chairman David, had demolished swathes of Lower Manhattan to build the Chase Manhattan Plaza as well as the World Trade Center and keep financial businesses downtown. The NYSE deal fell through, and the trajectory of Wall Street continued along an inexorable long-term trend: slowly but surely, as everyone had feared, losing its share of national finance jobs and losing jobs to technology, too. The stock exchange, longtime symbol of Wall Street’s humanity, hosts just [one-tenth](https://nypost.com/2020/02/15/how-the-macho-nyse-trader-became-an-endangered-species/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of its pre-millennial 5,000-strong trading and broking [force,](https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-MBB-26315?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and its expansion last year — an electronic-only stock-trading exchange — was [in Texas](https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse-texas?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The weird thing, though, is that even as the decline unfolded, New Yorkers stopped noticing. New York’s future turned out fine, economically and fiscally. New York State felt confident enough in its position as a home to high-end jobs that, in 2021, under then-Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo, it [sharply raised income taxes](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/nyregion/taxes-rich-budget-new-york.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on wealthy earners. But an analysis of that history shows why things may not *stay* fine, and the economic and fiscal uncertainty isn’t limited to the impact of artificial intelligence on jobs. Rather, the danger is an intensification of what’s already been happening for decades, with or without AI. We shouldn’t fear the unknowable future, but the acceleration of the present. ### How we got here Anyone worried about an AI-spurred jobs catastrophe coming to Wall Street — the city’s securities underwriting, trading, sales and investment sector — need only turn to the classified ads of the 1980s and 1990s New York Times Sunday “help wanted” sections to realize that we’ve already long had a hint of the Wall Street jobs catastrophe. In 1985, halfway through the Reagan-era “greed is good” decade that helped turn New York's fortunes from the 1970s fiscal bust, Wall Street was a growing industry, concentrated in New York. Local jobs in the securities industry had nearly doubled since 1973, from 74,500 to 130,000, and [comprised](https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/articles/attachments/LanciaHandout.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) more than one-third of the nation’s share of such posts. The industry always had its disproportionate share of Fifth and Park Avenue dwellers, but the classified ads demonstrate an egalitarianism, too. To staff an industry still dependent on in-person stock and bond trades as well as reams of paper to record those trades and transfers as well as the borrowing and lending that backed them, column after column of [ads](https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1985/09/01/issue.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) called for margin clerks, vault clerks, head runners, assistant head runners, payroll clerks, teletype operators. Applicants who wanted to start at the bottom and work their way up could join stockbroker-trainee programs, spending their days dialing for clients. No, the highest-paid jobs — scarce positions at Goldman, Sachs or J.P. Morgan & Co., or at a boutique firm — weren’t advertised in the newspaper; they recruited directly from elite colleges and family connections. But there was work [for everyone,](https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/2000/09/03/issue.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from new-account specialists to wire clerks. The mean annual bonus [was](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/press/pdf/bonus%5Fchart%5F2007.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) $13,970 — about $44,100 in today’s dollars. By the turn of the millennium, the Wall Street jobs roster continued to expand, to a peak 200,300 positions in 2000\. But the city was fast losing its share of industry jobs, down to below a quarter of the national tally. [Trading jobs](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/markstehli%5Fbank-of-america-inks-550k-sf-lease-at-bgo-activity-7155648175876313090-QHH9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) expanded in New Jersey and Connecticut. [Discount-brokerage firms](https://nypost.com/2026/04/09/us-news/these-companies-have-shifted-their-headquarters-out-of-california/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), replacing full-service brokers, expanded in California and later, in Texas. The jobs the city was losing were mostly in the middle or at the bottom of the industry. The average bonus, by then, was $100,530 — $198,300 in today’s dollars. Wall Street still employed tens of thousands of middle-class brokers, traders, and support workers. But in New York, it was mostly growing at the top: a relatively few people with ever more advanced educations, or proven skills at quantitative analysis, were making ever more money. After the tech-bubble burst that year, and after terrorists attacked Lower Manhattan the following year, Wall Street’s local middle-class jobs base never really recovered. New York City shed industry jobs far faster than the country as a whole — losing 23% of its peak-year industry jobs by 2003, compared to 9.8% nationwide over the same period. Though some hedge funds were opening or expanding offices in Connecticut, the jobs that vanished from Manhattan were still mostly not the top jobs, but middle-class and working-class jobs: Gordon Gekko kept his post, but Bud Fox didn’t. For a while, investment firms moved some of these middle-class posts to cheaper New Jersey and Connecticut, building new satellites in Jersey City, for example. Connecticut’s securities industry continued to grow through 2011, when it reached a peak of 26,500, and New Jersey’s grew through 2007, when it reached a peak of 59,600 — together, gains of more than 40,000 relative to the early 1990s. But that regional transfer of jobs largely stopped after the global financial crisis. Many middle-class financial jobs in the region simply disappeared, automated away: Few firms need floor runners anymore, and few people call a stockbroker to make a trade. Today, Wall Street is enjoying [record profits](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/press/pdf/securities-industry-employment-and-profits.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — $65.1 billion in 2025 (on an inflation-adjusted basis, profits were still higher just before the financial crisis). A volatile world has kept revenues from trading stocks, bonds and derivatives robust; borrowing, whether in the public or private sector, is at record highs; and nosebleed stock markets — albeit concentrated among a few tech companies — are hospitable to initial public offerings. And though traditional financiers [have viewed](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/04/brian-armstrong-crypto-regulation-00949711?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) cryptocurrency with [concern](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/29/dimon-jpmorgan-crypto-banks-coinbase-armstrong-00942998?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), so far, it hasn’t proven a formidable competitor to stocks and bonds. But a nearly two-decade-long bull run — it's been a long time since 2008 — hasn't translated into impressive employment numbers for New York. It took until 2024 for New York’s securities industry to surpass its local jobs peak of nearly a quarter-century before. Today, employment stands at 207,400, about 3.1% above its millennial peak, and now just 18% of the national share of such jobs, barely half of its mid-1980s share. The jobs that remain here are increasingly the well-compensated positions. The average Wall Street [bonus](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/press/pdf/new-york-city-securities-industry-bonus-pool.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) last year, out of a 2025 pool of $49.2 billion, another nominal record, was [$246,900](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2026/03/dinapoli-246900-average-bonus-on-wall-street-up-6-percent-in-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In 2024, the average annual salary in the industry, just above half a million dollars, was nearly five times the average private-sector wage in the city, the state’s comptroller [reminds us,](https://www.osc.ny.gov/osdc/reports/nyc-sectors/securities-sector?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) having more than doubled (in nominal terms) since 2000; the average wage citywide has risen slightly less, thanks in part to mandated increases in the minimum wage. ### How Wall Street’s makeup changed, and what it means That Wall Street steadily became more exclusive, and better-paying, helps explain why New York City and State government barely noticed that the industry has hardly created any new local jobs in a quarter century. Though fewer people are needed to generate record profits, the tax revenues have kept pouring in. The industry’s share of the economy and the state and city budget remains outsized. Last year, though comprising just 2.7% and 4.9% of private-sector jobs in the city and state respectively, the securities industry generated 15.2% and 22.5% of wages, says [Sifma](https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2026-The-Street-the-City-and-the-State.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the securities industry and financial markets trade group. According to my calculations based on state-comptroller data, Wall Street’s share of city tax revenues has held steady since the late 1990s, at an average of about 7.3% over the past three years, or about $5.6 billion annually. Wall Street’s share of state tax revenues, however, has risen, to about 21.7% of state tax revenues over the past three years — an average of $24.3 billion annually — up from about 17.5% around the turn of the millennium. (The city, with its property-tax base, is less directly vulnerable to a Wall Street downturn than is the state, which relies more on the income tax.) Another reason why New York barely noticed this wan Wall Street jobs recovery, compared to the national picture, is that the ever-higher-paid Wall Street workers freely spend their money. Sifma estimates that every direct job on Wall Street [supports](https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2026-The-Street-the-City-and-the-State.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) two more jobs within the state, from restaurant workers to private-school administrators to real-estate agents. Finally, New York barely noticed Wall Street’s stall-out because over the past quarter-century, New York succeeded in attracting well-paying jobs in other professions, mostly tech, both on purpose and by accident. The city more or less stumbled across a robust tech industry, as startups populated the lower half of Manhattan’s west side, attracted to sturdy old buildings as they took advantage of the city’s advertising industry and other legacy expertise. Tech employment [well more than doubled](https://www.technyc.org/nyc-tech-snapshot-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#jobs) over the past decade and a half, to more than 203,800 workers. In less well-paying jobs, New York has added tens of thousands of dollars in low-paying healthcare jobs, subsidized with the tax dollars generated by Wall Street. ### Short the future? Why worry now, then? Predictions of high finance shrinking as a share of the economy, whether from terror risk after September 2001 or growing street disorder after June 2020, soaring taxes and real-estate costs, have for decades come to nothing. Many of the jobs left, sure, but the money stayed. The new democratic socialist mayor, Zohran Mamdani, doesn’t trouble himself as Giuliani once did that investment and trading firms might leave the city. When, in February, American Express, the global payments firm, [announced ](https://www.americanexpress.com/en-us/newsroom/articles/colleagues-and-culture/amex-build-new-state-of-the-art-global-headquarters-new-york.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)a new headquarters building for 10,000 people at the World Trade Center site, the mayor concentrated his remarks on how the tower’s construction would generate “good union jobs,” rather than on how the company would employ finance workers in the tower itself. The city and state face two risks, though. The first is that during the next recession — and one is [overdue](https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/30/economy/recession-economy-timing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — Wall Street won’t confine its job-shedding to what’s left of middle-income and upper-middle-income jobs. Firms would target higher-end jobs, too, for transfer or elimination. This possibility isn’t so much a wild doom-and-gloom prediction as it is a slowly unfolding reality. In the past half-decade, firms from [JPMorgan Chase](https://nypost.com/2025/09/29/us-news/jpmorgan-chase-now-employs-more-workers-in-texas-than-ny-top-city-biz-advocate-calls-it-scary-development/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [Goldman](https://www.goldmansachs.com/pressroom/press-releases/2025/gs-unveils-fresh-look-inside-northend-campus?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Sachs to [Apollo](https://nypost.com/2026/05/06/business/wall-street-giant-apollo-aims-to-open-second-headquarters-outside-nyc-in-latest-fallout-from-mamdanis-war-on-the-wealthy/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have expanded not in New York, but in [Florida](https://nypost.com/2019/09/12/carl-icahn-moving-hedge-fund-to-miami-whether-his-workers-like-it-or-not/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and Texas. One change from previous expansions outside of New York: this time around, Goldman is among the firms that [wants top-level directors](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-06/goldman-gives-managers-a-choice-dallas-salt-lake-city-or-leave?embedded-checkout=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — not all, of course, but some — to base themselves in Texas. Indeed, Texas is becoming perilously close, from New York’s perspective, to reaching a self-perpetuating point where an agglomeration of finance jobs attracts even more and better finance jobs. Over the decade to 2025, Texas created 30,100 jobs in the securities industry — a 45.5% increase — outpacing New York’s 20,800 new jobs. As Sifma notes, the state, now with 8.3% of industry jobs, is “becoming a major financial hub,” already home to the second most Fortune 500 companies in the U.S. behind California. The new Texas Stock Exchange, with investment from major players such as JPMorgan Chase and BlackRock, [will soon start luring](https://pfnyc.org/research/texas-s-competitive-edge?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) IPOs — and potentially bank-led underwriting and sales jobs, as well. Texas' lack of personal-income tax is “especially alluring to high earners,” the trade group observes, in contrast to New York, “one of the few states to raise taxes in 2021.” As E.J. McMahon [notes,](https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/the-limits-of-new-yorks-tax-the-rich-policy-2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) top earners in the state now face the highest tax burden they have in four decades, when the financial sector began to take off. Most highly paid executives and traders may not have minded the Cuomo-era state income tax hikes on the rich a half-decade ago, and may not even mind that much now, when overall revenues are still growing. In an industrywide retrenchment, they may mind more. The second risk is that as this higher-end jobs transfer happens, New York’s job growth in its other professional industries slumps. This possibility, too, isn’t a prediction but a reality: The city [lost](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/exec26/mm5-26.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 57,300 private-sector jobs in the year through March, including 5,800 professional and business jobs. As growth in the tech and other industries slows or reverses, whether because of AI or because a debt-driven, consumer-dependent economy [is mostly spent out](https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/the-journal/americans-have-more-credit-card-debt-than-ever/f71236fd-849e-46eb-8817-6b426bc4cf21?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), what industry will replace it? No industry comes close to paying what Wall Street pays: the average tech job pays $135,000. ### What if the Masters of the Universe depart? What would New York look like if its well-paid Wall Street jobs base permanently shrank?.The city would be more equal, sure — but not in a good way, at least not for many people and interest groups who have grown accustomed to a permanent regime of state and city budget largesse funded by finance. In current dollars, New York City’s 1985 spending [was](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/content/data-center?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about $59.3 billion; the city, this year, [will spend ](https://www.city-journal.org/article/zohran-mamdani-budget-taxes-unions-welfare?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)$125.8 billion. High-paying job losses would also mean revenue losses for government. Absent drastic spending cuts both to union-worker compensation and to redistributive programs such as record homeless-services spending — cuts for which the state and city have never had a political appetite — the state and city would have to raise taxes on middle-class earners, including homeowners. New York City and State did not create the four-decades-long-and-running financial-markets boom that began in the 1980s and contributed so much to its recovery from its 1970s near-bankruptcy. But the difference between then and now is that back then, finance had no choice but to be in New York, despite the city’s crime and quality-of-life woes. Similarly, New York has no control over the trajectory of financial markets, or of technology. If AI results in permanent job cuts [in finance](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/21/business/ai-job-cuts-wall-street.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and elsewhere — still an unknown — New York City cannot stop that process. The only thing the city can choose, or not, is its own complacency. ### New York Families Are Doing Better Than You’ve Heard URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-families-positive-income-trends/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:30:49.000Z Is the middle class in danger? On social media and in the news, Americans regularly hear that the middle class has shrunk, been hollowed out, or is disappearing. These claims can be tricky to evaluate because there is no agreed-upon way to define the middle class. Should it be defined in terms of a fixed standard of living, so that if everyone gets richer, the middle class gets smaller while better-off categories — the upper-middle class, for instance — grow larger? Or should we think of the middle class as “the middle” regardless of how poor or rich America is? Viewed this way, if everyone’s incomes double, the middle class remains the same size. Defining the middle class these two different ways — using absolute or relative thresholds — can lead to different assessments of how the middle class is doing. Claims that it is doing poorly invariably rely on relative thresholds. It’s how the Pew Research Center could [claim](https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2015/12/09/1-the-hollowing-of-the-american-middle-class/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a decade ago that the middle class had “hollowed out,” with fewer families in the middle, more who were poorer than middle class, and more who were richer. It’s also how Pew [could say](https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2016/05/11/appendix-b-detailed-tables-and-maps/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that metropolitan New York City’s middle class made up less than half the population and how a recent *Chicago* magazine article could [fret](https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/chicagos-middle-class-is-disappearing/) that that city’s middle class is “disappearing.” Relative class standing matters in some contexts. If the cars that the richest Americans drive or the houses they buy are sufficiently luxurious that resentment builds among everyone else, a middle class that is better off in absolute terms might be considered worse off in relative terms. If the entry point to the middle class is pegged to what the typical family makes, the middle class might shrink if the median family’s income increases more than incomes of families lower down, raising the threshold for entry to the middle class faster than income grows among those trying to join or to stay in it. But these are stories about rising *inequality*, not falling living standards. The middle class shrinks in the [latest](https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/05/RE%5F2024.05.31%5FAmerican-Middle-Class%5FFINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Pew analyses, despite the fact that the middle class enjoyed a 60% increase in income. The lower-income categories in the Chicago [study](https://voorheescenter.uic.edu/chicago%5Fcommunities/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also grew but saw large increases in purchasing power. It is usually worth analyzing living standards and inequality separately, so that negative characterizations do not give the impression that families are worse off in an absolute sense. In a recent [paper](https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2027/12/The-Middle-Class-Is-Shrinking-Because-of-a-Booming-Upper-Middle-Class.pdf?x97961&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) I wrote with Steve Rose, we set class thresholds so that they remained constant over time in terms of living standards, rising only with inflation. That means “middle-class” incomes buy goods and services affording the same level of satisfaction in every year. If everyone’s inflation-adjusted income increases by 50%, relative thresholds will show a stable middle class, because it now requires 50% more income to enter it. Our absolute thresholds will show that more people make enough to reach the middle class but also that more make too much to stay in the middle class. We found that the “core” middle class shrunk between 1979 and 2024, but only because families became richer. The share of families poorer than the core middle class also shrunk. In contrast, the share who were in the upper-middle class rose from 10% to 31%. Subsequently, I [reanalyzed](https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/chicagos-disappearing-middle-class-can-be-found-in-its-proliferating-upper-middle-class-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the Chicago data and found that using absolute class thresholds, the disappearance of the middle class since 1970 is a happy outcome of everyone getting richer. The share of Chicagoans living in communities poorer than “middle income” fell between 1970 and 2024, as did the share who were in “middle income” communities. The share who were in “high income” or “very high income” communities rose from 7% to 48%. Designations such as “middle class,” “poor” or “high income” based on thresholds are difficult to interpret without a reference point. Nevertheless, when everyone sees real (inflation-adjusted) income growth, that progress will be apparent wherever one draws class thresholds, so long as they are absolute ones. That brings us to a recent [report](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/Bridging-the-True-Cost-of-Living-Gap-in-New-York-City-final%20%282%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on New York City living standards by the Urban Institute. That report determined that 62% of New Yorkers are “economically insecure,” based on their falling below “true cost of living” thresholds set by the [Urban Institute](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/Bridging-the-True-Cost-of-Living-Gap-in-New-York-City-final%20%282%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Those thresholds “\[capture\] costs associated with housing, food, health care, child care, transportation, technology, taxes, student debt, caring for people with disabilities, savings, and miscellaneous costs for items such as clothing, personal hygiene, and cleaning products.” But one could draw a different set of thresholds and find some other percentage of city residents are insecure. One recent analysis [absurdly ](https://scottwinship.substack.com/p/apocalypse-not?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)suggested that the poverty line in America should be set at $140,000, which, unsurprisingly, produces a much higher poverty rate than the official statistics do, since they set poverty thresholds much lower. How to assess any rate requires something to compare it against. To illustrate these points, I conducted analyses of New York City building off the Chicago ones I conducted earlier. (See that [report](https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/chicagos-disappearing-middle-class-can-be-found-in-its-proliferating-upper-middle-class-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for detailed methods.) First, consider how New Yorkers fare between 1970 and 2024 when we define classes in relative terms. Following the [approach](https://voorheescenter.uic.edu/chicago%5Fcommunities/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the University of Illinois at Chicago’s Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, I define five classes of communities (census tracts) in New York depending on whether their per capita income is below 60% of the metropolitan per capita income (very low income), between 60% and 80% (low income), between 80% and 120% (middle income), between 120% and 140% (high income), or above 140% (very high income). These thresholds change over time as metropolitan per capita income changes, so even if its per capita income increases significantly, a community might still fall down a class if its trajectory is outpaced by the rest of the metropolitan area. In 1970 , 43% of New Yorkers (residents of the five boroughs) lived in low-income or very low-income communities, 43% lived in middle-income communities, and 14% lived in high income or very high income communities. By 2024 , those figures were 61%, 19%, and 20%. Thus, one finds the same hollowing out as in Chicago — the same disappearing middle class while more communities become poorer or richer than middle class. In fact, New Yorkers become more concentrated in very low-income and very high-income tracts. The maps display this as the falling number of beige tracts over time and the rising number of red-orange and dark blue tracts. *Class definitions are based on percentages of the metropolitan area per capita income in either 1970 or 2024: very low income (under 60% of the metro average individual income), low income (60-80% of the metro average), middle income (80-120% of the metro average), high income (120-140% of the metro average), very high income (above 140% of the metro average). The metropolitan area per capita income was $34,311 in 1970 and $57,081 in 2024 (both in 2025 dollars). “1970” technically refers to 1969, while “2024” technically refers to 2020-24\. For full methodological details, see* [*this analysis*](https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/chicagos-disappearing-middle-class-can-be-found-in-its-proliferating-upper-middle-class-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/map_nyc_1970-4.png) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/map_nyc_2024_Method1-1.png) *New York City census tracts by income class, 1970 and 2024, using relative class thresholds. Shading ranges from red/orange (very low income, or under 60% of the metro average individual income) to salmon (low income, or 60-80% of the metro average) to beige (middle income, or 80-120% of the metro average) to teal (high income, or 120-140% of the metro average) to dark blue (very high income, above 140% of the metro average). Unpopulated tracts are shown as grey. For full methodological details, see* [*this analysis*](https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/chicagos-disappearing-middle-class-can-be-found-in-its-proliferating-upper-middle-class-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* How we view the state of New York City’s middle class changes markedly, however, if we hold class thresholds fixed over time. In the first set of analyses, a middle-income tract in 1970 had per capita income between $27,449 and $41,173 (2025 dollars), while the thresholds in 2024 were $45,665 and $68,498\. For the next analyses, I began with the 1970 thresholds but then kept them constant in terms of purchasing power over time. Looking through this lens, we can see clearly that the entire distribution of New Yorkers moved up. The share living in communities that were poorer than middle-income fell in half, from 43% to 21%. The share living in middle-income communities declined from 43% to 33%. But the share in high-income or very high-income communities rose from 14% to 46%. The maps show a decisive shift to dark blue. *Class definitions are based on percentages of the metropolitan area per capita income in 1970: very low income (under 60% of the metro average individual income), low income (60-80% of the metro average), middle income (80-120% of the metro average), high income (120-140% of the metro average), very high income (above 140% of the metro average). The metropolitan area per capita income was $34,311 in 1970 (in 2025 dollars). “1970” technically refers to 1969, while “2024” technically refers to 2020-24\. For full methodological details, see* [*this analysis*](https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/chicagos-disappearing-middle-class-can-be-found-in-its-proliferating-upper-middle-class-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/map_nyc_1970-5.png) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/map_nyc_2024_Method2-1.png) *New York City census tracts by income class, 1970 and 2024, using absolute class thresholds. Shading ranges from red/orange (very low income, or under 60% of the 1970 metro average individual income) to salmon (low income, or 60-80% of the metro average) to beige (middle income, or 80-120% of the metro average) to teal (high income, or 120-140% of the metro average) to dark blue (very high income, above 140% of the metro average). Unpopulated tracts are shown as grey. For full methodological details, see* [*this analysis*](https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/chicagos-disappearing-middle-class-can-be-found-in-its-proliferating-upper-middle-class-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* So if we want to talk about a disappearing middle class, we should start by noting that the income distribution in New York City has shifted upward, leaving fewer people with living standards as low as was typical in 1970\. That’s the kind of disappearance we can all get behind. How do these results square with the Urban Institute report claiming that 62% of New Yorkers are economically insecure? What the report actually finds is that 62% of families had resources (essentially, incomes) below the designated cost threshold for their family type. The share deemed insecure depends heavily on how the thresholds are set. The Urban Institute [uses](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/equity/downloads/pdf/2026%20NYC%20TCOL%20Measure%5F4%206%2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) different thresholds depending on whether children or elderly persons are present and depending on the borough. They range from $91,300 for a childless family in the Bronx with no elderly persons to $201,100 in Manhattan for a family with children but not elderly persons. Where do these values come from? They are based on the Urban Institute’s determination of what families “need” to spend on each of the categories it considered. However, those “needs,” more often than not, are based on median spending, or sometimes even average spending. The Urban Institute thresholds, therefore, approximate what the median family spends. On that basis alone, we might expect that about half of New Yorkers are “economically insecure,” since half of any distribution is, by definition, below the median. But that just redefines “economic insecurity” to mean “in the bottom half of spending.” It’s difficult to know how concerned we should be about “economic insecurity” when all we know is that 62% of New Yorkers have been designated that by an arbitrary methodology. If we had trend data on needs and resources, that would help. To illustrate the importance of having a comparison point for assessing how New Yorkers are doing, I used Census Bureau data to determine the household income below which 62% of New Yorkers in 2024 fell. That ends up being $131,170\. (This income definition is narrower than the expanded one used by the Urban Institute, but the details don’t matter much here. Note, too, that this figure is for household income rather than family income and is not size-adjusted, due to data limitations.) I then asked, how many New Yorkers lived below $131,170 (in 2024 dollars) in 1970? It turns out that 94.5% did. We can also ask a related question: How many New Yorkers in 2024 lived below the 62nd percentile of 1970’s income distribution ($67,625 in 2024 dollars)? Just 42 percent did. Suddenly, “economic insecurity” levels in New York City today look pretty good! Urban Institute researchers would probably say, well, needs were more modest in 1970, so one really has to compare 1970 incomes to 1970 “true cost of living” thresholds, not to 2024 thresholds. Doing so, they’d find much less of a reduction in economic insecurity than I do. It turns out half the population was below the median in 1970 too! Indeed, the Urban Institute approach might even find an increase in economic insecurity to go along with the hollowing out of the middle class produced using relative class thresholds. If all families “need” to spend what the typical family spends, then raising everyone’s income by the same amount doesn’t reduce economic insecurity. There is clearly something to be said for relative measures of wellbeing like those that commonly drive conversations about inequality and need in New York. Holding quality constant, the cost of goods and services depends in part on what others can afford. Again, though, this is where concerns about inequality trends might be relevant. Conventional inflation adjustment accounts for the general increase in prices. To affect the affordability of “needs,” inequality has to rise in such a way that something of constant quality that used to be affordable to middle-class families no longer is because its price has been bid up. These will tend to be goods whose supply is limited, like living in the “best” neighborhood, or getting the “best” child care. Alternatively, regulation can take lower-quality goods and services off the market, leaving some people unable to afford the remaining options. But these are edge cases. Housing has become generally more expensive because of artificial supply restrictions, but that is largely incorporated into inflation measures. Only so many people can ever afford to live in the “best” neighborhood. We generally don’t pity the lower reaches of the top one percent. The dominant trend for economic well-being — in New York City and elsewhere — is the continued rise in living standards as measured by inflation-adjusted incomes. Economic growth constitutes a rising tide that has lifted all boats impressively, even if more so at the top than lower down. How we characterize middle-class trends should not obscure that basic fact. ### Public Sector Unions vs. Mamdani’s Ambitions URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-nyc-unions-efficiency-reform/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:32:59.000Z Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s democratic socialism has a union problem. His agenda depends on delivering better City services at lower cost — but the public-sector unions that endorsed him, however reluctantly, have little interest in the efficiency reforms that would make that possible. Before Mamdani can build his urban welfare state, he has to reckon with allies standing in its way. The [vision is ambitious](https://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): free buses, universal childcare, City-run groceries — a supposed assault on the cost of living for working-class New Yorkers. But expanding government’s reach requires first proving that the existing government works — and recent events like the Long Island Rail Road strike don’t help the case. Mamdani cannot credibly promise expansive new programs if he cannot fix the ones already in existence. Recognizing this, Mamdani argued in his [inauguration speech](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-zohran-mamdani-inaugural-address?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that “for too long, we have accepted mediocrity from those who serve the public.” An early [executive order ](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-signs-executive-order-to-require-chief-savings-off?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)calls on each City agency to appoint a “chief savings officer.” During his [budget presentation](https://www.rev.com/transcripts/nyc-preliminary-fiscal-year-2027-budget?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the mayor highlighted his plans to identify savings by “reducing bureaucratic waste and rendering agencies more efficient and cost-effective.” Mamdani is right that New York City government can be slow, expensive and resistant to change. The civil service system can [take months to grade entry exams](https://publicsectorjobboard.substack.com/p/what-it-will-take-to-deliver-for?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — helping explain why the City has more than [14,000 jobs vacant](https://www.amny.com/politics/nyc-government-job-vacancies-budget-crisis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The Department of Sanitation’s contract with the Teamsters Local 831 has created the norm of [two workers per truck](https://www.wastedive.com/news/new-york-containerization-teamsters-equipment-truck/691569/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which the [Citizens Budget Commission](https://cbcny.org/research/getting-fiscal-waste-out-solid-waste-collection-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) calls the single biggest source of avoidable cost in the department. The union president’s response: “I don’t think there’s ever gonna be a one-man truck in New York City.” Public schools tell a similar story: Per-pupil spending [is nearly $42,000](https://nypost.com/2025/08/30/us-news/nyc-doe-projected-to-spend-over-42k-per-student-this-school-year-the-most-in-the-country/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — the highest in the nation and nearly double the [California average](https://www.ppic.org/publication/financing-californias-public-schools/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — yet [standardized test results](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2025/01/29/naep-scores-show-recovery-in-nyc-fourth-grade-math-as-reading-holds-steady/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are below the national and State averages, and middling compared to other large cities. Enrollment has [fallen by more than 123,000 students](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/07/nyregion/nyc-school-enrollment-declines.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since the pandemic and is projected to decline further. Even as students disappear, costs go up. > Despite being nominal allies, Mamdani's and the unions’ goals conflict. However, reducing what others see as bureaucratic waste threatens public-sector unions and the workers they represent. Efficiency efforts almost always mean doing more with less — automation, consolidation, streamlined processes and elimination of redundant positions. For unions, this is threatening on two levels simultaneously. Fewer positions means fewer dues-paying members and a smaller institutional base, which directly erodes union power. Beyond head count, many of the things that look like inefficiency from a management perspective — restrictive job classifications, limits on task assignments, overtime procedures, seniority-based placements — are hard-won contract provisions that unions and their members regard as fundamental worker protections. Agreeing to streamline them means giving back gains that took decades to secure and opening the door to further erosion in future negotiations. In short, despite being nominal allies, Mamdani's and the unions’ goals conflict. While Mamdani has occasionally skirted the issue by [pointing a finger at failures of contracting services](https://jacobin.com/2026/02/zohran-mamdani-efficiency-nyc-budget?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the private sector, the reality is that, with the exception of shelter, very little of core services — police, fire, education and sanitation — is outsourced. Workers in City hospitals, public parks, environmental protection, housing authorities and libraries are heavily unionized, civil-service-governed workforces, and the unions have successfully resisted privatization of core functions for decades. Democratic socialism has a ready answer for every fiscal problem: Tax the rich. But even on its own terms, the math doesn’t work. Mamdani’s millionaire’s tax requires Albany’s approval — and Gov. Kathy Hochul has largely said no. And even if she hadn’t, the revenue wouldn’t even fully fund free universal childcare. It would [barely cover the budget gaps](https://www.city-journal.org/article/zohran-mamdani-budget-taxes-unions-welfare?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the City already has. Therefore, the deal Mamdani is currently offering the City unions is respect, partnership and stability in exchange for patience, flexibility and political alignment — but not much cash. The looming question is whether Mamdani’s idea of [collaborative bargaining](https://thechiefleader.com/stories/mayor-mamdani-end-pattern-bargaining-start-collaborative-bargaining,55653?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and finding worker-driven efficiency is possible or if traditional patterns of adversarial bargaining take hold. State and City budgets will determine how much money the mayor has to play with. While the City is supposed to pass a budget [by June 30](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/content/budget-timeline?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the State passed its budget on May 27\. One of the most contentious issues was Tier 6 pension reform — public-sector unions’ top priority. The deal lowers the retirement age for teachers from 63 to 58 after 30 years of service and cuts contribution rates for all Tier 6 workers. Statewide cost is $557 million annually — below the unions’ $1.5 billion ask. New York City will absorb a disproportionate share of the costs given its large Tier 6 workforce — a recurring, permanent obligation starting at [$128 million in year one](https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/new-york-teachers-win-lower-retirement-age-as-lawmakers-pass-pension-reforms/2026/05?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — slightly reopening the City’s budget gap. In short, the unions’ victory on pensions may come at the expense of salaries and efficiency reforms. Indeed, the depth of Mamdani’s fiscal bind is illustrated by his most recent budget maneuver: floating a plan to [delay payments into the City’s pension funds](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/23/nyregion/mamdani-pension-funds.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which could save at least $1 billion in the upcoming fiscal year but would push the deadline for meeting long-term pension obligations beyond 2032\. A mayor who campaigned on more generous pensions is now proposing to defer paying for that generosity to stay solvent, in effect borrowing from future generations to fund the present. When the dust from the budget deals has fully settled, the mayor will turn to labor negotiations, with important questions about timing and “pattern bargaining.” Recall that under [New York State’s Triborough Amendment](https://www.empirecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Triborough-Final2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to its collective bargaining law, any union contract that “expires” remains in effect until a new one is negotiated. That means public workers continue to receive pay increases as they move up the salary schedule without a new contract, which incentivizes unions to hold out for a deal that is better than the old contract. For instance, rather than negotiate with Mayor Bloomberg during his third term, the unions simply waited to sit down at the bargaining table with his successor. That’s part of the reason why the Police Benevolent Association’s contract, [which expired in July 2025](https://www.police1.com/nypd/articles/nyc-nypd-union-reach-new-contract-after-seven-years-of-disagreement-Ro4M1jD2e3jF3hHN/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), hasn’t been renegotiated. The other reason is that New York City typically engages in pattern bargaining, whereby one contract with a big union — historically DC 37 or the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) — sets the broad terms of salary raises for other union contracts. However, Mamdani won’t face UFT [until late 2027](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2023/06/mayor-adams-uft-tentative-contract-agreement-providing-substantial-wage-increases-to?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which leaves DC 37, whose contract [expires in November](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2023/02/17/dc37-union-agrees-to-contract-with-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as the primary candidate to set the pattern. A strategic question for Team Mamdani is whether they set the pattern with DC 37 or wait until the UFT contract expires. > A mayor who campaigned on more generous pensions is now proposing to defer paying for that generosity to stay solvent, in effect borrowing from future generations to fund the present. Moving ahead with DC 37 has the advantage of acting while economic conditions are as favorable as they’re likely to get. Waiting until the UFT contract expires in late 2027 raises real risks: a recession, a federal funding cut or some other fiscal shock could arrive in the interim. That concern is sharpened by the fact that Mamdani entered office facing significant budget gaps despite nearly two decades of uninterrupted economic expansion. If the City can’t balance its books in good times, the answer in bad times won’t be pretty. Failing to set the pattern with DC 37 would mean waiting until late 2027 — nearly two years into a four-year term — with virtually every major union contract already lapsed. That’s not a recipe for efficiency reform. It’s a recipe for managed drift. Mamdani needs a clear-eyed strategy for the unions, not just goodwill. He will face immediate pressure to demonstrate good faith, but with little fiscal headroom to do so. The core problem is that, however aligned the rhetoric may sound, the unions’ fundamental goal is straightforward: higher compensation for their members. For them, the most direct route to “affordability” in the city isn’t free buses or City-run groceries — it’s a bigger paycheck. And if Mamdani can’t deliver on wages, it is difficult to see how he can ask unions to give ground on the work rules and staffing flexibilities that any serious efficiency agenda requires. It is helpful to recall that the Bloomberg administration had to raise teacher salaries 8% above the civilian union pay pattern to get the UFT to agree to [abandon the work rule](https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/04/nyregion/city-reaches-tentative-deal-with-teachers.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that required principals to hire the most senior teacher seeking a transfer within the school system irrespective of the principal’s assessment of that teacher’s quality. The reality is that changing work rules that some union members like costs a lot of money. If Mamdani’s salary offer is unsatisfactory, the Triborough Amendment lets unions simply wait. They can likely outlast Mamdani, who will face a mounting paradox: a democratic socialist at war with organized labor. Prolonged impasse will be his political problem, not theirs. For all the fanfare about democratic socialism, Mamdani risks ending up where most of his predecessors did — making modest concessions, deferring hard choices and leaving New Yorkers with the same sluggish, expensive government they’ve always had. Bloomberg moved the needle on education; Giuliani on policing. Everyone else managed the equilibrium. If Mamdani can’t crack the union problem, his democratic socialism won’t fail loudly — it will just quietly echo the status quo. ### A Bolder Development Strategy for a Crowded New York URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-joint-developments-public-land-housing/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:36:53.000Z During his campaign for mayor last year, [Zohran Mamdani focused on housing](https://www.zohranfornyc.com/policies/housing-by-and-for-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), emphasizing the importance of adding supply to address the city’s punishing rents. His emphasis responded to a real problem: More [than a quarter of city renter households](https://censusreporter.org/data/table/?table=B25140&geo%5Fids=16000US3651000&primary%5Fgeo%5Fid=16000US3651000&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#valueType%7Cestimate) — more than 600,000 of them — spend more than 50% of their incomes on housing costs. An additional 200,000 households that own their homes suffer similar burdens. In response, Mamdani promised to add 200,000 publicly subsidized, rent-stabilized homes within 10 years, while also [increasing “zoned capacity”](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08854122231166961?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with the goal of encouraging market-rate development, following in the footsteps of [recent large-scale upzonings, like that of Gowanus](https://www.urban.org/research/publication/how-big-upzonings-affect-housing-supply?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Brooklyn. His theory? Adding [more housing would make homes more affordable](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10511482.2018.1476899?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a concept well supported by reams of research and the real-world experience of cities like Austin and Minneapolis. One key mechanism Mayor Mamdani recommends using in his [recently released housing plan](https://www.nyc.gov/content/dam/nycgov/nyc-main/pdf/2026/block-by-block-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is activating [City-owned land](https://www.furmancenter.org/city-owned-and-leased-land/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — such as parcels [that are vacant](https://www.furmancenter.org/publication/what-new-interactive-maps-reveal-about-the-development-potential-of-new-york-citys-city-owned-land/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Using publicly owned land [can reduce overall project development costs](https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/policy-insights/social-housing-and-public-developer-models-in-the-us-and-beyond/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and ease approvals. Upon taking office, Mamdani established the [“LIFT” Task Force](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/executive-order-04?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), intended to identify sites appropriate to support 25,000 new homes within 10 years; the task force is expected to release its conclusions by July. In a city where development opportunities are too few and far between, it makes absolute sense to pick this low-hanging fruit. But vacant lots should be only the beginning. The mayor’s housing plan recommends colocating housing with schools, libraries and other public assets. These sorts of redevelopments, which I refer to as joint developments, enable the financing of new public facilities while making way for housing units on top — a combination that can help address the City’s underfunded [facilities needs](https://investinlibraries.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) while providing homes for thousands of New Yorkers. I conducted a sketch-level analysis, finding that such joint developments of housing plus schools, libraries, police stations and fire stations offer the opportunity to create between 20,000 and 34,000 new housing units over the next several years, equivalent to the [total number of housing units](https://www.bkreader.com/policy-government/nyc-sees-highest-housing-completions-in-nearly-60-years-but-permitting-declines-10355498?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) added citywide in 2024\. Joint developments, which the City has already begun to undertake, could thus be a major tool to generate more homes in the public arsenal. ### Recent joint developments in New York City Joint developments on publicly owned land often involve demolishing an aging facility and replacing it with a new tower that includes a new public service at the base and apartments on top. Across the United States, [dozens of libraries have been redeveloped in this way](https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/aging-libraries-could-offer-cities-unique-opportunity-build-new-housing-while-improving?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in recent years. New York City agencies have implemented such joint developments slowly but steadily. Examples of such combinations include: - [The Inwood Library project](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/022-24/the-city-cuts-ribbon-inwood-unveiling-174-deeply-affordable-homes-new-state-of-the-art?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/0), completed in 2024: This 174-unit affordable housing tower in Upper Manhattan, which replaced an existing library, includes a library and prekindergarten. - [The Solaire](https://www.thesolaire.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), completed in 2002: This 293-unit apartment building in Battery Park City houses PS/IS 276, an elementary and middle school. The City is currently in the early phases of additional projects, such as the Bloomingdale Library and Riverside Health Center on the Upper West Side. There, the City has [recently solicited proposals](https://edc.nyc/project/bloomingdale-library?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to redevelop the site with a new library, community center and [up to 850 affordable housing units](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sm38mJUbP5I&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Though New York City has not yet built new police or fire stations with apartments on top, other cities are pursuing this type of joint development. Washington, D.C., is planning to [redevelop a police and fire station on U Street](https://dmped.dc.gov/page/1617U?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And Miami’s 791-unit Mercedes-Benz Places project, [now under construction](https://floridayimby.com/2025/03/first-phase-of-mercedes-benz-places-goes-vertical-in-brickell-miami.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), will incorporate a fire station. ### Opportunities for new joint developments I sought to evaluate other opportunities available to undertake joint development projects on land now occupied by libraries, police stations, fire stations and schools in New York City. There are many thousands of possible sites. I leveraged New York City’s [PLUTO map data](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/resources/datasets/mappluto-pluto-change?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which I combined with the City’s [database of owned and leased properties](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/City-Government/City-Owned-and-Leased-Property-COLP-/fn4k-qyk2/about%5Fdata?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). I made the following assumptions, which result in conservative estimates of redevelopment potential, but are focused on aging facilities: Joint developments can only occur on land owned by the relevant public agency; buildings that are landmarked, that were constructed since 2000, that have been renovated since 2010 or that have greater than three stories (or two stories for schools) are not candidates to be replaced; and schools’ sports fields would remain in place. Nonetheless, this is a preliminary analysis; I did not review sites individually to evaluate their potential. I assumed that the maximum development size would be 300 units (small in some New York City contexts!) and that the first floor-and-a-half of any new development would be devoted to the public facility. My analysis makes two estimates. First, I calculate the number of housing units that could theoretically be built on each City-owned parcel following current zoning allowances for residential construction. Second, I calculate how many housing units could be built if the parcel were rezoned to enable densities at the 90th percentile of current apartment buildings in the community district in which the parcel is located — in other words, if they were built at a scale similar to the neighborhood’s existing environment. This latter figure reflects the fact that current zoning policy may sometimes be overly restrictive. This analysis found substantial opportunities for joint development throughout the five boroughs, including on sites now occupied by 125 libraries; 144 police department buildings; 188 fire department facilities; and 114 schools. In total, I estimate that about 19,500 housing units could be completed on these sites under current zoning, or about 33,900 units could be completed were sites upzoned to match the density levels of nearby apartment buildings. Under current zoning, library sites could accommodate about 3,100 units (75% located within a half-mile of a subway station), police department sites 4,900 units (71% near a station), fire department sites 3,300 units (87% near a station) and schools 8,200 units (61% near a station). These figures could increase dramatically, particularly in Brooklyn and Queens, if sites were upzoned to enable higher-density development. Some illustrative examples include: - The [Queens Library branch at Forest Hills](https://www.queenslibrary.org/about-us/locations/Forest-Hills?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): This two-story facility, completed in 1957, is half a block from a subway station. Current zoning enables roughly 55 units on top of a library at the site. - The [New York Police Department’s 28th Precinct](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/precincts/28th-precinct.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): This two-story building, completed in 1975, is located just south of 125th Street in Central Harlem. Zoning enables 217 housing units on top of a police station. - The [New York Fire Department’s Engine 54](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Engine%5F54,%5FLadder%5F4,%5FBattalion%5F9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/media/File:Engine%5F54%5Fgoing%5Fback%5Findoors%5F16C245.jpg): This two-story building, completed in 1974 at the intersection of 8th Avenue and 48th Street in Midtown, could be redeveloped to accommodate 59 housing units. [P.S. 308](https://www.schools.nyc.gov/schools/K308?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), an elementary and middle school in Brooklyn: This Bedford-Stuyvesant site, completed in 1972, could accommodate 150 housing units. Regulatory changes recently adopted by the City, including the [Expedited Land Use Review Procedure](https://nyweekly.com/business/nyc-elurp-affordable-housing-mott-haven-mamdani-expedited-review/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [Affordable Housing Fast Track](https://www.rosenbergestis.com/media/blog/industry-updates/nyc-voters-approve-significant-changes-to-accelerate-land-use-approvals?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), may speed the implementation of certain projects, especially if they incorporate affordable housing units. I modeled only projects incorporating libraries, police stations, fire stations and schools. But the City and its sister agencies own a large number of additional aging properties available for joint development. For example, earlier this year, the City Council approved the replacement of a seven-story City-owned office building in downtown Brooklyn with an [80-story tower including 1,263 housing units](https://newyorkyimby.com/2025/05/renderings-reveal-840-foot-skyscraper-proposed-for-395-flatbush-avenue-extension-in-downtown-brooklyn.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), many reserved for households with low and moderate incomes. ### Trade-offs in achieving joint development projects The use of publicly owned land can reduce projects’ total development costs. But joint developments cannot accomplish all public goals simultaneously, especially in neighborhoods with relatively weaker housing markets. Joint developments save developers money compared to what they would pay for land on a privately owned site. These savings could be redistributed to fund the new public facility. But realistically, those savings are unlikely to be adequate to cover the costs of both the new facility and many affordable housing units. To accomplish multiple goals simultaneously, officials may need to combine joint development with other initiatives, such as affordable housing grants, derived from other revenue sources. Moreover, in weaker housing markets, where developers are less likely to profit from projects, joint developments may produce inadequate revenue even to cover the cost of new public facilities. As such, the City should leverage this tool only if doing so is needed to replace a facility that is in poor physical condition or is in an area in great need of additional housing. Finally, the redevelopment of existing public facilities, such as fire departments, may cause years of disruption. In many cases, the facility may need to move to a temporary location, which could be expensive. As such, City staff should carefully coordinate construction plans to ensure continued service provision. Nevertheless, joint development is a major opportunity for cities like New York. The City should work with its sister agencies to quickly advance these projects, which could provide essential housing and new facilities for thousands of residents. ### The Millionaire Exodus That Never Came URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-tax-increase-millionaire-exodus-fears/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:33:22.000Z Every time a state proposes a millionaire tax, someone predicts an exodus. In 2004, New Jersey adopted a new tax bracket on million-dollar incomes. Critics immediately warned that wealthy residents would leave. Since then, similar predictions have accompanied nearly every proposal to raise taxes on top earners. When California debated a millionaire tax, opponents argued that "there's nothing more portable than a millionaire and his money." When Oregon considered a similar measure, Nike founder [Phil Knight](https://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/2010/01/nike%5Fchairman%5Fanti-business%5Fcl.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) warned of a "death spiral" in which "thousands of our most successful residents will leave the state." During New York City's 2025 mayoral campaign, hedge fund billionaire [Bill Ackman warned](https://x.com/BillAckman/status/1938094628034506984?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that wealthy residents would flee if Zohran Mamdani won and succeeded in raising New York City's income tax surcharge on incomes over $1 million by two percentage points. These warnings carry weight. In places that tax the rich, high-income taxpayers generate a large share of state and local revenue, making them valuable residents. But taxes on the rich also give them a reason to leave. If enough do, governments can face budget shortfalls and pressure to cut services. Top tax rates in New York City and California are now 13 to 14 percentage points higher than they are in Florida and Texas. Wealthy households have a great deal of freedom to choose where they live. They can afford to move. They employ accountants and financial advisers who know exactly where taxes are lower. If anyone should respond to tax incentives, it ought to be them. This intuition lies at the heart of the classic economic theory of tax competition. If wealthy households can relocate to lower-tax jurisdictions, states that raise taxes on top earners will lose residents and revenue. Millionaire taxes become self-defeating, shrinking the very tax base they were designed to tap. Governments will eventually learn the lesson: don't tax the rich. Over time, competition for affluent residents pushes tax rates steadily downward in a race to the bottom. The problem is that the race to the bottom never arrived. I have been studying millionaire tax flight for nearly 20 years. My colleagues and I have analyzed millionaire tax reforms in [New Jersey](https://cristobalyoung.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/NTJ-millionaire-migration-state-taxation.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [California](https://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/media/details/millionaire-migration-california-impact-top-tax-rates?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), decades of IRS records tracking [where Americans with million-dollar incomes actually live](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0003122416639625?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the [migration of Forbes billionaires](https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Millionaire-Tax-Flight-Inequality/dp/1503603806?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and most recently the effects of the [2017 Trump Tax bill and the COVID-19 pandemic](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/737165?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The popular image of the “mobile millionaire,” constantly searching for the lowest-tax location, unravels under close inspection. Top earners often travel, but they rarely change where they live. More often, they are deeply rooted – and powerful insiders – in the places where they built their careers and businesses and raised their families. It is not so easy to walk away from these kinds of relationships. Migration in America is concentrated among the young and the struggling, not the rich. Roughly 4.5% of low-wage workers - those earning less than $10,000 - move each year, often chasing jobs or affordable housing. Millionaires move at about half that rate, just 2.4% annually. They are not searching for their economic place in the world; they've already found it. More than anything, migration is a young person's game. Recent college graduates move across state lines at rates exceeding [12% annually, roughly five times the rate of millionaires](https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Millionaire-Tax-Flight-Inequality/dp/1503603806?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But their migration drops off fast: by the time they reach their peak earning years, college graduates display the same low migration rates as most other Americans. The implication is important: people typically settle on where to build their lives decades before they ever enter the top tax brackets. This does not mean taxes are irrelevant. When millionaires move - which is rare - they are more likely to relocate to lower-tax states than to higher-tax states. In the tax return data I examine, covering roughly 1999 through 2023, about 47% of millionaire moves were to states with lower income taxes than the states they left. But one-third were to states with higher income taxes, while another 21% were between states with essentially the same tax rates. These moves clearly cannot be explained by tax avoidance. People relocate for jobs, family, retirement, climate and countless other reasons. LeBron James, for example, roughly doubled his state tax bill when he moved from Ohio and the Cavs to California and the Lakers. New York illustrates the same point. Florida is the most common destination [for New York movers overall](https://www.timesunion.com/state/article/top-5-states-new-york-residents-moved-2023-19846015.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But among the richest 1% of New Yorkers, the most common destinations are [Connecticut, New Jersey and California](https://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/FPI-Migration-Pt-2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), all of which levy millionaire taxes. The richest New Yorkers are not simply decamping to the lowest-tax state available. Many are moving within the same high-cost, high-tax professional region. These moves are not really about taxes. The strongest evidence that taxes influence migration comes from Florida. It attracts millionaires on net from nearly every state in the country - mostly from high-tax states such as New York and New Jersey, but also from low-tax states such as Texas and Tennessee. The only states that do not lose at least some millionaires to Florida are Arizona and South Carolina, two other major retirement destinations. Florida also illustrates the limits of the tax-flight story. Nine U.S. states levy no income tax, but [Florida is the only one](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0003122416639625?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that consistently attracts affluent migrants from across the country. If taxes were the primary driver, we would expect Texas, New Hampshire, Tennessee and the other no-tax states to attract similar millionaire flows. They do not. In fact, each of those states experiences a net loss of millionaires to Florida. Florida's success reflects a broader package of amenities, including climate, retirement communities and lifestyle advantages. Even the nation's clearest case of tax-motivated migration owes much - though not all - of its appeal to factors other than taxes. Taken together, the directional pattern is clear but limited. Millionaire movers are more likely to move to lower-tax states than to higher-tax states: 47% compared with 32%. That 15-point gap provides a rough measure of the net excess movement toward lower-tax places. More technical analysis points in the same direction, suggesting that about one in seven millionaire moves are tax-motivated migration. But that is one in seven millionaire *movers*, not one in seven *millionaires*. Millionaires themselves rarely move. Once we combine the modest tax tilt among movers with the low overall rate of millionaire migration, tax-motivated migration becomes a small slice of a small slice: 0.3% of the millionaire population moves for tax-purposes each year. It’s not zero, but looks nothing like the exodus often described in political debates. ### Why aren’t millionaires more mobile? The problem with the tax competition story is that it mistakes freedom of movement for a willingness to move. Most millionaires are the late-career working rich. By the time they reach the top tax brackets, they have careers, businesses, reputations, colleagues, collaborators and networks in place. Much of what makes their lives work would not travel with them. Their very success in one place makes other places less appealing. Elsewhere, they would be less known, less connected and less central. Tax competition theory treats people and their paychecks as movable while ignoring how place helps produce success. Places like New York, Boston and Silicon Valley concentrate talent, capital, information, clients, investors, employees and opportunity in unusually productive ways. A wealthy New Yorker can move to Florida and lower a tax bill. But for someone who is already a powerful insider, taking their chips somewhere else often means giving up their seat at the table. ### A missing race to the bottom Critics of tax policies in New York and California often focus on competition from Texas and Florida. Yet the larger reality is that states compete most directly with their nearest neighbors. Most interstate moves, even among millionaires, are [relatively short-distance](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0003122416639625?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) moves to nearby states. A key prediction of the tax-flight story is not just that some wealthy households will leave. It is that other states will benefit from their departure. If New Jersey adopts a millionaire tax that drives away affluent residents, neighboring states gain those taxpayers for free. In this sense, tax competition is a zero-sum game: One state's loss becomes another state's gain. New Jersey adopted the nation's first modern millionaire tax in 2004, adding 2.4 percentage points to the top rate - slightly more than Mamdani's proposal. Five years later, voters elected Chris Christie after a campaign in which the tax was fiercely debated. Yet the millionaire tax survived and was eventually expanded. Rather than serving as a cautionary tale, New Jersey became a model that neighboring states increasingly followed. Washington, D.C. adopted a new high-income bracket in 2008\. New York and Connecticut raised taxes on top earners in 2009\. Massachusetts voters approved a millionaire surtax in 2022\. Maryland created new top brackets in 2025, and Maine soon followed with its own millionaire tax. The West Coast followed a similar path. California enacted a millionaire tax in 2004, expanded it through a statewide referendum in 2012 and made the increase permanent in 2016\. Oregon voters approved a millionaire tax in 2010\. Washington State, long known for having no income tax at all, adopted a tax on high-income capital gains in 2021 and enacted a millionaire tax in 2026. This is not a race to the bottom. It is a story of policy diffusion. State after state had an opportunity to observe the consequences of millionaire taxes in neighboring jurisdictions. If large numbers of the rich had fled, nearby states would have gained from their neighbors' losses, drawing in exile taxpayers. Instead, they waited, watched and most concluded that millionaire taxes were something to emulate. Rather than soaking up the spoils of tax competition, other states realized they were missing out on millionaire tax revenues. The political lesson is striking. The prediction was "tax the rich and they will leave." The reality was closer to "tax the rich and your neighbors will copy you." ### When tax flight happened Two recent events showed why the rich generally stay where they built their careers – and what it takes to actually change their minds and make them search for greener pastures. The first was the 2017 Trump tax bill, which capped the federal deduction for state and local taxes. For top earners in places like New York and California, this amounted to a considerable tax increase, with the money used to fund tax cuts for millionaires elsewhere. Many commentators, including the governors of New York and California, predicted fiscal chaos from millionaire flight. A widely shared Wall Street Journal op-ed, titled [“So Long, California. Sayonara, New York,”](https://www.wsj.com/articles/so-long-california-sayonara-new-york-1524611900?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) predicted that 800,000 people a year would leave these states. My colleague and I used deidentified IRS tax returns to track every millionaire taxpayer in the country for two years before and after the reform. The exodus [never materialized](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/737165?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Out-migration from high-tax states did not increase at all. We were preparing to write up the results as a null finding when something changed dramatically. The pandemic came, and millionaire tax flight arrived with it. The pandemic brought a profound shock to social embeddedness. Workplaces emptied out, with office-building entry swipes in major cities falling by nearly 90 percent. Local amenities were shuttered, and time spent alone increased. Schools closed, disrupting children's relationships with teachers and classmates. For many families, school closures also eliminated one of the biggest barriers to moving: taking children out of school. For many households, the pandemic created a strange form of freedom: a chance to rethink where to live and work, especially for top earners who could work remotely from almost anywhere. Disconnected from many of the ties that anchor people to place, [top earners left high-tax states](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/737165?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in historically large numbers and disproportionately chose lower-tax destinations. So millionaire flight did indeed happen at a larger scale for a relatively brief period — but it took a force larger than taxes alone to dislodge people from their longtime homes. Tax differences across states create real financial incentives to move. But in normal times those incentives compete with careers, friendships, schools, business relationships and community ties that are rooted in particular places. For most affluent households, tax savings alone are not enough to overcome those attachments. During the pandemic, many of those attachments weakened simultaneously. The financial incentives to relocate had always been there, but they suddenly mattered more because there was less tying people to place. Yet the effect proved temporary. As the pandemic receded and normal patterns of work and social life resumed, millionaire migration returned toward its pre-pandemic baseline. By 2023, migration rates had largely normalized. ### What the City should do instead Every state and city wants more top taxpayers. Many assume the way to get them is to keep taxes on the rich low. But in normal times, wealthy households are far less mobile than policymakers imagine. Many states today forgo substantial revenue in hopes of migration flows that never materialize. Places should focus less on courting millionaires and more on cultivating and retaining highly educated young people. Recent college graduates are among the most mobile people in the country. They are the pipeline for the millionaires and top taxpayers of 2045\. These young workers are not choosing where to live based on the tax rates paid by those at the very top. They're looking for places where they can afford the rent, find good work, build a social life, meet a partner and eventually raise a family. If they achieve their highest economic aspirations, one day they will be paying the highest tax rates. For now, they need the basics of opportunity to be within reach. Soon they'll need affordable child care and good schools. A city that delivers on those needs builds its own pipeline of future top earners. The way to keep the rich in New York isn't to coddle today's millionaires. It's to make sure today's strivers can afford to stay. ### Anchors of Opportunity? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-public-housing-economics/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:31:30.000Z Virtually all economists, and a growing segment of the public, agree that we are in the midst of a housing supply crisis in the United States. Prices and rents have risen rapidly as supply has consistently failed to respond to growing demand. But the discussion about the need to bolster supply has conspicuously overlooked a small but critical part of the supply-side solution: public housing, specifically the need to preserve the 900,000 public housing units across the country that have fallen into disrepair. [Public housing has never been popular](https://www.nber.org/papers/w21071?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When it was initially debated in the 1930s, the real estate industry feared competition, and conservatives were skeptical of public ownership. The program was ultimately sold to Congress — over the objections of market advocates — as a strategy to increase employment and stimulate the economy. There were of course some early supporters, including mayors who welcomed the support to clear slums in their cities and progressive housing advocates. But by the late 1950s, even many of those who thought public housing was a good idea in theory had turned against how it had played out in practice. Fair housing advocates charged that the program concentrates poor families in high-poverty neighborhoods and exacerbates racial segregation. While public housing developments are not as isolated as they once were, public housing developments are still located in census tracts [with poverty rates of 29 percent and minority shares of 61 percent](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The indelible image of the [Pruitt Igoe towers ](https://www.archdaily.com/870685/ad-classics-pruitt-igoe-housing-project-minoru-yamasaki-st-louis-usa-modernism?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)in St. Louis being deliberately dynamited continues to haunt any meaningful discussion of the topic. Economists, for their part, have written very little about public housing, perhaps because most so clearly favor housing vouchers — or portable subsidies like those provided under federal Section 8, which cover part of the rent for homes leased on the private market — as the way to make sure low-income people can secure housing (even though vouchers will not solve the supply-side problem on their own). But the economics of our current public housing stock are worth a closer look, especially in New York City, where the New York City Housing Authority continues to provide homes for[ over 170,000 low-income households](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycha/about/developments.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including 150,000 living in conventional public housing developments. These households face few other affordable options in the city, and none that are guaranteed to be permanently affordable. As building new housing has become increasingly difficult, the last thing we need to do is to demolish a source of permanently affordable housing or to let it deteriorate to the point of obsolescence or inhabitability. Effective supply strategies must not only bring in new units through the front door but also invest in existing homes to keep them from falling out the back door. Unfortunately, pro-housing advocates rarely focus on preservation. The pro-housing movement can also lose sight of the fact that all the supply in the world will not solve the housing challenges of very low-income households. Their incomes are simply insufficient to cover the costs needed to operate and maintain rental housing. These households will likely always require some form of subsidy to cover rent. And this is another key reason to prioritize preserving public housing. Rigorous recent research shows that public housing improves [children’s test scores](about:blank), grade [advancement](about:blank), and [economic mobility over the long-run](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=2850255&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This research counters[ the common view](https://www.huduser.gov/Portal/publications/The-Final-Report-of-the-National-Commission-on-Severely-Distressed-Public-Housing.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that public housing is bad for children. Further, today’s public housing is often located in relatively high-income neighborhoods, helping to lock in economic and racial diversity in those communities. In New York City, gentrification has meant that [two-thirds of public housing units](about:blank) are now surrounded by census block groups with an average household income above the citywide median. So at least in New York, public housing developments are no longer isolated, high-poverty communities but rather part of mixed-income neighborhoods.[Recent research on the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) HOPE VI program](about:blank) shows that children who grow up in renovated or new public housing developments that are part of mixed-income communities earn about 50% more as adults than those living in other public housing developments. The gains appear to be driven by the children living in revitalized public housing developments surrounded by more affluent communities. The core challenge, of course, is that as public housing buildings have aged significantly, the repair and maintenance costs have risen dramatically. And absent intervention, the stock will only continue to deteriorate, exposing tenants to growing risk of mold, broken elevators and malfunctioning electrical and heating systems. [Current estimates](https://www.novoco.com/public-media/documents/10-year-roadmap-interim-report-10232025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggest that the cost of preserving public housing nationally has climbed to close to $170 billion. [The New York City Housing Authority estimates that it needs some $80 billion](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycha/about/press/pr-2026/pr-20260305.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to preserve just its stock of public housing. And yet while the federal government helps to support operating costs and to fund renovations and capital improvements through the public housing capital fund, both of these federal subsidy streams have long been inadequately funded, forcing housing agencies to defer needed capital repairs. Congress isn’t likely to come to the rescue with new capital funding for the public housing program any time soon. That said, Congress provided something of a lifeline in 2012 when it enacted the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. The RAD program allows public housing agencies to convert developments from conventional public housing support (Section 9) to project-based Section 8 contracts, which commit HUD to provide long-term rental assistance funding to the building. In New York City, NYCHA PACT and the Public Housing Preservation Trust both rely on the RAD program to convert public housing to Project-based Section 8\. One benefit of these conversions is more steady operating support. While public housing has long been under-funded, Section 8 rental assistance has enjoyed steady, bipartisan support in Congress, in part because most of those dollars flow to private owners, and in part because cuts to Section 8 would force housing agencies to take away subsidies from current recipients. (Cuts to public housing force housing agencies to make far less visible cuts to maintenance and repairs.) [With Section 8 funding, developments can also leverage more sources of public and private funds for capital needs](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2016.1262445?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), rather than relying simply on the Congressional appropriations provided by Section 9\. [Nearly 200,000 public housing units](https://www.radresource.net/pha%5Fdata2020.cfm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) nationally have now converted to Section 8 contracts through the RAD program, and another 65,000 units are in the pipeline. [Advocates have expressed concern that RAD makes tenants vulnerable to eviction](https://citylimits.org/nychas-rad-pact-and-preservation-trust-plans-explained/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Still%2C%20PACT%20has%20been%20met,data%20at%20some%20of%20the) given that most conversions bring in private owners and managers. Mayor Mamdani voted against establishing the NYCHA Public Housing Preservation Trust when he was a member of the New York State Assembly, presumably out of concern about any movement towards privatization. [But as mayor, to his credit, he has taken a more pragmatic and ultimately more effective path to preserving public housing, embracing PACT and the Trust as critical tools, in addition to committing $5.6 billion in city capital dollars over five years.](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/26/nyregion/mamdani-housing-plan-nycha.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Some advocacy groups have criticized the Mamdani plan for its reliance on RAD. But designed with an eye toward avoiding [the displacement the HOPE VI program caused](about:blank), RAD retains many of the same tenant protections provided by the Section 9 program. The RAD program [requires one-for-one replacement of demolished units and guarantees that the original tenants can continue to live in (or move back into) renovated developments without new eligibility screening](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2016.1262445?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Recent research shows on average, [RAD conversions have not been associated with increases in eviction filings ](https://www.furmancenter.org/news/did-public-housing-conversion-lead-to-more-evictions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)or judgments in [New York State](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10511482.2026.2668088?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or nationally. Hopefully this research will help to reassure advocates about the RAD program since, at the moment, it’s the only game in town. The Mamdani administration will also need to work closely with residents to demystify the PACT and Trust options, convey the lack of alternative funding sources, and reassure them that despite some potential disruptions and temporary relocations, they will maintain their rights, and the housing will remain permanently affordable. On a related note, public housing agencies should also consider using some of the open space on their campuses to create new developments that can help to raise capital for repairs and also create mixed-income communities. They can do this “in-fill” development while still protecting legacy residents as well as preserving the long-run affordability of the public housing units. The key is maintaining public ownership of land. Even without new building, in many cities, including New York, public housing now offers a chance to allow low-income families to remain in neighborhoods seeing growing investment, and potential improvements in services and conditions. That said, it may be necessary to take explicit steps to break down the walls that often isolate public housing campuses from their surrounding neighborhoods and ensure that all residents can take advantage of any burgeoning opportunities. Local community organizations may be the best positioned to do this work, through offering programs and services to the full set of neighborhood residents. Investing in inclusive public spaces and forms of social infrastructure can also help to build bridges. But what about vouchers? Yes, virtually all economists prefer housing vouchers over public housing, and for some good reasons. One, they have been shown to be cheaper, and two, because they empower low-income households to choose where they want to live, including in neighborhoods that provide a richer set of resources and opportunities for upward mobility. But vouchers rarely work as cleanly in practice as they do on the pages of economics textbooks. Most fundamentally, vouchers only work if there are homes that are vacant and available to renters using vouchers. [Our recent work on voucher success rates](https://www.furmancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ee-legacy/Success%5FRates%5Fin%5Fthe%5FHousing%5FChoice%5FVoucher%5FProgram%5F508.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that nationally, just 57% of households who received housing vouchers (after typically waiting for years to receive them) were able to use their vouchers to rent homes. While voucher success rates may have been particularly depressed as rents rose rapidly in the immediate wake of the pandemic, success rates floated at around 65% in the pre-COVID years. So even prior to the pandemic, about a third of voucher recipients nationally were unable to use their vouchers. These rates show that the vouchers can be challenging to use in tight markets, [especially for certain types of households](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051137723000670?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Further, without meaningful changes that make housing easier to build on the supply side, expansions to the voucher program may simply lead to higher rents, as additional voucher recipients compete for a fixed supply of units. [Several studies](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150176&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have found that [landlords already capture some amount of existing housing voucher subsidies through rent increases](https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v83y2002i1p109-152.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Economists might view the first-best solution to the housing needs of low-income households to be housing vouchers (or even cash transfers) combined with radical reforms to land use that make it easier to build. But in the here-and-now,the prospects for radical land-use reform are slim. Plus, other barriers beyond land use regulations make it difficult to build quickly, including geographic constraints, labor and materials shortages, and limited land. Public housing continues to be the neglected stepchild of affordable housing programs. The growing pro-housing movement overlooks it as a key source of supply. Economists — and many affordable housing advocates — prefer vouchers. Even progressives touting new models of social housing often overlook the nation’s existing stock of social housing. Whether it is sound public policy to actually build new public housing is an important question for another time, but at the very least, it is critical to invest in and preserve the existing homes that we have. ### Time to Build Big Again URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-large-scale-housing-development/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:02:27.000Z Building big is an immutable identifier of development ambitions in New York City and has been ever since consolidation transformed New York into a city of five boroughs in 1898\. As New York transitioned into a modern city, real-estate forces inaugurated a new era of city-building. Real-estate activity loomed large in the life of the city. It became inseparable from the idea of New York itself, aligned to its culture of commerce economically, politically and socially — and so it remains today. But today, with New York seemingly built out, our ambitions for city-building are much smaller than they used to be. This is a mistake. The city might seem full, but we still have the opportunity, indeed the obligation, to think big. Once, driven by rapid business expansion and surging population growth, New York’s builders pursued a pattern of building at scale. Their works created New York’s iconic density evident in skyscrapers (which, relative to what’s come after them, don’t seem to scrape the sky any longer) jammed into the historic streets of Lower Manhattan, later generations of office towers in Midtown Manhattan and the newest residential towers in Brooklyn and Long Island City. Less photogenic, but equally essential to the story of New York’s prominence in city-building, are the many acclaimed landmark housing projects for wage-earners and middle-income families. Think Stuyvesant Town, Co-Op City, public housing projects and so many others. Housing the most people in the most economic manner while managing the risks of large-scale building dominated the urban dialogue in New York City during the first decades of the 20th century. Innovative experimental projects of ambitious scale made New York a pioneer. As a condition for the city’s continued economic prosperity and social health, the need for affordable housing at scale is ever more pressing today, and the city’s legacy of building big offers a prelude to thinking about the future. ### Experimental urbanism The last great wave of urban construction came out of necessity. Housing conditions in New York City at the turn of the 20th century were in dire need of reform. Old, overcrowded, inferior tenement housing built on the cheap during the 19th century needed to be replaced, and its design seriously reconsidered, to provide tenants with adequate light and improved sanitation and safety. Additionally, thousands of new dwellings were needed to accommodate a population explosion driven by waves of immigrants and others drawn to employment opportunities. Lot-by-lot development of tenements, the building pattern of the previous century, even when improved in design, was not up to the task of meeting the residential demands of an enlarged and rapidly urbanizing city. Large-scale projects were necessary, and they, in turn, imposed new demands on residential form and site design to mitigate the impact of increased densities. Acting on different motivations, a certain set of builders, architects, philanthropists, union leaders and insurance companies worked through new ideas of providing modest-cost housing and planning complete residential communities. In short, the drive for scale inspired innovative experimentation. Some of the city’s housing experiments evolved from different motivations. Wealthy philanthropists who aimed to address low-income housing problems founded City and Suburban Homes Company to build projects that could offer low rents because of large-scale organization and an investment model of limited returns: “philanthropy plus 5%.” When completed, the firm’s earliest projects in Manhattan, Avenue A Estate (1901-1913, 1,257 apartments plus a hotel) and First Avenue Estate (1898-1915, 1,059 apartments), were the largest low-income housing communities in the world; both are New York City landmarks. The most prolific of limited-dividend companies, City and Suburban Homes, after 25 years of operation, housed more than 12,000 tenants. Its success encouraged others to enter the field. As successful as it was, however, the model could not address the full scale of New York City’s housing problem. In 1922, prompted by a housing crisis and lobbying by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the New York State Legislature passed a law, the so-called “Metropolitan Bill,” enabling all life insurance companies operating in the state to invest up to 10% of their stated assets in residential development, with profits capped at 6%. Metropolitan Life responded with plans designed by architect Andrew J. Thomas for a project of 2,125 apartments built in five-story buildings around small interior courtyards on parcels still used for truck farming in Long Island City, Queens. Such scale, the company believed, would create economies in construction, operation and financing that would offset regulated rents. When completed in 1924, the complex (38 buildings, 1,500 apartments, currently called Cosmopolitan Houses) became the largest low-rent housing project in the country, rented mostly to middle-income households. In 1938, new legislation drew life insurance companies, with their deep pockets of capital, into city-building at even greater magnitudes of scale. Large-scale housing appeared to offer a secure and profitable investment, and the civic-oriented investment was as well good publicity for the industry. Led by Frederick H. Ecker, Metropolitan Life completed four enormous market-rate housing projects: in the Bronx, Parkchester (12,272 units, 1940-1941); in Manhattan, Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village (8,755 and 2,495 units, respectively, 1947-1949) and Riverton Houses (1,232 units, 1947-1948). The favorable economics of housing investment at the time, sweetened with tax abatements, influenced others: New York Life Insurance Company (3,008 units in Fresh Meadows, Queens, 1949; 582 units in Manhattan House, Manhattan, 1951) and Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (1,130 units at Fordham Hill, Bronx, 1946-1950; 1,221 units at Clinton Hill Apartments, Brooklyn, 1943-1955). By 1955, these big-three life companies had sponsored more than 33,000 housing units. As conservative fiduciaries, they were unlikely developers to take on the risk of constructing innovative, large-scale, planned communities affordable to middle-class renters in America’s most expensive city. The developer Alexander Bing, retired from his successful family real-estate company Bing & Bing, founded City Housing Corporation specifically to build a “garden city” under a limited-dividend investment format. Sunnyside Gardens, Queens (1924-1928), one of the most significant planned residential communities in New York City, gained widespread recognition for the way its architects Clarence Stein and Henry Wright designed low-density housing, amenities and landscaped open courtyards to foster a neighborhood that would meet the social as well as physical needs of its residents. By combining large-scale residential design and site planning (more than 600 buildings developed on 16 blocks covering 77 acres) with low-cost capital, Bing and his associates found a physical solution to the housing problems of the time. Desirous of promoting ownership rather than tenancy, the firm leveraged scale to keep selling prices low, and Bing’s real-estate skills enabled it to innovate homeownership financing mechanisms unique for the time. Today, it is a New York City historic district. During the building boom of the 1920s, two profit-seeking developers, Fred F. French and Henry Mandel, pioneered large-scale walk-to-work residential enclaves that aimed to keep the middle-class urban worker in the city by providing well-built housing at a modest cost. Each believed modest rentals could be achieved by building at scale in older neighborhoods where land could be purchased at a relatively low cost based on existing antiquated or deteriorating structures. With Tudor City (1927-1930, 2,800 apartments on 14.5 acres formerly known as Prospect Hill), French aimed for suburban ambience in the city and advertised his project as “a garden spot in the center of New York” with built-in amenities to make urban living convenient, an antidote to a city growing taller, more commercial, more congested and noisier. In London Terrace (1929-1930), Mandel also built “a city within a city” but hewed to high-density urban modernity in a massively scaled block-long complex of 14 continuous buildings (23rd to 24th Street) containing 1,665 apartments rising straight up from the street. Known as “the world’s largest apartment house under one roof,” Mandel planned London Terrace as an oasis offering residents an elaborate array of services and every accommodation for modern urban life. Both pioneering large-scale developments were speculative ventures based on an ideal. Both drove a dramatic shift in the fortunes of surrounding areas. Both used eponymous financing plans to support their development activities. And both created lasting legacies of city-building. The most notable of builders of housing for the working class, Abraham E. Kazan and his United Housing Foundation, joined forces with the power of the city’s labor unions to build an alternative vision for housing based on the idea of cooperative ownership. They planned housing not just as a collection of residential buildings but as complete cooperative villages, and they followed through on that ambition in Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens. Over the course of 40 years, Kazan oversaw the development of 40,000 cooperative homes in New York City in large-scale projects built on a not-for-profit basis. The first project, Amalgamated Housing Cooperative in the Bronx, is today the oldest surviving limited-equity housing co-op in the United States (11 buildings erected between 1927 and 1970, 1,468 units). Rochdale Village in Queens became the largest housing cooperative in the world when it opened in late 1963 (5,860 apartments housing some 25,000 residents in 20 buildings laid out in a massive 170-acre superblock with its own food stores, nursery schools and credit union), only to be surpassed in size by Co-Op City in the Bronx (1960-1964, 35 high-rise buildings with 15,372 residential units on 320 acres). Housing co-ops were not new to New York, but Kazan’s legacy of building limited-equity co-ops, firmly rooted in the city’s labor movement, uniquely contributed to the city’s history of housing. New York City’s growth and prosperity during the 20th century hinged on its ability to house the policemen, firefighters, tradesmen, garment workers, teachers, nurses and doctors, clerical and professional office workers and wage-earners who fueled the urban economy. The housing experiments I noted above represent approximately 82,000 dwelling units. More than bulk, the significance of building at scale on the land opportunities of the time enabled the creation of communities with open spaces and social infrastructure for urban life. Often cited as touchstones in the physical history of New York, these legacy communities established a template of ambition that inspired others then as it should today. ### 21st-century opportunity What to make of this legacy? How to learn from it today? Land that made such building at scale possible — the truck farms and rural estates of the outer boroughs and deteriorated tenements of Manhattan past their useful lives — is today no longer available in our built-up city, and the land reclamation projects that enabled large-scale projects like Co-Op City, Starrett City and Battery Park City are today environmentally constrained. With fewer opportunities to build at scale, sites like the Sunnyside Yard and Creedmoor Psychiatric Center in Queens and Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn present tantalizing possibilities. Consider, for example, the 180 acres of the Sunnyside Yard site, the largest undeveloped public site in New York. It offers a rare opportunity to create housing at scale based on a long-range framework for sustainable growth, planned in innovative ways that improve connections to well-established surrounding neighborhoods. Development of the Yard offers what building housing lot-by-lot cannot: the opportunity to build communities that sustain quality urban life. The scale of the site can provide some 12,000 to 15,000 mixed-income housing units; open space and supporting social infrastructure of schools, libraries and childcare and health care centers; and a start-from-scratch chance to rethink core physical infrastructure for support of urban living. Building a deck over much of the rail yard would create new publicly controlled land to serve the City’s future priorities, renew New York’s historic ambition to expand beyond its physical topography and further its legacy of innovative city-building. The [Sunnyside Yard Master Plan](https://edc.nyc/project/sunnyside-yard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was completed in March 2020 after years of planning, wide-ranging community engagement and extensive technical engineering work. It was not a thought exercise but rather a major effort to understand the constraints and opportunities, in consultation with communities, of creating a realistic basis for development of City priorities at scale. Since its completion, changed economic circumstances might necessitate amendments or adjustments to the plan and its mix of uses. As policy, however, the fundamental ideas undergirding it are consistent with public priorities for mixed-use, mixed-income, community-based development. We do not need to start the planning over. Incremental lot-by-lot development alone cannot meet the scale of today’s housing needs. The bold development of the Sunnyside Yard would take several decades, but today is the time to start structuring that process. The site presents complications and challenges, but New York City has the technical expertise and skilled public- and private-sector players necessary to bring a project of this scale to fruition within the time frame of other ambitious projects. Creating new communities at Sunnyside Yard — as was the case in the award-winning development of Battery Park City with its 8,275 residential units, 11 million square feet of office space, 36 acres of parks and four public schools — requires a large up-front public investment to build the platform for growth. It could be done incrementally, and a place to start would be a section of about 25 acres where a deck is easiest to build. Beyond the essential financial heft to build the infrastructure that would take the opportunity from plan to reality, officials at each level of government need to commit political capital to this project. And that commitment needs a strong governance structure to propel the project forward. To restate the obvious: The need for housing is great, and few opportunities exist in New York City to increase mixed-income housing at scale — which development of Sunnyside Yard could make possible. Mayor Mamdani needs to take the long view and embrace this priority. --- *Disclosure: The author was an independent advisor of the Sunnyside Yard Master Plan Steering Committee.* ### The Real Cost of a $30 Wage: The View From the Restaurant Industry URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-minimum-wage-increase-restaurant-industry/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T20:00:25.000Z As executive director of the New York City Hospitality Alliance, which represents thousands of restaurants and bars across the five boroughs, I hear regularly from small-business owners who have financial concerns about [a City Council bill](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7944787&GUID=8A9D75D7-55AE-4F9A-B411-69904826532F&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to raise the minimum wage to $30 an hour by 2030 and eliminate the tip credit, which allows gratuities to count toward guaranteed minimum wage obligations. In addition to the financial concerns, there are significant legal issues with the wage proposal. In [Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade v. City of New York](https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/1964/15-n-y-2d-604-0.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York’s highest court ruled that the City cannot set a minimum wage higher than the State’s. Additionally, the proposal would undermine a recent statewide agreement that raised and indexed annual minimum wage increases to inflation. The economic threat of the proposal is [significant](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ngad2nR3j3W8T1g%5Flk-MVRb-hvvpXHL%5F/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Restaurant operators and tipped workers warn it will strain small businesses and jobs — and there’s a good reason why. Less severe policies in cities like Chicago and Washington coincided with [restaurant closures](https://chicago.suntimes.com./city-hall/2026/03/11/samantha-nugent-freeze-phaseout-chicago-subminimum-wage-tipped-workers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [job losses](https://epionline.org/blog-post/epi-spotlights-best-data-on-dcs-tip-credit-elimination-impacts-during-hearing-on-repeal/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), lower worker compensation and operational challenges. As a result, Chicago [recently paused](https://blockclubchicago.org/2026/05/20/tipped-minimum-wage-hike-paused-2-years-in-blow-to-mayor-via-near-unanimous-city-council-vote/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its tip credit phaseout following Washington’s decision to reinstate its tip credit. The current minimum wage in New York City is $17 an hour, though most hourly restaurant workers [earn more](https://culinaryagents.com/search/jobs?search%5Bsort%5Fby%5D=date&search%5Bradius%5D=25&search%5Bname%5Fclass%5Fid%5D=&search%5Bname%5D=&search%5Blocation%5D=New+York%2C+NY&search%5Bcountry%5D=US&search%5Bname%5Fcopy%5D=&search%5Blocation%5Fcopy%5D=New+York%2C+NY&search%5Bview%5Ftype%5D=Grid&search%5Bcategory%5D%5B%5D=culinary&search%5Btype%5D%5B%5D=full%5Ftime&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Tipped workers earn a combination of base pay and gratuities, with servers and bartenders guaranteed at least the minimum wage and often earning well above it. To better understand the effect raising the minimum wage to $30 an hour and eliminating the tip credit would have on a full-service restaurant’s bottom line, we modeled it using member survey data, public wage benchmarks, statutory labor costs and projected wage compression. Our model found that total labor costs increased by approximately 69%, causing labor expenses to rise from roughly 35% of revenue to approximately 59% of revenue. A small restaurant generating $2 million a year in revenue, [with a typical 5% profit margin](https://pos.toasttab.com/blog/on-the-line/average-restaurant-profit-margin?srsltid=AfmBOopRbxeaDS6Rv53VIx%5FJPpoASB%5F8QADglWNf1JWuziiRkOfpU4nk&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), would run an annual loss of $380,000 when minimum wage hit $30 an hour. This would come at a time when restaurants continue to face rising [food costs](https://www.bonappetit.com/story/restaurant-costs-are-still-sky-high?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [rents](https://www.rivieraproduce.com/how-restaurants-are-fighting-back-against-inflation-in-2025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [insurance premiums](https://www.innovateli.com/as-costs-soar-lawmakers-must-tackle-insurance-fraud/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [delivery-related expenses](https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/technology/survey-shows-strong-restaurant-support-nyc-delivery-fee-cap?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and other forms of [inflation](https://pos.toasttab.com/blog/data/2025-voice-of-restaurant-industry-survey?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). New York State Department of Labor data show New York City restaurant jobs have declined in 2026, at times by roughly 9,600 jobs year over year, raising concerns about the industry’s stability. To illustrate the impact of this policy on our modeled full-service restaurant, we present a graphic that includes three paths restaurants would consider if a $30 minimum wage were implemented and the tip credit were eliminated. Path A shows the additional sales a restaurant would need to generate to offset the gap — which restaurateurs say is a false choice, because if they could increase sales by so much, they already would have. Path B offsets the gap through higher menu prices, making dining out more expensive and less appealing for New Yorkers while worsening the city’s affordability crisis; data also show the required price increases would reduce profitability. Path C reflects the difficult business decisions restaurants would be forced to make in response. Small business owners tell me these are not real solutions, but different versions of the same outcome: fewer neighborhood restaurants, higher costs for New Yorkers and a weaker small-business economy across the city. While eliminating the tip credit and implementing a minimum wage increase of this magnitude is unprecedented, local experience suggests the model is unsustainable. Before the pandemic, some restaurants experimented with eliminating the tip credit, raising base wages, and increasing menu prices to cover the cost, but ultimately abandoned the approach. Customers pushed back on higher menu prices, perceiving them as more expensive, even when their total out-of-pocket costs were comparable because a gratuity was no longer expected. In other jurisdictions, restaurants that added service charges to replace tip income faced similar customer confusion and resistance. The result was lower earnings for many workers, customer dissatisfaction, and restaurants reverting to the traditional tip-credit system. The restaurant and bar owners I represent clearly have a stake in this debate. Our analysis suggests that labor cost increases of this scale would lead to higher menu prices, job cuts, business closures and greater affordability pressures on restaurants, workers and consumers alike. ### How Immigrants Make New York City Go URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-immigrants-economic-vitality/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:00:02.000Z Immigration is essential to New York City’s vitality. The numbers alone are extraordinary. After nearly half a century of huge inflows from abroad, more than 1 out of 3 New Yorkers are now immigrants, or around 3.1 million people in a city of almost 8.5 million, according to 2024 census data. Together with their U.S.-born children, they are an estimated half of the city’s population, the overwhelming majority with origins in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. The city now has a foreign-born mayor — born in Uganda to parents of South Asian origin — who made history as the first Muslim to hold the position. It is not surprising, given Zohran Mamdani’s background and bases of electoral support, that he declared in his election-night speech that New York is built and powered by immigrants. At the same time, the very fact that immigration has been so critical in New York City raises questions about the degree to which the Trump administration’s plans for the massive deportation of undocumented immigrants and slashing of legal immigration will spell trouble for the city and its economy in the next few years. A major reason immigration is so important to New York is that it is a significant motor of the city’s economy. As researchers David Kallick and Anthony Capote report based on an analysis of the American Community Survey’s 2022 five-year sample: Immigrants, both those with legal status and those without, are literally building the city. An astounding 63% of the workers in the city’s construction industry are foreign-born, an estimated 41% of them undocumented. At the low end of the job hierarchy, nearly three-quarters of all construction laborers are immigrants; higher up, thousands of foreign-born people are painters, plumbers and paperhangers, and, still higher in status, many immigrants hold professional positions connected to the city’s construction industry — making up 36% of architects, for example, and 62% of electrical engineers. Immigrants are also central to the restaurant industry, another mainstay of New York’s economy: They are roughly two-thirds or more of the city’s food preparation workers, head cooks and chefs, and servers. In food as well as other sectors, immigrants have established a great many small businesses, so that by 2022 they accounted for 48% of all self-employed, incorporated business owners in the city. Immigrants have invented new types of businesses, too, including nail salons pioneered by Korean immigrants that are now ubiquitous in New York City and the wider metropolitan area. The health care industry is heavily dependent on immigrants, from those changing beds in hospitals and nursing homes to the physicians who diagnose and treat patients. A whopping four-fifths of the city’s home health aides are foreign-born, 53% of all registered nurses and 45% of all physicians. Without immigrant health care workers, the city would be plunged into crisis. The need for immigrant workers in health care — as in other parts of the economy — will become even more pressing in the future amid demographic changes. As the baby boomers age and retire, more people will be required to fill jobs they are vacating at all levels of the occupational hierarchy and, in an aging city, to meet growing needs in health care and other services. That immigrants provide many other services, from in-home childcare and housecleaning to home repairs, has made such services more affordable and thus more widely available. In this way, immigrants’ lower-paid labor has subsidized the lifestyle of middle- and upper-middle-class New Yorkers. What about fears that competition from immigrants will hurt native-born workers? These are greatly exaggerated. As I detail in my book, [“One Quarter of the Nation,”](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691206394/one-quarter-of-the-nation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the consensus among economists is that immigration’s adverse effects on U.S.-born workers’ wages and employment have, overall, been very small: Immigrants not only provide, but also increase demand for, goods and services; immigrant-owned small firms and startups often generate job opportunities for native-born workers; and highly educated immigrants boost productivity. Because immigrants and their families themselves use services, they have boosted the economy and job growth, including swelling demand for workers in an array of public service jobs, from teachers and bus drivers to workers in public administration. Public schools in the five boroughs are oftenovercrowded, but without large-scale immigration and a substantial second generation, many would have downsized or closed; the demand for teachers would have been reduced, along with the need for lower-level employees, from custodians to kitchen staff. Immigration has been a boon to the city in another way: revitalizing a number of neighborhoods that had fallen on hard times in the post-World War II years, when their populations declined as large numbers moved to the suburbs and the Sun Belt. Without immigration, it is likely that many apartments and houses in the neighborhoods left behind would have been vulnerable to abandonment. Brooklyn’s Brighton Beach and Sunset Park are two examples where immigrants brought new vitality, lifting the population, spurring economic growth and helping reestablish a commercial base as the newcomers started small businesses such as grocery shops and convenience stores. Immigration has also made New York City safer. A common belief is that rising immigration leads to rising crime rates, but this is a myth. Immigration was a factor behind the decline in violent crime in urban America from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. In 2014, New York City had fewer than 330 murders, at the time the lowest number since comparable records were kept — and despite a population larger than in 1990\. In 2025, the figure was down to 309 homicides, making New York one of the safest cities in America. What explains why immigrants have helped reduce violent crime? One factor is that they are a favorably self-selected population: ambitious, motivated to work and concerned with avoiding deportation. Something else is going on at the neighborhood level, where research indicates that large numbers of immigrants seem to lower crime and violence. The concentration of immigration in particular neighborhoods — leading to population growth and a reduction in housing vacancies — means more “eyes on the street” for informal neighborhood monitoring. Nor should we forget how immigration has enriched New York City’s culture: the foods New Yorkers eat, the music they listen and dance to, the novels they read, the films and television programs they watch. If Italians a century ago brought us pizza and Russian Jews introduced the bagel, post-1965 Chinese immigration has brought a wide range of new cuisines, including Sichuan, Hunan and Shanghai. You can now find a good Mexican taco in New York, as well as an Argentine empanada and Colombian arepa. Latin and Asian American parades have joined old staples like the Saint Patrick’s Day Parade. The West Indian American Day Parade Carnival is now the city’s largest ethnic festival, attracting hundreds of thousands who come to Brooklyn’s Eastern Parkway to celebrate it every Labor Day. Many plays on and off Broadway have immigrant themes and stars. While the cultural contributions of immigrants and the second generation typically draw on home-country customs, they also blend aspects of immigrant and American cultures, in this way becoming Americanized mixtures in the New York context. Finally, immigration has created a new and growing born-in-New-York second generation who, as a large-scale study by sociologist Philip Kasinitz and his colleagues shows, generally are doing better economically than their foreign-born parents. They have the ability to combine American and immigrant cultural patterns in ways that support getting ahead, as well as the good fortune to have parents who have instilled in them a high level of motivation. There is every reason to expect that second-generation New Yorkers will continue to add vitality and dynamism as they, once again, help to make New York City great. Less happily, there is the specter of falling immigration levels in the next several years owing to the Trump administration’s policies to deport undocumented immigrants on a massive scale and cut back on the number of new legal arrivals. These policies have the potential to dampen economic growth in the city and create shortages of workers in such key sectors of the economy as health care and construction, especially given the ongoing outflow of residents to the suburbs and elsewhere in the country. Still, to end on a more optimistic note, Trump’s harsh anti-immigrant policies are unlikely to last forever. Indeed, demographic pressures — falling fertility rates nationwide and a need to fill many jobs previously held by the large number of retiring baby boomers — may well lead future presidents to support relatively high levels of legal immigration from abroad. To the extent thatthe United States continues to admit a sizable number of new immigrants, New York City is bound to receive a not-insignificant share, if only because of the networks that link newcomers to established settlers as well as the demand for workers to shore up the city’s labor force and provide services for a large aging population. In that context, new immigrant arrivals — along with established immigrant residents and their adult children — can be counted on to enrich the city’s economy, communities and culture as they have done for the last half-century. The days of New York as a vibrant immigrant center are far from over. ### Editor's Note URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/editors-note-issue-16/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T15:58:41.000Z Economics, often thought of as the least slippery of the social sciences, is simultaneously the most impenetrable for outsiders. At its heart, it is the study of tradeoffs — how dialing up one thing, like prices, often winds up driving down another thing, like sales. Many of these tradeoffs are especially pointed as New York City considers the ambitious agenda of Mayor Zohran Mamdani. In this issue, we explore the questions that are raised when economics meet public policy. This isn’t new terrain for Vital City. We’ve been trying to answer closely related questions for the past year. When Mamdani said he wanted to freeze rent-regulated rents for four years, we looked at [what it would do to the balance sheets of thousands of buildings, all other things being equal](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-rent-is-too-damn-high-but-also-too-low/), and asked [whether there](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor/) was a [better way](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-needs-a-smarter-way-to-control-rents/). When Mamdani said that he wanted to dedicate $600 or $700 million to making buses free, writers in our pages wondered whether [that would really be the smartest use of limited resources](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/beyond-free-buses/). And as the Mamdani administration advanced plans to establish a small network of grocery stores with free rent, no property taxes and heavy subsidy, our commentary asked [what impact that would have on the already struggling small businesses](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-city-run-grocery-stores-small-businesses-nyc/) in their orbit and [why other market-distorting, price-inflating city regulations remain in place](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-grocery-cost-explained/). In this issue, we take a step back to pose a broader set of questions. In many respects, New York City is an economic miracle. It’s not only the American capital of finance but of culture and tourism. It’s a leader in technology, a behemoth in health care and law and media and so much more. Into this $2.6 trillion ecosystem, running a government that spends $125 billion a year, steps a democratic socialist who hasn’t been shy about his intent to remake the city. Is Mamdani’s agenda — free childcare to all, free buses for all, frozen rents for all rent-stabilized tenants and a wide range of other pricey promises — achievable, or is it destined to run into the brick wall of reality? Does the mayor’s core promise to make the city more affordable have any honest chance when the forces that move prices and salaries are much more powerful than anything the city’s chief executive can control? Can his promise to inject economic justice into government decision-making coexist alongside the basic responsibility of ensuring the city’s economy keeps growing? For all his ideological commitments, Mamdani is a politician, and a canny one at that. He’s already demonstrated the ability to adapt when circumstances demand it. If his robust [“Block by Block” housing agenda](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mayor-mamdani-releases--block-by-block--the-housing-plan-for-a-n?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which seeks to smartly leverage market forces and bulldoze obstacles to private development — is a sign of things to come, he’ll be charting a much more pragmatic course than many seem to expect. Cities, and New York City especially, are living through a time of profound disruption on multiple fronts. The government in Washington is mercurial and hostile to cities. Amazon and other e-commerce companies keep putting pressure on brick-and-mortar businesses struggling to pay the rent. The Sun Belt continues to lure families and businesses looking for lower taxes and better weather. The work-from-home revolution has made office buildings and business districts more precarious than before (even if the Manhattan office market is booking at the moment). And — oh yeah — AI threatens perhaps the most significant rupture in the nature of work since the industrial revolution. For this issue, we asked our contributors not just to wrestle with big questions but to try to point toward solutions. We are grateful that leading lights like Ed Glaeser, Sherry Glied, Nicole Gelinas, Martha Stark, Alicia Glen, Arpit Gupta and so many more have answered the call. As always, our contributors often disagree with each other, offering competing diagnoses and prescriptions for what ails New York. But the consistent thread that runs through their pieces is to beware of simple narratives. The “tale of two cities” rhetoric of progressives and the “all the rich people will leave” fears of conservatives don’t adequately represent the complicated economic realities that Mamdani and the rest of us are currently facing. What we didn’t get to in these pages could fill three more volumes. Exactly what are the ramifications of Trump policies on the city’s economic health? Why do so many storefronts stay vacant for so long, and what can be done about it? What are the contours of the city’s underground economy? How can the city’s economy be better organized for the freelance workers who settle here by the thousands? Watch this space in the months to come. ### The New York City Economy: A Data Story URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-economy-data-story/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:07:28.000Z _No content available._ ### New York Under Mamdani: At the Crossroads, Again URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-economy-zohran-mamdani-efficiency/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T20:02:43.000Z The American Rust Belt is full of cities, such as Cleveland, Detroit and St. Louis, that are shadows of their past selves. As these places declined, there were crucial moments when large employers and wealthier citizens decided that enough was enough. Between 1970 and 1980, Detroit’s population dropped by one-fifth. At the end of the decade, Dodge shuttered its factory in Hamtramck that had once [employed more than 30,000](https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/essays/motor-city-story-detroit?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Will the exit of Ken Griffin and Citadel appear equally momentous to the history of Chicago in 50 years? Will San Francisco’s claw back to safety under moderate Mayor Dan Lurie come to resemble New York’s resurgence after 1990? New York faces a similar set of questions. Mayor Zohran Mamdani ran as a full-throated redistributor eager to take from the rich and fund everything from groceries to housing. Yet his agenda faces constraints of law and constraints of location. Mayors don’t get to set income tax rates, but taxpayers do, because they can change where they live. Moreover, the [mayor’s announcement on May 28](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/mayor-mamdani-announces-commission-on-government-efficiency-to-m?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of a “Commission on Government Efficiency, or COGE, a Charter Revision Commission tasked with making City government work better for New Yorkers,” suggests he may understand that the most successful left-wing mayors, from Milwaukee’s sewer socialist Daniel Hoan to New York City’s own Fiorello LaGuardia, were also fantastic managers. New York’s economy would face fewer risks if the mayor coupled his progressive agenda with a campaign for competence that improves the quality of City services for rich and poor alike. This campaign could target spending more efficiently, for instance, by providing transit passes for people who are currently looking for work, rather than giving everybody free buses, or by targeting childcare spending on the children of working low-income residents. Better measurement of outcomes, like police respect for citizens, would make it easier for Mamdani’s managers to achieve his goals. Instead of funding city groceries, the mayor could push for one-step permitting for the city’s less wealthy entrepreneurs, which would be a blow for both upward mobility and delicious food. Deputy Mayor Dean Fuleihan enjoys a strong reputation as an administrator. Perhaps he could lead a big push to cut costs. ### The redistributor’s dilemma Mayor Mamdani faces the redistributor’s dilemma. How much can he burden New York City’s wealthier taxpayers before they depart for sunnier, lower-tax climes? All local leaders who are keen on redistributing from rich to poor face the challenge of figuring out just how much their tax base is willing to endure. Harvard Ph.D. students Matthew Jacob and Rene Livas [examine the impact](https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/5grej4l9znl1s7mmyaefl/wagetax%5Fdraft.pdf?rlkey=b1fdjai2ooja5rj9fffd8my4s&e=1&dl=0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of post-World War II changes in Philadelphia’s wage tax on the location of jobs. They compare the workplace choices of city residents, who face the city’s wage tax no matter where they work, and suburbanites, who pay the tax only if they work in the city. Jacob and Livas look at how changes in Philadelphia’s wage tax impact the difference in the probability of working in the city between people who live right inside and right outside the city border. They find that “a 1% increase in the tax rate reduces suburb-to-city commuting by 6.39%,” which should surprise no one who has watched the hedge fund industry blossom in the lower-tax suburb of Greenwich, Connecticut. While the number of millionaires in New York City [has remained steady](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/02/upshot/mamdani-tax-the-rich.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over the last five years and [increased from 2010 to 2022](https://cbcny.org/research/hidden-cost-new-yorks-shrinking-millionaire-share?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), theshare of America’s millionaires living in the city [fell by about one-third](https://cbcny.org/research/hidden-cost-new-yorks-shrinking-millionaire-share?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from 6.5% to 4.2% over those same 12 years. The Citizens Budget Commission estimates that if “New York State and City had the same share of millionaires in 2022 as they did in 2010, the State would have received $10.7 billion more in PIT (personal income tax) revenue, and the City $2.5 billion more.” But the difficult part of the redistributor’s dilemma is that the tax base’s willingness to suffer depends on local economic conditions that are largely outside the mayor’s control. Like Mayor Mamdani, Mayor John Lindsay was full of charisma and progressive plans, and Gov. Nelson Rockefeller mostly shared this progressivism. In 1957, the year before Rockefeller was first elected, the top State income tax rate was 7%, and New York City had no income tax. By 1973, when both Rockefeller and Lindsay stepped down, the top State income tax was 15%, and the City had its own income tax, which topped out at 3.5%. Despite those high tax rates, the City lurched into a fiscal crisis that almost turned into a bankruptcy. If New York City’s economy had been stronger, the scope of Lindsay’s ambitions would probably have been manageable. Unfortunately for Lindsay, his term coincided with massive deindustrialization and spiraling crime rates. Between 1950 and 1976, [overall manufacturing employment in New York City declined](https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/quarterly%5Freview/1977v2/v2n2article8.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from just over 1 million to 544,000, and employment in the once-mighty apparel industry fell from 340,000 to 155,000\. Social trauma accompanied economic dislocation, and the [number of murders in New York City rose](https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/NACJD/studies/3226/datadocumentation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from 634 in 1965 to 1,680 in 1973\. The city’s image morphed from the urban playground seen in “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” or the Doris Day-Rock Hudson romantic comedies to the hellscapes of “Taxi Driver” and “Escape from New York.” While the New York City of 1970 couldn’t handle the high taxes and overwhelmed policing of the Lindsay Era, the strong New York City economy at the turn of the millennium stoically endured the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. So is 2026 more like 1976, when the [state’s unemployment rate hit](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/NYURN?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 11.3%, or more like 2000, when the unemployment rate dropped to 4.1%? Despite being the port of entry to the U.S. for a once-in-a-generation plague and experiencing a subsequent epidemic of empty offices, the city is [holding up well](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/real-estate/commercial/cny-colliers-report-may-manhattan-office-market-20260601/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In March 2026, the [state’s unemployment rate](https://dol.ny.gov/state-labor-department-releases-preliminary-march-2026-area-unemployment-rates?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was 4.6%, and the New York City metropolitan area’s unemployment rate was 4.9%. [The New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) tells us](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2026-02/NYCEDC-2025-State-of-NYC-Economy%5F2-12-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the metropolitan area experienced faster employment growth than the nation in 2022, 2023 and 2024, and that the area’s office vacancy rate is down to 15.5%, which is far below Dallas (26.1%), Atlanta (26.8%) and San Francisco (35.7%). Moreover, the city experienced only 309 murders in 2025, which was fewer than half of the number of murders at the *start* of the Lindsay Era. ### The sharks circling New York City’s economy Yet risks remain, from a massive decline in human office work (if the artificial intelligence boosters or work-from-home boosters are right) to a massive stock market slump (if the artificial intelligence boosters are wrong). A redistributive agenda that takes the city’s highest earners for granted could go badly wrong if one of those risks becomes reality. Stock prices are high relative to earnings, which, like pride, often comes before a fall. Among the companies in the S&P 500, the [ratio of stock prices to earnings](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/stocks/peyields?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was 27 in early May 2026, which is much higher than the [long-run average](https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-management/institutional/insights/market-insights/guide-to-the-markets/guide-to-the-markets-slides-us/equities/gtm-forwardpe/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of about 17\. Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller prefers to cyclically adjust earnings by averaging them over the last decade, which produces a price-to-earnings ratio of 40\. By that measure, stocks are pricier than they have ever been, except for the dot-com bubble era between January 1999 and September 2000. There are also economic reasons for anxiety, which echo those held by the naysayers of the dot-com bubble. [In 1999, Warren Buffett wrote](https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/1999ar/FortuneMagazine.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that “the products or services that have wide, sustainable moats around them are the ones that deliver rewards to investors,” which implies that even a revolutionary technology will not yield outsize profits if there are few barriers to competition. If four or five major AI firms end up selling a similar service that costs far more to develop than it does to deploy, then they are likely to lose money. Standard economic logic suggests that market competition will push prices down to the costs of deployment (“marginal cost”), which will surely fall below the price needed to earn a profit (“average cost”). I have no confidence in my crystal ball, but the commodification of AI is only one scenario among many in which the majority of AI mega investors lose their shirts. If AI follows the kind of winner-takes-all pattern that enriched Google and Facebook, then only one of the firms will enrich its shareholders. What would a stock market crash do to New York? [According to the NYCEDC](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2026-02/NYCEDC-2025-State-of-NYC-Economy%5F2-12-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “In the 2000s, Finance and Insurance accounted for 21.1% of the city’s GDP; that rose to 22.5% in the 2010s, and has averaged 24.2% so far in the 2020s.” Those figures understate the region’s dependence on finance, because GDP also includes nontraded services, such as “retail trade” and “health care and social assistance,” which bring less outside money into the system than traded services like finance. Nonetheless, the 2001 internet stock bust did relatively little to the city, partially because other assets, especially those associated with real estate, continued to boom until 2006\. The busts of 1929 and 2006 and the stock market malaise of the mid-1970s were much tougher on New York. Employment in this sector has already begun to shrink. The city may be as vulnerable to AI success as to AI financial failure. The region has 370,000 workers in finance and insurance, but more than 1 million New Yorkers toil in the four sectors called “information,” “management of companies and enterprises,” “professional, scientific and technical services,” and “administrative and support services.” These office workers are responsible for New York’s relatively low vacancy rate, but their jobs are surely vulnerable to both AI and working from home. [For 30 years](https://www.nber.org/papers/w5562?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [I have argued](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119096920318?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that technology is more likely to make face-to-face contact — and the cities that enable that contact — more important. AI could certainly make the knowledge learned at the water cooler and over drinks after work more, not less, valuable. Yet despite my optimism about the power of live human collaboration, it would be foolish to ignore the AI-related risks to New York City’s office-based economy. New York City seems especially vulnerable because of the enormously high costs of doing anything from buying a home to building a subway. We should marvel at New York City’s resilience over the last five years, or indeed the last 45 years, but we shouldn’t forget that New York has grown far less than its lower-cost Sunbelt competitors. Between 2001 and 2024, the real value of output went up by 61% in Manhattan and 89% in Harris County, Texas, which contains Houston. Since 2000, the population of New York City has grown by about 6%, and the population of Houston has risen by 23%. Houston is, in a sense, New York’s political opposite. It has no state or city income taxes, it has limited land-use regulations, and its public sector unions aren’t allowed to engage in collective bargaining. The power of private-sector housing supply is well illustrated by the fact that red-state Texas does a much better job at providing low-cost housing for ordinary Americans than blue-state New York. According to the National Association of Realtors, the median price of a home sold in the first quarter of 2026 was $331,000 in Houston and $750,000 in greater New York. If New York’s information-intensive economy continues to work magic, then the city will still thrive. But if asset markets crash or AI radically reduces the need for urban office workers, then the low costs of places like Houston are only going to look more appealing to businesses and their employees. If a local downturn were coupled with a public push that radically raised costs for businesses and the rich, then this could turn into one of those moments of swift urban decline. ### The campaign for competence The best way to avoid that risk is for Mayor Mamdani to model himself after the most capable progressive mayors, like Hoan and LaGuardia, and start a campaign for competence. Many of his more ambitious redistributions [have been stymied](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/10/nyregion/mamdani-campaign-promises.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by political realities. He cannot unilaterally raise taxes on the rich, and [Gov. Kathy Hochul understands](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2026/03/11/hochul-says-new-taxes-could-drive-wealthy-out-of-n-y-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that New York is “in competition with other states who have less of a tax burden on their corporations and their individuals.” Their jointly proposed “pied-à-terre tax” is not a particularly sensible policy (since nonresident owners already pay full property taxes and impose little cost on City or State government), but at least it creates fewer economic risks than increasing income taxes. Moreover, a reasonable estimate is that the tax will raise between $340 million and $380 million, which is tiny relative to the City’s budget of $125 billion. The enormous size of that budget and the political limits on tax increases mean that the mayor can do far more for low-income residents by improving the efficacy of the existing spending than by fighting for dribs and drabs of extra revenue, more by reducing the regulations that hold back economic vitality than by providing public grocery stores. Here are five ideas that could help turn the zero-sum redistribution agenda into an agenda to expand the well-being of all New Yorkers in ways that particularly help lower-income New Yorkers. First, target spending. Instead of trying to make all buses free, the mayor could provide free transit passes for jobless people who are actively looking for work. Oluchi Mbonu (my former Ph.D. student) and Seth Chizeck [evaluate a program](https://ombonu.github.io/discounted%5Ffares%5Fstudy.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that randomly gives out free and reduced-fare transit passes in Allegheny County. They found little positive impact on the overall population, but for the initially unemployed, “free fares cause a 3.5 pp (percentage point) increase in the likelihood of being employed and a $2,845 increase in total earnings during the first six quarters.” If these results held up in New York City, the program could easily pay for itself with increased taxes and reduced reliance on City services. The mayor could also improve [the currently weak targeting](https://www.nber.org/papers/w31981?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of road repaving to make sure that the City repaves the roughest streets first. Second, the mayor could improve the quality of policing through better measurement. Management guru Peter Drucker famously declared, “What gets measured gets managed.” We measure crime much better than we measure community satisfaction with treatment by police officers. The mayor would find it easy to cajole left-leaning donors to fund an independent, repeated survey that asks ordinary people in precincts throughout the city about their experiences with police. Commissioner Jessica Tisch could then use that data to demand that her captains do more to ensure police treat every New Yorker with dignity and respect. Third, instead of funding public groceries, the mayor could do more to unleash the immigrant entrepreneur. Current City regulations impose much greater costs on lower-income entrepreneurs than on rich entrepreneurs. It is easy to start your internet or AI phenomenon, since most of the action occurs in cyberspace. It is far harder to start a grocery store in the Bronx. The Mayor should level that playing field. He has already [started along this path](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-signs-executive-order-to-inventory-and-cut-fines-a?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and that is good, but freeing the food vendor will require a long administrative battle. Despite heroic efforts over many decades to streamline permitting, starting a business in New York City still requires far too many steps. The mayor should create a one-stop permitting office with sufficient linguistic capacity to handle New York’s rich cultural mosaic. This has often been promised but never delivered. He should keep that office accountable by measuring the time to permit and insist on continual improvements in speed. Fourth, the mayor should pivot from promising to deliver free, universal childcare for every child over six weeks old to improving the quality of educational services (both pre-K and in upper grades) for the children of working low-income residents. The younger the child, the more expensive the care. [We have long known](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.1.3.111&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that pre-K programs, like Head Start, can achieve remarkable results for children of lower-income families, but providing universal care for all children will mean enormous spending on middle-class and upper-middle-class households. Targeted and regularly evaluated interventions deliver far more value than universal entitlements. Finally, Dean Fuleihan has a strong reputation as a capable administrator. The mayor should charge him with producing a plan to get more out of every dollar spent by the City, rather than relying on a network of “chief savings officers.” This program [appears to have identified](https://pix11.com/news/local-news/chief-savings-officers-found-1-7-billion-in-savings-mayor-mamdani/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) $1.7 billion worth of savings, which is far short of the budget gap. I also worry that his COGE will lack the unified leadership that is almost universally required to make tough administrative decisions. Budget cuts by lower-level administrators didn’t solve New York’s mid-1970s fiscal woes. Felix Rohatyn and the State-created Municipal Assistance Corporation did. A strong enough budget cutter within the City government today should be able to follow the Rohatyn path to fiscal health. New York City has shown remarkable resilience in the face of a terrible pandemic and the rise of working from home. Yet the pace of technological change means that there are plenty of things that could still go wrong. If New York’s taxpayers experience the combination of an economic meltdown and a government that is determined to use them as a piggy bank, then the City could re-experience the traumas of 1975\. The city and its economy will be much safer if the mayor’s redistribution is coupled with a big push to use City dollars more efficiently. ### Twilight of the Union City? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-labor-unions-history-future/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:26:11.000Z At an April 15, 2026, rally of thousands of building service workers threatening to strike at apartment buildings across the city, Mayor Zohran Mamdani declared that “New York City is a union town.” “That means,” the mayor said, “that we stand with our neighbors when wages and benefits are on the line.” Just two days later, events seemed to confirm the mayor’s view when the doormen, janitors and other building service workers won a contract that continued their free family health insurance, raised pensions 15% and provided a modest wage increase. The phrase “union town” suggests a high level of union membership and political and economic power. Compared to the rest of the country, the mayor is right: New York is a union town. Nationally, just 9.9% of workers belong to a union, while in New York, the figure is more than twice that, 20.5% (in 2024-2025). Few places in the country surpass that rate — only Honolulu and a handful of other midsize cities. Compared to the past, however, union density and power in New York are diminished. In 2007, more than 1 in 4 workers carried a union card, rather than 1 in 5 today. As recently as 2017, 17% of private-sector workers in the city were unionized; in the most recent data, that figure is down to 13.7%. (Public-sector union membership has also declined, but it is at a much higher rate, 65.5%.) Mamdani’s victory in the June Democratic mayoral primary, over an opponent supported by many of the largest and most politically active private-sector unions, illuminated a political landscape in which organized labor simply does not matter as much as it once did. Both union boosters and critics too often overlook labor’s diminished power. To be sure, unionization remains a major factor shaping the economic life of the city. Its most obvious impact is raising wages. At first glance, the effect does not seem great. In 2024-2025, across all jobs in the five boroughs, the median wage for unionized workers was [just 10 cents an hour higher](https://slu.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Union-Density-2025-CUNY-SLU.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than for those without union membership. The previous year it was [a more substantial 81 cents an hour](https://slu.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/The-State-of-the-Unions-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which translates to $1,684.80 a year for someone working a 40-hour week — not a trivial sum for families spending most of their money on necessities, but not a huge one. But that significantly underestimates the pay premium unionized workers enjoy. For one thing, the baskets of union and nonunion jobs are different, distorting the comparison. If you compare wages within particular industries, [the pay premium can be much higher](https://www.hofstra.edu/sites/default/files/2022-09/cld-state-of-new-york-unions-2022.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): 40% in construction, 28% in wholesale and retail, and a whopping 58% in leisure and hospitality. (These data are for the metropolitan area as of 2019-2021, the most recent year available.) Under a just-signed agreement, housekeepers in unionized hotels will earn more than $100,000 a year starting in 2032\. For another thing, unionized workers are more likely than nonunion ones to receive health insurance, pensions and other benefits through their job, delivering a sense of stability in unsettled times and freeing up money for other kinds of spending. For workers and their families, the union pay premium can make an existential difference — between struggling economically all the time and having a bit of security and discretionary spending power; between being a renter forever and buying a home (maybe not in the city but in a lower-cost outer suburb); between having a serious sickness bring economic disaster and having health insurance and disability pay easing the burden. For the next generation, parental union membership might mean being able to go to college or trade school as a path to upward mobility rather than having to take the first available job after leaving school. Employers often have a different perspective, seeing the higher wages and better benefits that come with unionization as a burden and a disincentive to investment. Historically, in some industries like garment manufacturing, when unionization drove up wages, New York employers relocated to cheaper parts of the country and eventually overseas. Today, that is less likely to happen because so many unionized jobs are in industries that are place-specific and cannot be relocated: construction, transportation and utilities, health care, education and government. Employers in some industries, including construction, have described union work rules that limit flexibility as more challenging and costly than union wage rates. (Workers see those same rules as protecting their jobs and health.) Some businesses and nonprofits claim that certain activities, like building affordable housing, are impossible using unionized workers due to high costs. Mayor Mamdani’s campaign pledge to create 200,000 units of affordable housing with union labor will be a test of whether this circle can be squared. But economic fearmongering aside, unionization also provides real benefits to employers, even if they may not acknowledge them. Decent wages and pensions reduce turnover, meaning experienced workforces and lower costs for recruitment and training. In some industries, with jobs of limited duration, employers can go to unions when they need workers with specific skills, say a construction electrician or a set-builder for a movie or a stage show. Unions in construction, building services, health care and other industries run training and apprenticeship programs that provide the next generation of skilled workers as well as advancement opportunities for current employees. In short, unions help sustain a workforce with a vast range of skills and deep experience — a strength of the New York economy. The presence of unionized workers benefits the city as a whole. Every additional dollar that goes to a worker is more likely to recirculate locally than a dollar going to a bond trader or real estate mogul, since there is only so much even a luxury-loving tycoon can spend. Unionized workers anchor many outer-borough neighborhoods, owning homes; patronizing local businesses; being active in their churches, mosques and synagogues; coaching youth sports; and volunteering in all sorts of community organizations. While unions continue to buoy a significant sector of the New York workforce, they have been less effective in helping many of the low-wage workers who are so vital in keeping the city going: delivery and restaurant workers, child carers, taxi and hired car drivers, cleaners and landscapers, and day laborers of all kinds. With some minor exceptions, this vast stratum of New Yorkers — which happens to be disproportionately immigrants and, in many cases, undocumented immigrants — lacks union protection. That has contributed to a level of economic inequality in the city that is very high by national standards. In 2023, the [average annual salary for employees in the securities industry](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-09/wall-street-salaries-decline-further-from-pandemic-heights?embedded-checkout=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was $471,370\. That same year, a quarter of New Yorkers, including 420,000 children, lived [below the poverty line](https://robinhood.org/reports/poverty-tracker-annual-report-vol-7/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of $47,190 a year for a family of four. Most of the recent gains for low-wage workers have come not through collective bargaining but government action: a higher minimum wage, scheduling rules, mandatory sick leave and the like. Union support for these measures helped push them through, but the workers themselves aren’t unionized. The “Fight for $15,” begun in 2012 by striking New York fast food workers, was meant to push up minimum wages and spur unionization of low-paid restaurant workers; it proved remarkably successful in the first regard but a flop in the second. Going forward, it is unclear how much influence organized labor will have over economic development policy, which, in any case, does not seem to be a priority for the Mamdani administration. The mayor is not indebted to the private-sector unions for winning office (though many of them, once Mamdani won the Democratic primary, abandoned Andrew Cuomo in the general — a demonstration of just how transactional their politics have become). Nonetheless, the mayor’s democratic socialism has led to a commitment by his administration to support workers in contract struggles, as Mamdani did with striking nurses as well as the building service workers, and to trying to increase private-sector union density. Perhaps the mayoral appointment most at odds with business-as-usual was the selection of former acting U.S. Secretary of Labor Julie Su to the newly created post of deputy mayor for economic justice. Su, an inventive longtime supporter of labor, has pledged to aggressively enforce labor laws, take into consideration the interests of working people in economic development decisions and use whatever power the City has to support unionization efforts. Labor can use whatever help it can get. Though the past decade has seen greater efforts to bring new members into organized labor, the advances have been very modest. One area of success has been among professionals in higher education, museums, digital journalism and gaming, where unionization is beginning to lead to significant changes. Among other things, unions can provide some protection from AI diminishing or eliminating jobs, as the NewsGuild, the Screen Actors Guild and the Writers Guild have done in recent contracts. Still, between January 2023 and June 2024, the United Automobile Workers, which has been at the forefront of organizing professionals, added only 1,571 new members through recognition elections or voluntary employer recognition, while the Service Employees International Union, whose giant New York affiliates represent health, building service and security workers, so gained just 1,134 new members. At this rate, there is no chance that organized labor will regain its former clout in the private sector. Public-sector unions are much stronger and, in part for this reason, are more frequently the target for attacks blaming organized labor for driving up costs while resisting reform. Government workers, who are unionized at more than four times the rate of private-sector workers in the city, represent nearly half of all unionized workers in the metropolitan area. They are indeed a political force; many will point a finger at the United Federation of Teachers for spearheading a class-size law so expensive that the mayor had to ask for a delay in its implementation, or the Police Benevolent Association for resisting police accountability reforms, or the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association for preventing improvements at Rikers Island. But the pay for City workers is often exaggerated in attacks on labor. A sanitation worker starts at a base salary of $44,821 per year for a difficult, dangerous, dirty job, and after five-and-a-half years reaches $92,093; a school lunch aide base salary tops out at $49,037, while a City architect makes between $76,262 and $137,501\. In recent contracts, City salaries have barely kept up with inflation, and sometimes not even that. While on some particular, parochial issues, unions representing City workers have considerable sway, for the most part they seem on autopilot, with few new ideas or ambitions. Arrangements that date back decades, like pattern bargaining (in which the City and one union come to an agreement that serves as a template for everyone else), have been kept in place even though they do not serve unions very well. The new administration could be an occasion for rethinking municipal labor relations, to get workers involved in developing more effective and less expensive ways of providing services. Former Transport Workers Union official Marc Kagan, who was on Mamdani’s transition team, suggested convening small groups of workers and midlevel managers to discuss such issues as scheduling, client interactions and wasteful practices, bringing feedback from the front lines to administrators often at a remove. So far, neither side seems interested. The mayor reappointed as head of the Office of Labor Relations Renee Campion, a competent professional first put in the post by Bill de Blasio and kept on by Eric Adams, seemingly a sign that no big changes in the relationship between the City and its employee unions are envisioned. At an event marking his first 100 days in office, the mayor indicated some interest in trying to move toward a more collaborative style of labor relations, but he has so far seemed not very engaged with managing the municipal workforce. Like it or not, the City will need to make municipal labor relations a priority, as current contracts begin to expire in an unfavorable budgetary climate. Unions will want wages to at least keep up with inflation. Benefits may present an even greater challenge. Right now, health benefits alone for active and retired City workers [make up nearly 13% of the City budget](https://www.centernyc.org/urban-matters-2/city-workers-have-a-new-health-plan-mayor-mamdani-good-luck-with-that?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). With the federal government cutting back on health care spending and the State not eager to pick up the load, the City and its unions are facing very difficult circumstances. When the City government asks its unions to partner with it, that usually has been a code word for making their members sacrifice in the face of fiscal challenges. It is not fair to ask modestly paid workers who keep the city going to take a hit as the stock market, real estate prices and inequality all soar. But the public-sector unions should join with the administration in looking for ways to improve service delivery and lower costs. Also, they can use their political influence (as some already do) to pressure Albany and Washington to provide New York City with the kind of support it once received. Stepping further out of the box, public-sector unions might use their large memberships and considerable assets to help with private-sector union organizing, something they have generally treated as none of their business. A shriveling labor movement in the private sector will ultimately make a robust public-sector labor movement unsustainable. In the decades after World War II, organized labor played an enormous role in shaping life in New York City, not only elevating living standards for millions of workers and their family members but also shaping housing, health care and other aspects of city life. Those days are largely over, but unions still matter, and matter a lot. How much that will continue to be the case will depend to a large measure on their ability to reverse their decline in membership and more aggressively use the power they have. The Mamdani administration presents a moment of opportunity for organized labor. It remains to be seen if labor will seize it. ### Voices of the City: The Economy URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/economy-opinion-survey-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T16:06:47.000Z *Vital City, in partnership with CrowdVox — an independent project led by veteran public opinion researcher John Della Volpe — is developing a new way for New Yorkers to be heard regularly about life in the city, the issues that matter most to them, and the direction in which leaders are taking New York.* *The project grew out of* [*previous research*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-five-political-types/) *showing that many New Yorkers want to be heard and understood by the institutions and leaders shaping city life more than they are today. To build on that insight, CrowdVox conducts nightly AI-assisted, open-ended interviews. More than 700 New Yorkers have participated so far across the five boroughs through phone and online audio conversations.* *Participants are recruited across each borough, with the interview pool designed to reflect the city’s diversity, including by geography, gender, race, ethnicity, education, income and ideology. Some questions are asked nightly so responses can be tracked over time. Others are updated on a rolling basis to explore the elements of city life that are most closely connected to New Yorkers’ overall life satisfaction, including affordability, personal safety, career and job opportunities, stress and recovery, community connection, whether city leaders understand neighborhood needs, school quality, public transportation, health care, public spaces, mental health, and more.* *Together, these interviews create a rolling qualitative portrait of how New Yorkers are experiencing the city in their own words. Here is what New Yorkers told us in May and June 2026 about the state of the city’s economy and the challenges they face.* --- ### The bright side "The cost of living is going down…There's better public service, there's better — the mayor is doing great and you know the cost of living is going down….The pay is competitive, the cost of living is competitive and the quality of living is about the same as most urban cities." — James, 26, white man, Brooklyn, Republican. Interviewed May 31, 2026. "Prices are going down, housing as well…The new mayor that's in charge has been profoundly moving things around in New York to make there more support for parents as far as opening schools. Prices are going down, housing as well, and just the people around are very friendly…Having a good paying job, a secure job, free daycare for, or free schooling for 2-to 3-year-olds so that I am able to work. Good grocery stores like Aldi that have good prices. Yes." — Jasmine, 24, white woman, married, Staten Island, Democrat. Interviewed May 27, 2026. "Oh no, I don't think anything is moving in the wrong direction of this city. I think this city is going in ~~to, um, this city is going in~~... the right direction…Right now I'm building myself up to be an owner of my apartment. So I will definitely stay here." — Randy, 27, white man, Harlem, independent. Interviewed April 28, 2026.**So so** "Fortunate for me, I do actually have a really good, decent job where I can afford to still maintain and still, you know, be able to live a little comfortable with the stuff that's been provided for me from my job. But it hasn't really been a struggle to me, but it has been for a lot of people, especially with grocery prices up. And that seems like to be like a worldwide thing. But New York can be extremely pricey, especially it really, really don't matter what borough you live in." — Day, 36, Black man, Queens, Democrat. Interviewed May 28, 2026. "As long as our streets are safe and good education and childcare, I'm fine…Businesses here seem to be doing okay, and there are part-time and full-time manual jobs or jobs for unskilled labor so that someone at my son's age can get his start and get some work experience, which is great because if the economy is doing well, then we will be doing well here…I live quite simply. So as long as our streets are safe, public transportation is safe, and good education and childcare, I'm fine. I can be able to afford to live here." — Allie, 57, white woman, retired, Staten Island, independent. Interviewed May 28, 2026. "My quality of life is much better than I would have in another area…I would say not necessarily, but my quality of life is much better than I would have in another area due to my pay, as well as the accessibility of public transportation, the community network…The housing prices are through the roof. You can't afford a house, and even if you do afford something, there's no space at all…Long term, it's not sustainable, you know?" — Liba, 22, Asian woman, Brooklyn, Democrat. Interviewed June 2, 2026. "My outlook on it is still positive but you can't ignore the stuff that you see…People are buying less stuff. Some people can't afford their basic needs, the cost of gas is up, everything is up. There's a whole war going on. It's just a lot of negativity. So my outlook on it is still positive but like you can't ignore the stuff that you see…People still looking for jobs and people wandering around aimlessly. It's not boredom, but just like, you don't really see them. Like there's no goal to what people are doing." — Guillermo, 42, second-generation Puerto Rican man, unemployed and studying digital cinematography, the Bronx, independent. Interviewed May 4, 2026. "I'm always hopeful because hope is the only thing that is letting us move on…Rome is not built in a day. So it's collective effort. So I think... I decided that if I move, if everybody starts moving, we won't be called New Yorkers. So with that said, I am still hopeful that things are getting better. Moving is not an option for me." — Abraham, 39, white man, Tribeca, Democrat. Interviewed May 1, 2026. "It feels like we're looking out from the inside and just like we're stuck behind a wall of glass. It just makes you feel like you're numb or paralyzed or something and can't do anything in the city that you love." — Sarah, 43-year-old white woman, Queens, Republican, Interviewed May 6, 2026 ### The dark side "We haven't been able to take vacations. There's certain foods we have to switch to cheaper brands…With everything going up, we haven't been able to take vacations recently and everybody in this house is dying to take a vacation. It's been over a year. There's certain things that we have to cut out on, certain foods that we have to switch, like brands, we have to switch to cheaper brands or we have to go without certain things…There are times when things stay heavy on my mind like rent and grocery prices and what's going to happen tomorrow with the utilities and all that stuff." — Sean, 46, Hispanic man, married with two sons, the Bronx, Republican. Interviewed May 31, 2026. "My salary doesn't rise with inflation…One big issue for me at least is that my salary doesn't rise with inflation or with cost of living... I actually make less money now than I did about a decade ago…I feel like there's probably a ton of people in New York working three or four jobs, just two couples both working multiple jobs just to make ends meet. But at some point, you have to wonder, you know, is it worth it? Should we just go somewhere else where it's a little more reasonable?" — Brian, 58, white man, married, Long Island City, Democrat. Interviewed June 1, 2026. "I have family in New York City and what's pushing me to leave is the cost of food, cost of rent, cost of gas. Everything is too expensive." — Heather, 38, Black and Hispanic woman, Far Rockaway, Democrat. Interviewed May 16, 2026. "I feel more isolated because I stay in more. I cannot afford to take Ubers or taxis on a regular basis to meetings of groups that may occur in faraway parts of Manhattan. So I'm by myself a lot…The cost of housing is astronomical. It's only habitable for wealthy people at this point." — Miriam, 72, white woman, retired, Upper East Side, Democrat. Interviewed May 21, 2026. "It feels like we're drowning in a cup of water and there's no one to save us. We just need a little help from you to at least bring rent back down to a certain amount where we're able to keep up and not have to just live paycheck to paycheck." — Yressa, 39-year-old Black woman, Brooklyn, Republican, Interviewed May 2, 2026"A lot of people that I speak to, including myself, cut back. Don't go to restaurants anymore. Don't go to the movies anymore. Just basically we have enough money just for our groceries and to get by and live." — Ally, 57-year-old white woman, Staten Island, Independent, Interviewed May 5, 2026 "I have no life. I'm stressed out constantly and I just work my part-time job and try to chip away at the rent a little bit by a little bit." — Michael, 45-year-old white man, Brooklyn, Republican, Interviewed May 4, 2026 ### For Cities, Aggressive Partisan Gerrymandering Has a Silver Lining URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/partisan-gerrymandering-cities-unexpected-benefit/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T15:03:25.000Z Let's stipulate at the outset: Partisan gerrymandering — whether in Virginia or Florida — is bad for democracy. In recent years, increasingly sophisticated computer models have enabled ever more aggressive line-drawing, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed, steadily widening lawmakers’ power to choose their voters rather than the other way around. The result dilutes minority voting power, makes it harder for elected officials to serve constituents with coherent shared interests, can effectively silence entire state delegations when partisan control of the House shifts, weakens public trust in elections and leaves entire communities without a meaningful voice. That’s a tragedy. But it’s a tragedy with one potential, albeit small, saving grace: In their efforts to crack and pack urban voters to dilute their influence in elections, Republican-friendly mapmakers sometimes end up spreading those voters — and their cities' challenges — across multiple congressional districts. Even when those districts are represented by people whose main center of gravity politically is in exurbs or rural areas, that can create broader political ownership over the kinds of issues that are often concentrated in urban centers, including public safety, housing instability and reentry after prison. The same effect occurs with Democrat gerrymanders, as the [Virginia redistricting scheme](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/virginia-supreme-court-blocks-democratic-drawn-congressional-map-voter-rcna342687?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) struck down by the state’s top court would have doubled the number of districts that include a piece of the Washington D.C. metro area. Consider Memphis and New Orleans, two cities frequently cited when national conversations turn to violent crime. Both cities have populations below the target district population of [761,169](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/2020-census-apportionment-results.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) per the 2020 census. Under relatively compact, geographically sensible maps, each could have a single House member who would presumably advocate for federal investment in crime prevention, reentry programs or housing stability. But now both cities’ populations are being carved up and scattered among multiple congressional districts by their state legislators. And so, where once there was one lawmaker with a stake in what happens on Beale or Bourbon streets, now there are two or three. Even if that makes the city itself less powerful in Congress, it will give multiple legislators with a wider ideological range a shared, if less significant, stake in the city’s future. And as a result, that’s likely to get those legislators more involved in figuring out how to solve problems in those cities — as opposed to sitting on the sidelines and pointing fingers at members of the other party who are allegedly failing at the job. That broader stake extends beyond housing. Crime, of course, is [hardly an exclusively urban phenomenon](https://time.com/6904210/america-suburban-crime-problem-essay/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Rural areas face [significant challenges](https://www.wosu.org/2025-10-28/politicians-are-focused-on-city-crime-what-about-rural-communities?fbclid=IwY2xjawRoS3RleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETFKQTlEdmYzRkFFdGVjQXczc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHkhVjCDAEUMJl%5FsJQhSukiQzAZEKNizgb1TUbFoGNx9z-Mjgi8l9roBybY1I%5Faem%5FTJ7Q0-F7W%5FZ-KB5fuhT00Q&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) related to drug addiction, property crime and violence. Suburban communities grapple with fentanyl overdoses and gang activity that don't stop at the county line. But perception often lags behind reality in politics, and the perception — fueled by selective media coverage and decades of political rhetoric — is that serious crime is primarily an urban problem. When suburban or exurban members of Congress suddenly find that portions of Memphis, New Orleans, Birmingham or Indianapolis fall within their district lines, they gain a new constituency — and with it, a new political incentive to care about what happens in those communities. Lawmakers who previously thought they had little reason to champion grants for violence interruption programs or DNA testing backlogs now have constituents who need those things. They may not be the constituents who are controlling primaries or general elections, but they are constituents nonetheless. Moreover, [research](https://jowei.polisci.lsa.umich.edu/florida.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has shown that members from districts that have communities of varying population density may be less ideologically rigid and more inclined towards crafting bipartisan solutions. Indeed, members from districts with more than one type of population density are 76% more likely to participate in the [Congressional Problem Solvers Caucus](https://problemsolverscaucus.house.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (PSC), the leading bipartisan legislative caucus.\* ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/06/image1.png) The implications for federal criminal justice policy are already significant. The [Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs](https://ojp.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) administers hundreds of millions of dollars annually in grants for purposes ranging from solving cold cases to funding pretrial diversion programs and supporting crime victims. Support for some of these initiatives has been [eroded over the last year](https://counciloncj.org/doj-funding-cuts-more-than-550-organizations-impacted-new-analysis-finds/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Historically, competition for such funds has been skewed toward states and localities with more members on key appropriations subcommittees — members who, by virtue of their districts, have had a reason to prioritize them. Now that gerrymanders have resulted in more House members having a direct stake in the fortunes of major urban centers, the political math around those appropriations is beginning to shift. The implications for federal criminal justice policy are already significant. The [Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs](https://ojp.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) administers hundreds of millions of dollars annually in grants for purposes ranging from solving cold cases to funding pretrial diversion programs and supporting crime victims. Support for some of these initiatives has been [eroded over the last year](https://counciloncj.org/doj-funding-cuts-more-than-550-organizations-impacted-new-analysis-finds/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Historically, competition for such funds has been skewed toward states and localities with more members on key appropriations subcommittees — members who, by virtue of their districts, have had a reason to prioritize them. Now that gerrymanders have resulted in more House members having a direct stake in the fortunes of major urban centers, the political math around those appropriations is beginning to shift. The same logic applies to housing policy. Urban housing instability and crime are deeply interconnected, with [research](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8496894/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[ consistently showing that stable housing reduces recidivism](https://www.urban.org/research/publication/housing-as-platform-improving-employment-and-justice-outcomes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and that concentrated poverty drives cycles of violence that neither policing nor social services alone can break. When lawmakers representing prosperous outer-ring suburbs now also represent inner-city neighborhoods where constituents’ adult children struggle to find affordable housing after release from prison, the dynamics of the policy conversation has already started to change. Abstractions become constituents. It also turns out free-market policies championed by many conservative lawmakers are crucial to [removing the red tape of permitting and zoning](https://www.niskanencenter.org/a-pro-supply-to-do-list-for-congresss-housing-bill/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that inflates housing costs, a reality that the [abundance movement](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-abundance-matters/) on the center-left has recently embraced to a considerable degree. None of this is to romanticize gerrymandering or suggest that a corrupt process can be relied upon to produce good outcomes. The distortions it creates in competitive elections, minority representation and democratic accountability are serious, and no accidental urban policy benefit comes close to justifying them. Independent redistricting commissions and statutory constraints on partisan line-drawing remain the right goals. All who care about the future of democracy should want the Supreme Court to reverse its corrosive recent precedents. But while we’re waiting for what may be an unlikely outcome, policymakers and advocates working on criminal justice reform and urban revitalization would be wise to seize the opportunities created by a new congressional map that gives more members a direct stake in our nation’s urban areas. If members who previously never would’ve attended a briefing on hotspot policing or violence interruption programs now have constituents in Memphis waiting for an answer, that briefing should become worth their time. If the representative of a safely red exurban district now also represents part of New Orleans, the incentive may be greater to advocate for initiatives like grants funding [DNA testing](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41800?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that can both solve more crimes and identify those wrongfully convicted. Innovative state-level initiatives offer a compelling model for what federal investment could look like. In Utah, a [bipartisan bill](https://le.utah.gov/~2022/bills/static/HB0137.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) created the Violent Crime Clearance Rate Fund, a grant program with [matching funds](https://www.arnoldventures.org/newsroom/arnold-ventures-matches-utah-investment-in-law-enforcement?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) provided by Arnold Ventures that helps law enforcement agencies solve violent crimes by increasing officer ranks and investigative resources. Such interventions already have bipartisan support, but they could find new champions among members of Congress who, thanks to gerrymandered maps, suddenly represent parts of urban communities that may be more likely to live with the consequences of unsolved violence. Nor should we overlook the electoral dimension at the heart of the new map. The presence of newly incorporated urban voters matters not only in general elections — where shifting demographics could make some suburban or even historically red districts competitive in a national wave environment — but also in primaries. The objection here is obvious: Aren’t some gerrymandered districts designed precisely to ensure those urban voters are too few to matter? In states with closed primaries, it’s true that the majority of urban residents who are Democrats can’t vote in Republican primaries, But, even if the urban area incorporates only 10 or 20 percent of the primary electorate, that could sway a tight race. Even if the chances of that are modest, lawmakers may feel obliged to attend to the concerns of their constituents. Consider Tennessee’s 8th Congressional District. That district — rated [R+21](https://ballotpedia.org/Tennessee%27s%5F8th%5FCongressional%5FDistrict?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and among the most reliably Republican in the South prior to the 2026 Tennessee gerrymander —included numerous suburbs in Shelby County, all of which are urban areas. Kustoff voted for the [First Step Act](https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/overview.jsp?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2018 and for the EQUAL Act in 2021 — the bill eliminating the federal sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine — both votes that divided Republicans. And in 2025, he spent a day alongside the Trump administration’s Memphis Safe Task Force and began pushing for a permanent federal law enforcement presence in the city, explicitly citing the need to address violent crime for his constituents. We’ve seen signs that such a dynamic can work even in a Congress that many consider hopelessly divided. A close look at the 2018 First Step Act, the landmark federal criminal justice reform bill that has [reduced recidivism](https://counciloncj.org/first-step-an-early-analysis-of-recidivism/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) among people released from the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, bears out the logic. The act, which reduced some mandatory minimum sentences in the federal system and expanded rehabilitative programming, earned overwhelming bipartisan support. But analysis of the House revealed a clear pattern: Republicans representing districts with any urban component were significantly more likely to vote for the First Step Act than those from entirely rural or exurban districts. Of the 36 Republican “no” votes, nearly all came from the most rural, heavily conservative districts. Conversely, Republicans whose districts included parts of cities — even if those districts were drawn to be safely red — voted “yes” at more than three times the rate (94% versus 29%) than their rural counterparts. If the First Step Act, which focused on sentencing and prison reform, produced such a clear correlation, there is good reason to expect an even stronger effect for legislation aimed at grantprograms to prevent and solve violent crimes. Violent crime is a visceral, immediate concern for urban constituents. Lawmakers who know that a portion of their primary electorate lives in a high-crime neighborhood might think twice before opposing funding for DNA testing backlogs, violence interruption programs or state grant initiatives like Utah’s violent crime clearance fund. Recognition of this silver lining is not a call for complacency about gerrymandering's real harms. It is an argument for clear-eyed opportunism in policy advocacy. Sometimes democracy's distortions create unexpected openings. The challenge is whether our elected leaders choose to walk through them. --- \* *Analysis performed using 2026 Congressional District Health Dashboard (CDHD) District Density Index that categorizes congressional districts into six types based on a gradient of household density: Pure Urban: Highest household density, Urban-Suburban Mix Dense, Suburban Sparse, Suburban Rural, Suburban Mix, Pure Rural: Lowest household density.* *\*\* Analysis performed using 2018 CDHD data.* *Marc A. Levin, Esq., and Khalil Cumberbatch co-lead the Centering Justice Initiative at the Council on Criminal Justice, where Levin is Chief Policy Counsel and Cumberbatch is Director of Engagement and Partnerships. They can be reached at mlevin@counciloncj.org and khalil@counciloncj.org.* ### What Rikers’ Receiver Should Do Now URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rikers-receiver-jails-reform-lessons/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T18:51:56.000Z One year ago, federal judge Laura Swain determined that conditions in New York City jails had been so bad for so long that the city had to give up control of its own jail system. Nicholas Deml is the remediation manager Judge Swain appointed to help turn things around, working with jail leadership. He will be issuing a report in July that includes recommendations for improving the city’s jails, including the notorious Rikers Island, to the parties involved in longstanding litigation on the issue. A final report will be filed with the court in July and publicly available. To reduce violence and improve conditions, Deml should consider some of the successes around the country that my colleagues at the Brennan Center for Justice and I cover in our [new report](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/prison-reform-united-states?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We wrote about states implementing innovative practices in some prisons that are making life safer and more humane for the people who live and work there. The experience of those states can provide a helpful blueprint here. Our study focuses on prisons in places as varied as Connecticut, Maine, Michigan, North Dakota and South Carolina. It’s true that prisons and jails aren’t exactly the same thing, but they share many of the same problems: the harm that comes with social and physical isolation, along with the constant threat of violence. Jails are largely a local function. They house individuals who have been arrested, those awaiting trial and those serving sentences for low-level offenses, typically for less than one year. Jails often have little to no programming opportunities because the population is supposed to be there for a short period of time. Prisons tend to house those who have been sentenced to more than a year, and typically have more robust educational and programming opportunities like parenting classes, educational instruction and behavioral health support. The issues plaguing New York City jails for both officers and those who are incarcerated there are pervasive and well known. People who have lived on Rikers Island [have said](https://www.vera.org/its-a-torture-chamber?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that officers treat them as “less than human.” That cruelty comes in many forms — from the excessive and unnecessary use of force to squalid conditions that include inedible food, a [lack of running water](https://queenseagle.com/all/2024/11/13/doc-boss-denies-knowing-about-rikers-worst-kept-secret?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), toilets not flushing and more. And the staffing challenges within the New York City Department of Correction aren’t helping. People who have worked on Rikers Island [have said](https://cobanyc.org/corrections-officers-call-for-better-conditions-on-rikers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the staff shortages make their jobs more dangerous. While Rikers Island has historically had one of the highest ratios of staff to detainees, since the beginning of the pandemic [more than 4,000 corrections officers](https://queenseagle.com/all/2025/12/10/rikers-guards-sue-city-over-return-of-12-hour-shifts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across the department have left their jobs. This is despite a [70% increase](https://nyc-jail-population-tracker.datacollaborativeforjustice.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the number of people incarcerated in the jail system over nearly the same timeframe. The current operational culture and widespread violence on Rikers Island and across New York City jails — with routine violence against detainees by staff, and a lack of discipline around use of force — is detrimental to everyone it affects. Deml and his team will work with a range of experts to reduce violence and improve conditions, including: the newly appointed Department of Corrections Commissioner Stanley Richards and his department, the Independent Rikers Commission, the Board of Correction, the New York State Commission of Correction, the Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget, nonprofits, advocates and other experts. The case studies in our report show that culture change requires improving how correctional staff engage with incarcerated people. A focus of Deml’s reforms should be on humanizing these interactions, and making sure that life in jail resembles life outside the jail setting as much as possible. The NYC DOC should help to transform the role of the correctional officer to that of a motivator and role model, not someone who focuses solely on security. ### Humanizing interactions with incarcerated residents Correctional officers need to be trained — and encouraged by department leadership — to understand residents’ mental and emotional needs. This allows staff to better anticipate and prevent security risks, rather than responding after an incident has occurred. This approach is known as dynamic security, and several jurisdictions across the country are embracing this new approach. As we studied culture change in corrections, we spent time shadowing an organization called [Amend](https://amend.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), based at the University of California San Francisco School of Medicine. It’s one of the many organizations working with corrections departments across the country to reduce violence in correctional facilities and instill dynamic security. Amend knows that poor working conditions for staff, under-investment in training and education and policies and procedures that perpetuate staff stress and trauma can be barriers to improving outcomes for incarcerated people. New York City jails face these same problems. Amend brings correctional officials from Norway, who are trained in more humane practices, to work alongside U.S.-based staff to make improvements in U.S. corrections culture and conditions. When our team visited prisons in North Dakota, Washington state and Oregon, we saw firsthand the incredible impact: The U.S.-based staff are more engaged at work, with higher morale and a greater feeling of safety. New York City is familiar with Amend. Back in 2019, a delegation of city officials visited Norway with Amend. For some time, there appeared to be some progress and exchanges of ideas. But correctional leadership turnover and the COVID-19 crisis overwhelmed city jails, and hindered this progress. So how does it work? To help promote culture change within corrections, Amend brings correctional leaders and government officials to prisons in Norway. Line staff also benefit from visiting Norway, where they shadow Norwegian correctional officers, attend Amend-led training programs at Norway’s correctional officer training academy, and learn more about innovative correctional practices. The Norwegians provide real-time feedback on U.S. staff interactions with incarcerated people and guide staff on more effective ways to encourage change. Amend’s training helps correctional officers re-envision their role as public health workers. The program empowers officers to support incarcerated people and their rehabilitation, fostering a more humane and dignified environment by reducing trauma, violence and harm in facilities. Some states are also implementing dynamic security by establishing specialized prison units for young adults ages 18-25, through the Vera Institute of Justice’s [Restoring Promise](https://www.vera.org/ending-mass-incarceration/dignity-behind-bars/living-conditions-in-prison/restoring-promise-initiative?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) initiative. Officers in these units receive training in listening and coaching skills, empathy, de-escalation tactics, conflict resolution and motivational interviewing. In practice, that training can manifest in simple ways. When our team visited such specialized units in North Dakota, we saw Director of Corrections Colby Braun asking incarcerated people we passed in the hallway how their day was going, how a visit with their family was and sometimes shaking hands with the residents. Officers in these units may also, for example, ask questions to explore why a young person is upset, instead of immediately issuing a disciplinary infraction. All these gestures might seem small. But they build on each other to encourage a supportive relationship and communication that’s based on trust, not fear. And they largely don’t happen in New York City jails. The Scandinavian Prison Project is another unit-based initiative that implements international approaches to incarceration. Researchers from Drexel University and the University of Oslo entered into an agreement with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to create an experimental housing unit at State Correctional Institution Chester, a medium-security, reentry-focused facility near Philadelphia. The “Little Scandinavia” unit opened in May 2022, and can house up to 64 men. The new staff curriculum includes courses in crisis management, negotiation and communication, suicide prevention and motivational interviewing. And correctional staff eat shared meals with the residents inside these units. These programs work. The team working with Amend in a high-security behavioral health unit in Oregon [reported](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0288187&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a mean 73.9% decrease in the rate of total assaults by incarcerated people — either against staff or against other incarcerated people. And an [evaluation](https://www.vera.org/publications/restoring-promise-a-randomized-control-trial-examining-the-impact-of-an-innovative-young-adult-housing-on-reducing-violence?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of two Restoring Promise units in South Carolina found that young adults from these units were 73% less likely to be written up for violence, compared with a control group in the general population. There was also an 83% reduction in solitary confinement stays during the first year of participation in the Restoring Promise units. And Scandinavian Prison Project researchers conducted a prison climate survey which found that Little Scandinavia has fewer disputes than other units at SCI Chester, less misconduct and decreased use of restrictive housing as a form of discipline. ### Reflecting outside life in the jail setting Another key principle we observed across multiple states and write about in our report is the idea that prison life should be organized to resemble community life as much as possible. For example, people behind bars may commute to a job, or personalize their living space with posters and family pictures. This approach is called normalization, and it’s another way corrections staff can establish more humane conditions for residents in their care. In Pennsylvania’s Little Scandinavia unit, for example, the prison [made structural changes](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/15371/download/2026%5F01%5Fprison%5Freform%5Ffinal.pdf?inline=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the unit layout and to individual cells to help provide a sense of normalcy. There’s a communal space with plants, couches, a fish tank, a game table, and exercise equipment. And residents can also access a washer and dryer, green spaces outside, and a kitchen that's fully equipped. Aspects of normalization are also already being replicated in some jail settings. Restoring Promise worked with Middlesex County, Mass., to open a housing unit at their jail. The project included renovations to brighten the space and add communal areas for prayer/meditation, along with a library/study hall. Officers in the unit emphasize the importance of a daily routine with residents. Staff are also trained in the same de-escalation, conflict resolution and other skills mentioned above. Within the first 11 months of operation, the Middlesex County Sheriff’s Office [reported](https://vera-institute.files.svdcdn.com/production/downloads/publications/PACT-report-final-3.6.19.pdf?dm=1568655693&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that only 13% of the young adults in this new unit had been issued at least one disciplinary report, compared to 33% of young adults in the general population of the jail. These types of practices and policies that produce a more normalized environment can better prepare people to rejoin their communities safely and successfully. ### Conclusion To be sure, the problems plaguing Rikers Island and jails across New York City are complex. They will not be fixed overnight. Fully addressing these problems also requires [reducing the jail population](https://www.nydailynews.com/2026/04/29/nyc-should-use-our-plan-close-rikers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through ensuring that cases move at a reasonable speed through the system, pretrial release and other alternatives to jail programs with an eye to public safety. But changing prison and jail culture is a pivotal step, and it’s possible as demonstrated by the examples in the states that we studied. By shifting to an approach that focuses on dynamic security and normalization principles, Deml and Richards can help improve conditions for those who live and work behind bars. Meanwhile, the City is planning for Rikers Island to close, and for the staff and the incarcerated population to move to new borough-based jails across the city. Deml and Richards’ work now to build a safer culture at Rikers won’t be lost but will travel with the staff to their new facilities, reducing the chance that the atrocities at Rikers Island will be repeated. ### Speeding Up the Bus: Reality Behind the Rhetoric URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/bus-speed-traffic-management-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T15:54:54.000Z Mayors across the country, from New York to Seattle to Los Angeles to Boston, have promised to make buses faster and more useful to passengers. What we have seen in practice, however, is the steady diminution of the bus as travel speeds and ridership have declined over the last 20 years. So how do we make good on these pledges to speed up the bus, made most prominently by New York City’s Zohran Mamdani? We argue that traffic management, specifically, how priority is applied to the bus, matters. By applying solutions that mitigate the sources of delay — namely road traffic and the amount of time buses spend idling at a bus stop, waiting for passengers to pay and board, sitting behind a double parked car or waiting for traffic to clear — we can start to chart a course to faster, more reliable buses, buses that passengers opt for because they get where they need to go faster than walking or in a car. In May, the Transit Costs Project released what we call the [Transit Priority Atlas](https://tpa.transitcosts.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It contains three primary elements. First, we collected quantitative data from 32 cities to compare and contrast their bus operations along a wide range of indicators. Second, we documented different priority strategies used to speed up the bus. Third, we reviewed historical case studies to show how change has been achieved. What we found is that improving surface transit operations is slow and politically perilous. There are no simple fixes. It requires an ongoing commitment to nuts-and-bolts traffic management to yield meaningful results that deliver faster travel times for people and greater service reliability. After collecting data from 32 cities from around the world, we discovered that while it’s true that surface street traffic waxes and wanes over the course of the day, bus and trolley operations don’t have to suffer equally. Cities like Zurich, Bologna and Munich have found ways to prioritize surface transit so that travel speeds remain consistent throughout the day even as automobile speeds vary. We collected these ideas in a transit priority toolbox with real-world examples and stylized drawings to make these interventions more tangible and vivid to practitioners, elected officials, journalists and anyone interested in how to improve transit. For example, painted bus lanes have become more commonplace in North America as mayors pay lip service to improving transit. These easy-to-deploy curb-adjacent and parking-adjacent bus lanes, however, haven’t been paired with other changes to convey substantive priority by addressing conflicts with other vehicles that delay buses, notably at intersections. The Atlas illustrates how an extensive set of tools can be combined into broader priority strategies that rearrange the hierarchy of streets and shape circulation patterns, for example, by diverting through traffic away from transit routes or by establishing priority corridors for transit. Dead-ending lateral streets or turning them into right-in/right-out are two examples of interventions that reorder the hierarchy of streets to favor transit. Instead of maintaining equal access to each street, these treatments prioritize the transit street over the non-transit street. Another successful strategy is to plan transit priority following a “complete network” rather than a “complete street” paradigm, especially in parts of cities built before the car, with dense road networks and relatively narrow streets. By diverting through traffic away from transit corridors using tools such as modal filters and transit-only streets, bus routes can be protected from congestion even when there isn’t sufficient space to give them their own lane. These localized interventions, when embedded in broader traffic management strategies that favor transit by systematically addressing the sources of delays, have delivered faster, more reliable, and cheaper-to-operate trams and buses in cities like Zürich, Munich, Prague, Lyon, Stockholm and many more examples detailed in the Atlas. Finally, through an in-depth case study, we documented how a forward-looking political vision for better transit and a less car-centric city shaped traffic management policies in Bologna over a four-decade period. In the 1970s as mass automobility overwhelmed Italian cities, Bologna decided to prevent automobile traffic from “suffocating” the city. It didn’t have the resources to introduce high-capacity transit, such as a subway, or build more road infrastructure to alleviate traffic. Instead, it turned to street network management. Through incremental changes at the city-wide scale, such as limited traffic areas, one-way streets and transit priority via bus-only streets and contra-flow lanes, Bologna reduced conflicts between automobiles and buses. By freeing the bus from congestion and limiting access to private vehicles into the city center, scheduled bus travel speeds increased from around 14.5 km/h to 16 km/h. Despite the small numbers, bus travel speeds improved by more than 10%. A faster, more reliable bus has coincided with Bologna’s resurgence: a thriving city center and one of the highest transit modal shares and per capita usage in the country at around 300 per year, even as Italian car ownership rates have gone from 300 per 1000 residents in the 1970s to 650 per 1000 residents in the 2000s. Bologna offers a lesson to cities that want to improve the bus but don’t have the money to take on capital construction: Smart management, namely creating a legible hierarchy of streets, minimizing conflicts and continually iterating on what works can tame congestion and revitalize public transit — and do it without straining the public fisc. ### Charter Revision Politics: A Primer URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/charter-revision-politics-nyc-primer/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T13:33:06.000Z Last week was a big one for the New York City Charter Revision Commissions — that’s “Commissions” plural. On Wednesday night, the Commission created by then-Mayor Eric Adams on his final day in office formally approved a charter amendment, to be placed on the November ballot, that would, if approved by the voters, authorize open primaries — that is, primaries in which all voters, regardless of party enrollment, may participate — in elections for City offices. However, moments before the Commission acted, Mayor Zohran Mamdani, exercising the power granted to him by the state legislature in the just-enacted state budget, rescinded that Commission and nullified its proposals. Then, on Thursday, Mamdani announced the creation of his own 15-member charter revision commission, dubbed the Commission on Government Efficiency (COGE) in satiric homage to you-know-what (if you don’t know what, it’s DOGE, Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s infamous wrecking ball aimed at the federal bureaucracy). Mamdani’s COGE, which is scheduled to hold its first public meeting this week, is charged with reviewing the City Charter to “remov\[e\] bureaucratic barriers that slow infrastructure projects and delay services; \[equip\] City agencies the authority, enforcement tools, and flexibility they need to deliver programs effectively; and \[modernize\] government to improve efficiency and saving, reserve, and budget practices.” (As long as we are counting charter revision commissions, there is also a third dangling out there — the City Council-created “NYC Commission to Strengthen Local Democracy,” which last summer adopted a package of proposed charter changes but, because of the actions of yet another Adams charter revision commission, was unable to get them on the ballot for voter consideration. That Commission has been quiet since last summer and its proposals are likely to be bumped from the ballot again this year by Mandani’s COGE, since a mayoral commission always takes precedence over a charter-authorized one.) So, what is a charter revision commission? Why are there so many of them? How was Mayor Adams able to create one as he was walking out the door? And what happens now with Mamdani’s commission? The New York City Charter is the constitution of New York City. First adopted in 1897 and revised and amended many times since, it creates the major offices and institutions of City government — the mayor, comptroller, public advocate, the Council, the borough presidents, major city agencies — and lays out their powers. It establishes the rules for adopting the City’s capital and operating budgets, zoning and land use regulation, procurement and local legislative process. Compared to the United States or New York State Constitutions, the Charter is relatively easy to amend through the regular local legislative process — meaning, action of the City Council, with mayoral approval. However, state law provides that charter changes that affect the powers of elected officials require voter approval. Those more significant charter changes can be prepared through ordinary legislation, but they also often come from charter revision commissions. ### What Charter Revision Commissions used to be Although the Charter can be amended without a commission, state law also authorizes the creation of charter revision commissions — typically the time for more ambitious reimaginings of how city government might work. A commission can be created by the City Council, from a voter initiative, or by the mayor, with mayoral commissions by far the most common. State law provides that a mayoral charter revision shall consist of nine to 15 city residents, handpicked by the mayor, who also designates the chair. The commission is supposed to “review the entire charter of the city” and recommend such changes as it considers appropriate, which can take effect only if approved by the voters. Any proposal has to be ready for the voters 60 days before election day, and the commission has until the second general election after it has been created to complete its work. In other words, Mamdani’s COGE has until the end of August if it wants to put proposals on the ballot this year, but can also continue work through the summer of 2027 to put proposals before the voters in November 2027\. That’s a pretty long tenure as these things go. Historically, charter revision commissions were used to prepare major changes to the structure of city government. The 1897 Charter creating Greater New York, the 1938 replacement of the Board of Aldermen with the Council, the strengthening of the mayor’s role in the budget and land use process in 1961 and the 1987-89 abolition of the Board of Estimate and the redistribution of its powers across City government were all the work of Charter Revision Commissions. As these dates indicate, for most of New York City’s history, charter revision was a once-in-a-generation process, responding to the felt need for wholesale reworkings in the structure of City government, or, as with the 1987-89 commission, the powerful outside pressure posed by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Board of Estimate. ### The new politics of Charter revision That all began to change as the 20th century turned into the 21st. While there were no more than a half-dozen charter revision commissions (including one created by the state) between 1897 and 1997, since 1998 there have been 14 charter revision commissions, 12 created by the mayor — or, on average, one commission every other year. Some of these have proposed significant changes to city government — like the adoption of ranked-choice voting in 2019 (proposed by a Council commission) and last year’s reform of the Uniform Land Review Process (ULURP) to speed up housing production — although not of the same scale as the abolition of the Board of Estimate. Others, like the 2022 proposal to adopt a statement of values as a preamble in the Charter, or the 2024 measure to expand the Department of Sanitation’s powers to clean all City property, were trivial and could easily have been adopted through the ordinary legislative process without a charter revision commission or voter approval. What accounts for this explosion of charter revision commissions? Growing conflict between the mayor and council, exacerbated by a not-so-secret weapon state law gives the mayor — the power to “bump” Council proposals or voter-initiated measures from the ballot. Under state law, if a mayoral charter revision commission submits a charter amendment for voter approval, no other question can be submitted to the voters at that election. Mayor Rudy Giuliani was the first to use this bumping power in 1998\. Giuliani wanted to use taxpayer funds to relocate the New York Yankees from the Bronx to a new stadium on Manhattan’s West Side. The Council tried to block this with a local law, passed over Giuliani’s veto, that would have asked the voters to adopt a ban on the use of public funds to build the stadium. To bump the stadium referendum, Giuliani created a charter revision commission, which wound up placing a number of campaign finance reforms on the November 1998 ballot. Giuliani used his bumping power again in 1999 to block a voter-initiated campaign finance reform proposal, creating a new commission in June 1999 that proposed multiple changes that would generally have strengthened the mayor’s power over the budget. The 1999 Giuliani commission’s proposals were rejected by the voters, but accomplished his goal of blocking the grassroots campaign finance reform measure. Mayor Mike Bloomberg also deployed the charter-revision-commission bumping power, against a grassroots initiative opposing the Iraq War in 2002 and another voter initiative to amend the charter to mandate strict caps on public school class sizes in 2003\. Mayor Adams’ 2024 commission — the one that expanded the Sanitation Department’s powers — was also rushed into existence to block a Council measure that would have expanded its power to approve or reject mayoral appointments of commissioners. The 2025 Commission also blocked a City Council commission’s recommendations from the ballot. Beyond bumping specific Council or grassroots proposals, mayors have used charter commissions to push their political agendas and leapfrog a potentially hostile City Council by getting their policy and government reform proposals directly to the voters. ### Where do we go from here? The Adams-Mamdani commission tango sets new standards for the political use of charter commissions. Although nothing in state law addresses the timing of the mayor’s creation of a charter revision commission, Adams is the only mayor to have created a charter revision commission consisting entirely of his appointees as he was leaving office. With no love apparently lost between the outgoing and incoming mayors, Adams’ commission could have handicapped his successor in two ways. First, any charter amendment it would have proposed would probably bump any Mamdani charter proposals from the ballot. Although state law does not address the prospect of dueling charter commissions by different mayors operating simultaneously, there is reason to believe that the Adams commission proposals, if prepared first, would benefit from the law’s preference for mayoral commissions. Second, the Adams commission’s directive to consider open primaries is a direct attack on Mamdani’s political strength — the growing power of the highly motivated ideological left that enabled him to dominate in the Democratic primary. Opening the primary to non-Democrats — including more centrist independents and Republicans — could make the mayor more vulnerable to a reelection challenger. Not only was Adams’s lame duck action unprecedented, so, too, was Mamdani’s rescission of it. When he acted, Adams appeared to have given Mamdani a fait accompli. While the law did not contemplate the situation Adams created, neither did it give Mamdani the power to remove or replace charter commissioners (although he could fill vacancies) or to cancel the commission. He could starve it of city funds, but the commission signaled it would raise private funds. In the end, Albany came to the rescue, with a new law, part of the state budget, written for the occasion, providing that when a charter commission is created between election day and the end of the year, its “continued existence” is dependent on “confirmation by the mayor in office” during the first six months of the following year. Failure to obtain confirmation — which Mamdani delivered last week — causes the commission to expire and nullifies its proposals. Members of the Adams commission have signaled they intend to fight their termination, but it is unclear what legal recourse they have. We are probably back to just two commissions — Mamdani’s COGE and the in-limbo Council commission. It is not yet clear what parts of the Charter the COGE intends to tackle, although from the mayor’s announcement of the commission it seems likely it will look at budget and fiscal issues, the process for approving capital projects, how the city delivers services and city agency powers. It remains to be seen whether COGE will live up to its promise of serious Charter change. But it has already accomplished its political purpose of blocking any charter initiative by the Council or anyone else. ### Did NYPD's Zone Strategy Cause Crime to Drop? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nypd-zone-strategy-crime-drop-analysis/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T00:09:15.000Z Every month, the NYPD releases the prior month’s [crime numbers](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR007/nypd-fewest-murders-recorded-history-the-first-four-months-the-year-in-april?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and lately those numbers have been moving in the right direction. The [sharpest drops](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr011/nypd-record-low-shooting-victims-first-half-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are happening in the department’s deployment “zones,” small swathes of the city flooded with officers on foot. In these zones, shootings, violent crime and overall crime are all reported down well past the citywide declines. The department [credits](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/transcript-%5Fmayor-mamdani-and-nypd-announces-fewest-murders--sho?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the deployment strategy. The drops are real. Fewer people are being shot on those blocks than during comparable time periods in the prior year. But there’s a question lurking underneath the press releases that rarely gets asked out loud: Is the strategy doing the work, or is something else? A long-known statistical phenomenon called regression to the mean — a fancy way of saying that random variations, especially in small sample sizes, typically explain most increases or decreases — predicts that when you pick the blocks that spiked the highest last year and look at them this year, those blocks will likely have fallen on their own, whether or not anyone deploys more police officers to them. Earlier this month, the NYPD doubled down on the zone strategy, launching what it called the [“largest summer deployment in the department’s recorded history,”](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR007/nypd-fewest-murders-recorded-history-the-first-four-months-the-year-in-april?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) sending up to 3,800 officers a night to 72 zones in 40 of the city’s 78 precincts. Each zone averages just over a tenth of a square mile, small enough to walk across in under 10 minutes. The department’s January-through-April [press release](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR007/nypd-fewest-murders-recorded-history-the-first-four-months-the-year-in-april?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) credited the deployment with major crime going down 22.7%, shooting incidents down 62.5% and shooting victims down 66% inside the zones. Last summer’s [19-week version](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/10/transcript--mayor-adams-and-nypd-commissioner-jessica-s--tisch-b?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), by [NYPD’s accounting](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr015/nypd-record-low-shooting-incidents-shooting-victims-first-nine-months-the-year?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), produced similar numbers, with shootings down 47% and overall crime down 18%. The story is the same season after season: Heavy deployment seems to yield dramatic drops, and the deployment gets credit. Commissioner Jessica Tisch called the zones “the one strategy that is game changing” in her January 2025 [State of the NYPD](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndrbYlzu2yg&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) address, a “hyperlocal, data-driven policing model” in which an algorithm selects “clusters of violence and disorder.” She has framed the approach as “the 2025 modernization of the classic cops-on-the-dots strategy.” That is shorthand for the [Jack Maple](https://www.qgazette.com/articles/crime-buster-jack-maple-secured-a-place-in-history/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) formulation, developed under Bill Bratton in the early 1990s, which became the operational core of CompStat. The system paired precinct-level crime data with regular command reviews, making commanders personally answerable for patterns on their watch. It has underpinned every place-based strategy since, from Operation Impact in 2003 to the current Violence Reduction Zones. The underlying approach has evidence behind it. Decades of research show that concentrating police resources on small, high-crime hotspots reduces violence. A 2024 [meta-analysis](https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/science/article/pii/S1359178924001010?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of 32 evaluations confirmed the finding and added an important distinction. Problem-solving approaches, in which officers and analysts identify and address the specific conditions sustaining crime on a block (an unsecured vacant lot, a failing streetlight, an open-air drug market), outperform programs that simply flood those blocks with additional officers. The question is not whether police presence in small high-crime areas can reduce crime. It can and does. The question is whether the headline drops the NYPD reports from its zones are evidence that this particular deployment is doing so. To be clear, citywide violence has fallen. Shootings last year hit a recorded low, and murders are also on track to hit historic lows. But what does analysis show when the focus is not on the citywide drop but on the much sharper declines the NYPD reports inside its zones? It’s not new for the NYPD to attribute significant crime declines in narrow parts of the city to its own efforts when another likely suspect is in the shadows. In [January 2003](https://nypost.com/2003/04/02/crime-slash-program-reprieved/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the NYPD launched Operation Impact, designating Impact Zones (high-crime areas judged to be experiencing recent spikes) and assigning roughly two-thirds of police academy graduates to flood them on foot. Over the program’s 12 years, it averaged about 25 zones across roughly six square miles. Commissioner Bill Bratton ended it in 2015\. “A generation of cops had grown up in a culture of enforcement, not one of relationship building,” [he wrote](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/bo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). “When I arrived, cops were still graduating from the Academy and going straight into Impact Zones.” The zone strategy launched in May 2023 has the same operational logic as Impact: identify blocks that are spiking and flood them with uniformed officers during peak hours. Both versions use algorithms, mathematical tools that look for where crime is concentrating, to pick the blocks. Both rely heavily on [rookies](https://nypost.com/2026/05/04/us-news/nyc-crime-plunges-to-historic-laws-as-nypd-boss-reveals-plan-to-keep-streets-safe-for-summer/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) straight out of the Academy. What has actually grown is the footprint. Last summer’s plan covered 12 square miles, twice Impact’s average of six. Operation Impact was evaluated by independent researchers. In 2016, John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda Geller [compared](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223&type=printable&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) zones to similar non-zone blocks in the same precincts. Their estimate, based on a more rigorous methodological analysis, came in at 10% to 14%, far smaller than the figures NYPD leads with. The department typically touted higher declines, ranging between [20%](https://www.nyc.gov/html/unccp/gprb/downloads/pdf/NYC%5FSafety%20and%20Security%5FOperation%20Impact.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [44%](https://nypost.com/2003/01/18/a-bite-out-of-crime/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), by comparing crime in a zone during the program to the same period the year before. That arithmetic takes the entire drop at face value, with no control for what would have happened without the deployment. ### The selection itself does the work Regression to the mean works like this. Crime on any given block in any given year reflects two things. One is the block’s underlying rate — the level of crime its population tends to produce. That rate is real and changes slowly. The other is the year’s particular bad luck: a crew that moved through, a hot summer, one repeat offender out and active. By definition, bad luck has no reason to repeat the next year. So when the department picks blocks at the very top of last year’s count, it has picked partly the blocks that need the most intensive intervention and partly just those that are experiencing bad luck or statistical noise. The first part stays. The second part doesn’t. Next year, crime levels on the same block are bound to decline, whether or not anyone did anything. The effect is amplified under three conditions: when the unit being measured is small, so a single event swings the count; when the window used to select a block is short, so one unlucky stretch is the whole record; and when the thing being measured swings around a lot from year to year on its own. The zone strategy checks all three boxes. Zones average about 0.17 square miles, or about 24 (Manhattan-sized) blocks. The NYPD told a joint Council hearing on [April 29](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/MeetingDetail.aspx?ID=1405167&GUID=97EB83F2-4F5A-408A-85FB-12042EC17D56&Options=info%7C&Search=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the School Safety Zones are designated on the prior year’s trends. And shootings, prominent among the reported outcomes, fluctuate block-to-block more than almost anything else public-safety agencies track. So how much would crime drop if no one did anything? The NYPD has not published the algorithm behind how it selects its Violence Reduction Zones, but the department has said they are picked based on [recent spikes](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndrbYlzu2yg&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Take the blocks scoring highest on a recent crime measure, stack them until the total footprint hits about 12 square miles, and call the result the zones. Whatever the formula, the act of picking the worst blocks in a given moment is itself enough to produce a drop the following year. For the purposes of this exercise, the exact method matters less than the act of selection itself. So we built a simple model that mimics the selection process, picking the highest-crime blocks each year and tracking what happens next, to show how much of the decline regression to the mean alone can explain. For every summer from 2010 through 2025, we ranked blocks by their crime incident count in a defined look-back window, i.e. the prior summer, the prior year or the prior three years of crime or shootings numbers. We then took the top blocks until the cumulative area reached 12 square miles, and recorded what happened in those blocks during that summer compared to the previous summer. We tested two outcomes (shootings and street violence like robberies and assaults) across three look-back windows (the prior three years, the prior year and the prior summer alone). Find our detailed methodology [here](https://github.com/jjhall77/rtm%5Fzones?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Two windows in this period are worth keeping straight. Operation Impact ran from 2003 through 2015\. The current Violence Reduction Zones launched in May 2023 and are still running. In the years between Impact and the current zones, the department stepped back from centralized, year-round hot-spot deployment. It adopted a[ Neighborhood Policing](https://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/POA/pdf/Plan-of-Action.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) plan instead, a precinct-driven model that left enforcement priorities to local commanders and [communities](http://communities.to/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To deal with increasing summer violence, the department instituted Summer All-Out, which sent a few hundred administrative cops to precincts with a lot of violence. Their deployment was left up to police commanders and has been shown to have [no impact](https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/ep4fs%5Fv1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on summer crime. In every summer from 2010 to 2025, whether or not a zone strategy was in place, the blocks that spiked the previous year fell, and they fell far more than the city as a whole. From 2015 through 2023, when no zone strategy existed, crime in simulated zones fell faster than the citywide rate every summer, with no extra officers deployed. For shootings, picking blocks on the prior year’s count produced an average drop of 76%, even as citywide year-over-year shootings averaged a 6% rise across the window. That is a gap of over 80 percentage points. For outdoor street violence, the same selection produced an average drop of 32%, against an average citywide rise of 2%. The narrower the selection window, the bigger the apparent drop. Picking on the prior summer alone, the narrowest window we tested, averaged a drop of 88% for shootings and 55% for street violence. During this period, there were no zone deployments, yet areas that had been spiking previously still saw drastic declines. The NYPD’s reported drops sit right inside the mechanical range, meaning they’re what one would expect to see even if police did nothing. For the broader major-crime category, the September 2025 press update reported that total crime in its zones went down 18.3% over the first four-plus months of the summer plan, as compared to a year-end citywide major-crime drop of 3%. That 15-point gap also falls well within the simulated range, slightly above what our most conservative look-back produces. Regarding School Safety Zones, which the NYPD has stated are chosen based on the prior year’s trends, the department [reported](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR007/nypd-fewest-murders-recorded-history-the-first-four-months-the-year-in-april?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) crime down 53% and shooting incidents and victims each down more than 75% in the program’s early months. Those numbers also sit squarely inside what our simulation produces with no deployment at all, under both prior-year and prior-summer look-backs. The acid test was summer 2020\. If anything should overwhelm a selection effect like the one described here, it is a year when the entire city moves in the wrong direction. Summer 2020 was such a year. New York’s shootings increased 150% compared to the summer of 2019, the largest single-year increase in modern city history. By most measures, police activity collapsed over the same period. Even in the summer of 2020, when New York’s shootings increased 150%, the blocks selected based on 2019 spikes still fell. If prior-year trends were used to select them, they fell 47%; if the prior-summer trends were used, they fell 80%. The reason is that the 2020 surge was spatially diffuse. It spread to blocks that had not been on the 2019 hot list. The 2019 hot blocks reverted toward their long-run rate even as the city around them more than doubled. If a program had targeted those 2019-hot blocks in 2020 and reported a 50% to 80% drop, it would have been hailed as a triumph. That drop, however, would have happened with or without any program. The city’s worst summer in two decades did not overpower this effect. So what should we make of the zone numbers? While all of this complicates the NYPD’s simple cause-and-effect assertions, none of this proves that it’s useless to deploy police to places in the throes of crime spikes. “Hot-spot policing” is proven to be [effective](https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/24928?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in many contexts. In their 2016 independent [evaluation](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), MacDonald, Fagan and Geller found Operation Impact reduced crime by about 10% to 14%, and the gains spilled over to neighboring blocks rather than pushing crime around the corner. The current program could plausibly produce something similar. But the headline numbers NYPD publishes don’t tell us whether it does. To distinguish a real deployment effect from the drop that selection alone produces, researchers need a credible counterfactual. They need to isolate what the intervention did beyond what would have happened anyway. For example, one could consider comparable blocks where police were not deployed, and observe those also during the same period. This is the standard in the criminology literature, what grant-funders expect in their reviews and what MacDonald and his coauthors did with Operation Impact a decade ago. The City is looking to spend real money on the zone program, expanding it to what the department [calls](https://nypost.com/2026/05/04/us-news/nyc-crime-plunges-to-historic-laws-as-nypd-boss-reveals-plan-to-keep-streets-safe-for-summer/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the largest scale in its recorded history. Whether it works, and how much, deserves a proper evaluation, using sophisticated analytical methods. The data to do such an evaluation largely exist on NYC Open Data or in NYPD’s own systems. Philadelphia commissioned an independent [foot-patrol evaluation](https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/philadelphia-foot-patrol-experiment-randomized-controlled-trial?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a decade ago. Other [cities](https://hcap.utsa.edu/documents/criminal-justice/final-dpd-y4-report-7.24.25.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) do this routinely. Public safety spending that can’t survive rigorous analysis shouldn’t survive the budget process. ### What New York Can Learn from the NIMBYs of the 19th Century URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/19th-century-nimby-housing-development-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T00:08:33.000Z In 1869, The New York Tribune heralded a new development in Manhattan: “Few people who pass through Broadway are aware that … there is now in course of erection … one of the largest and most magnificent hotels on the Western Continent.” The following year, the eight-story Grand Central Hotel opened with 630 rooms and three elevators reputedly capable of whisking guests to the top floor in just 30 seconds. Though called a hotel, it was also, like many grand establishments of the era, a long term residence — home to single men and even wealthy families, who lived there for months or years at a time, alongside short-stay travelers. It offered residents hot-water baths and in-house dining, without the need for servants of their own. In effect, this style of hotel living served as New York's earliest experiment in middle- and upper-class communal housing — a precursor to the purpose-built apartment buildings about to transform the city. It also set off a moral panic. The outrage wasn't really about the building's size. It was about what this new way of living seemed to represent. And that, as it turns out, is a pattern that has defined New York's housing fights ever since: Resistance to density is rarely about density itself. At the time, critics feared this new form of communal living would erode societal norms. One [New York Tribune journalist](https://www.loc.gov/item/01014724/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) warned, in language that has not aged well, that “hotel life is agreeable and desirable for masculine celibates,” but that any man would be unwise to take his wife there, given the “demoralizing influences” and “potent temptation.” In 1879, [The New York Times](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801486135/alone-together/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#bookTabs=1) lamented the rise of “lazy and fashionable women” no longer willing to endure “the drudgery of housekeeping.” These were the NIMBYs of the 19th century. New York’s housing debates have long been framed as fights over density, neighborhood character and the perceived threat of social change. What changes over time is not the structure of the argument, but the building type being argued about. This history matters because recent research confirms that opposition to development is often shaped less by density itself than by the way density is designed and perceived. Today, New York City is experiencing the [most severe housing affordability crisis](https://cbcny.org/building-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in decades, laying the groundwork for the most ambitious housing reforms the city has attempted in decades. The recently approved City of Yes zoning reforms seek to accelerate housing production by legalizing more housing types, easing parking requirements, encouraging office conversions and modestly increasing density across large portions of the city. Those changes are now being reinforced by a series of City Charter reforms and state-level housing initiatives designed to further streamline development, expand infrastructure capacity and accelerate housing production. Together, they represent a significant political shift away from decades of scarcity-driven planning and toward a more explicitly pro-growth housing agenda. State and local leaders have increasingly embraced these policies to improve the city’s affordability, economic competitiveness and ability to retain middle-class families. But even if these reforms succeed politically, they may still fail to meet ambitious housing goals if policymakers misunderstand what actually drives neighborhood-level resistance to development, often described as NIMBYism. > Too often, housing debates reduce opponents to selfish obstructionists. In fact, what people often resist is not density alone, but forms of development they perceive as placeless. Multifamily living dates back to ancient Rome’s *insulae* — apartment blocks that could occupy entire city blocks and rose several stories high. The Roman architect [Vitruvius](https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-ten-books-on-architecture-vitruvius/1100863297?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) defended them on practical grounds: With the city’s growing population, “it is necessary to increase the number of dwelling-places indefinitely.” Two thousand years later, his logic still applies to a city with very little land left to build on. What was new in 19th-century New York was not the building type but the question of who would live in one. Density was for tenements. Respectability meant a house. Living in a tenement [would have embarrassed](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801486135/alone-together/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#bookTabs=1) the “middling class” of “book-keepers, artists, editors, clerks, lawyers, copyists, mechanics, and members of other professions and trades who desire privacy” — but those families could not afford single-family homes in Manhattan either. The challenge for architects was to design buildings that stood apart from the negatively perceived tenement while still accommodating middle-class life. Calvert Vaux, the architect and landscape designer best known for co-designing Central Park, was among the first to argue that multi-family living needed a rebrand, urging New Yorkers to look to Paris. Drawing on Paris, Vaux and his peers adapted the Haussmannian model into elegant, respectable apartment buildings. The first rose on East 18th Street in 1869: Richard Morris Hunt’s Stuyvesant Flats, set on a block of mostly single-family row houses and given a facade to read as one. As the [Tribune reassured anxious readers](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/realestate/apartment-buildings-the-latest-in-french-ideas.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): “It is an attempt to introduce in this city the style of house-building almost universal in Paris . . . This is wholly different from the plan of the tenement house.” The same architectural type that was viewed as a moral hazard on the Lower East Side became — with larger suites, indoor plumbing, a mansard roof and a Parisian pedigree — a sign of cosmopolitan refinement. They called it the “French flat.” By the time the Dakota opened in 1884, the same building category that had threatened society a decade earlier was being marketed as luxury. Two recent studies point in the same direction: Opposition to new housing is shaped [not only by density](https://apietrzak.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/pietrzak-mendelberg-2025-political-architecture-contextual-development-and-opposition-to-housing.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but also by whether development appears [architecturally attractive](https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/kz4m8%5Fv2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), context-sensitive, pedestrian-friendly and visually coherent with its surroundings. In other words, people are more willing to accept new housing development when it feels integrated into the neighborhood rather than imposed upon it. Respondents were consistently more supportive of development when it reflected local architectural patterns, incorporated pedestrian-friendly design and appeared integrated into the surrounding urban fabric. Too often, housing debates reduce opponents to selfish obstructionists. In fact, what people often resist is not density alone, but forms of development they perceive as placeless. Even people who don’t live anywhere near a new development tend to oppose it if it’s out of context. But in an area where density is already the norm, people are more likely to accept it. In that sense, architecture and urban design are not secondary to housing politics. They are central to it. The Department of City Planning learned this lesson the hard way when the 2003 rezoning of Fourth Avenue in Brooklyn failed to consider how buildings met the street. The result was bulky, generic architecture and an unappealing streetscape. Fourth Avenue came to be known as the “canyon of mediocrity.” Fast forward to the Gowanus redevelopment that is taking shape today, and the story is very different. While there is the inevitable grumbling about the loss of historic brick warehouses, for the most part this large-scale redevelopment demonstrates that an entirely new neighborhood of well-designed large-scale buildings along a continuous public promenade — which includes significant affordable housing — offers a far more compelling model for what large-scale density can look like. If City of Yes and related reforms are implemented primarily as mechanisms to maximize unit counts without equal attention to design quality, political backlash may intensify rather than recede. The challenge facing New York is not simply whether it can build more housing quickly, but whether it can build more housing that people can feel proud of. Today, it is hard to imagine apartment living itself as controversial. Most New Yorkers live in one. But the deeper lesson of New York’s housing history is not merely that cities must grow. It is that successful urban growth has almost always depended on making density feel desirable, legible and integrated into the social and architectural fabric of daily life. The first real test will be the [South of Prospect Neighborhood Plan](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/brooklyn/south-of-prospect?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the first major rezoning recently announced by the Mamdani administration. This proposal has already opened up a debate about neighborhood character. In [interviews](https://brooklyn.news12.com/2026/05/22/city-plans-to-upzone-prospect-park-south-to-add-thousands-of-units/6jlRAuBEoGONnVIiTdhSXv?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), some residents of the Victorian-era Beverly Square just off Coney Island Avenue support a rezoning of the commercial corridor but do not want tall glass towers looming over their leafy green oasis. Threading this needle will be critical to showing New Yorkers that new housing can be built sensitively — sometimes referred to as [“gentle density.”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/gently-increasing-new-york-housing-density/) If policymakers fail to take seriously the underlying causes of NIMBYism — particularly the human desire for beauty, harmony and belonging — then no amount of regulatory reform, zoning liberalization or shifting of political power will automatically produce places that endure because they are genuinely beloved. ### The LIRR and the Lost Art of the Labor Fight URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/fred-naiden-interview-lirr-strike-labor/ Last updated: 2026-05-27T16:49:28.000Z --- *On this episode of After Hours, Jamie talks to Fred Naiden — Columbia grad, former TWU Local 100 motorman, Harvard PhD, and recently retired UNC classics professor — about his new book, "Railroaded: A Motorman's Story of the New York City Subway." Recorded the day after the Long Island Rail Road went on strike and settled, Jamie and Fred discuss the 1980 subway strike, what it was really like to walk off the job, why working conditions mattered more than wages, and how the city's transit world has changed since the days of 15,000 subway crimes a year. Fred also offers a pointed assessment of Mayor Zohran Mamdani — through the lens of someone who learned organizing from a communist rent-strike leader known only as "The General."* *You can listen to this episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-lirr-and-the-lost-art-of-the-labor-fight/id1794619189?i=1000769758863&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/7aE9zcVaMPndvnHBGGIaH1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### The Big Picture URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-summary/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:49:09.000Z *This is the summary overview of the problem and solutions in* [*Rubber Meets Road: Lighting*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road/)*, a Vital City-Center for Justice Innovation series on what New York can do to make its streets safer by lighting them better. The series also includes a* [*summary of the Rubber Meets Road project*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-about/)*,* [*detailed policy primer*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-details)*,* [*Aaron Chalfin on 50 years of research*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-primer)*, a* [*design deep-dive on what well-lit streets should feel like*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-design-deep-dive)*, maps showing where* [*darkness*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-satellite-crime-map) *and* [*311 lighting complaints*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-311-crime-map) *overlap with crime, and a* [*proof-of-concept mobile app*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-app) *for reporting dark blocks.* --- Print [ Download ](https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1--EvoWvVksjvFWFIjfhi780AqiNgEFIo&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [ Open in new tab ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1--EvoWvVksjvFWFIjfhi780AqiNgEFIo/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Fullscreen ### Street lighting Crime goes up when the sun goes down. This is true in cities across the globe. But street lighting can change that — and change it by a lot. In research using the highest standard of proof, a randomized controlled trial (RCT), serious crime in New York City housing developments dropped by 35% when the lights went on. Crime wasn’t displaced to someplace else — it just went away. Street lighting reduces serious crime in part because people think twice when they know they might be seen and caught. And they’re not wrong: Streetlights ensure that pedestrians and police on patrol are better able to notice and react to threats. But more fundamentally, better lighting means more life on the streets. Lighting creates a virtuous cycle, drawing residents outside to socialize and patronize local businesses, resulting in more “eyes on the street,” which in turn puts the brakes on many forms of bad behavior. ### The evidence Two recent studies have rigorously analyzed how improved lighting can drive down crime. In New York City, researchers identified 80 public housing developments with high crime rates and installed temporary lights in half of them. The new lights [reduced outdoor nighttime index crimes by 35%](https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joqcri/v38y2022i1d10.1007%5Fs10940-020-09490-6.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the drop in crime occurred without any increase in arrests. Nor did crime simply move to nearby locations. In Philadelphia, upgrading more than 34,000 streetlights in high-crime neighborhoods to provide brighter and more even light [reduced nighttime outdoor crimes by 15%](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.70006?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in comparison to neighborhoods where there were no changes in lighting, including a 20% drop in violent crimes and 21% reduction in gun crimes. These outcomes align with the lion’s share of studies over the past 25 years showing that crime declines when street lighting improves. Learn more by reading Aaron Chalfin's in-depth explanation of the evidence, [“50 Years of Evidence,”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-primer) at Vital City. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/05/CLIENT---VC---RMR-Lighting-chart---5.21.26-1.png) ### A cost-effective strategy Improved street lighting is easy to implement through existing municipal operations, and it yields immediate results. In New York City, for example, it costs $10,000 to install a single new streetlight (a capital expense if the project exceeds $50,000 within a half-mile radius). This is a fraction of the cost of crime and punishment, and far less expensive than employing additional police officers. ### Keys to success **1\. Pick the right locations.** Serious crime is highly concentrated, often in neighborhoods long passed over for all types of investment. To identify areas of need, this project is debuting [a new mapping tool](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-satellite-crime-map) merging crime data with nighttime satellite imagery to spot where darkness and high rates of nighttime violent crime overlap in New York City. [A second mapping tool](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-311-crime-map) shows the intersection of 311 complaints about broken streetlights and violent crime. But the human eye and experience are key. Cities should incorporate the knowledge of residents and others who are in the neighborhood every day (e.g., sanitation and parks workers and police) to pinpoint the places that feel unsafe and decide on where to install or improve streetlights. Here’s what Rubber Meets Road’s two mapping tools look like in action. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-19-at-10.52.06---AM.png) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-19-at-10.52.36---AM.png) **2\. Illuminate a few blocks, not just a corner.** While lighting just the dark alley or underpass might seem the most direct approach, the research shows that overly specific targeting has negative side effects. If the alley is lit, but adjacent areas remain especially dim, the people intent on committing crimes may simply slip into the nearby shadows. A better approach is to create an illuminated “buffer zone” around any particular hot spot. **3\. Invest in quality lighting.** The human eye sees best when light is uniformly distributed. But many city streets have glaring bright lights with dark stretches in between. The effect: Dark areas appear darker and visibility becomes poor. The solution: Rather than installing one overly bright fixture, install several warm and lower-output fixtures, evenly spaced. This approach improves visibility and creates pedestrian-focused spaces that encourage active use. Adding additional lights to existing poles, along with wall-mounted lights on businesses and residences, is another effective strategy. For more on the importance of lighting quality, read Buro Happold, Studio Gang, and Urban Design Forum’s [“What Well-Lit Streets Should Feel Like,”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-design-deep-dive) composed in consultation with the Pitkin Avenue BID, Youth Ministries for Peace and Justice, and Chhaya CDC, under “Rubber Meets Road” on Vital City’s website. **4\. Look beyond lighting.** Other changes to the built environment — for example, improving the design of scaffolding (or removing it promptly) and adding street furniture, like chairs or benches, to underused public spaces — may also help prevent crime. While these specific changes to a neighborhood have yet to be rigorously evaluated, research on [greening vacant lots](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36172506/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [fixing up blighted properties](https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303434?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) finds that, much like improved street lighting, these sorts of investments can help make neighborhoods safer by revitalizing neglected blocks and generating greater foot traffic. For more in-depth strategies, read our detailed policy guidance, [“Street Lighting: How to Get it Done.”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-details) ### How to Get It Done URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-details/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:41:15.000Z *This is the implementation roadmap in* [*Rubber Meets Road: Lighting*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road/)*, a Vital City-Center for Justice Innovation series on lighting New York's streets to make them safer. Read alongside it: a* [*summary of the Rubber Meets Road project*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-about/)*, the* [*summary overview of the problem and solutions*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-summary)*,* [*Aaron Chalfin on 50 years of research*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-primer)*, a* [*design deep-dive*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-design-deep-dive)*, maps overlaying crime with* [*satellite-measured darkness*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-satellite-crime-map) *and* [*311 outage complaints*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-311-crime-map)*, and a* [*proof-of-concept app*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-app) *for reporting dark blocks.* --- Print [ Download ](https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1bVEFRKCxTAqZqxLxYUeqb7uaPtZz3wwT&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [ Open in new tab ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bVEFRKCxTAqZqxLxYUeqb7uaPtZz3wwT/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Fullscreen Better lighting on a city’s streets and sidewalks can be a highly effective way to reduce crime — and to bolster civic life at the same time. It’s not just common sense. It’s been tested at the highest level of scientific rigor. In New York City, a randomized controlled trial in public housing showed [a 35% reduction in major crime committed outdoors during nighttime hours](https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joqcri/v38y2022i1d10.1007%5Fs10940-020-09490-6.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with no increase in nearby areas. These reductions were sustained over years. And research in other cities — including Philadelphia and Washington — shows that citywide lighting upgrades have a similar impact. Lighting is one of a handful of strategies that are twofers. It is a service that cities provide as part of their everyday responsibilities, and it has the added benefit of decreasing crime when smartly deployed. Improving lighting improves public safety without increasing arrests or incarceration. The power of lighting is rooted in the idea that improving social connections helps make a city safe. Lighting encourages lively public spaces, or, as Jane Jacobs put it, “eyes on the street.” Because the responsibility to provide this service lives outside of a police department — in New York City, primarily in the Department of Transportation — its crime-reducing powers are often overlooked. But with not that much effort and often without that much money, it can be a powerful tool. This guide for policymakers explains why improving lighting makes cities safer and summarizes the research supporting streetlights as an effective crime prevention strategy. It also outlines important considerations and practical steps for implementing a simple change that yields outsize benefits. ### The idea Changes to the way a city street looks and feels can have a large impact on public safety. Most people stay away from dark alleys but gravitate to well-lit streets. Meanwhile, those looking to commit crimes will see an opportunity — to avoid being seen and caught — in a city’s unlit, neglected places. Overwhelming evidence in city after city over the decades also shows that crime, particularly violence, is highly concentrated in a small number of neighborhoods and even on certain streets within those neighborhoods. And just as reliably, [study](https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303434?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) after [study](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36172506/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has shown that improving public spaces — whether by lighting or greening vacant lots or fixing up dilapidated buildings — can increase safety and reduce fear among residents. It’s not just social scientists who understand why lighting is part of the solution. In well-lit environments, people who might otherwise be motivated to commit crimes think twice. Potential victims and police on patrol are better able to notice and react to threats. And perhaps most importantly, lights draw residents outside to socialize with one another and patronize local businesses, which further discourages crime. ### The evidence A review of 21 studies spanning more than five decades of research finds that improved street lighting reduces crime [by an average of 14%](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359895696%5FThe%5Fimpact%5Fand%5Fpolicy%5Frelevance%5Fof%5Fstreet%5Flighting%5Ffor%5Fcrime%5Fprevention%5FA%5Fsystematic%5Freview%5Fbased%5Fon%5Fa%5Fhalf-century%5Fof%5Fevaluation%5Fresearch?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) compared to more poorly lit areas. The strongest evidence comes from New York City and Philadelphia, where recent, rigorous studies documented large reductions in nighttime outdoor violent crime, in New York City by 35% and in Philadelphia by 15%. In New York City in 2016, researchers identified 80 public housing developments with high crime rates and randomly assigned half to receive temporary lighting towers to illuminate dim or dark internal sidewalks; the other half served as a control group where the lighting was unchanged. The result, as measured in the months that followed: [a 35% reduction in felony assaults, robberies and other index crimes](https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joqcri/v38y2022i1d10.1007%5Fs10940-020-09490-6.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (murder, manslaughter, robbery, burglary, grand larceny and motor vehicle theft) outside at night. And crime didn’t simply move around the corner. The study looked for but found no evidence that crime was displaced to other areas. Critically, the decrease in crime occurred without any increase in arrests — compelling evidence that lighting deters crime and doesn’t widen the net of the justice system. And these weren’t just flash-in-the-pan results. Following up three years later, researchers found that [the crime declines had been sustained and arrests had not risen](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9133.12599?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). More recently, researchers in Philadelphia studied the ongoing rollout of a citywide lighting upgrade. Since summer 2023, the Philadelphia Energy Authority has been working to replace all 134,552 streetlights with new LED fixtures that provide more even illumination (and reduce energy usage and costs). An analysis of the first 34,374 upgraded lights, covering roughly a third of the city and installed disproportionately on blocks with higher crime rates, [found a 15% reduction in nighttime street crime, including a 21% reduction in gun violence](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1745-9133.70006?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as compared to areas not yet upgraded. As in New York City, the new lights did not displace crime to surrounding blocks, and the drop in crime occurred without any increase in arrests. The researchers also documented reductions in crime during the day, albeit to a smaller degree. As more cities embark on citywide lighting upgrades, the evidence has gotten stronger. In [Washington, D.C.](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PCohyCV44N5MbxCM%5Fd4YzQbN7MrQLbDL/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and [Mesa, Arizona](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n1jO6T-GUHIumfLcY8%5FmZOamLFA89Fbf/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), recent studies also found crime reductions following citywide lighting upgrades, with no evidence that crime simply moved elsewhere. In [Newark](https://catalog.results4america.org/case-studies/reducing-crime-through-street-lighting-improvements-newark-nj?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), violent crime fell by 35% within 200 feet of enhanced streetlights (although this effect dissipated after 6 months), with no displacement of crime to other areas, and no reductions observed in similar areas without improved lighting. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/05/CLIENT---VC---RMR-Lighting-chart---5.21.26.png) For the skeptic, it’s worth pointing to a simple but compelling natural experiment on lighting’s impact on crime: daylight saving time. Twice a year, we move our clocks backward or forward, dramatically changing daylight during certain hours of the day. One day, 7 p.m. is dark — the next day it’s light. Research studies from the [United States](https://jenniferdoleac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Doleac%5FSanders%5FDST.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Chile](https://publications.iadb.org/en/publications/english/viewer/Crime%5FTime%5FHow%5FAmbient%5FLight%5FAffects%5FCrime%5Fen%5Fen.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) demonstrate that when the clocks move forward or back and natural lighting changes, shifts in street crime follow. In a study in the United States, the extra hour of daylight reduces robberies by 7%. Of course, this doesn’t mean that every single dimly lit area needs brighter lighting — or that every well-lit area is sure to be safe. But when an area is both unsafe and poorly lit, better lighting is a cost-effective approach that pays dividends in safer and livelier streets. For more information about the body of evidence supporting street lighting as an effective crime prevention strategy, read [“50 Years of Evidence,”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-primer) written for Rubber Meets Road by Aaron Chalfin, associate professor of criminology at the University of Pennsylvania and the nation’s leading researcher on the effect of lighting. ### The costs Streetlights are a standard city service. Each year, cities allocate funds to maintain and repair existing lights and add new ones. For example, the New York City Department of Transportation, the agency primarily responsible for the city’s streetlights, spends roughly $35 million on repairs and $10 million on new installations each year (along with a $60 million energy bill). Maintenance efforts are generally funded by annual expense budgets, while installations draw on longer-term capital budgets (if the project exceeds a minimum threshold of $50,000 within a half-mile radius). These are large sums, but because these are existing budgetary commitments, using streetlights to reduce crime requires a small shift in mindset, not a big shift in dollars. To start, policymakers could simply add public safety to their list of criteria when deciding where lights should go. New or improved streetlights can be quickly installed. They have immediate impact, are long-lasting and are inexpensive to maintain. In New York, it costs approximately $10,000 to install a new streetlight and $400 annually to maintain it, and it lasts for 10 to 20 years. And because lighting appears to reduce crime through deterrence (which is cheap) and not through arrest and possible incarceration (which are expensive), it reduces the costs of both crime and punishment, yielding a rare double dividend for strained city and state budgets for years to come. Lighting is especially cost-effective when one factors in [the costs of crime](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225637886%5FNew%5FEvidence%5Fon%5Fthe%5FMonetary%5FValue%5Fof%5FSaving%5Fa%5FHigh%5FRisk%5FYouth?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to victims, families and neighborhoods, and the costs of investigating crimes and prosecuting and incarcerating offenders. And the benefits of improved lighting likely extend well beyond quantifiable criminal justice costs — from increased feelings of safety among residents to busier sidewalks and businesses. ### Putting the idea into practice Distilling the research and the wisdom of New York City government officials, urban planners and lighting experts, here is some of the best advice for the real work of improving street lighting. **1\. Pick the right locations.** Figuring out where dark places overlap with the highest rates of serious nighttime crime starts with looking at the data — what’s well-lit and what’s not, where and what kind of crime is happening, and in what concentrations. Assembling the crime data is relatively straightforward; the lighting data, less so. Figuring out where dark places overlap with the highest rates of serious nighttime crime starts with looking at the data — what’s well-lit and what’s not, where and what kind of crime is happening, and in what concentrations. Assembling the crime data is relatively straightforward; the lighting data, less so. To take a first cut, Vital City and the Center for Justice Innovation worked with researchers at NYU to develop a [prototype mapping tool](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-satellite-crime-map) that overlays where crime is concentrated (by type) with where the lighting needs work. We then tested the tool with City officials. The tool tries something new. Using NASA satellite images, it divides New York into 500-by-500-meter squares (roughly 12 city blocks). It then calculates the monthly average nighttime radiance (or surface brightness) and the counts of outdoor nighttime violent crimes for each square. Together, these data give City officials a starting point to zoom in on places where outdoor crime is high and lighting is relatively poor. The tool is also useful for identifying areas where lighting may be adequate but crime is still high, suggesting the need for other interventions. **2\. Talk to neighborhood residents.** Though the tool provides a pointer, the devil’s in the details. Because the analysis of satellite imagery can only calculate average brightness over a wide area, the tool can’t zero in on problem blocks or show where specific lights should be located. That requires shoe leather. Neighborhood residents, store owners and government workers who have daily experience in a neighborhood’s streets and parks often know where better lighting is needed. Some of these insights are captured in 311 calls — and we are also releasing [a map showing where complaints about street lighting and violent crime overlap](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-311-crime-map). These data have their own limitations, as they are skewed by deeply uneven complaint volumes by neighborhood. Using these tools’ suggestions as a starting place, the City could conduct lighting audits with residents to identify places where people feel unsafe — such as on dark corners, under scaffolding where views are obstructed and even in places where overly bright lights blind pedestrians and create shadows. Because this work stretches the conventional mandate of the agencies tasked with installing and upgrading streetlights, the City could partner with local community-based organizations with on-the-ground relationships. This kind of work might be incorporated into the neighborhood work that a soon-to-be-created Department of Community Safety, among other City agencies, are and will be doing. And this work should be documented to ensure cities and researchers learn which approaches lead to successful interventions. A recent [resident-driven planning process](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/connecting-communities-through-design/) in public housing developments in the Brownsville area of Brooklyn, for example, resulted in the installation of supplementary fixtures on light posts that illuminate dark corners and overpasses and also activate underused seating areas. To support these granular efforts and give both residents and the City an easier way to document lighting conditions, Vital City built a working proof of concept: [a browser-based tool](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-app) that turns a smartphone camera into a rough light meter, geotags readings and walks users through reporting outages to 311\. Although just a demonstration, this tool shows how an existing technology could be leveraged to better target maintenance and installation efforts at almost no cost. **3\. Illuminate a few blocks, not just a corner.** While it is tempting to light just the dark alley or underpass, research suggests that such focused strategies can potentially backfire. Lighting just a corner but not the surrounding area can simply push crime to new locations. [A study in the United Kingdom](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10940-022-09539-8?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that when lighting was upgraded on a single street, crime fell there but increased on adjacent streets. Interestingly, the same study also found that when street lighting was intentionally dimmed to reduce costs and carbon emissions, crime moved from the newly dimmed areas to adjacent streets with better illumination. This suggests that some people are willing to commit crimes in illuminated areas where they have more access to potential victims, perhaps especially if they can quickly “disappear” into dark areas nearby. [A study of power outages in Chicago](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353036947%5FStreet%5FLight%5FOutages%5FPublic%5FSafety%5Fand%5FCrime%5FAttraction?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) reached a similar finding: When streetlights went out, crime migrated from totally dark streets to partially illuminated ones nearby. These findings suggest that piecemeal improvements are unlikely to be successful. To avoid simply moving crime from one street to another, policymakers should create illuminated “buffer zones” by improving lighting on the blocks around crime hot spots. The larger the area in which lighting is improved, the lower the chance that crime will be displaced. This approach aligns with the studies in [Philadelphia](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1745-9133.70006?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Washington](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PCohyCV44N5MbxCM%5Fd4YzQbN7MrQLbDL/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Mesa](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n1jO6T-GUHIumfLcY8%5FmZOamLFA89Fbf/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), in which large-scale lighting upgrades reduced crime with no evidence of displacement. **4\. Use lights as a complement to, not a substitute for, law enforcement.** Given street lighting’s effect on increasing public safety and its low costs and ease of implementation, City officials might consider investing in lighting while reducing spending on law enforcement. Whether policing can be reduced as lighting improves is an unanswered question. It’s also not possible to say with precision how much increased activity on the streets would diminish the need for police presence. Neither question has been specifically addressed in the research, but experts note that police presence has a strong deterrence effect and likely complements lighting. Of all the studies to date on the effect of street lighting, none examined a coordinated effort to reduce policing as the new and improved lighting was added. In fact, each study examined instances in which lighting was upgraded and policing continued independently. **5\. Think hard about lighting quality.** The human eye sees best when light is uniformly distributed with little to no excessive brightness (what we commonly call glare). But some city streets have overly bright lights with dark stretches in between. The effect: Dark areas appear darker, visibility is poor, and pedestrians are unlikely to feel or be safe. In the 2016 randomized control trial in public housing developments, New York used very bright, temporary, diesel-powered mobile lighting towers to illuminate dark areas. These towers are quick to implement but are also powerful, loud and often smelly when powered by diesel, creating inhospitable spaces. While researchers have yet to study the specific relationship between light quality and crime prevention, lighting science suggests that, to maximize visibility and encourage active use of the streets and sidewalks, cities should generally install several evenly spaced, lower-output LED fixtures rather than individual, bright fixtures. Urban planners and lighting designers recommend using lights with a correlated color temperature (CCT) of no more than 3,000 K and installing them at least 12 feet and no more than 18 feet from the ground. ([New York City](https://www.nycstreetdesign.info/sites/default/files/2020-03/Lighting%5FSDM%5Fv3%5F2020%5F0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) uses 3,000 K bulbs, the standard light pole is 30 feet tall and pedestrian poles range from 12 to 18 feet.) The fixtures should also have shields that control the direction and spread of light to reduce glare. Such uniform, warm and pedestrian-friendly illumination creates welcoming spaces and encourages activity on streets and plazas. As a bonus, such lighting can also promote better health. Overly bright streetlights that shine into residences can disrupt circadian rhythms and sleep, contributing to impaired daytime functioning, among other health impacts. **6\. Try a variety of lighting solutions.** While high-quality street lighting is the foundation, additional lighting fixtures can improve visibility and activate public space. For example, a shielded, wall-mounted light can make it easier to see one’s surroundings when entering or leaving a building. A task light (a lower fixture that can be added to existing poles to illuminate benches, bus stops or other potential gathering places) encourages people to sit and read, play chess or stop to chat. This multifaceted approach might also include temporary lighting towers, especially in response to pressing safety concerns, where there is an immediate need or in places that are hard to access. For example, mobile units could be added to high-crime areas in the summer months to further deter crime. These mobile units should, wherever possible, connect to the power grid to avoid the noise, pollution and maintenance costs of diesel generators. Most importantly, they should be converted into permanent lighting if they prove effective. For more information on outdoor lighting best practices and different lighting solutions, including designs for novel temporary-to-permanent fixtures, read the design deep dive, [“What Well-Lit Streets Should Feel Like,”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-design-deep-dive) written for Rubber Meets Road by experts at Buro Happold, Studio Gang and the Urban Design Forum, in consultation with three community-based organizations: Pitkin Avenue BID (Brownsville), Youth Ministries for Peace and Justice (Longwood) and Chhaya CDC (Richmond Hill). **7\. Complement better lighting with other improvements to the physical city.** Lighting can’t be treated in isolation. There is strong evidence that other physical changes to neighborhoods, such as [greening vacant lots](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36172506/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [remediating blighted housing](https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303434?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), can also reduce crime. Some of these efforts are already underway in the city, such as attempts to remove scaffolding more swiftly. But these efforts — along with cleaning up blight and installing street furniture in underused public spaces, among other improvements — could be tested and assessed as natural, inexpensive ways to revitalize neglected blocks and bring people into public spaces. ### Implementation in New York City The process of making street lighting a part of a city’s public safety strategy will necessarily be different from city to city. Here are some ways that New York City might apply the above general guidance to the actual machinery of municipal government: In New York, lighting maintenance and installation is decentralized and reactive. The Department of Transportation (DOT) manages streetlights, the Department of Parks and Recreation manages some lighting in parks, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) manages lighting in public housing developments, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) manages lighting on and around transit infrastructure and underground, and the Department of Small Business Services (SBS) funds temporary lighting interventions in commercial corridors. Coordination could be significantly improved. There’s no map that identifies where each City-managed light is located. Nor is there a map that shows where outages are. Each agency separately evaluates requests for improvements from residents, elected officials or other agencies and funds installations and repairs through their own operational and budgeting processes. Agencies do not systematically share data. And none of the agencies formally consider public safety conditions in their repair or improvement operations. Here are steps that two of the agencies responsible for lighting could begin to implement tomorrow to make the city safer and more vibrant, as well as recommendations for a citywide process to advance longer-term change. **Department of Transportation** The Department of Transportation maintains nearly 400,000 streetlights and has the largest remit for lighting maintenance and improvements. Through 311, elected officials and other City agencies, it receives more than 18,000 calls about outages or other issues and around 700 requests for new lights each year. And it spends over $100 million each year on repairs, new installations and energy costs. Given its scale, even small changes in its processes have the potential for significant impact. Here are four places to start: - **Consider public safety in the decision-making process.** The most important change is simply to include the impact on public safety as one of the criteria when deciding where lights should be repaired or added. This could be accomplished by using a tool like the ones we’ve developed to identify areas where crime and darkness or crime and outages intersect or analyzing crime data when assessing the merits of individual projects. - **Add a public safety analysis to scopes of work for contractors.** Scopes of work are a mundane — but essential — element of City service delivery. Currently, when contractors apply to work on lighting improvements, the standard DOT scope of work requires them to assess a project’s impact on street safety. This language should be updated to require a similar analysis of the impact on crime. - **Create a map or dataset of all DOT lightpoles.** The current lack of data hinders progress. DOT should map the existing infrastructure, perhaps as part of a project to add maintenance sensors to each light (and publish it on the City’s Open Data portal). These data could be used along with nighttime satellite images, a phone-based light meter app or other tools to guide future decision-making. - **Study the impact and learn from implementation.** While the evidence for improving lighting is strong, there are unanswered questions about the best approach. For example, how many lights are needed in a given area to reduce crime? Does warmer, gentler light produce more activity and safety than harsh lights? By tracking where lights are improved and what impact they have, the City can refine its own practices and improve future interventions. While these changes would have the greatest scale and impact at DOT, all agencies with significant lighting infrastructure, such as NYCHA and MTA, could adopt a similar approach. **Small Business Services** Along with general improvements to street lighting, cities also need mechanisms to implement additional and creative lighting improvements in specific busy or high-crime areas, such as wall-mounted lights or lights in art installations. In New York City, many of these installations are funded by the City’s Department of Small Business Services, a small player in the world of street lighting. Each year, SBS awards a limited number of “public realm” grants of up to $100,000 to community-based organizations (CBOs) to improve commercial corridors, including through lighting. While limited, this initiative could facilitate just the sort of targeted improvements that complement DOT’s broader efforts. The current grant program has some advantages. Channeling the money through CBOs taps into local knowledge, ensuring that the infrastructure improvements are responsive to neighborhoods’ needs and likely to activate the upgraded public spaces. But it also has two significant flaws: First, the process is overly complex and difficult to navigate. While SBS provides the funding, the process of securing permits and accessing a power source is managed by other agencies — typically DOT or the Parks Department — creating extra paperwork and limiting the design, scale and impact of initiatives. Second, the impact is temporary. All permits and grants are only for one year, meaning considerable time and effort go into interventions that are typically removed a year later. These dollars could be put to far better use by changing how this grant program operates. Here are five changes to consider: - **Consider public safety in the decision-making process**. Applicants should be required to weigh public safety considerations in their proposals. The focus of the grants could also be broadened beyond commercial corridors to include other public spaces where crime is a concern and public life can be activated. - **Create a “one-stop shop” for funding, permits and power.** Rather than being run exclusively through SBS, the City could create a multiagency team to review proposals, make awards, issue permits and provide power access through a single, streamlined process. - **Set metrics**. Each project should have clearly articulated and measurable goals, such as increasing use of the space or reducing crime. - **Provide a path to ongoing funding**. If projects meet their metrics at the one-year mark (or other agreed-upon timing), they should unlock funding for additional years. Creating a pathway for multiyear funding, or even permanency, ensures that well-designed and implemented projects have lasting benefits. This might also include long-term funding for community organizations to function as stewards of the improved public spaces. - **Study the impact and learn from implementation**. As with the general improvements to street lighting, the City should track where projects are implemented and what impact they have. Because the public realm grants are not limited to lighting, studying them has the added benefit of documenting the impact of lighting and other physical improvements to public space in tandem. **Looking to the future** These changes at DOT and SBS are meaningful first steps, and NYCHA and MTA should follow suit. However, even with agency-by-agency changes, the current fractured landscape of lighting responsibility limits the City’s ability to fully harness the power of lighting to reduce crime. A better approach would be to form and empower **an interagency team** that brings together representatives from all agencies responsible for lighting. This team would: - Build on DOT’s efforts to map streetpoles and create **a centralized map or dataset of all agency-maintained lights** illuminating streets, walkways and green spaces on City-owned properties (and publish it on the City’s Open Data portal); - **Build shared systems to track requests** for lighting maintenance and upgrades; and, most importantly, - Shift from a reactive to a proactive posture by **developing a citywide Lighting Master Plan**. This plan would set clear standards for lighting quality, develop a process for identifying areas of need, set goals for lighting coverage and determine implementation timelines — all with the broader goal of aligning lighting improvements with efforts to reduce crime and nurture safe and vibrant communities. The plan could also incorporate the implementation of [recently passed City Council legislation](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6509412&GUID=70F34B69-DF33-439E-AEC2-EC3E417B9EC2&Options=&Search=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that requires DOT to improve pedestrian lighting in 300 commercial corridors annually. ### Conclusion Dark or dim areas in cities too often invite crime and discourage public life. Enhanced street lighting is a cost-effective strategy with immediate and lasting benefits for public safety and neighborhood vibrancy. To achieve the greatest reductions in crime and other benefits, government officials should rely on geolocated crime and lighting data and resident complaint data to identify broad areas of need, then leverage on-the-ground expertise to precisely target upgrades. They should invest in high-quality lighting, incorporate a variety of lighting interventions and track where interventions occur to facilitate further research on what interventions are most successful. And to achieve impact at scale, they should align agencies, systems and funding mechanisms in ways that use street lighting as a core public safety strategy. Turning on the lights can be just the start, but it’s a start that can reduce violence and help city life flourish. ### Where Darkness and Crime Overlap: An Interactive Map URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-satellite-crime-map/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T15:03:06.000Z _No content available._ ### Where 311 Lighting Complaints and Crime Overlap: An Interactive Map URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-311-crime-map/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T15:03:18.000Z _No content available._ ### 50 Years of Evidence URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-primer/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T15:03:31.000Z *This piece explains the evidence on street lighting and crime as part of* [*Rubber Meets Road: Lighting*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road)*, a Vital City-Center for Justice Innovation series on lighting New York's streets to make them safer. The series also includes a* [*summary of the Rubber Meets Road project*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-about/)*, a* [*summary overview of the problem and solutions*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-summary)*, a* [*detailed policy primer*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-details)*, a* [*design deep-dive on what well-lit streets should feel like*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-design-deep-dive)*, maps overlaying crime with* [*satellite-measured darkness*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-satellite-crime-map) *and* [*311 outage complaints*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-311-crime-map)*, and a* [*proof-of-concept app*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-app) *for reporting dark blocks.* --- In her [seminal 1961 book](https://www.amazon.com/Death-Life-Great-American-Cities/dp/067974195X?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “The Death and Life of Great American Cities,” Jane Jacobs argued that the vitality of urban life depends critically on the design of communal spaces. With respect to public safety, she argued that the police, while a critical input into crime control, cannot make a community safe all on their own, and that sustainable safety is ultimately created by “an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards … enforced by the people themselves.” In short, when public space is used and monitored by members of the public with the support of the police, these spaces are made safe for the public to enjoy. On the other hand, public spaces that are hidden from prying eyes — such as public housing stairwells or blocks where law-abiding people dare not venture — can become hot spots for crime and disorder. Jane Jacobs’ central insight was that the most effective crime control strategies enlist members of the community to coproduce public safety alongside the police — a task aided by policymakers who can help to design public spaces that are defensible. In urban planning, the study of how public spaces can be engineered with safety in mind is known as CPTED (pronounced SEP-TED), an acronym for “crime prevention through environmental design.” Among social scientists, the term of art is “situational crime prevention,” acknowledging that crimes are implicitly a function of a motivated offender, an attractive victim and the right situation. CPTED-inspired interventions are highly variable and include efforts to remediate blighted properties, find alternate uses for vacant lots, remove trash, better maintain public infrastructure, promote the use of surveillance cameras and design spaces that have better lines of sight, among many other varieties. Some of these interventions are a question of urban design and call upon the skill sets of architects and engineers. Others are related to the more mundane but critically important task of maintenance. As James Q. Wilson and George Kelling remind us in their seminal 1982 essay, “Broken Windows,” when public spaces aren’t maintained and property damage (e.g., a broken window) is allowed to proliferate without remediation, a signal is sent that no one cares, so broken windows cost nothing — a state of affairs that ultimately leads public spaces to be taken over by those with nefarious intentions. While many situational crime prevention interventions are worth investing in and studying, this white paper focuses on improvements in street lighting — perhaps the oldest form of situational crime prevention. ### Street lighting and human civilization Street lighting is undoubtedly one of the earliest forms of situational crime prevention — or any type of crime prevention for that matter. As far back as antiquity, people have understood darkness to mean danger, and streetlights have been around, in one form or another, for millennia. Recognizing the value of ambient lighting during nighttime hours, extensive systems of oil lamps were used to improve safety at night in the Greco-Roman world. After a late-night dinner party, Romans would travel back to their homes on illuminated streets, not much different from today. While lasting evidence is scant, it is probably reasonable to conclude that street lighting is an idea nearly as old as civilization itself, an essential public safety strategy that evolved alongside the world’s first cities and, notably, thousands of years before the world’s first professional police forces in the 18th century. The idea that lighting means safety is both intuitive and universal. Even before humans settled in fixed location, it is easy to imagine hunter-gatherers feeding their campfires throughout the night, adding a source of light to ward off animals and better recognize any attendant threats from other human beings. By some accounts, street lighting was introduced in the United States by Benjamin Franklin, who designed his own candle-based streetlight, first used in Philadelphia as early as 1757\. David Melville demonstrated gas street lighting in Newport, Rhode Island in 1805, and Baltimore became the first U.S. city with municipal gas streetlights in 1816\. And in 1880, after the invention of the electric light bulb, Wabash, Indiana, became the first U.S. city to use electric street lighting. Today, while there is substantial variation in their usage and intensity, streetlights can be found in varying degrees of abundance in every city in the United States and throughout the rest of the developed and developing world. However, the number of streetlights, their brightness and the evenness of the light they provide continue to vary substantially across different areas within a city as well as between cities. Most U.S. cities still rely on legacy streetlights, which provide dim yellow light, focused intensively on the area just beneath the light fixture. Recently, a number of cities, including Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Washington and Dallas, are switching — or have switched — to LED lights, which provide an experience of brighter and more even lighting. Despite investments in lighting, ultimately there are streets in every U.S. city that are simply not very well lit at night, which has led to a natural question: Would improvements in street lighting lead to improvements in public safety? On the one hand, given the potential benefits of lighting, it seems intuitive that the answer would be a resounding yes. On the other hand, if we think of people who commit crimes as highly motivated to do so, then perhaps a modest improvement in lighting would generate scant deterrence. The next two sections of this essay provide a high-level overview of how lighting might affect public safety as well as a summary of the evidence, including a discussion of what we do not yet know. ### Theories of change The presence of ambient lighting can affect crime through numerous channels, each of which may operate by changing the behavior of potential offenders, potential victims, community members, police officers or any combination thereof. Perhaps the most obvious way street lighting can influence crime is by increasing the perceived risk of being caught in the act by a patrol officer, bystander or surveillance camera, thus deterring people from engaging in criminal activity in the first place. Lighting can also affect the incidence of crime by changing the behavior of potential victims. Darkness is thought to generate a sense of insecurity because it decreases visibility and recognition at a distance, creating blind spots, shadows and potential places of entrapment. To the extent that better lighting enhances what people are able to see at night, it may empower them to mitigate a potential threat by taking an action as simple as crossing to the other side of the street or doing something else that makes them a more difficult “mark.” There are other, more nuanced perspectives on the role lighting may play in the generation of public safety. These theories emphasize how investments in improving neighborhood conditions strengthen community confidence, cohesion and something known as “informal social control.” Specifically, when a place is perceived as cared for, it tends to be more welcoming to law-abiding people and less welcoming to would-be offenders. Blocks, intersections and green spaces frequently traversed by community members are generally less attractive places to deal or use drugs or for gang members to hang out, for example. If better lighting reduces fear and brings more people outdoors at night, it may give rise to two potentially countervailing effects: On the one hand, more outdoor activity means more “eyes on the street,” potentially deterring crime by increasing the perceived risk of apprehension or through the types of informal social control that are a mainstay of the broken windows theory. On the other hand, more human activity means a greater supply of potential targets. To the extent that enhanced lighting increases not only the perceived but the actual probability of apprehension, it might also generate incapacitation effects, where crime falls due to more imprisonment. This happens if better lighting makes it possible for the police to gather better evidence and make more arrests. While crime reduction by any means is a welcome outcome, it is important to remember that deterrence is cheap relative to incapacitation, which requires municipal and state governments to finance the considerable costs of arresting, adjudicating and confining offenders. As such, the efficiency and therefore the scalability of a given crime-control strategy like improved street lighting depends on the relative magnitude of its deterrence effects. Indeed, if the deterrence effects are sufficiently large, it is possible for a crime control strategy to reduce both crime and incarceration, producing a “double dividend” in which two costly outcomes — crime as well as resources allocated to crime control — are simultaneously minimized. That is always the outcome we want. ### Empirical evidence In thinking about the importance of ambient lighting in maintaining public safety, a natural place to begin is to consider the effects of street lighting’s great rival: the sun. While the sun’s movement is governed by the laws of physics, its relationship to time is man-made and therefore subject to government policy. Twice per year, daylight saving time generates a revealing natural experiment in the public safety value of lighting. Consider that as soon as clocks are set forward, a 7 p.m. walk that used to take place during daylight hours becomes a nighttime endeavor. Likewise, when the clocks are set back, what was formerly a nighttime excursion suddenly happens in the light of day. Researchers in the[ United States](https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/97/5/1093/58281/Under-the-Cover-of-Darkness-How-Ambient-Light?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ Chile](https://academic.oup.com/joeg/article-abstract/23/2/299/6590082?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have studied what happens to crime, particularly street crime, during these controlled shifts, and their findings are what we would expect: A reduction in daylight leads to an increase in crime — powerful proof of concept that more ambient lighting leads to greater safety. In contrast to these studies of daylight saving time, most academic literature studies discrete interventions that typically add new streetlights to an area or enhance the quality of the lighting already present. Areas receiving improved lighting are compared to plausibly similar control areas that experience no upgrades in lighting, and the relative change in crime is computed using a research design known as “differences in differences.” A comprehensive review by Welsh et al. (2022) of over five decades of research found that street lighting interventions reduced crime by an average of 14% across 21 research studies in which the comparisons being made were regarded as credible. Notably, the entire body of literature includes just one randomized controlled trial — the gold standard in research that has become a mainstay of pharmaceutical studies and is equally powerful in assessing the impact of public safety interventions. That study, which evaluated the addition of portable temporary light towers in New York City public housing communities during the spring and summer of 2016, found that the added lights resulted in a 36% reduction in felony assaults and robberies during nighttime hours. Follow-up work from this trial found that enhanced outdoor lighting led to reductions in both crime and arrests in the intervention areas and that the beneficial effects of lighting in these communities endured for at least three years. ***Does lighting shift crime to other locations?*** A central question in studying any place-based intervention, be it street lighting, trash cleanup or additional police presence, is whether the intervention will genuinely reduce crime or simply displace crime to another location. From a scientific perspective, genuine crime reduction and displacement are equally interesting insofar as either effect provides evidence that crime is sensitive to lighting or whatever is being studied. But from a policymaker’s perspective, the difference between genuine crime reduction and displacement is critically important, as spending money merely to spread crime around a city is not a particularly attractive proposition. As a general matter, criminological research [has demonstrated](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-014-9209-4?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that displacement is more of a theoretical concern than a reality. Because crime is so intimately[ tied to social context](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00521.x?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and because the people who commit crimes tend to be so strongly tied to a small and familiar set of places, most place-based evaluations have not found evidence that crimes are pushed to alternative locations. Research that has studied the addition of lighting to *entire neighborhoods* reaches a similar conclusion — that better lighting tends to reduce crime in focal areas without causing crime to spill out to adjacent communities. When it comes to street lighting, though, there is some additional nuance to consider. This has to do with the sometimes hyperlocal nature of lighting, which can vary tremendously from street to street. Two research papers speak to this nuance and find suggestive evidence that poorly designed lighting interventions could simply push crime around the corner rather than lead to genuine crime reductions. A study of streetlight outages in Chicago considered the effect of electrical outages and spent lightbulbs that caused short-term disruptions to municipal street lighting. Essentially, an electrical failure or a spent bulb causes a street to go dark for several days before the issue is fixed. This paper analyzed changes in reported crimes before, during and after 300,000 streetlight outages and found that outages caused nighttime crimes to spill over into nearby street segments, with the greatest impact on robberies and auto thefts. The likely intuition here is that few people wish to walk down completely dark streets, so human activity — and crime — were reallocated to better-lit streets. While, in this instance, the better-lit streets received more crime, the broader lesson is that crime can, in fact, be responsive to changes in lighting on a street-by-street basis. A similar study of the Oxfordshire, Reading, West Berkshire and Wokingham municipalities in the United Kingdom examined what happened to crime after local authorities began to reduce the amount of street lighting at night to save energy costs and carbon emissions. Consistent with the Chicago research, the study found that crime increased significantly on street segments adjacent to those shut off at midnight to save energy costs. The study also found that areas adjacent to streetlights that replaced yellow lights (high-pressure sodium, or HPS, bulbs) with energy-efficient white lights saw nighttime crime decrease by 14% and increase by 13% on adjacent streets. The central theme across these studies is that discrete shifts in street lighting — on a street-by-street basis — have led to behavioral adjustments, raising concerns that piecemeal lighting upgrades could simply displace crime rather than produce a genuine, scalable improvement in public safety. In order to maximize the public safety benefits, policymakers should do their best to upgrade lighting on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis. ***Will lighting scale?*** Taken as a whole, research that studies improved lighting in communities has found beneficial effects. However, an enduring question is whether improved lighting can have effects at scale — that is, whether a citywide improvement in street lighting will lead to a citywide reduction in crime victimization. At-scale impacts are elusive in policy research. Indeed, there are numerous programs that appear to lead to important improvements in a small population served by the program but which are difficult to deliver to a larger population due to some rate-limiting step, such as the scarcity of transformational leaders or the difficulty of hiring a large number of high-quality employees. Lighting has several attractive properties when it comes to operating at a meaningful scale. The technical know-how involved in installing 1,000 streetlights is generally no different from what is required to install 10 streetlights. Similarly, delivering high-quality lighting is mostly an issue of a city’s capital budget and does not require the same degree of nuance and expertise as, for example, delivering culturally appropriate services to at-risk youth. Does lighting scale? The daylight saving time papers — which study crime across entire cities when there is more lighting — hint that it can. But, for a long time, empirical tests remained elusive. In the last three years, empirical tests suggest that lighting can have at-scale impacts. There are now four evaluations of improved lighting across an entire city. All four evaluations study the change from legacy street lighting to LED lighting, which produces light perceived to be brighter and which, critically, provides considerably more even light across a street, with far fewer dark spaces between streetlights. Research in Mesa, Arizona; Philadelphia; and Washington, D.C., found that as lighting rolled out to different communities citywide, crimes fell — notably, in Philadelphia’s case, including shootings. In contrast, similar research in Dallas did not find an impact of lighting on firearm offenses, which was the only outcome studied. Of note, since firearm offenses in Dallas are statistically rare, this study was probably underpowered to detect effects of similar size to those seen in Philadelphia. It is also worth observing that while Philadelphia is a pedestrian-oriented city, Dallas is more car-oriented and, as such, might offer a more limited scope for lighting to make a difference. ### Remaining controversies and future directions In 1997, a National Institute of Justice [report to Congress](https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/preventing-crime-what-works-what-doesnt-whats-promising-report-united-states?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), authored by several of the country’s leading criminologists, concluded that, due to the inadequacy of the available research, “we can have very little confidence that improved lighting prevents crime.” At the time, this was certainly the correct conclusion. Most of the available evidence was very old — from the 1970s — and consisted of comparisons between a single treated community and some other community, whether it was comparable or not. In the last 25 years, street lighting research, like other areas of social science, has been boosted by the[ “credibility revolution,”](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.24.2.3&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which has inspired empirical crime researchers to invest in obtaining stronger evidence. The lion’s share, albeit not all, of the more recent research finds that crime, including violent crime, declines in response to improved lighting. The crime declines that are observed have been modest but are large enough to be meaningful. On average, the crime reduction that we see in response to enhanced lighting is of an order of magnitude similar to that which would be expected from[ 10% more police](http://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272718302305?%5F%5Fcf%5Fchl%5Ftk=DHrpbJBesnRPHmXgvx2iTxt2CcsXmScKSKjrWsdOtf0-1774465503-1.0.1.1-qqMS2b%5FQyzjtrsi8FXVRv1UNQpc1AK.Rt5x%5F2HMnqU0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). However, much remains unknown, and some additional findings remain more speculative. First, we have little understanding of the types of places where lighting interventions will be most successful. This means we can offer little formal guidance to policymakers about how different types of communities or places should be prioritized for enhanced lighting. The best advice, in my view, is simply to prioritize areas that suffer from the highest rates of outdoor nighttime crime and that, at present, have the lowest-quality lighting. There is some empirical backing for this advice as [research on daylight saving time](https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/97/5/1093/58281/Under-the-Cover-of-Darkness-How-Ambient-Light?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has found that the impacts are felt disproportionately in communities with less municipal lighting and those with higher crime rates. Second, the mechanisms through which better lighting reduces crime remain murky. Does better street lighting reduce crime by bringing more people outside, increasing the number of eyes on the street? Or does lighting work mostly by deterring would-be offenders? If it is the latter, what is it about lighting that deters? Is it simply a matter of the increase in ambient light that increases the perception that there will be a witness to a crime or that the police will observe a crime in progress? Or does better lighting send a more abstract signal — that a particular area is looked after and cared for? In sorting out the potential mechanisms, we can engage in some informed speculation — informed because there is empirical research that sheds some light on these questions but still speculative because the available literature remains thin. With respect to whether lighting will change the way public spaces are used, [one recent study](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9125.70046?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of daylight saving time found that, when there was more ambient lighting, more people were out and about at the same hour of the day than when it was darker. This suggests — but does not prove — that better municipal lighting might change the way public spaces are used. We will soon have more data to answer this question. The availability of cellphone mobility data from firms like Safegraph and Advan makes it possible for crime scholars to observe whether better lighting brings more people outdoors, thus generating more eyes on the street. The Philadelphia research, referenced in the prior section of this brief, will report such estimates in the near future. These findings are relevant to our understanding of public safety and important for other reasons. Outside of observed crime rates, the extent to which people are willing to use public spaces in their community after dark is an important measure of fear and well-being. With respect to whether it is ambient lighting itself or the signaling effect that improved lighting might have, there is some tantalizing evidence that the signaling effect of lighting may play an important role in shaping the efficacy of lighting interventions. First, it is potentially noteworthy that one of the largest effects in the literature comes from the randomized trial in New York public housing that studied lighting that was very bright and especially salient to community residents. Second, in that study and several others, better lighting also appears to have led to some decreases indaytime crime. This is especially remarkable as streetlights do not turn on during the day, so there is no other way for street lighting to have an effect on daytime crimes except by sending a signal about community caretaking. Finally, we can say something about whether lighting is reducing crime by leading to more incapacitation — and thus widening the net of the justice system. This is a plausible hypothesis about how lighting could work. With better lighting, surveillance footage might have greater evidentiary value, eyewitness testimony might be more useful, or police might directly observe a crime in commission. But two available data points suggest that lighting reduces crime without more arrests. Most notably, the randomized trial from New York that found outdoor nighttime crimes fell by 36% in response to enhanced lighting also found that arrests fell. Daylight saving research finds that street crimes decline but there is no indication that arrests fall with darkness. Likewise, while more research is needed to determine whether these findings will hold across a broader range of interventions, this finding is potentially very powerful: Interventions that reduce both crime and arrests represent the holy grail of public safety — and offer a double dividend to society by reducing victimization as well as the cost of adjudicating and punishing criminals. One final caution merits discussion. Investments in physical infrastructure are often compared to investments in policing, with discussion ensuing about which effect is larger and therefore which is the wisest investment. Such discussions miss the mark and are based on a misleading read of the available research. To my knowledge, there has yet to be a paper that tests the effects of an intervention that increases lighting while reducing police presence at the same time. As such, lighting studies are probably best thought of as revealing the impact of improved lighting, holding law enforcement inputs constant. From a conceptual standpoint, police and community investments are considerably more likely to be complements than substitutes. Lighting makes places more defensible, but the most sustainable forms of safety are likely to be created using a layered approach. ### What Well-Lit Streets Should Feel Like URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-design-deep-dive/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T14:55:36.000Z _No content available._ ### About This Project URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-about/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T00:24:07.000Z How do cities decide what to do? The tug on the sleeve, the crisis in the moment, the upcoming State of the State or State of the City address requiring a Big Idea or three. These days, it is fashionable to refer to “evidence-based policies” (a hilarious formulation if applied, say, to medicine). But how, really, can cities and their leaders figure out what works, use that as the ballast of governance — whatever else politics may require — and steel themselves to the prose of implementing the ideas? We’re in luck. Because every day, great ideas are being tested. They come out of neighborhoods, the academy and cities more generally. But too rarely do they reach policymakers, who have little time — even with Claude — to figure out what really works for them, and what really are the operational obstacles to implementation. Vital City’s new project, launched in partnership with the Center for Justice Innovation, is called Rubber Meets Road: Running Cities on Evidence. It aims to solve that problem and make better the lives of city dwellers and the public servants who work on their behalf, first by finding the best ideas across the nation and around the globe and then by offering nuts-and-bolts guidance on how to implement them. Where possible, we have created tools that can both illuminate the problems to be solved and ease the solutions. We are starting with a set of ideas to reduce violent crime. Crime may be trending down nationwide these past two years, but it remains a leading concern of New Yorkers and people across America. And while we have some breathing room, why not use it to tap into solutions that may come from surprising places but offer a durable way to keep the peace. Each idea we showcase is powerful by itself, but no one is sufficient by itself. Each idea is explained to resonate with a broad range of people — people who live in cities, journalists, researchers and others. But our emphasis here is reaching the busy bureaucrat, who will need to make the budget and policy case. Where possible, we offer costs, and sometimes cost-benefit analyses. We are cautious here, trying to see the issue from the point of view of a budget director who may not be moved by promised savings in a generation or even five years or even when the savings accrue now but to the “wrong pocket.” In this first iteration, the ideas, while generally applicable to cities, are offered in detail as applied to the budget and operations of the City of New York. New York is the nation’s biggest city and therefore the one where solutions can reach the most people. But we anticipate developing “city agnostic” tools in the coming months as well. Vital City is deeply grateful to our friends, critics and colleagues who offered trenchant comments and advice. All mistakes are our own, but we particularly want to thank: Aaron Chalfin, Eric Cumberbatch, Renita Francois, Sherry Glied, Gloria Gong, Chenghe Guan, Anna Harvey, Candice Jones, Dana Kaplan, Lee-Sien Kuo, Jeff Liebman, Jens Ludwig, Jessica Mofield, Daniel Neill, Sarah Picard, Abdul Rad, Amy Sanaman, Pat Sharkey, Marcos Soler, Shu Wang, the CUNY Institute for State and Local Governance, the NYU Wagner School, the Urban Design Forum and the New York Police Department, the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice and Department of Transportation for their comments, work and pushback. We are also extraordinarily lucky to have the support of Arnold Ventures, the Public Welfare Foundation, the Charles H. Revson Foundation and the Tow Foundation, whose resources and thought partnership have been key in shaping and realizing this public service. ### How Dark is Your Block? A Proof-of-Concept Mobile App URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-app/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T15:03:47.000Z *This proof-of-concept tool is part of* [*Rubber Meets Road: Lighting*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road/)*, a Vital City–Center for Justice Innovation series on lighting New York's streets to make them safer. The series also includes a* [*summary of the Rubber Meets Road project*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-about/)*, a* [*summary overview of the problem and solutions*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-summary)*, a* [*detailed policy primer*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-details)*,* [*Aaron Chalfin on 50 years of research*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-policy-primer)*, a* [*design deep-dive*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-design-deep-dive)*, and maps overlaying crime with* [*satellite-measured darkness*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-satellite-crime-map) *and* [*311 outage complaints*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rubber-meets-road-lighting-311-crime-map)*.* --- What’s the lighting like on your block at night? Are the streetlights dim or out? Most New Yorkers have no easy way to tell — and the City has no easy way to know either, beyond complaints filed through 311\. To show what’s possible, Vital City built a working proof of concept: a browser-based tool that uses your phone’s camera as a light meter, geotags the reading, and walks you through reporting outages to 311\. The full tool, including the underlying code, is freely available so the City can adapt it — ideally as a feature inside the official NYC 311 app, or as a standalone municipal release. Below is how the demonstration works today. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/05/image1.png) ### Get set up (30 seconds) 1\. On your phone, open[ https://vitalcity-nyc.github.io/streetlightmeter/](https://vitalcity-nyc.github.io/streetlightmeter/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Safari (iPhone) or Chrome (Android). 2\. Add it to your home screen so it opens like a regular app: on iPhone, tap the Share icon and choose "Add to Home Screen"; on Android, tap the three-dot menu and choose "Add to Home screen." 3\. That's it — no app store, no account, no download. ### Take a reading 1\. Head outside at night to the spot you want to measure. 2\. Open StreetLightMeter and tap "Measure light here." Grant camera access when prompted. 3\. Hold your phone at chest height, rear camera pointing straight ahead (not up at the light). 4\. Tap the capture button and hold still for about two seconds. 5\. You'll get a reading in lux and a plain-language rating: dark, dim, or adequate. *The camera image is analyzed on your phone and never uploaded.* ### Report it to 311 If the reading shows a problem, the app walks you through filing a report: 1\. Pick the issue type (for example, "Street light out" or "Insufficient lighting"). 2\. Optional but helpful: enter the pole number (stamped near eye level on the pole) and attach a photo. 3\. Choose how to file: online via the NYC 311 street light form, by phone, or by text to 311-692. 4\. Save the service request number the city gives you so you can track the repair. Your reading is also added to a shared map, so neighbors can see which blocks have been measured. ### Tips ● Take readings mid-block and directly under the pole for comparison. ● Measure on a clear night; rain and fog will skew results. ● If a whole stretch reads "dim," file one report per pole — the city dispatches crews by pole number. ### From proof of concept to city tool This is a demonstration, not a finished product. Vital City built it to show that the technology already exists to give New Yorkers — and the agencies that serve them — better information about street lighting at almost no cost. The natural next step is for the City to take it the rest of the way. Two paths look promising: ● Build it into the NYC 311 app. The agency already collects streetlight complaints; a one-tap light meter would shorten the path from “something’s wrong” to a service request with a verified pole number, a lux reading and a precise location. ● Release it as a standalone “NYC StreetLight” tool. DOT or the Mayor’s Office of the CTO could publish a polished version, with the readings flowing into a citywide map that helps target maintenance and identify chronically dark blocks. Either route would turn what is now a small civic experiment into a real piece of municipal infrastructure. The code, the methodology and the data are open; we’d be glad to work with the City to make it happen. ### Hochul's School-Choice Choice URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/hochul-trump-school-choice-ny/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T13:37:42.000Z Speaking recently at an event hosted by Agudath Israel, an Orthodox Jewish organization, New York Gov. Kathy Hochul[ announced that she intended to opt into the Education Freedom Tax Credit](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2026/05/08/kathy-hochul-opts-into-federal-tax-scholarship-school-choice/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (EFTC) program, which was fiercely opposed by Congressional Democrats. Enacted as part of the president’s “Big Beautiful Bill,” EFTC authorizes a dollar-for-dollar tax credit to anyone who donates up to $1,700 towards the largest federal school choice program in history. The funds collected will be administered through private scholarship-granting organizations and made available to parents whose family income does not exceed 300% of their area median income. The money can be used for tuition at private and religious schools and a host of other education-related services. Hochul’s surprising decision is not only politically important for Democrats; it could shape policy in profound ways in New York City and State for generations to come. As a concession to Democrats who caucused against the bill, the EFTC program grants state leaders discretion to opt into the program or refuse to do so. At the time of Hochul’s announcement, only one of the 27 states that opted in had a Democratic governor: Colorado, led by Jared Polis. When Democratic Govs. Andy Beshear of Kentucky and Laura Kelly of Kansas refused to participate, their decisions were overturned by Republican-controlled state legislatures. It’s little wonder why most Democratic governors have turned a cold shoulder to the program.The program has been vehemently opposed by national teachers union president Randi Weingarten, a longtime opponent of private school choice and a prominent voice in the Democratic Party.[ She claims](https://gothamist.com/news/enrollment-is-declining-in-nyc-schools-expect-more-school-closure-fights?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the EFTC will drain resources and students from public schools like those in New York City, where enrollment[ has declined by 160,000 since 2020](https://gothamist.com/news/enrollment-is-declining-in-nyc-schools-expect-more-school-closure-fights?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Sympathetic labor leaders have lined up behind Weingarten. Democratic State Sen. John Liu, who chairs his chamber’s education committee,[ has threatened](https://www.silive.com/politics/2026/05/ny-gov-hochul-pushes-back-amid-dem-clash-over-trump-private-school-tax-credit-program.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to challenge the governor’s decision in the state legislature. Why isn’t Hochul toeing the line? Since launching her reelection campaign, the governor has brandished an uncharacteristic independent streak. Last year, she broke with U.S. Sens. Chuck Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand, as well as the state party chair Jay Jacobs, to endorse the left-leaning mayoral campaign of Zohran Mamdani against party stalwart Andrew Cuomo. While the two still bicker over heavier taxes on the rich, the governor and the mayor overall seem to have a productive relationship. After endorsing her reelection campaign, Mamdani was able to secure state funding to support his childcare program and other campaign promises. But this feels like a bigger break. Why would a centrist politician like Hochul defy the powerful teachers union president and other labor leaders who have routinely aligned with her?Perhaps it was a purely political calculation. Where else do the EFTC’s opponents have to go if they have problems with her position? Her Republican challenger in this year’s gubernatorial race, Bruce Blakeman, declared support for the federal funding long before the governor did. While Hochul is polling favorably, it is still early in the election season. Blakeman’s campaign recently got a boost when[ a state judge ruled that he qualifies for $3.5 million in public funding](https://www.wxxinews.org/text/new-york-public-news-network/2026-05-12/bruce-blakemans-legal-win-could-unlock-3-5m-for-his-campaign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) after a state board denied it. Hochul may be thinking that the issue could neuter a perceived Blakeman advantage. It wasn’t just a coincidence that Hochul made her provocative announcement to a powerful conservative Jewish organization. Their members, many of whom could well be swing voters in the gubernatorial election, have a lot to gain from a federal program, which will provide tuition relief to parents whose children attend yeshivas. Then there is the larger Catholic school lobby with its own financially strapped school system. It has been a reliable supporter of school choice in the past, not to mention Republican officeholders. But the support for school choice does not end there. It is also popular within Black and Latino communities because children from those communities are more likely to get trapped in chronically failing public schools with no reasonable options. Generations of Black and Brown parents have come up with their own tuition payments to find better opportunities in Catholic schools; but not all can afford it, so they remain consigned to underperforming institutions. Democrats generally have ignored their pleas for alternatives. It is not a winning election strategy[ at a time when their party has been hemorrhaging support in Black and Latino voting districts](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/20/us/politics/democratic-party-voter-registration-crisis.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The dynamic is fascinating and worth following: Notwithstanding the thumbs-down from municipal labor leaders in sympathy with the teachers, many parents who stand to benefit from the federal aid are members of these very unions. It remains to be seen whether Hochul’s decision will encourage other Democratic governors to welcome the infusion of federal funding. Private school choice has been the third rail of Democratic politics[ ever since the first voucher program appeared in Milwaukee back in 1990](https://www.amazon.com/Radical-Dreamers-Failure-American-Education/dp/0197827101?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Since then, the idea has gained enormous momentum across the country. It is likely to grow in popularity with national test scores[ sliding to record low levels](https://ed.stanford.edu/news/us-student-achievement-was-falling-long-pandemic-study-finds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and more parents questioning the quality of public schools. Today, some 75 school choice programs are active in 35 mostly red states, and they differ in purpose and scope from the earlier ones. The original programs that came about in Milwaukee and Cleveland were the result of odd coalitions between Black activists and moderate Republicans. They targeted children from low-income families who sought alternatives to failing public schools. A progressive model of school choice evolved, setting standards for participating schools and protecting the rights of students and teachers. Despite their orientation, mainstream Democrats continued to oppose these programs. Even charter schools, public schools of choice with clear standards that tend to have positive records of academic performance serving underprivileged children, have been a point of contention for Democrats. The more recent state programs [differ in purpose and scope](https://www.future-ed.org/early-returns-first-results-from-the-new-wave-of-public-funding-of-private-schooling/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They include vouchers, tax credits and education savings accounts. More expansive than the early school choice programs, they fund private and religious school tuition, attendance at micro-schools, homeschooling, and a wide range of education- related expenses. Many are universal in scope, making them available to all students. Many lack accountability provisions to ensure sound education standards. It was in the spirit of these state laws that the federal tax credit program was enacted. Until very recently, it was widely assumed that the regulations eventually produced by the Trump Treasury Department would mimic the more recent brand of choice programs — sweeping programs available to all with fewer government regulations. Then, on May 14, appearing before the House Education and Workforce Committee, Secretary of Education Linda McMahon stated that states would be authorized[ to set their own conditions for administering the program](https://www.chalkbeat.org/2026/05/14/states-could-set-rules-for-federal-education-tax-credit-mcmahon-says/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). If true, this could be a game-changer that brings still more Democrats into the fold, assuming they can finally come to terms with the choice issue. Was this the thinking behind the secretary of education’s turnaround on the regulations? Did the surprise announcement by the governor from the deep blue state of New York alert Republicans to a fresh opportunity to expand the choice regime? Or was McMahon’s statement merely a ploy to isolate Democrats from some of their own constituents? Hochul was wise enough to give herself some wiggle room when, after making her original surprise announcement, she said that she would look out for “poison pills” within the regulations before signing on. To make her case among fellow Democrats, she will need to ask more pointed questions about the scope of the regulations. She has argued that no funding would be taken from public schools and that money appropriated to the state could be used by public school students for items like tutoring, transportation and after-school activities. If permitted, might it also possibly be used to underwrite Mamdani’s plans to offer universal childcare? Under existing federal laws, the city Department of Education spends $1.5 billion annually in tuition payments to send students with disabilities to private institutions that public schools do not have the capacity to serve. Might there be some mechanism to apply EFTC funding toward these costs as well? Such opportunities could bring savings to overburdened state and city budgets and make funds available for other favored programs of the governor and mayor. There will be other, more difficult questions that Democrats, including the governor, will need to wrestle with as the federal program proceeds. Assuming limited funds are available, would it be possible to prioritize federal vouchers for low-income families whose children attend low-performing schools? Will states be able to hold participating private schools to existing educational standards? Will these standards be sufficient to hold newly opened institutions to acceptable levels of performance? And what would happen if a private or religious school participating in the program refused to hire a teacher who is gay or admit a student who identifies as transgender? Assuming that the U.S. Supreme Court is no longer so reliable a protector of individual rights, will plaintiffs in such cases have adequate safeguards through state laws and regulations? The school choice train left the station decades ago. It has barreled across the country and is gaining increasing momentum. Rather than jump on board and steer it in a safe direction, Democrats have generally chosen to lie in its path, and it has passed over them. Gov. Hochul may have a chance to change its course by asking the right questions and marshaling its resources to address the learning gap defined by race and class that has been a national disgrace for generations. It is a bold wager in an election year. ### How Zohran Mamdani Can Help Shrink the Child Welfare System in New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-child-welfare-community-safety-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-05-19T14:19:03.000Z In 2021, New York City [asked thousands of NYCHA residents](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2021%5FActionAgenda%5FFINAL%5FPAGE-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) how to improve public safety. Some of the needs they articulated: easier access to public benefits, sports and arts programs, [healing spaces](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/designcommission/downloads/pdf/PDC%5FStreetscapesForWellness.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) like community gardens and [restorative circles](https://www.hiddenwatercircle.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to address trauma, community centers, and peer support and “credible messengers” with the life experience to help others navigate through a challenge. That same year, parents across the city [were asked](https://www.risemagazine.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/AnUnavoidableSystem.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a different question: How can the city reduce over-reliance on the child welfare system? Their answers were very similar: to invest in neighborhoods. They wanted investments in grassroots groups, community spaces and programming that offer holistic support. These responses, reported months apart by the city’s [NeighborhoodStat](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nstat-should-be-key-to-mamdani-public-safety-plan/) program and by Rise, a parent advocacy group, reflect what decades of [research](https://opportunityinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/HopeVI%5FPaper.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also show: Place matters. Children and families do better — and crime is lower — in places with a strong social fabric, well-kept parks, welcoming libraries and vibrant community organizations. Mayor Zohran Mamdani understands this logic when it comes to safety. His campaign was built on the premise that over-reliance on law enforcement to manage social problems causes its own harms — and that a community-rooted approach could produce better outcomes. That’s the vision behind the new Office of Community Safety. Now, he has an opportunity and responsibility to apply that same logic to child welfare. ### The problem with policing families For decades, New York City’s primary institutional response to family stress has been to send investigators from the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) to a home to determine whether there’s neglect or abuse. If a teacher notices something worrying or a doctor has a concern, their training told them, “when in doubt, call the hotline” — the state-run phone line that takes reports of suspected harm to children. The result is that nearly [1 in 20](https://familypolicynyc.org/data-brief/hotline-calls-2023/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New York City families faces a child protective case every year, even though 93% of these cases are not serious enough to lead to further intervention. Even when children are quickly assessed to be safe, regulations in New York state require multiple visits to the home, interviews with people who know the family, record gathering and extensive documentation. The typical case lasts 40-60 days, while the threat that children may be removed hangs over families. That knock on the door leaves lasting damage even when it leads nowhere. [Research](https://academic.oup.com/sf/article-abstract/97/4/1785/5113162?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that parents who have been investigated pull back from their communities. They confide less in doctors and teachers. They avoid the mental health providers and social services that might actually help them — because those institutions now feel like threats. “We are scared to talk to our doctors or our children’s teachers,” [one affected mother wrote](https://www.risemagazine.org/2019/12/mariya-kolesnichenko-target-the-situations/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “because we fear they may misinterpret our words and use them against us.” As [one mother](https://www.risemagazine.org/2021/06/fear-of-cps-impacts-every-move-i-make/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) put it, “Being scared of the child welfare system has an impact on almost everything I do.” Today, [experts](https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/exploring-the-intersection-of-child-neglect-and-poverty/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) [agree](https://preventchildabuse.org/resources/primary-prevention-toolkit/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [that](https://imprintnews.org/opinion/rolling-out-the-welcome-mat-for-prevention/270728?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), while it’s essential to act swiftly when children are in danger, the child protective system is a blunt instrument deployed too often in situations it was never designed to address. In the past two years, ACS has sought to reduce unnecessary investigations, training more than 25,000 frontline staff in schools, hospitals and shelters that they can “support, not report” a family when a child is not in danger, with promising [results](https://www.casey.org/media/25.07-QFF-TS-Transforming-mandated-reporting%5Ffinal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That’s a good first step, but it’s not enough. The problem is that no city agency holds a charter to ensure that families themselves find a welcoming front door when they need help. ACS — an agency with the power to separate families — can’t offer that friendly hand. That is why I am part of [a coalition of advocates](https://narrowingthefrontdoor.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) proposing that New York City stand up a new Office of Family Well-Being to commit to building a community approach to family safety, just as it has committed to a community approach to public safety. Ideally, this new office would work in tandem with the Office of Community Safety, and potentially become part of the expanded Department of Community Safety that Mayor Mamdani aims to build. The building blocks of both should be to build up place-based planning and neighborhood supports that stabilize residents, both in everyday life and when setbacks threaten to become crises. ### The front-door problem For 25 years, child welfare advocates and ACS leadership have focused on reducing the most serious trauma of the system — family separation — with significant success. The number of children in foster care fell by [70% between 2001 and 2025](https://familypolicynyc.org/2026/01/15/edwards-jama-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), while deaths of children from abuse and neglect also declined. But the rate of *investigations* — the front door of the system, where families first encounter its power — has barely moved. These investigations are not distributed equally. Nearly [45% of Black and Latino children](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2106272118?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the city can expect to experience an investigation by age 18\. And child welfare involvement is hyperconcentrated — and has been for decades — in a small number of neighborhoods. A quarter of all ACS investigations of Black families occur in just nine of the city’s hundreds of zip codes. To a striking degree, these are the [same disinvested neighborhoods](https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/citywide-framework-to-hold-upstream-efforts-accountable/243348?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — Brownsville in Brooklyn and Mott Haven in the Bronx, to name two — where policing is concentrated. For families, conditions in these neighborhoods increase the potential for stress. In [Brownsville](https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.cccnewyork.org/2020/12/CCC-Brownsville.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for instance, commute times are long, childcare is scarce and afterschool programs are lacking. Parents told [researchers at the Citizens Committee for Children](https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.cccnewyork.org/2020/12/CCC-Brownsville.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that they avoid local mental health providers because they fear ACS involvement and hesitate to let their kids play outside because of violence. This lack of basic amenities and social infrastructure reflects the legacy of redlining and the results of decades of city disinvestment. It’s well-established that [neighborhood neglect produces crime](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo5514383.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and a [growing body of research](https://familypolicynyc.org/explainer/neighborhood-conditions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also finds that neighborhood conditions influence child safety and child welfare involvement. For instance, cleaning and greening vacant lots [reduces gun violence](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22871378/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — and greener neighborhoods also see fewer child welfare reports, even when poverty levels are the same. Possibly the most important factor is what’s known as [collective efficacy —](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/robert-sampson-interview) the sense of place and belonging that encourages residents to look after one another and to act in solidarity when necessary. Research reliably finds that neighborhoods with stronger social fabrics have lower rates of crime, substantiated child maltreatment, [domestic violence](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2002.00833.x?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [substance abuse](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4006326/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), even when controlling for income and other factors. A Columbia University [analysis](https://familypolicynyc.org/explainer/neighborhood-conditions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of New York City found that high rates of collective efficacy are associated with lower rates of substantiated investigations and foster care entries at the zip code level. With neighborhood conditions tied so tightly to positive public safety and family safety outcomes, a Mayor’s Office of Community Safety that addresses crime while ignoring child welfare is doing half the job. It is critical to fold families into that vision. ### The missing office Over the past year, a collaboration including the Narrowing the Front Door Workgroup, the Innovations Team in the Mayor’s Office of Policy and Planning and two dozen parents and community leaders have developed a [detailed proposal](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1X9KRyc5txh%5F2l88REfzJ8zK2L-3pdIk9/view?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for a new Office of Family Well-Being, which could sit within the City’s proposed Department of Community Safety. The proposed office would perform three interlocking functions. In each neighborhood where child welfare involvement is concentrated, a designated community anchor — a trusted local organization, not a government agency — would lead a planning process to identify the resources families want and need and the local strengths to build on. The office would then direct grants to community organizations to address priorities surfaced in the planning process. These might include flexible, non-stigmatizing supports that could help families out of bind, such as emergency cash, back-up childcare, peer support, grief counseling and help navigating public benefits, as well as joyful family gatherings and civic actions that bring neighbors together. At the citywide level, the office would be responsible for identifying citywide gaps and collaborating with local groups to address conditions — like a city warmline for family support — that community collaboratives can’t resolve alone. ACS itself has been supportive of this planning. “It’s a wonderful idea to have a city entity focused solely on family wellness,” said recent ACS Commissioner Jess Dannhauser at a City Council hearing in February, adding that he sees “no reason why we shouldn’t urgently kick off a planning process for what an Office of Family Well-Being would look like.” ### Direct cost savings for the city New York City has already demonstrated that upstream child welfare investment pays for itself. [A new report](https://familypolicynyc.org/report/reinvesting-upstream/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) published by the NYC Family Policy Project that I co-authored with Tim Ross assembles what city and state taxpayers actually spend on child welfare investigations, and what upstream reforms could save. We found that, since the state created an uncapped fund for preventive services 25 years ago, sharp reductions in foster care entries have saved billions. If the same number of children were in foster care today as in 2001, New York City alone would be spending [$1 billion more annually](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2021/08/parents-advocates-rally-against-expansion-family-enrichment-centers/184609/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on foster care costs. That [stunning annual savings](https://familypolicynyc.org/report/reinvesting-upstream/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with no reduction in safety, is the return on a visionary structural decision made a generation ago. The next phase of reform could potentially produce a similar return. Each year, New York City spends [$142 million](https://familypolicynyc.org/report/reinvesting-upstream/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) responding to hotline calls, an average of about $2,800 per investigation. About [40%](https://familypolicynyc.org/report/reinvesting-upstream/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of that cost comes from city tax dollars. Eliminating tens of thousands of investigations each year can generate tens of millions of dollars. With the City perennially under pressure to find budget savings, this is the rare reform that will cost less the better it works. ### The decision in front of the mayor The Mayor’s Office of Community Safety is being stood up at this moment, and the mayor continues to envision a full-fledged city department to achieve its mission. The question is whether this vision will expand to include a comprehensive, resourced, independent Office of Family Well-Being — with real authority to shape neighborhood conditions. When [New York went upstream on crime](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/stemming-violence-investing-in-civic-goods/), it proved you can’t just arrest your way out of a safety problem. You also need to invest your way out of it. That’s true for child safety, too. With the synergy of investing in public safety and family well-being together, in the same places, through the same trusted institutions, New York City can have a bigger impact on both. ### Lessons from Tokyo URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/joe-mcreynolds-interview-tokyo-zoning/ Last updated: 2026-05-14T15:33:14.000Z --- *Joe McReynolds has two jobs. By day, he's a national security analyst tracking Chinese information warfare. Nights and weekends, he's a Tokyo obsessive with a PhD in progress, a private digital library of hundreds of Japanese-language urban studies books, and a story about the time he frantically called his boss to manufacture an emergency just so he could fly to Tokyo and show Ezra Klein around. Jamie sits down with McReynolds to talk about what New York could actually learn from a city where you can open a bar in your living room for $2,000, health inspections happen every five to seven years, and grandmas sell homemade lunchboxes off folding tables without anyone hassling them. Also: public toilets, the 1961 down-zoning that broke everything, and why Joe is terrified about the short term but quietly hopeful about geoengineering.* *You can listen to the podcast on* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/6HGwLGrIQtL40TPQ2OmSR1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/lessons-from-tokyo/id1794619189?i=1000767759906&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* --- **Jamie Rubin:** You’re listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City podcast. Today’s episode is a totally fascinating conversation with Joe McReynolds, who came over to talk to me on a Sunday a few weeks ago. Joe currently serves as the chief for global information operations and cyber at the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, the China Security Studies Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, and as a co-founder of the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute. He’s the lead editor and co-author of the book “China’s Evolving Military Strategy,” as well as the upcoming “China’s Information Warfare.” In addition to his foreign policy work, he’s an urban studies scholar affiliated with Keio University’s Almazan Architecture and Urban Studies Laboratory in Japan, where he studies Tokyo’s approach to urban policy. He is also the research editor and co-author of the book “Emergent Tokyo: Designing the Spontaneous City.” A theme to keep in mind is the picture Joe paints of Tokyo as a place where anything can develop in any neighborhood and support a vibrant, economically self-sufficient community. He talks about how many restaurants and bars Tokyo has, particularly in comparison to New York. I found myself wondering whether New York City really can be a place like Tokyo in that sense — if we fixed regulatory issues, could we support small businesses run by anybody who lives there? Joe, thank you for being here on a Sunday afternoon. Tell me where you actually live. **Joe McReynolds:** Depending on the year, different places, but at the moment I am splitting my time half and half between DC and Tokyo. **Jamie:** Exactly what is it that you do for a living? You seem to have seventeen different flavors of employment. **Joe:** My day job is as a national security analyst focused on China, Chinese military development, and especially Chinese information warfare. But then nights and weekends, I am an urban studies researcher focused on Tokyo and what American cities can learn from Tokyo. **Jamie:** But your PhD work is in what? **Joe:** PhD work is in urban studies — it is basically “Tokyo-ology,” building off of the book “Emergent Tokyo.” I became obsessed with cities and how they work differently. Tokyo was the most interesting because of the human experimentation and dynamism in people trying out different ways to live and form communities. I already spoke Japanese from public school in California. I was using Chinese in my day job, then realized I was obsessed with Tokyo and started collecting primary source materials in the 2010s. Finally, the Japanese Ministry of Defense brought me over for a year as an exchange; I’d do China information warfare stuff for them, but really I wanted to understand why Tokyo works the way it does. That was the genesis of the book. **Jamie:** I was thinking about you this morning because of an article in the Times about the renovation — or destruction — of the East Wing ballroom. Architects explained why the designs made no sense, and it made me think of the notion that there should be less scrutiny and more of a “let a thousand flowers bloom” approach. How does that fit into your conception of a city? **Joe:** I’ve been thinking about this recently because I’ve been involved a bit with the folks building California Forever, that new city project in California. They hired people out of SPUR, the Bay Area urbanism think tank, to talk about Tokyo-style neighborhood design. **Jamie:** California Forever is this effort to quietly aggregate land, led by Jan Sramek and funded by wealthy Silicon Valley types. Are they actually building a city? **Joe:** They didn’t really account for the political realities of zoning, but they hit on a solution: get a neighboring city to absorb you with a sweetheart deal that grandfathers every existing resident in as a king with financial incentives. By being absorbed into an existing city that can set its own zoning, that solves the farmland zoning problem. My answer to the city question is that you have to have a degree of trust in people, which goes beyond architecture to land use. One of my biggest takeaways from Tokyo for American cities is to let people do more things with their own residences. In Tokyo, the “exclusively residential zone” includes the right to open a small restaurant, bar, workshop, or boutique on the ground floor. People are entrusted to do this, and nuisance issues are negotiated with neighbors. We are designing our cities in such a defensive crouch from any possible harm that we lose something in the process. I don’t think the answer is that we can’t trust people; setting rules with guardrails that allow for individual flexibility could be a happy medium. **Jamie:** You have written a couple of articles for Vital City. One was about public toilets. Explain that situation in Tokyo. **Joe:** The piece on public toilets is as much about transit systems as it is about toilets because they are intertwined. About eight or nine private train companies run about half or more of the stations in Tokyo. They operate the rail itself, commercial shopping hubs above stations, and build out bedroom communities around them. They even operate tourist attractions at the end of the line. They are fundamentally in competition to make their commuter lines the best places to live. Public toilets are part of what they offer — clean, well-appointed amenities, always inside the fare gates. The infrastructure is spatially doable in New York; the plumbing hookups are there. It is a question of prioritization and the MTA’s relationship with the city. **Jamie:** You mention cleanliness — is it downstream of Japanese culture? **Joe:** No. Anyone who has been on a drinking street in Tokyo when the salarymen are going hard knows they have the same bad aim as drunk men everywhere else. It is about expectations. In New York, it is rare to have bars or restaurants above the second or third floor. In Tokyo, you’ll see eight-story buildings where every floor has something. Real estate developers in New York say they don’t do that because New Yorkers are not accustomed to looking up. That then rewires the economic logic for developers. We are used to not expecting much in the way of public toilets, so there isn’t pressure on City Hall or the MTA. **Jamie:** With the MTA, it’s a budget issue. Relatively small things like a million dollars of revenue don’t seem worth it to an organization that big, even if it would change the experience. Mayor Mamdani has made a public commitment to more toilets. In the city, they found a Riverside Park toilet that has cost $3 million so far and still isn’t built. How much of that is an issue? **Joe:** It’s a huge issue, but reform of the contracting process would unlock a lot of urban improvements. We have been in the urban political wilderness by accepting that better things are not possible. Mamdani’s campaign compared to Eric Adams’ City of Yes shows a political pendulum swing toward boldness that people are hungry for. **Jamie:** People often talk about Tokyo’s housing development. How many units do they develop? **Joe:** About 150,000 every year, though that includes units being torn down and built anew. **Jamie:** The population of the greater Tokyo metro area is about 40 million, while New York is 8 or 9 million. The other interesting piece is the restaurant and bar scene. **Joe:** Tokyo has about ten times or more bars and restaurants compared to New York. It is a question of zoning, liquor licenses, and health inspections — which only happen once every five to seven years in Tokyo. I know a Japanese American woman who opened an eight-seat bar in a nice area of Tokyo; her total startup cost was under $2,000. New York restaurant owners’ jaws drop when they hear that. It is possible because of by-right zoning, $50 liquor licenses, and permissive regulations for mom-and-pops. In Japan, mom-and-pop businesses get to keep the sales tax they collect up to a certain point as an incentive. In any residential neighborhood, someone can operate a business out of the ground floor of their house. You get older couples who rent their ground floors to young people to bring energy to the community; they aren’t trying to maximize profit. I studied this in New York and found survivability often depends on special landlords — like a co-op that likes having a bookstore downstairs or a family that bought the building forty years ago and likes the continuity. **Jamie:** Is what you’re describing a luxury good, or does it matter beyond how it feels? If we tried it in New York, would it only end up in fun areas like Park Slope or Downtown Brooklyn? **Joe:** When you give people flexibility, the optimal result for a given area can naturally emerge through micro-scale choices. In Tokyo, you have grandmas selling homemade lunchboxes out of their ground floors for $4\. When you allow people to cook for their neighbors and monetize it without hassle, it is a pocketbook positive for entrepreneurial cooks and provides affordable food. That would arise organically in economically depressed areas. Regarding housing, I was shocked at the extent to which New York is nominally zoned for housing but 80% is considered at capacity. This is an artifact of floor area restrictions. **Jamie:** Let’s close with a lightning round. Commercial-to-residential conversion? **Joe:** I find it more interesting to turn offices into other forms of commercial space, like micro-commercial hubs, to break the norm of New Yorkers not looking up. **Jamie:** Ezra Klein and “Abundance”? **Joe:** I actually took Ezra around Tokyo when he was writing that. I fundamentally agree with the message. He’s arguing for a political prioritization. My prediction for Zoran is that he won’t dramatically transform the future of New York housing, but he’ll get more political credit than past politicians because he’s shown an appetite for boldness. **Jamie:** You have two sides to your life: foreign policy and urban issues. Are you an optimist about where we are in history? **Joe:** Short-term, I am very terrified. We are seeing a move toward dramatic development of military technologies and the shattering of old consensuses. Long-term, I am more optimistic that we’ll solve climate change because of advances in geoengineering technology. The youth scare me, but they also seem to be self-correcting and embracing in-person connection. I just turned 40, so the youth have informed me I am now an “unc.” **Jamie:** As a 58-year-old, I can tell you it’s liberating. Joe, I appreciate you coming by. Thanks for listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### A Diamond, a Mayor and a Citywide Lesson Plan URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/museum-art-repatriation-mamdani-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-05-14T15:33:04.000Z It is just after nine in the morning and I am facing a group of about 100 New York City fifth graders, preparing to speak to them about my latest novel for young people, an art repatriation museum heist set at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The auditorium’s stage is full of haphazardly stacked xylophones from a recent school concert, and it is over-warm and stuffy in the way that older city buildings can be in the late spring. Like pupils at any New York area school, these 10- and 11-year-olds on their wooden auditorium seats are of many colors and backgrounds, a wide range of heights and sizes. The kids are a little restless at first, but thankfully, I have been supplied a cordless microphone, so I’m able to walk among the students as I launch into my interactive presentation, asking them questions and allowing them to sometimes interrupt me in turn. I talk first about the infamous heist of the Mona Lisa from the Louvre in 1911, and the thief Vincenzo Peruggia’s [belief that the Italian masterpiece had been stolen by Napoleon and therefore belonged not in France](https://www.npr.org/2011/07/30/138800110/the-theft-that-made-the-mona-lisa-a-masterpiece?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but Leonardo’s home country of Italy. Soon, I’m connecting this to the issue of colonial looting of art and artifacts — encouraging students to ask the question where the art they see in museums came from, where it belongs and who has a right to own whose treasures. By the time I mention [Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s comment](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/30/nyregion/kohinoor-diamond-india-history-mamdani-king-charles.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) late last month that if he were granted time to speak privately with King Charles III during the monarch’s recent visit to the U.S, he would encourage him to return the Koh-I-Noor diamond, the students are entirely engaged, hooting and hollering in outrage at the gall of Britain and other colonial powers. The famed 105.6-carat Koh-I-Noor, which currently sits in the Tower of London as part of the British crown jewels, has long been a symbol of colonial plunder, as well as a touchstone for the issue of repatriation of looted artifacts to formerly colonized countries. The British Crown [claimed the massive diamond](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/true-story-koh-i-noor-diamondand-why-british-wont-give-it-back-180964660/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 1849 following the annexation of the Punjab. India, Pakistan and Afghanistan have all since demanded its return, citing that it was obtained through the aggressive and illegal coercion of a 10-year-old boy king after the imprisonment of his mother (Read the full sordid history at [Smithsonian Magazine](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/true-story-koh-i-noor-diamondand-why-british-wont-give-it-back-180964660/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).) The U.K. has resisted; in 2010, then-U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron [said](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10802469?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “If you say yes to one, you suddenly find the British Museum would be empty … it is going to have to stay put.” To whom do looted art and artifacts rightfully belong? When I was a museum-visiting child, I was never taught to ask such questions. Neither were my own now young adult children. Yet the tides of the broader cultural conversation seem to be shifting. The 2025 Louvre heist involving the French crown jewels, for instance, was [deemed a “colonial wake up call,”](https://hyperallergic.com/the-louvre-heist-was-a-colonial-wake-up-call/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) because the gemstones were mined by the French using exploited labor when they laid claim to lands across Asia, Africa, and South America. (For more, [read the Associated Press’ description of the jewels’ origins](https://apnews.com/article/jewels-crown-louvre-1fc9ced982798bc5c292a2f58d075275?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which “moved through imperial networks that converted global labor, resources — and even slavery — into European prestige.”) Conversations about colonial looting — and what to do about it — have been increasingly in the zeitgeist. Ryan Coogler’s 2018 “Black Panther”opens with [a museum heist scene](https://news.artnet.com/art-world/black-panther-museum-heist-restitution-1233278?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that gestures to the repatriation of African art and artifacts.There is an entire BBC docuseries entitled [“Stuff the British Stole.”](https://www.bbc.com/video/docs/series/10227966?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Popular internet [memes](https://hyperallergic.com/can-we-meme-the-british-museum-into-doing-the-right-thing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) joke that Western museums are crime scenes, and [a video game called “Relooted”](https://www.npr.org/2026/02/24/nx-s1-5707283/relooted-is-a-game-about-repatriating-art?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) centers on the stealing back of looted African art. New York City museums are not above this sort of critique. In 2021, The Metropolitan Museum of Art [returned a few Benin Bronzes — among many taken by the British in an 1897 raid on Benin City — to Nigeria](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/arts/design/met-museum-benin-bronzes-nigeria.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In 2023, [it returned Khmer-era looted artworks to Cambodia and Thailand](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/15/arts/met-return-ancient-treasures.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In 2024, the museum [brought on its first head of provenance research](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/arts/met-museum-first-provenance-research-head.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and has established [inventories of repatriated antiquities](https://www.metmuseum.org/collections/570?pkgids=570&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as well as one for Nazi-era provenance research. Despite these [active and ongoing efforts](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/18/arts/design/met-museum-provenance-research-lucian-simmons.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [it continues to possess other objects historians consider looted](https://www.propublica.org/article/the-met-museum-native-american-collections?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Colonial looting did not limit itself to inanimate objects. In 2023, [art historian and legal scholar Erin L. Thompson’s investigative report for Hyperallergic](https://hyperallergic.com/a-new-york-museums-house-of-bones/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) revealed that the American Museum of Natural History had a collection of 12,000 individuals’ bodies and body parts, most from Indigenous and formerly colonized communities. These human remains were often gathered in the name of racist eugenic practices, projects of comparative anatomy designed to prove white racial superiority. Due perhaps to the public outcry after Thompson’s revelations, the museum changed course, [declaring it would no longer display such human remains publicly](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/arts/american-museum-natural-history-human-remains.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and closing two major halls displaying Native American objects, due to Biden-era federal regulations requiring museums to obtain consent from indigenous communities prior to displaying cultural items. For many, however, these actions feel long overdue. As an author of a novel for young people about art repatriation, what I hope Mamdani’s comment does is to open the door to more informed engagement with these issues in our own city. A critical component of New York’s identity is its museums. From the Met Cloisters to the South Street Seaport Museum and everything in between, not only do visitors from everywhere in the world enjoy our museums, but so do the city’s residents. For students, museum visits are often a part of school curricula. Programs like [Culture Pass](https://www.nypl.org/blog/2018/07/16/culturepass?s%5Fkwcid=AL!18508!3!339988332682!b!!g!!culture%20pass%20nyc&gad%5Fsource=1&gad%5Fcampaignid=1479435788&gbraid=0AAAAAD%5FjtH7AhnRoBvBz2InPLxEGGNyAX&gclid=CjwKCAjwzevPBhBaEiwAplAxvmpmKkhboNCgWVVSuB0a8cNr8L4lOQz9MUMbTiUVLvwlDWvJN9TRRxoCE5cQAvD%5FBwE&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Cool Culture](https://www.coolculture.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as well as free museum days and partnerships with educational institutions make New York’s museums accessible to a broad range of its families and children. Yet, as far as I’m aware, there is no consistent curricular component teaching New York’s students about colonial looting, or encouraging young people to ask where museum artifacts come from. As I have been traveling around New York City schools doing author visits, I’m consistently impressed by how simple the issue of repatriation is to young people: Stuff that was stolen (or obtained under fundamentally immoral or dishonest terms) should be returned. Once presented with the facts, the issue is plain and simple to most of our city’s students, many of whom are themselves from immigrant communities impacted by colonial histories. Yet for adults, whether academic colleagues or family members accompanying young people to events about my book, the issue seems more vexed. As one educator put it to me recently, didn’t repatriation of objects deny children of various immigrant diasporas the right to learn about their own culture? Couldn’t, say, the bombing of Iran have been stopped through more education in the U.S. about the beauty of Persian art? To me, such comments are consistent with the narratives that justified colonialism itself, the idea that colonialists ‘rescued’ art from irresponsible communities uninterested in or incapable of caring for their own precious treasures. They remind me of Edward Said’s [theory of Orientalism](https://hyperallergic.com/how-the-contemporary-art-world-repackages-orientalism/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — an idea of a backward and barbaric “other” who must be tamed and civilized — which has been used to not only justify colonialism, but continues to inform the way that Western institutions frame and view art from the rest of the world. The repatriation of ill-gotten works is not simply about possession, but the construction of collective cultural memory and therefore history itself. Diasporic immigrant children cannot learn about their own cultural objects without learning about the violence that brought those objects, and perhaps their own families, to the U.S. Current-day wars cannot unfortunately be avoided by eliding mention about past wars, invasions and colonial violence. Indeed, conversations about repatriation, [in the words of Erin Thompson](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/04/opinion/museums-artifacts-stolen.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), can actually enrich and deepen museums, whether that means better and more complete museum education or richer relationships with the communities from which art and artifacts originate. “Repatriation can make an opening rather than leave a hole,” [writes Thompson](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/04/opinion/museums-artifacts-stolen.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), citing several possibilities, including museums displaying replicas of repatriated objects, alongside videos of the original object in use in its country of origin, or commissioning work from modern-day artists working in their cultural traditions. Museums are what Michel Foucault called [heterotopias](https://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/foucault1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “worlds within worlds,” spaces that represent and reveal truths about the society in which they exist, as well as trouble them. Not just the treasures within museums, but the ethical standards of museums shape the way we understand ourselves, each other, our histories and futures. Even as Mayor Mamdani draws worldwide attention to the Koh-I-Noor’s potential return, his words are an opening for New York City in general, and New York City schools in particular, to deepen museum education. It is an opportunity for the city to ask questions about the looted art and human remains still being held in our museums, while engaging in meaningful conversations about repatriation and reparations. At a time when immigrant communities all over the country are dehumanized and [demonized by the president’s rhetoric](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-degrading-language-immigrants-rcna171120?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [terrorized by ICE raids](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/were-being-terrorized-what-mainers-are-seeing-as-ice-launches-operation-in-the-state?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City can change the narrative of what this country should treasure: ill-gotten goods from formerly colonized countries, or immigrant communities from those countries, the kids and families who truly make this city great. Due to our mayor’s albeit brief comments, New York has a meaningful opportunity right now to become a world leader in the arena of museum ethics and education. Diamonds may be forever, but a citywide anti-colonial museum curriculum could be our metropolis’ best friend. ### Call It What It Is: A State Bailout of New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-hochul-nyc-budget-bailout/ Last updated: 2026-05-14T21:23:12.000Z On the morning of May 12, 2026, Gov. Kathy Hochul and Mayor Zohran Mamdani [announced](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/05/governor-hochul-and-mayor-mamdani-announce-additional-aid-and-st?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=With%20this%20latest%20agreement%2C%20the,more%20affordable%20for%20working%20people.) that New York State would provide New York City with an additional $4 billion “in gap-closing support” over the current and upcoming fiscal years to enable the City to balance its FY 27 Executive Budget without the need for increased property taxes or significant reductions in services. The joint announcement noted that between the current budget year and the upcoming FY 27 Budget, the State had provided the City with $8 billion in additional resources, comprised of about $3 billion of additional direct State assistance and approximately $5 billion being State authority for the City to engage in financial engineering in the form of deferring pension contributions, a new pied-à-terre tax and permission for the City to delay implementation of the State’s small class-size unfunded mandate. Later that afternoon, Mamdani introduced New York City’s $124.7 billion FY 27 Executive Budget. The mayor’s narrative is that he was able to overcome a $12 billion budget deficit created, and hidden, by his predecessor. He argues that he accomplished this through the skillful identification of “waste” in City government and savings opportunities, increased State assistance won through his collegial relationship with Hochul and legislative leaders, and by “taxing the rich.” What is left of the mainstream media in New York saw things differently. The New York Post ran an [op-ed](https://nypost.com/2026/05/12/opinion/zohran-mamdanis-unbelievably-dishonest-budget/?utm%5Fcampaign=iphone%5Fnyp&utm%5Fsource=mail%5Fapp) titled “Zohran Mamdani’s unbelievably dishonest NYC budget.” The New York Daily Newseditorial headline was, “Logic triumphs over mayor’s initial very bad plans.” The editorial criticized the “tax the rich” rhetoric the mayor used as the organizing principle of his budget strategy, adding: “He is mayor now (and has been since Jan. 1) and must end his political campaigning.” All elected officials try to win the “history of the war” irrespective of whether they have actually won the war. Mamdani not only is no exception to that rule, he pays more attention than most to controlling the narrative. He built his political career on the combination of a bold agenda and an exceptionally effective communication strategy, using social media to communicate directly with his political and ideological base in New York City and beyond. Mamdani concluded his Executive Budget presentation by saying that he had “made the choice to tax the rich and reject the false inevitability of austerity.” In fact, very little of the City’s Budget gap was closed by taxing the rich — and although this is not an austerity budget in the sense that there are significant reductions in services or programs, this budget also does little to advance the ambitious affordability agenda on which Mamdani campaigned. It will take a few more days to parse all the nuances. But we know enough now to understand the extent to which Gov. Hochul bailed out the mayor from a fiscal dilemma that he largely ignored in his campaign. She arguably advanced both of their political needs in doing so. The mayor needed significant cooperation from the State to avoid deep cuts in services or unpopular property tax increases. The governor needs the political support of Mamdani’s political base in her upcoming re-election and to relieve pressure from progressives in the state Legislature. But despite Mamdani appearing to declare victory, New York City’s fiscal pressures are not going away. The City still faces a substantial structural budget deficit (i.e., recurring revenues minus recurring expenses). As New York City Comptroller Mark Levine said: “\[T\]he Executive Budget relies on $2.8 billion in one-time measures and $2.3 billion in short-term pension savings, without solving for the fact that City government continues to spend more than we take in, even in a year of record revenues …Taken together, these actions delay addressing the deeper structural imbalances in the City’s budget, as is clear from out-year gaps of $7.1 billion in FY 2028 growing to $9.8 billion in FY 2030.” Understanding the evolution of the City’s deficit-closing dance with the State and the strategies ultimately adopted to achieve a balanced budget holds clues for the obstacles Mamdani will face in the future as he attempts to implement the ambitious vision on which he was elected. ### Mayor Mamdani’s budget odyssey Mayor Mamdani’s budget odyssey began with his dramatic announcement on January 28, 2026, that he had discovered that New York City was facing a “budget crisis”: a $12 billion deficit that needed to be resolved in order for the City to enact a balanced budget by the constitutional deadline of June 30, 2026\. Mamdani insisted that he saw few opportunities to meaningfully close the budget gap through spending reductions. Instead, he called for New York State government to authorize the $9 billion of corporate and personal income tax increases he had campaigned on, as well as to increase State funding to address a “structural imbalance” between the City and the State. After the mayor’s announcement of the $12 billion deficit, it [was reported](https://nypost.com/2026/01/30/us-news/hochul-peeved-by-mamdanis-tax-the-rich-demands-as-he-claims-nyc-faces-12b-budget-hole/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that Gov. Hochul thought the City was exaggerating its budget problem to create leverage for the mayor’s priority of raising taxes on wealthy New Yorkers and large corporations. Indeed, by the time the mayor presented New York City’s Preliminary Budget on February 17, City Hall had reduced the size of the City’s deficit to $5.4 billion, primarily as a result of upward revenue revisions but also aided by a last-minute addition of $1.5 billion in new State funding on top of the roughly $1 billion in budget relief funding for the City that had been included in the governor’s initial Executive Budget. Even with this smaller deficit, the mayor continued to insist that the problem could only be solved by the State. In a transparent effort to force the State’s hand, the Mayor threatened to increase New York City property taxes — the only tax the City can increase without State approval — by 9.5% unless the State authorized the alternative taxes he proposed and substantially increased State funding to the City. In the end, both the Governor and the Mayor got what they needed. The governor was able to find enough other resources for New York City through a combination of additional State aid and State authorization of City actions to bail out the City without increased personal income taxes or increased corporate taxes. The mayor got Albany’s support for $7.5 billion of additional resources between increased aid, relief of unfunded mandates and authorization of pension “smoothing,” plus a new pied-à-terre tax supposedly worth $500 million, which enabled the mayor’s frame of his budget solution in the context of “taxing the rich.” Although not the largest contributor to deficit reduction, the signature initiative of New York City’s FY 27 Budget is certainly that new tax on luxury second homes. Such a tax was not a radical idea. It had been seriously considered in 2019, with even Gov. Cuomo reported as being open to the idea if it advanced through the legislature. Several obstacles have stood in the way since. First, it is difficult to operationalize given the complexity of New York City’s real estate tax law. Second, previous studies suggested it would not raise that much revenue. A [study](https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/new-options-december-2020.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by New York City’s Independent Budget Office in 2020 concluded a tax on second homes with a value above $5 million would only raise approximately $232 million a year. Third, and decisively, it was bitterly opposed by New York’s real estate industry, which argued it would sufficiently impair market value and wind up rendering many new luxury projects uneconomic. Although the pied-à-terre tax could have been sold to the public as a relatively modest proposal that addresses the inequity of wealthy part-time residents avoiding the high State and City income taxes borne by full-time residents, Mamdani had the opposite goal in mind. He wanted to present the pied-à-terre tax as fulfilling his promise to “tax the rich.” He boasted about the tax in a social media video that was uncharacteristically off-key, “naming and shaming” the billionaire Ken Griffin as being a representative target of the tax. The video unleashed a ferocious backlash from New York City’s business and media elite, reinforcing many of the negative perceptions of the mayor that he had been working to reverse. As for the pied-à-terre tax itself, as of this writing, the provisions of the law remain unclear, reflecting the difficulty of translating a simple concept into programmatic language. The New York City Comptroller, Mark Levine, said his office [estimated](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/nyc-comptroller-mark-levine-releases-comprehensive-estimation-of-a-potential-pied-a-terre-tax-and-key-uncertainties/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the tax would quite possibly raise only about $340 million to $380 million because of tax-avoidance efforts by owners of second homes. In short, the pied-à-terre tax is not a bad idea, but the amount of revenue it can produce is paltry within a $125 billion budget, and it comes with intangible baggage in the form of loss of business confidence. > Budget watchdogs view stretching out pension obligations as the road to perdition, and this deferral may rattle the bond rating agencies that have already reduced the outlook on New York City’s debt from Stable to Negative. So where did the money come from? The largest single gap-closing measure in the New York City budget involves deferral of pension contributions. Instead of amortizing the unfunded liability in New York City pension plans by 2032 as required under current law, that obligation will be stretched out to 2037\. This will save New York City $652 million in FY26 and $1.64 billion in FY27\. Budget watchdogs view stretching out pension obligations as the road to perdition, and this deferral may rattle the bond rating agencies that have already reduced the outlook on New York City’s debt from Stable to Negative. Moreover, this deferral of contributions is subject to the approval of the City’s five pension plans, which at a minimum gives the public employee unions considerable leverage in upcoming contract negotiations. That said, with the governor ruling out significant new taxes and the mayor ruling out meaningful program cuts, this act of financial engineering, at least in hindsight, looks inevitable. In addition to calling for significantly increased taxes on the rich, the mayor based his strategy for closing the City’s budget gap on the argument that decisions by Gov. Andrew Cuomo during his time in office from 2011-2021 had shifted funding away from New York City and created a “structural imbalance” between the City and the State. This argument always ignored the fact that the State had assumed far more spending that the City historically had been responsible for — about [$1.5 billion annually](https://nypost.com/2026/05/12/us-news/nyc-dumping-record-43b-into-public-schools-at-whopping-44k-per-pupil-despite-plummeting-enrollment-poor-test-results/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) just from freezing the City’s Medicaid contribution. It similarly ignored actions Mamdani had supported in the state Assembly, such as the unfunded mandate for smaller class sizes. In any event, the reversal of fortune between the City and the State in recent years was attributable to the fact that New York State significantly increased income taxes on high earners in 2021, while the City did not. This action, combined with the exceptionally strong stock market over the last three years, has left the State with an embarrassment of riches in fiscal terms, while the City now faces a deep structural deficit. The State could have used a number of mechanisms to drive funding to New York City, at least some of which would have been justified in light of the change in the City’s financial position relative to that of the State. As it happens, the State chose to direct approximately $1 billion of funding in the Executive Budget that could be construed as budget relief, mostly in the form of increased child care spending, $1.5 billion over two years (of which $500 million was non-recurring) in additional assistance in the 30-day amendments to the Executive Budget and approximately $352 million of direct assistance in the package announced on May 12, 2026\. Other than the pension smoothing and the pied-à-terre tax, the City’s gap-closing actions fall primarily into two buckets. First, the City is saving approximately $1 billion by delaying the implementation of two major program expenses — the small class-size initiative and the expansion of the CityFHEPS rental subsidy program. In addition, the City assumes it will save approximately $149 million by stemming [the tide of the growth in special education due-process cases, which now cost the City approximately $1.4 billion annually](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/exec26/erc5-26.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This has long been a policy goal of City Hall, but has proven very difficult to implement in the real world. What is second nature to fiscal experts but not always intuitive to the general public is that “savings” typically involve reductions in baseline growth rather than the actual elimination of spending. About $300 million of the bucket of savings in this case comes from budgeting increased staff vacancies, while much of the rest comes from the familiar goal of increasing “efficiency” in government operations and programs. No doubt that in a $125 billion budget, efficiencies can be achieved. With the potential of AI, in particular, the extent to which efficiencies can be realized is as much a matter of political choice as it is technical capability. ### Conclusion The way in which Mayor Mamdani has managed his first budget is fairly conventional. Blaming one’s predecessors for fiscal problems is par for the course. Faced with the dilemma of choosing between unpopular spending cuts and unpopular broad-based taxes, financial engineering such as deferring pension contributions is a budget director’s best friend. The mayor was fortunate that New York State is in its strongest fiscal position in 50 years — and can afford to rebalance spending obligations with New York City. Finally, the mood of the times makes taxing the rich in the form of a pied-à-terre tax acceptable even to a moderate governor. What is less typical is the chasm between the expectations Mamdani created for his administration and the amount that can actually be accomplished not just now, but for the foreseeable future. Something major will have to give — such as a willingness for the State to enact significant increases in personal income taxes on high earners and corporate taxes — or not even someone with Mamdani’s exceptional political skills can square this circle. ### Mamdani’s Supermarket Mistake URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-city-run-grocery-stores-small-businesses-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-06-22T17:19:21.000Z My first job ever was working at my father’s Met Foods grocery store in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn. Like most of his employees, I did whatever was needed, from stocking shelves to checking out customers. I learned a lot about how small businesses survive by understanding their community's particular needs and dedicating themselves to meeting them. Perhaps more importantly, the exposure at such an impressionable young age to co-workers of vastly different economic, ethnic and social groups made me appreciate that no matter how hard people may work, the circumstances of where they come from have a huge impact on where they wind up. It also gives me a special perspective on Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s plans to create a small network of government-run supermarkets, which clash with so much else he purports to believe in. Mamdani has weighed in on the value of small businesses — and pledged to make their lives easier, by streamlining regulations and reducing fines, among other things. “You cannot tell the story of New York without our small businesses. Yet, our city has long made it too hard for these same businesses to open their doors, and to keep them open,” he’s said. Most New Yorkers would agree with that quote and would prefer a city with fewer large generic chain stores and more “mom and pop” unique local businesses. The preference for small, local businesses has a strong foundation. Such businesses provide a critical rung on the ladder of opportunity for many New Yorkers. My father was the classic story: After graduating from high school, he worked in a relative’s grocery store in Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn. A few years later, he started his own store, giving our family a ticket to the middle class. The amount of work and hours involved in keeping it afloat astonish me (someone who spent years working in a large corporate law firm) to this day. Although it never allowed us to rise above middle income, it gave him, and to some extent me, a sense of agency usually reserved for people much higher on the income spectrum. My family and I, however, were far from the only beneficiaries of his business. Small businesses like grocery stores typically have a much more informal hiring process than large businesses, which rely on detailed policies and procedures. As a result, mom-and-pops often employ people who might not be hired by big chains or the government and give them the opportunity to join a union (as his employees did). These include senior citizens running low on cash, people who have long since made amends for early brushes with the law and people with documentation issues but with a family that needs to survive. Small businesses have the flexibility and incentive to treat their employees more humanely, as they are people who work directly with the owner daily and not statistics in a corporate or government database overseen by a human resources department. Small businesses also have the ability to help customers who may temporarily be financially strapped or have special needs, and they play a greater role in the community of which the local store is an integral part. Which brings me back to the mayor’s signature initiative to open a City-owned grocery store in each of the five boroughs — a plan that cuts in the opposite direction of so much of his rhetoric and positioning. These publicly owned grocery stores are likely to offer benefits and pricing that undercut independently owned businesses. Let’s do some math. The project’s estimated cost totals $70 million, with the Manhattan store in East Harlem alone costing $30 million. Mamdani’s [stated aim](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani-announces-la-marqueta-as-first-site-identified-for?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is “to deliver affordable, high-quality groceries that provide meaningful savings to New Yorkers and strengthen neighborhood food access citywide.” But the East Harlem site is hardly a “food desert.” It is within a 35-minute walk of approximately 45 existing grocery stores, which vary from small bodegas to large chains, and is well serviced by public transportation allowing access elsewhere. Clearly, there are people suffering from food insecurity in this part of Harlem. But they are not food insecure because they lack access to a place that sells food. They are food insecure because they lack the money to buy that food. Is it possible the proposed store will sell groceries at meaningfully lower prices than competing stores? Perhaps — but if so, that will be only because it pays no rent and has a steady stream of government support that small businesses can’t compete with. As I know only too well from personal experience, existing grocery stores have notoriously low profit margins, which are [often estimated to be between 1% and 3%](https://smallbusiness.chron.com/profit-margin-supermarket-22467.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mamdani’s proposed stores will pay no rent and no property taxes — benefits that none of the other thousands of places that sell groceries in the city get. The $30 million price for a single 9,000-square-foot Manhattan location works out to over $3,000 per square foot. Although there is not good data on the per square foot cost of setting up grocery stores, the data suggests that this is far in excess of what it should cost. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is [almost four times what it would cost to set up a comparable business](https://nypost.com/2026/04/17/real-estate/mamdanis-nyc-grocery-store-will-cost-4-times-the-normal-price-to-build/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These subsidies and expenses, which will undermine existing taxpaying businesses, raise the question of whether this program makes sense at a time when the City is facing multibillion-dollar deficits. If the goal is to address hunger, this is a particularly inefficient way of doing it. It will not help the many budget-constrained New Yorkers who do not have convenient access to these stores and will help the many non-budget constrained New Yorkers who do have convenient access to them. Furthermore, the most severely budget-constrained New Yorkers will still have trouble paying even the reduced prices. Clearly, there are many more efficient ways to help food-insecure New Yorkers. Existing initiatives include [Health Bucks](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/health-bucks.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that help residents stretch their food stamp dollars at farmers markets, [the Green Carts program](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/business/food-operators/green-carts.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that helps increase access to fresh fruits and vegetables through street vendors and the FRESH initiative that helps facilitate grocery stores opening in underserved neighborhoods. These are all laudable projects that could be scaled up with the funding that will be going to City-run grocery stores. More funding for food pantries and for local residents cut off from federal [SNAP benefit reductions](https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-tracker-people-are-losing-food-assistance-as-the-republican-megabill?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) would also address food insecurity more efficiently. The mayor’s well-expressed preference for small businesses, like the one my father owned, is based on so much more than a mere nostalgia for a time when small, independent, unique and somewhat quirky stores were able to thrive in the city. So many of these have been pushed out by giant corporations running national, or international, operations. Those that have managed to hang on deserve help from the City, not competition from yet another deep-pocketed competitor. ### New York’s Wooden Water Tanks: A Perfect Fusion of Form and Function URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-wooden-water-tanks-architecture-history/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T16:25:42.000Z New York is a city of towers, and not just the skyscraper variety. Sitting atop many of the city’s buildings are towers of a different type — the modest but ingenious water tank. Capped with conical roofs, these instantly recognizable cylindrical features of the skyline have contributed to the city’s signature look for nearly a century and a half. It is estimated that more than 5,600 water tanks currently populate the cityscape. How didthese structures come into being, and why have they far surpassed their utilitarian value to become a symbol of the city? The answer tells us as much about the city’s character as it does about physics and economics. In a quintessentially New York mix, long-entrenched commerce, artistic imagination and stubborn practicality — an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” attitude — have all contributed to this enduring urban phenomenon. New York’s built environment has long been shaped by public health and safety concerns. It was, for example, not only the desire to humanely house the poor that led to the passage of the city’s first Tenement House Law (1867), which set minimum standards for residential buildings. One powerful perception repeatedly catalyzed reform — namely, the idea that slum dwellings lacking sanitary facilities, as well as adequate natural light and ventilation, served as incubators of infectious diseases. Similarly, the development of New York’s vast municipal water system, the envy of cities around the world, was rooted in public health issues. The lack of sanitary systems rendered privately operated wells, including those drawing water from a spring-fed pond in lower Manhattan known as the Collect Pond, extremely hazardous. In 1842, to address this issue, as well as the need to provide significant protection from fire, the damming of Westchester’s Croton River led to the creation of the Croton Aqueduct system. Like subsequently established municipal water systems in Boston and San Francisco, it relied on gravity. Though the Croton Reservoirs stood at an elevation of only about 60 feet, by the time water reached the city, the pressure created by the water’s weight was sufficient to push it up to the level of a building’s sixth story. By the 1880s, however, the passenger elevator and steel-frame construction had allowed buildings to rise above 10 stories. At the same time, the demand for water skyrocketed as the result of both the city’s burgeoning population and the widespread adoption of indoor plumbing. Natural water pressure no longer sufficed. The rooftop water tank, along with the development of powerful electric pumps, offered a solution to the distribution problem posed by tall buildings. Water could be pumped up to a building’s roof and stored in a tank. When a building occupant turned on a faucet, gravity was on their side. Water depletion prompted a coordinating pump to trigger refilling, functioning much like a toilet. As New York rapidly became a skyscraping city, its barrel-making industry was eager to fulfill the unprecedented demand for wooden tanks. (The city solidified this demand by legally mandating that all buildings over six stories be equipped with rooftop water tanks.) Barrel-maker William Dalton expanded his business, founded in 1866, to produce the new product, and in 1894, he sold his business to an employee, Harris Rosenwach, who established an eponymous water tank business. Four years earlier, in 1890, Isseks Brothers had become the first company expressly founded to manufacture water tanks, and by 1920, the two manufacturers had been joined by a third: American Pipe & Tank. The companies became the city’s principal producers of water tanks. Tap and drag to explore. [Open full screen ↗](https://vitalcity-nyc.github.io/nyc-water-towers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Today’s wooden water tanks are not merely vestiges of the Industrial Age. They continue to be built and installed. In the New York City area, the same three multi-generational, family-owned businesses dominate the industry, manufacturing 90% of the city’s water tanks. Wooden water tanks typically last 25 to 30 years, so while many new buildings incorporate sophisticated basement pumps that turn on and off based on demand and can distribute water directly to locations throughout a building, eliminating the need for rooftop tanks, replacement of existing tanks keeps manufacturers in business. And some new buildings opt for installing the older technology. Amazingly, traditional cooperage materials and building methods are still used. Wood is favored over steel or concrete because it is less expensive and requires less maintenance. Additionally, it provides significant insulation, preventing the water within a tank from freezing in the winter or getting too warm in the summer. Redwood and cedar are the woods of choice due to their light weight and resistance to insect infestation and decay. The average wooden tank, 10 to 12 feet high and capable of holding up to 10,000 gallons of water, is constructed of precut lumber and assembled on site, usually within 24 hours. Individual components too large to fit in a freight elevator are hoisted up the outside of a building. Three-inch-thick strips of wood (known as staves), narrower at the ends than in the middle, are grooved on the bottom to fit into floorboards. Staves are installed in a circular fashion around a base to form a cylinder. Cables are then placed around the wood. A conical cover, or “hat,” which adds a distinctive and almost humorous dimension to the design, serves to keep out debris. Once complete, the barrellike tank can be lifted onto steel stilts. When the tank is filled, water initially leaks out, but as the wood dampens and expands, the tank becomes watertight. Miraculously, neither nails nor synthetic sealants are used. Some buildings hide their water tanks behind brick or concrete enclosures, but so iconic have the wooden structures become that a 1994 set of voluntary design guidelines for residential buildings in Lower Manhattan’s Battery Park City encouraged exposed rooftop water tanks “if they are of the traditional wood barrel type.” Five years later, in his design for the high-end apartment building at 400 Chambers Street, the architect Robert A.M. Stern followed the development’s guidelines. Sitting atop a massive rooftop platform, a classical New York water tank became a highly visible element of the building’s design. How did such practical structures enter the realm of urban mythology? In the early decades of the 20th century, artists, including Ash Can School member John Sloan and Edward Hopper, acknowledged water tanks as a ubiquitous feature of the city. Later, in the 1970s, the German conceptual artists Bern and Hilla Becher created meticulously assembled grids of black and white photographs that celebrated the New York water tanks they described as “anonymous sculpture.” In 1976, as New Yorkers responded to the impact of the fiscal crisis with a reinvigorated sense of pride (bordering on chauvinism), Saul Steinberg’s memorable *New Yorker* cover illustration, “View of the World from Ninth Avenue,” featured multiple water tanks as an indispensable part of the city’s visual vocabulary. Twenty-two years later, the Public Art Fund commissioned the British artist Rachel Whitereid to create a sculpture; she sought to depict an object she considered to encapsulate New York. While visiting Brooklyn and looking across the East River at the Manhattan skyline, she was struck by the ubiquity of water tanks. The resulting work, “Water Tower,” a life-size translucent resin cast, was initially displayed on a rooftop in SoHo and subsequently became part of the Museum of Modern Art’s permanent collection. Today New York’s rooftop wooden water tanks stand proudly, miniature versions of the water towers that loom over smaller low-lying towns and communities nationwide. Byproducts of age-old craft and 19th-century technology, they continue not only to efficiently serve our daily needs, but to fascinate us. Perhaps this is because they seem to stand outside of time, antiquated, yet up to date. Or perhaps it is because unlike so many technologies in the Digital Age, which defy common understanding, we can readily comprehend how water is collected, stored and distributed. In the wooden water tank, we see not only practical accommodation but also the perfect fusion of form and function. ### The Voting Rights Act in New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/voting-rights-act-nyc-supreme-court/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T14:46:48.000Z Coverage of the Supreme Court’s decision last week to undo Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act — a ruling that will make it more difficult to create “majority-minority” voting districts — has focused on its effects on minority representation in the South. Specifically, commentators have shone a spotlight on how the Act has uprooted deeply racist voting practices in places like Louisiana, where the current challenge had been playing out. Even New Yorkers deeply disturbed by the ruling likely comforted themselves in part with the thought that they at least live in a state where the just and heavy hand of the federal government was not needed to keep racist voting rules at bay. That self-assurance was no doubt reinforced if they were lucky enough to have seen Bryan Cranston’s Tony Award-winning portrayal of Lyndon Johnson’s megalomaniac machinations to pass the bill, which focused almost entirely on uprooting anti-Black voter suppression in the former Confederacy. That view of this crucial federal legislation is far too narrow. Indeed, virtually every core element of New York City’s current governmental structure has been shaped by New York City itself being subject to that very same Voting Rights Act. Not in 1965 or in 1969, but in the late 1980s. I should know. Because as a junior, just-out-of-college staffer to the 1988 and 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commissions led first by Richard Ravitch and then Frederick A. O. Schwarz, it was my responsibility to compile, photocopy and collate our submission to the Justice Department for pre-clearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. All 20,000 pages of it. Because of its past history of discriminatory voting practices in Manhattan, Queens and the Bronx (specifically, English literacy tests in the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections, combined with low turnout), New York City needed federal approval, or “preclearance,” before changing any voting laws in any of those “covered” counties. And thanks to a unanimous 9-0 [Supreme Court ruling](https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/23/nyregion/justices-void-new-york-city-s-government-demand-voter-equality-in-all-boroughs.html?searchResultPosition=16&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on March 22, 1989, in [Board of Estimate v. Morris](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/489/688/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City’s voting laws needed to change, big time. The problem was that the city’s distinctive and all-powerful quasi-legislative body, the Board of Estimate, which made virtually every major decision and approved every City contract and land use action, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, specifically the principle of one-person, one-vote. Created when the five boroughs consolidated as a single city in 1898 and amended a few years later to add Borough Presidents, the Board of Estimate’s structure was designed in part to balance citywide and borough interests.. Along with citywide elected officials who each had two votes, each borough president had one vote. But as the plaintiff’s lawyer Richard Emery noted, there was a problem, one that New York’s political establishment chose to ignore for almost a century: It wildly distorted an individual voter’s power. Staten Island’s borough president, who represented 350,000 people, had the same voting power as Brooklyn’s borough president, who represented 2.2 million people. Ditto for voter dilution in Manhattan, Queens and the Bronx. While the Voting Rights Act was not central to the Supreme Court decision, it became an [essential lens](https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/25/nyregion/planners-must-satisfy-voting-law-in-the-shifting-of-municipal-power.html?searchResultPosition=2&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through which any new form of government and decision-making would be viewed. It was not lost on people that Staten Island’s population was far less diverse than the more populous boroughs, adding another layer of inequity to be remedied beyond the mathematically simple issue of one-person, one-vote. A central issue was what to do with the City Council, an entity so lacking in gravitas and power that onetime at-large Councilman Henry Stern said that it was “less than a rubber stamp because a rubber stamp at least leaves an impression.” The first step in that Charter revision was to give it more power, including many of the legislative and land-use powers the Board of Estimate had held. And since some of the other Board powers, such as the approval of contracts, were more logically shifted to the executive branch, the traditional legislative oversight powers seen at the national and state level needed to be enhanced as well. Hand in hand with the question of how to empower the Council in a manner consistent with federal antidiscrimination law was the question of how diverse it would be. The existing Council consisted of 35 equally populated districts; 10 additional at-large borough seats, two representing each of the five boroughs, had been eliminated in a 1983 charter revision.It became clear that the recent elimination of the at-large seats was not enough to create a more diverse and locally-responsible legislative body and that the overall number of equally-populated council districts needed to significantly increase. Staff conducted [detailed research](https://www.proquest.com/docview/208169508?parentSessionId=TzY1iQyyumXBD11YcZRkST%2FnpnxoGALDzD16QKmfY4A%3D&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (to which I was lucky enough to contribute) and after considerable deliberation, the Commission decided to increase the number of Council seats to 51, holding populations constant across the districts. While many voices feared strengthening a body with a lackluster record and reputation, others recognized that a reconstituted body had the power to significantly [alter the racial balance of power](https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/06/weekinreview/the-region-recasting-city-council-to-make-room-for-more-minority-voices.html?searchResultPosition=7&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the city. A significant coalition of groups representing minority interests, led by then-Bronx Borough President Freddy Ferrer, feared that the provisions would result in an “imperial mayor.” Ferrer called the proposed revisions a [“gross infringement of the Voting Rights Act”](https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/04/nyregion/ferrer-to-fight-charter-plan-at-the-justice-department.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and vowed to challenge them at the Justice Department. As a junior staffer I knew that my writing and thinking had a minimal impact on the Commission’s work. Arguably it was my physical work — my brawn rather than my brain — that mattered more and which also signalled how very seriously the Commission and its staff took the Voting Rights preclearance process. Across multiple volumes and more than 20,000 pages, I had to help catalogue, collate, index and copy every single transcript, piece of testimony, research memo, legal brief, sign-in sheet, legislative history and angry letter from disrespected machine pols to Staten Island secessionists. At the end of the day, the Justice Department reviewed what the New York Times called [“a small truckload of documents”](https://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/03/realestate/assessing-new-york-s-charter-change.html?searchResultPosition=2&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and found that the proposed charter revisions passed legal muster, at least through the lens of the Voting Rights Act. Interestingly, because of the compressed time frame after the Supreme Court decision in the spring of an election year, that approval didn’t come until *after* the voters had had their say, approving the charter changes in November 1989 by approximately 55% to 45%. While those approvals resulted in the most significant changes in New York City’s governance in 90 years, what far more New Yorkers recall about that historic election was the mayor’s race: David Dinkins defeated Rudy Giuliani by a much slimmer margin to become the city’s first black mayor. In a single day, through the mayoral election and the Charter referendum, the racial balance of power in New York City changed dramatically. Four years later, David Dinkins lost to Rudy Giuliani, but the newly empowered and more racially diverse Council was here to stay, thanks to the Voting Rights Act. ### A Different Waymo Future Is Possible URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/waymo-nyc-robotaxi-future/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T14:06:32.000Z In some sunbelt cities, robotaxis are becoming part of everyday life. In Atlanta, Austin, Los Angeles, Phoenix and San Francisco, you can ride a Waymo to your destination with no human behind the wheel. But [not](https://www.wgbh.org/news/local/2025-07-24/driverless-cars-run-into-resistance-at-boston-city-council?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [yet](https://www.wired.com/story/waymo-hits-a-rough-patch-in-washington-dc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the Northeast. In New York, robotaxis are stalled. In January, Gov. Kathy Hochul [proposed](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-unveils-proposals-fuel-innovation-and-create-good-paying-jobs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) legislation to authorize pilot programs for robotaxis. Her plan would have required companies to obtain the approval of local communities before deploying robotaxis, and it excluded New York City entirely. But even this incremental approach proved too controversial. In February, Hochul [withdrew](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/19/nyregion/new-york-robotaxi-upstate-hochul.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) her proposal. At the same time, there is a [bill](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/7390/text?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) moving through Congress that would preempt much state regulation of robotaxis and other forms of automated driving. A House committee already [voted](https://www.youtube.com/live/FrwkCCiUDfU?t=3906s&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to advance the bill. If the bill becomes law, it could deprive states and cities of their say over many of the rules that govern these new technologies on their streets. As one of us recently [testified](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bm7f95ZxZY&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to Congress, we believe both in the potential of automated driving and in the [imperative](https://newlypossible.org/files/2026SenateAnswers.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of community control. Robotaxis could transform cities for the better — but only if policymakers steer them in the right direction. In a new [paper](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=5595951&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we argue that robotaxi policy should have three goals: (1) improving safety, (2) reducing externalities and (3) protecting the public. First, robotaxis must realize their [potential](https://ssrn.com/abstract=2923240?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to make the roads safer. Robotaxis can avoid many of the errors that lead human drivers to crash. When designed and deployed carefully, they follow speed limits, obey stop signs and traffic lights, and yield the right of way more consistently than human drivers. But they can also make errors that most human drivers wouldn’t make. They have driven around stopped [school buses](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-safety-board-opens-probe-into-waymo-robotaxis-passing-stopped-school-buses-2026-01-23/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), steered into [flooded roads](https://carbonandcode.substack.com/p/i-almost-crashed-in-a-waymo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and crashed into a [telephone pole](https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2024/RCLRPT-24E049-1733.PDF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [Credible peer-reviewed work](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15389588.2025.2499887?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by [Waymo](https://waymo.com/safety/impact/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the leading US robotaxi company, suggests that its robotaxis are involved in far fewer injury crashes than humans driving in comparable conditions. Independent safety researchers should thoroughly engage with Waymo’s data, methodologies and conclusions. And it’s too early to say that robotaxis are saving lives: Even Waymo has not driven [enough miles](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research%5Freports/RR1400/RR1478/RAND%5FRR1478.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and one catastrophic crash could negate years of safety statistics. But these early results are encouraging, particularly given the tragic status quo on our streets. State legislators can help regulators and the public learn more about robotaxi safety by requiring that companies report crashes. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) already [mandates](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=4190688&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) crash reporting at the federal level. But NHTSA lets companies redact important information. New York can fill this gap by requiring companies to report crashes and miles driven not just within its borders, but in any state or country where they operate. And for serious crashes, regulators should require companies to share video, with personally identifiable information obscured. As recent events have [illustrated](https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000010631041/minneapolis-ice-shooting-video.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), video has credibility that a narrative crafted by an interested party can’t provide. Then, state and local regulators should use crash reports to monitor safety. If a crash suggests deeper problems with a company’s technology, regulators should investigate. If they determine a company is creating an unreasonable risk, they should order it off the roads. Safety is about more than just avoiding crashes. For example, in December, a blackout in San Francisco caused many of the city’s traffic lights to go dark. As a result, robotaxis got [stranded](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/21/us/waymo-suspended-service-in-san-francisco-after-problems-during-power-outage.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the streets. Waymo [explained](https://waymo.com/blog/2025/12/autonomously-navigating-the-real-world?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that its software was designed to check in with a remote assistant before proceeding past a non-functional traffic light, and the blackout caused the remote assistants to be overwhelmed. This incident [shows](https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2025/12/on-waymos-traffic-jams/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that regulators need to stress-test companies’ emergency planning proactively. How will a company respond in the event of a hurricane, a riot or a cyberattack? Will their fleets be sufficient to help in an evacuation? Robotaxis are not really “driverless”: Their drivers are the companies that develop and deploy them. State regulators accustomed to licensing human drivers should similarly have the power to license these corporate drivers, to enforce traffic laws against them — including fines — and to require a sufficient corporate presence in the state. Second, regulation should ensure that robotaxis don’t impose unfair costs on third parties. Here, regulators face hard tradeoffs. All motor vehicles cause pollution and congestion. The deployment of robotaxis could be an opportunity to reduce those externalities because it’s politically [easier](https://ssrn.com/abstract=3463827?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to regulate a few companies deploying a novel technology than millions of drivers who are accustomed to roads being free. That’s why states have been able to require robotaxi companies to have more insurance than most human drivers would. But at the same time, imposing costs on robotaxis but not personal vehicle owners could distort consumer choices. Robotaxis should be able to fairly compete against other modes, including, eventually, individually owned automated vehicles. On pollution, the good news is that today’s robotaxis are all battery electric vehicles. The bad news is that, even though electric vehicles have no tailpipes, they still generate pollution from upstream energy use and [tire emissions](https://e360.yale.edu/features/tire-pollution-toxic-chemicals?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We would mandate that all automated vehicles use batteries or an alternative fuel to prevent backsliding and then use broad-based environmental regulation to address these other emissions sources. Congestion can’t be [“solved,”](https://ssrn.com/abstract=2303907?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but robotaxis could help or hurt. Robotaxi fleets should be utilized more productively than ordinary cars — they shouldn’t spend most of the day depreciating in parking garages. But if robotaxis make car travel more convenient, there will be more car trips. Policymakers should therefore integrate robotaxis into congestion pricing systems, like New York’s [successful](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-22/nyc-congestion-pricing-is-the-controversial-program-working?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program, treating them like regular taxis or Ubers. They should also charge all vehicles-for-hire a per-mile fee between rides, so the companies internalize the costs of circling the streets waiting for passengers. Robotaxis could also create a new kind of externality — [surveillance](https://ssrn.com/abstract=5034907?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The sensors they use to perceive objects in their environment passively record their surroundings. And that means every person within range is being recorded too. In some cases, that sensor data could help cities [detect](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/waymo-robotaxi-autonomous-driving-nyc/) potholes or investigate crimes. We have no objection to companies disclosing data when investigators obtain a valid warrant. But we are concerned that robotaxi companies are already [sharing](https://www.vice.com/en/article/san-francisco-police-are-using-driverless-cars-as-mobile-surveillance-cameras/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) video data voluntarily. Companies have strong incentives to do favors for law enforcement and little incentive to protect bystander privacy. Policymakers need to set rules about how robotaxi companies can use privacy-sensitive data, when they can share it, and when they must delete it. Third, regulators need to protect the public, including those who want to ride and those who do not. The easiest way to keep prices low and service quality high is to encourage competition, both among robotaxi companies and across travel modes. If Waymo raises its fares today, riders can easily switch to a bus, a taxi, or an Uber. But what if fares fall and robotaxis start to outcompete other modes? The transportation market could become highly concentrated. Robotaxis benefit from network effects — the more riders on a network, the less time each vehicle spends deadheading between rides. So larger networks can be more profitable. That’s why the ride-hailing market became an Uber-Lyft [duopoly](https://toddwschneider.com/dashboards/nyc-taxi-ridehailing-uber-lyft-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A similar dynamic could emerge for robotaxis. How can we protect riders if a few robotaxi companies come to dominate our transportation system? Imagine you had a friend who was moving to New York from Texas. Suppose you were trying to convince her that she wouldn’t need a car to live here. You would explain that the subway runs 24/7, that it covers most of the city, and that the fare is always three dollars. You could say that because the subway is a public service, the MTA isn’t trying to squeeze every last penny out of its riders. But a private company might stand to gain from taking advantage of riders who come to rely on its service. Indeed, there is evidence that Uber’s increasing profitability has been fueled by [algorithms that tailor prices](https://len-sherman.medium.com/how-uber-became-a-cash-generating-machine-ef78e7a97230?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to individual riders. Regulators should ban personalized pricing for fares in robotaxis as well as conventional ride-hails. Every rider who requests the same trip at the same time in the same mode should get the same fare. Robotaxi companies will almost certainly record every trip's origin, destination, time and fare; regulators should have access to the same data for the limited purpose of detecting personalized pricing. If a robotaxi company acquires monopoly power and starts to raise its fares across the board, regulators should impose utility regulation. We expect that the companies won’t love these proposals, yet we think they might encourage robotaxi adoption. People might be much more willing to give up their cars if they know companies can’t take advantage of them. Robotaxis should be accessible. The industry has long argued that robotaxis will give new freedom to people with disabilities. Regulators should hold companies to their promises. They could require that robotaxi designs be [accessible](https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradtempleton/2023/09/20/cruise-shows-origin-robotaxi-with-wheelchair-ramp-many-disabled-options-possible/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for people who use wheelchairs and other commonly used mobility devices. Or if that’s impractical, they could impose accessibility requirements on each company, create a market similar to emissions trading, and then monitor wait times and fares to ensure that people who need accessible vehicles experience service comparable to other riders. Our proposals for regulation don’t address all the policy issues that robotaxis raise, including their effect on employment. It’s also understandable that residents of transit-rich cities like New York are more skeptical of robotaxis than residents of car-dependent cities like Phoenix. We, too, are fans of public transit — one of us commutes on the subway (and the other bikes to work). We doubt that robotaxis will make high-throughput transit obsolete. At least on our current streets, a fleet of robotaxis couldn’t move as many people from Harlem to Midtown on Lexington Avenue nearly as effectively as the subway underneath it. But not every transit line is like the Lexington Avenue subway. Wide swaths of New York City, let alone other parts of the state, are served only by buses that run infrequently. In these areas, the deployment of robotaxis could expand mobility. And to the extent robotaxis do replace low-throughput transit, state and local governments should subsidize rides for people with low incomes. In the long run, robotaxis could change the transportation system for the better. They could make the roads safer for cyclists and pedestrians. They could expand mobility for people who aren’t well served by transit. They could enable denser development outside of downtowns. And in the long run, they might obviate the need for parking, which will allow us to liberate urban land from cars. This future won’t arrive if we give the industry a blank check *or* shut it out. We need to get to work on regulation. ### Just Fix It: 8 Policy Tweaks City Hall Can Make to Speed Up the Permitting Process URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-housing-permits-fast-track-construction-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T17:12:57.000Z *As Mayor Zohran Mamdani himself seems to understand, the job of mayor is about more than laying out grand visions. It’s about improving small- and medium-bore management to make New York’s government work better.* [***Just Fix It***](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/just-fix-it/) *is Vital City's running list of concrete, nonideological ways to unstick the gears of city government and make it work better for all New Yorkers.* *The pace of building things is a top contender, especially given the administration’s understandable focus on producing more housing. It can take one to two years for as-of-right development to acquire the appropriate permits. For the biggest and most complex projects — those requiring rezonings or other discretionary city approvals —* [*three years can pass*](https://cbcny.org/research/improving-new-york-citys-land-use-decision-making-process?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *between the first application and final city sign-off. And that’s before construction even commences.* [*Recent research*](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/2036899627748806898?utm%5Fsource=substack&utm%5Fmedium=email) *found that each year saved would shave roughly 5% to 8% off the total price tag. And with the city facing a historic housing shortage and growing calls to build infrastructure of all kinds, every minute counts.* *The problem has been getting a good deal of attention and action in recent years. In November, voters gave the City’s protracted land-use process — which it takes projects two-and-a-half years, on average, to get through — a speed boost for certain projects. A push underway in Albany to reform the state’s environmental review process (SEQR) could put a* [*particularly big dent*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-seqra-slows-housing-development-new-york/) *in reducing timelines. And early announcements from the Mamdani administration, like an interagency task force to* [*hasten*](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/executive-order-05?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20SPEED%20Task%20Force%20shall,Department%20of%20Buildings%2C%20the%20Department) *affordable housing production, are encouraging. “This administration is willing to move at the speed of need to make this a city New Yorkers can continue to call home,” the mayor* [*said*](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mamdani-administration-launches-new-program-to-deliver-affordabl?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *at a recent press conference.* *But there are other moves that City Hall can make to speed things up. This column lays out eight.* --- ### 1) Streamline agency reviews **The problem:** Permitting approval is subject to a series of wholly separate agency reviews, which stretches timelines. **The Mamdani administration should:** Enforce maximum permitting periods so no one agency can hold up the process. **The fine print:** From pre-filing to occupancy, a building’s permit needs sign-off from a total of 10-plus city agencies, including the Department of Buildings (DOB), the Department of City Planning (DCP), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Fire Department (FDNY) and others. Projects cannot advance to the next phase until the green light is given from the specific entities involved in that part of the process. But each agency follows its own timeline, which is often left to its discretion. Thus, permitting can get stuck in a rotation of reviews with little to no motive to move it along. --- --- City Hall should hold its own agencies accountable by ensuring that each review adheres to a strict schedule, with timelines set in reasonable accordance with responsibilities. Maximum wait times could be enforced to accelerate reviews — for example, DOT could be given a certain number of months to conduct its traffic analysis, and a sewer sign-off from DEP could take days, not weeks. Or else face consequences. Other cities and states have shown what potential nudges exist. In Minnesota, zoning applications are [automatically approved](https://archive.strongtowns.org/journal/2019/4/22/a-permit-process-should-never-take-a-year-heres-a-different-way?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=A%20Permit%20Process%20Should%20Never,Year.%20Here's%20a%20Different%20Way.&text=First%2C%20the%2060%2Dday%20time%20limit,codes%20and%20processes%20that%20are) if an agency doesn’t respond within 60 days, and a request for extension must be justified in writing. Pennsylvania's [PAyback program](https://payback.pa.gov/Home/Who?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) refunds applicants’ permit fees when state agencies miss their statutory review deadlines. The City of New York should immediately explore the options available to get its agencies working together, and on deadline. ### 2) Get rid of redundancies **The problem:** Siloed processes and overlapping jurisdictions lead to repetitive, time-consuming inspections. **The Mamdani administration should:** Conduct an exhaustive review of the city’s permitting process for redundant approvals. **The fine print:** Each city agency is empowered to review projects under a specific legal code, but agencies rely on systems that are unable to communicate with one another and share findings in real time. The result of those blurry lines and inadequate information-sharing is that officials sometimes carry out tasks that mirror work that came before or after. Case in point: Currently, two city agencies review buildings for fire safety — the Fire Department and the Department of Buildings — and both under separate codes. A process meant to be concurrent is often fragmented; first it’s FDNY, then DOB and then FDNY again, but not until DOB has approved plans. Re-inspection can take months, and is rife with issues: In late 2024 and early 2025, two former fire chiefs [pled guilty](https://nypost.com/2025/01/29/us-news/second-ex-fdny-chief-pleads-guilty-in-200k-bribery-scheme/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to creating a “VIP lane” for building inspections in exchange for bribes, with developers hiring illicit ‘expediters’ to secure approval. In recent years, the FDNY deployed new technology and revamped hiring practices for fire inspections. The results were promising — wait times eventually [fell](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2024/01/nyc-touts-faster-fire-inspections-new-report/393718/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from 18 weeks to four weeks, according to City Hall— but were later reversed by budget cuts and political setbacks from City Hall. Efforts like that should be revived and furthered. Similar to the work of the newly designated “chief savings officers” tapped by City Hall, the administration should ask each agency involved in permitting to scan its respective processes for spots to streamline, and deliver responses in the next 90 days. And as we’ve [seen in Guadalajara](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/guadalajara-visor-urbano-permitting/), fully digitizing the process, with a one-stop shop for permits, is long overdue. ### 3) Right-size the traffic studies **The problem:** No matter the building size, construction requires traffic analyses that haven’t kept up with recent policy changes and mobility advances. **The Mamdani administration should:** Re-evaluate the criteria for traffic impact studies in terms of location and building size. **The fine print:** During the environmental review process, DOT conducts [a study](https://www.dot.ny.gov/CommercialHWP/traffic-impact?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to assess what a proposed development’s impact will be on local traffic flow. For most projects, the analysis can take up to two months. But the way we get around has changed dramatically, calling into question whether such studies are still needed today. The passage of City of Yes [lifted](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-city-needs-a-two-track-mind/) mandatory parking minimums in most of Manhattan, western Queens and northern and western Brooklyn, meaning that future developments sited there will no longer have to provide on-site parking, a major source of vehicular traffic. (They were reduced or diluted elsewhere.) South of 60th Street in Manhattan, where the required analyses are already a lighter touch, congestion pricing prevails and has [substantially reduced](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/one-year-into-congestion-pricing-in-new-york-city/) traffic. Meanwhile, New Yorkers are biking and scooting more than ever before, so the assumption of [a sometimes 1-1 ratio](https://www.arch.columbia.edu/research/labs/15-housing-lab/parking?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of units to parking spaces and potential drivers may not hold the same weight as it once did. Besides, a growing body of evidence [casts doubt](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-06-03/in-killed-by-a-traffic-engineer-a-us-road-planner-pleads-for-reform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the engineering standards the analyses are based on in the first place. At the same time, fully recognizing that a stadium isn’t the same as a single-family home, City Hall should direct its DOT to “right-size” its traffic code, with limits on buildings with 500 units or below. Reforming SEQR [will help](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/whats-the-deal-with-seqra/) — the city DOT is often following its state counterpart — but the City should explore what’s within its own power to clear the bottlenecks. ### 4) Flex the building code **The problem:** Most of the city’s building code was written decades ago, with standards that still drive up costs and timelines for construction. **The Mamdani administration should:** Launch a task force to quickly identify and advance amendments in accordance with international standards and new zoning laws. **The fine print:** New York City’s Building Code was adopted in 1968\. Heralded then for its modern overhaul of the 1938 edition, it placed [heavier regulations](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-form-density-takes/) on mixed-use and taller buildings. It was then updated in 2008, 2014 and 2022, and a new Existing Building Code goes into effect [next year](https://www.nyc.gov/site/buildings/codes/existing-building-code.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Yet still, New York City’s rules and regulations for buildings are considered some of the most byzantine in the country, especially when compared to European and Asian counterparts with similar densities. The City should immediately initiate an effort to further modernize its building code to match modern sensibilities and the new zoning rules put into effect by City of Yes. Here are a few places to start. The live-in super rule, which requires an on-site or nearby hand for buildings with nine or more units, was codified when coal-fired boilers — most of which have since been phased out — had to be monitored 24/7\. The City [regulates](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-high-price-of-fine-print/) the use of certain building materials, like copper for wiring or concrete and steel for building, even though cheaper and more environmentally friendly alternatives — like hemp, recycled plastic and mass timber — exist. Elevators, which once unlocked the potential of skyscrapers, are now often a [deterrent](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/03/11/housing-regulation-disability-reform/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to building vertically, because the rules require them to be wide enough to accommodate a standard 24-by-84-inch ambulance stretcher in the horizontal position. And in the last two years, seven states across the political spectrum have [rewritten](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/04/business/single-staircase-apartment-buildings.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) rules that require one, rather than two, staircases in buildings of a certain size for fire safety purposes. While our unique building code exists as [yet another extension](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-high-price-of-fine-print/) of a New York-or-nowhere exceptionalism, lawmakers are actively studying what else can be done to smartly loosen the rules. ### 5) Empower the project managers **The problem:** There is little accountability for project progress, with responsibilities shared — and often lost — between agencies. **The Mamdani administration should:** Designate point people within City Hall to guide construction projects across the finish line. Create a publicly available tracker to bolster transparency and identify roadblocks. **The fine print:** Once an application is filed for a building permit, its fate is largely left to the process. This puts the onus on the private citizen or company to navigate through an alphabet soup of agencies (hence why many hire an expeditor), favoring those with expertise and resources. A general lack of accountability allows projects to wallow, their completion being both everyone’s and no one’s problem. City Hall should convene a team within the Deputy Mayor for Housing and Economic Development’s office that can effectively project-manage the permitting for private projects above a certain size, offering both an attentive eye and the authority to find fixes to hurdles that may arise. These outcomes-focused roles are particularly needed when working with private stakeholders, like utility companies. To aid in those efforts, the City should launch an online project tracker — like what exists for [parks](https://www.nycgovparks.org/planning-and-building/capital-project-tracker?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [mass transit projects](https://capitaldashboard.mta.info/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — that can tell any New Yorker what is going on with that project on their corner, and who is responsible for its delay. Today, the best information most New Yorkers often have is months-old, uninformative notice posted at the construction site. ### 6) Get the new rules on the books **The problem:** New York City voters just approved a number of far-reaching ballot proposals related to construction. But some are still not law. **The Mamdani administration should:** Expedite the rulesmaking processes for the referenda passed last November. **The fine print:** In November, a majority of New York City voters [approved](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/four-ballot-items-to-unlock-more-new-york-city-housing/) three measures meant to speed up construction. The first — Proposition 2 — fast-tracks affordable housing projects, with particular grease for “the bottom 12,” or the community districts that produced the least amount of affordable housing in recent years. Proposition 3 puts smaller projects through a less-intensive land-use process, while Proposition 4 creates an Affordable Housing Appeals Board, which may intervene if a development is blocked or diluted. These measures will ease bureaucratic and political gridlock that can trip up permitting. So no more time should be wasted getting them going. The Affordable Housing Appeals Board is still just a concept, although even just the threat of it has already led one council member [to reverse their stance](https://nysfocus.com/2026/02/24/vickie-paladino-housing-appeals-board-ballot-proposition?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on a new development. To its credit, the Mamdani administration has already [announced](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mamdani-administration-launches-new-program-to-deliver-affordabl?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the first ELURP projects: an 84-unit affordable housing development in Mott Haven and a climate-resiliency acquisition on Staten Island. This speedier runway for City-owned land [consolidates](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/expedited-housing.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Community Board and Borough President reviews into a single 60-day window and removes City Council review for certain categories, cutting the roughly seven-month public-review timeline to 90 days. The City launched the Affordable Housing Fast Track rulemaking shortly after. But rulesmaking can notoriously drag. To maximize potential, these processes should be expedited given the moment’s urgency, so city officials can start to tap into the benefits and opportunities the new powers pose. A particular focus should be placed on the bottom 12\. If the City now wields greater powers to catalyze construction there, it shouldn’t be afraid to use them. ### 7) Staff up **The problem:** Many of the offices critical to approving construction projects are not operating at full capacity. **The Mamdani administration should:** Focus on filling vacancies at DOB and expand headcount at the Board of Standards and Appeals and the City Planning Commission. **The fine print:** The Program to Eliminate Gaps (PEG) cuts implemented by the Adams administration shaved a quarter of the DOB workforce between 2022 and 2024, [leading to](https://nypost.com/2024/05/15/us-news/nyc-buildings-dept-cuts-back-staffing-including-inspectors-despite-recent-collapses/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) an increase in wait times across inspections. While the City should simultaneously pursue efficiencies that don’t require bolstering staff, a hobbled workforce will ultimately hamper permitting reform. The City should consider options to restore headcount, which will include increasing salaries to compete with the private sector. Hiring for necessary roles is ultimately an investment — a faster rate of inspection helps bring down price tags, which allows projects that ultimately benefit the city coffers to advance. Beyond DOB, the City should move to quickly staff up the offices with recently expanded authorities. The Board of Standards and Appeals, which will now oversee the affordable housing fast-track, has five commissioners and a support staff of several dozen people. Similarly, the City Planning Commission has a range of new and expanded responsibilities, yet still is composed of only 13 members with a similarly squeezed second bench. These entities will become much bigger players in how the City builds in the years ahead, and will need a workforce that reflects this brave new world. ### 8) Use AI more, and do it smartly **The problem:** The City has thus far been averse to leverage AI as a potential tool for permitting efficiency. **The Mamdani administration should:** Aggressively explore all the ways in which AI could be used to streamline processes. **The fine print:** In 2023, the City of New York released its first-ever [AI Action Plan](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/oti/downloads/pdf/reports/artificial-intelligence-action-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which laid out potential opportunities to incorporate generative AI and large language models (LLMs) to improve daily operations. Success thus far has been mixed. [Innovative pilots](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-to-deploy-ai-policing-nyc-nypd/) persist at the agency level: The Department of Education recently permitted AI in lesson planning, DOT is studying traffic patterns with AI and FDNY recently used AI to chart more efficient ambulance routes. But deployment is still fragile, with City Hall recently shutting down a chatbot launched by its former occupant after it notoriously offered incorrect advice. Permitting was not mentioned in the AI Action Plan, but there are two areas where it could yield real dividends. The first is interagency communication, where AI would make it easier for separate systems to share data with each other to reduce those redundancies mentioned earlier. (Another popular mayor, Boston’s Michelle Wu, signed [an executive order](https://www.boston.gov/departments/boston-digital-service/new-era-permitting-boston?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in August to do just that.) The second is what’s known as predictive analytics, where AI can pre-scan documents to alert applicants to potential problem areas later on, as well as forecast timelines so they can realistically plan ahead. This doesn’t remove humans from the critical job of reviewing work sites documents; it just helps them target limited resources where the data shows them to be most needed. In California, San Jose is [piloting](https://www.govtech.com/artificial-intelligence/san-jose-will-leverage-ai-to-address-the-housing-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the technology to hasten approvals of Accessory Dwelling Units (or ADUs), where 90 percent of applications are returned for missing information. New York City should do the same. Privacy concerns and worries that AI will unintelligibly approach issues without context are no doubt valid. But the City should [actively explore areas](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/putting-tech-to-work-for-all-new-yorkers/) where the technology could be deployed for overly analog processes that currently take up an excessive amount of time and staffing. --- *This installment was prepared with the help of John Surico. Sarah Feinberg and many others provided essential guidance and will continue to inform our work on this project going forward. In the weeks and months ahead, we will continue to surface practical suggestions from people who know the system best — current and former agency staff, nonprofit partners and the everyday New Yorkers who routinely deal with, and often trip up trying to navigate, New York's bureaucracy.* *Vital City will continue to surface practical suggestions from people who know the system best — current and former agency staff, nonprofit partners and the everyday New Yorkers who routinely deal with, and often trip up trying to navigate, New York's bureaucracy.* *Send your ideas to justfixit@vitalcitynyc.org; if you wish to remain anonymous, we will honor your request.* ### The Unions and the Cities URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/public-sector-unions-city-politics/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T09:00:41.000Z On May Day, Mayor Zohran Mamdani [posted a slickly produced video](https://x.com/NYCMayor/status/2050207448846274956?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with the tagline that “there is no NYC without unions,” featuring images of proud public workers “showing the world what solidarity means.” It’s a fine sentiment, but it’s not quite right. There is no New York City without *government workers*. But the city thrived for generations without powerful *unions* to represent those workers. In fact, public-sector unions are relative newcomers to the labor movement. Before the 1960s, the few that existed were small and weak. Walkouts were rare; when they occurred, the disruption of public services could provoke backlash, as occurred after the 1919 Boston police strike. Powerful public-sector unions as we know them today emerged only in the late 1960s and 1970s. They did not arise organically. Instead, they were called into being by a rash of new state laws requiring municipalities to bargain collectively. This chart documenting the rise of teachers’ unions, which I lifted from Terry Moe’s [“Special Interest,”](https://www.brookings.edu/books/special-interest/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is quite something: The modern public-sector union is entirely a creature of law. And it was something new under the sun. For decades, judges and public officials had insisted that collective bargaining would cede sovereign power to private organizations whose interests diverged from the community at large. In 1971, two Yale law professors, Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter, refined that argument in a [prescient book](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The%5Funions%5Fand%5Fthe%5Fcities%5Fby%5FH%5FH%5FWelling/OP2i0QEACAAJ?hl=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) called “The Unions and the Cities.” Wellington and Winter cautioned against extending arguments in favor of private-sector unions to the public sector. In the private sector, they noted, unions are disciplined by the market: They share with their employers an interest in the success of the collective enterprise. Demands that make it impossible to compete would be bad for business and, ultimately, bad for workers. Public-sector unions, in contrast, are constrained only by politics. Elected officials are supposed to represent the voters, but the public is disinterested in the minutiae of local elections. Unions, in contrast, care a lot about who’s sitting across the negotiating table and often have the clout to get them elected. Institutionalizing the power of public-sector unions, Wellington and Winter feared, “would leave competing groups in the political process at a permanent and substantial disadvantage.” They were right to worry. As early as 1975, one union leader in New York City [was blunt](https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): “We have the ability, in a sense, to elect our own boss.” So it remains today. In states with collective bargaining, public-sector unions are the most potent force in city elections. In the 2023-2024 cycle alone, the four biggest unions representing government workers spent [a whopping $915 million](https://commonwealthfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Union-Political-Spending-Report-Dec2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on politics. Union power is felt most acutely during primary elections, when the public is disengaged and candidates jockey for union endorsements and campaign dollars. And in most cities, the primary is the ballgame. Election timing can further amplify union influence. Sarah Anzia, a Berkeley political scientist, has [shown](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381611000028?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that teacher pay is higher in districts with school boards that are elected in off-year elections, when the public is paying even less attention than usual. What’s more, collective-bargaining agreements often extend past a mayor’s term. The next mayor may be elected on the promise to fix failing schools or a rotten police force — only to find his or her hands tied. Union power has real advantages. Public employees deserve good wages, safe working conditions and protections from political reprisal. Especially as American cities become increasingly unaffordable, unions can discourage attempts to economize on the backs of the middle class. They can also force officials to confront real problems in the delivery of government services: employee burnout, abusive supervisors, untenable workloads and more. Politicians elected with union backing, however, are under intense pressure to enter into labor contracts that are good for the unions and bad for the public. Yes, improvident labor deals may yield bloated budgets and crappy public services. But the diffuse frustration over a poorly managed city is nothing to the white-hot rage of the unions. The public does care about high taxes, which puts an upper limit on wage increases. But that just encourages officials to placate unions with lax work rules and generous pensions and health benefits, as Robert Gordon and I discussed in [a recent New York Times op-ed](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/23/opinion/democrats-public-sector-unions.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What’s happening in New York exemplifies the problem. In Albany, public-sector unions are pushing for [legislation](https://nysaflcio.org/tier-6?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that would allow government workers to retire at age 55 with full pensions after 30 years of service. That would be an unthinkable deal for most Americans. It would also saddle a cash-strapped New York City with fiscal obligations that will frustrate Mamdani’s efforts to implement his most ambitious policy proposals, including universal child care. At the same time, the Metropolitan Transit Authority is locked in [a bitter fight](https://nypost.com/2026/04/27/opinion/kathy-hochul-and-bruce-blakeman-must-both-stand-up-to-the-union-thugs-threatening-an-lirr-strike/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with the unions that represent Long Island Rail Road workers. Among the key hang-ups are arbitrary work rules that require double and sometimes even triple pay for a single day’s work. The costs of collective bargaining may partly explain why blue cities in red states — David Brooks calls them [“red-blue mash-ups”](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/13/opinion/sun-belt-migration.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — are growing faster than blue cities in blue states. Most of that growth is a function of business climate and housing markets, of course; it’s still cheaper to live in Houston than Los Angeles. But red-blue cities also tend to have lower taxes than blue-blue cities, in part because they are less burdened by legacy pension obligations. Though this is more speculative, blue cities in red states may deliver public services more efficiently. Per-pupil spending, for example, is a poor predictor of educational performance across states. But red states cluster on the low-spending left half of this graph, and blue states on the high-spending right. In New York City, [spending is around $40,000 per pupil](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/04/new-york-city-schools-budget/686971/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That’s likely to rise further under a rigid and expensive union-backed law [requiring smaller class sizes](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/04/02/mamdani-class-size-law-compliance/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across all the city’s schools. Student performance is middling. In short, laws that require collective bargaining created modern public-sector unions. Those unions then exploit their legal privilege to dominate urban politics, often at the public’s expense. That dynamic isn’t unique to unions. The corporate form, for example, is also a legal privilege with major electoral consequences. But only public-sector unions have a monopoly on negotiating labor contracts that immediately affect both the quality of public services and city finances. It’s tempting to try to solve the problem by prohibiting unions from injecting money into politics. After *Citizens United*, however, efforts to cap unions’ independent spending will run into a brick wall. But collective bargaining doesn’t have to be all-or-nothing. Lawmakers can pick and choose what unions can negotiate over. Unions play a salutary role in pushing for competitive salaries, for example, which is essential to attracting a high-quality public workforce. It’s more troubling when they demand work rules that erode accountability and degrade public services. It’s also worrisome when unions press elected officials to shift compensation into pensions and health benefits that are obscure to voters and whose costs will only become apparent decades down the line. Why not limit public-sector unions to negotiating over wages? It’s not a fanciful proposal; that’s what Wisconsin did in 2011\. Wisconsin’s law went too far in some respects and not far enough in others; its exception for police and firefighter unions was unprincipled, and it has now drawn a [serious equal-protection challenge](https://apnews.com/article/wisconsin-union-lawsuit-collective-bargainin-75faef922860f9a7d1dc06ae1dc783d1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But the idea has much to be said for it. Whatever the right approach may be, Democrats who worry about public safety, urban schools and the fiscal health of our cities ought to be open to rethinking the bargain we struck with public-sector unions five decades ago. Just 7.3 million people belong to public-sector unions, or about 2% of the population. They deserve a voice in our politics. But they shouldn’t have the power to shout the rest of us down. --- *This piece has been cross-posted at NYU Law’s Democracy Project.* ### Does When We’re Born Make Us Who We Are? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/robert-sampson-adam-gopnik-interview-transcript/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:06:58.000Z *Sociologist Robert J. Sampson’s new book,* [*“Marked by Time: How Social Change Has Transformed Crime and the Life Trajectories of Young Americans,”*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674987548?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *draws on three decades of data from the landmark Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods to argue that the era in which a person comes of age matters as much as, or even more than, their individual circumstances.* *On Monday, April 27, New Yorker staff writer Adam Gopnik spoke with Sampson at an event hosted by Vital City, NYU Wagner and the Russell Sage Foundation. The attached video is unedited; the transcript that follows is edited for clarity and length.* --- --- **Adam Gopnik:** This is a work of social science, but for those of us who are essayists, it’s an astonishing thing — it’s not your opinions. It’s driven by data collected over a very long time. Tell us about the specifics of the project, and more broadly, what drew you to this kind of empirical sociology. **Robert J. Sampson:** The ideas actually developed over time. Let me take you back to the beginning. The study started in the early 1990s, when I was on the faculty at the University of Chicago. It was a large-scale collaborative effort — what you might call big science — because at the time, academics were really trying to figure out how to understand urban violence. In the early 1990s, violence had been rising since the 1970s and ‘80s, but things were really coming to a head. New York had over 2,000 murders. Chicago wasn’t far behind. We were designing the study in 1992, and there was a particular incident that I mention in the book. A young boy named [Dantrell Davis](https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/7-year-old-dantrell-davis-murder-led-to-gang-truce-in-1992-those-who-were-there-call-for-new-effort-with-multiple-children-shot-recently/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), just 7 years old, was walking with his mother on a sunny day when he was shot and killed by someone trying to take out a gang rival. It was emblematic of the crisis. So we designed what became the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods to understand how children developed within their social contexts — not pitting individuals against neighborhoods, but trying to understand both. The data collection was a monumental effort. We enrolled about 6,000 children across different ages and followed them over five to six years, conducting interviews with mothers, children and other caretakers. We collected original neighborhood data — we even drove down streets with video cameras to observe conditions. About 100 to 120 people were involved in data collection at peak. We were lucky to get funding, and I felt lucky to be part of it. **Gopnik:** Just as you were starting the study, the era of the so-called “super predator” was beginning. That sets up a kind of dramatic tension at the heart of the book. **Sampson:** Exactly. To illustrate the argument, I use two kids from the study. I call one Darnell, born in 1995, raised by a single parent in one of the highest-poverty neighborhoods in the city — every risk factor one might think would predict a life of crime. I pair him with Andre, born in 1980, who came of age in the 1980s, around age 13 during the peak of violence. Same neighborhood, same race, same poverty, same family structure. Environmentally similar in almost every way — but walking into very different futures. And indeed, they had very different lives. That’s the core of the book. It’s not a narrative about two individuals. It’s a study of birth cohorts — using that comparison to make the argument that when we are born shapes outcomes in ways we haven’t fully reckoned with. **Gopnik:** One of the philosophical foundations of the book seems to be that social experience is malleable and changeable — that it isn’t always fixed. That’s a particular tradition in American sociology, isn’t it? **Sampson:** Absolutely. A lot of criminological research, at least historically, has been rooted in the assumption of stable propensity — the idea that criminal character is essentially built into the person. That’s embedded in the concept of the “super predator.” The book challenges that idea by looking at cohorts coming of age in very different historical contexts. One of the problems with prior research is that most studies follow the same people through time — a single cohort. That’s a wonderful device, but as we age, time marches on. There’s a philosophical aphorism from the ancient Greeks: No man steps into the same river twice. The river changes; the man changes. So I wanted a design that could look at kids starting at very young ages across different birth years, all followed through the same historical window. That allowed us to compare children coming of age in genuinely different circumstances. **Gopnik:** And that leads to what struck me as the central finding of the book. What you’re saying, in essence, is that it’s not where you’re raised, not even by whom you’re raised — it’s when you’re raised. **Sampson:** That’s the strong version of the argument, yes. There’s a basic fact about crime called the age-crime curve: Across virtually all data sources, across different countries and historical periods, criminal activity rises sharply in adolescence, peaks in the late teens or early twenties, and then declines. Teenagers commit a disproportionate share of crime — all parents know this. But what the cohort comparison reveals is that when one is a teenager is centrally important. Kids from the older cohorts — those born in the 1980s — had arrest trajectories that were substantially higher and persisted later into life. Younger cohorts, even controlling for race, family structure, neighborhood poverty and other individual characteristics, showed dramatically lower arrest rates. When you adjust for all of those factors and the cohort difference still holds, that tells you something fundamental: It’s the historical moment, not the individual profile. **Gopnik:** And this is, in a sense, a reproach to both sides of the political debate about crime. **Sampson:** I think that’s right. There are roughly three views. One holds that there are simply bad people — wicked individuals — and nothing to do except separate them from society. Then there’s a more incentive-oriented view: It’s about deterrence, incarceration, the rules. And then the sociological view, which I subscribe to, emphasizes social ties, social controls and informal community norms. What the data show is that economic indicators — GNP, unemployment, poverty rates — don’t really explain why crime rose or fell in consistent ways. But something was changing. What was happening, particularly as the younger cohorts came of age, is that the world changed around them in ways that made arrest much less likely. **Gopnik:** What changed? **Sampson:** Several things. First, the collapse of the drug war — or at least of drug arrests. When we think about mass incarceration, we tend to think of arrests rising. But actually, arrests were declining starting in the late 1990s and into the 2000s. Drug arrests dropped around 75%in some areas. Disorder arrests — the kind associated with broken windows policing — dropped about 90%. That is a fundamentally different social world for a kid growing up. At the same time, the drug market itself changed. There’s a sociologist, Randol Contreras, who studied the South Bronx and whose own life illustrated the point. He came of age slightly later than the kids who had become drug dealers, and by the time his cohort arrived, the profits had collapsed. The South Bronx was improving, gentrifying. The pull of the drug economy simply wasn’t what it had been. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/GopnikSampson-25-1.jpg) Sampson and Gopnik in conversation. Credit: Anthony Esguerra **Gopnik:** Broken windows theory is one of the hypotheses you examine. Is it a concept with some residual value, or is it empty? **Sampson:** It is a concept — it’s not nothing. But I think it’s been misapplied. The original Wilson and Kelling article from 1982 was actually more nuanced than what came after it. They were talking about the breakdown of informal social controls and the importance of working with communities to clean things up. Over time, that morphed into much more aggressive policing — massive stop-and-frisk of young people without cause. That’s not what Wilson and Kelling had in mind, and it’s not responsible for the crime decline, in my view. Perceptions of disorder vary a great deal depending on context — whether you’re in a wealthy neighborhood or a poor one, whether you’re higher or lower income. And a fair amount of research suggests that disorder itself is not what’s driving crime. Most crime control happens not because there’s a police officer on the corner. It’s the everyday regulations and norms — parents supervising their children, community organizations getting involved — that prevent crime. **Gopnik:** Patrick Sharkey’s work puts a lot of weight on community organizations. You look at that too. **Sampson:** Yes, absolutely. What happened in many cities over this period can be thought of as reclaiming urban space — the no-man’s-land areas that we all saw in the 1980s and ’90s, reclaimed in multiple ways. Community organizations, particularly those that received increased funding and focused on youth, showed real crime declines. You can attribute a meaningful portion of the crime drop to community organizing — not policing. There’s also interesting experimental work on cleaning up vacant lots. Researchers took abandoned lots that were sites of crime and fear and transformed them into green spaces. What happened? People started using those spaces, interacting. There were more eyes on the street, in Jane Jacobs’ sense. People were more willing to intervene. Crime went down. It seems almost too simple, but it’s part of the broader argument that environments matter — that environmental policy is crime policy. **Gopnik:** You even address the lead hypothesis, which I’ll confess I initially thought was a kind of red herring. **Sampson:** I never expected to deal with it either. But over time, through colleagues and the accumulating research — including historical data on lead pipes and the leaded gasoline phaseout — I came to believe there was something there. Lead poisoning is a form of toxic environment, just like financial stress or neighborhood violence. For a while, it was everywhere. In some Chicago neighborhoods, 70% to 80% of children had elevated blood lead levels. We were fortunate to get data from the Chicago Department of Public Health. For the infant cohort, higher lead levels were associated with more antisocial behavior later in life. And the decline in lead levels — which was sharpest in the poorest communities — tracks with the decline in problem behavior. It’s not the whole story, but it’s part of it. I found the research compelling enough to include it, and I think it’s a real vindication of empirical social science — because it sounds tabloid-ish at first, but you look into it carefully and find there’s something there. **Gopnik:** Let’s talk about what the book means for policy. It seems to have some uncomfortable implications for a lot of tools that criminal justice systems currently rely on — risk assessment, prediction instruments, cost-benefit analysis. **Sampson:** Prediction is a key area. A lot of risk assessment instruments are built on the assumption of stable propensity — that past behavior predicts future behavior in ways that don’t change over time. But our data show that the relationship between predictors and outcomes has been shifting. We took prediction technology, trained it on the older cohort, and applied it to the younger cohort. We overpredicted by 50% to 90%. That’s not a small error — it’s a difference of kind. Criminal history records are used in so many decisions: bail, sentencing enhancements, tenant screening, employment. To the extent that the probability of being arrested in the past is baked into those records, you are, in effect, making predictions based on when someone was born — what I call cohort bias. The younger cohorts are simply less likely to have been arrested, and instruments trained on older cohorts systematically overestimate their risk. What can be done? New York City has actually been at the forefront of updating its instruments. But beyond that, we need to recognize that the relationships between predictors and outcomes are constantly dynamic. These instruments are doing real damage, and there are ways to build them better. **Gopnik:** And cost-benefit analyses have the same problem? **Sampson:** Yes. A lot of social programs are touted using cost-benefit projections — “this intervention will save X dollars” — but those projections are often based on experiments conducted on the older, higher-crime cohorts. The estimated benefits simply won’t be as high when applied to younger cohorts who were already less likely to commit crime. That has real implications for government budgeting. If you’re in city government, you should be redoing those analyses using more recent cohorts, or at least weighting them accordingly. **Gopnik:** What about incarceration itself as a crime-reduction strategy? **Sampson:** A National Academy of Sciences panel concluded that incarceration explains a relatively modest portion of the great American crime decline — perhaps 10% to 15%, and only up to a point. Beyond that point, you’re incarcerating people who are less and less likely to commit crime anyway, and you’re creating collateral consequences — severed social ties, loss of housing, employment barriers — that can make things worse. The book isn’t primarily about incarceration, but it’s relevant to the argument: The cohorts coming of age now are less likely to be arrested, and therefore less likely to be incarcerated later. The prison population is actually falling off a cliff, even as budgets for correctional facilities continue to be built around the older, higher-crime cohorts. That’s a mismatch with real fiscal consequences. **Gopnik:** What intervention addresses the time variable? If when we are born is so central, what do we do about it? **Sampson:** I don’t think there’s a magic bullet — and that’s part of the point. It’s a thousand smaller things that add up: community organizations, environmental cleanup, reducing police contacts for low-level behavior, updating our prediction instruments, investing in basic science so we understand what’s actually working. There’s also a more conceptual point I want to make. We spend enormous energy searching for criminal character in individuals. But what the data suggest is that we should be thinking about the moral accountability of society — what I’d call social character. Are we providing the social structures and informal controls that actually prevent crime? Howard Becker had a wonderful book title: “What About Mozart? What About Murder?” — meaning, what do you say to the sociologist who claims it’s all about social variance? My answer is the same as Becker’s: Murder is wrong. But how we react to it, what counts as crime, who gets arrested for what — all of that varies enormously. The marijuana smoker who would have gone to prison in 1985 walks past five dispensaries today. That’s not a change in human nature. It’s a change in the social world. The good news is that both the behaviors and the social reactions to them are trending in a positive direction. Young people today are less likely to commit crime, less likely to be arrested and less likely to be incarcerated than their counterparts a generation ago. Understanding why — and building on it — is what this book is really about. --- *Robert J. Sampson is the Woodford L. and Ann A. Flowers University Professor at Harvard University. His new book is “Marked by Time: How Social Change Has Transformed Crime and the Life of Young Americans.” Adam Gopnik is a staff writer at The New Yorker.* ### How Guadalajara Killed the Paper Permit URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/guadalajara-visor-urbano-permitting/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:01:09.000Z [Vital City](https://soundcloud.com/vital-city-604970448?ref=vitalcitynyc.org "Vital City") · [How Guadalajara Killed the Paper Permit](https://soundcloud.com/vital-city-604970448/how-guadalajara-killed-the?ref=vitalcitynyc.org "How Guadalajara Killed the Paper Permit") --- *This is the second installment of* [*Borrow and Steal*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/londons-quest-for-low-traffic-neighborhoods)*, our monthly interview series profiling evidence-backed urban policy ideas from around the world — and the practitioners who have translated them into reality.* *Our second interview is with* [*Yunive Moreno*](https://www.linkedin.com/in/yunivemoreno/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, director of* [*Visor Urbano*](https://visorurbano.guadalajara.gob.mx/inicio?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, an online, one-stop shop for issuing commercial permits. Visor Urbano was first developed by the Mexican city of Guadalajara in 2016 with support from Bloomberg Philanthropies. It is now hosted by the state of Jalisco (population roughly 9 million), with some 60 cities across Mexico running a version of the platform. Applicants can pull up zoning maps, see what’s allowed on a given parcel and apply for a permit to open a business or begin construction — entirely online. The average turnaround for a permit is three days.* *What began as a bureaucratic cleanup project produced an unexpected dividend: a clean digital paper trail that cut out local middlemen who had long extracted fees, formal and otherwise, from business owners navigating the permit process. An* [*impact evaluation*](https://franciscolaragarcia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/visor-urbano-impact-evaluation-delivery-associates-report-v4.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *from researchers at Oxford and Columbia found an 84% reduction in licensing time, a 74% drop in reports of bribe solicitation by municipal officials and an 85% drop in solicitation by third-party intermediaries. Some Jalisco municipalities have since seen permit revenue rise by 100% to 300% in a single year.* *American cities should be paying attention. In many U.S. cities, obtaining a permit still requires in-person trips to a diffuse array of agencies, each with their own, fragmented software. Inspectors compare plans to byzantine codes that have, over decades, produced an entire profession —* [*“the expeditor”*](https://www.permitflow.com/blog/permit-expediter?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— whose job is essentially to walk applications through City Hall.* *In New York, that system has* [*produced scandals on a regular schedule*](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2017/09/18/is-time-up-for-nycs-construction-expeditors/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*: 50 inspectors, expeditors and owners arrested in a 2015 sting;* [*11 Department of Buildings employees charged*](https://abc7ny.com/post/bribery-scheme-probe-leads-to-arrests-of-building-inspectors-contractors/511324/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *with taking more than $400,000 in bribes;* [*a former DOB supervisor indicted just three weeks ago*](https://manhattanda.org/manhattan-d-a-dept-of-investigation-announce-bribery-indictment-of-dept-of-buildings-supervisor/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *for allegedly fast-tracking plan reviews in exchange for $75,000 in cash and travel. And that’s before we get to the* [*federal indictment of Mayor Eric Adams*](https://www.nytimes.com/article/eric-adams-indictment.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, which alleged that he pressured FDNY officials to permit the high-rise Turkish consulate to open before the building was deemed safe to occupy.* *In our interview, Yunive explains how Visor Urbano was built, how it was scaled from a single city to a state of 9 million, and what cities considering the model should know about the politics of digitization. She also offers some blunt advice for anyone considering the same path.* --- **Cara Eckholm:** Yunive, thanks for joining. **Yunive Moreno:** Hi, Cara. Thanks for having me. **Cara Eckholm:** Wonderful. So you were around in 2016 when Visor Urbano was just an idea. How did permitting work in Guadalajara before the platform, and what inspired the push to digitize the process? **Yunive Moreno:** The process was, much like in the United States, quite complex. The principal challenge we faced at the time was the asymmetry of information around urban zoning — a lot of paperwork and a lack of transparency about what each permit actually required. Also, in 2016, the city’s urban planning framework was updated for the first time in more than ten years. Those plans were published as documents full of highly technical language and data that were very difficult for ordinary people — anyone without a background in urban planning — to understand. That’s what motivated us to take those rules and translate them into an easy-to-use platform. With Visor Urbano, you select the property you’re interested in, and within seconds, you can see all the regulations that apply to that zone. Once you’ve reviewed the applicable rules, you can start your application process entirely online — or, if you prefer, in person at the office. We maintained both channels. Staff at the Visor Urbano office help people digitize their paperwork and navigate the process. That’s how Visor Urbano got started, almost 10 years ago. **Cara Eckholm:** It sounds like you’ve come a very long way. Just to make sure I’m understanding correctly — before Visor Urbano, if I were a business owner and wanted to check whether I could open a business at a particular site, I would have had to go in person? **Yunive Moreno:** Yes, exactly. Before you could even begin the process of opening a business or starting construction, you had to visit a separate government office that held the urban planning information. That information existed as a kind of legal document — a PDF with hundreds of rules. Guadalajara is divided into, I believe, 10 or 12 zones, and the document ran more than 100 pages. **Cara Eckholm:** Right, a zoning code. **Yunive Moreno:** Exactly. It was really difficult to read and interpret. So you’d go to that office, and a public servant would analyze your situation manually — reviewing the law, sometimes visiting the site in person — and that process alone could take months, just to confirm whether your project was even permitted in that zone. There was a large asymmetry of information. Many consulting firms offered to do that analysis for you, but at a significant cost to citizens. What we did was take all of that zoning information and put it into a database. We mapped all the urban zoning rules by district and automated the lookup, which produced what we call “urban fact sheets” for each property, which citizens can download. Each fact sheet says what is allowed — and with that information you can then immediately begin your application online. For larger projects, a public official still needs to review the application. But for something like a grocery store or other low-impact use, you can get your approval almost instantly. **Cara Eckholm:** Where does the three-day average come in? What’s automatic and what requires a human reviewer? **Yunive Moreno:** The fact sheets are instantaneous, but the permit application itself requires additional documentation — your ID, proof of property ownership, that kind of paperwork. The review of your uploads takes up to three days, during which a staff member verifies your identity and confirms that the property is legally yours. After that, you’re cleared to open your business. **Cara Eckholm:** So just to recap: The zoning code is available online for anyone to consult. You look up a property, see whether your business is permitted there, and if you want to proceed, a human reviewer is looped in — but you’re still applying online and getting a response within about three days. And for more complex construction projects, I assume the review is more intensive. How do you differentiate between something like a grocery store — which gets fast approval — versus a multi-story commercial building? **Yunive Moreno:** Yes, we have a hierarchy of project complexity. For all projects, there’s always a technical reviewer on the other side of the screen. For low-impact uses, that specialist works through a clear set of rules, so the process is relatively straightforward. For more complex projects, you should expect the review to take longer — but the key difference is that you can upload everything online: your project plans, architectural drawings, everything the reviewer needs. You no longer have to walk files into an office. **Cara Eckholm:** Got it. And how did Visor Urbano go from idea to reality? I understand you initially received support from Bloomberg Philanthropies to build out the software, but that it remained a city-owned and city-operated project. Can you elaborate? **Yunive Moreno:** Sure. In 2016, when Visor Urbano was just an idea, we applied for a [Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayor’s Challenge](https://www.bloomberg.org/government-innovation/spurring-innovation-in-cities/mayors-challenge/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Latin America, and we were one of five winning cities to receive a grant from the foundation. That grant allowed us to build a dedicated technical team within Guadalajara city government, focused exclusively on the project. We believe that this platform opened up information that had for many years been siloed and gatekept. The response from the public was very strong. Following Guadalajara’s success, we transitioned to working with the state of Jalisco, with the goal of replicating Visor Urbano across all 125 municipalities in the state. That was a real challenge — scaling something built for one of Mexico’s major cities to work for municipalities with vastly different resources and realities. Some of our municipalities have fewer than 100 residents. The needs are completely different. We developed a new platform, Visor Urbano Jalisco, specifically for the state context. We visited municipalities across the state, ran surveys and listened carefully to understand what each community needed. Many other municipalities didn’t even have computers in their offices. They didn’t have specialized staff to handle permit applications. So we studied those realities, built Visor Urbano Jalisco accordingly and launched in 2020\. The pandemic actually helped us — because people couldn’t go to government offices, there was strong demand for online services. We ran a major communications campaign, and we’ve since launched in 35 municipalities. **Cara Eckholm:** I’m curious about how that replication effect actually works in practice. You mentioned that the mayor of Guadalajara later became governor of Jalisco — is that right? Was it his initiative to take the platform statewide? **Yunive Moreno:** Yes, exactly. I think the political backing was the key driver of our success. The core values of Visor Urbano — transparency, efficiency and digitalization — were values that the team shared from the beginning. When Mayor Enrique Alfaro transitioned to the governorship of Jalisco, his innovation team moved with him, from the city to the state. The digital innovation agenda came with them, and the goal became bringing to all 125 municipalities the same tools that Guadalajara had. The idea was that it shouldn’t matter if your municipality doesn’t have the resources of a capital city — you should still be able to have your own modern, functional permitting platform. So we built the software to be adaptable — each municipality can configure the platform to fit its own context. And the Visor Urbano Jalisco team does a lot of on-the-ground work: visiting municipalities, getting to know the staff, building capacity and supporting the transition to a new way of working. It’s a significant amount of people-oriented, soft-skills work alongside the technical implementation. **Cara Eckholm:** That’s a great segue to my next question, which was about the political dynamics. Was there any pushback from permitting officers? Because as I understand it, in the old system, there were people making money at various stages of the process who were essentially cut out once everything went online. What was the reaction from those groups — the people working inside city governments, and the intermediaries who were helping shepherd applicants through the process, some legally and some not? **Yunive Moreno:** We were actually surprised by how positive the reaction was. Part of that is because Visor Urbano’s initial focus was low-impact permits, which represent about 70% to 80% of all permit applications. But more importantly, we worked proactively with the business chambers — the chambers of commerce and construction industry associations — and tried to create a win-win situation. We showed them how the platform could actually help their work: It gave them better tools for managing higher-impact projects, and it helped their members get more transparent, rapid feedback from the government. I also think those groups benefited from the platform in a more indirect way: As the process became more efficient, more people chose to go through official channels rather than informal ones. We saw that when the platform works well, it builds trust — people become more willing to engage with government processes and do things by the book. **Cara Eckholm:** I’m curious about the platform architecture. Why did you decide to make it open source? Was it always obvious there would be demand from other cities? **Yunive Moreno:** From the very beginning — both with Guadalajara and later with Jalisco — we understood that this was a problem facing many cities. We received calls, attended conferences and heard from cities all over Mexico that wanted their own version of Visor Urbano. As a fun fact: In Mexico today, saying “I have my own Visor Urbano” has become shorthand for having an online zoning and permitting platform — even when those systems weren’t built with our code or our support. Making the code open source was also a commitment we made to Bloomberg Philanthropies from the start. It was part of the foundation’s vision — and one of the final deliverables of our collaboration — to open up Visor Urbano Jalisco in the most accessible and practical way possible. We published the code in late 2024. Since then, a number of cities have been building on it. We’re always open to helping. And I know that Bloomberg Philanthropies is also running its [Cities Ideas Exchange](https://citiesideaexchange.bloomberg.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program with Visor Urbano as one of its featured projects, with the goal of replicating it in cities around the world. **Cara Eckholm:** How many cities are using Visor Urbano today? **Yunive Moreno:** Approximately 60 cities in Mexico. **Cara Eckholm:** And has it spread beyond Mexico yet? **Yunive Moreno:** Not yet. Through the Bloomberg Cities Ideas Exchange, there are plans to launch in one city in Argentina and one city in Chile, but as of now, there are no implementations outside Mexico as far as I know. **Cara Eckholm:** Still, 60 is impressive. And how does the platform work for municipalities that don’t have reliable internet access, or even computers? You mentioned some towns are starting without basic infrastructure. **Yunive Moreno:** Yes. As part of the support we provided to municipalities — with philanthropic backing — we were able to supply desktop computers for Visor Urbano in some cases. We’re also continuing to work with the state of Jalisco to expand that support. But the hardware is often the easier part. The harder, more ongoing work is capacity building — training public servants to use the platform consistently, making sure citizens know how to navigate it and sustaining both sides of that equation over time. We have two sets of users: citizens applying for permits, and the government staff processing them. Serving both well is a continuous effort. It’s a hard process, but a deeply fulfilling one when you see how many people it reaches. **Cara Eckholm:** In terms of volume — how many users or downloads have you seen across Jalisco? **Yunive Moreno:** Right now, Visor Urbano Jalisco has urban plans available for 10 municipalities. Not every municipality has an updated and digitized urban plan — that’s a separate process — but for the ones we do have, we’ve generated 440,000 urban fact sheet downloads since the platform launched in 2020\. That number reflects a lot of interest in doing business and building in the state. In addition, 35,000 permits have been processed through the platform across the state. We’re really proud of those numbers — it’s the most-used online platform in the state government. **Cara Eckholm:** I want to ask about the platform’s impact. I know [researchers from Oxford and Columbia](https://franciscolaragarcia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/visor-urbano-impact-evaluation-delivery-associates-report-v4.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) came to study Visor Urbano in Guadalajara around 2020\. What did they find? **Yunive Moreno:** Yes. They came toward the end of the Guadalajara phase and conducted surveys and calls with platform users. They found an 84% reduction in average time for the licensing process, a 74% reduction in reports of bribe solicitation by municipal officials and an 85% reduction in bribe solicitation by third-party intermediaries — what we call “coyotes,” the people who used to help applicants navigate the process. That impact evaluation was enormously meaningful to us, because fighting corruption in urban development was always one of Visor Urbano’s goals. It’s a sensitive topic — not many cities are willing to openly acknowledge or study corruption in their permitting systems. So having rigorous external evidence was really powerful. **Cara Eckholm:** Right, I know Jalisco has been in the news a lot recently related to gang activity. I will say though that corruption-in-permitting is a universal problem. It’s not specific to Jalisco or Mexico. In U.S. cities, we’ve essentially legalized the intermediary role by creating the “expeditor” profession, but every few years there’s a major scandal. In fact, one of the original corruption charges against the last mayor of New York involved pressuring someone to approve a building permit before an inspection had been completed. It sounds like you’ve made progress relative to where most places are. On that note — the last time we spoke, you mentioned that you also saw a corresponding increase in municipal permitting revenue. The idea being that money that once went to bribes is now being collected by the city. Is that right? And how significant have those revenue increases been? **Yunive Moreno:** What we observed in Jalisco is a bit more nuanced than a direct bribe-to-revenue conversion. In many smaller municipalities, the issue wasn’t exactly bribery in the traditional sense. It was more that there wasn’t really a formal permitting process to speak of. People knew each other, deals were made informally and businesses opened without permits — not necessarily because anyone demanded a bribe, but because that was simply how things worked. A lot of economic activity was happening outside the formal system. So the revenue increase we’ve seen is largely, we believe, due to people entering the formal economy. When you make the formal process easy, accessible and trustworthy, people who previously operated informally start going through official channels. That’s one major factor. It’s worth understanding just how significant permits and licenses are as a revenue source for Mexican municipalities. Their principal income streams come from three things: land use and property tax; water usage charges and permit and license fees. That’s essentially the full menu of owned revenue for a local government. So when permit revenue increases substantially, it matters. And the state benefits too — as municipalities collect more revenue, the state’s federal transfer allocations also increase. We’re currently working to formally institutionalize Visor Urbano Jalisco as a state public policy — moving it from an innovation project to a permanent part of the government structure. It’s a complex process, given the need to respect municipal autonomy, but the case is strong: we have municipalities that have seen revenue increases of 100% to 300% in a single year. **Cara Eckholm:** It sounds like the program pays for itself? I hadn’t thought about the informal-to-formal economy angle, but it makes complete sense. Just to close out — what are the key takeaways for other cities considering digitizing their permitting processes? Any advice? **Yunive Moreno:** My advice is simply: start. You don’t need to wait for the perfect moment or have all the resources in place. What you need is the will and the right team. You will encounter resistance and hear a lot of “no’s” along the way — but once you push through that, the benefits become visible and the momentum builds. I also believe citizens are demanding more information, clearer rules and more power in their own hands. And the lesson from our experience is that when the government delivers better services, people respond. **Cara Eckholm:** Of course. Well, thank you so much for your time, Yunive. It’s a great story, and I’m sure it’ll be a source of inspiration for a lot of people. ### Government AI, the Road to More Bureaucratic Discretion and Accountability URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-government-ai-accountability-discretion/ Last updated: 2026-04-29T15:45:01.000Z When Mayor Zohran Mamdani created a new[ Office of Mass Engagement](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-establishes-office-of-mass-engagement-to-transform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), promising to listen more closely to the needs of everyday New Yorkers, it was a welcome first step toward earning the public’s trust. But as Mamdani seems to understand, listening better, and to a broader swath of the public, is only half of the recipe for a more responsive local government. City Hall also needs to solve the irritating quality-of-life problems more nimbly and proactively. I saw how this played out when I served as Mike Bloomberg’s deputy mayor. Even though the City generally received high marks for performance, I wanted to understand how operations affected New Yorkers in their daily lives. So, I would meet five times a week with small groups of community representatives in each borough, starting each session with a simple question: How could city government do a better job for you and your neighborhood? Almost every conversation included a common-sense request or complaint that ran into rigid interpretations of City rules. Can the timing of walk signs be adjusted to allow seniors to cross a wide street more safely? The traffic engineering manual said no. Why was the construction at a neighborhood park shoddy? Because procurement rules at the time required choosing the lowest bidder, not the best. A restaurant owner in Queens once hollered about getting fined by health inspectors for leaving his mozzarella out of the refrigerator while he was making pizzas. To understand how it got this way, you have to go back over a century to the Progressive era. In response to Tammany Hall’s corruption and abuses of power, reformers went overboard with rules, compliance requirements and oversight that have stayed with us to this day. Union leaders in many jurisdictions are eager to protect their workers from supervisory abuses; understandably, they embedded restrictions and limitations in the work rules set out in bargaining contracts. Unfortunately, this leads to compounded restrictions, further limiting flexibility for supervisory staff. > In this model, the traffic engineer looking at the wide street can pull up pedestrian counts, crash data and the age profile of the surrounding residents in seconds and adjust the walk signal without waiting six months for a manual revision. To be sure, city managers, elected officials and residents all want decisions that follow rules, reflect public values and treat people fairly. Too much control, however, creates nonsensical rigidity. It robs traffic engineers, procurement officials and restaurant inspectors of the discretion to develop pragmatic solutions to neighborhood problems. Artificial intelligence, paired with updated civil service and management rules, offers a new way to strike a healthy balance. In a[ recent journal article in Urban Governance](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2664328626000069?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), my coauthor Juncheng “Tony” Yang and I call it “accountable discretion”: giving frontline workers room to use judgment on the problem at hand, while using technology to make every decision traceable, reviewable and fair. In this model, the traffic engineer looking at the wide street can pull up pedestrian counts, crash data and the age profile of the surrounding residents in seconds and adjust the walk signal without waiting six months for a manual revision. The health inspector, upon walking into the Queens pizzeria, can see that this is a first-time issue in an otherwise clean kitchen, issue a warning rather than a fine and offer guidance on how to meet the intent of the rule. The procurement officer can weigh a contractor's past performance against the low bid, with the comparison built into the system rather than buried in a file cabinet. AI can do the work that used to make discretion difficult, if not impossible: It pulls the relevant data to the moment of decision, handles the routine paperwork that eats a field worker's day and leaves a clear record of who decided what and why. The frontline worker spends less time typing and more time judging — and every judgment is visible after the fact. Supervision changes, too. Instead of writing rules that force every inspector to act the same way, a supervisor can watch how her inspectors actually use their judgment — and intervene only where the pattern looks off. If one inspector is issuing warnings at twice the rate of her peers in similar neighborhoods, that is a coaching conversation. If fines in one borough track the race of the business owner more than the severity of the violation, that is a problem the old system would have hidden for years. A supervisor responsible for dozens of field workers cannot read every case file; AI can and can flag the handful that deserve a second look. > Accountable discretion only works with strong human oversight, clear limits on surveillance, serious investment in staff training and straightforward ways for residents to question a decision and push back. None of this is automatic. AI tools are only as good as the data they draw on, and most City data still lives in siloed, aging systems — locked up by privacy rules written for a different era or trapped in software that does not talk to the software next door. Without fixing the plumbing, faster answers will just be faster wrong answers. There are also real risks on the other side: agencies that monitor their own staff too closely, or managers who rubber-stamp whatever the algorithm suggests. Accountable discretion only works with strong human oversight, clear limits on surveillance, serious investment in staff training and straightforward ways for residents to question a decision and push back. AI can also change how a city listens to its communities, advancing, over time, an intervention in the life cycle of a developing problem. Residents routinely document deficient park construction on Instagram and other public platforms weeks before the issue reaches municipal channels. To close this latency gap, some cities are now deploying anonymized survey instruments and AI-based sentiment analysis to surface neighborhood-level quality-of-life concerns — including dissatisfaction with specific contractors or facilities — earlier in the complaint cycle. AI should monitor sensors to get ahead of problems: A spike in an air-quality sensor in the South Bronx, for example, could trigger a response before the first asthma complaint comes in. Rather than removing human judgment, AI, when properly used, can free up more time and space for frontline common sense. An AI helper can sort records, summarize documents, flag patterns or handle routine steps. AI can increase responsiveness by dramatically expanding self-service. Why should a family opening a restaurant in the Bronx have to chase permits across a dozen agencies, when a single AI-powered front door could take their information once, in whatever language they speak, and route it to every office that needs it? Residents receive faster, clearer answers and services along with new levels of transparency. These shifts will free up more time for judgment and help public employees focus on areas that deserve more attention. None of these changes will come easily. Civil service procedures are governed by state and local statutes, encrusted by decades of litigation. Union leaders, often skeptical of both managers and elected officials, will need to be persuaded. Public anxiety about AI misuse must be addressed directly. Yet this is precisely the moment for reform, when mayors can get out in front of changes that are coming regardless. Cities need rules and protections regarding AI that, for example, require it to be deployed to expose bias, not entrench it. Mayors with strong labor relationships should engage now — demonstrating that humans remain in the loop at every decision point, and that accountable discretion is itself a recruiting advantage with a new generation of tech-fluent public workers. Thousands of New Yorkers will tell you, on any given day, that you cannot win against City Hall. But it is their City Hall, and what they want is common-sense responsiveness. Public employees take these jobs because they want to serve, not to hand out fines over mozzarella. With the right tools and the right rules, both sides win. Struggling New Yorkers have the most to gain, and efficiency can be turned into better and more affordable services. --- *This piece draws on an academic paper by Stephen Goldsmith and Juncheng “Tony” Yang,*[ *“AI and the Transformation of Accountability and Discretion in Urban Governance,”*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2664328626000069?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *in the journal Urban Governance.* ### Local Politics, After Murder URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-declining-murders-politics/ Last updated: 2026-04-30T18:35:28.000Z For my entire lifetime, the central political issue in New York City has been crime, and even more specifically, the murder rate. In the New York City of my youth, the local evening news and the front pages of the Post and the Daily News were effectively a crime blotter, your daily dose of grisly crimes and ineffective politicians, vicious gangs and heroic cops. Worries about crime played a key role in everyday decisions, about whether to take the subway at night or whether it was okay to walk home from school alone. [Political scientists have shown clearly that the murder rate](https://people.duke.edu/~nwc8/arnold%5Fcarnes%5Fholding%5Fmayors%5Faccountable.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — not the local economy, not the quality of other local services — has been *the* measuring stick by which we judge the success and failure of politicians. The murder rate has historically played a role in New York City mayoral approval ratings, much like the unemployment rate or GDP growth have in determining presidential approval ratings. Murders have also always led media coverage, particularly in New York City’s vibrant tabloids. If it bleeds, it leads. [Books about New York City’s political history](https://www.amazon.com/Gods-New-York-Idealists-Opportunists/dp/052551063X?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are often mostly discussions of murders, and the political ramifications of those murders. High murder rates have destroyed the careers of some of the city’s most promising politicians, like David Dinkins. Falling murder rates have elevated extremely unlikely ones, like Rudy Giuliani. Even as the murder rate fell to historic lows, mayors who sought to change the subject to other issues, like Bill de Blasio, [have seen their tenures partially defined by conflict with the police](https://abcnews.com/US/nypd-officers-turn-back-de-blasio-cops-funeral/story?id=27851746&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as the specter of “the bad old days” hovered over everyone’s shoulders. There’s a reason for this. The bad old days were *really bad*. New York City had more than 2,200 homicides in 1990\. The rate fell dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s, making New York City one of the safest cities in the country. As Vital City’s essential annual look into crime statistics noted, all types of crime spiked during COVID, but, [while other types of crime have been stubbornly persistent, murder rates have fallen dramatically](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/crime-in-new-york-city-trends-statistics) since. Last year, there were [309 murders in New York City, a decline of 20% from the prior year](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR001/nypd-safest-year-ever-gun-violence-fewest-shooting-incidents-shooting?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This was close to the [2017’s 290, which was the fewest since the city started recording murder statistics](https://abc7ny.com/post/nypd-new-york-citys-2017-crime-rate-was-lowest-since-1951/2868270/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In the first quarter of this year, [murders were down another 28% year-on-year](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/transcript-%5Fmayor-mamdani-and-nypd-announces-fewest-murders--sho?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That data is noisy, and the low numbers this year almost certainly have something to do with snowstorms and extreme cold, so this year’s huge decline may not stick. But the decline is enormous. If the number of murders keeps declining at this year’s rates, New York City’s murder rate this year will be about 2.6 per 100,000 residents, a lot like we see in cities like [Toronto (1.6) and Berlin (3.2)](https://www.london.gov.uk/londons-homicide-rate-capita-lowest-records-began-having-recorded-its-lowest-homicide-figures-eleven?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Crime remains an issue in these cities, of course, but worries about murder do not dominate their politics. Further, a large majority of New York City residents, whether they are transplants or the young, simply have no memory of an era with high murder rates. (They likely do remember the spike during COVID, but, as serious as that was, it was small potatoes when compared to the 1980s and ‘90s.) While some other types of crime are stubbornly persistent, the Bad Old Days of high murder rates are increasingly a ghost story told at night to a population that doesn’t remember and may not care. The causes of the decline are only partially understood. Scholars have some [clear findings](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426877?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), like that increases in the number of police officers generally reduce crime. But while theories abound, they don’t have clear answers for why we saw such [a huge decline in the 1990s and 2000s](https://www.amazon.com/City-That-Became-Safe-Lessons/dp/0199324166?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (or why rates fell across the country, although at different rates). We similarly don’t have clear answers about why rates have come back down all over the country post-COVID. So there’s no guarantee this trend will continue. Whatever the reason why murder has declined, it’s worth asking now what politics in New York City will look like if there are not many murders anymore. On some level, we don’t even have to ask. Mayor Mamdani’s election, [according to](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/28/opinion/ezra-klein-show-chris-hayes.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) many, would have been unthinkable if the murder rate was not so low. Would the city have taken a chance on an inexperienced left-wing upstart if people were very afraid of crime? Notably, a number of Mamdani’s rivals in the last election put fighting crime at the center of their appeals to voters, either affirmatively or as defenses against criticism. But, while Mamdani talked about crime, it was not a major part of his appeal to voters — childcare, free buses, rent freezes and tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy were. Further, if homicide continues to fall, it is likely that Mamdani’s own political prospects will be strong, regardless of what else happens with the budget and taxes. So what would we talk about in a city if we stopped talking about the murder rate? The answers can be broken into the more narrow question of what crime politics will look like, and the broader question of what effect the decline in homicide talk will have on the rest of politics. I think that, if homicide is truly defeated, city politics will be less consumed by fear and far more focused on the cost-effectiveness of government, an area in which New York City, despite its successes in reducing the murder rate, has long lagged. ### Crime politics after murder It would be wrong to think that homicide becoming less of an issue would be the end of public debate about crime. After all, murder isn’t the only crime, nor is prevention of murder the only thing the police do. One area where we will see increased attention — indeed, one where we already have — is on the services police provide, without seeking to justify them in terms of their effect on the murder rate. For instance, since the 1990s, we have had a debate over whether police should focus on arresting people for committing quality-of-life crimes. But that debate has largely been about whether “broken windows policing” reduces murder. ([The empirical](https://news.northeastern.edu/2019/05/15/northeastern-university-researchers-find-little-evidence-for-broken-windows-theory-say-neighborhood-disorder-doesnt-cause-crime/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) evidence has never been that strong, [but debate continues](https://www.amazon.com/s?k=peter+moskos+back+from+the+brink&adgrpid=186668573419&hvadid=779674748105&hvdev=c&hvexpln=0&hvlocphy=9004077&hvnetw=g&hvocijid=3345900255240836161--&hvqmt=e&hvrand=3345900255240836161&hvtargid=kwd-2411643678686&hydadcr=22593%5F13821245%5F8237&mcid=6fa93700adb239dd80eb8079bcbe872f&tag=googhydr-20&ref=pd%5Fsl%5F1r946myael%5Fe).) In a city with few murders, that framing will be less important. But it will not end the arguments over whether police, perhaps now freed up from other tasks, should address problems ranging from public urination and littering to threats of violence and harassment on the subway. (Or, indeed, actual assaults, which remain stubbornly high.) That is, our crime politics will be about whether it is good to arrest people and devote public resources to fighting disorder because people *dislike* disorder, rather than linking that debate to questions about murder. Rather than focusing on the terror of murder, the question in policing will increasingly be about providing a positive vision of public services and unthreatening public spaces. Similarly, there is a long debate about the effect that clearance rates, or solving cases, has on murder rates. There's [substantial evidence](https://www.amazon.com/When-Brute-Force-Fails-Punishment/dp/0691142084?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=When%20Brute%20Force%20Fails%20explains,put%20that%20knowledge%20to%20work.) that the certainty of punishment is more important to reducing crime than the severity of punishments. Although it makes logical sense, linking this to the clearance rate is [harder to do.](https://cls.gmu.edu/defenses/905?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) As murder falls, I suspect clearance rates will be thought of in moral, rather than consequential, terms. That is, in a world where there are fewer murders, police will be held to account for solving murders, not because doing so will deter crime, but because people will want the government to provide victims with answers in cases of serious crimes. And, in a world with fewer homicides, police will be in a better place to solve crime, as their efforts will be spread across fewer cases. Notably, these arguments are about whether the social and economic benefits of order and justice are worth the tax price of police officers and prosecutors (and the social costs of arresting people). One way to think about this is to ask whether voters will demand a “peace dividend,” cuts to police budgets and shifts of resources to other areas. The city surely has other needs, and, as the murder rate falls, some will put concerns about providing social services above demands for continued policing vigilance. Mayor Mamdani’s proposed Department of Community Safety is partially in this spirit. On the other hand, defunding the police has never been popular, even in 2020-21\. There are plenty of reasons why citizens will continue to want high levels of policing even as murder rates fall. Demand for public services like police and firefighting increase as property values increase, as they provide a kind of insurance for property. Providing public safety beyond murder prevention is important to economic development, as disorder and low-level crime reduces business investment. Rather than a “peace dividend,” citizens may demand the police and other city officials turn their attention to making public space more usable and making the city a more livable place. Either way, in a city with a lower murder rate, crime politics will be fought out on very different grounds than it has been in living memory. ### Local politics more broadly The main effect of the decline of murder on city politics will probably be to make crime less important to local politics, and to elevate other issues. Indeed, as Mayor Mamdani’s election shows, issues of affordability and redistribution will have more space in a world where murder takes up less attention. More generally, the central question is likely to be about whether the extraordinarily high prices New York City residents pay in taxes and rent are worth it. Mayor Mamdani’s affordability politics are a perfect fit for a post-murder era. Telling voters you’ll spend scarce tax revenue on free buses or government-subsidized grocery stores is only plausible in a world where higher order concerns about safety have abated somewhat. [Whether or not you think these are good ideas](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/why-does-everything-cost-so-much), they are responses to the demands of voters less concerned about the murder rate. The fundamental pitch is not about avoiding the criminal downsides of urbanity, but about making it possible for more people to enjoy the upsides of living in the city. The fights we are seeing over the City’s budget also have a post-murder feel to them. New York City has long had an extraordinarily high “tax price” for services. New York [pays more than any other large school district per student](https://cbcny.org/research/highest-costs-middling-marks?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but gets middling results [The cost of running](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/nyregion/citys-annual-cost-per-inmate-is-nearly-168000-study-says.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [jails and prisons is much higher](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-cost-of-incarceration-per-person-in-new-york-city-skyrockets-to-all-time-high/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the quality again does not seem to be higher. Mayor Mamdani’s [focus on “public excellence,”](https://jacobin.com/2026/02/zohran-mamdani-efficiency-nyc-budget?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or improving the quality of services for a given tax price, is an effort to justify New York City’s high taxes (and the higher ones he’d like to see). Critics will argue for cuts to services, changes in union contracts or reforms to civil service rules to reduce costs. Either way, the focus will be on trying to convince New Yorkers they are getting a good deal. Mayor [Mamdani’s embrace](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/politics-policy/pro-development-yimby-advocates-lead-mamdanis-housing-effort?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [of YIMBYism](https://www.city-journal.org/article/new-york-city-election-charter-zoning-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is also a transition to a post-murder politics. At a rhetorical level, Mamdani has recognized that New York City can offer its residents (and potential newcomers) more value if it allows more housing construction to occur, [slowing increases in rent](https://x.com/PEWilliams%5F/status/2021280346189201797?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And he can afford more of his promises if population increases and economic growth surges. Critics of this move are very much playing on an older playing field, where fear — of change, of new neighbors — dominated politics. There will be left-wing and more moderate and even conservative approaches to housing growth. But housing growth and prices almost certainly will increase in salience. If murder ceases to be a major concern, it will lead to increased demand for city living. This will increase demand for housing, creating growth but increasing prices. A falling murder rate will likely increase public support for YIMBY politics, as support for new building is associated with a positive affect towards cities as [David Broockman, Chris Elemendorf and Josh Kalla have shown](https://osf.io/preprints/osf/surv9%5Fv2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It would be a healthy sign indeed if the housing growth rate replaced the murder rate as the key statistic in urban politics. If the murder rate continues to fall, New York City politics will orient itself towards making urban living more affordable and a focus on the quality of services (and the tax price of those services) offered to city residents by its government. Or at least one can hope. ### How the Public Can Help Mamdani Guide New York City Schools URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-parents-nyc-schools/ Last updated: 2026-04-28T14:09:22.000Z With mayoral control of New York’s schools once again up for renewal by the State Legislature — the authority will expire this June 30 unless extended before then — there’s pressure on Mayor Zohran Mamdani to show that he can bring parents to the table in a meaningful way. A careful bottom-to-top analysis of parent powers in the school system reveals that there are multiple levers he can pull to accomplish this task, largely under the current law. Let’s start with the lowest-hanging fruit: Every year parents are surveyed on their children’s schools. Yet there is little visible sign that those survey results go anywhere. Mamdani should insist upon a comprehensive review of every principal in the system, using parent survey results as a tool. This is an appropriate time for such assessment. Our new chancellor, Kamar Samuels, and his new deputy chancellors for elementary/middle and high schools, need to get a handle on the system they’ve inherited, in which [enrollment has been declining for years](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2026/02/13/nyc-school-funding-hold-harmless-mamdani-enrollment-decline/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Focusing on parent satisfaction is both good practice and good politics, especially in a competitive environment with charters and private schools. Assessing principals on their dedication to parent engagement should not be an inquisition, but rather an effort at bottom-up system improvement and a demonstration that grassroots attention will be the new chancellor’s governing paradigm. The survey is just the beginning. Every public school is supposed to have an effective parent coordinator, a working [School Leadership Team](https://www.schools.nyc.gov/get-involved/families/school-leadership-team?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and other committees with parent representation. [Parent Associations](https://www.schools.nyc.gov/get-involved/families/parent-associations?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) elect parent members of the SLTs, are a conduit for information and opinions between parents and the administration, and often serve important fundraising roles. One way to exhibit respect for the role of School Leadership Teams — which are charged with development of educational policies and oversight for their schools — is for Mamdani and Samuels to give the teams the prerogative to choose which approved reading and math curricula should be adopted by the school. Ex-Chancellor David Banks gave that choice to his hand-picked superintendents when it should have been a school-based decision all along, with waivers made more freely available if schools demonstrate viable alternatives. Where school-based decisionmaking is possible, that should be the administration’s default. There’s more. The administration should empower parents’ role in hiring school and community district leadership. No, parents shouldn’t be given veto power — but they should be carefully heard during searches. Now, under Chancellor’s Regulation [C-30](https://www.schools.nyc.gov/docs/default-source/default-document-library/c-30-8-1-2019-final-combined-remediated-wcag2-0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (principals and assistant principals) and [C-37](https://www.schools.nyc.gov/docs/default-source/default-document-library/c-37-8-1-2019-final-remediated-wcag2-0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (community superintendents), parent consultation is too easily dismissed by superintendents or the chancellor, respectively, who have the final word. To put teeth into a better process, a new statutory position, Parent Advocate, housed in either the Department of Education or the office of the citywide elected Public Advocate, should be created to monitor and support parent engagement. To ensure the role’s independence, the Parent Advocate appointment should be approved by a collective vote of Community Education Council presidents, a decisionmaking body already empowered to appoint one of a number of parent members of the central Panel for Education Policy. Community Education Councils in each of our 32 community school districts — largely now treated as vestigial versions of the old Community School Board — and the citywide Panel on Education Policy are another potential source of parent power and decisionmaking. But these councils currently have little power. The Legislature is being pressed to give them a greater role over district governance. That could make sense, but only if the councils are rethought. As long as these bodies are constituted through low-turnout school-district-run elections, their governing role will rightly be questioned. Arising from the late 20th-century era of community control, their predecessor community school boards were elected by all eligible voters in the district, plus otherwise ineligible parent voters. If the Legislature wishes to enhance the powers for the Community Education Councils, it would at a bare minimum make sense to restore the franchise to non-parents. Public schools are a public good. Besides the old saying against taxation without representation, it’s important as a matter of public support for education that the entire adult population (including eligible students) be given a voice in public school policies and operations. In any event, whether left to parent voters or the general public, administration of Community Education Council voting should be moved from the Department of Education to the Board of Elections, which is more expert at conducting elections. Atop the parent power pyramid, our pre-mayoral control Board of Education had broad powers including appointment of the chancellor, with its seven members appointed by the borough presidents and mayor and no designated parent members. Today, its replacement, the 24-member [Panel for Educational Policy](https://www.schools.nyc.gov/get-involved/families/panel-for-education-policy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), majority-controlled by the mayor, has a [statutory](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/EDN/2590-B?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) minimum of 14 public school parents, including at least two who have children with disabilities and one with a child enrolled in a bilingual education program. While the Panel’s powers were originally limited to policy rather than operations, its [authority](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/EDN/2590-G?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) now extends to certain contract and school utilization decisions, including closures, grade configurations and co-location of schools within a building. An obscure power of the Panel for Educational Policy — [to redraw community district lines](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/EDN/2590-B?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — presents the possibility of solving daunting systemwide problems caused by uneven conditions of school under-enrollment, overcrowding and class-size limits, as well as racial and economic segregation. Current lines drawn 50 years ago now needlessly discourage mergers and restructured attendance zones that could better serve our students. A recent [study](https://availabletoall.org/report-and-stay-out/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) demonstrates how schools near to one another but across district lines could be improved by erasing these artificial barriers. The system of district-based superintendents and councils creates understandable proprietary interests in serving their own populations. But that means cross-district arrangements have rarely found footing. Current law gives drawing of elementary and middle school attendance zones within the district to community education councils, a closely-held super power we saw malfunctioning in the recent [District 3 merger controversy](https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-nixes-plan-to-close-upper-west-side-school-amid-outrage-over-parents-racist-remarks?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Community school district lines are determined by the PEP. Unless the legislature wants to step into this debate, new lines approved by the PEP that promote greater fluidity in school enrollments are the best, if unlikely, solution. But through the weight of the mayor’s appointed majority, informed by strong parent representation, this needed reform could become a reality. Some suggest changing the composition of the PEP to wrest majority control from the mayor, but that’s not wise. And, though its current size is unwieldy, major changes might run into legal or political trouble. For example, an elected board favoring Chicago’s parent voters faced judicial [rejection](https://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/1990/69558-7.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over one-person-one-vote concerns, and even a mayor as progressive as Michelle Wu in Boston appoints that city’s seven member School Committee, circumscribed only by the flimsy [requirement](https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/file/2024/12/nominating-panel-legislation.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that “the mayor shall strive to appoint individuals who reflect the ethnic, racial and socioeconomic diversity of the city of Boston and its public school population.” Increasing parent/school partnership in public education is crucial in an era of decreasing enrollments and increased competition. While mayoral control provides the needed budgetary, operational and contractual structure, our schools are hollow without parents actively engaged in their educational mission. The way forward is clear. System leaders and legislators need to rise to the occasion. ### Want More Parental Input While Keeping Mayoral Control? Look to Community Schools URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-mayoral-control-parents-community-schools/ Last updated: 2026-04-24T15:20:50.000Z As a candidate, Zohran Mamdani opposed mayoral control of the schools — saying the public needed a much bigger voice in educational decisionmaking. Soon after becoming mayor, he changed his mind, urging the legislature in Albany to preserve the authority that’s been law since 2001\. But New York City does not have to choose between mayoral control and community voice in our schools. We can have both, and we already do. The city’s community schools, now 420 strong, show what it looks like to build structured, democratic input into school decisionmaking while keeping a clear line of accountability to City Hall. We should build on that foundation rather than swing between competing approaches in search of something entirely new. Mayor Mamdani has said that he wants New York to “belong to more of its people than it did the day before,” and he’s created an Office of Mass Engagement in City Hall to try to amplify the voices of ordinary residents. In education, the challenge is to translate that promise into practices that are transparent, consistent and inclusive, without weakening the mayor’s ability to mobilize resources and deliver results. It’s easy to say, tough to execute. Giving control to ordinary New Yorkers sounds great, but in this city, almost everyone disagrees on almost everything, some voices are much louder than others and decisions still have to be made. For the mayor to deliver on goals as ambitious as universal childcare and stronger literacy outcomes, he needs to be able to coordinate across agencies, set priorities and act at scale with a clear line of accountability. That is why Albany should extend mayoral control for the next four years. The debate, then, shouldn’t be whether a mayor should lead our public schools. The debate should be whether leadership can be structured so it is informed by the people most affected by school decisions — all of them, not only those with lots of time on their hands or those who are fluent in English, or those who already know how to navigate the system — and in ways that are transparent and consistent. The good news is that New York City already has a practical template for how to do that. It is community schools. Today, New York City has a large network of community schools, district schools that combine academics with deeper family engagement, integrated family supports, expanded learning time and formal partnerships with lead nonprofit community-based organizations. The city’s initiative began in 2014 with 45 schools and grew significantly over the following decade. These are not charter schools or separate governance entities. They are “traditional” district schools, but they use a model that integrates academics with supports families often need, from mental health services and health care to food pantries and after-school programming, while giving families and community partners a more meaningful role in shaping school priorities and preserving clear accountability for final decisions. They run the gamut from P.S. 154 in Mott Haven to Port Richmond High School on Staten Island. Research says these schools deliver results for kids. The RAND Corporation evaluated New York City’s community schools in two stages. A [2017 implementation](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research%5Freports/RR2100.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) study of 118 schools found that about 81% reported families were more present in the school as a result of becoming a community school. Then, in its [2020 impact study](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research%5Freports/RR3245.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), RAND found that community schools posted stronger outcomes than comparable schools, including higher graduation rates and lower rates of chronic absenteeism. I have seen what this looks like when it is done right. During the de Blasio administration, I had the privilege of serving as the founding senior executive director of New York City’s Office of Community Schools. In that role, I worked with educators, community-based organizations and city agencies to build the approach and strengthen how schools engage families and respond to the needs of the whole child and family. One example is M.S. 50 in Williamsburg. Each year, the school holds a forum where families review data, identify the school’s strengths and gaps and help shape the school’s priorities and comprehensive education plan. The forum is multilingual and designed to make families feel welcome, with celebrations of student work and food that reflects the school community, because honest input depends on genuine belonging. After reviewing the data, families share their perspectives on barriers to success and on the programs and supports students need, from academics to enrichment. Done well, this creates something rare in public systems: a structured way for families to influence priorities, grounded in evidence and connected to planning. If Mamdani wants to honor his commitment to a more inclusive style of governing, he should treat community schools as a way of running schools, not a special initiative on the side. That means making two moves at once: expanding the number of community schools over time and bringing the practices that make them work to more schools, not just those formally designated as community schools. The fastest way to scale this work is to standardize transparent, inclusive school-level priority-setting and invest in helping parents and caregivers build the skills, knowledge and confidence to lead. Community input works only when families have the time, information and support to participate on more equal footing. That is how participation becomes broad and representative. Here is what this could look like in a Mamdani administration. First, set a citywide expectation that every school holds an annual community planning forum, based on the Community School Forum model, with accessible information, multilingual participation and a clear set of questions designed to surface priorities. Require all schools to publish what they heard and the priorities they will act on. This is not meant to replace existing channels for parent engagement, including PTAs and School Leadership Teams. Those structures still matter. But they are limited by design and often draw from a relatively small group of parents. A broader community planning process would widen participation and give formal governance bodies better, more representative input to work from. Second, invest in building a stronger corps of parent leaders through Parent University, NYCPS’s existing learning platform, offering free workshops, resources, and events to help families support their children and navigate the school system. Without support, even highly engaged parents can struggle to interpret school data, understand where decisions are actually made or feel comfortable speaking up in meetings dominated by educators that freely use acronyms and jargon. Parent University could be used more intentionally to help parents build the skills to interpret school data, facilitate discussion and represent their communities in school-level and district-level bodies. Community-based organizations could help recruit, coach and support parent leaders on the ground, while the City provides the practical supports that make participation possible, including translation and child care. Third, create a simple, systemwide accountability loop so community input is visible even as elected leaders make major decisions. Central offices should aggregate and incorporate what schools are hearing, identify patterns the city can address and report back publicly on what actions are being taken. The Panel for Educational Policy should receive regular public updates on what communities are raising and how the system is responding. That would make community input easier to trace, and harder to ignore. This approach would keep the line of accountability clear while bolstering community input in ways that matter. It would keep the mayor responsible for results while using an existing and effective strategy to bring families and communities into the work in a structured way. Community schools show New York City does not have to choose between strong leadership and a system where people have a voice. We can do both. ### The Cost of Freezing the Rent URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/alex-armlovich-interview-rent-freeze/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T16:37:55.000Z --- *Freezing the rent sounds simple. Alex Armlovich, one of the sharpest housing policy minds in the country, explains why it isn't — and why that doesn't mean it's wrong. Jamie and Alex, a fellow at the Niskanen Center and program officer at Coefficient Giving, dig into what the Rent Guidelines Board actually does, what happens to buildings when operating costs outpace revenue, and what a "physical equity extractor" is — and why you don't want one buying your building.* *You can listen to this episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-cost-of-freezing-the-rent/id1794619189?i=1000762999029&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/6KcXnWyPItENAUFQUiaDP8?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### New York's Nameless Knights URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorkers-help-each-other-despite-stereotype/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T16:25:27.000Z The man in the red shirt fell onto the subway tracks directly in front of me. I had noticed him seconds earlier, wobbly, with a cane. He looked elderly, then I realized he could have been younger than my 60 years, but with harder circumstances bearing down upon his countenance. His cane caught, ironically, on the nubby rubber yellow “safety strip” at the platform edge. He faltered, then fell sideways onto the trackbed. He was moaning in pain, his clothing torn. Blood trickled down his pants. I screamed “POLICE” at the top of my lungs. Because it was midday people were spread sparsely across the platform at Herald Square. A woman ran towards the end of the tunnel where a train might momentarily arrive, her cellphone flashlight on and ready to wave at any oncoming F or M. She yelled out that subway operators know to look for waving flashlights as a sign to stop the train. Not knowing this, others and I followed suit. The rescue plan, at least the one in my head, was simple: help her stop an oncoming train and wait for professionals to arrive to rescue the man. But before I knew it, two burly men — everyday straphangers with weathered work boots — swiftly jumped onto the tracks with an unassuming gallantry. “C’mon, get his shoulders,” one said to the other. They gently lifted the man and brought him to the platform edge, where another person and I helped pull him to safety. The two of us then moved quickly to bring up the good samaritans, a white man and a black man. The first ascended, one hand in mine, the other carrying the injured man’s cane. The second waited with a patient anxiety, his eyes fixed in the direction of oncoming trains. As we brought him up, he turned to me and said, “My heart is racing like a hummingbird,” to which I could only respond, “Of course it is, you just saved a man on live subway tracks.” Paramedics arrived and tended to the injured man. Blood washed over his scarred and pockmarked legs, his veins an intricate spiderweb. He seemed to be yet another person New York had lost to the street, and almost lost for good that day. The paramedics cared for him gently and took him away. A downtown F train pulled into the station minutes later as we all, a bit stunned, went about our days while his blood disappeared beneath. As the train doors shut, I felt guilty that it hadn’t occurred to me to jump onto the tracks. The police had arrived within minutes of my shout and could have brought the man out safely before any trains had arrived. For all I knew, they may have already radioed dispatch to stop all oncoming traffic. But the two samaritans were there first and acted instantaneously, with little thought for themselves. Their heroism will never be a glaring New York Post headline. There will be no ticker tape parade for these two brave men. They were just there and did what they felt was right. I have found time and again, contrary to our reputation in the wider world, New Yorkers look out for each other, like when my spouse lost her purse on the subway and it was returned, fully intact, at the next station, or when I had a bad Christmastime bike accident on Lexington Avenue in response to which tourists gawked while locals helped. I have heard versions of such stories of civic selflessness from many longtime New Yorkers, and yet this beautiful hallmark of who we are as a shared citizenry — in contrast to the stereotype of us as hardened urbanites who ignore each other’s plight — never seems to travel across our bridges and tunnels. A particular purveyor of this urban callousness stereotype is Taylor Sheridan, the creator of “Yellowstone,” its spin offs and *“*Land Man.” To wit, the premier of his latest hagiographic paean to Montana, “The Madison,” begins with the daughter of the protagonist being mugged and shoved to the sidewalk on Fifth Avenue in broad daylight while onlookers ignore the blood on her Bottegas and scurry away. (Confession: I will watch anything with Michelle Pfeiffer in it.) As someone who has driven across this beautiful nation multiple times and is overwhelmed by the glory of Montana, I don’t understand the need to trash the city in order to deify the country. It is a response, perhaps, to the sense that we city folk do the opposite when we look down on our rural brethren. We should all work harder to break through the stereotypes of our deeply divided era. What Sheridan should consider is the nexus between Madison, Montana, the breathtaking county after which the show is named, and Madison Avenue. He should understand that the people of both places are pioneers and rangers of sorts, insisting upon the hard but often fulfilling path of their intensely rural or urban lives. I have friends from both walks of life who equally state that they could exist no other way, maybe because both places have exhilarating characteristics that make people feel alive, a quality that perhaps mountains and skyscrapers both instill. Rural America, however, isn’t perfect, and neither are we. There is much to concern us about the state of our city. We have been losing population. While crime is down, [the subways do not feel as safe as they should](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-to-do-about-subway-safety-nyc-policy-recommendations/), in part because of rare but horrific crimes, in part because of the kind of quotidian, lower-level disorder that rarely makes the news. The recent Saturday morning [machete incident at Grand Central](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/15/nyregion/machete-attack-grand-central.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a stark reminder about our mental health crisis and its impacts on everyday New Yorkers. And of course, tragedies like this man tumbling to the tracks might have been avoided if we had the more modern two-door platform system used on London’s new Elizabeth Line, not to mention more affordable housing, more shelters and more mental health support. Yet beyond these problems that we in the political cognoscenti ceaselessly debate, this story for me was a reminder of the pain and the promise of a Gotham forged by everyday people, people who instinctively jump on live tracks. It is a social compact few outside our borders will ever understand, yet we eight million know. New York’s nameless knights — the chivalrous men who saved this soul, the woman with the flashlight, the first responders, the conductors, or even the bicycle delivery men who peeled me off the pavement that frigid December day — are the individuals who in the end make this place work despite our inability to deliver a better city, a better society, on their behalf. ### The Unlikely Tool That Could Transform Second-Chance Hiring URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/second-chance-hiring-insurance-employer-risk/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T14:57:05.000Z I was 7 when my father went to prison. I remember when he was allowed an outing in the park, a rare and special gift, knowing even at the time to hold on to every moment he could push me on the swing. I remember him finally coming home and seeing the classifieds in the paper open on the table. The unsaid imperative: find work. The classifieds didn’t work out, the sting of a record too great. In a stroke of good fortune, a friend of a friend took a chance and hired my dad despite his past. He became a travel agent, helping people plan their dream vacations to faraway places while the terms of his probation kept him landlocked. That one hire, that one “yes,” changed the trajectory of my life, too. It allowed us to get back to a version of normal where I could focus on my future. April is Second Chance Month, a time to reflect on the barriers that people with criminal records — and their families — face long after they have served their time. Chief among those barriers is employment. [64% ](https://www.rand.org/news/press/2022/02/18.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)of all unemployed men have some form of criminal record. For years, policymakers have sought to either regulate this problem away through reforms like ban-the-box laws or subsidize it through tax credits, but research shows that most of these interventions have not meaningfully changed outcomes. At Arnold Ventures, where I work on criminal justice policy, we go to the evidence first to see what works. What emerged in this area surprised us: Making second-chance hiring less risky to employers — through insurance — could make a big difference. Employers are often concerned that hiring someone with a record could make them more vulnerable to issues like theft on the job. We don’t actually know how true this is, given the dearth of data. But there is insurance that addresses this type of risk: Crime and safety coverage is a standard part of policies that employers purchase to cover the cost of thefts committed by their employees while working. Unfortunately, these policies typically exclude employees with a criminal record, meaning employers are on their own if they encounter any issues. This affects small- and medium-sized businesses the most. Large businesses either self-insure or buy custom insurance policies. But for the millions of small- and medium-sized businesses that lack the resources to negotiate custom policies, the coverage gap for workers with criminal records is a powerful, invisible deterrent to giving someone a second chance. A [rigorous randomized controlled trial](https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=63031&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by economists Zoe Cullen, Will Dobbie and Mitchell Hoffman conducted a real-world experiment to see what interventions shifted employer behavior. When employers on a staffing platform were offered crime insurance covering potential damages from their hires, their willingness to hire workers with records jumped by 16 percentage points. Employers weren’t opposed to second chance hiring on principle. They were rationally responding to real financial exposure — and when that was addressed, they shifted their hiring decisions. How could we use this insight to help more people? Arnold Ventures is exploring ways to close this standard coverage gap. For instance, we’re working with state and city leaders to explore government-backed funds that would reimburse businesses for covered losses their insurers won’t pay. This could generate useful data on payouts to help commercial insurers offer such products in the future. Some might argue that we shouldn’t invest public resources to help people with records. But preventing people with records from getting work actually may [cost us all more](https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wp-content/uploads/sites/283/2015/09/incar.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the long term — in subsidies for public benefits, damage from new crimes and ultimately system costs for reincarceration. As I can attest, helping someone reintegrate not only pays individual benefits, but helps their family and ultimately their community. Reentry is an area where we need innovation to make society healthier and safer. I never expected to get excited about insurance. But insurance has extraordinary power to shape what people feel safe doing. It turns an uncertain risk into a manageable decision. For the employer weighing whether to hire a qualified candidate who happens to have a record, knowing they’re covered could make all the difference. My father was lucky — he knew someone willing to take that chance. Most people coming home from prison don’t. April is Second Chance Month. Let’s commit to building a system where it doesn’t take luck to make a match between a qualified employee and a business eager to hire. Let’s realign incentives to make it easier for more employers to say yes. ### Learn from Japan to Get New York City Commuter Rail on Track URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/japan-rail-system-lessons-mta-nj-transit/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T14:22:15.000Z The Japanese railway system is the most extensive and efficient system of public transportation in the world. [Over a quarter of all Japanese passenger-miles are traveled by train, compared to 8.1% in the UK and 0.3% in the United States](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/relative-share-of-passenger-kilometers-travelled-by-rail-and-road?country=JPN~GBR~DEU~FRA~USA~IND&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But while Japan is most famous for subways and Shinkansen bullet trains, the backbone of Japan’s rail system is the intricate urban commuter rail network, which carries passengers at a scale that American commuter rail systems could only dream of. On an average day in 2024, Shibuya Station on the Keio Inokashira Line — just one of many busy stations — carried [286,000 passengers](https://www.keio.co.jp/company/corporate/corporate%5Fmanual/number-of-passengers.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to and from Tokyo’s western suburbs. In the summer of 2025, the entire Long Island Rail Road averaged about [265,000 passengers per day](https://www.mta.info/press-release/lirr-ridership-surges-fall-season-begins-surpasses-300000-one-day-first-time-pandemic?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Last month, I spent 10 days in Japan, seeking to understand the country’s thriving commuter rail systems. There are three key things Japanese railways do better than their American counterparts. Japanese railways invest in labor-saving technology, they buy better trains and they make transit-oriented development an integral part of their financial stability. The MTA and New Jersey Transit should learn from these ideas. With both agencies facing fiscal shortfalls and lots of talk about how to generate more housing in and around New York, it has never been more urgent to learn how the most successful commuter railroads in the world do business. ### Better technology ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/20260331_104126.jpg) **The JR Yamanote Line, the busiest commuter rail line in the world, is slated for full automation by 2035\. Credit: Jake Berman* Japan faces dire labor shortages due to a shrinking population. [Its working-age population peaked in 1995 and its total population peaked in 2008](https://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/press/koen%5F2025/data/ko250824a1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Not coincidentally, the country’s commuter rail lines have gone all-in on automation. Some of these are large, flashy investments. The East Japan Railway Co. (JR East) operates the busiest commuter rail line in the world, Tokyo’s Yamanote Line, and [is currently working to automate it](https://asia.nikkei.com/business/transportation/tokyo-s-busy-yamanote-loop-line-to-go-driverless-by-2035?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). By 2035, the entire line will be driverless. For lines which still have street crossings, full automation is not possible with current technology, but even then, railways are installing equipment to reduce crew sizes. The [Keio Inokashira Line](https://www.keio.co.jp/news/update/news%5Frelease/news%5Frelease2024/pdf/nr20250306%5Fjidouunten.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, is currently trialling automatic train control equipment to eliminate train conductors, enabling one-man operations. Automation saves money and enables railroads to run more frequent trains. Even American examples bear this out. The BART regional rail system in San Francisco currently uses one-man operation, and it costs $374.50 to run a single train car for one hour in passenger service (in transit parlance, per “vehicle-revenue-hour”). This is less than half of what it costs the [Long Island Rail Road](https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/transit%5Fagency%5Fprofile%5Fdoc/2024/20100.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ($850.81 per vehicle-revenue-hour), [New Jersey Transit](https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/transit%5Fagency%5Fprofile%5Fdoc/2024/20080.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ($765.29 per vehicle-revenue-hour) and [Metro-North](https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/transit%5Fagency%5Fprofile%5Fdoc/2024/20078.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ($836.37 per vehicle-revenue-hour). Japan’s commuter railroads don’t just use automation to operate the trains. They also invest in off-board technology to enable more efficient running. Japanese operators universally use turnstiles to collect fares, [rather than the manual ticket takers used by the LIRR, Metro-North and NJ Transit](https://nypost.com/2023/01/16/mta-lirr-let-385m-fly-off-the-rails-beg-kathy-hochul-for-bailout/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (which also have machines supplementing their work). At major stations, Japanese operators have installed platform edge barriers which reduce delays in two ways: first, they prevent passengers from holding the doors; second, they keep passengers from falling onto the tracks. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/20260402_122144.jpg) **Platform edge doors, Shibuya Station, Keio Inokashira Line, Tokyo. Credit: Jake Berman* Japanese railroads have also invested in the simplest technology: platforms at the level of the train, so passengers don’t have to climb stairs to board, and the train crew don’t have to lower the stairs. New York and New Jersey are far behind. Rather than reducing staffing requirements on trains, the New York State Legislature [passed Bill S4091 last year banning one-man subway operation ](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/traffic%5Fand%5Ftransit/2025/12/20/hochul-vetoes-bill-requiring-two-person-crews-on-subway-trains?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)at the behest of the Transport Workers Union, but Governor Hochul vetoed the bill. Fare collection remains a labor-intensive, manual business. The Long Island Rail Road, for example, [requires at least two workers per train to take tickets](https://nypost.com/2023/01/16/mta-lirr-let-385m-fly-off-the-rails-beg-kathy-hochul-for-bailout/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a process that has been subverted by corrupt [employees](https://www.wshu.org/long-island-news/2021-10-20/8-lirr-conductors-were-caught-pocketing-tickets-in-a-sting?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To its credit, the MTA has installed level boarding platforms at Metro-North and LIRR stations, but New Jersey Transit still has dozens of stations which have not been upgraded. According to Nolan Hicks of NYU’s Transit Costs Project, [level boarding saves about 30 seconds of boarding time per station](https://transitcosts.com/momentum/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Over the course of a long run, such delays add up. For example, switching the dozen low-platform stations on NJ Transit’s Raritan Valley Line to level platforms would save an extra six minutes in each direction. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/20260331_104423-1.jpg) **JR Yamanote Line turnstiles at Tokyo Station*. Credit: Jake Berman ### Better trains In Japan, it’s not just the surrounding technology that’s advanced. The trains themselves are much more fit for their purpose than their American equivalents. Compared to the rolling stock used in the Tri-State Area, Japanese trains are lighter, faster and have more doors so passengers can board more quickly. On the weight front, the MTA’s newly purchased M9 railcars, used by the LIRR and Metro-North, weigh 65 tons each. A four-car, 340-foot train weighs 230 tons. [Comparable Japanese trains, like the E231 series used on Tokyo’s Chuo Line, weigh half as much](https://www.jreast.co.jp/e/environment/pdf%5F2004/report2004%5Fp06-07.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A five-car, 327-foot train of E231s weighs 115 tons. Weight matters because lighter train cars are faster, require less electricity and put less wear and tear on tracks. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/car-comparisonArtboard-1@3x.png) Credit: Jake Berman The speed comparison becomes even more stark when comparing Japanese trains to the diesel locomotive-pulled trains still in common use in the Tri-State Area. According to Hicks, an eight-car train pulled by a diesel locomotive takes about 120 seconds to reach 80 mph from full stop. Japanese commuter trains can go 0-80 in 45 seconds, because each car has its own motors, electric motors give better torque and the trains themselves are lighter. The time savings are enormous. When the Caltrain system in San Francisco switched from diesel locomotives to lightweight electric trains, [it cut travel times for a 50-mile trip — the distance from Grand Central to Cold Spring — by 24 minutes](https://www.caltrain.com/electrictrainfaq?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/20260402_122652.jpg) **Japanese commuter rail cars are optimized for fast loading and unloading. Keio Inokashira Line, Tokyo.* Credit: Jake Berman Finally, Japanese commuter trains take less time to load and unload passengers because they have more doors. Japan’s E231 Series, for example, has 20 doors for a five-car, 327-foot train; the MTA’s new M9s have only eight doors for a roughly equivalent four-car, 340-foot train. American train designs make it harder to load and unload passengers quickly, leading to train congestion at major hubs like Penn Station. BART in San Francisco faced similar issues with its fleet of 1970s train cars. When BART replaced its fleet in the late 2010s, the agency bought cars with more doors. How does it add up? At Penn Station, [the LIRR and NJ Transit respectively take 18 and 22 minutes](https://www.irum.org/20140807%5FAmtrak%5FNYP%5FThru%5FRunning%5FAssessment.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=11) to unload passengers, load new passengers and depart. In Tokyo, the Keio Inokashira Line takes three minutes, six seconds to do the same at its Shibuya terminal. Some of this inefficiency is because Penn Station has narrow platforms, and the LIRR and NJT do have outdated operating practices — but much of it is because it takes passengers longer to get on and off the train. The Tri-State Area’s railroads have stuck with these outdated train designs, even though the Federal Railroad Administration [legalized the use of lightweight Japanese-style rolling stock in 2018](https://railroads.dot.gov/regulations/federal-register-documents/2018-25020?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It’s not just the MTA ordering heavy, outdated equipment, either. [New Jersey Transit ](https://www.njtransit.com/press-releases/nj-transit-continues-commitment-modernize-rail-fleet?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)recently ordered more dual-level train cars that weigh an average of 75 tons per car. Per car, this is 10 tons heavier than the MTA’s M9, 30 tons heavier than the [dual-level cars ordered by Caltrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stadler%5FKISS?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and over 50 tons heavier than the E231 series used in Tokyo. ### Transport and real estate development, hand in hand The MTA only covers a [third of its operating expenses through fares](https://www.mta.info/document/201681?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and [NJ Transit recovers about half](https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/FY24%20FACTS%20AT%20A%20GLANCE.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but Japanese commuter rail operators don’t require public subsidies to balance the books. How is that possible? The Japanese make train stations destinations in and of themselves, not just places that passengers pass through. ([Hong Kong’s publicly owned Mass Transit Railway does the same.](https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/the-rail-plus-property-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) A showcase example is at Tokyo Station, Japan’s long-distance train hub. The grand old Tokyo Station Hotel, owned by JR East, occupies the station’s upper floors. But grand hotels aren’t the only part of Japanese railways’ real estate portfolios. They also build apartment buildings and commercial complexes. Each station is a small hub for people to work, live and play, even in the suburbs. The MTA and NJ Transit could do the same in New York City’s suburbs — if only it were legal to do so. In New York, Section 1266(8) of the Public Authorities Law makes the MTA subject to local zoning rules, and city councils can veto any development of [“facilities that are devoted to purposes other than](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PBA/1266?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [transportation or transit purposes.”](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PBA/1266?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) NJ Transit is similarly dependent on local cooperation [and lacks sufficient legal authority to carry out large-scale transit-supportive development on its property](https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/marketing/website/pdf/REAL%5FESTATE%5FOPPORTUNITY%5FREPORT.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [A bill to give NJ Transit that authority](https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2008/S3000/2972%5FI1.PDF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was proposed in 2009, but failed. As of fiscal year 2024, [less than 1% of NJ Transit’s operating revenue](https://vtc.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/NJT-Funding-Report%5FVTC-2025-FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) came from real estate. For comparison, the Keio Corporation (which runs Tokyo’s Inokashira Line) earned [18.3% of its revenue](https://www.keio.co.jp/assets/pdf/company/sustainability/management/integrated-report/integrated-report2025-english.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from real estate leasing and sales. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/20260331_104824.jpg) **The Tokyo Station Hotel owned by JR East is one of many railway-owned hotels in Japan. Credit: Jake Berman* In addition to their larger-scale projects, Japanese railways undertake myriad small-scale building projects, including commercial developments beneath their elevated lines. Under-track development is both profitable and mitigates the urban blight caused by elevated railways, as retailers of all kinds line the under-track areas. Metro-North’s Park Avenue Viaduct in Harlem, the LIRR’s Atlantic Avenue Viaduct in Brooklyn and the disused [Rockaway Beach Branch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockaway%5FBeach%5FBranch?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Queens are all viable candidates for this type of transformation. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/20260331_095925.jpg) **Under-track retail spaces, Yurakucho, Tokyo. Credit: Jake Berman* ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/20260403_122426.jpg) **Under-track retail spaces, Ueno, Tokyo. The JR East Yamanote Line elevated tracks are on the upper right. Credit: Jake Berman* Legally restricted from developing their real estate portfolio, the MTA and NJ Transit have had to fall back on fare hikes, service cuts and state subsidies. Giving the MTA and NJ Transit general authority to develop real estate is an opportunity to steady both agencies’ finances, and it would be in line with a growing national trend. The [Northern Illinois Transit Authority](https://gov-pritzker-newsroom.prezly.com/fact-sheet-northern-illinois-transit-authority-act-sb-2111?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) gained development authority last year, as part of a package of state reforms to stabilize greater Chicago’s public transport network. [San Francisco’s BART received authority to develop on its properties in 2018](https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/BART%5FAB2923%5FFinalTechGuide%5FFull.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To date, BART has built over 4,000 homes, 672,000 square feet of offices and 202,000 square feet of retail. BART’s suburban El Cerrito Plaza development is illustrative of the possibilities. On what was once surface parking, [743 units of housing, a public library and 2,100 square feet of commercial space](https://www.bart.gov/about/business/tod/el-cerrito-plaza?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are planned or under construction. Closer to home, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has long been supported by its real estate portfolio. For the MTA and NJ Transit to do the same would take legislation in Albany and Trenton and an internal build-out, but it’s far from a pipe dream. This combination of real estate and transportation used to be the norm in the United States, and it was how the commuter rail system was originally built. Grand Central Terminal was originally half real estate development, half transport expansion. [As the New York Central Railroad wrote in 1912](https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015038162999&seq=4&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “\[Grand Central\] is perhaps the largest, and promises to be the most successful, combination of the esthetic \[sic\] and the practical in city building yet planned in America ... Now, behind this artistic ideal of city building is a sane and hard-sense commercial proposition, for without some definite business side it would not be feasible.” ### An opportunity in a crisis The MTA and New Jersey Transit are facing slow-motion fiscal crises. The MTA’s long-term structural deficit [is projected to reach $1.1 billion by 2029](https://cbcny.org/research/mta-operating-budget-outlook-short-term-stability-long-term-risks?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), according to the Citizens Budget Commission, while New Jersey Transit’s [structural deficit is currently around $200 million](https://gothamist.com/food/world-cup-fans-face-150-train-tickets-to-nj-games-regular-riders-get-service-cuts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Rather than making brute-force cuts and raising fares, the commuter rail agencies should first think creatively about ways to improve the efficiency of their systems. There are plenty of ideas that can be borrowed from the Japanese commuter rail playbook. These can be simple cost-savers like new turnstiles and high platforms, or they could be longer-term plays like automation and real estate development. But the MTA and NJT needn’t come up with these ideas from first principles. Japan has already solved the problem of commuter rail sustainability, and it behooves the Tri-State Area’s transit agencies to learn from their ways. ### How the MTA Built Its New App In-House URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mta-new-app-subway-omny/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T13:49:03.000Z *Last month, the state-controlled Metropolitan Transportation Authority* [*released*](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-launch-new-best-class-mta-app-new-york-city-subway-and-bus-customers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *its new map and schedule app for subways and buses. In contrast to many public-sector attempts to build tech tools, the elegantly named* [*MTA App*](https://www.mta.info/document/202106?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *is fast and simple, enabling a user to learn when a subway or bus near her is coming on the first screen she sees, rather than forcing her to tap multiple times. The MTA App is easily on par now with — or even superior to — the tech-industry competition.* *What went right? It’s a question we should ask more often, because we never forget to ask what went wrong when mistakes are made. Vital City sat down with three of the people behind the app: Chief Customer Officer* [*Shanifah Rieara*](https://www.mta.info/transparency/leadership/executive-leadership/shanifah-rieara?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, Deputy Chief Customer Officer* [*Kevin Call*](https://x.com/kevinjcall?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and Head of Product* [*Jen Chen*](https://www.amny.com/news/mta-launches-new-app-subway-bus-omny?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— to understand what the MTA App does for riders, how the agency built it with an in-house team rather than depending on outside contractors, and what the experience might signal about the future of government technology.* --- **Nicole Gelinas:** It's been almost 14 years since the MTA announced its first Subway Time app, which covered just six numbered lines. Now the MTA is offering zero-tap information on real-time subway and bus arrivals across the whole system. What's the first thing people will notice about this app — and why should they download it rather than just use Google or Apple Maps? **Shanifah Rieara:** This is built for New York City Transit by transit riders, and that's what we want to convey. The zero-tap feature gives you a countdown clock in your pocket. It works in low-connectivity environments, which matters as we're still wiring up the system. You get real-time bus tracking, transfer options, key service alerts, a 24/7 customer service chat — and more is coming. **Gelinas:** What's the one thing people really wanted that you were able to deliver? **Kevin Call:** Speed. It was the biggest drawback of the predecessor — the information was there, but you'd have to sit and wait for it to load. This is New York. Seconds matter, especially if you're on a local trying to decide whether to get off and wait for an express. This app is optimized to work in low-data environments, so it loads fast. The other major apps are primarily driving apps with some transit added on. We can offer something incredibly customized to the experience of riding the subway and bus. **Gelinas:** How are you getting the word out? **Rieara:** We're taking a two-pronged approach. Everyone who had the previous app got a push update — they didn't have to go to the app store. To complement that, we've embarked on a marketing campaign using our 10,000 digital screens across the system, along with social media and rolling outreach. The rollout a couple of weeks ago generated a lot of positive reaction and [news coverage](https://www.timeout.com/newyork/news/the-mta-just-launched-a-new-revamped-app-with-real-time-tracking-032626?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We want to build on that. **Gelinas:** Let's talk about the decision to build in-house. Back in 2012, the MTA signed an $800,000 contract with an outside vendor to handle web development. What was the reasoning for bringing it back? **Rieara:** In the past, we relied on consultants who lived in every corner of the country or the world to develop a product for us. They'd create it, and then we were left finding capacity and funding to maintain it. As part of the new MTA, we've done a robust job of recruiting amazing talent — Jen came to us from Google. Having that capacity in-house means we can build it, maintain it and update it. As we get feedback from customers, it gets integrated by our team. We're not shelling out hundreds of thousands of dollars. This is a homegrown product. **Call:** This generation of MTA leadership is confident that we can attract the best talent and deliver a digital experience New Yorkers deserve. Previously, the agency just wasn't confident, so they went the consulting route. There's nothing in place of having folks in the building who take the system, who know the quirks inside and out. As problems arise, we get into a room and hammer out a solution in real time, versus getting on the phone with a team in a different country that may never have been to New York. **Gelinas:** Jen, why did you leave Google for the MTA? **Jen Chen:** I wanted a job where I could have a positive impact on the community around me. I spent eight years on Google Maps — I know all about scale and launching across hundreds of countries. But the MTA gave me an opportunity to work on something for the city where I live and dive into details you don't get at that scale. With this app, I can model West 4th Street with its upper and lower levels. I can tell you that yes, Times Square gives you a free in-system transfer to the A-C-E, but it's a bit of a walk. These details really make or break a customer's experience. **Gelinas:** Tell us about the team. How big is it, and how did it come together? **Chen:** We try to operate as a startup within the MTA and really bring what it means to build software to the transit agency. We began with a few engineers who wanted to build a better ticketing experience for the Long Island Rail Road. That project became [TrainTime](https://www.mta.info/traintime?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which — at least for a while — was my favorite government-issued transit app. From that success, we realized we could build something in-house that's really good and set a new standard for what it means to be a government app. Then we took on the challenge of subway and buses, which is a different level of complexity compared to the commuter railroads. We also built the digital signage you see rolling out across stations. We probably reached 20 people last year. **Call:** That's across products — the mobile apps, website and digital screens. **Chen:** I think we've reached a good size for the products we support. And of course, as a product manager, I'm never going to say no to more people. **Gelinas:** What would be the ballpark cost versus what it would have cost to contract this out? **Call:** That one I might have to get back to you on. There were several vendors involved with the last app that we've over time sunset — some of these services have shut down or are in the process of shutting down, so it's not easy to make an apples-to-apples comparison. **Gelinas:** Does bringing it in-house bring challenges? Do you have to convince people to be paid less than they'd make at Google? **Rieara:** None of us who work for a government agency will ever be rich. But we're drawn to this because we believe in good government. We're here to apply our skill sets and make effective change. And there's no shortage of areas at the MTA where we can be innovative. Kevin has been instrumental in setting up text and email alerts so riders can get real-time service information — and that's now folded into the app. This will also complement the [Weekender](https://cloud.info.mta.org/weekender?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). There are other things these talented individuals can focus on, because we have a lot of systems that are antiquated and long overdue for overhaul. There's also a flexibility advantage. When we procure with vendors, it's done through the lens of a particular job scope. When we onboard talent in-house, we get people who are jacks of all trades. Kevin doesn't come in and do one job and wrap his day up. We don't have the luxury of operating that way — and that ends up being a strength. **Chen:** I find a lot of people are excited about working for the MTA, but they don't know how to get in. This isn't a career track the MTA has traditionally recruited for. The people we get tend to be a bit later in their career and want to bring private-sector experience to the MTA, or a bit earlier and want to have a really big impact. There's a real desire in tech right now to work on things that are mission-driven. It's just not something government has been traditionally well-suited to do, and that's what we're trying to change. **Gelinas:** Did you use AI in building the app? **Chen:** We use AI development tools as standard now. But every code change has been reviewed by a human. Some of our best work is what we now call "hand-coded," because there are things only a human eye can do. But AI makes a lot of work go faster — it can create a debug interface in minutes that would normally take a day. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/Untitled-design--1--1.png) Pages of the MTA App **Gelinas:** Where does the walking-directions data come from? Do you have to buy that? **Chen:** In the app, we link to Apple Maps or Google Maps for walking directions. It's just a link to their service. **Gelinas:** And they don't charge for that? **Chen:** No, because we're sending traffic to them. **Gelinas:** A kind of non-monetary trade — you own the subway and bus feeds, which are very valuable. When you do contracting, you have [goals](https://www.mta.info/press-release/mta-announces-commitment-award-historic-amount-of-work-75-billion-historically?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for MWBE — minority- and women-owned business enterprises. According to research from [McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/institute-for-economic-mobility/our-insights/how-to-close-the-black-tech-talent-gap?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and others, Black people are underrepresented in top tech jobs. Will there be workforce development goals for the in-house staff? **Rieara:** We have a diverse team from all walks of life and different backgrounds. I'm very proud to work at an agency that every year reaches the platinum level for MWBE, with a billion dollars in spend annually. [Chairman Lieber](https://www.mta.info/transparency/leadership/executive-leadership/janno-lieber?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) pushes every department to procure from and do business with MWBE vendors. When we recruit and onboard, all of that is factored in. **Gelinas:** There are features in the app for customer safety. Would you ever consider something where a rider could drop their location and send a message — someone smoking in a subway car, for example? **Call:** We already have a couple of features for that. There's a link to the feedback form, and we also offer 24/7 live-agent customer care, where you can connect with someone and submit a report — something broken, feeling unsafe, needing assistance. **Rieara:** To complement that, in every subway car, and now on buses, we have announcements — digital on screen-equipped cars, posters on others — letting customers know they can text us 24 hours a day, seven days a week, at 212-MTA-Info. **Call:** And the chat team is in the real control center, sitting next to the comms desk, next to NYPD. When you contact them, you're going direct to the source. **Gelinas:** What about the physical infrastructure that underpins this? You couldn't have the tech without the countdown clocks, which were a [big achievement](https://www.nydailynews.com/2018/01/01/mta-adds-countdown-clocks-to-all-subway-stations-11-years-after-project-started/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for a previous generation. **Call:** This ties to why the [CBTC](https://www.mta.info/project/cbtc-signal-upgrades?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) signaling project is so important. The [B Division](https://nypost.com/2025/10/30/us-news/mta-drops-1-5b-on-new-fleet-of-subway-cars-in-move-to-avoid-breakdowns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) currently uses a beacon system, which tracks a train as it moves through a station. When CBTC is more widely online, we'll know train locations within a centimeter, which will make predictions even better. **Chen:** We know customers really like seeing live vehicle locations on a map — it builds trust. So we increased the GPS polling rate for buses from every 30 seconds to every five seconds. You can watch the bus live as it comes down the street. **Gelinas:** You've said you'll integrate OMNY trip history into the app. Do you envision in-app payments eventually? **Call:** Coming later this year, we'll have trip and charge history in the app. To follow, the ability to add, edit and remove payments, and digital closed-loop OMNY cards — meaning if you have a transit benefits card that doesn't have the RFID chip, you'll be able to link it to a digital OMNY card and use your phone. **Gelinas:** Would you ever have one app for all MTA agencies? **Rieara:** That's something we're constantly talking about. Right now, we want to get the MTA App where it needs to be — all the functions and features our customers want, attracting riders who haven't downloaded it yet. Then we'll reevaluate. **Gelinas:** How often do you expect to update it? **Chen:** Right now, weekly, because we're getting so much feedback and trying to iterate quickly. I don't expect it to always be weekly — maybe every two weeks. **Gelinas:** What kind of feedback have you responded to? **Chen:** As we've scaled out our Android deployment, Android has such a diverse variety of hardware and operating systems — much more so than iOS. Scaling out has helped us see our performance on different devices and find places where we could optimize. **Gelinas:** Can you support it on any phone, even one that's very old? **Chen:** That can be tricky, depending on the manufacturer's support for operating systems. At some point, Apple and Google stop releasing security updates. It depends on our software development kits as well. But we're aiming to support as much as we reasonably can. **Gelinas:** There's always discussion about whether the MTA should do more of its big projects in-house — mega-projects like the [Second Avenue Subway](https://www.mta.info/project/second-avenue-subway-phase-2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) extension. Have you learned any lessons from building this app that might apply? **Rieara:** What we've shown is that we have credibility now in these spaces — in delivering something in-house. Look at the [platform barriers](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-metropolitan-transportation-authority-has-installed-protective?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): when there was a need and concerns around customer safety, those were done in-house by an amazing group of transit workers. There are countless examples where we have the talent to do it ourselves. Under the direction of the chairman, we've been doing fiscal re-baselining exercises, and we've set goals in annual cost savings, initially $500 million. We're continuously looking at how to be innovative but more efficient. And when repairs or updates are needed, we don't have to wait for an external vendor — we deploy the army of the willing that's here. **Gelinas:** The public's experience with government tech — whether it's federal, state or local — is often not great compared to private-sector products. Why is that, and does this app provide lessons for other government entities? **Call:** In the public sector, you might have people who focus on the back end and neglect the front-end experience. In the private sector, you don't just have a developer — you have UX resources and a designer working together. We've tried to replicate that here. **Chen:** Part of the challenge for government agencies is attracting talent, because big tech companies and startups have a natural funnel. When we do bring people in-house, you get really passionate people who bring a level of quality you can't get from a vendor. Government hasn't traditionally been well-suited to do this. That's something we're trying to change. **Rieara:** We are proud of the product we've launched. We've done this in-house, with an amazing group of talented individuals invested in New York City. Download the app if you don't have it already, use it and give us feedback. It's a product for New Yorkers, by New Yorkers. ### To Prioritize Pedestrians, We Need to Walk the Walk URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/pedestrian-foot-tracking-nyc-map-model-mit/ Last updated: 2026-04-16T19:37:51.000Z There is an old saying in urban planning: What gets counted, counts. By that logic, what remains uncounted risks being overlooked. Stand at a busy street corner in New York — say, somewhere between Midtown’s 5 p.m. hustle-bustle and a quieter outer-borough avenue — and watch closely. Some move quickly, some slowly; some with purpose, while others meander or sit down. What first appears as a whirlwind of pedestrian flux, soon appears to have structure. People are not moving randomly. They are tracing paths: from subway exits to office towers, from homes to schools, from shops to parks. Together, they form a system. In fact, one of the most fundamental systems in the city — what Jane Jacobs liked to call the “sidewalk ballet,” Jan Gehl the “life between buildings” and Alison and Peter Smithson “the charged void.” For more than a century, urban planning has devoted extraordinary attention to the movement of vehicles. We know how many cars pass through every intersection, how car traffic ebbs and flows over the course of a day, how congestion propagates across networks. These measurements are not merely descriptive; they are constitutive. They determine funding formulas, infrastructure priorities, street-design specs and ultimately the physical shape of cities. Pedestrian movement, by contrast, has remained largely in the shadows. Walking is not only the most universal form of mobility — accessible to children, to older adults, to those who cannot afford to drive — but, in cities like New York, it is also the most common. More trips are made on foot than by car. And yet pedestrian activity is the least systematically measured and understood mode of travel. While the New York City’s Department of Transportation is one of the very few city agencies in the world that actually has a number of staff dedicated just to pedestrian mobility, cities generally do not know how many people walk on each given street, nor maintain reliable maps of the sidewalks where they can walk. In [recent work with colleagues at MIT](https://www.nature.com/articles/s44284-025-00383-y?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we sought to make pedestrian movement visible at the scale of the entire city. This required beginning with a problem that is at once mundane and revealing: assembling a coherent map of New York’s pedestrian network. Sidewalks, crosswalks and footpaths, all connected into a routable network — the basic infrastructure of urban life on foot. --- Using this network, we developed a model to estimate how pedestrians travel in the city during peak travel hours — in the morning, during the midday and after work — between homes, jobs, transit stations, schools, parks and amenities. Unlike traditional transportation models, which operate at the level of large zones, this approach works at the scale of individual buildings and street segments. It allows us to ask, with some precision, not just how many people are walking in a neighborhood, but where, exactly, they are walking. How much foot-traffic does 32nd Street between Fifth and Sixth Avenues in Manhattan have on weekdays between 5-6 p.m.? Around 3,700 people per hour. What about Bushwick Ave between Linden St and Gates Ave? Around 190 people per hour. We calibrated the model with roughly a thousand observed pedestrian counts that the DOT had commissioned at different streets and intersections throughout the city. When one begins to measure pedestrian movement systematically, the city’s dynamism takes on a different clarity, revealing an underlying structure. Morning peaks are shaped by the gravitational pull of jobs and transit stations; midday flows reflect the rhythms of errands and social life; evenings blend the residuals of work with the anticipations of leisure and social gatherings. These patterns are not incidental. They are the temporal signature of interactions between individuals’ activity and travel choices and the built environment that frames and constrains these choices. Modeling and visualizing foot traffic in a city has a number of practical implications that are increasingly difficult to ignore. Cities today face a set of intertwined challenges: reducing carbon emissions, accommodating growth and ensuring safety and equity in development. In each of these domains, pedestrian movement plays a central role. Consider the question of decarbonization. Ambitious climate targets hinge, in no small part, on shifting trips away from automobiles toward more sustainable modes (the transport sector is the largest contributor to CO2 emissions in the U.S., roughly 30%, largely due to personal cars). A shift to more walking and public transit use is essential to reducing this share. But such shifts do not occur by convincing people to change their behavior, against their self-interests or needs. People choose to walk or to use public transit when such modes offer the most convenient, affordable or time-efficient ways of getting to places. To ensure that a larger share of the urban population naturally chooses sustainable travel options in the future, we need to ensure that the built environment develops in a direction that makes sustainable travel accessible and logical for more people. This takes time, but the good news is that there are a number of things that planners and city governments can actually do to nudge this shift — configure land use patterns that contain various daily necessities in close proximity, incentivize denser urban developments, prioritize pedestrian and cycling attributes in streets renovations and improve transit service quality. A model of pedestrian movement allows us to examine how the built environment influences sustainable travel behavior. It offers a way to anticipate how changes in land use or infrastructure might alter walking patterns, and by extension, mode choice. Without such tools, planning for mode shift risks relying more on aspiration than on evidence. At a finer scale, the implications are equally significant. Because the model operates at the level of individual buildings and street segments, it can connect everyday planning decisions to broader system-wide outcomes. A new residential development, a rezoning action, a shift in retail geography — each of these interventions generates and redistributes pedestrian trips. Taken together, they shape the mode-share profile of the city. This connection between the granular and the global is often missing in urban policy. Climate goals are articulated at the scale of cities or regions, while the decisions that influence them are made incrementally, parcel by parcel. Bridging that divide requires tools that can trace the cumulative effects of local actions. Pedestrian models offer one such bridge. They also introduce a more nuanced understanding of pedestrian well-being and safety. Much of the current discourse around pedestrian safety relies on counts of crashes or injuries. While important, these measures can be misleading if considered in isolation. A location with a high number of crashes, like Times Square, may simply reflect a high volume of pedestrians. Another location, with fewer incidents but far fewer pedestrians, may present a greater risk per pedestrian. A granular understanding of foot traffic provides a measure of exposure — a denominator against which risk can be assessed. When viewed through this lens, the geography of risk shifts. Some of the most dangerous intersections, in relative terms, are not the most crowded ones in Manhattan, but locations in other boroughs where pedestrian volumes are lower and risks per person are higher. This has implications not only for safety, but for equity too. It suggests that the distribution of risk — and by extension, the allocation of resources to address it — may be misaligned if we focus solely on aggregate crash counts. Improving walking infrastructure in outer boroughs that have historically received far less investment and where kids have to walk to school over dangerous intersections is no less important than maintaining the sidewalks of Times Square. Underlying all of this is a more fundamental point: measurement is not neutral. It directs attention, frames problems and shapes solutions. For decades, the tools of urban analysis have been finely tuned to capture vehicular movement. They have enabled remarkable advances in transportation planning, but they have also reinforced a particular way of seeing the city — one in which the movement of cars is central, and the movement of people on foot is peripheral. Rebalancing that perspective requires not only new models, but a broader shift in what we consider worthy of measurement. Walking, after all, is not a niche activity. It is the connective tissue of urban life. It links transit to destinations, homes to neighborhoods, individuals to one another. It is also the most equitable mode of transportation we have. To take it seriously — to measure it with the same rigor we have long applied to driving — is to begin to see cities more clearly. And perhaps, in doing so, to design them more wisely. ### Why It Takes Four New Housing Units to Get One Person Off the Street URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-it-takes-four-new-housing-units-to-get-one-person-off-the-street/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T17:30:29.000Z City governments are increasingly focused on reducing the number of people with serious mental illness who live on city streets — and with good reason. Living on the street is clearly [dangerous](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10546518/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=These%20health%20disadvantages%20manifest%20in%20significantly%20higher,and%20substance%20use%2C%20which%20are%20often%20co%2Doccurring.). The presence of people with mental illness living on the street also disturbs other city residents, for reasons ranging from fear of violent behavior (whether well-founded or not) to compassionate and empathetic concern. Censuses suggest that about [one-quarter](https://www.kff.org/medicaid/five-key-facts-about-people-experiencing-homelessness/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20U.S.%20Department,than%20those%20who%20are%20sheltered.) of unsheltered homeless adults have a serious and persistent mental illness, though the share varies by city depending on the availability of shelter. In New York, the city comptroller estimates that roughly [2,000](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Data%20shows%20that%20there%20are,effectively%20to%20solve%20the%20problem.) people with serious mental illness are living on the streets. Research suggests that for many people with mental illness or serious addiction, supportive housing, which provides both subsidized shelter and the services they need to stabilize, is the best living option. The policy puzzle is that the counts of unsheltered people with serious mental illness and other maladies are quite small relative to the number of supportive housing units already in use — roughly [40,000](https://shnny.org/uploads/State%5Fof%5FSupportive%5FHousing%5F5.19.25%5FFINAL%5F.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in New York City. Given existing inventories, it might seem relatively inexpensive and straightforward to expand supply by just 5% and house another 2,000 people in New York, thereby addressing the problem. Experience shows that it is not so simple. One well-recognized [challenge](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-lander-announces-blueprint-to-end-street-homelessness-for-people-with-serious-mental-illness-in-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is that [some people](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2818505/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Prior%20research%20indicates%20that%20placement,of%20more%20powerful%20social%20theory.) with serious mental illness choose not to remain in housing, even with supports, and instead return to the street. But these transitions are only one of the many dynamics that muddle the arithmetic of reducing street homelessness. Street homelessness is not a static condition — it is dynamic. Part of that dynamic consists of inflows from and outflows to those living in the community in ordinary (often subsidized) housing. Most people with serious and persistent mental illness at risk of losing housing (a group that we have estimated constitutes at least [0.85%](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/appi.ps.20240450?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the total adult population) are not homeless at a given point in time — they live in the community. However, about [one-tenth](https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article-abstract/40/1/65/3074503?redirectedFrom=fulltext&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of people with a serious mental illness currently living in the community had been homeless in the prior year and one-fifth had experienced one or more episodes of homelessness over their lifetimes. These statistics imply that for every person with serious mental illness living on the street at a point in time, there are roughly four others — currently housed — who have experienced homelessness in the past. They also imply that many people currently living on the streets will eventually return to housing in the community. Flows into and out of jails, hospitals and other institutions add another dimension to this dynamic system. Nearly [half](https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/40/1/65/3074503?guestAccessKey=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of individuals with a lifetime history of homelessness (whether or not they had serious mental illness) have been incarcerated at some point. Studies of supportive housing interventions find that large [shares](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2002.9521437?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of homeless people with serious mental illness have had prior stays in inpatient or state psychiatric facilities. [Most](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2002.9521437?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) people living on the street have also spent time in homeless shelters. At a point in time, about [97%](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/news/press%5Freleases/2025/pr-hope-7-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of homeless adults in New York are in shelters. The overall population at risk of homelessness also evolves over time. Young adults experiencing the onset of serious mental illness [enter](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/10783903251314873?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the population, while those already affected — whether living on the streets, in shelters or in the [community](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/eclinm/article/PIIS2589-5370%2823%2900471-6/fulltext?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — face elevated [mortality](https://www.nber.org/digest/202402/estimating-mortality-rates-us-homeless-population?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com&page=1&perPage=50) risks. > Perhaps surprisingly, we find that adding supports to help people remain in supportive housing, so that they are less likely to return to the streets, has little effect on the overall street population. Adding supportive housing units to this complex system sets off a [cascade of effects](https://thinkbiggerdogood.org/using-markov-modeling-to-understand-the-dynamics-of-unhoused-populations-experiencing-serious-mental-illness/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Supportive housing directly reduces the number of people sleeping on the streets, but it also (intentionally) reduces entry into jails, hospitals and institutions, and, proponents hope, improves life expectancy. It may also (unintentionally) reduce the likelihood that individuals return to other forms of housing in the community. These changes — many of them highly desirable — reduce outflows from the formerly street-homeless population. Combined with steady inflows into homelessness, this means that additional housing units may have more limited effects on the unsheltered population census than expected. In recent research, we use an approach called Markov modeling to [estimate](https://thinkbiggerdogood.org/using-markov-modeling-to-understand-the-dynamics-of-unhoused-populations-experiencing-serious-mental-illness/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) how additional supportive housing targeted to people with serious mental illness would affect the street population in New York City. Under very restrictive targeting assumptions — where units are reserved exclusively for individuals who have lived on the street for at least two years — we find that more than two new units are required to reduce the street population census by one person. Under assumptions that more closely reflect existing supportive housing programs, we estimate that about four new units are needed to reduce the street population by one person. Other research, not limited to people with serious mental illness, suggests that as many as [10 new units](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1051137715300474?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) may be required to achieve this outcome. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that adding supports to help people remain in supportive housing, so that they are less likely to return to the streets, has little effect on the overall street population. These supports help individuals remain in their units and may keep them out of jail and hospitals, but that stability means that units turn over less frequently and become less available to new entrants. Our analysis suggests that strategies targeting the much larger population at risk — those currently housed in the community — might make a given supply of supportive housing go farther. Unfortunately, it’s difficult to design and target such strategies so that they don’t become prohibitively expensive. The dynamics of homelessness, particularly among people with serious mental illness, make this a challenging policy problem. Significant investments in housing can yield smaller-than-expected reductions in the street population. But this does not reflect waste or inefficiency. Rather, the visible street population represents only the tip of a much larger underlying problem: a sizable population with serious mental illness who struggle to consistently secure stable housing. These conditions make it very unlikely that people can earn enough (or collect enough through disability benefits, which currently average about $1,000 a month) to consistently and continuously afford adequate and stable housing. Most people in this group manage to remain housed most of the time, but a substantial share is at ongoing risk of homelessness. Supportive housing units targeted to those who are chronically homeless do have appreciable effects on the street census (even if not as large as anticipated). Perhaps more importantly, they provide people in this very vulnerable group with the stable shelter and services they need. While there is no way to entirely escape the effects of housing dynamics, policymakers may be able to achieve more from available units by strategically targeting them to those who are least likely to return to the community and by supplementing supportive housing units with more intensive services for those at high risk for homelessness who live in the community. ### Homeless Encampments, Expenditures and the Evidence We Keep Ignoring URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-homeless-encampments-spending-81k/ Last updated: 2026-04-16T13:08:43.000Z I first learned how to do outreach to homeless individuals on the streets of the Bronx in 2005, where, at BronxWorks, I was part of a shift in how such work is done — from passively handing out sandwiches to people who were willing to engage, to actively seeking out those who were not. We climbed under fences, ventured deep into remote areas of parks and public spaces, and resolved long-standing encampments through a strong, coordinated response across city agencies. By some measures, this approach [reduced street homelessness citywide by nearly 40%](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dhs/downloads/pdf/hope-2018-results.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) between 2005 and 2009. Since then, we’ve forgotten some of what drove that success. As the homelessness problem grew — from about 37,000 people in shelter each night in 2009 to over 85,000 today — so did emergency spending and response. In the process, we lost the intensity of focus and leadership that encampment resolutions require. Outreach is among the most challenging roles in homeless services. Anyone who takes it on quickly learns that success is measured not in any single interaction, but in what comes before and after: the months of trust-building, the institutional readiness to receive someone when they finally say yes and the careful coordination of care to ensure that same individual does not land right back on the street after a housing placement. Unsheltered homeless individuals do not land on the street overnight; they have usually been failed by multiple social safety nets, and they are choosing personal autonomy in ways that may seem strange — even frustrating — to those of us who have stable housing situations. And yes, a portion of this population may be unable to make rational decisions concerning their own well-being due to substance use or serious mental illness. Two recent flashpoints have renewed conversations over how to approach this problem effectively and efficiently: a [New York Times piece](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/13/nyregion/nyc-street-homeless-outreach.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the intractability of shelter avoidance, and viral reports [in the press](https://nypost.com/2026/03/16/us-news/nyc-spent-roughly-81k-per-person-on-homeless-services-last-year-comptroller/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and on [social media](https://x.com/charliesmirkley/status/2033383075422540105?s=46&t=7In4G5WJw2unjfs1fo5wiQ&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which reference a [New York State Comptroller’s report](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/reports/osdc/pdf/report-21-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) concluding that New York City allegedly spent $81,000 per street homeless person last year. Both deserve a careful and considered response. ### No easy answers When people talk about encampments, they are most often referring to one or more individuals who have established improvised structures (using tents, tarps or other materials) as a temporary shelter in a public space or vacant private property. And let’s be clear: Homeless encampments are dangerous for everyone in them. As a form of shelter, they are inadequate and unsanitary. They also compound the kinds of trauma — including past experiences with violence — that often drives people to the street in the first place. Encampments can also impede foot traffic, disrupting surrounding neighborhoods and the New Yorkers who share those public spaces. A persistent encampment sends a signal — to the people living in it and to the surrounding community — that this is an acceptable outcome. It isn’t. But it’s equally true that if you rush to dismantle encampments without a strategic, coordinated plan, you won’t solve the problem. You will just move it around. A [New York City Comptroller’s audit](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-department-of-homeless-services-role-in-the-cleanups-of-homeless-encampments/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#%5Fftn4) found that a paltry 5% of people accepted temporary shelter from encampments cleared between March 1, 2022 and November 30, 2022\. Of the 2,036 people in those encampments, only 119 accepted shelter. Sixty-six of those remained in shelter for more than 50 days and only three made it into permanent housing. That is an enormous expenditure of resources by police, sanitation and nonprofits whose job it is to help unhoused individuals find shelter for an outcome that amounts to rearranging where people sleep on the streets. Few would disagree that the goal should be connecting people in need to appropriate settings and ensuring that the encampment does not return once it’s addressed. The question is how to get there. When Breaking Ground, the nonprofit where I serve as chief operating officer, began its outreach work over two decades ago, the approach to encampments was genuinely collaborative. Today, Breaking Ground, under contract with the Department of Homeless Services (DHS), is responsible for the bulk of outreach to street homeless individuals for the entire boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, along with a swath of Midtown Manhattan from 23rd to 59th Street, river-to-river. At the outset, we and our peer outreach providers — the people with daily, face-to-face relationships with individuals living outside — fed information to DHS to help shape decisions about when and how to approach a cleanup. That intelligence was the difference between knowing that a particular encampment includes three people who were days away from agreeing to come inside and treating it as an obstacle to be cleared on a schedule set by a 311 complaint. The advent of HOME-STAT in 2016, through which the de Blasio administration sought to replicate the success of the Police Department’s data-driven COMPStat, brought innovation and additional resources to street outreach. But it also introduced layers of bureaucracy that, in some key ways, have thwarted creativity. Over the past decade, the City’s encampment strategy transformed into a sterile set of protocols, with nonprofit outreach providers — who, thanks to contracts with the City, provide the bulk of outreach efforts to homeless individuals — cut completely out of the picture. If the sole goal was to close out 311 complaints in a timely manner, that approach could claim a certain kind of success. If the goal was getting people to enter shelter willingly and begin the process of stabilization, it was a failure as documented by the City’s own data. Effective encampment response requires cutting through the fragmentation of various City departments with two things: urgency and accountability. Nonprofit outreach providers should be back at the table as genuine strategic partners with DHS, not just implementers of decisions made above them. Everyone involved — DHS, the Police Department, Department of Sanitation, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of Parks & Recreation, nonprofit providers — must agree on a timeline for resolution and operate under clear, shared rules, such as those [outlined in this special Vital City report](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways/). We must also build in aftercare through sustained follow-up to ensure that people placed from an encampment remain housed, and that new encampments do not reemerge in the same spaces. The goal should not be simply to clean the area, but to house the people. Finally, one of the most promising areas for innovation is accelerating placements to permanent housing. Every month that a street homeless individual is not cycling through various systems — emergency rooms and hospitalization, shelters, safe havens, drop-in centers, jail — can lead to better health outcomes and save thousands of public dollars. ### The spending argument gets it wrong The recent viral claim that New York City spends over $81,000 per unsheltered homeless person demands scrutiny not because the spending figures are incorrect, but the denominator is wrong. The $81,000 figure, which understandably causes jaws to drop, is derived by dividing total city spending on unsheltered homelessness by the number of unsheltered people counted in the annual HOPE survey, a point-in-time count conducted on a single night each year that is specifically designed as a benchmarking tool, not a census. Point-in-time counts provide only a one-night snapshot and miss the many people who cycle in and out of unsheltered homelessness over the year. Outreach data suggest the true annual figure is much higher than the official count. The Comptroller’s report, for instance, also noted that the City made 10,841 placements from an unsheltered location to “stable settings” in fiscal year 2025 — 400% more than in 2017\. That suggests the number of people experiencing street homelessness was likely more than triple the HOPE count measure. (Breaking Ground’s outreach teams alone engaged with over 5,300 unique individuals in 2025.) Dividing real spending by an artificially small number produces an artificially large per-person cost. The spending critique also misses something entirely. Safe haven beds — specialized transitional units designed for short-term use by chronically homeless individuals who have consistently refused traditional shelter due to restrictive rules or safety fears — numbered approximately 1,100 in April of 2020\. Today, the City has expanded this resource to more than 2,100 beds at a cost of nearly $120 million, absorbing more than 1,000 additional people into these more intensive, humane settings while safe haven staff and outreach teams continue to work with each individual to find permanent housing. Safe havens offer more privacy than traditional shelter and do not require the homeless individual to go to a central intake center — outreach teams transport the individual directly to their placement and accompany them through intake. In addition, by offering clinical support, no curfews and the kind of structured environment where someone who has spent years on the street can begin to stabilize, safe havens are a meaningful alternative to shelter for those who have been unsheltered for long periods of time. This is hardly evidence of waste. To the contrary, it is a deliberate, and appropriate, upgrade in the quality of care over these five years. During that same period, the HOPE count rose from 3,857 to 4,305\. So is that evidence that despite the money we’re “throwing at” homelessness, the problem is growing? No. When the number of people on the street grows, it’s not a direct function of outreach’s effectiveness or lack thereof; it’s the result of an unsheltered homeless population that is likely growing faster than even the tools we use to measure and address it can capture. The real villain in the spending data is not homeless service providers, it is the housing market. According to the most [recent data](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the vacancy rate for units that rent for under $1,100 per month is just 0.39%. That is most certainly a crisis for people in the lowest quintile of income. And a statistical analysis by the [U.S. Government Accountability Office](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-433.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that a $100 increase in median rent is associated with a 9% increase in homelessness. Is it any wonder that homelessness is growing? Additionally, more than 77% of unsheltered New Yorkers surveyed by the [Coalition for the Homeless](https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/View-from-the-Street-April-21.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2018 had already tried the shelter system. Meanwhile, the number of single adults in shelters has climbed from roughly 14,000 in 2016 to over 25,000 today. Street homelessness is not, primarily, a story of people refusing help. It is largely a story of people who tried the system, had a negative experience and ended up outside. The city’s shelter system is the main feeder for street homelessness, and the housing market is the exit ramp that unhoused individuals can never quite reach. The City and State are spending heavily on crisis response because they have not invested adequately in prevention. More safe havens are needed, yes — and more permanent supportive housing, and more deeply affordable units, and faster pathways out of shelter and off the streets. The question should not be whether $81,000 per person is too much, but whether we’re spending it in the right places, and whether we’re building enough housing so that the next person who arrives at central intake doesn’t eventually end up on the street. Those of us who do this work every day already know the answer. We’re ready to help the City find it. ### Why It (Almost) Always Makes Sense to Send the Cops URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/policing-alternative-response-cahoots/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T14:23:55.000Z The death of George Floyd was taken by many as indicative of a plague of murders by police, and hastened demands to reduce the rate of police contact with the public. It spurred [demands](https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2022.307107?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for “alternative response models” — responses to people in crisis by professionals other than police — as a matter of “health equity” aligned with “public health values.” Across more than 80 million police-community contacts a year, fatal force occurs in just [0.00041%](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10986111251383548?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of 911 calls in the U.S.; however, according to the American Public Health Association, law enforcement violence is now a [critical public health issue](https://www.apha.org/policy-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-briefs/policy-database/2019/01/29/law-enforcement-violence?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Any such incident is consequential, but the statistical rarity of the police use of fatal force complicates claims that lethal outcomes are representative of routine policing. Nevertheless, many reformers have taken up the call and are advancing their agenda. In the eyes of these advocates and policymakers, the use of alternative responses is the cornerstone of efforts to [reduce police involvement](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0731129X.2022.2062546?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in private and public space. Medics and counselors will attend mental health crisis calls, outreach workers will attend victims of addiction and homelessness and credible messengers and violence interrupters will settle neighborhood beefs and reduce shootings. The goal is to make these programs [“integral components of the public safety and wellness infrastructure.”](https://www.policingproject.org/events/2026/6/4/2026-advancing-the-field-of-alternative-response-convening-establishing-permanence?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) In New York City, Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s new Office of Community Safety aims to [expand these programs](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2026/04/04/new-york-police-mental-health-mamdani?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), even though the impact of a pilot program, B-HEARD, has not been assessed because the organizations responsible for implementation “[do not, overall, collect sufficient evidence](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-behavioral-health-emergency-assistance-response-divisions-effectiveness-in-responding-to-individuals-with-mental-health-crises-and-meeting-its-goals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to assess the program’s effectiveness against its stated goals.” Before New York and other cities double down on alternative response, they need to think hard about how it works — and doesn’t work — in practice. ### The limits of diversion and the realities of implementation Advocates of a public health approach to violence deploy carefully selected data to [point out](https://www.versobooks.com/products/178-the-end-of-policing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that crime control is a small part of policing. Clearly someone forgot to tell folk in Philadelphia. More than two-thirds of Philadelphia police patrol time spent on calls for service received from the public in a year is related to [crime or quality of life](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40163-021-00141-0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or has the potential to be so related (68.4%). Using similar categories, Cynthia Lum and colleagues’ data [showed](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10986111211035002?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the average across nine US cities was 60%. Could the remaining non-crime calls be diverted to an alternative agency? As Loren Atherley, senior research scientist for the Seattle Police Department, has [pointed out](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10986111251383548?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the potential for large-scale diversion may be more limited than is often implied. The practical question is not whether some calls can be handled by non-police professionals, but how many can be diverted without introducing unacceptable risk. Atherley’s analysis of three years of data from Seattle suggests that about a quarter of police service hours could be diverted to non-police personnel without significant risk. He does, however, recognize what he calls the “Ratcliffe paradox” (kindly referencing a recent article of mine) in that [determining whether a situation is appropriate for non-police response often requires an initial police presence](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40163-021-00141-0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Risk assessment in dynamic environments is inherently uncertain, and public agencies understandably tend to err on the side of caution. Existing alternative response programs are frequently placed on a pedestal with uncritical admiration. Eugene, Oregon’s CAHOOTS program is a prominent example, with [claims](https://kval.com/news/local/when-reform-backfires-how-the-cahoots-act-helped-dismantle-eugenes-mobile-crisis-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that up to 23% of the calls in the emergency response system were dealt with by CAHOOTS (Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets). Brian Stettin, who served as senior advisor on severe mental illness under former New York Mayor Eric Adams, [reports](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-mamdani-gets-wrong-about-severe-mental-illness-and-crisis-response/) this is misleading and estimates that the rate is more likely in the range of 3-8%. Whatever the real rate, it wasn’t enough to prevent the program from being shut down in 2025. Context matters as well. I suspect many commentators (like me, writing from Center City, Philadelphia) reside in relatively safe, functional communities where many of the informal mechanisms of public life perform reliably — the [“elephant of social control.”](https://doi.org/10.2307/3054129?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) But to extrapolate a program like CAHOOTS from the affluent college town of Eugene, Ore., to somewhere like the Southwestern district of Baltimore is an altogether different proposition, where the elephant is barely on life support. > The practical question is not whether some calls can be diverted, but how many can be diverted without introducing unacceptable risk. These constraints are compounded by decades of underinvestment in social services that have not kept pace with demand for services related to homelessness, mental health and addiction. This constrains the effectiveness of any response model, whether police-led or civilian. Institutional failures do not disappear; they are displaced. As David Thacher, professor of public policy and urban planning at the University of Michigan, [observes](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0731129X.2022.2062546?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), police are routinely called upon precisely because other systems have failed or are inaccessible, making them, in effect, managers of institutional breakdown. This was evident in the [extensive fieldwork](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2024.2311899?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) colleagues and I undertook evaluating [Philadelphia’s transit police opioid response](https://www.sciencedirect.com/org/science/article/abs/pii/S1363951X22000136?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and co-responder programs. A year-long randomized trial, largely in the subterranean network of tunnels that extend for blocks beneath the center of the city, examined a dedicated police SAVE team (Serving a Vulnerable Entity) aiding the vulnerable community. Shifts were randomized between the usual arrangement of officers working alone or in pairs, with shifts when they were accompanied by trained social work specialists. In terms of getting vulnerable people to accept transport to a shelter, triage facility or hospital, the combined social work-police teams [outperformed police-only teams 41% to 32%](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-024-09634-9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); however, every team experienced how challenging it was to work with the city’s shelters and treatment facilities. Facility capacities are limited, users feel their rules are often restrictive and shelters are frequently perceived to be dangerous. People with extensive unmet needs often return to the street within days or hours. In some cases, police officers brought more practical experience to these encounters than their civilian counterparts, demonstrating a better understanding of the support ecosystem and tailoring more effective responses. What if social workers replaced officers in a wide swath of interactions? We did not test that scenario, but the [“doorman fallacy”](https://www.amazon.com/Alchemy-Curious-Science-Creating-Business/dp/006238841X?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is useful here. A hotel doorman who opens a lobby door can be easily replaced by a machine, but in the words of Rory Sutherland, “opening the door is only the notional role of a doorman; his other, less definable sources of value lie in a multiplicity of other functions, in addition to door-opening: taxi-hailing, security, vagrant discouragement, customer recognition, as well as in signalling the status of the hotel.” When not engaged in activities related to the vulnerable community, the social work specialists largely waited to be called, but the transit police officers performed a wide range of ancillary public safety functions such as helping with medical emergencies, tackling crime and disorder, guiding tourists and reassuring passengers. In an ironic twist, the SAVE initiative was cancelled by the police chief due to a lack of resources and a perceived need to increase the number of generalist officers available to handle whatever came up. The police chief needed more hotel doormen. > Would improving training within existing systems yield greater returns than building parallel ones? ### Costs and constraints Much of the discussion centers on an underlying assumption that police social service delivery to vulnerable communities is notably poorer than that of other providers. And debates about alternative responses often place significant weight on “lived experience” as a qualification for service providers. There is limited evidence here, and what evidence does exist is mixed. Research on interventions such as cognitive-behavioral therapy [suggests](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-005-3541-7?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that effectiveness is more closely associated with implementation quality and provider training than with experiential similarity between provider and client. In other words, people in recovery do not need a hand from someone with the same experiences, but instead access to well-trained, high-quality support structures. In “The End of Policing,” sociologist Alex Vitale [argues](https://www.versobooks.com/products/178-the-end-of-policing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that improving police training is beside the point, because “The reality is that the police exist primarily as a system for managing and even producing inequality.” He adds, “American police receive a great deal of training.” If by that he means the amount of training time, his comment will surprise anyone who knows the topic. For example, at the time of writing, police training in South Carolina comprises four weeks at a local police station watching videos, eight weeks at a police academy, and a mandatory four weeks of post-academy field training (approximately 1,080 hours). The [South Carolina Board of Cosmetology](https://llr.sc.gov/cosmo/examins.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) demands more training for someone who cuts and colors your hair (1,500 hours). And yet still, most police encounters are resolved without incident, raising a different question: Would improving training within existing systems yield greater returns than building parallel ones? As New Yorkers will soon find out as the Department of Community Safety gets up and running, alternative response teams are not cost-neutral, and reallocating a portion of police funding can’t in and of itself support the infrastructure of an entirely new administrative entity, nor negate the need to sustain those functions in the police service. A new organization requires HR, systems and policies, accountability structures and sustained funding for vehicles, offices, training facilities and pension systems — all of which already exist in policing. The value of alternative responders must also be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but relative to other possible costs. Specialization is expensive, and alternative responders have a narrow role. For all their imperfections, police, like hotel doormen, have a broad social function. In the process of their activities, built environment problems can be identified, crime opportunities reduced, crime victims reassured, confidential sources recruited and harmful social conditions ameliorated. Given [Americans’ propensity to want services and their hostility towards paying for them](https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/lindsey-graham-praises-tax-avoidance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), increasing police training and recruitment might do more to improve a swath of social service response functions than the costly support necessary for a new, largely untested organization. Having police secure a situation and then wait for a team with scant additional capabilities to turn up seems less efficient than simply having the officers deal with the situation on arrival. Co-responder teams may seem an effective compromise, but at what point do the police officers gain sufficient experience and expertise to render the civilian co-responder redundant? The current case for alternative response as a scalable, cost-effective replacement for the police in a social service role is grounded in weak analysis and skirts over potential adverse outcomes. Worse, these efforts may deflect attention from the potential benefits of improving law enforcement capability. Current efforts to institutionalize alternative response models as core components of public safety infrastructure may therefore be premature — not because the underlying goals are misguided, but because the operational, fiscal and institutional constraints are more substantial than is often understood and acknowledged. ### When Push Comes to Budget URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/louisa-chafee-nyc-budget-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T15:18:12.000Z --- *New York City's budget is arguably more honest than it's been in years — with an asterisk. Louisa Chafee runs the Independent Budget Office, the charter-created agency that tells New Yorkers where their money goes. In this episode of "After Hours," Chafee and Jamie discuss why Mayor Zohran Mamdani deserves credit for accurately budgeting expenditures after years of the Adams administration hiding billions in shortfalls, why the revenue side of the ledger is built on optimism and a property tax increase the City Council doesn't support, and how underfunded state mandates on class size and special education are eating up revenue. She also breaks down why government rarely pauses to ask whether it's working efficiently — and what the new administration's Chief Savings Officers might actually find. Plus: a lightning round on nonprofit payment delays, public bathrooms, Sunnyside Yards and why the Mayor's Management Report has ballooned from 200 pages to over 500 without getting more useful.* *You can listen to this podcast on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-honest-city-budget/id1794619189?i=1000760172954&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/34Uf03gKq8ZC2S5TjW3CG8?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Mamdani’s First 100 Days: A Scorecard URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-first-100-days-scorecard-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:21.000Z *Zohran Mamdani ran for mayor on a platform of big, transformative ideas,* [*many of them dependent on other layers and levels of government*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdanis-real-world-constraints)*. But as every New Yorker knows, day-to-day life is shaped less by grand visions than by the basic machinery of city government — and too often, that machinery is stuck. While Mamdani’s mayoralty will be a test of his ambitious proposals, it will also be a test of small- and medium-bore management. *Just Fix It* is Vital City’s contribution to helping him pass that test: a running list of concrete, doable ways to unstick the gears of government and make it work better for all New Yorkers.* *Another New Yorker — Franklin Delano Roosevelt — established the significance of an administration’s “first 100 days.” In his case they were to be devoted to “starting of the wheels” of his vision for governance, which he had called the New Deal. For Mayor Mamdani, a similar lexicon — his pitch of a “New Era” in city governance — permeated campaign promises.* *So: How’s he doing? Many scorecards have tried to answer the question in broad terms. Here, we focus instead on the tasks we laid out for him as inauguration neared in December — our* [*inaugural Just Fix It installment,*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/government-improvements-mamdani-can-tackle-in-the-first-100-days/) *which put forward 11 specific improvements Mamdani could enact without City Council or Albany permission to make government work better and improve life for New Yorkers. Here’s where they stand, and what else needs to happen to get them done.* ### 1. ### The problem: scaffolding Sidewalk sheds are unsightly and a nuisance in neighborhoods. **Our recommendation:** Ratchet up enforcement and offer new incentives for building owners to complete repairs faster to remove sidewalk sheds. **What the Mamdani administration did:** Reducing the amount of scaffolding on buildings throughout the city was a priority for the mayor’s predecessor. Its [Get Sheds Down initiative](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/04/mayor-adams-signs-historic-legislation-get-sheds-down-remove-unsightly-scaffolding-across?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) allowed the Department of Buildings (DOB) to update its regulations, permitted new designs and created new penalties for sidewalk sheds that stayed up too long. We said the Mamdani administration should go further. The mayor has indicated that he’s interested. In a press conference last month, he [announced](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mayor-mamdani-launches-new-efforts-to-take-sidewalk-sheds-down--?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that his DOB is moving forward with its revisions to Local Laws that regulate scaffolding, shortening size and timeframes and proposing new enforcement abilities that, pending public comment, should go into effect this summer. A specific emphasis has been placed on NYCHA campuses, where some 40 developments plan to take down their sidewalk sheds in the coming months. ***Verdict: It’s a start!*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Target inspections to the worst sidewalk shed scofflaws. Draw up plans for the 1,120 sheds that have been up for three years or more, and help the rest navigate permitting. Offer rewards if need be. And don’t be afraid of using drones to expedite inspections. --- ### 2. ### The problem: placards Parking placards are routinely abused, creating dangerous situations and effectively announcing that government employees think the rules don't apply to them. **Our recommendation:** Rationalize the process for granting placards, and deem all unofficial parking placards moot. Declare a no-tolerance policy for placard and parking abuses. **What the Mamdani administration did:** [Nothing of note](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/01/30/ten-years-of-placard-abuse-the-criminal-practice-that-mamdani-must-end?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Late last year, the NYPD — perhaps the most notorious offender — [rejected](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/11/25/exclusive-nypd-rejects-ending-self-enforcement-scandal-at-precinct-houses?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a reform that tried to clean up the out-of-control parking in front of police precincts, which often blocks sidewalks and crosswalks. The Department of Inspection has consistently [said](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/01/16/tischs-nypd-cleanup-continues-doing-right-from-curbing-car-chases-to-cracking-down-on-rental-vehicle-misuse/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the commissioner has to get a handle on it, an assignment that has so far proven elusive. But when recently asked by a reporter at Streetsblog, the city media’s chronicler of parking snafus, Mamdani merely said [he’d look into it](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/04/07/mamdani-reckless-driving-cops-placard-abuse?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ***Verdict: Insufficient progress*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** [Look into it](https://x.com/placardabuse?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — and start clawing back and rationalizing placards right away. --- ### 3. ### The problem: lighting New York City’s public spaces are defined by their vibrancy, but after dark, many neighborhoods are marred by “dark zones” where inadequate infrastructure actively discourages civic life and invites criminal activity. **Our recommendation:** Scan the city’s dark places with high crime rates and, working with residents who understand the local landscape, install permanent, high-quality street lighting to foster public activity and deter serious offenses. **What the Mamdani administration did:** Mamdani appears aware of the power of light. At the end of Ramadan, which saw the city’s first Muslim mayor criss-crossing the five boroughs to break fast alongside New Yorkers, he [stood](https://www.instagram.com/reels/DWFnUapDrXA/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in front of revelers on 125th Street in Harlem and pressed on “Eid Mubarak” decorations that brightened the often dim commercial corridor. A lot more lights — about 100 in total — are [coming](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/ahead-of-opening-day--mamdani-administration-breaks-ground-on-pr.?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to a major crosstown route in the Bronx as part of a major overhaul. ***Verdict: It’s a start!*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Come up with a citywide plan to improve lighting, especially where crime and darkness overlap. --- ### 4. ### The problem: homeless people struggling with serious mental illness Responsibility for the estimated 4,000 New Yorkers living on the streets and subways — many of whom suffer from serious mental illness or addiction — is currently scattered across a dozen siloed agencies. But because no one “owns” responsibility for this specific population, vulnerable people cycle through a never-ending churn of ERs, jails and shelters, compromising those people and the public space more broadly. **Our recommendation:** Designate a single, high-level authority within City Hall to engage this population, coordinating budgets, data and operations across agencies to ensure every person in crisis is tracked to a stable outcome. **What the Mamdani administration did:** On the campaign trail, candidate Mamdani promised to create a Department of Community Safety, which would consolidate the city’s various outreach efforts to the most vulnerable New Yorkers — which had mostly been relegated by police officers — under a new roof. But with the push still unfunded and unsettled in the City Council, which must draft legislation to create new departments, the mayor has instead [started smaller](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/18/nyregion/mamdani-department-community-safety-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), creating an Office of Community Safety within the confines of City Hall. Community safety expert and [Vital City contributor](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/author/francois-renita/) Renita Francois now serves as the first official deputy mayor for community safety, which may be the closest thing yet to a centralized conduit to care for the 4,000 New Yorkers living on the streets. And early moves, like the [opening](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/02/mayor-mamdani-announces-opening-of-new-safe-haven-shelter-in-low?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of a 106-bed shelter in Lower Manhattan and [a new wing](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/04/06/rikers-island-bellevue-infirmary-nic-240-million/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at Bellevue to replace the Rikers Island infirmary, show promise. ***Verdict: It’s a start!*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Task the Office of Community Safety with mapping this massive population in most need, down to the individual level. --- ### 5. ### The problem: curb chaos Cars and trucks blocking the bus lane and the curb lane with double parking and deliveries cause congestion throughout the city and create dangerous situations for drivers, bicyclists and pedestrians. **Our recommendation:** Expand on the MTA’s Automated Camera Enforcement program, which uses cameras and on-the-ground enforcement to stop double parking and free up the curb lane for traffic. **What the Mamdani administration did:** The “free” part of the Mamdani administration’s “fast and free buses” promise is still [stuck in traffic](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/08/mamdani-free-buses-00863065?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but the “fast” part is off to the races. The mayor’s Department of Transportation (DOT) has [revived](https://www.amny.com/news/mamdanis-first-100-days-transportation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) plans for bus lanes in the Bronx and Manhattan that stalled under his predecessor, and work on Brooklyn’s Flatbush Avenue, which will offer near-Bus Rapid Transit levels of service to New York City’s streets, is underway. City Hall is eyeing another 45 corridors for acceleration — and cameras will likely be part of the equation. With data showing [much clearer lanes](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/01/13/go-ace-bus-stops-are-clearer-than-ever-thanks-to-mtas-bus-mounted-camera-enforcement?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the MTA is [rolling out](https://nypost.com/2026/02/05/us-news/mta-adds-more-bus-cams-to-catch-driver-scofflaws/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its ACE program to more corridors. But within its jurisdiction, City Hall has expressed a sincere interest in unclogging the curb. A new Office of Curb Management is [taking shape](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/04/07/exclusive-mamdani-creates-curb-management-office-at-dot-seeking-long-sought-order-from-chaos?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at DOT, with a mission scope of enacting more efficient uses of the city’s most prized real estate to encourage turnover. Options include more meters, which would free space for deliveries and deter double-parking. ***Verdict: It’s a start!*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Work with the MTA to roll out more bus routes and lanes that utilize the ACE program. Opt for 24/7 enforcement [like speed cameras](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-speed-cameras-road-safety-mamdani-policy/). Parking reform will be a bigger fight, but it’s one worth having. --- ### 6. ### The problem: rigid civil service rules The outdated New York City civil service program that governs much of City hiring is broken: As of November 2025, there were more than 14,000 vacancies, and it can take months to grade civil service entry exams. **Our recommendation:** Dramatically overhaul and streamline the City hiring and civil service system to make it more efficient, which will allow the administration to be better able to attract high-quality talent. **The Mamdani administration did:** Not much. As New York Focus [reported](https://nysfocus.com/2026/02/11/mamdani-civil-service-exams-hiring?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Adams administration had a window last year to accelerate hiring by exempting 51 different job titles from the civil service exam. But the initiative ultimately caved under pressure from organized labor. The Mamdani administration has so far stayed mum on any further attempts at overhaul. The vacancy rate for City jobs [sits](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2025/09/behind-all-time-high-job-growth-nyc-17k-government-positions-sit-vacant/407933/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at around 6%, and City Hall has said it wants to fill the 17,000 open roles, if the budget allows it. But some 75,000 people submitted CVs during the transition, and [only a fraction](https://www.thecity.nyc/newsletter/31-hires-80000-applicants/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have been hired thus far. ***Verdict: Insufficient progress*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Draw up a list of short-, medium- and long-term fixes to the civil service system, first [exploring](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdani-technology-innovation-new-york/) technology that could help and then initiating talks with labor unions for a smarter, deeper overhaul. --- ### 7. ### The problem: inefficient service delivery AI is underused by the city government. Bureaucratic rules remain a maze, and government service delivery is far too inefficient. Emerging tools can answer questions — and help government find solutions. **Our recommendation:** Invite the private sector to compete to build an AI tool that delivers clear, government-verified answers to a wide range of questions, while aggressively exploring ways to use AI (with human oversight) to do the work of government more efficiently. **The Mamdani administration did:** When it comes to AI, the last occupants of City Hall might be most remembered for creating a chatbot that doled out [inaccurate advice](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/01/30/mamdani-unusable-ai-chatbot-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to people. The Mamdani administration has cancelled the contract, and the mayor explicitly called it out as wasteful spending. (It cost the city about half a million dollars.) It has yet to be replaced. But AI’s place in city government remains unclear at the moment. Mamdani himself [said](https://www.cityandstateny.com/personality/2026/04/mamdani-trump-ai-menin-and-what-can-be-accomplished-100-days/412727/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) he doesn’t use ChatGPT or Claude, but City Hall brought on [an expert on AI and privacy](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/03/city-hall-hires-expert-ai-and-privacy/412260/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as a senior advisor. Last month, the Department of Education [released](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/24/nyregion/ai-nyc-classes-grades.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) guidance on AI usage for teachers, permitting it for lesson planning but not grading. Smaller pilots persist at the NYPD, FDNY, DOT and elsewhere. And tech-wise, the administration is letting its agencies join the mayor on [TikTok](https://www.wired.com/story/in-a-big-reversal-zohran-mamdani-tells-nyc-agencies-to-use-tiktok/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ***Verdict: It’s a start!*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Revisit the [AI Action Plan](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/oti/downloads/pdf/reports/artificial-intelligence-action-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and see where progress can be made across a range of government functions. Start with permitting and social program assistance. --- ### 8. ### The problem: a hidebound budget office The Office of Management and Budget plays an outsized role in city government, but it's usually as the penny counter and the Bureau of No. It needs to be a more proactive partner in efficient service delivery. **Our recommendation:** Put the M back in OMB, directing the office to modernize and advance its analytical capabilities to improve efficiency of government service delivery. **The Mamdani administration did:** Nothing yet. Sherif Soliman, the new head who previously brought order to CUNY’s finances, was [consumed](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/03/25/city-budget-deficit-mamdani-julie-menin-sherif-soliman/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by questions over the city’s uncertain fiscal future at the City Council’s budget hearing, rather than any talks of reform. Meanwhile, the City Hall-designated ‘chief savings officer’ at OMB moved forward with cuts to [costly office leases](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/politics-policy/cny-mamdani-savings-officers-cuts-budget-20260325/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but nothing beyond that. ***Verdict: Insufficient progress*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Start the process of modernizing OMB. --- ### 9. ### The problem: vestigial offices and panels Year after year, executives and legislators create their own smattering of new offices, boards, working groups and reports. Administrations rarely do the hard work of decluttering the bureaucracy — leading to inevitable redundancies, inefficiency and waste. **Our problem:** Rationalize the many interagencies and offices and streamline their functions. Then continue the work to eliminate unnecessary reports, boards and redundant staffing. **The Mamdani administration did:** City Hall has been on a roll with roles. [The Office of Mass Engagement](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-establishes-office-of-mass-engagement-to-transform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [The Office of Community Safety.](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2026/03/19/sources--mamdani-set-to-name-first-deputy-mayor-for-community-safety?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [The Office of LGBTQIA+ Affairs](https://gothamist.com/news/mayor-mamdani-creates-lgbtqia-office-with-nycs-first-out-trans-agency-head-in-charge?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A [“mom and pop czar.”](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/politics-policy/cny-mamdani-mom-and-pop-czar-20260407/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) A [“childcare czar.”](https://www.the74million.org/zero2eight/mamdanis-child-care-czar-on-nycs-first-of-its-kind-universal-2-k-rollout/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) A [“World Cup czar.”](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-announces-additional-appointments-across-key-city-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) And within the agencies themselves, a new Office of Curb Management (NYCDOT) and a new [Office of Street Vendor Services](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mayor-mamdani--sbs-commissioner-kenny-minaya-name-carina-kaufman?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Small Business Services, or SBS). We’ve also gotten a few [new](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani-takes-bold--unapologetic-actions-to-protect-new-yo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [taskforces](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mamdani-administration-launches-new-program-to-deliver-affordabl?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To some degree, this is a matter of reshuffling. City Hall has [revived](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-signs-eo-to-revitalize-mayor-s-office-to-protect-t?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the Mayor’s Office to Protect Tenants, for example, while sunsetting the Office of Public Realm, instead directing those resources elsewhere. The “chief savings officers” may have replaced the futile “chief efficiency officer.” And the long-awaited release of a Racial Equity Plan, which sputtered out for so long in a new office created by the last mayor that its leaders [sued](https://gothamist.com/news/lawsuit-asks-court-to-prod-mayor-adams-on-long-overdue-racial-equity-plan-for-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), may imply a newfound sense of ownership of a sprawling organizational chart. ***Verdict: It’s a start!*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Rearrange hierarchies to meet changing needs and priorities. Continue to pinpoint redundancies wherever possible. --- ### 10. ### The problem: inadequate transparency The public has the right to know how the mayor and his team are conducting the city's business — and transparency is a tonic for creeping cynicism in government. **Our recommendation:** Set a new bar by becoming the most transparent mayoral administration in history. Release a comprehensive daily schedule; push out information quickly; turn around FOIL requests in days, not weeks and make leaders available for regular engagement and questions — on any and all topics. **The Mamdani administration did:** It’s a mixed bag. Mayor Mamdani pretty quickly [archived](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2026/01/mamdani-plans-delete-all-adams-tweets/410435/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) his predecessor’s tweets and deleted them from public viewing. He has [invited](https://x.com/NYCMayor/status/2009006097974087859?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) more forms of ‘new’ media into City Hall, but the [exclusion](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/nyc-mayor-zohran-mamdani-news-outlets-excluded-press-conference/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has frustrated Room 9 reporters. He came [under fire](https://www.politico.com/newsletters/new-york-playbook/2026/03/02/mamdanis-signal-habit-tests-transparency-pledge-00806566?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for talking about government business on Signal. He [quietly](https://www.nbcnewyork.com/new-york-city/mamdani-trump-meeting-columbia-student-arrested/6470240/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) skirted off to Washington for a surprise meeting with President Trump. And his administration [still owes](https://www.nbcnewyork.com/investigations/mamdani-pledged-a-culture-of-transparency-but-hes-not-ready-to-hand-over-these-govt-records/6474264/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) some FOILs. But the Mayor and his team are also out there more than most. Hizzoner is [walking](https://www.instagram.com/reels/DW4LzRREQDg/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (or [biking](https://www.instagram.com/reels/DWzsK-%5FiaBE/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) home from City Hall and greeting New Yorkers along the way. The new deputy mayors and commissioners have led public availability, including a recent ‘Ask Me Anything’ on Reddit [around housing.](https://www.reddit.com/r/nyc/comments/1sdz9p1/were%5Fmayor%5Fzohran%5Fmamdani%5Fdeputy%5Fmayor%5Ffor/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) And the ‘Rental Rip-Off’ hearings had policymakers [face the public](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rental-ripoff-hearings-landlords-tenants-economics/). ***Verdict: It’s a start!*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Release the FOILs faster, and let the press know of any advance trips — especially if it involves the largest housing project in a borough’s recent history. --- ### 11. ### The problem: an overly complex housing voucher process The process to help move New Yorkers into permanent housing is time-consuming, confusing and redundant, keeping people in shelter longer than necessary and costing the city money. **Our recommendation:** Streamline the process to obtain CityFHEPS vouchers without loosening eligibility. **The Mamdani administration did:** As a candidate, Mamdani promised to loosen eligibility rules for the fast-growing program that offers vouchers for permanent housing, after the Adams administration sued to stop a Council-backed expansion of eligibility. In office, as he faces down deficits, Mayor Mamdani has understandably [continued the effort](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/03/24/cityfheps-mamdani-vouchers-court-appeal/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to block it. The mayor’s budget proposal [instead](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2026/04/nyc-councils-preliminary-budget-response-doesnt-include-cityfheps-expansion-its-priorities/412573/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) kept the same funding for the $1.2 billion program intact, [sparking outrage](https://citylimits.org/honor-his-promise-advocates-criticize-mamdanis-cityfheps-reversal-and-what-else-happened-this-week-in-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from advocates and policymakers. While a CityFHEPS expansion is not in the cards for budgetary reasons, City Hall must focus much more on the dozens of steps and many months it takes for those who are eligible to access the program. ***Verdict: Insufficient progress*** **What the Mamdani administration should do next:** Systematically review the overly bureaucratic CityFHEPS process and streamline it — without widening access in a way that grows the program’s costs. --- *This installment was prepared with the help of John Surico. Sarah Feinberg and many others provided essential guidance and will continue to inform our work on this project going forward. In the weeks and months ahead, we will continue to surface practical suggestions from people who know the system best — current and former agency staff, nonprofit partners and the everyday New Yorkers who routinely deal with, and often trip up trying to navigate, New York's bureaucracy.* *Send your ideas to justfixit@vitalcitynyc.org; if you wish to remain anonymous, we will honor your request.* ### Good Government, Beyond the Couch Cushions URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-nyc-vendors-contractors-staff/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:21.000Z Not since Vice President Al Gore[ smashed an ashtray](https://www.google.com/search?q=gore+ashtray+letterman&oq=gore+ashtray+letterman&gs%5Flcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIICAEQABgWGB4yBwgCEAAY7wUyBwgDEAAY7wUyCggEEAAYgAQYogQyCggFEAAYogQYiQXSAQg5OTE0ajBqN6gCALACAA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#fpstate=ive&vld=cid:7a374aef,vid:6VM8TvVV6aY,st:0) on David Letterman has a politician made cutting waste as entertaining as Zohran Mamdani’s recent [viral video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T6s4N2h6Eec&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Strolling through what looked like Gracie Mansion, pulling cash from couch cushions while naming savings, Mamdani expressed a simple idea: “The City was paying for a lot of work from outside contractors that was costing us far too much, so we’re bringing a lot of that work in house, and saving our budget millions.” Cutting vendors rightly energizes the populist[ ](https://marianamazzucato.com/books/the-big-con/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[left](https://x.com/ddayen/status/2036853938792915059?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the technocratic[ center](https://www.amazon.com/Outsourcing-Sovereignty-Privatization-Government-Functions/dp/0521867045/ref=sr%5F1%5F3?crid=369BIEIIW9UQ8&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.UJJifA0o1QnpDxaVE9feBUtImWLYY-oBQQQ7FjU9-yMGJdR8JkreC-EiITktJRIY20Rs9vjGJPnusUxrTO0C7sSJGmhWqDzf7d7AelbcQOBqZ78pP6LrgpkDxVmEO0617bEXdVH5zbHD82MRWXmzKnLIwH9iPRvDM-E0c01CMFz9R26ru9lpZybIWHs0namu6IzZB3oUw74Yt%5FdldKetQxvZ4IJRjVICKqaR67kBngM.su4WHvqqkV%5Ftm2ldPY3bvdzUejbf8e4Fyb82ijIKaz8&dib%5Ftag=se&keywords=government+outsourcing&qid=1775387255&s=books&sprefix=government+outsourcing%2Cstripbooks%2C129&sr=1-3&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ ](https://www.amazon.com/Bring-Back-Bureaucrats-Federal-Government/dp/1599474670?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[parts](https://federalnewsnetwork.com/hiring-retention/2026/03/opms-kupor-would-be-perfectly-happy-hiring-more-feds-if-contractors-are-cut/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the right. But, at least thus far, Mamdani has announced contract savings that only amount to pocket change,[ maybe](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/03/mayor-mamdani-releases-update-on-savings-plan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 1% of the City’s giant budget gap. To get better results, the City will need a larger and stronger cadre of government managers and experts to lead major construction and technology projects. But building that top-tier talent will require the mayor to change his budgeting approach and push the civil service system to its limit. He will also need to push Albany to change that system in law. These tasks would be hard for any leader, and they will be especially hard for an egalitarian mayor with sympathies for organized labor. But Mamdani has already proven [practical](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/31/nyregion/mamdani-nyc-public-schools-mayoral-control.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in policy and[ “ruthless”](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/nyregion/mamdani-politics-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in politics. He will need to bring both qualities to bear if he is to achieve excellence in governance. ### Capacity gaps Outsourcing sometimes[ makes sense](https://academic.oup.com/cesifo/article/65/4/349/5518997?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as when the government is buying standard goods that are easy to judge on price and quality, like cars or computers. The City also[ saves](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/67928e2ea2dbb23e331ac21d/1737657937883/Moving+Beyond+COLAs+to+Salary+Parity+++For+New+York+City%E2%80%99s+Nonprofit+Human+Services+Workers+FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by contracting with nonprofits to deliver human services. But outsourcing can be disastrous for big custom projects that require careful assessment, like planning and building a park or a benefits system.[ ](https://www.amazon.com/Bring-Back-Bureaucrats-Federal-Government/dp/1599474670?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)Decades of outsourcing expertise have decimated governments’ capacity to manage that kind of work. Agencies that lack strong staff don’t evaluate what they’re buying and become locked into ever-deepening dependence on vendors whose fiduciary responsibility is to their owners, not the public. The pattern plays out across New York’s biggest investments. The best transportation example [is](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/nyregion/new-york-subway-construction-costs.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the “most expensive mile of subway track on earth”: the Second Avenue Subway extension. According to [exhaustive work](https://transitcosts.com/wp-content/uploads/TCP%5FFinal%5FReport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the Transportation Costs Project, the relevant management shrank from an in-house shop of 1,600 to a skeletal staff of 124, responsible for overseeing $20 billion worth of projects. That staff relied on consultants who earned perhaps three times more money, were not tightly managed and built knowledge that public employees needed and never gained. While the MTA is a State authority, the City’s own capital program shows similar deficits. Nearly 80% of Department of Design & Construction projects are [behind schedule](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-of-the-department-of-design-and-constructions-mitigation-of-delays-and-cost-overruns-on-capital-construction-projects/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and by an average of three-and-a-half years. One big reason is the City’s own weakness. One audit [found](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/flying-blind-on-billions-how-weak-capital-data-undermines-new-york-citys-infrastructure-investments/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that project data is fragmented, inconsistent and so incomplete that nearly half of the $157 billion capital plan isn’t even in the city’s tracking dashboard. The story is similar for MyCity, the one-stop online portal for city services that Mayor Adams began rolling out in 2023\. According to a withering comptroller [audit](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-on-the-new-york-city-office-of-technology-and-innovations-mycity-system/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), MyCity was “initially intended to be developed in-house,” but was shifted to vendors “due to a lack of staff resources.” The City then engaged 50 vendors (many with [checkered histories](https://nysfocus.com/2025/03/19/mycity-eric-adams-child-care?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) through more than 120 contracts and delivery orders, spent over $100 million, could not verify whether key contractors had actually delivered their work, created custom technology when off-the-shelf options were available and built a childcare portal that scored 7 out of 100 on a standard mobile performance test. Mayor Adams [budgeted](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Office-of-Technology-Innovation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about three out of every four dollars for the City’s technology office outside payroll, mostly to vendors, a ratio that has barely [changed](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/feb26/de2-26.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) under Mamdani. This is a contract management operation without the capacity to manage contracts. ### Success stories Governments can build the muscle to do the work better, with or without contractors. Since the 1950s, Milan has had a municipally owned transit engineering [firm](https://www.mmspa.eu/en/about-us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that has successfully [bid](https://transitcosts.com/wp-content/uploads/TCP%5FFinal%5FReport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for work in Copenhagen and Tehran. The United Kingdom’s buildout of the Government Digital Service saved [more than](https://www.ukauthority.com/articles/gds-claims-4-billion-savings-for-government-it/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) $4 billion and [cut](https://public.digital/pd-insights/client-stories/gds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) central website operating expenses by 70%. Here at home, Maryland Governor Wes Moore has [saved](https://governor.maryland.gov/news/press/pages/Governor-Moore-Announces-New-Maryland-gov,-Improving-Access-to-State-Benefits,-Services,-and-Resources.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [millions](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/22/opinion/trump-budget-state-city-local.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by getting top staff and cutting contractors. New York itself has a recent success story. The MTA’s new app for tracking trains [works far better](https://www.curbed.com/article/mta-app-maps-commute-train-car-accessible-stations.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than MyCity ever has. And as the state has [touted](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-launch-new-best-class-mta-app-new-york-city-subway-and-bus-customers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the app was “developed by an in-house team of tech experts” who can now continue to improve the product on their own, without vendors. Note well two things: The MTA is a State authority in which the relevant staff operate under the more flexible state civil service law. They were mostly hired based on resumes, not exams, which the State partly [suspended](https://www.cs.ny.gov/help/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2022\. Second, creating a new app for a discrete task is far easier than fixing legacy systems that vendors have built over decades. To begin to replicate successes elsewhere, a new budget could layer cost-saving hires on top of existing structures and slots. Mamdani has [taken](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/02/transcript--mayor-mamdani-releases-balanced-fiscal-year-2027-pre?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that approach where new hires drive savings quickly — adding 50 auditors to collect taxes and 100 lawyers to defend against tort claims. The City could also hire new FTEs as one-for-one swaps to replace “staff augmentation” contractors who cost twice as much. But Mamdani’s [budget](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/feb26/tech2-26.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) does not appear to pursue this path of increasing FTEs to save on contractors. Rather, his OMB is tightly [controlling](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2026/04/Fiscal-Year-2027-Preliminary-Budget-Response-2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) staff additions across the board, filling half of vacancies and eliminating the other half entirely. This is classic penny-wise-pound-foolish behavior. It is also understandable. Adding highly paid construction and tech engineers is a tough sell even without a deficit. And given that the City has a workforce [with](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/for-the-public/nyc-agency-staffing-dashboard/dashboard/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 307,247 authorized positions and 15,495 vacancies (last I checked), OMB probably believes that agencies can already bring on board the talent that the City needs. This is wrong. Many of the mayor’s commissioners have hired only a handful of key staff. And that’s normal: Public sector leaders may manage thousands of employees, but they rarely feel able to hire the people they need. Here’s one story from my own public sector experience: While crafting an [overhaul](https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/nyregion/09schools.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the City’s approach to $5 billion in school funding two decades ago, I relied on two consulting firms — financed by philanthropy — because City staff did not have the right analytic skills and I was only allowed to hire one person. Here is how it goes down. Let’s say an agency head wants to add a cadre of engineers. She has a thin layer of truly at-will, “exempt” appointments, often filled through a political pipeline. After that, she must work through the civil service system if she wants to add staff. OMB probably won’t approve new positions, and there probably aren’t vacancies in the relevant title. Indeed, titles like “software engineer” don’t even [exist](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-mamdani-ny-civil-service-system/) among traditional civil service titles. If a position requires an exam, then the agency must consider candidates in a rigid order based on test scores. As candidates often turn down jobs, the process regularly takes over a year. Agencies try to negotiate around these constraints in different ways, such as using classifications that don’t require exams. But setting up those classifications [requires](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/pdf/reports/100%5F2R.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a [hearing](https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2024-02-27-0100-pm-committee-on-civil-service-and-labor/chapter/how-are-open-competitive-and-promotional-exams-conducted-in-the-education-and-experience-format/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and state approval, and OMB tightly limits the number of people in those roles. The system conspires against getting the right people into the right roles to manage and replace contractors. But that does not make change impossible. ### What is to be done Right now, the mayor should direct his administration to do everything in its power to expand the ranks of hires who do not need to take civil service exams. And to find room to hire themselves, agency heads should take a hard look at their top staff and seek to replace those who cannot meet the moment. If they are protected by the civil service system, that will require a protracted process. But city law allows executives to encourage exit by [reassigning](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/pdf/reports/320%5F2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) managers to different duty stations and [cutting](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/pdf/reports/320%5F2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) their pay up to 20%. The City also can make more hires under provisional and temporary authorities that are both more flexible and less protected than traditional civil service roles. Language of this kind may call to mind DOGE, but there is a vast gulf between Elon Musk’s chainsaw and ordinary incrementalism. In that gulf belong leaders who believe in government passionately and will do what it takes to make government work. This moment requires public-spirited relentlessness. Better management alone cannot fix a broken system. Lasting reform will require Albany changing the civil service law, making it easier to hire and fire and enabling restructurings that take into account performance as well as seniority. The City should continue to demand civil service hiring based on skill, not politics, nepotism or corruption, but it should enforce those prohibitions mainly through audits and oversight, dropping rigid personnel rules that favor those who can work a byzantine system. In such an effort, the City would also want to raise take-home pay for the most skilled talent. Top technologists [can](https://www.glassdoor.com/Salaries/new-york-city-ny-software-engineer-salary-SRCH%5FIL.0,16%5FIM615%5FKO17,34.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [earn](https://www.glassdoor.com/Salaries/new-york-city-ny-software-engineer-salary-SRCH%5FIL.0,16%5FIM615%5FKO17,34.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) two to three times their City salary in the private sector, and there is a smaller but still [meaningful](https://www.indeed.com/career/civil-engineer/salaries/New-York--NY?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20average%20salary%20for%20a,updated%20February%2022%2C%202026) [gap](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-pay-increases-engineer-and-related-licensed-positions-across-new?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for civil engineers. Inadequate public-sector pay for top talent does not save money. It costs money. Zachary Liscow and two colleagues [studied](https://tobin.yale.edu/research/experienced-state-employees-can-deliver-big-savings-infrastructure?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the costs of transportation contracting in California and made two striking findings. First, bigger departments built roads more efficiently, likely because they managed costs down better. Second, higher-quality engineers reduced project costs by 14% — savings worth more than three times an engineer’s salary. These are hard jobs, and knowing how to drive faster, lower bids matters a lot. The state lost top engineers regularly, the authors found — not because average salaries were higher in the private sector, but because the private sector rewards its best performers far more generously. Raising the top of the pay scale in city government is not a popular agenda for anyone, and certainly not for a socialist. Indeed, Mamdani has reportedly capped pay in his own office at $230,000\. Caps on pay make a trivial contribution to reducing income inequality, but are a significant drag on government performance. When acting as an employer, the public sector best advances equality by delivering effective services to all. Another challenge is political. DC37, the city's largest municipal union, [blocked](https://nysfocus.com/2026/02/11/mamdani-civil-service-exams-hiring?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the City's effort to join the State in waiving civil service exams for key positions. But Mamdani has already proven willing to break with labor, changing his position on eliminating mayoral control of the schools. He could make a similar choice here. Mastering the bureaucracy is harder than making videos, but a leader who wants to go down in history must do thehard things. The question is not whether New York can afford to build the government it needs. Creating space for top public-sector talent pays for itself many times over. The question is whether the mayor, admirably pursuing government excellence, will challenge his own administration and coalition to get there. ### NYC’s Fiscal Tightrope Act URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-mark-levine-potential-fitch-moody-bond-downgrade/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:21.000Z In recent weeks, New York City’s credit rating agencies have sent us a clear warning about the fiscal trajectory our city is on. This may eventually have implications for our ability to borrow for critical capital investments. But it already raises a serious question: Can our budget withstand an economic downturn or unexpected shock? New Yorkers should be paying attention. By many indicators, New York City’s economic health remains strong. Wages grew 3% last year in real terms, while income tax, sales tax and property tax receipts are all up. Wall Street just had the best bonus season ever. Office leasing is at a pace we haven’t seen in two decades. Demand for housing, including luxury properties, remains robust. (One notable exception: Job growth has stalled.) If New York City’s economy is strong, and our tax revenue is increasing, what’s the problem? Our rating agencies have told us: The City’s budget has a structural imbalance, with recurring expenses outpacing recurring revenues. And the current fiscal plan does too little to correct it, instead drawing down the City’s fiscal cushion, including its reserves, end-of-year surplus and overall flexibility. Three agencies — Moody's, Fitch Ratings and Kroll Bond Rating Agency — have [made that concern](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/financial-matters/nyc-bonds/new-york-city-debt/ratings-reports/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) clear by revising their outlook for New York City from “stable” to “negative.” S&P Global Ratings has not changed its outlook but has issued similarly stark warnings. None of the agencies has yet lowered NYC’s bond rating, which remains strong. And there is still robust demand for our bonds among buyers. But the agencies are making it clear that a downgrade could well be on the horizon if we fail to fix the structural problems in our city’s budget. > The City’s budget has a structural imbalance, with recurring expenses outpacing recurring revenues. The bond rating agencies are not making a political judgment. They are evaluating whether the City is managing our finances in a way that protects our ability to meet our obligations in good times and bad. To do that, they look not just at whether the budget balances in a given year, but *how* it balances — and what condition it leaves the City in for the future. They track key quantitative indicators such as reserve levels as a share of spending, the size of projected budget gaps and whether fund balances are rising or falling. The agencies have been crystal clear about their concerns. Moody's [cited](https://ratings.moodys.com/ratings-news/461132?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) “large and persistent imbalances” in NYC’s budget even during favorable economic conditions, and warned that a downgrade could follow if budget gaps grow, reserves are depleted, or the City continues relying on one-time measures like drawing on retiree health funds. S&P Global Ratings, while maintaining a stable outlook, has [issued a similar warning](https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/3534086?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): Continued reliance on temporary fixes and a weakening cushion could put the City’s rating at risk. Fitch Ratings [flagged](https://www.fitchratings.com/research/us-public-finance/fitch-revises-new-york-city-outlook-to-negative-rates-fiscal-2026-ser-f-g-1-go-bonds-aa-20-03-2026?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a “sustained erosion” of reserves as a key concern and emphasized the need to close budget gaps in a lasting way. Kroll Bond Rating Agency [has raised](https://www.kbra.com/publications/XDSKKRHy/kbra-releases-report-assigning-aa-rating-negative-outlook-to-the-city-of-new-york-general-obligation-bonds-fiscal-2026-series-f-and-g-and-general-obligation-bonds-fiscal-2026-series-1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) similar issues, pointing to growing imbalances, large out-year gaps and declining reserves and surplus. Different frameworks, but the same message: The City’s financial cushion is shrinking, and its room for error is narrowing. What would the impact be if New York City’s bond rating were to be downgraded? It would likely add to our borrowing costs, but in the near term the direct financial cost may be manageable given the City’s strong investor base. But even small increases in borrowing rates, applied across tens of billions of dollars in debt, add up. Over time, those higher costs compound — meaning more taxpayer dollars going to interest and fewer available for schools, parks, housing and infrastructure. Just as important, a downgrade sends a broader signal about fiscal management, which can further raise borrowing costs and reduce flexibility. The real risk is not a sudden shock, but a gradual erosion of the City’s financial position. > There will be only tough choices between now and June. The politically easy solutions have mostly already been exhausted. For me, the greatest concern with a potential downgrade is what it says about our city’s ability to weather a difficult turn in the economy or other unexpected shock. Though our economy is strong today, we face myriad risks ahead, driven by continued damage from the president’s tariff policies, the impact of the war in Iran and mounting inflation. And then there is the rapid pace of AI advancement, which adds a whole new level of uncertainty for employment, the stock market, cybersecurity and more. This is a terrible time to be weakening NYC’s fiscal shock absorbers. Fortunately, a bond rating downgrade is not inevitable. If the economy holds, we could see stronger-than-expected tax revenues. In Albany, State leaders are currently negotiating the budget, which I hope will include much-needed (recurring) support for New York City, especially given that we send billions more to Albany each year than we receive in return. Most important are the choices we make ourselves. We have significant work to do between now and the June deadline to adopt the City budget. We need a plan that relies less on one-time fixes, reins in fast-growing expenses, avoids unspecified cuts and preserves — not depletes — our reserves, including both the Rainy Day Fund and the Retiree Health Benefit Fund. There will be only tough choices between now and June. The politically easy solutions have mostly already been exhausted. But the alternative to decisive action now is to push risk into next year at a moment of real uncertainty. New York City has one of the most dynamic economies in the world, a deep and diverse tax base and a track record of adapting in the face of challenge. The warning from the rating agencies should not be read as a verdict on our future, but as a call to action. If we make the right choices now — restoring our fiscal cushion and addressing our structural imbalances — we can ensure that New York remains not just resilient in the face of the next downturn, but positioned to thrive for years to come. ### Does When We're Born Make Us Who We Are? A New Way of Thinking About Crime and Success in America URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/robert-sampson-adam-gopnik-interview/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T18:31:31.000Z Many people believe that individual character determines outcomes. But new research challenges this idea. In a three-decade study of over 1,000 Chicago children, sociologist and Vital City contributor Robert J. Sampson finds that the era into which you're born matters as much as who your parents are. Children born a decade apart — from identical backgrounds and neighborhoods — experience dramatically different life trajectories. Join Vital City, NYU Wagner and the Russell Sage Foundation for a conversation between New Yorker writer Adam Gopnik and Robert Sampson about his new book, [“Marked by Time: How Social Change Has Transformed Crime and the Life Trajectories of Young Americans.*”*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674987548?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Featuring remarks from Polly Trottenberg, Dean, NYU Wagner Elizabeth Glazer, Founder and Co-Editor, Vital City Bruce Western, President, Russell Sage Foundation **Monday, April 27 | 5:00 PM doors, 5:45 PM program** NYU Wagner Main Event Space, 105 E 17th St, New York, NY **Sign up to attend in person using this form.** ### A Road Safety Blueprint for the Mamdani Administration URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-speed-cameras-road-safety-mamdani-policy/ Last updated: 2026-04-30T13:35:35.000Z In one of his first acts after being inaugurated as mayor, Zohran Mamdani stood at the side of the Williamsburg Bridge and announced his first major improvement to transit infrastructure in New York: eliminating the notorious “bump” that has long rankled cyclists. Mamdani has moved quickly across the board on transportation, pushing speed limits down to 15 mph in school zones, accelerating [red-light camera](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pr2026/activate-additional-red-light-cameras.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) deployment and showing a willingness to use every tool available to make streets safer. What else should rank highly on the mayor’s list of transportation safety priorities? Automated traffic enforcement would be a good place to lean in. The need for cities like New York to take bold action has become increasingly urgent since February, after the Trump Administration [cut](https://www.roadsbridges.com/road-traffic-safety/news/55355034/usdot-moves-to-restrict-federal-funding-for-automated-traffic-enforcement-cameras?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) federal transportation grants for automated enforcement. We recently published an evaluation of New York City’s speeding camera program in the [Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences](https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2520328122?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), finding that speed cameras produced large reductions in collisions and injuries. When cameras are installed, they issue many violations in the first month, followed by a steep decline in the next few months as drivers learn about their location. This suggests that the cameras effectively deter speeding by changing driver behavior, a best-of-both-worlds scenario where financial penalties decline as safety benefits accrue. This is particularly striking given that New York City's speed cameras are so lenient: Violations carry a flat $50 fine with no points, compared to hundreds of dollars and upwards of three points for police-issued tickets. While critics worry that speed cameras will become revenue generators, indiscriminately taxing drivers rather than changing driving behavior and improving road safety, our research suggests the opposite. Critics have raised valid concerns about the surveillance implications of expanding automated enforcement. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, law enforcement’s use of automated license plate readers has intensified domestic [violence](https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac%5Fpubs/1515/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [cyberstalking](https://local12.com/news/nation-world/police-chief-gets-caught-using-license-plate-cameras-to-track-his-ex-girlfriend-228-times-arrests-charges-probation-flock-safety-follow-stalk-new-boyfriend-broke-up-out-of-town-misuse?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by police. Additionally, the ever-expanding surveillance capabilities of federal immigration enforcement raise civil liberties concerns, particularly as other New York law enforcement databases [feed into ICE systems](https://nysfocus.com/2025/04/23/trump-ice-new-york-gang-database-deportation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > Cameras effectively deter speeding by changing driver behavior — a best-of-both-worlds scenario where financial penalties decline as safety benefits accrue. These concerns can be remedied by requiring frequent deletion of traffic safety data, banning the application of [facial recognition](https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/06/23/boston-facial-recognition-ban?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) technology and implementing firm firewalls between civil traffic enforcement and local or federal law enforcement databases. Such efforts could be given real teeth through civilian oversight [mechanisms](https://www.oaklandca.gov/Government/Boards-Commissions/Privacy-Advisory-Commission?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The efficacy of speed cameras can also be improved through further policy reforms. State law limits implementation to school zones, and the relatively lenient penalties mean that [“super-speeders”](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-09/nyc-s-speed-cameras-reveal-super-speeders-on-the-rise?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) can rack up literally hundreds of tickets with few consequences. Additionally, scofflaws obscure their license plates to dodge camera tickets, a problem that has [worsened](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-on-the-new-york-city-department-of-transportations-speed-camera-program/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over time. But the City has policy tools at its disposal that could strengthen enforcement, like mandating the installation of [speed-limiting devices](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/intelligent-speed-assistant-new-york-legislation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in vehicles that are frequently caught speeding, or cracking down on the distribution of fake license plates. Action is needed from Albany to both classify toll evasion as [theft of services](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2024/02/29/on-eve-of-congestion-pricing-plate-scams-at-bridge-tolls-are-way-up?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and close a DMV [loophole](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2021/09/27/mtas-100k-toll-scofflaw-is-merely-the-tip-of-the-license-plate-obstructing-iceberg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that ties unpaid toll fees to surrendered plates instead of registered vehicle owners, allowing drivers to swap plates and avoid revocation. In the meantime, the City and State can scale up enforcement through their multi-agency ghost plate task force. The New York State legislature is also [considering](https://transalt.org/reports-list/yn29thckywv9n0qpsv4jb1ab07nryp?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the Stop Super Speeders Bill this session, which would require drivers with many camera violations to install speed limiters curbing their speeds on roads to within 5 miles of the legal limit. The City Council passed a law in 2020 that would have required drivers with 15 or more violations in a year to take a safe driving course or risk vehicle impoundment. But the [de Blasio administration](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/danger-unabated/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) slow-walked its rollout, and Adams only enrolled 1,605 drivers (against a target of 5,000), while failing to punish drivers who ignored enrollment notices (only [impounding](https://www.amny.com/nyc-transit/nyc-program-reckless-drivers-expires/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 1.7% of noncompliant drivers). The program expired in 2021\. The Council should [reinstate it](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/re-up-program-to-curb-reckless-driving-comptroller-lander-recommends-in-new-policy-study/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and ensure proper implementation. > Last year saw the lowest number of crash-related deaths since New York City started tracking traffic fatalities. The City should also scale fine amounts according to the driver’s [ability to pay](https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-103-issue-1/graduating-economic-sanctions-according-to-ability-to-pay?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This concept is called a “day fine,” where penalties are scaled to daily income — and it’s not completely new to New York City, as Staten Island implemented a [pilot program](https://www.vera.org/publications/the-staten-island-day-fines-experiment?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the 1980s. For wealthy motorists, a flat $50 ticket is less than a slap on the wrist. In Scandinavia, some traffic tickets hit [six figures](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/06/finnish-businessman-hit-with-121000-speeding-fine?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). On the other hand, fines should also be scaled downward for less affluent motorists. New York City’s automated traffic enforcement program builds on past successes. Mamdani has inherited a city that has made real progress on traffic safety. Since 2014, when Bill de Blasio ran for mayor on a [“Vision Zero”](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research%5Freports/RR2333.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) plan for no traffic fatalities, New York has seen [consistently fewer](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2025/pedestrian-deaths-vision-zero-roads/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) pedestrian deaths. Those gains continued under Mayor Adams. Last year saw the [lowest](https://aeelaw.com/insights/congestion-pricing-safety-impact/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) number of crash-related deaths since the City started tracking traffic fatalities. That can’t be said for most cities, [even those](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/12/05/fridays-headlines-visionary-nyc-edition?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) pursuing Vision Zero’s goals. What accounts for this improving, if imperfect, landscape? As our study shows, speed cameras are part of it, but increased enforcement is not the only approach. In 2024, the City removed parking spaces close to nearly 300 intersections, a practice that improves visibility for drivers and walkers, [reducing collisions](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/daylighting-and-street-safety.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). New York has also installed 23 miles of protected bike lanes, well short of the distance [required by law](https://projects.transalt.org/bikelanes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [promised by Adams](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/transit/2022/04/24/mayor-adams-pledges--904-million-in-traffic-safety-investments?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but a considerable step toward safe cycling. The City also began [lowering speed limits](https://gothamist.com/news/lawmakers-to-allow-nyc-to-lower-speed-limit-to-20-mph?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to 20 mph across the five boroughs in 2024 after the State passed Sammy’s Law, completing [implementation](https://pix11.com/news/local-news/nycs-speed-limit-will-drop-to-20-mph-in-250-areas-by-end-of-2025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the end of last year. Mayor Mamdani has already begun to use Sammy’s Law [more aggressively](https://abc7ny.com/post/nyc-traffic-new-york-city-impose-15-mph-school-zones-mayor-zohran-mamdani-announces/18721909/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than the previous [administration](https://transalt.org/press-releases/after-247-speed-cameras-safety-projects-and-over-a-decade-of-vision-zero-historically-safe-2025-on-new-york-citys-streets-demonstrates-the-need-to-double-down-on-what-works?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), reducing speed limits to 15 mph in 700 school speed zones. Perhaps the biggest recent change to city traffic patterns has been the introduction of congestion pricing, the program that tolls drivers coming into lower Manhattan. Reducing traffic has [cut crashes](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/six-months-governor-hochul-highlights-success-congestion-pricing-traffic-down-business-and?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the [tolled zone](https://www.cody-cook.com/papers/nyc%5Fcongestion%5Fpricing.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by 14% and [likely contributed](https://transalt.org/press-releases/new-data-from-transportation-alternatives-and-families-for-safe-streets-shows-vision-zero-works-should-be-expanded-congestion-pricing-has-made-streets-safer?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Traffic%20violence%20is%20killing%20fewer,from%20this%20time%20last%20year.) to 2025’s record low traffic fatality count. Air pollution in the congestion relief zone also [dropped](https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2025/12/congestion-pricing-improved-air-quality-nyc-and-suburbs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by 22%, with additional benefits extending citywide. But what else can be done? Speed cameras are one element of a web of transportation and road safety good governance reforms that ideally work in tandem. One promising reform would be for New York State to follow jurisdictions like [Connecticut](https://www.ctinsider.com/waterbury/article/waterbury-speed-cameras-red-light-cameras-20242122.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which have earmarked funds generated from automated enforcement to go towards fixing structural design flaws on streets in neighborhoods disproportionately affected by traffic crashes. Following the lead of cities from San Francisco to Oslo, New York could also [adopt](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/02/opinion/mamdani-free-buses-parking.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a demand-based parking pricing system, which First Deputy Mayor Fuleihan [said](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/03/05/mamdani-deputy-mayor-on-charging-for-street-parking-its-not-a-no?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the City would consider. Currently, 97% of New York’s street parking is free; implementing meters and residential permits could generate over $1 billion in revenue annually, funding the mayor’s free bus program. It would also reduce double parking and free up curb space, both of which would improve visibility and safety. Such reforms discourage automobile dependence and encourage public transit use while generating funds that can be used to redesign streets and expand the frequency and quality of transit service. This is the most promising direction for a Mamdani administration. Until city government can redesign New York at scale, however, speed cameras remain a simple and effective way to make walking, biking and driving in the city safer. ### Karen B. Shaer 1959-2026 URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/karen-shaer-in-memoriam/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:22.000Z ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/131018151130-women-in-management-karen-shaer-3498915393-1776259645396.jpg) Portrait of Karen B. Shaer. Credit: David Hills Photography If you actually know how things work, you know that making the world a better place is less about the campaigns and politics of presidents, governors and mayors than about the daily, under-the-sink-with-a-wrench work of public servants. They are ones who figure out how to make governance flow like poetry, how to get from a to b to c, and most especially how to know that z is your goal. Earlier this week, one of the greatest examples of this kind of public servant, Karen Shaer, died. She had been a federal prosecutor, a defense lawyer, a publishing sweepstakes business tycoon, and an advisor to a mayor and a governor. She was also the person with the widest and deepest and most devoted circle of friends and family of anyone I have known. Karen was brilliant — not in a Hegel sort of way, but in a way that went right to the heart of the matter with clarity, precision and insight. She was kind and generous, in the confident and bracing manner of firstborns who sit comfortably with themselves and their unconscious magnetism. She had insanely good judgment, born from quiet listening, and the restraint, unusual in most, to put aside any psychodrama. She was hilarious. She lived her life with irrepressible joy and she had a keen sense of the absurd that the world can serve up. Strange though it might be to phrase it this way, it seems uncharacteristic for her to have died, as death and Karen were not on the same wavelength. She was shockingly young, at the full height of her formidable powers. I have known Karen since law school when I watched agog at the moot court finals in which the best of the third year students argued a case before a Supreme Court justice and two other distinguished judges. She cantered lengths ahead of her opponents. Her brilliance was not wrapped in the obscurantism that can sometimes mar legal argument. She was crisp and plain. She had that quickness of mind that good litigators (and great public servants) have, undergirded by a sixth sense in anticipating where the alternative storylines might go and an uncanny ability to put herself in someone else’s shoes. She was able to synthesize complicated topics and then push the analysis to an understandable and persuasive place. Some years later, I was lucky enough to persuade her to work with me in the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice, where our goal was to get to the lowest crime rate with the lowest incarceration rate, using all (legal) means possible. But how? The criminal justice system is sprawling. It has no boss, with city and state agencies, independent judges, defenders, district attorneys and an enormous array of non-profits each having different obligations and interests. Our office had merely the power of cajoling and convening. Karen was maybe 5’1”, but she was a giant when it came to organization, mobilization and persuasion. First came the data: She wanted to know about every person in jail, every story behind who was held and why — no mean task. Then came the negotiation, figuring out who could do what to get people released. Finally came the crucial work of making a regular and reliable system that could safely ensure a smaller jail population. Over the course of several years, the jail population reached historic lows (from over 11,000 to under 4,000), at a time when the city also experienced the lowest levels of crime that it had in decades. This success was built in no small part on Karen’s capacity to do the dreary trench warfare that all byzantine bureaucracies require. But Karen was not just a strategist — she was an inspiration. She brought the best out of people because, well, she expected it, and if she expected it, you fell in line because you wanted to honor that trust. While we shouldn’t have to wait for funerals to take the measure of a life, the hundreds of people who crowded the hall at Riverside Memorial Chapel earlier this week, ranging from scores of 20-somethings to people well into their eighties, bore some testament to how her friendship had shaped so many lives. In the early days of Vital City, before we had written a single story or published any data or issued any policy recommendations, I asked Karen if she would help us to figure out what Vital City could be. She was an absolutely crucial piece in the puzzle. As was characteristic, she sought no public credit for her work. No person’s life is summed up in a recitation of their work. Karen maybe more than most lived in a way that demonstrated how it is the thickness of life and thought and family, all tightly interwoven, that gives richness to all our lives. And one does not stand without the other. It is the nature of things that fame accrues to those who seek it. Campaigning and politics may win the day, but it is policy and governance that steady a city and permit it to be great. For sure, people campaign in poetry but govern in prose. But governance, when it is well-practiced, has a certain poetry too. It is the poetry of people, of human connection, bent to the common task — with all its nuts and bolts — of making cities work. There was no one better at this complicated work than Karen Shaer. Karen leaves behind her extraordinary family. Her mother, Janice, an example of the joy and life force that marked Karen’s life; her beloved sisters, Ellen and Jen, who were her earliest co-conspirators and remain so along with their families; her adored husband Ben, and her children, Joey and Jess, and their spouses, Lisa and Matt. And, of course, their dog, Fenway. May her memory be a blessing. ### Why Your Pre-War Radiator Runs Hot, Clangs at 3 a.m. and is Painted Silver URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/radiator-steam-heat-history-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:22.000Z “Is that normal?” you ask your roommate when the radiator starts its evening percussion solo. “Yes,” they say, not looking up. “Just the pipes complaining about condensate.” You stare. “About what?” There it is again. That metallic bang that sounds like someone’s taken a sledgehammer to the pipes in your walls. It’s rhythmic. Insistent, even. Your radiator has opinions and it’s sharing them at full volume. Welcome to steam heat. One New York City writer has called it a [“nightly Philip Glass symphony on PCP.”](https://gothamist.com/news/how-to-survive-winter-with-your-accursed-clanging-feverish-radiator?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Everyone else calls it an average weekday. In winter, it is almost charming. Spring is another matter. You want a little heat, but a radiator doesn’t do “a little.” You’re either sweating or freezing, though the noise is constant. ### What’s actually happening inside your walls? Steam radiators work by sending steam from a boiler through pipes to radiators throughout the building. The steam heats the radiator, then cools and condenses back into water. That condensed water, known as condensate, needs to drain back down to the boiler through the same pipe that it was sent up. This is where things get contentious. Steam rises. Water falls. They’re traveling in opposite directions through the same pipe. For this to work, the pipe needs to slope precisely toward the boiler, [about an inch per 20 feet](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tpA1epqFMCw&t=4s&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), so condensate can drain back by gravity while steam pushes up past it. When that pitch is even slightly off, condensate pools. Steam hits that pool of water at high speed and pressure. The result is a collision technically referred to as a water hammer; this is what produces that distinctive metallic clang that sounds like someone’s attacking your heating system. The pipes are protesting because the steam is annoyed, and your radiator is the complaint department. Noise isn’t the only complaint. Heat distribution is another problem. A poorly maintained system leaves rooms near the boiler warm while those farther away stay cold, a problem of calibration and maintenance rather than the system itself. ### Why steam heat exists (and why your radiator is calibrated for a different time) Mass steam heating was an American specialty that was genuinely revolutionary. Before it existed, warming a building meant a fireplace in every room, coal hauled upstairs, soot on the plaster and hearths eating the floor space that architects increasingly wanted for other uses. 1920s [boiler advertisements](https://www.ebay.com/itm/257293330307?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) called steam heat “a servant that works unseen and never tires.” Architects loved it. Rooms could be lined with tall windows and clean walls. Interiors shed their hearths and opened up. The radiator, tucked under a windowsill, became almost invisible. By the mid-1800s, manufacturers were stamping out sectional cast-iron radiators by the thousands, turning what had been a bespoke luxury installed in country houses and churches by specialist firms into a standard piece of urban infrastructure. Dense American cities, with their multi-story tenements and apartment blocks, were ideal territory. One boiler in the basement, pipes running up through the walls, cast-iron radiators in every room. The American Radiator Company was confident enough in its dominance to commission [a skyscraper](https://www.villagepreservation.org/2021/08/26/beyond-the-village-and-back-the-american-radiator-building/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that looked like a piece of burning coal. Some people were not charmed, of course. Gilded Age critics complained of the [hiss and clatter of the steam mains](https://www.nytimes.com/1883/01/24/archives/the-steamheating-nuisance-complaints-made-to-the-board-of-healthan.html%29?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the unbearable stench they left behind. It is safe to say that they lost the argument. ### A feature, not a bug The radiator’s position under the window was not incidental. It was intentional and it points toward everything that followed. In the decades after the Civil War, a panic took hold about indoor air. Lewis Leeds, a health inspector for Army field hospitals, became convinced that the air exhaled by people in enclosed rooms was slowly killing them. He called it [“the national poison”](https://heatinghelp.com/systems-help-center/why-congress-has-no-windows/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and took his argument on the road in magic lantern shows. Writers such as Harriet Beecher Stowe (of “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” fame) helped popularize the same obsession. One slide showed a family at ease in their drawing room. The next showed red vapor rising from the father’s mouth and drifting toward the child on the floor. The child fell over. Audiences were terrified. The solution, Leeds and Stowe argued, was constant ventilation. They were wrong about exhaled air being poisonous but right about the relationship between fresh air and disease. When the [1918 flu](https://www.npr.org/2020/12/10/945136599/how-spanish-flu-pandemic-changed-home-heat-radiators?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=As%20it%20turns%20out%2C%20radiators,be%20plenty%20of%20ventilation%20indoors.) arrived, their ideology had already been baked into American building codes for 50 years. New York’s Board of Health responded to the epidemic by requiring 68°F minimums in all centrally heated apartments and mandated open windows. Engineering textbooks stated the consequence plainly: Radiators and boilers must be sized to heat a building on the coldest day of the year with the windows open. The radiators moved to sit directly beneath the windows to warm incoming winter air. Architects replaced double windows or storm sashes with single-pane sash windows because [they leaked better](https://heatinghelp.com/news-and-media/dead-men-tales/old-buildings-new-steam/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). So your pre-war apartment radiator isn’t malfunctioning when it turns your apartment into a sauna. It’s doing precisely what it was designed to do. ### The paint is not decorative When the Depression arrived and coal became expensive, people shut their windows. The oversized radiators, now operating in sealed apartments, made conditions unbearable. A 1935 National Bureau of Standards report, [“Does the Color of a Radiator Matter?”](https://heatinghelp.com/systems-help-center/does-the-color-of-a-radiator-matter/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that aluminum-bronze paint reduced a radiator’s heat output by about 20%, a cheap way to tame a system nobody could afford to replace. If your radiator is that distinctive dull silver, that’s why. Not an aesthetic choice but a 1930s government-endorsed workaround. Three historical crises — a post-Civil War ventilation panic, a flu pandemic and the Great Depression — had all resulted in the widespread use of a single paint color. Similarly, the radiator covers of the same era weren’t about keeping children from burning themselves. A cover with a solid top and a perforated front reduces [heat output by up to 40%](https://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/4222/1/An%20Investigation%20into%20the%20Effect%20of%20Decorative%20Covers%20on%20the%20Heat%20Output%20from%20LPHW%20Radiators.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Combined with the silver paint, the covers effectively halved what the radiators put out. “The Dead Men,” as historians call the engineers who designed these systems, had built something too powerful for the world. The world then spent the next two decades quietly tamping it down. ### Why steam is still here Over time, central heating technology has improved. Hot water and forced-air systems have become more common. But in older buildings — including the pre-war apartments, Victorian houses and early-20th-century homes that make up much of the housing stock in older urban neighborhoods across North America and the UK — steam heat endures. According to a [2019 report](https://www.urbangreencouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/2019.02.12%5Fdemystifying%5Fsteam%5Freport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), about 75% of New York’s multifamily buildings use steam heat — and the percentage is likely higher among buildings overall. Replacing steam heat would mean tearing into walls, disrupting lives and spending thousands. And so the systems remain. Steam has its advantages. It can heat a fifty-story building without pumps or pressure problems. It won’t freeze if the boiler fails. And it is, in the words of [a New York City housing official](https://heatinghelp.com/news-and-media/dead-men-tales/old-buildings-new-steam/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) explaining why the city installed brand-new one-pipe steam systems in renovated tenements as recently as the 1980s, essentially vandal-proof. Hot water systems use copper pipes. “A contractor can look at a truckload of copper tubing and see a truckload of copper tubing,” the official explained. “But to a drug addict, that truck looks like a jewelry store.” Steam heat is largely a North American and British phenomenon. Most of the world uses hot water radiators or radiant floor heating. These systems are quieter, more efficient and don’t involve condensate complaining at antisocial hours. So if you’re reading this thinking, “what are these people going on about?” ... Consider yourself fortunate. Your heating system has better manners. We treat our apartments like modern enclosures, but steam heat is a reminder that many of us are living inside a 19th-century machine. The pipes in your walls likely predate your landlord’s birth; the system they carry was designed when “fresh air” was the only antibiotic and coal was the king of the basement. You are now being woken up by a system that is completely indifferent to the fact that the pandemic it was built for ended a century ago. But there’s something almost admirable about it, if you’re in the right mood. Your heating system may be loud, but at least you’re warm. Passed in 2019, [Local Law 97](https://www.nyc.gov/site/buildings/codes/ll97-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reductions.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is now pushing New York City buildings toward electrification, with heat pumps as the leading solution. But heat pumps have limits. They struggle in extreme cold when demand is highest and typically last 15 to 20 years, sometimes less in harsh climates. Meanwhile, much of what we’re replacing was built to endure. Cast iron radiators can last a century, are fully recyclable, and deliver steady, radiant warmth that’s easier on respiratory health. Steam systems can also be decarbonized through cleaner fuels like biomethane or green hydrogen, while relatively simple upgrades such as thermostatic radiator valves allow for temperature control, and quieter vents and improved insulation improve overall efficiency. Before we replace infrastructure that already works, we should fully understand what we’re giving up. ### Rent Stabilization: What’s Constitutional, Anyway? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-rent-stabilization-law-supreme-court-clash/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:22.000Z When New Yorkers argue about rent regulation and the city’s nearly 1 million rent-stabilized units, they argue about many different things. They argue about whether the Rent Guidelines Board should increase rents on rent-stabilized units, some arguing that substantial rent increases are too much for tenants and others that low or no increases are unfair to landlords and will reduce the quality of the housing supply. They argue about whether there should be “vacancy decontrol,” or the moving of units out of rent regulation at the end of leases for at least some units, something that was banned by the state legislature in 2019\. And they argue about the prevalence of high-income tenants in rent-stabilized units, and whether there should be “luxury decontrol,” something that was also banned in 2019\. And much else, too, including how landlords can be compensated for improving apartments, particularly after the legislature limited the ability of landlords to increase rents due to improvements in 2019, but then relaxed this (a bit) in 2024\. The last mayoral election was largely about these fights, with Zohran Mamdani campaigning on a promised four-year rent freeze for stabilized tenants. I’m not going to adjudicate these arguments for you — you’ve heard them all before, I’m sure. But one issue that comes up in debates about rent stabilization is whether some change or another will set in motion a series of events that render the broader system of rent stabilization unconstitutional. These arguments can be difficult to assess because the U.S. Supreme Court, in recent years, has changed several aspects of its takings clause analysis — the primary basis for challenging the law’s constitutionality — even as New York has been reforming its rent stabilization program. For the uninitiated, the 5th and 14th Amendments require the government to pay “just compensation” if it engages in a “taking” of property — something that is easy enough to determine in the case of government taking ownership of a piece of property, but that can be conceptually and doctrinally complicated when owners of property argue that regulations have become so severe that they amount to a taking. (I’m leaving aside arguments that limits on rent increases violate state law, [something recently addressed well in Vital City](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-rent-freeze-nyc-rent-guidelines-board-explained/).) First, depending on your perspective, the good or bad news: It is *very* unlikely that the Supreme Court will find the whole system unconstitutional. Courts have repeatedly upheld rent-regulation regimes, and in 2024 the Supreme Court declined to hear sweeping challenges to New York’s current system. But the content of some of the more aggressive parts of the state legislature’s 2019 changes to rent stabilization and some of the Court’s new decisions have raised real questions about the constitutionality of particular aspects of rent stabilization. Indeed, [a recently filed case](https://ij.org/ll/freeing-the-new-york-city-housing-market/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — one brought by owners of [“zombie apartments,”](https://nypost.com/2025/11/29/opinion/pray-this-new-lawsuit-frees-up-zombie-apartments-to-help-tenants-and-landlords/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who claim that their vacant apartments can’t be rented out profitably due to the legal limits on the ability of owners to recoup investments in needed renovations — may be the first in a series of these targeted challenges. Here’s a guide to the types of challenges that can be, and have been, brought against rent stabilization. Broad-based challenges to the existence of rent stabilization are unlikely to succeed, but there are a number of narrower challenges — from owners of “zombie apartments,” from owners seeking to move back into their own units, or from developers required to build rent-regulated units as a condition for building new apartments — that might. Any one of these cases could upend local politics and housing markets to different degrees. ### Broadsides Repeatedly over the last 100 years, the Supreme Court has found that rent regulation is a constitutional exercise of what’s known as the police power and is not an unconstitutional “taking” of property under the 5th and 14th Amendments. The test the Court now uses to analyze claims that regulations amount to takings is called the *Penn Central* test, named after a case that challenged the application of New York City’s landmark laws to Grand Central Station. It’s very deferential to public regulations. After the massive 2019 changes to rent stabilization, several landlords brought lawsuits that offered the Supreme Court a chance to reverse itself, but it declined to hear the case. Even Justice Clarence Thomas, who wrote a [statement respecting the denial of certiorari in one of the cases that suggested an openness to challenges to the rent stabilization laws](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-1130%5Fc0nd.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), asked for more narrow claims about specific applications of rent stabilization, rather than broad challenges to the overall system. That said, the Court has reversed a number of long-standing precedents recently, so I suppose you never know. ### “Zombie apartments” The more serious current line of attack is narrower. It focuses on vacant apartments that owners say cannot realistically be returned to the market because the legal rent is too low to justify the cost of renovation. That argument became more salient after the 2019 reforms to rent stabilization laws sharply restricted rent increases for vacant apartments and for “Individual Apartment Improvements,” or in response to renovations. (A 2024 reform raised the cap on IAIs, but did not undo the broader changes.) The 2019 law also ended vacancy decontrol, which allowed vacant apartments with higher rents to leave the rent stabilization system. In [Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council](https://www.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-453?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Court held that a regulation becomes a “per se” taking by the government — that is, it doesn’t have to go through the *Penn Central* balancing test and is simply determined to be a taking and thus require compensation — if it deprives property of all economically beneficial or productive use. Landlords recently brought a case that argued that specific apartments they owned needed too many renovations and were limited to charging rents too low to have any economic utility. A key question in the case is [whether “hardship” provisions](https://rules.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/fact-sheet-39-06-2019.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) inside the rent stabilization laws, which allow landlords to argue for emergency rent increases under certain limited circumstances, are sufficient to protect these landlords (and thus make their constitutional claims unsuccessful). Although the outcome of the case is not certain, this amounts to a serious challenge to rent stabilization. If Mayor Mamdani is successful, as expected, and the Rent Guidelines Board approves a rent freeze, while costs like insurance continue to rise, the number of vacant units that a landlord cannot profitably rent out will likely increase. (How many units this is true of is the subject of substantial debate.) That said, while the landlord plaintiffs in the new challenge have asked for broad remedies, like an end to vacancy control, the city may be able to get out from under such a decision by allowing rent increases in these “zombie” units — effectively a stronger, judicially imposed “hardship” exception — rather than ordering fundamental change to the rent stabilization system. ### Owner re-entry The 2019 state reforms also tightened owner-occupancy rules. Under current law, an owner generally may only take one rent-regulated unit out of the rental market for the owner’s or an immediate family member’s primary residence, and only on a showing of immediate and compelling necessity. The elderly, disabled and long-term tenants receive additional protections. Could this rule be challenged? Possibly. In [Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid](https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-107?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Supreme Court held that a California state law that required farmers to provide union organizers with temporary access to their farms constituted a permanent physical occupation, as it removed farm owners’ right to exclude. (Interestingly, this case is a direct descendant of another New York City case, one in which the Court held that requirements that apartment buildings allow for cable television boxes and wires constituted a physical taking.) *Cedar Point’*s focus on the right to exclude suggests that rent regulations that limit the ability of owners to move back into their own apartments may be the kind of thing the Supreme Court has in its sights as the next extension of its takings jurisprudence. This issue came up in the post-2019 challenges to rent stabilization and was rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. But the court noted that the plaintiffs had not actually tried to remove a tenant for personal use, and therefore had not pleaded sufficient facts to bring this kind of “as applied” challenge. If a challenge of this sort succeeded, and the Supreme Court held that owners must have the power to reoccupy their units, it could have a huge effect on New York’s system of rent stabilization. Owners of rent-stabilized units would have an incentive to sell to individuals who want to move in, to turn rentals into condos, leading to a very substantial flow of units out of the rent stabilization system. ### Inclusionary zoning One of the most contested parts of New York’s broader system of rent regulations is its [“mandatory inclusionary housing” policy](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/citywide/mandatory-inclusionary-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), under which new buildings in rezoned areas must include at least certain amounts of below-market-rate subsidized rents. The Court in recent years has built out its “exactions” doctrine, holding that governments cannot condition a land-use permit on surrendering money or property unless the condition bears an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” to the development’s impacts. That is, the condition must mitigate the effects the development itself has on the community, and must not be excessively harsh given the size of those effects. Recently, the Court has expanded this doctrine in a number of ways, including applying it to monetary conditions (i.e. requirements that developers pay money for the right to build.) A number of courts have considered whether inclusionary zoning amounts to an “exaction,” meaning the demand of a payment or property in return for the right to build. Doing so requires answering two separate questions — whether inclusionary zoning is a condition at all, and whether it can be justified. From one perspective, inclusionary zoning is a condition, as a building permit is being conditioned on an agreement to rent out units at below market rents. From another perspective — [one adopted by the California Supreme Court ](https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-129/california-building-industry-assn-v-city-of-san-jose/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)— an inclusionary zoning requirement is just a normal zoning regulation, akin to a limit on the height of a building, something that has been constitutional since [Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty](https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/272us365?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The problem is that *any* regulation can be restated as a condition — a three-story height limit can be described as a rule that says “you can’t build unless you agree to build fewer than three stories.” As a result, it is conceptually difficult to say whether policies create ordinarily valid use regulations or conditions that may raise concerns under the Court’s takings clause jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of inclusionary zoning regulations, the Supreme Court is going to have to clear this up at some point. If the Court does determine that an inclusionary zoning regulation is a condition, it is likely to find that it is a taking. Jurisdictions pass inclusionary zoning regulations on builders of market-rate housing to encourage the creation of below-market-rate “affordable” housing. But new market-rate buildings don’t exacerbate the need for affordable housing. Instead, by inducing [“chains of moves,”](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094119021000656?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) economists have shown that they [lead to lower rents](https://joeornstein.github.io/pols-4641/readings/Pennington%20-%20Does%20Building%20New%20Housing%20Cause%20Displacement%20The%20.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), even very nearby. This is the longstanding [“irony of inclusionary zoning.”](https://openyls.law.yale.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/8a395acf-18d3-4f7d-8f56-fc5357cec212/content?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) It is a tax on a product (new buildings) that would, on its own, reduce the problem the regulation is trying to solve. Governments might try to challenge this well-established social science finding, arguing that it is not true in a particular context, or would offer other justifications for the regulation, [like neighborhood economic diversity](https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-129/california-building-industry-assn-v-city-of-san-jose/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But it seems pretty likely that courts would reject these arguments, at least in most cases. However, even if New York City’s inclusionary zoning regulations are found unconstitutional, tax law might save parts of the basic setup. Under New York’s old 421-a program and its replacement 485-x program, builders in certain areas get partial exemptions from property taxes if they meet certain conditions, one of which is including affordable units. (The percentage and the rents vary with the size and location of the project.) It’s pretty clear that a voluntary tax incentive is not a conditional taking. And builders frequently need the tax exemption because of New York City’s punishing property tax regime for apartment buildings. Further, it’s not exactly clear what the effect of removing inclusionary zoning would be on building in New York. The effect would depend on what else the City does. If the City responded to a Court decision banning inclusionary zoning by downzoning, arguing that if housing is not going to be “affordable,” it shouldn’t be built at all, then the decision wouldn’t encourage building. On the other hand, if the City responded by either allowing existing zoning rules to stay or, better yet, further relaxing zoning to encourage construction, it would lead to much more building. \*\*\* Given the ideological balance on the Supreme Court, a successful constitutional challenge to aspects of rent stabilization has felt like the shoe that hasn’t dropped in local housing politics for quite a while. While there is a decent — quite good, even — chance the Court never takes this up, everyone on both sides of these fights should be ready in case they do. Washington could scramble New York politics, public policy and economics for the umpteenth time. ### What’s the Deal with SEQRA? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/whats-the-deal-with-seqra/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:22.000Z *In the latest episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin, Annemarie Gray of Open New York joins the podcast to discuss the growing momentum behind housing reform in New York. Fresh off a major victory in reforming the City Charter, Gray breaks down the push for State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) reform — a 50-year-old law originally designed to protect the environment that she argues is now being weaponized to block green, transit-oriented development.* *From the shifting political landscape under Mayor Zohran Mamdani to the "invisible" regulatory hurdles adding tens of thousands of dollars to the cost of a single apartment, Gray explains why modernizing these rules is essential for an "all-of-the-above" approach to affordability.* *You can listen to the episode on* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/2JDRChkSXtVWN6byZaZZwS?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/seqra-reform-and-ye-shall-find/id1794619189?i=1000757178247&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* --- **Jamie Rubin:** You're listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. Hey, Liz. **Liz Glazer:** Hey, Jamie. How are you? **Jamie Rubin:** I'm well. How are you? **Liz Glazer:** It's finally springtime. **Jamie Rubin:** It is springtime. All the dirty snow, the disgusting snow has melted. This episode is largely an interview with our friend Annemarie Gray about an important piece of state legislation in the state budget that will hopefully be passed sometime in the very beginning of April. We're sitting here on March 22nd, 2026 – so fairly soon. I wanted to start by talking about something that you manifested into being — the Mayor's Office of Community Safety. You manifested it by thinking hard, writing a piece in Vital City about the Mayor's public safety policy, and then by having started Vital City, which led to an episode on January 28th called “Reducing Crime by Improving Neighborhoods: An Interview with Renita Francois.” Obviously, without any of those things, there would be no Office of Community Safety headed by Renita Francois. Do you want to link all those things together and demonstrate your immense power? **Liz Glazer:** Hardly. First of all, Renita Francois was announced last week as the first-ever Deputy Mayor for Community Safety. If people haven't taken a look at her extraordinary announcement — her really moving remarks and the way she fielded questions — they should, because it will show in a snapshot what an extraordinary leader and thinker she is. I had the good fortune to work with her for seven or eight years when she headed up the Office of Neighborhood Safety in the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice. She created a civilian approach to what safety should look like — led by residents, participated in by 20 city agencies and nonprofits, trying to figure out in sharp ways what makes neighborhoods safe. That included everything from summer youth employment to good lighting to community centers — all separate from simply calling in the police. This new office is an expression of something that was a centerpiece of Mamdani's campaign promises around public safety: a new look at how safety could be secured through civilian power and civic power, not simply the police. **Jamie Rubin:** During the campaign, most people would have thought he meant that instead of police being sent out for certain emergency calls, other kinds of personnel would be sent out — mental health professionals, substance abuse counselors — instead of police. So is that what we have now under Renita, or has it morphed into something different? **Liz Glazer:** The devil's in the details. There were and continue to be very prominent incidents of people who were shot by police after their families called for mental health assistance on this mayor's watch. There's been a lot of focus on whether we can send civilians instead of police. The Mayor has doubled down on B-HEARD, which are civilian teams that respond to calls about someone in mental distress. But B-HEARD has been pretty universally acknowledged as not being particularly effective — there's a comptroller's report and other assessments. The idea is: how could it be amplified? The problem is that this simplifies an incredibly hard issue. It's not just a question of who responds. It's a question of what happens after. Many of the outreach teams act in a moment of crisis, but there isn't a sense of: we are going to stabilize this person with housing and services, we are going to be with this person like glue, because these may be lifelong issues that come and go. That hasn't been our approach. If the task before Renita is to figure that out, that's enormous. It encompasses many different agencies. She's also responsible for hate crimes, gun violence, and a whole array of other issues. She's an enormously talented person, but operationally, it's a lot. **Jamie Rubin:** It's a steep hill. But my take is: as hard as the problem is, they've decided on a leader, which is always very important, and they picked somebody who is not going to ignore those details. You're not going to see something new and perfect spring up overnight until Renita says it's ready. That's a good thing for people who care about the government working well, as opposed to living under a government of bumper stickers. **Liz Glazer:** Leadership is key. They couldn't have picked a better person who understands the complexity and has the skill to pull together all those strings to make something real. It's a great outcome, and she'll be terrific at it. **Jamie Rubin:** Annemarie has been on before. Last year she came on to talk about the Charter Review Commission and specifically the ballot questions that passed — largely due to her activity — which led to some really important zoning reforms. The Governor has proposed a significant revision to the state's environmental laws, also in the furtherance of building more housing faster. Annemarie is at the forefront of the campaign to help the Governor pass that law as part of the budget. I have my own views about all this because I live in the housing world a bit more than you do. What was your impression of what Annemarie said? **Liz Glazer:** The first thing that struck me is, as Hemingway said about bankruptcy, it happens gradually then all of a sudden. For so many years, people have been fighting about these issues. Then, suddenly, we have these referendums that pass: Hochul getting behind the SEQRA stuff, and then Mamdani, on the very last day before the election, supporting it. I wondered: how much of this is a sea change? How important is it? **Jamie Rubin:** Every piece of it is important, but the housing crisis is like anything else — we didn't get here quickly. We got here after decades of different decisions. SEQRA reform will help address one piece, but nothing is going to get resolved overnight. The difference between this and zoning reform is that SEQRA revisions generally apply to people who have already secured the ability to build something and are now waiting for environmental clearance. It's less controversial — more about speeding things up and costing less money than about overriding local zoning, which is viewed as much more existential. That's why the governor has failed the last few times she's tried to do zoning reform through state legislation. It's a fundamentally harder thing to do. **Liz Glazer:** When I hear Annemarie and you talk about this, I think about the “abundance book” and other cities. How applicable is what's happening in New York? Are we further behind, or are we going to be a light unto the nations? **Jamie Rubin:** We're late to the game in some ways. The charter review was a big deal — no city has done something like what we did. But California has beaten us in some ways. Gavin Newsom got a similar environmental regulation reform passed in his last legislative session. We're getting there in our New York-y kind of way. A quick update on where we are politically: the SEQRA reform is part of the Governor's budget for this year. It's generally thought likely to pass, maybe with some changes negotiated at the table. The single biggest issue is that the environmental community has looked at this and said: it's not a terrible idea to update 50-year-old laws to fit the ability to build more homes in a crisis, but we have some issues with how you're going about it. My assessment is that it should work out. The Governor will back off on some of what she's proposing in the climate laws. The environmental community will get behind most of what she wants to do with SEQRA, and the budget will emerge with two key — by the way, non-financial — items that are basically both good for the state. But we won't know until the puff of smoke goes up and we have a new budget. **Liz Glazer:** It's like a choose your own adventure in alphabet soup. **Jamie Rubin:** Exactly. So we'll now listen to Annemarie Gray and hope you enjoy it. --- **Jamie Rubin:** Annemarie, welcome back to the show. **Annemarie Gray:** Thanks, Jamie, for having me. **Jamie Rubin:** A lot has happened since you were last on — in the world and to you personally. What's the most important thing that's happened? **Annemarie Gray:** Is the answer supposed to be that I had a baby? **Jamie Rubin:** Yes, absolutely. **Annemarie Gray:** I had a baby! We have a new New Yorker – very relevant to all the talk about childcare and affording healthcare and affording to live in New York City while trying to grow a family here. That's been very exciting. And simultaneously, the city and the state are really making good headway on building more housing. It's just been an exciting time all around. **Jamie Rubin:** Second to your personal news, the other big thing was the Charter Review Commission's housing questions. Talk about what was at stake and what happened. **Annemarie Gray:** About a year ago, the last administration formed a Charter Revision Commission charged with taking a hard look at the barriers the Charter creates for building more housing of all types, which we know is the core root cause of the housing affordability crisis. They came out with four really strong questions — Questions Two through Five — all about fast-tracking city-financed deeply affordable housing, fast-tracking modest housing infrastructure proposals, creating a housing appeals board as a backstop to hyper-local vetoes of housing projects for no good reason, and replacing outdated paper maps with a digital map system. We were really involved in shaping those questions. Then we launched a campaign called "Yes on Affordable Housing" — an independent coalition – but Open New York really made it happen. They passed on election night, and it's a really big deal. It's a national example. New York City is finally tackling some of the worst barriers upholding exclusionary zoning practices. We've already seen a couple of projects go through the process in ways they wouldn't have before. **Jamie Rubin:** And to put a fine point on it, they passed overwhelmingly — without the candidate who ultimately became mayor saying anything supportive until the very final day. The tailwinds were the crisis and your campaign, basically. **Annemarie Gray:** They won 50 out of 65 Assembly districts — 77 percent. They won in every district that went for Mamdani and some that went for Cuomo. Even in places where you'd expect less support, like homeowner-heavy southeast Queens, there was really strong performance. And you're already seeing Mamdani prioritize the affordability crisis, lean into the need to build more housing, and start using these new tools. It's really exciting. **Jamie Rubin:** Give me an example. What specifically has happened in the first six or eight weeks of this administration? **Annemarie Gray:** Two weeks ago, I was with the administration as they announced the very first ULURP project — that's Question Three, the expedited review for modest housing proposals. They announced the first project in the Bronx, a deeply affordable housing project that HPD is doing, and it's going to move months faster. Then we saw Council Member Vicki Paladino, who has been one of the staunchest opponents to new housing — she was outwardly opposed during City of Yes and the ballot measures — put out a long video explaining how she didn't like the measures but now that they were law, she couldn't stop them. She's wrestling with the politics: is it better to vote yes so she has some say, knowing that if she doesn't, it goes to the appeals board? And then the project got approved. You're watching in real time how the political calculus shifted from a default hyper-local veto for bad-faith reasons to *okay, everyone needs to build housing.* Places across the country are watching us. We really started to curb member deference in the absolute worst cases, and we're just starting to see the impact. ### SEQRA Reform: What It Is and Why It Matters **Jamie Rubin:** With that major victory under your belt, and having tried a couple times at the state level to pass legislation with similar regulatory impacts — cracking down on the most egregious obstructionism to new housing — there's new momentum. Scroll forward to the Governor's State of the State address in January. What did she announce? **Annemarie Gray:** She announces reforms to SEQRA — the State Environmental Quality Review Act. It's a signature part of her State of the State speech and her executive budget, targeting an April 1 deadline. Very short turnaround. And she was extremely supportive of the ballot questions well in advance of Election Day. Hochul has clearly been talking about housing for a couple of years now, and it's a big theme with governors across the country. Some of the other things she's tried haven't gotten full traction because the state grants authority to municipalities to control their own zoning, which has a really big impact on what actually gets built. But there are steps that can pave the way for bigger reforms, and one of them doesn't get a lot of coverage because it's invisible — but it really matters. Building new homes requires going through thousands and thousands of pages of paperwork. You'd think from the name that the analysis has a huge amount to do with the environment and making sure there aren't bad impacts to climate. That is where this idea started about 50 years ago, but that's really not what SEQRA is actually measuring now. It was written in the '70s, designed to stop environmentally destructive actions like new coal-fired power plants or highways bulldozing neighborhoods. But 50 years later, that same law is ironically preventing green infrastructure projects. It's preventing infill housing right next to transit. It's blocking exactly the climate action that makes sense for the 21st century because it's never been modernized. **Jamie Rubin:** How does a state environmental quality act actually block climate adaptation? **Annemarie Gray:** To build anything, you need to go through this required state process. If you're building a single-family home in a sprawling suburb, you're not required to go through anything like this, but you are for a small apartment building. Off the bat, it doesn't make sense how you're setting requirements. It takes a lot of time, and time is money. It's become so broad that you're measuring things like shadow impacts, or what traffic signal changes might be needed 10 years down the road because new people will live there. It's designed against the status quo and slows down the process. And because you have thousands of pages of paperwork, anyone with money to hire a lawyer figures out some way to stop a project. We did a huge amount of research on projects delayed by SEQRA. One example is 250 Water Street in the South Street Seaport — housing on a parking lot in a historic district. A lawsuit argued the developer's environmental analysis was insufficient, and the project got stalled. There was also a lawsuit against City of Yes arguing the city hadn't properly studied the environmental impacts of rooftop solar panels. That is ridiculous. Our environmental laws are being abused to stop solar panels. Something has gone really wrong. This is a world where wealthy people figure out a way to stop housing in their district, and SEQRA gets weaponized. **Jamie Rubin:** The Citizens Budget Commission has done research showing that housing projects can cost as much as $82,000 more per unit due to unnecessary regulatory costs. When the average cost of a new unit in the city is $500,000 to $750,000, that's as much as 10 percent of the cost. **Annemarie Gray:** And this does not suddenly open up development on greenfields or take away water quality protections — all of that is still in place. You're just modernizing it so it cannot be used for the worst reasons and making projects that obviously make sense move faster. **Jamie Rubin:** So the Governor's proposal is framed as exemptions, right? Types of projects exempt from SEQRA review, new housing below a certain size, projects on previously disturbed sites where review has already happened or is unnecessary. **Annemarie Gray:** It's mainly doing two things. One: exempting whole categories of projects — but remember, those projects still have to go through any discretionary process required by the local government, like zoning, site planning, and permitting. They just get exempted from full environmental review. Two: for larger projects that don't meet the exemption criteria, they still go through existing environmental review but with timelines to ensure local governments don't delay forever. It's like a clock — analogous to what the ballot questions did with timelines on review. Something to keep in mind: in many cases, these are projects that were already approved by local governments. They went through community planning. They went through discretionary reviews. They were already approved. And then someone decides they didn't like the outcome, hires a lawyer, sues, and it gets stalled. It's not even reflecting the democratic process as it currently exists. That said, as a state, there are a lot of ways we need to keep building on this momentum and adding accountability for places that just aren't building homes. SEQRA is definitely not the end, but it's a really good baseline — something smart, something obvious — and then we keep tackling the affordability crisis year after year. ### The Environmental Community and the Politics of Reform **Jamie Rubin:** Even on its face, this appears to be somewhat limiting of landmark state environmental review legislation. You'd probably say it's trying to bring the original purpose back into focus and take away the extraneous stuff that's been abused. But it sounds like the Governor has to side with either housing or the environmental groups, and the proposal has fallen on the side of housing developers. How do you deal with that? **Annemarie Gray:** This is making it easier to build an energy-efficient home near the subway where people don't need a car. This is making it easier to build solar panels. This is making it easier to build infill housing on a parking lot so that homes don't get built as new sprawl development instead. A lot of environmental groups see this, and the goals are really aligned. Our current land use and environmental review processes are actually exacerbating sprawl. The whole conversation has come a long way from a '70s-era environmental framework to 2026 climate realities. What does our land use need to look like to reduce emissions? Dense development done in smart ways is a conservation strategy. That's how you make sure you're actually preserving land. You're seeing some opposition from groups fearing they'll lose a tool they've used for a long time. But we launched a coalition alongside RPA that now has 35 to 40 groups, including environmental groups. I'm having multiple conversations today with people working on climate issues alongside fair housing and planning groups. The battle lines are just not that clear. Something we haven't mentioned: a version of environmental reform passed in the Senate last year. The Governor isn't alone on this. That bill was by Senator Rachel May, who comes from an environmental background. The bill was called the Affordable Housing and Sprawl Prevention Act. People are thinking carefully about how to be clear about intentions. Mayor Mamdani has been a staunch supporter, which has helped the conversation in New York City a lot. ### Abundance, Good Faith, and Climate Alignment **Jamie Rubin:** Part of the problem is that it's been a really rough couple of years for the environmental community. It didn't start with the election of Donald Trump, but that was a watershed moment. Terrible things have happened, including basically the destruction of the EPA's key regulatory functions. The landmark state legislature – CLCPA that passed a couple of years ago – has been painfully slow to implement. And then you and I have talked about abundance a lot. You could see this coming for environmental regulation a mile away. I didn't love some of the dialogue around abundance a couple of years ago. There are good-faith abundance-people and less good-faith abundance-people, and on the less good-faith side, they've been targeting environmental regulation for some time. Is that fair? **Annemarie Gray:** I spend my days working on housing issues, so I'm not the expert on everything happening writ large. It is a very scary time for people who care about climate — and frankly for all of us. I stay up at night worried about that, but it's not what I focus on day to day. **Jamie Rubin:** But those are your allies. **Annemarie Gray:** The fear — what those groups are actually wrestling with in terms of their policy priorities — is real and very scary and probably extremely frustrating. To your point about abundance, I honestly don't use that word myself because it means really different things to different people. The way I see it is that dense housing in smart ways is a climate solution. And a lot of the folks thinking about this day to day — there's real good faith there. I actually think there's a huge amount of alignment. ### How Mayor Mamdani Is Doing on Housing **Jamie Rubin:** I'm going to take the last few minutes to brag on you. Anybody who's been watching the Mayor over the last two months has noticed that, going back to his transition team, your face keeps popping up in close proximity to the Mayor. You're the closest thing we have to a housing celebrity. I mentioned the transition because you were on the Mayor's housing transition team — you were the chair. **Annemarie Gray:** There wasn't a chair. I just spoke. **Jamie Rubin:** Every time they wanted to talk about the transition, you were one of the people who spoke, so I'm going to call you the chair. We don't expect you to be unbiased, but you call them as you see them. How's the Mayor doing on housing? **Annemarie Gray:** In a world where there's a lot to be dire about, I'm feeling really hopeful and excited. This mayor, from partway through his campaign, really recognized the role of building more housing — something he changed his mind on. You saw him lean into the ballot measures. You saw him use language that Open New York has been at the forefront of for years — that tenant protections and building new homes are not in conflict. And they can't be, because having buy-in for a neighborhood to grow means people have to not feel like they're getting displaced. That's really real. Him leaning into that and running on the four-bill agenda was really huge. I've been impressed with the appointments. Layla Bozorg is someone I've worked with for a long time and think extremely highly of — a really smart pick to blend these priorities, rooted in fair housing and a truly progressive lane for building more housing as part of an all-of-the-above approach where every neighborhood has to be part of the solution. We have to think about tenant protections and the role of the public sector and public excellence. She's a really good person to run that. Her chief of staff, Genevieve Michael, is a political genius and a smart person for that position. Good for New York, but a bit of a loss for me — Andrew Fine, my number two, our policy director and chief of staff, is now on her team. Great for New York. Some of their first announcements are about how they're going to use the ballot measures. They're just getting started. I'm excited to see their full housing plan. There are still announcements and appointments to be made. But in general, it's an exciting moment to see a new administration embrace this momentum that cuts across different types of politics in a way where people are really serious about life getting better. ### Lightning Round: Sunnyside Yards, ADUs, and Pinball **Jamie Rubin:** Before we go, quick lightning round. Sunnyside Yards. **Annemarie Gray:** A smart, insanely complicated generational project that they should keep looking at — but knowing it's really complicated, really expensive, and should be one of a wide range of things they pursue. Leaning into the fact that building new homes is central to the affordability agenda and going to the president to talk about it — that's excellent. But it shouldn't be the only thing they're working on. **Jamie Rubin:** Agreed. It's not going to be. ADUs — now legalized via City of Yes, you're starting to see the first projects come about, a couple of little companies popping up. **Annemarie Gray:** Like in California! It's so cool. The ballot measures do this too — we've lost this whole industry of small-scale builders because it was illegal. ADUs are a great entry-level path for small home builders. It's a much more accessible way to enter the industry than the massive developer world that usually runs things in New York. In California and other states, you've really seen small business growth when these things get legalized. Super cool. **Jamie Rubin:** We're all about middle-class creation here. That's great. Last one: best place to take a five-month-old on a rainy Saturday in Brooklyn. **Annemarie Gray:** You're going to love this answer. There's a pinball museum that opened in my neighborhood. **Jamie Rubin:** Is it in Red Hook? **Annemarie Gray:** Yeah! It's really chill, really kid-friendly. It's free. The lights and sounds — the baby was really mesmerized. It's somewhere inside that's not a bar, with a lot to look at that's not screens. It's wholesome — old pinball machines from the '50s. **Jamie Rubin:** I'm delighted that you're not taking your baby to a bar. You get a lot of points for that. Annemarie, it's so good to talk to you. We'll talk again after SEQRA passes. **Annemarie Gray:** Sounds great. Thanks, Jamie. **Jamie Rubin:** Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### It's a Jungle Out There URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/navigating-apartment-hunting-rising-rent-in-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:30.000Z There’s a lot of talk in our politics about how rents are unaffordable. We see historically low vacancy rates and record asking rents flash across our screens. But it wasn’t until I had to find a new place to live that the problem literally hit home for me. When I moved to New York City in 2017 to pursue my PhD, I remember being pleasantly surprised by the cost of rent. I was living on 157th Street in Washington Heights — but my rent wasn’t that different from what I had been paying on the outskirts of Boston. I used to tell my friends back in Boston that New York clearly had a wider distribution of apartment prices, even if the median was higher. Nearly a decade ago, that turned out to be true: My rent was $1,750 per month for a one-bedroom in a pre-war building right off the 157th Street C stop. I was a bit of a chronic mover at that point in my life, hopping from place to place, upgrading slightly each year as my then-partner’s salary increased. We ended up in a place on 184th Street for $2,000\. Then the pandemic hit. My ex got a job in Chelsea, so we decided to move downtown. It was early 2021, which in retrospect now seems like something of a golden age of apartment hunting in New York City. The COVID-19 pandemic brought widespread health and economic disruption, but it also led to a temporary softening of rental demand. It may seem unbelievable now, but according to [a report released by the Comptroller](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/spotlight-new-york-citys-rental-housing-market/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), the median asking rent for a one-bedroom in New York City had fallen to just below $2,600\. Nearly half of apartments were [offering incentives to get people in the door](https://inhabit.corcoran.com/new-york-city-residential-rental-market-report-february-2021/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including free months of rent. We found an apartment in a glorious, historic building called Chelsea Gardens, listed at an almost unbelievable $3,200. That apartment became my dream home. Every window faced a beautifully kept interior garden. It sat just off the C/E and 1 trains on 23rd Street. The living room was huge, the bedroom equally so. The building was a co-op — meaning it was owned by its residents, with rentals a rarity — and the owner of our unit, based on his emails, seemed like a genuinely good person. When he raised the rent, he did so apologetically. Even then, it was $3,650\. Expensive, but still a deal for what and where it was. Two years in, my partner and I broke up. Over the next three years, I made the apartment my own. It became part of my identity. It was large enough that I was constantly hosting friends. I leaned into the gay history of the neighborhood and the building. The co-op board president, Gil Neary, was a legendary real estate mogul and longtime resident of Chelsea and Fire Island Pines. [His firm’s motto was](https://gaycitynews.com/local-gay-real-estate-agency-has-a-new-home/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “A castle for every queen.” As the broker for the building, he had originally rented us the apartment and was known for hosting fabulous parties. In many ways, he kept an old-school gay way of life alive at a time when much of that part of Chelsea’s culture was slipping away. He was on vacation in Maine when he tragically lost his life in a car accident in August 2024. With his death came changes to the building. The new board, from what I was told, was no longer sympathetic to renters. My lease was set to expire in April 2026, and I did not expect a renewal, having already reached the five-year limit an owner is allowed to rent out their unit. Still, I thought there might be an exception. I was liked by my neighbors; one had even written a letter asking the board to let me stay. I was a responsible and respectful tenant who always paid his rent on time, and I felt like I was a member of the community. Moreover, the owner of the apartment, Paolo, who was doing humanitarian work in the Middle East helping refugees from Palestine, wrote a long and, I thought, convincing letter requesting the same. The board denied the request. I have now re-entered the world of apartment hunting, and the market is bleak. The median asking price for a one-bedroom in Manhattan, according to a study by RentReboot that looked at 300,000 listings over the last year, has increased from its pandemic low of around $2,600 per month in 2021 [to over $4,730 in 2026](https://rentreboot.com/guide/nyc-rent-report-feb-2026?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Of course, Manhattan is far from the only place a New Yorker can live. I was willing to move anywhere, within reason, but asking rents were not meaningfully better elsewhere. The citywide median asking price for a one-bedroom is now [approximately $3,785, with Brooklyn at $3,800, and even the Bronx exceeding $3,100](https://rentreboot.com/guide/nyc-rent-report-feb-2026?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The same apartments in the Heights I lived in when I first moved to the city were now more than a thousand dollars more expensive a month. To put this in perspective, [under the standard 40x rent rule](https://www.curbed.com/article/rental-income-requirement-landlord-mystery.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), qualifying for a median on-the-market one-bedroom in New York City now requires an income of roughly $150,000\. In Manhattan, the number is closer to $180,000\. Studios in many neighborhoods are now exceeding $3,500, yet are so small, they come with mini fridges. I have found it difficult to wrap my head around the number of people earning that level of income who are also willing to live in spaces that feel like college dorms. One proposed partial answer to the affordability crisis in New York City is the [housing lottery](https://housingconnect.nyc.gov/PublicWeb/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), where people can apply for a rare, random shot at income-restricted housing, produced with a city subsidy. (I actually applied for — and “won!” — the housing lottery back in 2024, and went through two grueling rounds of paperwork before learning that all of the units had already been accounted for.) But the irony is that for middle-income earners, it is often not actually affordable. Take a real example from a new building in Manhattan. An “affordable” one-bedroom set aside for those at 130% of area median income is priced at $3,689\. For this apartment, the eligible income range for a single person is $130,800 to $147,420\. The same 40x rule would lead to an affordable rent range of roughly $3,270 to $3,685. In other words, even at the top of the eligible income range, the rent as a percentage of income is at or above what most landlords would allow under the standard 40× rule. And even the highest earners of the income bracket would be rent-burdened, with close to half of their take-home income going toward housing. Middle-income New Yorkers are being squeezed from both sides, with little evidence of relief. My friends keep saying, “just come to Brooklyn, or come to LIC, or Astoria.” And I would happily. I no longer need to stay in Manhattan the way I felt I needed to do when I was at Columbia. But the rental market in these places is not much better. In response, I have started sending them screenshots of StreetEasy maps showing what is actually available. Their usual response is just, “Oh.” You might wonder who I am to complain. I’m a successful professional who has lived in New York for less than a decade, just one year shy of the [informal 10-year benchmark](https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/andrew-yang-fran-lebowitz-and-who-gets-to-be-a-real-new-yorker?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for being considered a “real” New Yorker. But rising rents affect all New Yorkers. As rents increase, middle-income residents are pushed further out, and that pressure does not disappear but instead shifts, accelerating displacement in surrounding neighborhoods. Over time, the city risks becoming a place where the core is accessible primarily to the very wealthy, those supported by intergenerational wealth or buyers treating housing as an investment rather than a place to live. I am not sure what the near-term solution is. Mamdani has proposed to “freeze the rents,” but that would apply only to approximately 1 million rent-stabilized units, not the market as a whole. Freezing rents for stabilized tenants may even [shift some pressure onto the market-rate side](https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/effects-rent-control-expansion-tenants-landlords-inequality?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). The deeper issue is simpler, and it’s not solved quickly: There are not enough apartments. If there is any silver lining, it is that people still want to live in New York City. There is a good reason people continue to compete for space here, even at these prices. Not just for the jobs or the density or the convenience, but the energy, the sense that something is always happening, the feeling that you are part of something larger than yourself. Yet that same demand is what is making it increasingly difficult to stay. Many of the people who give the city its character, its culture and its history are being priced out of it. The version of New York that so many of us love becomes harder to sustain when fewer people can afford to live here for long. Despite all of the financial pressures related to rent, I am not leaving. There is no place I would rather be. But staying is no longer a passive choice. It requires tradeoffs, compromises, and increasingly, luck. I’m hoping to get lucky again, as I did with my place in Chelsea Gardens, and find another needle-in-the-haystack apartment to call home for years to come. Let me know if you find one. ### London’s Quest for Low-Traffic Neighborhoods URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/london-low-traffic-neighborhoods-safety-urban-planning/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:09:13.000Z [Vital City](https://soundcloud.com/vital-city-604970448?ref=vitalcitynyc.org "Vital City") · [London's Quest for Low Traffic Neighborhoods](https://soundcloud.com/vital-city-604970448/londons-quest-for-low-traffic?ref=vitalcitynyc.org "London's Quest for Low Traffic Neighborhoods") *This is the first in a new monthly interview series, Borrow and Steal. In each installment, I’ll profile a different evidence-backed urban policy idea from around the world — and talk to a local who has worked to translate the idea into reality.* *Our first interview is with* [*James McAsh*](https://x.com/mcash?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, a councillor in London who, since 2018, has represented* [*Southwark*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London%5FBorough%5Fof%5FSouthwark?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— a district of about 300,000 residents on the south bank of the Thames, known for landmarks like Shakespeare's Globe and the Tate Modern. Until earlier this month, James was the council member responsible for street design across the borough, where he oversaw the scale-up of so-called “*[*low-traffic neighborhoods*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low%5FTraffic%5FNeighbourhood?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*,” a street management program enacted as an emergency measure to create more safe, outdoor space during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, James has worked to make many of Southwark's low-traffic neighborhoods permanent. And James has become an advocate for rolling out the concept to other cities, like New York, where there is* [*a nascent movement*](https://www.openplans.org/low-traffic-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to replicate London’s scheme. (Open Plans, a local street safety group, has advocated for* [*five low-traffic neighborhoods*](https://x.com/OpenPlans/status/2028850803163766957?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *in every New York City borough. Recently, Queens Community Board 6 \[Forest Hill and Rego Park\]* [*voted to request* ](https://www.qchron.com/editions/central/cb-6-looks-to-curb-cut-through-traffic/article%5F56880c35-131e-59a2-bd76-dd608d9bf313.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*the Department of Transportation stage a local low traffic neighborhood pilot, while Manhattan Community Board 8 \[Upper East Side\]* [*rejected a similar measure*](https://www.uppereastsite.com/anti-car-lobbyists-low-traffic-neighborhood-plan-rejected-by-ues-community-board-members/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.)* *In this interview, James explains the low-traffic neighborhood (LTN) concept and shares insights from London’s experience. We dig into costs and benefits, including data on safety and congestion impacts, and the politics of rolling out low-traffic neighborhoods. James concludes with advice for other cities considering this as a strategy to create more livable streets.* *The following conversation has been condensed and annotated for clarity.* **Cara Eckholm:** To kick us off: what is a low-traffic neighborhood exactly? And how does it relate to other, perhaps better-known, urban planning concepts, like the 15-minute city? **James McAsh:** A low-traffic neighborhood is closely connected to the concept of a 15-minute city. You start by defining a neighborhood by its main roads — what we call boundary roads. Those boundary roads should be the routes built to handle higher volumes of traffic. You essentially draw a line around the neighborhood. Inside the boundary, the goal is simple: no through-traffic on residential streets. That doesn’t mean the area is pedestrianized — cars can still enter — but you can’t cut through. If you want to get from one boundary road to another, you have to go around on the boundary, not straight through the neighborhood. Every home and business is still accessible by car, but every car journey inside the neighborhood starts or ends there, which dramatically reduces traffic. There's no reason why someone from outside should be driving through residential streets. **Cara Eckholm:** To address the boogeyman in the room — how do you deal with parking? **James McAsh:** You can keep parking exactly as it was. You might lose a small number of spaces to install infrastructure — usually because you need turning space near the barriers used to block cars from entering — but we’re talking a few spaces here and there, not major changes. **Cara Eckholm:** So if I’m a resident with a car, and I previously had a parking space, I’m keeping it. The difference is that people who were cutting through on their way to an alternate destination can’t anymore. Is that right? **James McAsh:** Yes, exactly. In some ways, LTNs would work better for U.S. cities than U.K. cities because you have the grid. With the grid, it’s easier to define a clean box bounded by major roads, which cars can no longer cut through. The main tool to block passage is a modal filter, which is just a technical term for something in the road that blocks certain modes of transport. The simplest version is a planter or bollards placed so pedestrians and cyclists can pass through, but cars can’t. You can also do it with camera enforcement: the street stays open, but if you drive through, you get a fine. **Cara Eckholm:** How prevalent are low-traffic neighborhoods in London? My understanding is that London [introduced congestion pricing in 2003](https://www.arup.com/en-us/insights/two-decades-in-what-can-other-cities-learn-from-the-london-congestion-charge/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — but that the LTN push is more recent, and stemmed partly from experimentation [during the pandemic](https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/streetspace-and-low-traffic-neighbourhoods-1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). **James McAsh:** That's mostly right. The phrase *low-traffic neighborhood* was popularized in 2020\. But actually, if you think about what a low-traffic neighborhood is, it's a quiet residential street where you can't drive through. Those have existed all across the world, including in London, for a very long time. Think about a cul-de-sac. Or social housing projects — they are rarely designed for people to drive through them. But yes, in 2020, we had a big leap forward. People went from talking about low-traffic neighborhoods to executing them. Social distancing exposed how narrow sidewalks were on routes that people depended on. At first, we did some sidewalk widening, but LTNs were also a way to redistribute space — not banning cars entirely, but shifting street space toward walking and cycling. *\[Note: While estimates vary, there are now at* [*least 80 known*](https://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/early/2025/07/17/ip-2024-045571?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *LTNs throughout London.\]* **Cara Eckholm:** How many LTNs did you roll out in Southwark? **James McAsh:** In Southwark, we did about a dozen. The 2020 rollout was reactive. We put several in quickly, pulled a few back, and have since expanded others. It was driven by demand and which local politicians were keen. It was great that we were able to have this big jump forward, but the speed of execution created some tension. If you don’t design boundary roads carefully, you can displace traffic onto nearby residential streets, and, understandably, the residents who live on those streets are upset. Now we’re doing things more holistically: mapping the borough’s main strategic routes first. Inside them, we’ve identified about 25 zones that *could* become LTNs; all 25 are designed so implementing one won't make a mess next door. **Cara Eckholm:** Do you have a sense of how much traffic in these areas was cut-through traffic versus residents driving locally? **James McAsh:** It varies massively. But I’ll give you a contrast. We did one in [Dulwich](https://moderngov.southwark.gov.uk/documents/s91328/Appendix%20A%20Dulwich%20Village%20LTN%20measures.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which is in the south, further away from the center. It's more residential, affluent, whiter and has higher car ownership. And we did one in [Walworth](https://healthywalworth.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/walworthhealthystreetsv.11-18jun20.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which is very inner-city. It’s ethnically mixed, lower income, much lower car ownership. Residents’ experiences in both neighborhoods reflected their relationship to cars. If you live in Dulwich, you probably drive, so you feel the route change immediately — some liked it, many did not. Whereas, in Walworth, many people walk, take the bus, or cycle. So traffic feels like an external force imposed on you. Making your kids choke, taking up space, and creating noise pollution. So people generally had a positive reaction when traffic was removed. *\[Note: As a comparable, one* [*study in New York*](https://www.openplans.org/press-releases/whos-on-your-streets-data-shows-up-to-88-of-drivers-innbspsome-neighborhoods-are-only-cutting-throughnbsp?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *found that the majority of driving on residential streets in most Community Districts was cut-through traffic.\]* **Cara Eckholm:** You started to get into the politics of deciding where LTNs are placed. How does an LTN actually get approved and implemented? **James McAsh:** In 2020, our process for approving LTNs was very request-driven, but we saw the inequity and tensions that created. Now we’re trying to ensure every part of the borough has an opportunity, paired with community engagement about what people actually want. The physical infrastructure is cheap — planters, bollards, benches. You start with the basic measures, then once the pattern is established and people are using the newfound space you can do lots of really exciting things. Like creating space for kids to play. **Cara Eckholm:** And the borough pays for it? **James McAsh:** Yes. And we introduced a prioritization framework. At the center were deprivation, air quality and the number of people who’d been killed or seriously injured in collisions. So we focused on places that are dangerous, polluted and home to disadvantaged communities. **Cara Eckholm:** What should other cities expect in terms of cost? **James McAsh:** The bare bones — planters — are in the tens of thousands of pounds. Once you move into beautification and making it permanent — public realm upgrades — you’re in the hundreds of thousands. Even a relatively big LTN usually isn’t more than a million pounds. *\[Note: A recent* [*study by a trio of U.K.-based academic researchers*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140524000173?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *found a per-person cost of £28-35 for LTNs implemented during 2020 as emergency interventions, or £112 for higher-cost, permanent LTNs. It estimated over £1 billion in health economic benefits on a program cost of £100 million.\]* **Cara Eckholm:** The staggered nature of the rollout created natural experiment-like conditions, which seems to have offered a really [fertile ground](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213624X23001785?via%3Dihub&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for transportation research. What does the data say? **James McAsh:** The strongest data is [London-wide](https://content.tfl.gov.uk/tfl-impacts-of-low-traffic-neighbourhoods-feb-2024-acc.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Inside the new low-traffic neighborhoods, there were [50% fewer casualties than there were before.](https://findingspress.org/article/25633-impacts-of-2020-low-traffic-neighbourhoods-in-london-on-road-traffic-injuries?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) And importantly, there was no increase in casualties on boundary roads, which is the common criticism. We also saw that [74% of the streets within LTNs have reduced traffic](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d30896202a18c0001b49180/t/6481e3d5be84550c6c001470/1686234089805/Changes+in+motor+traffic+inside+London%E2%80%99s+LTNs+and+on+boundary+roads+%283%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). One figure I’ve seen is median traffic falling from roughly 1,200 vehicles a day to around 650 inside LTNs. Some impacts are less expected. There’s [some preliminary evidence](https://findingspress.org/article/23623-short-term-association-between-the-introduction-of-2020-low-traffic-neighbourhoods-and-street-crime-in-london-uk?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of lower crime in LTNs. I think there's a lot of potential for exploring why that might be the case. And we’ve also heard concerns about emergency response times — especially from fire services — but the [evidence suggests response times remain the same](https://findingspress.org/article/23568-the-impact-of-2020-low-traffic-neighbourhoods-on-fire-service-emergency-response-times-in-london-uk?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). People notice the moment a vehicle hits a barrier and has to reroute, but they don’t notice that the rest of the trip is faster because there are fewer cars on the road. And if you use cameras instead of hard barriers, you can build in exemptions for emergency vehicles (or disabled drivers). All of a sudden they're on roads that have much less traffic, which can actually make motor vehicle trips faster. **Cara Eckholm:** To play devil’s advocate: You haven't seen any drawbacks? What's the case against LTNs? **James McAsh:** The key downside is a feature, not a bug in my view: Short car trips inside the neighborhood become harder and slower. That is intentional. We want to reduce those kinds of journeys. But unfortunately, some people do get caught in the crossfire. Maybe they've got lots of kids or they're plumbers or they're moving a piano or something like that. They need a motor vehicle. They can't do it on their bike. So that is a downside. They can still make the journey, but it may become longer because they have to go out to the boundary roads and loop around. **Cara Eckholm:** What distance does an LTN typically cover? **James McAsh:** Something like one to two miles, probably, at the upper end. You’re not talking about huge areas. The reason it connects to the 15-minute city is that the neighborhood should be walkable — how big it is depends on the road structure and specifically where you have boundary roads that can handle large volumes of traffic. But 15-minutes walking is about right. **Cara Eckholm:** The 15-minute city has been heavily politicized, as have LTNs. My understanding is that conservative MPs are generally opposed to LTNs, and your former prime minister, Rishi Sunak, [ordered a review of the program](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-66351785?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which created tension with London Mayor Sadiq Khan, who’s set a goal for [80% of all trips](https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/the-mayors-transport-strategy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the city to be done by bicycle or public transport by 2041\. How did LTNs get caught up in national politics? **James McAsh:** It very much became tied up with a broader culture war and with conspiracy theories. In the U.K., often, low-traffic neighborhoods and the 15-minute city are used synonymously. They don’t mean the same thing, but in the discourse, they’re sort of used interchangeably. And there’s this conspiracy theory that we are putting in all these cameras so that eventually you will need a pass to get out of your neighborhood to go to a different neighborhood. **Cara Eckholm:** Wow, that’s more nefarious than I was expecting. **James McAsh:** Yeah, I mean obviously, that is far from the truth. Local government is nowhere near efficient enough to manage something like that! Now to be clear, Rishi Sunak isn’t a conspiracy theorist, but the “war on the motorist” is something that Sunak pushed — the idea that woke councils like Southwark are going to war with good working people who need their car to drive. So he did call for a review. The hook was that the 2020 LTNs were implemented without consultation — considered an emergency measure during the pandemic, with consultation only afterward. Actually, when the [evidence came back](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/mar/08/low-traffic-neighbourhoods-generally-popular-report-ordered-by-sunak-finds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it suggested that LTN’s achieved their policy objectives and that they are popular with the majority of residents. The national debate has cooled down now. And we have a new Labour government. They’re not evangelical about LTNs, but they’re also not against them. They’re mostly leaving councils alone. Progressive councils do them, less progressive councils don’t. **Cara Eckholm:** Is this mostly a London phenomenon? I am thinking about the congestion pricing analogy, where you haven't really seen a replication effect outside of large cities. **James McAsh:** It’s a very London-centric project, but that’s not to say it’s just London. Oxford, which is a much smaller city, also has quite developed low-traffic neighborhoods, and there are a few others dotted around the country. One difference is that congestion pricing needs scale to work and has high setup costs. In theory you can have a low traffic neighborhood in a pretty small town. A town of 20,000 could have a low-traffic neighborhood. **Cara Eckholm:** What was your experience like rolling out LTNs in Southwark? What were you actually seeing on the ground in terms of the community's reception? **James McAsh:** We’ve learned lessons and hopefully your readers can learn from our mistakes as well. We’ve essentially found that you’ve got this curve: At first, the only people who know about LTNs are those pushing for them. As an elected representative, your inbox is full of support. It feels very positive. Then it’s announced and popularity really, really drops. The protestors come out. With most political issues, you can say “this is a systemic problem” — but an LTN is clearly a political choice with your name on it. It can feel like you’re under quite a lot of pressure at that point. **Cara Eckholm:** Were you panicked? **James McAsh:** I wasn’t panicking, but I was new to this and didn’t have the research I have now. The downsides of a low-traffic neighborhood are experienced immediately. You could previously take a route, bollards go in and now you can’t take that route. The upsides take longer. It takes a while for that mom to realize there’s a new route she can walk with her kids, traffic-free. She won’t know the route is there immediately. Then when you start adding infrastructure like little parks, the benefits are clearer, but that takes a while to come through. So when implementing schemes like LTNs, you do have to steel yourself, be prepared for a lot of negativity, and understand that there is a cycle. You also need to set clear expectations on what your success criteria are and be honest about what you can and can’t measure. Air quality is a good example: Hyperlocal air quality data is hard to measure, even if broader trends are positive. **Cara Eckholm:** Have the LTNs that were rolled out during the pandemic stuck? **James McAsh:** None were removed. Some were adjusted — rolled back slightly — but they stayed. The big shift now is moving from emergency implementation toward high-engagement, more deliberate design. The one I worked on most recently is in the central part of the borough. The area includes the Tate Modern and Tower Bridge, and has high population density, low car ownership and lots of tourists. We recently did early engagement with multiple proposals — street closures, modal filters — and every proposal had majority support. In fact, the main feedback was to be more ambitious. More modal filters. **Cara Eckholm:** What should other cities take away? Do LTNs need to come after congestion pricing, or can they be a line of first defense? **James McAsh:** I’d treat them separately. I support congestion pricing and it covers a bit of my borough, but it actually doesn’t overlap with the 2020 LTNs we introduced — it's a different geography. So if you don’t have congestion pricing, LTNs can be a strong tool in their own right. The biggest lesson is that early engagement is really important. You need to know what's happening on the ground. The best example is your conversations with local businesses. Businesses often say, “If you ban cars, I’ll go out of business — my customers drive.” So now we don’t start with business owners. We start with customers. We stand outside shops and ask: How did you get here? Usually, it’s overwhelmingly walking, cycling and transit. Then we go to the business and say: This is how your customers already arrive, and we’re going to make that easier. **Cara Eckholm:** Do you have a team of ethnographers who go out and do this research? The type of engagement you are describing is pretty different from what we usually see in the U.S. — a community board meeting where people show up to lodge their support or their complaints. **James McAsh:** In Southwark, the engagement process I introduced has five stages. Stage one is simple: We ask residents across the whole borough, *what do you want on your street?* Do you want more trees? A pedestrian crossing? People can tick boxes and show us on a map. The goal is to gather early, grounded data. We also want to make sure the responses are representative. The typical approach in the U.K. is an online portal and maybe a few meetings at a library. Instead, we track response rates street by street across the borough. If a street had less than a 20 percent response rate, we knock on doors. That helps us reach people who are less likely to participate. Stage two focuses on individual zones. We go back to residents with some initial ideas and ask: *What do you think of these proposals?* Stage three is when we present a full scheme. We show exactly what the area will look like — what routes might change for drivers, where public space will improve, where we might add planting, small parks or play areas. Stage four is a statutory consultation — a formal public hearing, where people can lodge support and complaints. At that point, the scheme is essentially fixed. It’s largely a yes-or-no moment. Then stage five is evaluation. We measure the project against the criteria we set at the beginning and give people the chance to say whether it’s working and make tweaks. **Cara Eckholm:** And in terms of your role in this movement, you just wrapped up your term overseeing street design in Southwark. What's next for you? **James McAsh:** We have elections coming up and I’ll be running for re-election. Beyond that, I’m talking to people and looking for where I can make the biggest impact — especially on sustainable travel and cities. ### Dan Garodnick on What Comes After Yes URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/dan-garodnick-housing-zoning-city-of-yes-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:22.000Z *Dan Garodnick, a former city councilman who represented Manhattan’s East Side for 12 years, led the Department of City Planning under Mayor Eric Adams. Seen by many as a bright light in the administration, he shepherded through the City of Yes rezoning — the most significant set of zoning reforms in decades — and pushed for a suite of charter reforms designed to make housing production easier.* *In the wake of Zohran Mamdani’s victory, Garodnick announced he was stepping down from his position. Last month, Mamdani* [*appointed Sideya Sherman*](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/02/mayor-mamdani-appoints-sideya-sherman-as-city-planning-director-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to the role. On his way out, Garodnick spoke with Vital City about what he’d tell his successor, what comes next for housing and the policy levers that matter most.* --- **Vital City:** Imagine we had a tradition like presidents leaving notes to their successors. What would you want to convey to someone stepping into your role? **Dan Garodnick:** I’d strongly encourage someone in my seat to go deep into the details and substance of the work. Zoning and everything else we do is dense and complicated. But at the same time, you need to speak with moral clarity and at a level of detail that’s accessible to most New Yorkers. This stuff is hard. It needs a translator. You need to be steeped in the details but also able to communicate them to a wider audience. I’d also encourage them to invest time in the relationship with the City Council. They’re important players in the land use process, and that dynamic ideally works well. And I’d encourage them to build on our recent successes. We just took some of the biggest swings on housing that have ever been taken, and we got them done. There’s an opportunity to build on that. **Vital City:** Is there anything you learned the hard way? **Dan Garodnick:** One thing I learned walking into a city agency is that just because you give an instruction doesn’t mean it will be carried out in the way you anticipated — or at all. Managing an agency is itself a political process. You need single-minded purpose and determination to make sure things keep moving. **Vital City:** City of Yes was a big swing — three pieces of legislation, plus charter reforms to make housing production easier. Does the Mamdani administration now need more policy changes, or is this mostly about executing with the tools already in hand? **Dan Garodnick:** It’s a bit of both. There are definitely ways to take the important precedent of City of Yes and continue to add opportunities for housing supply through zoning. The mayor has been clear that’s a priority — whether it’s transit-oriented development or other approaches. At the same time, you need to activate what you’ve already got. You need to make things easier to get built. That includes changes at the state level to environmental review, which will speed up the process before you even enter public review. And it includes changes the new mayor should make on the other end — regulatory approvals that would make it easier to get a building built or add an accessory dwelling unit after the public review process. So part of it is continuing to enable more supply, and part of it is making things easier and faster. **Vital City:** Is there a big regulatory or legislative fix that you wanted to pursue but couldn’t? **Dan Garodnick:** A really big one is now on the table: reform of the environmental review process, in the governor’s budget. That’s something that materially slows things up. When I was in the City Council, I thought the main risk for someone considering a big investment in New York was the politics — the volatility of the political environment. I now understand that while that’s true, there’s an equal amount of risk in the passage of time. Finding ways to shorten the process overall has an enormous impact on what projects actually proceed. **Vital City:** The de Blasio administration picked specific neighborhoods for upzoning, and they happened to be lower-income neighborhoods where some residents feared development. The Adams administration went citywide. Now Mamdani is looking at various upzonings. What are the strategic considerations — and how big an obstacle are historic districts in wealthier parts of the city? **Dan Garodnick:** It’s important for the city’s fair housing goals to enable housing in parts of the city that historically haven’t seen it. That was central to City of Yes for Housing Opportunity, and it should continue to be central to the Mamdani administration’s mission. In recent years, 10 of our 59 community districts produced as much housing as the other forty-nine combined. There are neighborhoods that have been functionally shut off to housing production. That will now start to change. The way to build a thoughtful new program is to state some principles, like we did with City of Yes, and make them big and broadly applicable. That could mean focusing on areas with great transit access, or areas that have been the lowest producers of housing over time. There are a variety of ways to think about it, but stating a principle and applying it broadly is very useful. **Vital City:** New York City contains what are essentially suburbs — parts of Staten Island, eastern Queens and sections of the Bronx that are indistinguishable from Westchester. Is single-family zoning compatible with being part of New York City? **Dan Garodnick:** You want to respect the character of neighborhoods. People have a certain expectation for where they live, and I think that’s worth acknowledging. On the other hand, there are lots of ways to enable some amount of housing even in lower-density neighborhoods that aren’t harmful and that open doors to opportunities that don’t exist today. We need to do that because we’re in a longstanding crisis that’s been going on for so long that people have accepted it as a fact of life. **Vital City:** People say two things that seem contradictory: “It’s so expensive nobody can afford to live here,” and “We have far too little housing to meet demand.” How do you square those? **Dan Garodnick:** They’re easily squared. With housing scarcity, you get high demand and everything that goes along with it: exorbitant rents, displacement pressures, homelessness and a real imbalance of power between landlords and tenants. When you’re looking to negotiate your lease and you have no other options, you’re out of luck. When you need a basic repair, you have very little leverage. We need to add considerably more supply to relieve that pressure and create options for people who live here now and who want to live here in the future. We’ve gotten so far away from a healthy environment that we need to take significant steps to address it. **Vital City:** Is all housing that’s produced essentially equal, or does it need to be tagged “affordable” with income bands and protections to truly count? **Dan Garodnick:** It’s important to create affordable housing to ensure that people of low and moderate means have a place to live. But it’s also important to create market-rate housing — because otherwise you have people with resources chasing after homes where people are already living, driving up costs and creating gentrification pressures. And the city can’t just subsidize its way out of this crisis. We need all the tools, both market-rate and affordable. **Vital City:** What drives construction costs up in New York? Nobody can wave their hands and make Manhattan land cheaper. What’s actually in a policymaker’s control? **Dan Garodnick:** The things that are in the public’s control are the opportunities the law presents to build, the incentives that exist for housing creation and the speed at which you can enable something to go from idea to actualization. Those have been central in what has or hasn’t happened over time. **Vital City:** Should union labor be required for City-subsidized affordable housing construction? **Dan Garodnick:** In an ideal world, you can do it all. But there are obvious challenges, and the math will answer the question. **Vital City:** There’s a lot of discussion about 485-x and whether its labor standards are incentivizing buildings of 99 units and below to avoid the higher pay rates that kick in at a hundred units. What’s your read? **Dan Garodnick:** We need to give this one some time. Time will tell what is viable and what the results of the tax policy are. We need to be clear-eyed about what it does. But it’s too early to come to any clear conclusions. **Vital City:** In the old world of spot rezonings, a developer would go to the City Council with a proposal, the council would demand more affordable units at lower income bands, and the developer would say it doesn’t pencil out — even though their first offer probably more than penciled out. The public never really knows the real math. Do you agree? **Dan Garodnick:** It’s also true that different projects have different considerations for what makes them viable. So yes, in some circumstances it’s hard to suss out the real picture and the absolute final line between viable and not. But if a single dollar of public money is going into a project, the public should have absolute transparency as to what’s going on. **Vital City:** [Henry Grabar](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-high-price-of-fine-print) wrote a piece for us about how much in the building code inflates costs and adds complexity. Have you had a chance to scour the code for the small things that add up? **Dan Garodnick:** We did some of that when I was in the City Council — looking at a set of rules that each individually made sense at one time, but taken together started creating unnecessary obstacles and felt ridiculous. That should be a constant part of the agenda, and I’d encourage it to be a priority for this Council, too. **Vital City:** Forget about the incremental approach of City of Yes for a moment. If you were starting from scratch and building a new zoning code, what would it look like? **Dan Garodnick:** You’d start from a great transit system that works and is reliable, and you’d build most densely where transit was most accessible. You’d prioritize housing over cars in construction and make sure your neighborhoods were walkable, filled with parks and schools and everything you need within a small radius of your home. Zoning has a purpose — to ensure that uses that don’t belong together stay apart. But it’s also had a real limiting effect, which we’re now starting to address. One thing we found with City of Yes for Economic Opportunity: the definition of manufacturing has changed enormously since 1961\. Back then, manufacturing was, for all intents and purposes, a cement factory. Today it could be a 3D printer or a jewelry maker — something that could easily live in a commercial district. We made that change, the largest expansion of manufacturing in sixty years. Zoning has a purpose, but it needs to evolve with the times and reflect a modern economy. **Vital City:** New York puts a heavy share of the property tax burden on commercial property and tries to lighten the load on residential. But within the residential classes, renters bear a disproportionate burden — they just don’t see it broken out because it’s passed along in their rent. Is the way we tax rental apartment buildings itself a drag on housing production? **Dan Garodnick:** It’s one of the reasons you need tax incentives to make housing production happen in New York. **Vital City:** What are the realistic prospects for property tax reform? People have been talking about it forever. **Dan Garodnick:** Any time you change the property tax system, it’s a zero-sum experience. Any mayor who takes it on will need to do so sensitively and carefully because it affects real human beings with certain economic expectations for their families. **Vital City:** Mamdani is embracing a lot of pro-development, abundance-style policy ideas while also pushing for a rent freeze and using landlords as a punching bag — think about the [boxing-style posters](https://www.nyc.gov/main/rental-ripoff?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for hearings about “Rental Ripoffs.” Good strategy? **Dan Garodnick:** I happen to think that tenant protections and housing supply go hand in hand. It’s good to advocate for rules that make sure tenants aren’t being abused or taken advantage of. And at the same time, adding housing supply is another form of tenant protection, because when tenants have a little more leverage, they’re not subject to the same sorts of mistreatment. **Vital City:** Talk to a hundred economists and 99 will tell you rent stabilization isn’t great economic policy. Talk to a hundred New York politicians and all of them will defend it. Is there any world in which it gets meaningfully scrutinized? **Dan Garodnick:** It’s here to stay. **Vital City:** Right now, vacancy is around 1.4%. But if we were suddenly at 10%, the system would still be defended, wouldn’t it? **Dan Garodnick:** We are far from being out of our emergency condition. It’s hard to imagine a circumstance in which anyone would advocate for rent stabilization to end. **Vital City:** We’ve published pieces by [Alex Armlovich](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor) and [Howard Slatkin](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-rent-is-too-damn-high-but-also-too-low) that both argue for a less blunt instrument than the Rent Guidelines Board’s single increase or freeze. There are many different types of rent-stabilized buildings and landlords. Is the current tool too simplistic? **Dan Garodnick:** If the city had the tools to do this with more nuance, it certainly would help, because right now everybody is treated exactly the same, and that may or may not be fair. I remember representing 30,000 rent-stabilized tenants in Stuyvesant Town. The owner of those buildings — whether it was MetLife or Tishman Speyer — was in a very different condition than a small landlord in Brooklyn or Queens who owned one or two buildings. They’re only the same insofar as the law that covers them happens to be the same. Everything else about their circumstances is quite different. ### New York’s Worst Housing Production Impediment? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-seqra-slows-housing-development-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:23.000Z A 123-unit senior housing building in NoHo. A new headquarters for a blood bank. A 79-unit affordable housing development in Sag Harbor. A neighborhood rezoning in Inwood. What do all these projects have in common? They were all delayed, and in some cases denied, after private individuals challenged their land-use approvals under New York State’s environmental review law, the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). In recent years, federal and state lawmakers across the country have realized that initially well-intentioned environmental review laws like SEQRA have instead slowed down and increased the cost of development. In her most recent budget, Gov. Kathy Hochul joined their ranks, proposing to exempt a handful of strategic priorities, like multifamily housing, childcare and resiliency projects, from SEQRA to accelerate their development. These reforms did not come out of nowhere: The history of SEQRA can shed light on why she is proposing this now and how the proposal might play out in Albany. ### From good intentions to bad results SEQRA requires state and local governments to identify and address the potential impacts of public actions like rezonings and infrastructure projects on the surrounding communities — and allows those communities to challenge those reviews in court if they believe them to be insufficient. In passing SEQRA in 1975, state lawmakers hoped that environmental review would make the government more accountable to New Yorkers. But a half century later, these reforms have instead slowed public decision-making by burying new development in paperwork and opening the door to legal challenges. Gov. Hugh L. Carey[ proposed the bill](https://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/18/archives/carey-seeks-to-strengthen-states-role-on-land-use.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that became SEQRA in April 1975, at a moment when public trust in New York government was at an all-time low. Robert Caro had just published “The Power Broker,” his biography of Robert Moses’ use and abuse of power to build housing and infrastructure throughout New York. The New York State[ Urban Development Corporation](https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/09/archives/the-monthlong-drama-at-the-udc-synopsis-of-a-near-tragedy.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was insolvent, causing Carey to appoint Richard Ravitch to stave off default on its $1 billion in outstanding debt. And New York City was in the middle of its fiscal crisis,[ teetering on the brink of bankruptcy](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/drop-dead-city-review) after banks cut off its access to the bond market. Like many other governors at that time, the newly-elected Carey responded to the perceived failures of big government by placing checks and balances on the state and local agencies that had nearly bankrupted New York. Returning power to communities, he hoped, would enable individuals to hold executive power to account. SEQRA was one of the most far-reaching of those reforms. The idea was appealing: If only Robert Moses had been required to pause, crunch numbers and hold public hearings, he might not have pursued projects like the Cross Bronx Expressway that polluted the environment and displaced thousands of New Yorkers. During the early 1970s, many states passed state-level equivalents of the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which Congress approved in 1969 after a series of environmental disasters including an oil spill off Santa Barbara, Calif. and a fire on Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River. But Carey’s proposal went further than other state’s local NEPAs. SEQRA would subject a broad range of actions to review; New York became one of just seven states, for example, that would require it for zoning and land use actions, in addition to the large-scale infrastructure projects subject to NEPA. Carey[ signed the bill into law in August](https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/07/archives/carey-signs-bills-on-environment-impact-statements-required.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), over the[ objections](https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/14/archives/builders-upset-by-prospect-of-new-environment-rule.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of a coalition that included the Real Estate Board of New York, building contractors, construction unions and New York City Mayor Abe Beame. They all warned that interest groups could weaponize SEQRA to obstruct development, as had already happened after the passage of NEPA. After NEPA went into effect in 1970, environmental advocates and community groups successfully blocked federal projects across the country, including a 1972 lawsuit to halt the construction of the Metropolitan Correction Center in lower Manhattan. Carey insisted those concerns were overstated — that SEQRA would only apply to “significant” projects and that any problems that arose could be fixed in the future. Those revisions never came, and the delays and cost concerns raised by SEQRA’s opponents became baked into New York’s planning processes. The genesis of Hochul’s determination to pass SEQRA reform responds directly to the warnings of those early critics. Environmental review adds years before a project even reaches the approval process Median duration of environmental review and pre-certification for NYC zoning changes, before entering the formal land-use review (ULURP) Full EIS Environmental Impact Statement 33 months Streamlined assessment No significant impacts found 23 months 012 mo24 mo36 mo These timelines are *before* the project enters ULURP — the formal approval process adds more time on top. --- Elizabeth Street Garden Affordable senior housing tied up in SEQRA litigation for nearly a decade Mayor withdrew from project Inwood rezoning 2018 rezoning won at lower court, overturned on appeal First project delayed 3 years 0 states with SEQRA-like review for zoning changes 0 SEQRA court challenges decided in 2024 0 challenges that actually prevailed **Even meritless lawsuits add cost and delay.** The threat of a challenge is enough to deter projects from ever being proposed. Source: Sean Campion, Vital City. Median durations based on NYC zoning changes 2014-2017. ### How it works Under SEQRA, state and local governments must conduct an environmental review for all “discretionary” actions: cases in which a public entity has a choice about whether to approve a proposal. Review is required, for example, for land use actions that require zoning changes or special permits, for the construction of new public facilities like schools, libraries and highways, and for many private projects that are awarded public subsidies. It is not needed for routine actions where governments must issue approvals based on a set of criteria, like the issuance of building permits for projects that meet zoning rules, or for maintenance and repair work. Before an agency can grant a discretionary approval, the applicant (a public agency in the case of public projects, or a private developer for many rezonings or permit applications) must extensively review the project’s potential effects on the surrounding community. After determining that the project is not explicitly exempted from review under law or regulation, the applicant first conducts a streamlined review known as an environmental assessment (EAS) to determine whether the project might have “significant adverse impacts” on the environment or surrounding community, such as traffic flow, construction noise, shadows, increases in the number of school-age children or water runoff. Most projects end the environmental review at this stage. The reviewing agency declares that the project will not have adverse impacts, occasionally after a public hearing, and the project can move to the agency’s decision-makers for a final thumbs-up or thumbs-down. In New York City, projects enter the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) after completing this step. A smaller number of projects, including many capital projects and neighborhood rezonings, however, are required to undergo deeper scrutiny through a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). An EIS requires its own extensive process. The agency or private applicant develops a scope of work, prepares for and holds a public hearing, then publishes a draft impact statement on up to 20 topics. This is followed by another public hearing and round of comments. The agency overseeing the review must declare that the review is complete before accepting a final EIS, which must include a statement of findings and any potential mitigations. Even for simple projects that end review after the streamlined EAS, this process translates into months, and often years, of legal, lobbying, communications and executive time. Projects requiring a full EIS produce impact statements whose length can better be measured in linear feet than in page numbers. The threat of a SEQRA challenge is enough to deter projects from ever being proposed; a chilling effect that never shows up in court statistics. Some applicants shrink projects to avoid triggering a full EIS; others expand scope proactively to head off complaints. ### Review as roadblock This complex process alone does not explain how environmental review came to become an obstacle to discretionary projects. On paper, SEQRA is merely an information-gathering requirement. Yet in the real world, its implementation has created a time consuming and bureaucratic exercise in risk management. Three developments led to this point: 1\. **Environmental review is enforced through the court by individuals**: Like many reforms of the 1970s, environmental review empowers individuals to challenge administrative actions by suing public agencies, a concept known as a private right of action. The intent was that public accountability would keep agencies on the straight-and-narrow. Unsurprisingly, it wasn’t long before project opponents leveraged SEQRA’s private right of action to obstruct projects they disapproved of, as had already happened under NEPA with the lower Manhattan jail. Over the past 50 years, private individuals and groups have challenged nearly every action that public agencies take in the environmental review process. As a result, agencies and applicants have potential lawsuits in mind at every step. 2\. **Early SEQRA litigation made a “hard look” the law of the land:** A series of early court rulings increased the level of scrutiny required beyond Carey’s original intent. The most significant of these cases was[ a 1979 decision](https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=pelr&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Page%204,of%20whether%20the%20agency's%20decision) that temporarily blocked the construction of Syracuse University’s JWA Wireless Dome stadium. Neighbors sued to block the project, arguing that the State authority overseeing the project had failed to thoroughly analyze the stadium’s traffic impacts before approving it. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, halting the stadium project, and finding that agencies must take a “hard look” at all potential impacts before acting. Over time, subsequent cases applied this “hard look” test to every step in the review process, increasing the time needed to complete reviews. 3\. **How many technical analyses?!** SEQRA originally focused on a limited number of environmental impacts, but over time, the number grew. One City government veteran described the additions as driven by planners and advocates, like myself, who insist on data-driven and accountable governance. But the desire to improve analysis has increased review times and opened new opportunities for potential lawsuits. New York City, for example, now requires [20 technical analyses](https://www.nyc.gov/site/oec/environmental-quality-review/technical-manual.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), ranging from intensive analyses of impacts on infrastructure, traffic, and air quality to non-environmental concerns like neighborhood character, socioeconomic changes and historic resources. Mistakes in any one of those analyses can trip up a project, and scope changes can require starting the analysis over again. The ongoing redevelopment of Willets Point, for example, required [two supplemental EISs](https://a002-ceqraccess.nyc.gov/Handlers/ProjectFile.ashx?file=MjAyM1wyM0RNRTAwNlFcZmluZGluZ3NcMjNETUUwMDZRX1N0YXRlbWVudF9PZl9GaW5kaW5nc18wMjE5MjAyNS5wZGY1&signature=5748b7c8f368be0abfd2c9b1d94da747f4c9929c&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=A%20supplemental%20Final%20Environmental%20Impact,February%202024%20%28CEQR%2023DME005Q%29): one in 2013 to modify the original 2008 EIS, and a second revision in 2024 after the scope changed again. ### What it all adds up to The good news is that relatively few projects get sued under SEQRA, and most lawsuits challenging environmental review fail. In 2024, for example, State courts decided[ 43 SEQRA challenges](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5684&context=faculty%5Fscholarship&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), of which only five prevailed. But the mere threat of legal challenges increases the time, cost and uncertainty for projects that already undergo extensive environmental review. My analysis of[ New York City zoning changes](https://cbcny.org/research/improving-new-york-citys-land-use-decision-making-process?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from 2014 and 2017 found that environmental review, even for projects that have no impacts, takes a long time. Projects taking advantage of streamlined environmental assessments took a median of 23 months to complete environmental review and pre-certification before entering the City’s Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), compared to 33 months for those undergoing a full EIS. Simply dragging out the approval process can be enough to stop a project. Applicants can run out of money or lose financing. They can be required to redo analyses after a certain period of time. Markets and political winds can shift. Opponents of a proposal to build affordable senior housing at the[ Elizabeth Street Garden](https://www.curbed.com/article/eric-adams-save-elizabeth-street-garden-flops.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, tied up the project in litigation for nearly a decade before convincing Mayor Eric Adams to withdraw from the project in his final months in office. A lawsuit challenging the 2018 Inwood rezoning, which permitted 1,800 new affordable housing units, won at a lower court before getting overturned on appeal, ultimately delaying the[ first project](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2021/06/17/inwood-affordable-housing-project-moves-forward-after-rezoning/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with 174 affordable units and a new public library, from securing approvals for three years. More rarely, a lawsuit can kill a project altogether. In 2022, wealthy Sag Harbor residents[ used SEQRA to block](https://www.eastendbeacon.com/sag-harbor-affordable-housing-code-struck-down/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a 79-unit affordable housing complex in a town where the average home is[ worth $2.2 million](https://www.zillow.com/home-values/47499/sag-harbor-ny/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Interested parties can also leverage the threat of a lawsuit to extract benefits. Recently a labor group[ challenged the EIS](https://www.syracuse.com/micron/2026/01/last-minute-lawsuit-aims-to-block-micron-chip-fabs-on-environmental-grounds.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for Micron’s new semiconductor factory in Clay, NY to secure labor commitments. And even for the majority of projects that do not get sued, environmental review requirements can affect what gets proposed or built. Some applicants shrink projects to get below thresholds known to trigger a more extensive EIS. Others, especially in the public sector, proactively expand the scope of capital projects to anticipate complaints from potential detractors. Leah Brooks’ and Zachary Liscow’s[ analysis of federal transportation projects](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20200398&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, found that highway construction costs tripled following the passage of NEPA. ### The shape of reform Despite its economic success, New York faces an immense housing shortage, threats from climate change and aging infrastructure that is increasingly falling into disrepair. Addressing these challenges will require public actions that are subject to SEQRA, such as increasing housing capacity via rezonings, expanding renewable energy and upgrading storm sewers to mitigate climate risk. New York’s land-use and permitting framework was adopted in the 1970s, in the wake of urban renewal and environmental disasters. It prioritized environmental protection, community input and transparency into public decision-making. By design, it slowed down and increased the cost of projects, and sometimes dissuaded them from happening at all. But in the process of addressing those concerns, environmental review often wound up preserving the status quo at the expense of progress. Reforming environmental review does not mean abandoning state and local oversight. The development that Governor Hochul would exempt from SEQRA would still be subject to zoning and building codes. Approval processes like ULURP would remain in place. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation will enforce the state’s many environmental protections, most of which passed after SEQRA went into effect. The changes simply rebalance public decision-making processes so that New York can address its mounting needs at a pace befitting the scale of its challenges. ### Can Mayor Mamdani Freeze the Rent? It’s Complicated URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-rent-freeze-nyc-rent-guidelines-board-explained/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:23.000Z Zohran Mamdani, the newly elected mayor who promised as a candidate to freeze the rent for rent-stabilized units each year in his four-year term, will soon seek to make good on his promise. He can’t do it alone. He needs the cooperation of the NYC Rent Guidelines Board, an appointed body on which both of us have served as chair in recent years. The RGB was created pursuant to state law to set rent adjustments for apartments in the city that are subject to the Rent Stabilization Law. About one million of New York City’s over three-and-a-half million units of housing are rent-stabilized. The incoming Board — on [which Mamdani has made a majority of appointments](https://gothamist.com/news/mamdani-names-new-rent-guidelines-board-majority-testing-rent-freeze-pledge?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — will begin its work [this month](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/2026-meetings/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At the top of its agenda will almost surely be considering whether to keep the rents of rent-stabilized housing at current levels. As it does its work, the Board can best serve the city if all members are committed to carefully reviewing data collected and analyzed by RGB staff and other information brought to the board by experts and the public before reaching its decision. Put differently, the RGB should not simply execute the mayor’s command. There are laws to follow and economic data to consider. The stakes are high for tenants facing increased housing burdens, for landlords facing increasing costs and for the fabric of our diverse city. ### The Rent Guidelines Board’s mandate The City's rent stabilization system differs from rent regulation in other jurisdictions. While some jurisdictions allow landlords to increase rent when an apartment turns over to a new tenant, the Housing Stability & Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) eliminated vacancy rent hikes. Rent adjustments in New York are also set by a Board instead of being based on a formula that is tied to the inflation rate. The Board can therefore set rent increase rates higher or lower than inflation, based on the statutory criteria it applies. The media rarely explains the RGB’s decision-making process clearly and sometimes echoes misunderstandings about how the Board works. Perhaps the biggest misunderstanding is that mayors decide whether and how much rents go up. But that is not how rent stabilization was designed to work. Even though one of us chaired the Board during the mayoralty of Bill de Blasio, who used the bully pulpit to advocate for a rent freeze, we know well it is the members of the Board who have the sole power to make this decision. Each of us had to work to get a majority of the Board to support what became the adopted guidelines each year. Board members take their roles seriously and typically engage in lengthy discussions about the data before deciding which proposals to support. Rather than seeing a rent freeze as a simple test of mayoral power, the public is best served by understanding the limited but important function of the Board and the constraints on its decisions. Let’s step back a bit. The [Rent Stabilization Law (RSL)](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCadmin/0-0-0-201924?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) charges the Board with one central task: adjusting rents of rent-stabilized units after reviewing “the economic condition of the residential real estate industry,” cost of living data and a catch-all, “such other data as may be made available to it.”Thus, there is no single, simple formula for the Board to apply. To get into the weeds, the law requires that the Board review data regarding the operating and financing costs landlords are bearing, including (1) real estate taxes and sewer and water rates; (2) gross operating maintenance costs (such as insurance premiums, governmental fees and the cost of fuel and labor, among other things) and (3) costs and availability of mortgage financing. The Board is also charged with considering the supply of housing as well as vacancy rates. While tenants’ rent burden — the portion of their income they spend on rent — is not explicitly mentioned in the RSL, the Board has interpreted its mandate for decades to include an assessment of housing affordability. While the mayor appoints all members of the Rent Guidelines Board (or a predecessor mayor, for holdovers), it is an independent body that is required by law to make its own determination about rent adjustments. The Board is composed of the chair, who serves at the pleasure of the mayor; two members who represent tenant interests; two members who represent landlord interests and four members who represent the general public. Other than the chair, members serve terms of two, three or four years. Tenant members typically focus on affordability for today’s tenants. Landlord members often focus on the finances of rent-stabilized buildings, such as whether they are earning enough to cover maintenance and capital repairs as well as a profit for their owners. Those are appropriate agendas for those two sets of members. Chairs consider all of this, but also usually focus on the long-term, asking whether proposed rent adjustments will ensure that the rent-stabilized housing stock has sufficient revenue to be maintained for its residents for years to come. Landlords have repeatedly challenged the Board’s annual rent guidelines, but courts have generally deferred to the Board’s expertise and upheld its balancing of the competing concerns of increasing costs for landlords and diminishing affordability for tenants. How the Rent Guidelines Board works The nine-member board sets annual rent adjustments for NYC’s roughly one million rent-stabilized apartments. Chair Tenant Tenant Owner Owner Public Public Public Public Chair Tenant (2) Owner (2) Public (4) All members are appointed by the mayor. The chair and public members often are the deciding votes. ▼ Price Index Tracks building expenses Income Study Measures rent burden Supply Report Vacancy & stock condition ▼ 0%–5.25% typical increase Guidelines aren’t the only increases. Landlords can receive additional increases for MCIs and IAIs on top of the annual vote. Source: NYC Rent Guidelines Board · Vital City ### The state of the housing stock The Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, passed by the state Legislature and signed into law by then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo in 2019, dramatically altered the finances of the rent-stabilized housing stock. Proponents of the law wanted to limit ways that landlords could raise rents and, in particular, curb incentives to exit the program through high-rent/high-income deregulation. They succeeded in doing that, but rents flattened and buildings dropped in value as a result. Many buildings in the program are now showing financial distress as expenses have continued to increase each year. A recent [Furman Center report](https://furmancenter.org/nyc-rent-stab-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that there is reason to worry that the current regulatory environment has set up a dynamic where around two-thirds of the rent-regulated housing stock is on a trajectory of financial distress — potentially including mortgage default and bankruptcy — that will result in deteriorating quality in housing for tenants. This would mean more heat and hot water outages, more pest infestations and more lead paint hazards, among other health and safety concerns. That picture of the current stock brings us back to how the Board makes its decisions. As we noted, many people think that the mayor simply tells the Board how to vote. That has not been our experience. Nor has it been our sense of the experience of other chairs we have spoken with. It is true that mayors often appoint members who are broadly sympathetic to either tenants or owners. Now, even with some members whose terms straddle previous administrations, Mayor Mamdani has tapped a majority of the incoming Board. The mayor does not — and should not — “control” them. With a process designed to provide broad technical and public input, chairs and other Board members formulate proposed rent guidelines that reflect the data that the RGB’s research staff provides them. The Board staff and members take their work seriously. They must consider the data before them, and the Rent Stabilization Law requires the Board to make challenging calls to balance increasing costs for building owners with affordability concerns for tenants. If the record does not support a finding that the Board’s decision was based upon their statutory mandate, it is open to challenge. [Some have asked](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-york-needs-a-smarter-way-to-control-rents) [why a rent increase or freeze](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor) needs to be boiled down to a single number when so many buildings and building owners face different pressures and conditions. It’s a fair question, but right now, the law doesn’t allow for fine-grained distinctions. Each year’s rent guidelines are a blunt instrument that applies to every building with rent-stabilized units. This means that the same figure applies to a building in the Bronx composed entirely of 99 rent-stabilized units and to the one remaining rent-stabilized unit in a 99-unit luxury building in midtown Manhattan where the owner has no limitation on how much it can charge for those ”market rate” units. The Mamdani administration will need to grapple with this blunt instrument, just as every previous administration has had to. Ultimately, the Board must pay close attention to the data to determine how rents should be adjusted — understanding that a freeze will likely harm buildings in deep financial distress even as it would aim to help tenants in buildings whose landlords are doing just fine. ### The Board does not act alone Whatever the Board decides, many stabilized buildings will continue to face financial distress. But the fate of the rent-stabilized housing stock does not solely rest with the Board. The governor, the Legislature, the mayor and the City Council can all act to ensure that the rent-stabilized housing stock has sufficient funding for maintenance and needed capital repairs. While the City and State have many tools at their disposal to address financial gaps, the three main avenues for helping distressed buildings are bigger rent increases, new subsidies or reduced costs for buildings in financial distress. After the passage of the 2019 HSTPA, rent increases for rent-stabilized units can only be authorized by the Board (or, subject to stricter limits under the HSTPA and subsequent amendments, through temporary Major Capital Improvement (MCI) increases and permanent Individual Apartment Improvement (IAI) increases). And because previous amendments to the RSL have limited the Board’s discretion to target certain subsets of the housing stock, rent increases cannot be targeted to the buildings that need them most (not to mention the fact that tenants in the most distressed buildings tend to have lower incomes and are less likely to be able to afford those targeted increases). RGB rent increases will not be enough on their own to resolve the financial distress of many of these buildings. Direct subsidies to preserve this stock will be very expensive, easily measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and soon into the billions of dollars each year — at a time when the City is already struggling to close significant budget gaps. Nonetheless, the City and state may need to subsidize a large portion of rent-stabilized housing to keep it from failing, and that will redirect resources from other priorities. Broader changes to the regulatory and property tax regime that govern revenues and expenses for this housing stock might help, but none of those changes will be easy, and indirect subsidies come with measurable costs as well, even if they are not showing up in State and City budgets. It will be difficult otherwise to reduce costs, such as insurance and interest on mortgages, as these are set by third parties over whom government actors have relatively little control. There are no easy answers to this growing problem. But as the politics heat up, it is important that the public understand the basic nature, power and obligations of the Rent Guidelines Board. All New Yorkers should be concerned about the long-term viability of the rent-regulated housing stock, and we are all on notice that it is at risk. This part of the housing stock is a precious resource for a city rightly committed to socio-economic diversity, and we should all look for a path forward to preserve it. We assume that the mayor will work hard to make good on his promise to freeze the rent. If he doesn’t, many of those who voted for him will see it as a betrayal. If the Board, following its mandate, agrees, preserving the stabilized stock will require partnering with the governor, the Legislature and the City Council to address the impending financial crisis facing a large swath of this vital source of housing. ### Landlords: The ‘Good,’ the ‘Bad’ and the Ugly Financial Realities URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/rental-ripoff-hearings-landlords-tenants-economics/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:23.000Z The Mamdani administration has been promoting its series of [“Rental Ripoff Hearings,”](https://www.nyc.gov/main/rental-ripoff?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with publicity posters reminiscent of a prizefight, pitting New Yorkers against Bad Landlords. The hearings themselves have felt more like a resource fair. While this may have disappointed audiences hungry for the spectacle of a fight, the distance between the advertising and the product was apt: It’s not knockout punches but *resources* that are needed to make housing work better for millions of New Yorkers. The landlord-tenant relationship is far from a simple battle between good guys and bad guys. In a properly functioning housing system, it can be a mutually beneficial compact, with built-in incentives for landlords to maintain buildings in good condition and provide resident services, and for tenants to pay their rent and be good neighbors. But in a city where housing is scarce and [both rents and the costs of operating buildings are so high](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-rent-is-too-damn-high-but-also-too-low), the relationship breaks down, becomes heavily regulated and often breaks down further. Housing is not a morality play; it’s an economically complex system. There are some bad actors who actively aim to break the rules for personal gain. But there are far more property owners and managers who are committed to maintaining housing in good condition for their tenants, and many of them are not succeeding. If we misunderstand distressed housing only as a product of landlord neglect or malice, we won’t succeed in solving the problems tenants face, and are likely to make them worse. In other words, rather than looking at landlords and tenants as prizefighting opponents facing off in the ring, it may be more helpful to understand them as competitors in an increasingly punishing [Hunger Games](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1392170/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a competition in which the players aren’t truly antagonists but are forced into escalating conflict by dysfunctional financial and regulatory conditions. ### The will and the means to be a good landlord To start, we should step back and review what a landlord needs to do. “Landlording” involves not just ownership and financial support of the building but also property management, a critical but often overlooked role in our housing system that encompasses staffing and operation of buildings, minor and major repairs, rent collection, administrative filings and numerous other functions. Property management may be performed by the owner or under contract with them. In any event, the owner as landlord is ultimately responsible for the quality of property management. There’s a common assumption that disrepair in a building — as evidenced by the issuance of housing code violations — is de facto evidence that there’s a bad landlord. The reality is often more complicated. While there are indeed neglectful landlords who purposefully underfund property management and allow their buildings to fall into disrepair, there are also high-capacity nonprofit and for-profit organizations that take on distressed housing with many violations in order to restore it to sound condition. We shouldn’t look at housing code violations as reliable evidence of scofflaw behavior the same way we might see, say, a long string of red-light camera tickets. Building violations are less like a summons and more akin to a doctor’s visit where the patient shows a fever — an indication that a building is in poor health, but not evidence of why. Violations may be caused by a chronic condition like neglect, past disinvestment or advancing building age. They may be from an acute condition, like a fire in an apartment. The landlord might be at fault — say, because a prolonged disruption to building heat led a tenant to use a faulty space heater — or might not, as in a case where a tenant in psychological distress has set off the sprinkler system, causing water damage to multiple apartments. The conditions under which tenants live are partly a reflection on their landlord, but also a product of each building’s financial realities. In some neighborhoods and buildings, prevailing rents are high while in others they are lower, and in roughly half the city’s rental housing rent stabilization laws limit the rate at which rents may increase — more tightly since 2019 legislative changes. The basic costs of operating a building vary less: Lower rents don’t mean there’s less of a need to take out the trash or fix the boiler. For an increasing share of buildings, revenues aren’t covering operating expenses or the cost of capital upgrades. Under these conditions, even the best landlords can’t actually be good landlords. To understand how financial circumstances affect buildings owned by various types of landlords, it’s useful to draw a simple diagram in which the horizontal axis represents the motivations of the landlord, and the vertical axis the revenues of their building. These aren’t absolutes; the point is that it’s a spectrum in both directions. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/image1-1776259647240.png) On the right-hand side of this chart fall landlords who specifically aim to meet tenants’ needs, support their stability and uphold their rights. Among these are the city’s many operators of affordable housing, including both nonprofit and mission-driven for-profit organizations. At the left are those landlords whose motivation broadly derives from financial self-interest. Every landlord has a blend of motivations. For instance, there are many for-profit owners with a strong social mission, and nonprofits also need revenue to sustain their operations and advance their mission. At the top of the chart, we have buildings where revenues are more than sufficient to maintain buildings in good condition. At the bottom, we have buildings with low rent rolls that are inadequate to cover the cost of operating the building properly, let alone making the capital investments needed in any building over the long run. We can use this diagram to help understand how different types of landlords respond to financial circumstances, and what types of public policies can be used to address these situations. Let’s start with the upper portion of the diagram, where buildings generate sufficient revenue to do right by tenants. This is the way things are supposed to work. For instance, a socially-oriented landlord, on the upper right, has the resources to pursue their mission, maintaining buildings in clean and sound condition, employing attentive and respectful staff, providing prompt repairs and responses to complaints, remaining accessible for tenants’ questions, offering clear communication and feedback, and staying on top of myriad compliance requirements. This condition requires regulated affordable housing to be adequately funded, whether by subsidies that reduce the debt service on the building or by rental vouchers or other subsidies that bolster revenues. In the upper-left portion of our chart, we’ll find profit-driven landlords who maintain their buildings well. In a properly functioning housing system, there is an alignment between the financial interests of the owner and the interest of a tenant in living in a well-maintained building. If tenants can leave for comparably priced, better-maintained housing when landlords do a bad job, landlords will keep buildings in good condition to achieve lower vacancy rates and a more valuable asset. Under these conditions, there is little need for code enforcement to ensure housing quality. In a housing market suffering from a deep supply shortage, however, the rents tenants need to pay for quality housing rise can rise sharply. Rent stabilization was established to enable tenants to renew their leases without precipitous increases. Under rent regulation, though, the tools available to both landlord and tenant become duller. Because landlords don’t receive a financial benefit from further investment in their buildings, they have a disincentive to provide more than a bare minimum level of service. With few comparably priced alternatives available to them, tenants can’t act on their discontent by moving out. This makes even financially viable rent-regulated housing far more reliant on a system of enforcement. It also encourages buildings to slip down toward the equator of our chart, or below. Let’s move our way down to the lower-right quadrant, where we will find the well-intentioned, socially committed landlord whose rent roll doesn’t pay the cost of maintaining buildings and properly serving tenants. There are an increasing number of mission-driven affordable housing operators, nonprofit and for-profit, in this situation. Notably, the New York City Housing Authority can also be placed here: despite dedicated leadership and supportive State and local policy, the federal government’s systematic underfunding of public housing makes it impossible for NYCHA to be a good landlord. What can a landlord do in these circumstances? In years past, private owners may have been able to raise capital for improvements by refinancing their buildings at lower interest rates, but the rates that made this possible are no longer commercially available, and their return is not imminent. Raising rents to make their balance sheets work isn’t an option in rent-stabilized or subsidized affordable housing. This leaves the alternatives of cutting services to the bone — something a well-intentioned landlord really doesn’t want to do — or asking for government assistance. Finally, let’s look at the lower left of our chart, which is where we would find a textbook slumlord. Without a prospect of running a profitable building, this landlord’s angle is to squeeze as much cash flow out of the building as possible while spending as little as possible. This is terrible for the people who live there, and it’s terrible for the housing supply. Even if it’s possible to get the building into the hands of a well-intentioned landlord for rehabilitation that keeps it affordable, this requires significant government funding. With public resources limited, this may work for a relative handful of buildings, but not for large numbers of them. When well-intentioned landlords cannot see a reasonable prospect of operating a building successfully, they will be sellers and not buyers of buildings. Bad landlords become the only buyers, and the worst outcomes multiply. ### Policy implications The goal of housing policy should not be to herd landlords along the horizontal axis of our chart, but to take constructive steps to increase the share of buildings in the upper half of the chart, and to minimize the number in the lower half. Where landlords are operating housing well, public policy should aim to sustain this. One way is to help manage operating costs. Administrative requirements, legal expenses insurance, utilities or other operating cost hikes all increase the price of delivering sound housing, making some share of well-performing buildings into poorly performing buildings. The City should pursue ways to alleviate burdens for landlords who do their jobs well, such as making low-cost insurance available. Housing policy should utilize the alignment between the interests of owners and tenants to keep buildings above the equator of our chart. For instance, both landlords and tenants benefit from the smooth renewal of housing vouchers, keeping missed rent payments from snowballing into massive arrears. Rather than sending these cases to drawn-out housing court proceedings, the City should embrace [proposals for diversion programs](https://thenyhc.org/2026/02/25/nyhc-report-nycs-affordable-housing-eviction-crisis-and-recommendations-to-fix-it/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that bring together landlords, tenants, case workers and public assistance agencies to work out timely solutions that prevent evictions and sustain building revenues. Regulations for affordable housing should be flexible enough to support long-term affordability within today’s financial realities. For instance, subsidized affordable housing is subject to a regulatory agreement with a housing agency that requires them to serve residents at a specified income level. Changes to rent laws in 2019 have in some instances imposed tighter caps on rents, leading to a revenue shortfall in affordable buildings. It’s possible to remedy this: when an affordable unit becomes vacant, it should be possible to reset rents based on the original regulatory agreement. This would help bolster the finances of affordable housing without raising rents on any tenant or removing any unit from regulation. A sustained policy of adding more housing will help bolster the market power of tenants to vote with their feet. But this will remain less true for residents of lower-priced rent-regulated housing. For these apartments, code enforcement should aim to improve the performance of landlords whose buildings have revenue sufficient to support proper maintenance when they are unresponsive to tenant complaints. The issuance of violations is less likely to produce satisfactory results for buildings in the lower-left quadrant of the chart, however. Violations of course do not create new revenues to cover the cost of repairs and upgrades, and financial penalties can actually diminish the ability to pay for these improvements. The City can and should intervene to address serious and urgent housing maintenance problems, and HPD’s enforcement system includes undertaking emergency repairs, which ameliorate conditions temporarily. Other programs, including Article 7A and Third-Party Transfer (defunct, but proposed to be [revived in modified form](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7872930&GUID=DCC5EF0A-7863-47F2-A95A-B28A03D414E0&Options=&Search=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), have been created to transfer property management or ownership to a more responsible party. This can move them toward the right side of our diagram, but without the infusion of additional funding, these buildings will typically remain in or fall back into poor repair. This brings us to the elephant in the room: New York City has a large and growing population of buildings in the lower-right corner of the chart. For these buildings, tenants and owners aren’t Rocky Balboa and [Ivan Drago](https://youtu.be/966xtpEwYEo?si=mfae%5FsMpXvPklQ6l&t=65&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They’re more like [Katniss Everdeen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katniss%5FEverdeen?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and her competitors, pitted against one another by a system that sets both up to fail. ### Counting the lifeboats First, the good news: The City has extensive experience in designing programs to recapitalize aging affordable housing. For instance, the Permanent Affordability Commitment Together (PACT) program provides funding to recapitalize public housing as well as a [resident partnership model](https://chpcny.org/initiative/public-housing-revolution/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to help center the priorities of tenants for capital improvements and new property management. A comparison of violations data for PACT buildings and other housing, conducted by Citizens Housing and Planning Council, which I lead, suggests that the program’s capital investments are [dramatically improving building conditions](https://chpcny.org/publication/web-brief-what-the-data-says-about-housing-violations-and-pact/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Gov. Kathy Hochul has proposed reviving and enhancing the J-51 tax incentive program to support the rehabilitation of regulated housing. But the sheer scale of the financial needs is sobering. Many buildings that were developed under programs dedicated to social goals of long-term affordability and tenant stability have been systematically underfunded over time, reducing them to what I’ve called “[antisocial housing](https://citylimits.org/opinion-nycs-antisocial-housing-problem/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” that fails to provide tenants with decent homes. NYCHA’s capital needs alone are estimated at roughly $80 billion. Estimates for other regulated housing vary, but Enterprise Community Partners and the National Equity Fund [recently found that](https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/Distress-in-NY-Affordable-Housing-Stock.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) nearly 60% of their New York housing portfolio was experiencing negative cash flow, indicating a large and growing problem. There are nearly 180,000 units of NYCHA housing, nearly 47,000 units of Mitchell-Lama housing under City jurisdiction, and nearly 200,000 units in subsidized, income-restricted housing. The City has both a financial interest and a moral obligation toward these buildings and their residents. If we can’t bring mission-driven affordable housing operators and tenants into a more harmonious relationship, there’s little reason to think it’s achievable for other categories of low-cost housing. There is also an enormous problem to solve in the non-subsidized housing stock. While rent-stabilized buildings that also contain a significant share of non-stabilized units have generally performed well, RGB data shows [pervasive financial trouble](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-rent-is-too-damn-high-but-also-too-low) in buildings containing primarily rent-stabilized housing. NYU’s Furman Center [estimates](https://furmancenter.org/overview-brief-rent-stabilized?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that there are more than 450,000 rent-stabilized units in this at-risk category. Some observers have imagined a future in which the City takes ownership of this housing to restore it and keep rents low. Even if we set aside [the experience of *in rem* housing in the 1970s and 1980s](https://www.furmancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/04/AHistoryofHousingPolicycombined0601%5F000.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — when the City was unable to manage distressed housing and placed it back in nonprofit and private ownership to be rehabilitated and maintained — a major commitment of public resources would perversely prioritize this housing ahead of distressed income-restricted housing the City itself has financed. The City needs to explore solutions for non-subsidized housing that do not drain the resources needed to keep subsidized affordable housing afloat. In an environment where more of the city’s low-cost housing is sinking into the red, we run a very real risk of running out of lifeboats for it. We must reverse the widening gap between expenses and revenues. If we don’t, we can expect even harder choices about public priorities, housing conditions that continue to deteriorate and a further fraying of trust between tenants and landlords — with neither one emerging from this fight a winner. ### Stanley Richards on the Past, Present and Future of Rikers Island URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/stanley-richards-rikers-island-nyc-jails/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:23.000Z *The new New York City correction commissioner, Stanley Richards, steps into his role with a perspective few in the history of the department have possessed: He has seen the system from both sides of the bars. Having cycled through Rikers Island in the mid-1980s before finding a path to leadership through advocacy and service, Richards brings that understanding of the jails’ environment to the top job — at a time when they are about to be largely taken over by a federal receiver.* *In this conversation with Vital City founder Elizabeth Glazer, Richards reflects on how his personal journey informs his approach to one of the city’s most entrenched challenges. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.* --- **Elizabeth Glazer:** Commissioner, thanks so much for sitting down with me and congratulations on your position. You literally know the jail system inside out. I’m wondering if you’d describe how you first came into the system, what Rikers was like then, and how that has perhaps shaped your vision for the system going forward. **Stanley Richards:** Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you and the readers of Vital City. My journey started years ago in Soundview Houses in the South Bronx, where I got involved early on in gang activities that escalated to drug use and drug sales. I found myself cycling in and out of jail. For a long part of my life, I believed that was the reality of my experience, and I learned to live in that system. I learned to survive on the streets and on Rikers. When I was here, there were many more people — about 18,000 to 20,000\. \[*Editors’ note:* In the early 1990s, the jail complexes on Rikers Island held more than 20,000 individuals. Jail population fell to 3,800 in 2020\. Today, the population hovers around 6,800.\] The way you operated was to basically forget about everything in the community once you went over that bridge \[which separates Rikers Island from the rest of the city\] and focus on surviving in here. Survival was about movement and access to food and the right jobs. My last incarceration happened in 1986, and I stayed here until 1988 fighting my case. Even though the jails were chaotic, we had steady officers. There was free movement. If you had a visit or a meal, they weren’t feeding you in the housing area; you went to the mess hall. If you needed the clinic, commissary or medical, they would call your housing area and you would get a pass. It was a way of managing the facility because everyone knew that if you got an infraction, you would lose that free movement. It was a way of saying, “We’re trusting you, and if you violate that trust, we’re going to take that from you.” When I went upstate, I worked in pre-release and realized I didn’t have to live that life. I wanted to give back so others would know they didn’t have to live it either. When I was released, I went to The Fortune Society. While other organizations talked about reentry, Fortune was the organization that really walked the talk. That started my journey of trying to provide people with hope that life could be different. **Elizabeth Glazer:** That philosophy seems to be what you’re taking into your current job. Over many decades, violence has been the problem. We’re now way above the levels of violence that the court found unconstitutional in 2015\. Why is this such a hard problem, and what is your approach? **Stanley Richards:** When I look at how Rikers has operated over decades, I think we have a situation where hurt people hurt people. We have created a system structured in a way that increases isolation, devalues the people who work here and the people in our care, and diminishes hope. When you factor in violence and trauma, everyone ends up in a situation of “survival of the fittest.” I’ve worked with an organizational psychologist who says the health or pathology of those in authority will be manifested in those with lesser authority. Our correction officers feel devalued, isolated, unseen and unheard. As a city, we have asked them to care for people who also feel that way. It is hard for members of service to extend care and comfort when they don’t feel it themselves. Part of my work is the belief that a rising tide lifts all boats. I’ve told the unions and the members of service: I see you, I hear you and I value you. At the same time, we need to let the people in our care know they are valued. We are not the judge and jury. Our job is to care for you while you get your case adjudicated. This isn’t a speedboat moment where I turn the ship around 180 degrees instantly. This is a cruise ship or battleship moment where it’s going to take critical inch progress to turn around decades of neglect and harm. **Elizabeth Glazer:** How do you see the role of the union in improving conditions? How do you get on the same side of the table? **Stanley Richards:** The union is not my enemy; I need them in partnership. My goal of making sure we have safe jails is the same goal the union wants. I don’t want members doing 16-hour double tours. We may not all agree on strategy, but if we agree on our North Star, we can have conversations. Historically, they have been brought to the table only when implementation is happening. My strategy is bringing them to the table in the early stages. We are looking at how we allocate officers. I want steady posts and a process that is fair and transparent. For example, during the recent major snowstorm, we experienced significant staff shortages. We came up with a strategy to provide incentives for officers to come in. Before rolling it out, I called the union heads at 8:00 PM to get their feedback. They were so appreciative that they sent out alerts on all their social media and chat rooms to support officers coming in. **Elizabeth Glazer:** One flashpoint with the union has been over solitary confinement. What is the approach for someone who has repeatedly hurt others in custody? **Stanley Richards:** We have to hold people accountable using the tools available, including prosecution through the District Attorney’s office. We also remove the person from the situation, but it is then our obligation to engage them to reduce the likelihood of them infracting again. Perpetual isolation does not reduce violence. If it did, it would have worked by now. We are reaching out to experts around the country, including San Francisco, Connecticut, looking at models like Little Scandinavia in the Pennsylvania prison system and at the European system, anything that significantly reduces violence. **Elizabeth Glazer:** The jails are affected by many parties not under your control — DAs, defenders, judges. What role will you play in reducing lengths of stay? **Stanley Richards:** We are looking at what levers we have to focus on population reduction. This includes working with the Office of Court Administration and DAs to move long-stay cases forward. I am also going to be using 6A \[*Editors’ note*: This refers to [a section of state law](https://law.justia.com/codes/new-york/cor/article-6-a/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=2025%20New%20York%20Laws%20COR%20%2D%20Correction,Program%20in%20New%20York%20City%20Correctional%20Institutions&text=Disclaimer:%20These%20codes%20may%20not%20be%20the%20most) that gives the correction commissioner the authority to “extend” a sentenced individual’s confinement to outside of jail when that person is enrolled in a work program or other program designated by the statute\] to make sure people who can be safely managed in the community get access to services so they don’t come back. Right now, we have about 520 people in the city-sentence pool. We also have over 200 people who are state-ready \[meaning: awaiting transfer to state prison to start serving their term\]. Those folks should not be in our system. During COVID, [the population dropped from 5,000 to 3,800 in six weeks](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-state-of-new-york-citys-jails-year-end-2024/) because everyone — judges, DAs, corrections and City Hall — pulled in the same direction. We can use that experience as a live demonstration that we can bring down the population safely without a crisis. **Elizabeth Glazer:** The federal courts have appointed a remediation manager with very broad powers. How do you anticipate working together? **Stanley Richards:** Nick \[Deml\] and I have met a couple of times. Our role is to be in partnership to achieve safety and compliance with the Nunez contempt orders. He is going to be out here on Rikers Island with me. This isn’t about territory, ego or positional authority; it is about getting to safety. My vision and model right now is people first. If we put the people who work in this department and the people in our care first, we can create the conditions that reduce violence. My approach is to nail one corner of the blanket down at a time. The tendency is to try to nail them all down, but to do it in a way that is manageable, digestible and achievable, you nail one corner at a time. **Elizabeth Glazer:** From your lips to God’s ears. Thank you, Stanley. ### What Molly Park Knows About Homelessness and City Government URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/molly-park-dss-exit-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:23.000Z --- *Molly Park spent 22 years in New York City government and almost nobody outside the policy world knows her name. That's partly the nature of the job: as commissioner of the Department of Social Services, she oversaw a $16 billion budget, 14,000 employees, and services touching 3 million New Yorkers a year — from SNAP benefits and Medicaid to the country's second-largest rental assistance program. Her last day was Feb. 27\. In this episode of "After Hours with Jamie Rubin," recorded less than a week after her departure from that role, Park gives what amounts to an exit interview — covering how she walked into an agency that was tens of thousands of cases behind on processing and what she did about it. Park discusses she believes homelessness is fundamentally a housing problem that gets treated as a social services one, and what the right to shelter actually means in a city with 2 million rent-burdened households and a 1.4% vacancy rate.* *The conversation is also a window into what the new Mamdani administration inherits. Park doesn't mince words about the federal threats bearing down on the social safety net: HR 1's broadened SNAP work requirements, which went into effect essentially on her successor's third day, now cover an estimated 230,000 to 240,000 New Yorkers — and the Trump administration's reinterpretation of the Welfare Reform Act could require immigration checks for everything from emergency shelter to food pantries.* *Park wanted to stay on. The incoming team wanted its own people. She's at peace with that, and generous toward her successor, Erin Dalton. But the clock is already ticking on some very large problems.* *You can listen to this episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/leaving-city-hall-an-exit-interview-with-molly-park/id1794619189?i=1000754684008&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/4mxtax5WK0LhFsoLEr23kg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* --- **Jamie Rubin:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City Podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. Molly Park's last day as the Department of Social Services Commissioner was February 27th, 2026\. If she never goes back into city government, she will have spent 22 years as a New York City public servant, becoming an expert in the budget, affordable housing development, homelessness, and every possible entitlement program. I talked to Molly on Thursday, March 5th. It was definitely too early for her to reflect on her entire career, but our conversation was kind of an exit interview, touching on lessons learned from her many stops along the way — up to and including her discussions with the incoming mayor's team about staying on. Molly's the kind of person who doesn't get much attention unless something is going badly on her watch. But New York City is full of extremely sophisticated consumers of government service, and like Knicks fans at the Garden, they know the right things to cheer for. Not the slam dunks, but the amazing pocket passes. To stretch that analogy perhaps a little bit too far — Molly's departure has been marked by public and private send-offs and loud expressions of admiration and affection across the spectrum. The genius of Molly comes through in the article she wrote for Vital City back in December, entitled "System Coordination and Crisis Response to High-Acuity Homelessness." When you read it, you'll see the distillation of her long career dealing with incredibly complicated problems. She acknowledges the challenges of bureaucracy and the limitations of fiscal resources, and in the end, she calls for individual accountability for performance at the highest level of government. It's the kind of thing only someone like Molly could actually write — a career of mastery boiled down to a few simple ideas. There's every reason to think that agency leadership should turn over periodically, and you'll hear that Molly is a realist about that. She's proud of what she's accomplished and genuinely interested to see what the future holds, as well as curious about whether her successor comes up with some new approaches. Okay. So Molly, thank you for being here. **Molly Park:** Thanks so much for having me. **Jamie:** We're recording this on March 5th, 2026\. When was your last day working for the city? **Molly:** February 27th. So last Friday. **Jamie:** So you've been in the wind for almost a week. **Molly:** Yes, that is — I guess one way of putting it. There's been a lot of going-away parties. There are a lot of people leaving city government. **Jamie:** Yeah. So let's start out — I gave a quick overview of what you've done, sort of the résumé version, but maybe it'd be helpful if you took literally two minutes to explain what you've done with yourself up to today. **Molly:** So I've spent almost all of it in city government, working on issues primarily around housing and homelessness. Government was not the plan — I went to grad school at Berkeley, but was job hunting here for family reasons. I ended up at the Independent Budget Office, which is a watchdog city agency. I know you're familiar with it. **Jamie:** Mm-hmm. **Molly:** And that was going to be a landing point while I figured out something in the nonprofit sector. It seems, in retrospect, sort of immensely silly, but I was at a briefing on the new Housing Marketplace Plan — the Bloomberg housing plan — sitting in the basement at 100 Gold Street at HPD. And I just sort of had this realization: when you're in government, you get to write the strategy, you get to have a seat at the table, you get to be the one who shapes what happens. And I wanted in. So from IBO I transitioned over to HPD, and then moved over to the Department of Homeless Services. Despite the fact that homelessness is fundamentally a housing issue — there are 86,000 people in the shelter system, and the one thing they all have in common is that they don't have an affordable place to live — homelessness is traditionally treated as a social service issue that's divorced from housing. Housing is considered an economic development issue; homelessness is a social service issue. And there are very few people in the city who speak both languages. So I wanted to be a bridge — to bring some of the real estate tools that I had over to the homeless services world and really try to service some of that connection within government. That was the fall of 2019\. And what I ended up doing a lot of at DHS was public health, because COVID hit almost immediately after. It was certainly challenging, dealing with a population where thousands of people with underlying health conditions were living in congregate situations during a global pandemic. But I was able to do some of that bridge-building I had in mind — and even more so when I stepped into the commissioner role at DSS. It's been a combination of things I very deliberately set out to do and things that have been unbelievably happy accidents. But it's been a really fantastic 22 years in government. **Jamie:** And do you leave with the same instinct that you had when you were sitting in that basement — that more than anything else, government is where you go to make the biggest difference? **Molly:** New York City government in particular is amazing because you are responsible for the program operations, but it's also just an amazing scale. The budget at DSS was $16 billion. You're touching 3 million New Yorkers a year. **Jamie:** Okay. Well, that makes sense. And that sort of leads me into the nature of what New York City actually does for the population you worked with most recently — your last stint at DSS. On the one hand, you dealt with an agency that touched 3 million people. By the law of large numbers, you literally can't help every single person individually — you're trying to design or work with large systems and achieve the best outcomes on the whole. On the other hand, you wrote an article for Vital City back in December with Jody Rudin — we'll talk about it a little bit later — about an approach to housing the most difficult to house. You talked about accountability, and specifically about focusing on literally a thousand very specific people who the agency would ideally know by name. So on the one hand, your agency is this giant agency. On the other hand, you believe you can still make a big difference even in New York City by focusing on very, very small parts of the population. The approach that New York City has adopted — the one you've participated in for the better part of your career — is enormous, very expensive, and brings in all kinds of outside players: nonprofits, government at all levels, experts, communities, everything else. My bias is that it's incredible that New York City does as well as it does. On the other hand, there are lots of people who would say we've thrown money at these problems and haven't gotten the outcomes we should expect — that we have to try something new. The question I'd like to have hovering over this discussion is: Does New York City have the right approach, and what we need to do is work with it and make it better and more effective? Or does New York City have something fundamentally wrong? And if you could wipe the slate clean, would you want to do that? I think the best way to get at this is to talk about probably the most complex job you've had — the one you've had for the last four years or so, which is running DSS. Hyper-complicated agency. Most people think of you as the homelessness person, which is far from the truth. So maybe talk about DSS a little bit. **Molly:** Sure. DSS is actually a hybrid of two separate agencies that was combined during the de Blasio administration. It's the Department of Homeless Services, which is the primary sheltering agency for the city. And that is a very heavily regulated space. New York City has the right to shelter, which was created out of several court cases back in the 1980s. Virtually everything that DHS does is regulated — down to the feet between beds, and exactly what we say to people when they walk in the door at intake. There are some exceptions to that. The street outreach that DHS does — between DHS staff and contracted outreach providers, there's 24/7 street outreach — that is not mandated by either court or regulation. That is something the city does because it thinks it's the right thing to do. The other half of DSS is the Human Resources Administration, which, despite its name, has nothing to do with human resources. It is the primary benefits agency for the city. The big ones that most people associate with HRA are cash assistance and SNAP — federal benefits with a lot of federal and state regulation associated with them. HRA also administers Medicaid for about 1.6 million New Yorkers — what the state calls the aged, blind, and disabled population. Everyone else on Medicaid receives it through the state. HRA also runs an enormous rental assistance program — one that more than doubled under my tenure. That's the CityFEPS program, the city-funded rental assistance program. One of the things I was really working on was cementing DSS's identity as a housing agency, because it is in fact the second-biggest rental assistance program in the country behind NYCHA. And then there are many other programs that are smaller but critical to specific constituencies: programs for domestic violence survivors, for people with HIV/AIDS, the IDNYC and Fair Fares programs — the city's ID program and discounted public transit. There's also a large career services component targeted at people receiving cash assistance who have work requirements — and as of five days ago, people on SNAP who have work requirements as well. I've certainly left things out that my former colleagues will be upset about, but it's just a huge agency serving lots of people in lots of different moments. **Jamie:** You said half and half, but DHS is not half the people, obviously. **Molly:** HRA is a much larger organization with respect to both budget and staff. I'd say DHS is probably higher-profile. **Jamie:** Absolutely. Do you remember how many employees DSS has overall? **Molly:** It's about 14,000\. About 2,000 give or take at DHS, the rest at HRA and DSS central. **Jamie:** To what extent does DSS end up with that range of programs because the systems and populations are similar to what it's already doing — and to what extent does it reflect a philosophy about how to work with people in those situations? In other words, is this expedient, or is it a conscious policy decision? **Molly:** You know — yes. **Jamie:** Okay, good. **Molly:** It's somewhere in between. And I think there's also a third element — the personalities of the people running the organization versus the people running other agencies. DSS has traditionally had a "yes, we'll take it on" attitude, whereas other agencies may be a little less so. CityFEPS could have lived in a housing agency. But it also makes sense at DSS because it's a program very much targeted toward people within the shelter system, and if you want to maintain that laser focus and manage the mission creep, you need to have control. **Jamie:** So it sounds like it does make sense that it would be under one roof. **Molly:** Yeah. And it goes back to the point I made earlier — the one thing all people experiencing homelessness have in common is that they don't have an affordable place to live. If you treat homelessness solely as a social service issue, you're not going to make a dent. Homelessness is fundamentally about a lack of housing, and having a housing tool to meet people's needs was incredibly important to what DHS does. **Jamie:** You've referred a couple of times to new regulations on SNAP — the work requirements. What are the new work requirements as of five days ago? **Molly:** So HR 1 — which I refuse to call the "big, beautiful bill" — imposed work requirements on Medicaid and SNAP. For SNAP, this applies to what are known as able-bodied adults without dependents, or ABAWDs. The concept of work requirements for ABAWDs has been on the books for a very long time, but there was a lot of flexibility for jurisdictions to get waivers. In New York, every county but Saratoga has had a waiver for many years. Don't ask me about Saratoga. They took away most of the waiver authority and also significantly broadened the definition of who meets the ABAWD requirement. It is now any adult between the ages of 18 and 64 — used to be 54 — who does not have a child under the age of 14 — again, that was a change from under 18\. The bill also removed some exceptions for people experiencing homelessness, for youth aging out of foster care, and for veterans. There are an estimated 230,000 to 240,000 New Yorkers who fall under this broadened definition of ABAWD and who must be working 80 hours a month in order to qualify for SNAP. If you fail to do that for three months, you lose your benefits — and it's a 36-month window before you can receive benefits again. If you can demonstrate you're working, you can come back in. The door isn't forever closed, but you can only receive SNAP without meeting the work requirements for three months out of a 36-month period. **Jamie:** If you are terminated for reasons beyond your control and you're looking for work, how does that play in? **Molly:** There are some opportunities to get credit for looking for work, but it's not an easy thing to document. One of the biggest challenges with work requirements — particularly for something as fundamental as emergency food access — is that they presuppose you have steady hours and a steady paycheck. That's just really not true for a lot of people in the shift and gig economy. There was a Senate hearing on this, and there was a home health aide who testified — she said, "When my patient's in the hospital, I don't have hours." That can mean the difference between qualifying for SNAP that month and not qualifying. If you're driving for Uber, how are you documenting your hours, even though you may very well be working plenty? There's a lot inherent in the system that I think is going to be designed to kick people off of benefits. I will say HRA has been doing an immense amount of work to make it as flexible as possible so that as many people as possible can keep their benefits. But these are really challenging new rules. **Jamie:** I assume the agency has some estimate of what the gap is ultimately going to be between folks who need SNAP and may currently be receiving it, and those who are going to lose their benefits for one reason or another. Is there a budget estimate in place for making up that gap? **Molly:** At this point, the city has not planned to replace SNAP benefits — to come in with a city-funded SNAP for people who lose it as a result of the ABAWD work requirements. The city does support food pantries, and that funding was baselined during the preliminary budget that came out a couple of weeks ago, so that is positive. HR 1 also pulled back SNAP from refugees and various categories of legal immigrants — and it has always been the case that you have to be in the country legally for five years in order to receive SNAP. So there are absolutely universes of people who don't qualify. HRA is experimenting with some voucher-type programs through the food pantry funding. There's a very small pilot that's live now, and there's an RFP that I think is on the street — or maybe just wrapped up — to do a larger pilot. It helps with providing those individuals with choice, but also with addressing the mismatch between where pantries are located and where people are. The highest level of food insecurity in the city is in the Bronx, but the Bronx has the lowest concentration of pantries. So it helps with some of that mismatch. **Jamie:** Okay. So HRA and the state are doing their best, but there's not, at the moment, a full-on replacement — which would be extraordinarily expensive and hard to manage. Okay. Let's slip over to homelessness, which as you said is the higher-profile piece of what you've been doing. Is DHS first and foremost an operator and funder of shelters? Is that fair to say? **Molly:** Yeah. **Jamie:** Okay. **Molly:** 97% of the people experiencing homelessness in New York City are sheltered — they are indoors. Very different from, say, some of the West Coast cities like Los Angeles. The last stat I saw was that 70% of people experiencing homelessness in L.A. are outside. The shelters get periodic moments in the spotlight, largely because of NIMBYism — when City Council members, say, challenge police officers during siting discussions. But what most people think of when they think about homelessness is the roughly 4,000 or so people who are on the streets or in the subways. If DHS is the tail on the dog, then those 4,000 people are really the tip of the tail. They are the exception, but they are a particularly challenging situation — for the agency, for the individuals themselves, and for communities. When I talk to groups of students, when I ask what they think of when they think of homelessness in New York City, it's always the guy on the subway. Very few people realize that a plurality of people experiencing homelessness in New York City are children. **Jamie:** And those children are almost exclusively in shelters one way or another. **Molly:** A hundred percent in shelters. **Jamie:** A hundred percent in shelters. **Molly:** A child on the street is a drop-everything, hands-on-deck emergency — the commissioner talking to the ACS commissioner and the police at two o'clock in the morning. That does not happen in New York City. **Jamie:** And I think whatever people think of how New York City operates, what you just said is really worth sitting with for a second — it's remarkable that we've got so few people on the street. If you went to Los Angeles or San Francisco, most folks are on the street. It seems like, well, the weather's better — maybe that's just where they want to be. That's a fallacy, right? **Molly:** It's the right to shelter. There are challenges with that. **Jamie:** It's complicated policy. **Molly:** Yes. But I've sort of come to believe that the only thing worse than the right to shelter is not having the right to shelter. There are 2 million rent-burdened households in New York City and a 1.4% vacancy rate. In some ways the miracle is that there aren't more people experiencing homelessness. It's a challenging thing to meet the need at this scale. But the right to shelter puts a floor on it — at a minimum, the city will be meeting people's basic needs. And I think that is incredibly important. **Jamie:** One quick digression — what do you think about right to housing? **Molly:** As a housing person and as a human being, I love it. It will be extraordinarily expensive. It requires building at a scale that is — look, forget Sunnyside Yards. We need hundreds of Sunnyside Yards, because there is such an absolute shortage of housing in New York City. Just one telling example: the federal Department of Education has come out every fall with a students-experiencing-homelessness report, and the definition of homelessness in that report includes kids who are doubled up. The New York City number is typically 140,000 to 150,000 students experiencing homelessness. The number of school-aged kids in the shelter system is in the 20,000 to 25,000 range. So you're talking about orders of magnitude more people in doubled-up situations who are not a DSS responsibility at this point. If you're talking about a right to housing, it's not just the people flowing through the shelter system — it's all those people who are doubled up. And the fact is, it's a really difficult policy to implement at the municipal level, because people make very economically rational decisions and come to places where there are resources. I say that not to blame anyone involved — we all make decisions based on where the resources that we and our families need exist, and low-income people do that too. Would I love to see the federal government adopt a right to housing? Absolutely. I have no illusion that that's coming. But I think it would be a really challenging municipal policy. **Jamie:** So you don't think that waving a wand and implementing a right to housing would solve the homelessness problem? **Molly:** I mean, it would — but it's the waving-the-wand part that I'm wrestling with. That's 22 years of government talking, right there. I am a great believer in thinking big and being ambitious, but I am also always cognizant of the pragmatic aspect of getting there. The first step toward a right to housing is thinking about developing housing at a scale that is completely different than anything that has happened — or hasn't happened — in generations. I was joking about Sunnyside Yards, but it's exciting. The affordable housing sector does great work, but we're not solving this with a bunch of 150-unit buildings. **Jamie:** No. And not surprisingly, I come back to NYCHA at some point in every episode. NYCHA was the last great example of building at scale in this city. In a lot of ways, that's where we should be starting — that government should be back in the development business, not exclusively and not as developer without any involvement from the private sector, but the role of government is needed. It's going to be extraordinarily expensive. But if you don't do it, we're going to continue to run on the treadmill. As a government veteran and an expert — and as someone who has been a government official — everything you just described, which is just a thumbnail's worth of what your job actually entailed, sounds like an unmanageable system. How did you get in every day and try to manage through it? **Molly:** There's a phenomenal team at DSS, and that goes a very long way. It really does come back to trusting your colleagues and teammates. When I walked in the door at DSS, we were tens of thousands of cases behind in cash and SNAP processing. The agency was being sued because we weren't processing benefits in a timely way. I walked in, sat down with a group of people, and said, "Alright, where's the plan for solving this?" And I got crickets. That was a place where I was incredibly hands-on — really encouraging people to come up with solutions they believed in. Two years later, when HR 1 passed, there were different structures in place and different levels of people taking accountability for issues. I was very lightly involved in what the implementation strategy was on that, because there was a team really owning it and leading it — who could come and say, "Hey, can you help with this," or, "We should be worried about that," or, "We need to flag this to City Hall." But otherwise, they had it. **Jamie:** We're going to put the Vital City article you wrote with Jody Rudin in the show notes. My takeaway from that article — and from what you just said — is that you need to focus at the operational level and also from the top down on outcomes, not process. You figure out where your pain points are. In that case it was the most intense users of the shelter system, but in what you were just talking about, the pain point was delayed payment of critical resources. I think it's worth noting that it's incredibly hard to manage in government because you don't have a lot of the tools you have in the private sector. Some of it has to come from tone-setting at the top, because you don't have the same system of rewards. The example you just described — walking in the door, dealing with the payments issue — that was tone-setting at the top. Everybody probably realized: we've got someone who's very focused on outcomes, who figured out quickly what the biggest problem was, demanded accountability, and was herself willing to take accountability. You have to model the kind of behavior you want. Does that sound about right? **Molly:** Yeah, absolutely. And really important to me is always making sure that I'm listening to the people who are the experts. At a place like DSS, there's absolutely no way I can be the expert in everything. Listening to the experts, respecting their opinions, really giving people the opportunity to raise ideas — and then when I do need to make an executive decision, making sure I'm giving people context as to why. **Jamie:** Okay. So fast forward — there was an election in November. Mayor Ani was elected in early November. In the private sector, somebody in a senior position who is doing a really good job — particularly in an area of such sensitivity as you're describing — it's unusual that you'd seek to turn over that position. First question: Did you want to stay on? **Molly:** I did, yeah. **Jamie:** Did you have the opportunity to talk to them about what you'd done and your strategies, your thoughts about going forward? **Molly:** I had quite a bit of engagement with the Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services. But it became fairly clear — really across the board — that they were looking for their own people, which is their prerogative and not at all unusual in government. It's the exception rather than the rule that commissioners get carried over. So I can be sad that I didn't get to stay, but I certainly can't be angry or particularly surprised. **Jamie:** I agree that it is sort of the exception. And you want your own people — if there are different parties or different governing philosophies, that's a different thing. But it's kind of hard to figure out what the next governing philosophy at DSS is going to be. Is there some fundamentally different philosophy you think the agency is going to adopt going forward? **Molly:** I definitely don't feel comfortable speaking for the new folks. There is absolutely room to do things differently and to innovate. And there actually isn't an opportunity to completely start over, because there are so many external forces that guide what happens. But I'm sure there will be innovation and new ways of doing things that I look forward to seeing. **Jamie:** Have you met your successor? **Molly:** We had a conversation last week before I left, yeah. **Jamie:** Okay, great. You didn't know her beforehand? If she said, "Molly, what's the single biggest pain point I need to watch — that is going to become glaringly obvious and that I need to focus on" — what would you say? **Molly:** I'm not going to presume to give her advice. But there are a few things to be aware of. The full-throated assault on the social safety net from the federal government is one you can't ignore — the ABAWD work requirements went into effect basically on day three of her tenure. So keeping a close eye on all of that is very much an issue. One of the things that worries me significantly is a reinterpretation of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996\. The Welfare Reform Act said you couldn't provide public benefits to non-qualified aliens. But almost immediately after it passed, there was an interpretation that defined "public benefits" in such a way that things like food pantries, emergency shelter, and other emergency services were not considered public benefits — on the theory that anyone should be able to qualify for them. The Trump administration rescinded that interpretation, which means that theoretically this vast array of services now requires an upfront immigration check. That's going to hit immigrants who need the benefits. But also non-immigrants who can't, in a moment of crisis, prove their citizenship. Who brings their passport to a food pantry? There is a stay in place right now — AG James is my hero in fighting back on all of this — but that is temporary. The Welfare Reform Act also says that states can pass legislation that would allow at least state and local dollars to be used without immigration checks, but New York State does not have that legislation in place. That is an anvil over the whole state's head. I'm very much hoping that the state passes some version of that. I don't think there is something akin to being 40,000 cases behind in cash and SNAP processing. I'd like to think I left the agency in better shape than I found it. **Jamie:** I was going to say — maybe that's part of your legacy: that you didn't leave anything like that for whoever came next. **Molly:** I do think I left DSS in better shape than I found it. But there are immense challenges, of course — 86,000 people in the shelter system, infrastructure that is challenged. I have no doubt that Commissioner Dalton has a tough job in front of her, and I really do wish her all the best. **Jamie:** Of course, and everybody else does as well. **Molly:** Yeah. **Jamie:** Two things can be true at once. You can think that Molly Park did a phenomenal job at DSS — as she's done everywhere else — and you can hope that Erin Dalton does a great job as her successor. Because if you live in the city and you care, or even if you live elsewhere and you care about New York City or just about people — we're all better off if everything goes really well. Okay, the last question. Most obvious. What are you going to do next? I assume you're going to run a hedge fund, because that's the well-trodden path, right? **Molly:** Clearly. **Jamie:** Yeah. **Molly:** I am figuring it out. I'm confident I'll be somewhere in the space around social services, housing, and homelessness — that's what I've spent my career doing and it's what I care about. In a perfect world, I'd really like to be in a space that does straddle some of those silos. One of the challenges that this sector needs to address is the fact that people are complicated. When we talk only about housing or only about food insecurity or only about homelessness, we're missing the intersection of those issues. I'm hopefully looking for a role where I can bring some of that cross-sector work. **Jamie:** Not yet? **Molly:** I'm going to take a little break. **Jamie:** Good. Well, nobody deserves it more — and then you're going to have tons of opportunities. Molly, thanks a lot. **Molly:** Thanks so much for having me. Appreciate it. **Jamie:** Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### Can Erin Dalton Make Progress in Curbing Chronic Homelessness? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/erin-dalton-data-driven-social-services-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:23.000Z Local agency appointments are often dismissed as insider news — meaningful to City Hall watchers, distant to the public. Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s appointment of Erin Dalton as commissioner of New York City’s Department of Social Services deserves a different reaction. Though the choice of Dalton was met by some with an eyeroll, as though someone from out of town, in this case from Pittsburgh, had no business taking such a big job in the nation’s largest city, it is in fact a signal that competence and evidence matter in governing a city — and that management choices in human services can translate into real, measurable changes in people’s lives. That may sound obvious. But in an era of deep cynicism about government, it is worth saying aloud. It would have been easier for Mamdani to promote someone from within city government or reward a political ally. He looked outward across the country and recruited someone widely respected for doing something that often feels rare in public policy today: building systems that learn and use data, partnership and evaluation to improve results over time. Dalton’s tenure as the Director of Allegheny County’s Department of Human Services (DHS) has been closely associated with a culture of experimentation, collaboration and rigorous evaluation. Again and again, when new approaches to complex social problems are discussed, Allegheny DHS shows up as a partner or model. Developing integrated data systems that link information across housing, health, schools and human services? Allegheny DHS built one of the strongest local government models in the country — and policy decisions flow from what those data reveal. It is not surprising that Dalton led the Office of Analytics, Planning, and Information Technology at Allegheny DHS before she was promoted to oversee all of DHS. Among many awards and accolades over the years, in 2024, Allegheny County was featured by the U.S. National Institute of Justice in the opening plenary of its [2024 National Research Conference](https://nij.ojp.gov/events/conference-2024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#1-0), titled “Advancing Justice Through Science: Tracing Allegheny County’s Journey.” Pioneering innovations in housing and supportive services for frequent utilizers of public services — people repeatedly cycling through emergency rooms, homeless shelters and jails who typically have long histories of mental health issues and substance use? Allegheny DHS used its integrated data system to [identify key intervention points](https://www.alleghenycountyanalytics.us/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/21-ACDHS-13-FrequentUtiliziersReport%5FAug2022.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), then created systems and strategies that promote long-term wellness, reduce repeated high-intensity service use and in turn lower costs across emergency, housing, justice and health systems. For instance, Allegheny recently became the [first jurisdiction in Pennsylvania to offer assisted outpatient services](https://www.wpxi.com/news/local/allegheny-county-becomes-first-community-pennsylvania-introduce-assisted-outpatient-treatment/3CUDQFMGNJCZTE3KIUZS4UGTJE/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for individuals with mental health and substance use disorders, adding an important service option designed to stabilize people in the community and reduce unnecessary court involvement. Rolling out alternative crisis response? Not surprisingly, Allegheny County’s focus on reducing unnecessary public costs and system involvement led them to [build](https://www.alleghenycounty.us/Services/Human-Services-DHS/DHS-News-and-Events/Accomplishments-and-Innovations/Improving-Crisis-Prevention-and-Response?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [measure](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/project/launching-alternative-emergency-response-in-allegheny-county/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a system in which clinicians — not just police — respond to eligible mental health emergency calls, with police support when safety requires it. Although the program, which sends an “A-Team” to respond to nonviolent, non-medical 911 calls at the request of the participating police departments, is too new to have rigorous outcome evaluation results at this date, Allegheny DHS built a [public dashboard](https://tableau.alleghenycounty.us/t/PublicSite/views/AlternativeResponsePilotPublicDashboard/Home?%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the system to provide the public with up-to-date information that displays call volume over time, response types, call types and response outcomes. The dashboard also supports data and statistical analyses and interactive visualizations. A quick look at the dashboard’s “interventions and outcomes” page shows that between October 15, 2024 and November 10, 2025, the A-Team was able to assess/interact with clients in 95% of responses. Bolstering prisoner reentry support and jail-cycling reform? Allegheny DHS coordinated supervision and services beginning inside the jail and continuing into the community. [An Urban Institute evaluation](https://www.urban.org/research/publication/evaluation-allegheny-county-jail-collaborative-reentry-programs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found a 24-percentage-point reduction in rearrest risk, which translates to roughly two dozen fewer rearrests per 100 people served. Understanding the harms and costs of violent criminal victimization in order to help drive prevention? When our research team at Temple University and NORC at the University of Chicago launched the [NIJ-funded HAVEN project](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2025.2456182?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Allegheny was a natural partner. Dalton and her team shared their integrated data system to help quantify the often-hidden health and economic consequences that follow violent victimization. Creating a community violence intervention “ecosystem” where anti-violence programs are carefully layered together to fill service gaps for both the people and places most touched by violence? Allegheny County DHS was featured as one of three “jurisdiction immersion” sites at the 2025 Cities United convening, where other jurisdictions come to learn about successes in creating and sustaining a comprehensive anti-violence strategy that includes prevention and intervention. In a country with thousands of urban jurisdictions, that kind of recognition is rare. Getting swifter and smarter child welfare decisions after allegations of maltreatment to help predict foster care placement? Allegheny DHS experimented publicly with a machine-learning screening tool (the Allegheny Family Screening Tool or “AFST”) that pre-selects investigation as the starting choice for the highest-risk referrals. [An evaluation](https://www.alleghenycountyanalytics.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Impact-Evaluation-from-16-ACDHS-26%5FPredictiveRisk%5FPackage%5F050119%5FFINAL-6.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) commissioned by Allegheny County found it reduced Black-white disparities in investigation, case opening and removal rates. More specifically, the evaluation found a 20% reduction in first entries into foster care from 2016-20, the years when AFST was implemented. Additionally, a [later study shows the potential power of AFST for child protection](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32761210/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): The model’s risk scores strongly predicted serious child harm measured through hospital injury encounters. This means the algorithm is effective at identifying children most likely to experience serious physical harm, allowing agencies to prioritize resources and interventions for families facing the greatest risk. Dalton has had a significant hand in shaping all these innovations. I first met Erin about 25 years ago when she was at the National Institute of Justice as a project manager for the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative. What stood out even then was how consistently she emphasized two things she viewed as nonnegotiable: partnerships and good data. Those are also the two hardest things to achieve in complex social policy. Partnerships require agencies with different missions and incentives to share responsibility and information. Fealty to data requires careful and ethical governance — and the discipline to measure outcomes honestly, even when the evidence forces you to rethink what you are doing. And not surprisingly, Allegheny DHS carefully surveys clients, community members and providers — asking them how to best meet community needs and where they could do better. They use the feedback to add and change programs, shift funding and improve program monitoring. Allegheny County DHS repeatedly invites evaluation. It partners with researchers, publishes dashboards and allows (usually by directly asking) outside researchers to test whether programs actually worked. In many jurisdictions across the country, evaluation is treated as a threat. In Allegheny, it became part of governance. Dalton did not build these systems alone. But she clearly created a culture where experimentation was encouraged, collaboration expected and data used to guide decisions. That matters in New York. New York’s Department of Social Services, with a [budget of $18.5 billion](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/content/publications/2025-social-services?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and roughly 12,500 employees, sits at the center of housing stability, poverty reduction and crisis response in the largest city in the United States. It oversees the city’s core public benefits operation and its homelessness response system — administering major assistance and rental subsidy programs and managing the shelter and outreach network delivered through a vast nonprofit provider infrastructure. Yet many of the systems most closely tied to large-scale system challenges, including child welfare, public health and public safety, sit outside the department, run by nonprofit groups that contract with the City. What Dalton has demonstrated repeatedly is an ability to work across those silos, regardless of whether the systems are under her purview, using partnerships and shared data to tackle problems that no single agency can solve alone. In a city as large and complex as New York, that kind of leadership is invaluable. I consider this appointment a vote of confidence in evidence-based governance and in the idea that cities should reward leaders who test ideas, rigorously measure results, collaborate across systems and enable responsible access to integrated administrative data for external researchers so evidence can accumulate and lessons can travel across jurisdictions. That’s welcome coming from Mamdani, who some worry is going to be guided more by ideology than a desire to innovate and get results. If the culture she helped build travels with Erin Dalton, all of New York City will benefit, not just New York City residents served under DSS. And importantly, the rest of the country will benefit too. In the nation’s largest city, results don’t remain local, they shape the field. And every other city loses the excuse that it can’t be done. ### Sewer Socialism, Meet Toilet Socialism URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-public-bathrooms-mamdani-plan/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:24.000Z Last month, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani [announced](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-announces-new-commitment-to-expand-access-to-publi0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a $4 million investment in 20 to 30 modular public restrooms. The idea is that installing these units will be faster and cheaper than building traditional public restroom projects — which require more digging, heavier construction and complicated connection to sewer lines. Many New Yorkers applauded, and I was among them. I’ve got a small bladder and am a bit of a public toilet aficionado. Over the past few years, I’ve [rated each of New York City’s privately owned public toilets](https://nycpolitics101.substack.com/p/pops?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), criticized City Council legislation that mandated new public toilets [without streamlining any associated costs](https://nycpolitics101.substack.com/p/cost-of-maintaining-public-toilets-in-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and written about how [neighborhood opposition](https://nycpolitics101.substack.com/p/neighbor-opposition?utm%5Fsource=publication-search) affects what gets built in New York City and when. So when the Mamdani administration released the RFP for the new public toilet plan, I was excited to read through and understand what we’d get for the money — and whether this mayor is likely to learn from many failed attempts by his predecessors. We’ll get to that in a second, but let’s start with an important question. In a city of 8 million people, why are there so few places to pee? Countless private businesses have toilets, but most of those are for customers only. Parks have bathrooms, sometimes called “comfort stations,” but many of those are in very poor shape. Indeed, a report in The City reveals that [50 park bathrooms sit closed](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/03/03/public-bathrooms-parks-closed-repairs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Underground, where so many of us have long waits and no easy access to a urinal or toilet, there are many bathrooms run by the MTA, a state authority. But too few are open and too few of those are in good shape. [An audit earlier this year by the agency’s inspector general](https://gothamist.com/news/most-nyc-subway-bathrooms-lack-basic-amenities-like-toilet-seats-and-soap-audit-finds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) spot-checked 32 of the 125 bathrooms in the system and found 85% lacked a basic need like toilet seats and soap. Add it all up, and New York City [ranks 93rd out of the country’s largest 100](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/discomfort-stations-the-conditions-and-availability-of-nyc-parks-bathrooms/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) cities for public bathrooms per capita. That’s especially problematic given that our city has the most vibrant street life and more visitors than anyplace else. Little wonder that adding public toilets was listed among the [top 17 ways](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/01/05/arts/design/mamdani-how-to-improve-new-york-vote.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the new mayor could improve the city in a recent survey by The New York Times. [According to Mamdani](https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/12/business/zohran-mamdani-bathrooms-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), “When you can’t find a restroom, you are made keenly aware of just how few public bathrooms there are and how dependent we have left New Yorkers on either the generosity and kindness of a business owner or a requirement that they pay seven bucks for a coffee.” But remedying the problem is easier said than done. As a bare minimum, the Parks and MTA bathrooms need to be kept in much better condition. Then, the City should create a network of new, clean, street-level toilets available to whoever needs them by learning from previous efforts that didn’t go the distance. So what went wrong in the past? In the early 90s, Mayor David Dinkins [piloted a coin-operated, self-cleaning toilet kiosk](https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/27/nyregion/yes-new-york-city-plans-sidewalk-toilets.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); it died due to a combination of factors, including procurement problems that caused delays, and neighbors like Steve Stollman, who made a name for himself as the loudest activist voice against the plan (he was mostly mad about ads on the bathrooms). Stollman called his campaign against the public toilet program [“The Privy Council,”](https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/23/nyregion/about-new-york-amid-artifacts-of-past-gadfly-visions-of-future.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the New York Times referred to him as “New York’s leading toilet gadfly.” In the early 2000s, Mayor Bloomberg’s administration bought 20 public toilets, but [installation got stymied](https://www.thecity.nyc/2022/03/29/nyc-promised-public-bathrooms-still-waiting/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by neighborhood opposition and engineering concerns. When previous mayors’ plans hit snags, implementation stalled — or, to use toilet terminology, clogged. For a higher-priority, higher-profile issue like housing or public safety, it’d be worth the attention, effort and political capital to get out the plunger. But there’s not a powerful, organized constituency hounding elected officials for public toilets, so for the last 30 years, bathroom projects have limped through years-long pilots, making slow progress until they die a quiet death. New Yorkers have called out the red tape that has been holding up public toilet projects for 35 years now. A New York Times headline from 1991 read: [“In New York, Few Public Toilets and Many Rules.”](https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/21/nyregion/in-new-york-few-public-toilets-and-many-rules.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) This time, with fresh attention being paid to the legacy of [“sewer socialism”](https://www.slowboring.com/p/learning-from-milwaukees-sewer-socialists?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that emphasizes effective investment in public works, we shouldn’t settle for procurement problems that cause delays or neighborhood opposition that drives up costs. ### Stretching every dollar Is that $4 million Mamdani price tag realistic? Let’s do some basic math on a toilet-paper square. In 2023, New York City purchased five modular Portland Loo toilets — a [fancy prefab model](https://portlandloo.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — for [$185,000 each](https://www.thecity.nyc/2023/02/27/portland-loo-park-bathrooms/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Extrapolating from that price, $4 million could today buy the city 21 Portland Loos. But that’s just the cost of buying the units — not the full cost of implementation. In 2023, *installing* each pre-fabricated Portland Loo was $815,000\. That’s much higher than in other cities, where it [typically costs around $220,000](https://www.amny.com/news/modular-restrooms-nyc-parks-million-install/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) per unit, attributable to New York City’s red tape and complex public infrastructure. At 2023 building and installation prices, $4 million would only get us four public toilets. That’s basically nothing. Here’s where the new administration is changing it up. In the past, New York City public toilets had to connect to water, sewer and electrical lines. [This RFP](https://edc.nyc/modular-public-bathroom-installation-and-maintenance-services-citywide-rfp?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) aims to save on installation costs by requiring that each bathroom unit be self-sufficient without requiring connection to any utility lines. That could yield many more toilets, since companies selling fancy portapotties have lower capital costs. Also helpfully, the $4 million budget doesn’t just include development and installation, it also includes one year of maintenance. That’s essential — because the only thing worse than no public bathroom is a dirty bathroom with no toilet paper or soap. The RFP specifies that maintenance not only includes making sure toilet paper is refreshed and toilets are clean, but also that graffiti and debris are removed up to five feet around the toilet (i.e., snow, ice, trash, leaves). And that a vendor arrives on site to respond to emergencies within two hours and non-emergencies within 24 hours. In its RFP, the City also makes clear that it prefers that the vendor manually clean each unit, as opposed to self-cleaning models. What can $4 million cover, once we take lower installation costs and ongoing maintenance costs into consideration? One fancy portapotty company that services D.C., Los Angeles and other U.S. cities, [Throne](http://thronelabs.co/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), charges about $90,000 per toilet per year for hosting and maintenance. At $90,000 per toilet, $4 million would cover 44 bathrooms, higher than the goal of 20-30 bathrooms. All of which is to say, the RFP points in the right direction. But in these preliminary stages, what else can be learned from previous failures? And where are the likely places that costs could overrun, potentially leading to fewer units installed or ballooning costs down the line? ### Flush “everything bagel liberalism” One way costs can balloon in toilet development, like in so many realms, is when government piles on expensive, well-intentioned mandates, rather than sticking to the core purpose at hand. That’s what Ezra Klein termed [“everything-bagel liberalism.”](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/02/opinion/democrats-liberalism.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) One requirement that increased New York City’s costs for the 2023 toilet project was related to the fabricator’s location. In that case, the City required that if a fabricator is outside the five boroughs, they need to be approved by the Department of Buildings or have the products inspected by a registered special inspector. None of the pre-approved manufacturers were willing to take on the project, so the company had to go through the process of getting certification — a step that added delays and costs. Mamdani’s current RFP gets the balance right. Overall, I found the stipulations for the units very reasonable. Here’s a snapshot of what the current RFP requires each modular bathroom unit to include: one toilet fixture; one sink fixture; receptacles for trash and menstrual products; a mirror; a hand-dryer; dispensers for toilet paper, liquid soap, and menstrual products; at least one hook (to hang clothing, bags, etc.); a fold-down babychanging station; an exterior ramp leading to the entrance; signage; ventilation; exterior lighting adequate for public safety, particularly at the entry, as well as a safety mirror for exterior corners; and an emergency call button and non-emergency customer service button. I don’t see many extraneous things there. Though it is worth at least thinking about innovative models like that in Paris — where, in addition to fully fledged public toilets, they tried installing [open-air urinals](https://time.com/5366560/open-air-urinal/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (which made some people upset). The point is not that those are suited for New York, simply that there’s nothing wrong with a mix of facilities that serve different people, rather than ensuring that every single one must be suited to every single person. Overall, the RFP does a good job of requiring the need-to-haves, outlining possible nice-to-haves and aligning incentives between the City and the vendor. ### Siting and installation pitfalls The risks don’t end with the requirements delineated in the RFP — far from it. Another hoop that can trip up a project like this is commission approvals. Most of these modular units will end up in parks, plazas and sidewalks. That means they’ll need to get approved by the [Public Design Commission](https://www.nyc.gov/site/designcommission/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (PDC), the 11-member design review board with jurisdiction over permanent structures proposed on public property. If the proposed bathroom is in a landmarked area, it will also require approval from the 11-member [Landmarks Preservation Commission](https://www.nyc.gov/site/lpc/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (LPC). The LPC protects historically significant buildings and neighborhoods; they’re the gatekeeper of the city’s historical fabric. Both commissions have their own multi-month process for publishing information about projects, soliciting community feedback and providing a decision. For example, the LPC process requires applicants to present their proposal to the local Community Board at one of its monthly meetings, which must be scheduled well in advance. When I served on Manhattan Community Board 5’s Landmarks Committee, it was common for applicants’ presentations to include multiple staff, presenting detailed slide decks that clearly took many hours to put together. Applicants must also submit their completed application at least four weeks before presenting to the LPC at one of its monthly hearings. Prior to the public hearing, applicants meet with their assigned LPC staff preservationist to review the proposal, confirm presentation requirements and submit all required materials. The process involves multiple sequential steps, each of which adds time and coordination requirements. If a commission rejects a project, the project needs to edit their proposal and re-apply if they want to keep moving. Fortunately, there’s an asterisk. Both commissions have staff that can issue approvals on a rolling basis to move projects along faster. For example, the Landmarks Preservation Commission decided a couple of years ago that bus shelter infrastructure could be approved by staff going forward — no need to go to the full commission for a formal vote anymore. Their reasoning: Bus shelters are critical infrastructure that provide protection from rain, wind and sun. This is a reasonable approach to take for public toilets as well, since they’re also critical infrastructure that would be best designed for function rather than historic relevance. The Commission voted to change the Landmarks Preservation Commission Rules in order to streamline the process. The Public Design Commission also has categories of projects that can be approved at the staff level, instead of going through the full vote. Mamdani should use both expedited processes. Team Mamdani can also learn from how previous administrations’ attempts broke down at the siting and design stage. In the past, many holdups with public toilets in New York City have stemmed from communities' inability to agree on the details. For example, [in 2006](https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/nyregion/31toilets.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the City asked community boards to propose locations for new public bathrooms, but many of the sites put forward weren’t feasible. Brooklyn Community Board 2 in Prospect Heights proposed two sites, but one wasn’t perfect because the Public Design Commission was concerned that the modern design clashed with the existing “Victorian stylings” and the other proposed site wasn’t great either because the area was being redeveloped. When agencies and electeds couldn’t reconcile all the tradeoffs, nothing got built. City agencies should propose the most optimal sites, solicit public input to highlight any significant unforeseen challenges and move the projects forward. ### Maintenance, maintenance, maintenance Every piece of public infrastructure needs to be maintained, but for obvious reasons, toilets especially so. The City’s goal is for the units to be accessible 24/7, 365 days a year. That means they need to withstand manmade challenges like vandalism, as well as weather ranging from extreme heat to snow and ice. The City ought to plan for ways to pay for and save on maintenance from the start, lest ballooning maintenance costs lead to dirty facilities, or even worse, facilities falling into disrepair and becoming unusable. Here, I worry the administration is making it difficult for vendors to get creative to save on costs. The RFP specifies that the vendor must employ a minimum of three full-time service technicians to keep all the toilets in good working order. While the language doesn’t rule out self-cleaning toilets, it does state a preference for manual cleaning, which is a recurring labor cost. Historically, self-cleaning toilets haven’t been that reliable in this city — but technology is always advancing. They shouldn’t be ruled out. Nor is the City allowing for ads to recoup costs, at least at first. The RFP states that “Advertising on or inside these units will not be allowed for the full Contract Term \[of one year plus any extensions\].” That’s a mistake. Yes, historically some of the loudest complaints from neighbors about toilets have centered on ads. But again, if we’re prioritizing function and usability as the most important goal, we need a way to fund ongoing maintenance. Why not let advertisers make paid appeals at least to passersby, if not to the captive audience inside the restrooms themselves? LinkNYC wi-fi kiosks put many more ads in many more places for an arguably less important reason. A good maintenance plan must think through ways to discourage use by people who might not treat the bathrooms properly. We may never have a population as respectful of public toilets as Tokyo’s, but that doesn’t mean we should surrender them to a future of terrible treatment. It’s not uncommon for other cities to charge for public toilet use, or require a smartphone or a touch card. For example, [Throne](https://thronelabs.co/how-it-works/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) requires a smartphone or tap card for users to enter, implements a 10-minute time limit, and bars future use if there’s evidence of vandalization or misuse. [Portland Loos](https://portlandloo.com/why-the-portland-loo-is-a-safer-bathroom/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also employ multiple methods to deter inappropriate activity in their bathrooms: open grating that preserves privacy while allowing law enforcement to observe how many people are inside, hand-washing station on the exterior of the unit and [blue lights to deter intravenous drug use](https://www.npr.org/2019/09/03/756976676/blue-lights-may-deter-intravenous-drug-use-in-public-spaces?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (yes, that makes it difficult for people to find their veins). All of those steps technically make restrooms less accessible — but they’re worth the tradeoff to ensure they remain operational for most people most of the time. Optimizing for safe bathrooms up front not only eases community members’ fears about crime, but also holds down maintenance costs and extends the life of the unit. New York City may be sharply divided on the wisdom of opening public grocery stores. But a network of sparkling new public bathrooms could be in the city’s near future. We just have to make some smart decisions. ### Tokyo’s Toilet Teachings URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-tokyo-built-clean-accessible-toilets-nyc-wants/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:24.000Z Tokyo’s public toilets have attracted a surprising level of global attention in recent years — perhaps best exemplified by the 2024 Academy Award nomination for the Wim Wenders film “Perfect Days,” with its meditative portrayal of a Tokyo public toilet cleaner’s inner life. Despite the film’s depiction of Tokyo restroom maintenance as an almost monastic activity, however, the reality is a more prosaic tale — one that New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani should pay close attention to as he seeks to give New Yorkers and visitors more places to go. Tokyo has a strong, interlocking system of public and “semi-public” toilet infrastructure that combine together to produce a highly functional urban environment. Tokyo boasts an average of [eight public toilets per square kilometer](https://disegnojournal.com/newsfeed/in-praise-of-public-toilets-tokyo-toilet-project?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), putting it ahead of European capitals such as Paris. But these fully public toilets are only part of the story; nearly all of the roughly 900 train stations in the Greater Tokyo area have one or more public bathrooms. As discussed below, these ‘semi-public’ bathrooms are central to the average Tokyoite’s daily experience. These are the lessons from Tokyo for New York’s public bathrooms as I see them — from the perspective of a [scholar of Tokyo urbanism devoted to finding ways we can learn from Japan’s megacity](https://www.amazon.com/Emergent-Tokyo-Patterns-Spontaneous-Micro-Urbanism/dp/1951541324?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to improve urban life here at home. **1) In a transit-dense city, train station bathrooms are the backbone of public bathroom access** Tokyo’s rail transit network is rightly held up as a global exemplar, but few outside of Tokyo realize that about two-thirds of the Tokyo metropolitan area’s railway stations are operated by private railway lines. These *shitetsu* (私鉄) corporations [don’t merely provide transit](https://da.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/da/kernel/D1006598/D1006598.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); they operate multi-story shopping malls above their train stations, develop real estate around their stations into commuter bedroom communities and even operate quality-of-life businesses (such as subsidized affordable childcare services) along their train lines in order to make their neighborhoods more attractive places to live. In a city where trains and stations are everywhere, the restrooms in these private railwaystations — generally located right inside the fare gates — are the most common public restrooms that the average Tokyoite interacts with in their daily lives. They can be thought of as “semi-public” infrastructure — in private hands but accessible to the general public, particularly as railway fares are [politically negotiated between the government and the railway operators](https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3097&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and thus kept low by global standards. The aggregate effect is powerful: When your city is dense with rail and every station offers clean, plentiful public toilets, you organically end up with a city full of public bathrooms. In New York, ironically, subway stations and their bathrooms are publicly managed by the state-run Metropolitan Transportation Authority, but the trend for New York City transit bathrooms has moved in the opposite direction: neglected, almost entirely closed off to the public (with those that are open having heavily limited opening hours, 7AM to 7PM with an inexplicable one-hour cleaning break around lunchtime), and/or reserved for staff. An attempt to find an open bathroom in an MTA station frequently requires begging a station attendant for help, and the odds of success are low. The ostensibly ‘public’ bathrooms of the MTA are in actual practice much less open to the public than the ‘semi-public’ bathrooms of Tokyo’s private railway conglomerates. This dearth of station bathrooms — which even at their full intended capacity now appear in only about [10% of the MTA system’s nearly 500 stations](https://www.mta.info/agency/new-york-city-transit/bathrooms?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — appears to be the result of two negative trends in New York’s transit infrastructure: budget scarcity from the MTA being funded at the state rather than municipal level, and a separate failure of public services for the unhoused and mentally ill that then reorients transit stations around reactively managing spillover social dysfunction rather than serving the median member of the general public. San Francisco’s recent experience here is instructive. As the Bay Area’s BART system installed stronger fare gates through its “Next Generation Fare Gate” program, the [maintenance costs at the upgraded stations dropped off a cliff](https://growsf.org/news/2026-02-12-bart-fare-gates-10-million/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — suggesting that only a small portion of the population (fare-evading, to boot) had been causing an unusually high share of damage and wear to station infrastructure. With the MTA [moving in a similar direction](https://www.mta.info/project/modern-fare-gates?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York may be able to begin investing in its train stations as welcoming public infrastructure once again, including via well-maintained public restrooms. **2) Put public toilets where the city already has eyes on the street** Beyond train stations, Tokyo’s ward governments are clear-eyed in their planning around the linkage between public toilets and public safety. Public toilets in parks and public areas are frequently located near the *koban* police boxes that have been [the cornerstone of local policing in Japan since the Edo period](https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2016/spring2016/sharing%5Fpolice%5Fmodel.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and in other locations with a combination of good public order and predictable foot traffic — [a decision aimed at increasing feelings of safety and reducing the likelihood of their use for illicit purposes](https://japantoday.com/category/features/kuchikomi/minister-of-toilets-aims-to-transform-japans-public-loos?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In many ways, the value of any given public bathroom is downstream from the general maintenance of the public realm around it. If the general public feels safe walking through a city park at night, the impact of a public toilet in that park changes dramatically. The same staffing investment and active management that parks and stations require to be safe and welcoming to ordinary residents, rather than havens for illicit activity, also enables public bathrooms to better serve their intended purpose. **3) Designing public toilets with diverse needs in mind** Presently, the global norm in cities across the developed world is to offer a single ‘multipurpose’ toilet in addition to gendered toilets, designed to encompass everything from disabilities to caregiver needs, and Japan was until recently no exception. Starting in 2021, however, many high-traffic public spaces such as train stations [now offer multiple ‘accessible’ bathrooms](https://www.mlit.go.jp/sogoseisaku/barrierfree/content/001913509.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (referred to as ‘barrier-free’ in Japan’s parlance) differentiated by use in an effort to relieve user congestion. So rather than a single bathroom serving as a catch-all for those with disabilities, mobility issues, caregivers, and diaper changing, diaper changing rooms are explicitly differentiated from ‘barrier-free’ restrooms. The goal is to maximize the odds that a person in need of an accessible bathroom will actually find one available, rather than having everyone who requires privacy competing for a single space. Japan’s new push puts it at the forefront of the developed world in this regard, and if the MTA works to revitalize its station bathrooms, it should similarly add enough accessible capacity that its “special needs” spaces aren’t a single overburdened stall doing three jobs. Diversity is also a question of time; an MTA station restroom that [technically exists but is closed most of the night](https://www.mta.info/agency/new-york-city-transit/bathrooms?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is effectively a restroom for the same office workers who are already well-served by private bathrooms, not a restroom for shift workers, late-night riders or caregivers navigating a 24/7 city. Part of Tokyo’s success in this regard is that it treats restroom access as part of everyday mobility, not as a special or exceptional service. That said, Tokyo has its own struggles in this regard. The Tokyo-based journalist Phoebe Amoroso [went viral during the 2019 G20 Summit](https://x.com/PhoebeAmoroso/status/1143098870605332480?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when she pointed out that rubbish bins had been preemptively sealed shut in toilets at one of the city’s main train stations as a matter of security, seemingly with no concern for women needing to dispose of sanitary products. And despite Tokyo’s general reputation for cleanliness, it is only in recent years, particularly with a [modernization push in preparation for the ill-starred 2020 Tokyo Olympics](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12045882/pdf/IJPH-54-801.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that soap dispensers have been installed in many of the city’s public toilets. **4) Make cleanliness measurable, not notional** Although standards differ across the city, Tokyo’s public and semi-public toilets generally have fixed maintenance regimes that specify not only the frequency of cleaning (typically three times per day) but are now in some cases [introducing external audits](https://tokyotoilet.jp/en/maintenance/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These third-party inspections are not yet the norm in Tokyo by any means, but that should not keep them from serving as an example for New York. The audits involve quantitative measures like adenosine triphosphate wipe tests (a common proxy for surface cleanliness), plus periodic measurements of ammonia and environmental conditions. Third-party audits can make the difference between a municipal promise (“we clean regularly”) and a service standard (“here is the protocol; here is the result we test for; here is who verifies”). Frequency of cleaning matters to an extent for hygiene, but, according to studies on the topic, less than one might think. Actual accountability matters more, as audits create feedback loops. New York is perfectly capable of this kind of rigor. The city already accomplishes it in other domains, ranging from food safety and water quality to building inspections. The lesson is simply to treat toilets as a public health interface worthy of the same kind of measurement. As the American city most comparable to Tokyo in terms of the density and reach of its transit network, New York can learn from Tokyo without fetishizing it. Japan’s enviable public toilets are not an outgrowth of national culture, but rather the result of a public policy that takes toilets seriously as public health infrastructure, centered on transit-located toilets and other sites with a high natural degree of public oversight. New York can embrace transit toilets once again, while designing for real users and their diverse needs. And, above all, the MTA can make toilet maintenance a measurable, audited public service rather than a meaningless promise. As our taciturn toilet cleaner in “Perfect Days” would surely agree, a city isn’t made livable by grand gestures. It’s made livable by standards — and by the people and systems that rigorously keep them. ### Reality Check: Why Do New York City’s Crime Numbers Change? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/real-crime-numbers-nyc-nypd/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:24.000Z Each month, in a familiar ritual, the police commissioner announces the latest crime statistics — the standard way the NYPD has reported data since the de Blasio administration ended monthly in-person CompStat press conferences. On Monday, the department [announced](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR004/nypd-fewest-shooting-incidents-shooting-victims-murders-recorded-history-the?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that major crime fell about 8% in February, with record lows for murders and shootings. The accompanying press release used restated February 2025 figures as its year-ago baseline — but those figures look nothing like the ones the department originally [published](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr535/nypd-crime-continues-decline-february-2025-shatters-30-year-shooting-record?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). (New York calls these "major" or "index" crimes, echoing but not exactly mirroring the FBI's legacy classification of seven serious offenses: murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto). Those numbers were accurate as of March 3, 2025, when they were posted. But compare them to yesterday's press release, when the NYPD used that same month as its comparison baseline, and the numbers are different: Index crimes are now at 8,250, not 7,821; subway crimes grew from 135 to 162; and the month's murder count rose from 19 to 24\. The February 2025 numbers increased by 5.5% overall and 20.0% for transit between the time they were first announced and their appearance in yesterday's release. A year ago, Commissioner Jessica Tisch celebrated "the third consecutive month of double-digit declines in nearly every major crime category" and credited the department’s subway safety plan with a 15.1% reduction in subway crime. What was initially reported as a “double-digit” decrease in subway crime is now a slight increase after the numbers settled. This isn't a mistake, nor is it an artifact of delayed reporting or fraud. The NYPD classifies every crime by the date it was first reported, not the date it occurred. Report a burglary today that happened a month ago, and it lands on today's ledger. What changes is the *classification* of those crimes — for example, whether the crime is a felony or misdemeanor assault, an attempted murder or a murder. Seriousness upgrades, downgrades or lateral reclassifications occur as complaints move through the department’s extensive auditing process. A hospital exam reveals a victim’s broken jaw, upgrading a misdemeanor assault to a felony; someone who reported a car stolen learns it was actually towed, removing the crime from the ledger. A Vital City analysis of eight years of revisions reveals a consistent and one-directional pattern. New Yorkers, journalists and policymakers should treat the monthly figures that drive the city's public safety hot takes as a first draft, not a final verdict. ### This is a national phenomenon. New York City just lets us measure it. The reliability of crime statistics has become a national and partisan issue. During the 2024 presidential campaign, the two federal pillars of crime measurement— the FBI's [Uniform Crime Reporting Program](http://fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/more-fbi-services-and-information/ucr?%5F%5Fcf%5Fchl%5Ftk=GXfiR51ZNsQHBMA%5FOTZJ80JrvptEwV6.rZGpHmWrMNs-1772371544-1.0.1.1-Xqgc6bPDYaofpUMb4WeirVTC4%5FoRYMqjbC2dL2.w9T8&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which compiles crimes reported to police, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics' [National Crime Victimization Survey](https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection/ncvs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which asks households directly whether they've been victimized— told [contradictory stories](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2024/06/27/trump-and-biden-spar-over-crime-rates-ahead-of-their-debate-what-do-we-really-know?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about whether violent crime was rising or falling. When the FBI quietly revised its 2022 figures, changing a reported 2.1% decline in violent crime to a 4.5% increase, it [deepened suspicion](https://www.factcheck.org/2024/10/crime-stats-still-show-a-decline-since-2020/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on all sides. The Council on Criminal Justice [noted](https://counciloncj.org/when-crime-statistics-diverge/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the FBI revised its data "without explanation," and called the absence of transparency a threat to public trust. The FBI has since moved to [monthly data releases](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-monthly-crime-and-law-enforcement-data?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with a built-in three-month lag, acknowledging that data needs time to “stabilize.” In effect, the FBI is trading timeliness for greater stability — a reasonable choice, but one that sacrifices the real-time figures that drive policy and politics. Cities like New York don’t wait three months. They announce crime numbers within days of a month closing, and those numbers are treated as facts by reporters, elected officials and the public, much the way the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ monthly jobs report drives headlines and markets. New York gives us an unusual opportunity to study the phenomenon. The NYPD releases monthly crime data through press releases and updates its numbers continuously through weekly CompStat reports, the [CompStat 2.0](https://compstat.nypdonline.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) website, and quarterly open data releases. Each new monthly release includes updated year-ago comparison numbers. By archiving these releases over time, it is possible to track how the same month’s crime count changes as it is reported, re-reported and eventually finalized. ### Why the numbers don’t always match Astute readers of Vital City’s year-end crime reports may notice that the figures cited there sometimes differ from the NYPD’s own published totals. This is not an error. It reflects the fact that the NYPD effectively publishes crime data through multiple channels that do not always agree: monthly press releases (the first and most widely reported), [weekly CompStat pages](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/crime-statistics/borough-and-precinct-crime-stats.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the [CompStat 2.0 website](https://compstat.nypdonline.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the City’s [Open Data](https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) portal (updated quarterly) and [historical CompStat tables](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis%5Fand%5Fplanning/historical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-2000-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (the numbers used in historical reporting). Because each source captures data at a different point in the revision cycle, discrepancies are inevitable. The latest available press release for a given month will typically report higher crime counts than the historical end-of-year tables, because the press releases reflect the most recent reclassifications while the year-end tables appear to freeze counts closer to when the “books are closed” — meaning that late-arriving reclassifications for December, in particular, may not be captured. Vital City’s analyses draw on whichever data source is most appropriate for the question at hand, and differences from NYPD-published totals generally reflect these timing gaps rather than any disagreement about the underlying facts. ### The numbers almost always go up Of the 95 monthly major crime totals examined, spanning 2018 through November 2025, every one was later revised upward between the initial press release and subsequent available data. None were revised downward. The average upward revision for total index crime was 2.7%, ranging from less than 1% to just over 6%. This is not random noise; it is a one-directional measurement artifact that systematically understates crime at the moment it is announced. That translates to roughly 3,000 additional major crimes absent from the initial annual count. But recent months have run more than double that average, with revisions reaching 6%, suggesting the gap between what's announced and what actually happened is widening. And unlike polling error, which fluctuates randomly in both directions, these revisions moved only one way — upward — in every month examined. The initial numbers are the ones that make headlines; the corrections arrive quietly, if they are noticed at all. This pattern has an institutional logic. There are asymmetric pressures at work in police crime classification. On one side, individual officers and precinct commanders face [well-documented incentives](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1350/ijps.2010.12.3.195?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to classify crimes at lower severity levels: Lower crime numbers mean better performance metrics, and felonies generate more paperwork, mandatory investigations and supervisory scrutiny than misdemeanors. On the other side, the department’s auditing apparatus exists precisely to catch and correct underclassification, because undercounting the seriousness of crime carries real consequences: delayed detective involvement, misallocated resources, and victims who don’t receive the investigative attention their cases warrant. The auditing process tends to run in one direction because underestimating a crime's severity carries real costs, such as delayed detective response and misallocated resources, while overestimation is the less consequential error. The result is a system that reliably undercounts crime on first release and reliably adjusts upward over time. What does this mean in practical terms? Under the more conservative historical rate, a reported 3% decline is likely to finish nearly flat; a 'flat' month is probably an increase of about 3%. Under the recent rate, the adjustments are larger: a reported 5% decline may land closer to flat, and a 'flat' month likely finishes up 4 to 5%. Either way, the direction of the revision is the same, and any announced decline of less than 5% is at risk of shrinking substantially or flipping signs entirely. The problem occurs when the public conversation treats first-release numbers as final, when elected officials cite them at press conferences without caveat and nobody reads the 'preliminary' fine print at the bottom of the press release. ### How a crime gets counted — and recounted Better understanding this phenomenon requires a brief primer on the NYPD’s complaint process. When someone calls 911, walks into a precinct or even mails a letter (yes, it happens), a responding officer conducts an initial investigation and determines whether a crime has occurred. That officer classifies the offense, assigning both a crime type (such as murder, robbery, or larceny) and a severity level (such as felony or misdemeanor), and files a complaint report. A supervisor reviews and signs off. The report enters the system within hours. The process that follows is governed by the [Crime Complaint Reporting System Guide](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public%5Finformation/public-pguide1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=148), which sets out the rules for categorizing offenses." From there, the precinct's Crime Analysis Unit, a small team of civilian and sworn staff responsible for reviewing complaint reports, may upgrade or downgrade the classification, sometimes calling complainants back for additional information, usually within a day or two. If the case warrants investigation, detectives take over. As new evidence or witness statements come in, detectives can request reclassifications through the precinct. In the ensuing weeks and months, the department’s Data Integrity Unit, which sits outside precinct command structures and is generally indifferent to local pressures, samples complaints for quality and sends them back to precincts for reclassification when errors are found. The Quality Assurance Division investigates specific complaints of misclassification. It is sometimes assumed that prosecutors play a role in how crimes are classified in police statistics. They do not. Under the FBI’s [Uniform Crime Reporting](https://www.rccd.nv.gov/siteassets/content/about/ucr/FAQsforUCR.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), crime statistics are collected and reported exclusively by law enforcement agencies. The system was designed to capture offenses known to the police, not charging decisions or court outcomes. The NYPD is no exception: District attorneys have no say in how the department classifies a crime complaint. Auditing is what separates serious crime statistics from wish lists. The problem is that the original numbers (the ones that make headlines, shape narratives and inform policy decisions) carry an asterisk that nobody reads. There is also a practical cost: When a crime is initially classified at a lower severity than it deserves, it can delay the investigative response. Detectives may be notified late, witness memories fade and cases that warranted immediate attention get a slower start. ### Not all crimes revise the same way The direction and magnitude of revision varies dramatically by crime type, and the pattern reveals something about the mechanics of each offense. **Murder** has the largest average revision: +13.5%. This is almost entirely driven by the Medical Examiner’s office. When someone is shot or seriously injured, the initial complaint is often classified as a felony assault or as “investigate aided,” NYPD shorthand for a case involving a person requiring medical attention whose outcome is still uncertain. If the victim dies days or weeks later, the crime is reclassified as a homicide, often too late for the initial CompStat report. Some death investigations take months to determine the cause. A month that initially reports 16 murders routinely closes at 18 to 20\. The absolute numbers are small, but the percentage shift is large enough to change the story about whether murder is rising or falling in any given period. Year-over-year murder comparisons can swing by 8 percentage points as the data matures, wide enough to flip the sign of the trend when comparing to prior years. When the department announces that “murder is down 10% this month,” the honest answer is often: We don’t know yet. (The department does track these pending cases internally and generally knows which deaths are likely to be reclassified, but that information doesn’t make it into the early press releases.) A [January 2025 press release](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr006/new-york-city-crime-continues-decline-1-700-fewer-major-crimes-january-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) illustrates the problem. At the time, the NYPD reported 25 murders for the month, a 24.1% drop from January 2024’s 33\. By [January 2026](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR002/nypd-fewest-shoooting-incidents-shooting-victims-murders-january?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the January 2025 figure had been revised to 30\. The actual decline was 9%, not 24.1%. The headline number was directionally correct but dramatically overstated. **Felony assault** revises upward by an average of 4.4%, and it does so with remarkable consistency. This is predictable undercounting, and it makes mechanical sense. The line turns on the victim's injuries: broken bones, loss of consciousness, or hospitalization can upgrade a misdemeanor to a felony once medical records arrive. And while 4.4% may sound modest, applied to the tens of thousands of assaults recorded annually, it represents a substantial number of violent crimes missing from the initial counts. Felony assault is the single largest contributor to total revision in 56 of the 95 months studied. **Grand larceny** revises by a more modest 2.2%. But because it is the city's [highest-volume index crime](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/crime-in-new-york-city-trends-statistics) (roughly 48,000 cases a year, compared with 309 murders), it accounts for about a third of the total revision in absolute terms. Some of the reasons for this volatility include the nature of the crime: When a credit card is used fraudulently, the evidence of that fraud may arrive after the initial report. Grand larceny and felony assault together drive approximately two-thirds of the total revision each month. **Burglary** revises upward by 5.0%. Some of this may be driven by retail theft cases where an arrestee turns out to have been previously banned from a store. Under New York law, burglary requires entering or remaining unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime. A shoplifter with no prior ban is simply trespassing or committing larceny, but once a store has formally excluded someone, any subsequent entry becomes unlawful, satisfying the burglary statute and upgrading the charge. What began as a larceny becomes a burglary, but only after investigators confirm the prior ban, a fact rarely known at the time of the initial report. And then there is **grand larceny auto**, the only index crime that consistently revises *downward*, by about 1.0%. The reason is straightforward: Initial reports of stolen vehicles are sometimes reclassified once it turns out the car was towed by the city, the owner misremembered where it was parked or the complaint involves insurance fraud rather than theft. ### The revision rate is increasing Across all index crimes, the annual revision rate was relatively stable from 2018 to 2023, hovering between 1.7% and 3.3%. In 2024, the rate averaged 3.2%, but with a clear acceleration in the second half of the year, when monthly revisions regularly exceeded 3.5% and climbed as high as 4.4%. In 2025, the average monthly revision rate jumped to 4.5% — and because most of those months are still maturing, the final figure will be higher. The monthly time series tells a more granular story. The revision rate was remarkably stable under most commissioners, averaging between 1.9% and 2.7% during the tenures of O'Neill, Shea, Sewell, Caban and Donlon. Under Tisch, the average has jumped to 4.7%, and because those months continue to mature, the final figure will climb further. ### Transit crime is revising more than anything else Transit crime numbers deserve special attention. Since 2022, subway crime has been a central focus of the department’s public messaging. Gov. Hochul [secured $77 million](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/safer-subways-governor-hochul-announces-subway-crime-track-reach-lowest-levels-generation-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) last year for enhanced transit patrols, and transit crime figures have become among the most closely watched numbers the department publishes. The NYPD is revising transit crime upward at rates that far outpace revisions for the city as a whole, and the gap is widening. Between 2018 and 2022, the department revised transit crime upward by a stable 2.2% per year on average, consistent with citywide crime numbers. In 2023, the revision rate started to diverge from other crime revisions, jumping to 4.6% while the overall revision in citywide index crimes was 2.3%. In 2024, transit crime revisions reached 8.7% while citywide index crimes were at 3.2%. For the 2025 months analyzed, the average transit crime revision has hit 11.2%, compared to 4.6% citywide. This means that a headline claiming transit crime is “down 10%” in a given month, based on initial data, could finish flat or even up once the numbers stabilize. The February 2025 transit numbers are a case in point: reported as 135 crimes last February, it has since grown to 162, a 20.0% increase. This analysis cannot say definitively why the transit revision rate has climbed so sharply. The pattern is consistent with several possible explanations: heightened political attention to subway safety may have increased auditing scrutiny on transit complaints; the influx of officers on transit patrols may mean more initial reports filed by personnel less familiar with transit crime classification or the same downclassification pressures documented in the Hyland case may be more widespread than a single district, with the department's auditing apparatus catching and correcting them after the fact. The data alone cannot distinguish among these explanations, and they are not mutually exclusive. What is clear is the practical implication: Transit crime numbers are now the least settled figures in the department's monthly releases. ### A note on transit data integrity One data point that may bear on the 2025 transit revision numbers: in March 2025, the NYPD [stripped Captain Steven Hyland](https://nypost.com/2025/03/19/us-news/nypd-transit-commander-demoted-for-allegedly-faking-subway-crime-stats-victimized-the-victim/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from his command at Transit District 20, which covers central and northern Queens, after an Internal Affairs audit found that he had allegedly directed subordinates to forge signatures and reclassify legitimate complaints to make his district's numbers look better. The department confirmed that a “[handful](https://nypost.com/2025/03/19/us-news/nypd-transit-commander-demoted-for-allegedly-faking-subway-crime-stats-victimized-the-victim/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)” of reports had been “intentionally misclassified.” The department said the misclassified reports did not significantly affect Transit District 20’s overall numbers, in spite of the overall increase in transit revisions in 2025\. ### The damage premature crime stat announcements can do – 2023 example The changing crime data is not an abstract concern. At the end of 2023, Mayor Eric Adams and the NYPD announced that crime had declined for the year. As data continued to mature early into 2024, the numbers told a different story. By spring, the [New York Post reported](https://nypost.com/2024/04/03/us-news/crime-was-in-fact-up-year-as-mayor-adams-tries-to-downplay-disorder/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that crime had in fact risen and that the celebrated decline was a product of preliminary numbers that had not yet been revised upward. But by then the damage is done. The initial numbers have already shaped coverage and public perception, leaving a false impression and further eroding trust in official data. This is the scenario the data predicts. With an average upward revision of nearly 3%, any initially reported decline of less than 3% is at serious risk of flipping signs. And because the revision is systematic, not random, the “preliminary” caveat buried at the bottom of each press release is not just boilerplate. It is one of the most important sentences in the document. ### What should change Four things can improve how the city communicates and consumes crime data. **First, the NYPD should publish revision tables alongside each monthly release.** Include a sidebar in each press release showing how the comparison month's numbers have changed since they were first reported. If January 2025's crime numbers were initially reported as 8,433 and are now 8,940, say so. Let the reader calibrate. The department should also timestamp all data releases, as it already does for its [historical Compstat tables](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis%5Fand%5Fplanning/historical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-2000-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Clear labeling of different versions would reduce unnecessary confusion when observers notice discrepancies between sources. **Second, the mayor’s office and the department should be cautious about making definitive trend claims based on single-month preliminary data.** A month’s crime report is a useful data point, not a verdict. Claiming “eight straight months of decline” when each month’s number is still maturing is an invitation to the kind of embarrassment that followed the 2023 end-of-year announcement — and to the broader erosion of trust that follows when official numbers don’t hold up. Confidence intervals belong in the conversation, at least informally. **Third, journalists should routinely compare the prior year’s numbers in the current press release against the original press release for that period.** This is a five-minute check that would immediately contextualize every monthly crime story. The raw materials are public; the NYPD archives its press releases online. **Fourth, the NYPD should invest in better front-end classification.** The revision pattern is not just an accounting problem. It reflects thousands of individual moments where an officer or supervisor got the severity wrong on the first pass. The goal isn't to eliminate revisions; some reclassification is inevitable as facts develop. It is to reduce the share driven by errors that better training could have prevented. ### How to read the next headline When the next monthly crime report drops, and it announces that major crime is up or down by some percentage compared to the same period last year, observers should mentally add 4 to 5 percentage points to any reported change in total index crime. Add more for burglary, felony assault and especially murder. Subtract for grand larceny auto. Treat transit numbers, for the moment, as provisional sketches rather than finished portraits. The NYPD’s crime data is among the most granular and well-audited in the country. That auditing process is a strength. But the public conversation about crime — in the press, at the podium and in politics — runs on first drafts. And first drafts, it turns out, are systematically wrong. ### Abundance On a Budget URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-can-mamdani-do-nyc-budget/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:24.000Z It is budget season and New York is arguing about the [numbers](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/02/shhh-listen-did-mamdani-say-percent-or-percentage-point/411517/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as City Hall and its defenders and opponents frame their tax proposals. Is the mayor’s proposed tax increase on high earners 2% or 2 percentage points? (It’s two more percentage points on incomes over $1 million.) Is an alternative property tax increase 9.5% or 1.17 percentage points? (It’s the former — which happens to also be the latter.) Is the city’s [deficit $5 billion](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/feb26/sum2-26.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), $7 billion or [$12 billion](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/02/tada-nyc-budget-gap-now-down-7-billion-mamdani-says/411354/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? (The current figure, down from earlier estimates, stands at around $5 billion.) The differences matter, both for substance and presentation, but any way you slice it, the City has a substantial hole in its budget, the [economy is not to blame](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-levine-projects-2-2-billion-budget-shortfall-in-fiscal-year-2026-and-10-4-billion-in-fiscal-year-2027/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the City’s [commitments](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/07/nyregion/mamdani-nyc-class-size.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are set to continue to grow. On top of local structural issues, Mayor Zohran Mamdani faces a [Trump administration](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/how-new-york-city-should-prepare-changes-federal-funding?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20fiscal%20year%202026%20budget%20includes%20$7.4,%2A%20School%20food%20programs%20%2A%20Family%20shelters) that is likely to be more of an [obstacle](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/nycs-federal-funding-outlook-under-trump/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than a backstop, no matter how many pleasant meetings the mayor and president may have. To address the budget gap, Mamdani proposes increasing taxes on high earners and corporations. Given substantial [inequalities](https://fiscalpolicy.org/new-data-show-rising-inequality-strong-wage-growth-for-top-earners?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in recent wage growth — incomes for high earners are outpacing those for everyone else — there is a strong argument for more progressive taxation. That said, the move is fiscally and politically challenging. Despite the Trump administration’s [giveaway to high earners](https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/by-the-numbers-harmful-republican-megabill-favors-the-wealthy-and-leaves?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and big businesses nationally, New York City is still a [high-tax](https://cbcny.org/newsroom/cbc-releases-top-charts-3-new-york-and-its-localities-are-1-taxing-3-spending?utm%5Fsource=substack&utm%5Fmedium=email) place to work and do business relative to elsewhere in the country, which could eventually hurt its competitiveness. Given the [disproportionate](https://joshgreenman.substack.com/p/raise-taxes-or-the-girl-gets-it-mamdanis?utm%5Fsource=post-email-title&publication%5Fid=234560&post%5Fid=188671995&utm%5Fcampaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=7b0b6j&triedRedirect=true&utm%5Fmedium=email) share of taxes that high earners pay, this is a fiscal risk for New York. Further, Gov. Kathy Hochul, who is up for reelection and who has taken a collaborative approach to working with the mayor, seems to be drawing the line at a tax hike (for now). Whether or not the mayor wins this budget battle with Albany, he should consider emphasizing reforms that give the City more bang for its buck by pursuing an abundance agenda — namely, making it easier, faster and cheaper to build what New Yorkers need, and that close the gap between what government promises and what it delivers. These reforms are achievable in tight fiscal conditions and would set the stage for a higher-capacity public sector when fiscal conditions improve and spending can increase. The place to start, as detailed in our recent [policy agenda](https://www.abundanceny.org/agenda?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), is improving the government’s own capacity. For example, the City had [pursued reforms](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2024/Capital%20Process%20Reform%20Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to its own capital construction process under the Adams administration. Mamdani should return to those efforts and push them even further. Currently, the School Construction Authority and Economic Development Corporation enjoy flexible authorities that allow them to build and procure without many of the requirements that the City’s departments of Transportation, Design and Construction or Parks have to follow. While some argue that the state should make some of these [agencies](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2023/S2765?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [authorities](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/mocs/downloads/Regulations/legislative-regulatory-reform/CP-Reform-Task-Force.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with some of the same flexibilities, Mamdani should argue for a comprehensive reform to reduce the requirements on City agencies and make it easier to build. Alongside empowering agencies, the mayor could push to make it easier for them to hire. More than[ 13,000 city positions sit vacant](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-yorks-mamdani-ny-civil-service-system), leaving departments unable to keep pace with basic demand. The civil service exam system — designed a century ago to prevent patronage — now makes hiring far too cumbersome and time-consuming. The State’s [NY HELPS](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-new-resources-help-new-yorkers-find-careers-state-service?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program proved that flexible, experience-based hiring can work, cutting weeks and months off timelines without leading to corruption. Under the last administration, the City[ nearly followed the state’s lead — and then backed off](https://nysfocus.com/2026/02/11/mamdani-civil-service-exams-hiring?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) under union pressure. Mamdani should revisit that decision. And as the state pursues a permanent reform to civil service rules, the City should join efforts that would make the exams faster and job-appropriate and in the [meantime](https://publicsectorjobboard.substack.com/p/what-it-will-take-to-deliver-for?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) use plainer language, more user-friendly design and better track applications to improve the hiring process. Further, while Mamdani’s primary instinct may be to augment the public services that New Yorkers already receive and increase the number of eligible recipients, a more progressive approach would be to improve [access](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-new-resources-help-new-yorkers-find-careers-state-service?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the people already eligible, who tend to be the neediest. Fair Fares, for example, [reaches](https://rpa.org/work/reports/reduced-fares?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) only 40% of eligible riders. Rather than having to find $600 million or more to enable everyone to take the bus for free, the City could improve coordination and auto-enrollment to ensure that everyone eligible gets the benefit they are due. The same is true for [housing](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/04/29/housing-lottery-apartment-application-less-paperwork-rent/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [cash assistance](https://citylimits.org/why-are-you-making-it-so-difficult-nyc-cash-aid-applicants-face-denial-surge/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) benefits, which have [burdensome](https://chpcny.org/publication/brutal-bureaucracy-nyc-housing-connect-analysis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) requirements aimed to prevent fraud, putting a [time tax](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/07/how-government-learned-waste-your-time-tax/619568/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the city’s poorest. Indeed, City Hall could start by extending the time between required renewals and then assemble a [team of technologists](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nHcH6zLXYfl1Gn7vh8IF7aIp5jAS8kCJ/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from within and outside of government to overhaul application processes across government. On housing, the mayor has already demonstrated the right instinct. His support for Hochul’s[ SEQRA modernization](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/let-them-build-governor-hochul-unveils-landmark-reforms-cut-red-tape-and-build-more-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which would exempt infill housing from lengthy environmental review, is aligned with his support of last year’s City Charter amendments. Now, the mayor should build on City of Yes and the charter amendments by [rezoning along subway lines](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor) to both add homes and improve subway revenue. Fixing permitting is equally essential: Between 2010 and 2023, the average permit for a new residential building of five or more units took [18 months](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/2025-Charter-Revision-Commission-Preliminary-Report-DIGITAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with four years typically passing from initial filing to occupancy. Other cities have [cut](https://www.constructionowners.com/news/san-francisco-pushes-major-permitting-reforms?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) permitting to weeks. The mayor should also focus on [building codes](https://www.centerforbuilding.org/publication/beyond-zoninghidden-code-barriers-to-middle-scale-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to make [elevators](https://www.centerforbuilding.org/publication/elevators?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) cheaper for buildings to install by reducing size requirements and allow for bigger single-stair buildings to cut costs. The administration also seems [interested](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/02/05/leila-bozorg-mamdani-housing-rent-freeze/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in expanding [modular construction](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/building-better-piece-by-piece) and [mass timber](https://progresschamber.org/research/mass-timber-promising-housing-tech/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which bring factory efficiency to home construction. The mayor also should throw his weight behind making it cheaper and easier to build and establish new lines. Without reform, Phase 2 of the Second Avenue Subway could [cost as much $4 billion](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/why-it-costs-4-billion-per-mile-of-subway-track) per mile, [many times the global average](https://transitcosts.com/transit-costs-study-final-report/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#case%5Fnewyork). To make projects like it and the Interborough Express cheaper, the City could reduce and streamline demands it makes on the MTA and support the MTA’s ongoing efforts to reduce costs (such as by right-sizing stations). On buses, [results are available sooner](https://transalt.org/big-ideas-bus?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): busways, all-door boarding, automated bus lane enforcement and curbside improvements would [meaningfully accelerate the system](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/68014662afada372eb0560ca/t/68f6457384978845da0d64ab/1760970099339/Riders+Alliance+Much+Better+Buses%5F+It%E2%80%99s+About+Time+%281%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Combined with more Fair Fares uptake, this would result in a huge improvement for affordability and quality of life for working-class families. Many of these reforms would involve Albany, but progress to improve the government’s plumbing may be easier now that the state sees the City’s fiscal challenges and the voters’ clear demand for change. And relative to a bruising budget fight, Albany lawmakers may well welcome the opportunity. By moving on these fronts, Mamdani would be doing a few crucial things to advance his agenda. First, he would make life more affordable for millions of New Yorkers who cannot access public services and who see themselves as being squeezed out of their city. Second, he would be delivering on his [promise](https://jacobin.com/2026/02/zohran-mamdani-efficiency-nyc-budget?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to create a government “where excellence is no longer the exception.” Mamdani generated an enormous amount of hope and goodwill in his campaign. He may well win the state revenue fight eventually. Federal funding will eventually start flowing again to New York. If those new resources come, New Yorkers would benefit even more from having them flow through a more streamlined, outcome-oriented process. ### For Whom the Plows Come URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/snow-complaints-staten-island-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:24.000Z When the snow started falling on the evening of February 22nd, it came down the way the forecasters said it would: fast, heavy, and indiscriminate. [By sunrise, 22 inches had accumulated at LaGuardia.](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2026/02/23/new-york-city-blizzard-snow-storm-february-2026-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Schools were closed. Roads were impassable. And across all five boroughs, New Yorkers picked up the phone. On February 23, [15,387 of them called 311](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Social-Services/311-Service-Requests-from-2020-to-Present/erm2-nwe9/about%5Fdata?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a roughly 50% spike over the winter daily average. The number alone tells you little. Storms cause surges; surges recede. But the shape of those calls (who made them, from where, and about what) tells you everything. The snow fell on everyone equally. What happened next did not. Here is the first thing the data shows, and the most disorienting: Staten Island, population 496,000, the borough that consistently files the fewest 311 complaints on any given day, filed the most. Not by a hair. By a mile. Its 4,027 complaints on the 23rd outpaced Brooklyn (3,803), Queens (3,425), the Bronx (2,287) and Manhattan (1,834). Of those, 3,546 were for snow and ice, outnumbering the other four boroughs combined. Eight of the 10 hardest-hit zip codes were on the island. Meanwhile, Manhattan, population 1.7 million, logged 146 snow complaints. One hundred forty-six. Adjusted for [population](https://data.census.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Staten Island’s snow complaint rate was 715 per 100,000 residents. Manhattan’s was 9\. That is an 83-to-1 ratio. The 311 system is one of Michael Bloomberg’s most lasting legacies. Before he launched it in March of 2003, New Yorkers seeking city services were left to sort through over 40 agency-specific phone numbers: one for potholes, another for rats, a third for noise, most of which rang and rang or went to voicemail. Bloomberg, ever the systems thinker, saw this as an information problem. Consolidate the intake, route the requests, track performance. A McKinsey fix, neatly boxed into three digits. It worked. And then it became something else. Because every 311 call is also an act of faith: a New Yorker picking up the phone and trusting that someone on the other end will do something. Over 23 years, tens of millions of those calls have piled up, and they tell you, in close to real time, where the city is failing. When 6,524 people called about snow and ice on a single day — nearly five times the previous winter’s worst — that was thousands of people saying: I cannot get out of my house. Staten Island is the least urban borough by a lot, and it shows. One subway line (the Staten Island Railway, 14 miles, unconnected to the rest of the system). A bus network that leaves much of the South Shore immobile without a car. Most days, they make it work, as people all over America do. But when 22 inches of snow fall and only 41% of your street segments are designated for priority plowing — compared with nearly two-thirds of street segments in Brooklyn and Manhattan — that independence turns into isolation. Staten Island has always felt a little like a stepchild. In 1993, [65% of its voters sought to leave New York City *entirely*](https://www.silive.com/news/2023/08/65-of-staten-islanders-voted-to-secede-from-new-york-city-in-1993-from-the-vault.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* The vote was symbolic, but the frustration was real. Many of its residents have spent their lives feeling like Manhattan and Brooklyn politicians only remember them when it is time to collect a toll. When Nicole Malliotakis, the island’s congresswoman, rails against [congestion pricing](https://malliotakis.house.gov/media/press-releases/malliotakis-joins-bipartisan-group-elected-officials-unite-against-potential?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), she is channeling a community exhausted by paying for a city that rarely pays them any mind. Zip code 10314, Mid-Island, where strip malls meet single-family homes, filed 791 complaints on the 23rd. That is more than any Manhattan zip code filed all week. The 311 data tells a second story too. The Bronx, which ranked fourth in total complaints, led the city in one category that has nothing to do with snow: lack of heat and hot water. Of the 2,256 heating complaints filed that day, 766 came from the Bronx alone, outpacing every other borough, including Brooklyn, which has nearly twice its population. The most common descriptor was two words: “entire building.” Not one apartment, not one floor. The whole building. No heat in the freezing cold. So on the same day, in the same storm, Staten Island was calling about snow in the streets and the Bronx was calling about cold inside the walls. The first problem is a city that did not send enough plows. The second is landlords whose buildings lost heat. One is a failure by the government. The other is a failure by a landlord. The Department of Sanitation fielded 43% of the day’s complaints. Housing Preservation and Development fielded 23%. Snow removal is the Department of Sanitation’s job; heat is a landlord’s obligation, enforced by HPD. The snow and the cold came from the same sky, but the failures had nothing to do with each other. Yet we talk about all of it as ‘storm response,’ as if the answer is always more salt and more shovels. The snow, at least, will melt. The landlord will still be there in April. Then there are the trees. On an average day, about 44 New Yorkers call to report a damaged tree; the previous winter’s worst day drew 306\. On the 23rd, 1,496 people called. That number includes 572 reports of entire trees falling, and 724 of major limbs coming down. The Parks Department, which on most days concerns itself with mowing schedules and playground permits, was suddenly an emergency response agency. And while fallen trees might sound like a secondary concern next to frozen pipes and buried cars, they block streets, take out power lines, crush parked vehicles, and, on occasion, [kill people](https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/tree-fall-kills-woman-in-backyard-nyc-pool-police/3825149/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In the language of emergency management, this is called a cascading emergency: one problem that generates five others. The less glamorous companion stat: 88 complaints about “wood pile remaining,” a 60-fold spike over the winter average. The trees came down fast. Cleaning them up took considerably longer. It snowed in Manhattan too, by the way, triggering 146 complaints. You might wonder how an entire borough gets through a blizzard with 146 complaints. After the January storm, DSNY issued over [4,500 sidewalk violation summonses across the city.](https://www.amny.com/news/nyc-blizzard-sidewalk-shoverling-rules-tickets/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Manhattan received 179\. Queens got 1,529\. The sidewalks in Manhattan were already clear, because Manhattan has doormen, building managers, commercial landlords and BIDs like the Downtown Alliance, whose [60-person sanitation team](https://downtownny.com/about-us/services/sanitation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) clears bus stops, crosswalks and sidewalks after every snowfall. It feels as if below 96th Street, the borough handles itself. That is how it works when you have money. You do not call 311\. You do not need to. Staten Island has no equivalent of the Downtown Alliance, and its business improvement districts cover far less ground. Neither do the Rockaways, where zip code 11691 still cracked the top 10 in complaints. In neighborhoods like these, when the plow does not come, 311 is the only thing between you and waiting. During the January storm, CBS New York [reported](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/staten-island-snow-removal-frustration-dsny/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that DSNY had pulled crews off the island and reassigned them to Brooklyn while streets were still buried. Borough President Vito Fossella did not mince words: “Staten Island became second-class citizens a couple of days ago.” When schools reopened, citywide [attendance was 63%.](https://abc7ny.com/post/2026-blizzard-mayor-zohran-mamdani-announces-public-schools-will-reopen-tuesday-snow-day/18643037/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) On Staten Island, where accumulations reached 28 inches, [elected officials put the figure at 16%](https://www.fox5ny.com/news/nyc-schools-reopen-backlash-staten-island?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It took 4,000 calls and two buried days before the city sent [reinforcements](https://ny1.com/nyc/staten-island/news/2026/02/25/mamdani--dsny-doubles-staten-island-crews-to-clear-snow?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and it was not the first time the borough had been left waiting. Weeks earlier, the Sanitation Department had [reassigned](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/staten-island-snow-removal-frustration-dsny/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its crews to Brooklyn mid-cleanup. According to its own priority maps, only 41% of Staten Island’s streets are designated for first-pass plowing, the lowest rate of any borough. The snow did not fall unevenly, but the plows did. ### The Hidden Cost of Trash URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-trash-removal-cost-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:24.000Z Last year, mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani captured the public’s imagination with a series of [snappy affordability pledges](https://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): a rent freeze on stabilized units, fast and free buses, City-owned grocery stores and free childcare for all. But as the father of his vanquished opponent once said, “you campaign in poetry; you govern in prose.” Now, as mayor, he has to figure out how — or whether — to deliver on the promises made during his campaign. Childcare looks like a winner; even [moderate](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/12/menin-and-mamdani-could-find-common-ground-on-child-care-push-00686809?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [Democrats](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-investments-deliver-universal-child-care-new-york-children-under?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) were eager to work with him on it. On the flip side, even many New Yorkers who support free buses don’t think the government [should actually do it](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/10/upshot/polling-experiment-free-buses.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the campaign and now administration have been quietly shifting the emphasis from “free” to “fast.” As for City-owned grocery stores, [Vital City readers know how I feel](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/nyc-grocery-cost-explained). That leaves the rent freeze. People can debate (including in [Vital](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor) [City](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-york-needs-a-smarter-way-to-control-rents)) the wisdom of zeroing out increases on the roughly one-third of housing units in New York City that are subject to rent regulation. But the campaign promise was simple, clear and — if the Rent Guidelines Board goes along — squarely within the mayor’s control. The administration has [reaffirmed its promise](https://www.thecity.nyc/2026/02/05/leila-bozorg-mamdani-housing-rent-freeze/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of a four-year rent freeze. The task now at hand is how to pay for it. Mamdani the candidate argued that landlords are already on average [so far ahead](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yn0sFssPZTg&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that they can handle a few years without rent hikes. Mamdani the mayor understands that [averages obscure outliers](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-rent-is-too-damn-high-but-also-too-low). A growing share of rent-stabilized buildings are in [dire financial straits](https://furmancenter.org/thestoop/entry/experts-warn-distress-in-part-of-rent-stabilized-housing-stock-poses-growing-risks-for-tenants-and-new-york-city?%5F%5Fcf%5Fchl%5Ftk=y7b2uFKf2bQ.sU2BI3zvUhDhcvuk1Kt.HfIP3XuTcls-1771432893-1.0.1.1-FxoJxWWJ4qOh.pEKnHInEh6anKVfm9qtMiOWdt6MS0E&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which soon might get even worse with a looming [property tax hike](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/17/nyregion/budget-mamdani-property-taxes.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When costs exceed rents, buildings risk a return to the dark days when landlords simply walked away from their properties. With a rent freeze seemingly a foregone conclusion, the administration has been casting about for how to rein in landlords’ operating costs. The conversation has focused on things like insurance and property taxes, but there is one more tangible item that often gets overlooked: trash. The rotting, leaking bags of trash piled onto the city’s sidewalks have long been an embarrassment for the city, and the Department of Sanitation under Eric Adams finally made a move to do something about it, requiring some buildings to put refuse in bins. But hidden beyond the cleanliness struggles are big costs for New York City residential building owners. The journey of a few hundred miles from curb to landfills, incinerators and recycling centers [costs taxpayers](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Department-of-Sanitation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) around $35 per dwelling unit per month, facilitated by Department of Sanitation workers and private waste management companies. The cost to building owners to move trash, recycling and now compost just a few feet from the city’s cellars and courtyards to the curb is, surprisingly, much higher. The cost has never been tallied up, so my organization, [the Center for Building in North America](https://www.centerforbuilding.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), worked with [the Center for Zero Waste Design](https://centerforzerowastedesign.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to interview dozens of owners and pore over financial statements to figure out how much it costs, and [published a report with our findings](https://centerforzerowastedesign.org/all/advocacy/hidden-cost-of-trash/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To get this right, we found owners of everything from brownstones to large campuses, and worked with them to determine what share of their labor and other budgets were going towards waste handling and related work. The number that we arrived at is about $75 per month, on average, for each apartment in the city. While building owners pay the cost directly, one way or another, operating costs are passed along to residents. And at least for small and mid-sized buildings, this is a cost that is completely avoidable if New York City would adopt the same waste collection policies that you find across Europe and beyond. Seventy-five dollars a month might not be a lot of extra cost for a new luxury apartment, but it’s a sizable sum for most New Yorkers. Citywide, the median household income is around $81,000\. That $75 a month means $900 a year — more than 1% of all income that the typical New York City household earns before taxes goes towards paying to move their rotting banana peels, Amazon boxes and used yogurt containers from the trash room to the curb. For rent-stabilized housing, $75 a month means the difference between a cost-neutral rent freeze and one that will cost owners dearly. The median rent in a rent-stabilized building is $1,384 a month, so if the City can deliver landlords an operating savings of $75 per month by relieving them of the duty to handle waste, that would pay for about two years of a rent freeze, assuming the alternative is rent hikes of around 2.5% per year. Seventy-five dollars a month also means that new affordable housing that the City subsidizes will not be able to serve the tenants most in need. When the City finances new fully affordable housing, it tries to ensure financial sustainability by setting rents at levels that at least cover operating costs. It’s the same when the City sets affordable rents in private developments receiving tax breaks, or built under the Mandatory Inclusionary Housing program. An extra $75 per month in costs for affordable housing translates to an extra $75 per month in rent, which means an extra $3,000 that applicants must demonstrate in yearly income to rent a given apartment (the City uses the same 40-times-your-rent formula that private landlords do). It might seem surprising that it costs more than twice as much to move waste a few feet, from building to sidewalk, than it does for the almost 10,000-strong Department of Sanitation and its private contractors to take it hundreds of miles from curbs to landfills and incinerators as far away as South Carolina. But when you consider the inefficiency of the work, it starts to make sense — as does the logical solution. My own five-story condo building in Williamsburg shows how high the costs of waste handling can be. We have a storefront on our ground floor, so residents trudge downstairs to leave bags of trash and recycling in the cellar. Three times a week, the management company sends a porter to haul the bags up the narrow staircase and onto the street. Back when buildings were still allowed to leave refuse on the sidewalk, that was the end of it. But in an attempt to clean up the streets, the City now requires that waste be placed in bins. So, after bringing the bags up, the worker has to bring the bins up as well, where they sit on the curb until collection. The next day — another three times a week — they come back to the building to haul them back downstairs. Along the way, there is constant cleaning — cleaning the waste room, fishing pedestrians’ stray trash out of bins that sat at the curb, spraying the bins down. And much of this work now has to happen after hours, with the City pushing the old 4 p.m. setout time to 6 p.m. or even 8 p.m. in an attempt to shrink dining hours for rats, in the process lengthening hours for supers and porters and driving up costs for those who employ them. The actual work is unpleasant and physically taxing, but the real hassle is in traveling to and from the building six times a week. It’s a small building with just seven apartments and minimal other cleaning needs, so most trips are just to move waste and bins between the cellar and the sidewalk. Co-op and condo fees have [skyrocketed in the 2020s](https://millersamuel.com/?charts=manhattan-hoa-monthly-cost-per-sq-ft-based-on-sales-during-each-quarter-2&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the growing difficulty of finding labor to move all of this waste around is one reason why. When accounting for how much of the building workers’ time is spent hauling around bags and bins of waste, the total comes out to $750 per month for my building, or $107 for each of our seven units. As it turns out, this is not an uncommon amount for a small building. One owner of a Brooklyn brownstone reported paying a service a whopping $214 per unit just to move bins from her front yard to the curb and back. Most owners, especially of bigger buildings with economies of scale, pay less, but the average for waste handling works out to $75 a month for each apartment. Trash needs to be taken out, but there is a better way. Visitors to Spain might notice that there are large bins on the street, taking up a few parking spaces near the corner, and residents bring their trash and recycling down to them directly. There is no super, porter or “trash concierge” (as new luxury buildings are now branding it) to handle your waste. Your landlord or condo board has no involvement in your waste at all — it’s between you and the City. For large or luxury buildings with waste chutes or luxury expectations — and the rents and maintenance fees to go along with them — paying staff to ferry waste from the building to the curb might still make sense. Indeed, our research found that larger buildings have lower per-unit handling costs. But for the typical row house or small apartment building, the sort of building that most New Yorkers live in, the waste-handling intermediary adds little value and imposes huge costs. New York is a city that most people experience on foot, so one person in almost every household walks down their street every day. Carrying a bag to a bin somewhere on the block would not be that onerous (and for many buildings, like my own, it would even spare schlepping down a flight of stairs to the cellar or to a courtyard). Many buildings were not built with waste storage areas that are convenient or adequate to today’s trash, so removing buildings from the business of storing their own waste would relieve residents of the smells of stinky bags of garbage in and around their buildings. It also means that far less of our public space has to be given over to trash, since mechanical collection from common containers means that the City can pick up waste more frequently. There would be a related benefit: making the City’s pickup job much easier. Beyond the costs and hassle to owners, the City pays tremendously for door-to-door collection. With the typical New York City lot being just 25 feet wide, sanitation workers must crawl down every block in the city two or three times a week and manually lift bags from the curb (and increasingly from inside bins) and then toss them into the back of a truck. The wall of parked cars between the sidewalk and the street means that it’s not realistic to mechanically collect the suburban-sized bins the City is asking owners to put their waste out in. The work is [back-breaking](https://swana.org/news/swana-news-archive/article/2024/12/19/SWANA-Statement-on-BLS-2023-National-Census?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the constant need to jump on and off of trucks in moving traffic is [dangerous](https://www.city-journal.org/article/the-toughest-job-in-town?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When heavy snow creates an impassable wall between the street and the curb, collection grinds to a halt and bags pile up. New York City has been [dipping its toes](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dsny/collection/containerization/m9-bins.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into more efficient practices, but old paradigms have limited the appetite for innovation. The City calls its “Empire Bins” — large containers as part of a pilot program that hold far more waste than typical suburban-style bins, and which can be mechanically collected — “European-style,” but the way they use them is not as efficient as in Europe. In New York, only building staff can access the containers, so building owners still have to pay to store waste on-site and have supers and porters carry it out to bins, meaning minimal cost savings. The bins are also specific to one building, so they are limited to large properties lest entire streets be taken over by them, one in front of each house or small tenement — not something that New Yorkers would tolerate given competing demands for parking, the [return of outdoor dining](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/02/04/city-council-to-bring-back-year-round-outdoor-dining-after-adams-era-decimation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [curb extensions](https://www.nycstreetdesign.info/geometry/curb-extension?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for pedestrian safety. And while Empire Bins are lifted mechanically, making collection far more efficient than the old manual methods, the Department of Sanitation has not updated its pick-up frequency to capitalize on these efficiencies — they still only collect two or three times a week (and just once for recycling and compost), compared to up to [twice *per day* in Europe](https://dsny.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/reports/future-of-trash-april-2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), allowing for far fewer bins and less smelly trash sitting out. Moving to a system of City-owned containers might some day open up possibilities for waste management beyond what door-to-door collection can manage. In New York, most waste that could be recycled [is not](https://www.thecity.nyc/2024/04/04/new-yorkers-recycling-less-sanitation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In parts of Europe, properly sorting waste into separate streams is encouraged by charging for disposal of trash destined for landfills, while offering recycling for free. Collection from larger, City-owned containers also allows greater investment in infrastructure, moving waste containers underground, as [in the Netherlands](https://www.reddit.com/r/oddlysatisfying/comments/190s8vb/the%5Ftrash%5Freceptacles%5Fof%5Fthe%5Fnetherlands/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), keeping smells and bulky containers off the street, and enabling even greater quantities of waste to be collected in one go. Some places in [Scandinavia](https://www.envacgroup.com/us/projects/bergen/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have even taken this to the extreme with underground vacuum tube systems, eliminating the need to collect waste with trucks at all — a system that New Yorkers might be familiar with on Roosevelt Island, installed back when the city still had grand visions for improvement. New York isn’t the only city in North America that struggles with waste and could benefit from a new approach. The United States and Canada are historically low-density and suburban nations, leaving cities to struggle with suburban-style solutions. In Toronto, many new buildings must [sacrifice huge amounts of ground-floor retail space](https://www.azuremagazine.com/article/parking-type-g-loading-toronto-retail-haf-giaimo/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to make way for enormous loading docks that can host enormous garbage trucks making three-point turns. Other American cities on the Northeast Corridor struggle with similar inefficiencies as New York — bins or even bags put out by individual buildings, but with mechanical collection blocked by a row of parked cars. In Philadelphia, a strike by sanitation and other municipal workers even forced the city to temporarily embrace a more efficient model — [centralized collection points](https://www.fox29.com/news/philly-strike-where-drop-off-your-trash-district-council-33-goes-strike?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) rather than door-to-door pick-ups — albeit in a slapdash, smelly way compared to the modern sealed containers on every block that residents have access to in, say, Madrid or Prague. It may feel to New Yorkers today like supers and porters hauling bags and bins back and forth from the curb are in the city’s DNA, but waste practices have changed before. [In 1971](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/03/02/upshot/nyc-trash-rules.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the miracle of plastics let the city move away from Oscar the Grouch-style metal cans to thick contractors’ bags. [In 1982](https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/20/nyregion/2-man-garbage-crews-agreed-on-for-the-city.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), reeling from the City’s brush with bankruptcy, the sanitation workers’ union agreed to cut three-man crews down to two workers per truck. Under the [rat-hating](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/nyregion/rat-sightings-trash-new-york.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) administration of Eric Adams, the City is finally signing up for waste containerization — forcing bags into suburban-style bins and even larger containers. Now, with Mayor Mamdani’s pledge to deliver on a rent freeze for rent-stabilized tenants and housing affordability for all, it may be time for New Yorkers to learn to take out their own trash. ### Of Molehills, Mountains and Snowballs URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-nypd-snowball-fight-police-arrest/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:24.000Z At this rate, we might have to rename the West Village’s Washington Square Park the Place Where That Snowball Fight Happened. For the moment, that great public space has been redefined by an incident in which a social media-generated snowball fight in the aftermath of a blizzard devolved into a crowd of people [pelting NYPD officers](https://x.com/BGOnTheScene/status/2026065265201475765?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the back, chest and head with snow and ice. The officers were responding to 911 calls that the event had turned disorderly, and within seconds, a few people turned from hurling snowballs at each other to targeting the police. As the officers beat a retreat, they were hit again and again by members of a jeering crowd that seemed to delight in watching them wince and grimace. The snowball fight has taken on a life of its own, aggravated by the comments of the city’s political actors. Politicians, activists, and the commentariat writing off the forceful pelting of cops with snowballs as a minor kerfuffle or all in good fun are wrong. Clobbering police officers with snowballs as they try to assess a situation and determine what to do, knowing it could hurt them and will definitely humiliate them, long after they have made it clear they aren’t there to participate, is dangerous and undermines the function of city government by normalizing the disrespect and mistreatment of its police. Mayor Zohran Mamdani, who rightly expressed some concern about the incident, should’ve been more alarmed by how the NYPD was treated and called for a more decisive response by the city, acknowledging that a crime — even if it was a minor one — had been committed. Instead, he insisted it was a minor incident that should be put to rest without further action: “I've said that what I saw was a snowball fight. It should be treated accordingly. It was one that got out of hand. But that's what it was.” But contrary to the claims of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association and hardened critics of everything Mamdani that the incident amounts to a series of violent felonies that call for prison time, this doesn’t indicate a rampant crisis of disrespect for the city’s police. It is more like the usual actors responding to a police-involved incident as we’ve come to expect: by either dismissively brushing it off, or treating it as the crime of the century. In 2012, when I was commanding the NYPD’s 6th precinct, which covers the West Village, I policed [a massive pillow fight](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVcgGsNlO40&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the same park. It consisted of no less than 1,000 people spending hours hitting each other with pillows. Like the snowball fight, it was social media-generated, done without a permit (and therefore technically unlawful), and intended to be harmless. Feathers and other pillow parts wafted into the air and left the park a mess, but otherwise it went off without a hitch. The reason it remained a recreational pillow fight and not a free-for-all was that we sent several officers to the location, cordoned off an arena for the fight, and made sure it didn’t disrupt anyone else using the park. I coordinated the police response from a perch atop the park’s memorial arch, accessed by a secret stairwell. The participants respectfully followed our instructions, ended the event when we asked them to, and didn’t target bystanders. More important than our attempt to control the crowd through a police presence, nobody got it in their head to run up to cops and relentlessly hit them with pillows. If that were anything more than brief and playful, or [looked anything like](https://x.com/BGOnTheScene/status/2026065265201475765?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) how the crowd treated the police in the park on Monday, we would have shut the event down and arrested the people who impeded police operations. Hitting police officers in the head with snowballs might be funny or even cute if you’re six years old, but not if you’re a grown man. Repeatedly throwing snow and ice at someone’s face is not good-natured frolic. Anyone who has been hit square in the head with a snowball, let alone an icy one, knows this. But since the line between winter fun and aggression can be blurry, and the most common snowball fight is indeed consensual, it is the type of act people exploit to harass or hurt someone under the cover of play. Think of it as a more dangerous version of a child twirling a finger inches from a sibling’s face while saying “but I’m not touching you,” or a protester thrusting a phone camera inches from a police officer’s face and following them around while insisting they are doing nothing more than exercising their rights. In the latter case, the person can be arrested for impeding the officer. The same logic applies to hurling snowballs at police who are trying to do their job, except it can also be injurious. As a police officer, I’ve seen people bullied to tears by a mob hitting them in the face with snowballs, as a parent, I’ve seen it result in bruises, and as a teacher, my wife has seen it cause eye injuries. It is a crime, (s)no(w) exception, to throw anything at anyone in public without their consent if it doesn’t serve a legitimate purpose and causes annoyance, alarm or injury. This is a settled matter under [New York State Penal Law](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/240.26?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The only questions are whether the crime is disorderly conduct, harassment or assault, and whether it is a violation, misdemeanor or felony. This includes throwing snowballs at police officers. When the act also prevents officers from performing their job, you have the additional charge of obstructing government administration. While I doubt the offenses rise to the level of a felony assault against an officer, which are reserved for cases of intentional physical injury or use of a weapon, it doesn’t mean the crowd’s actions weren’t criminal in nature, deserving of a response that holds people accountable and sets the tone for the future. It’s true, in the past, police officers have engaged in snowball fights with members of the public. But those incidents were generally congenial and voluntary, and the police weren’t dispatched to the fight by 911 after citizens called them to the scene. In the case here, the throwers were not children laughing along with the police; the emerging account is that the incident consisted of adults and teenagers repeatedly throwing snow and ice at officers long after it was extremely clear the officers wanted no part of it, and it was a form of aggression. When you watch [the](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/24/nyregion/nypd-snowball-fight-washington-square-park.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [videos](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bx7PbRpJPOA&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the pelting intensifies even as officers take the hits passively, on the retreat, and show obvious discomfort and stress at being struck in the head. If anything, all of this seemed to just embolden some of the participants, leading frustrated officers to shove people out of their path and threaten the use of pepper spray. If their jeering and relentless persistence were any indication, those throwing the snowballs were attempting to humiliate police officers in a way that could injure them. That’s why Mamdani’s response missed the mark. To understand what I mean, you only have to imagine the mayor’s likely reaction to treating anyone else this way. Picture nurses going to work being pelted with snow by a crowd, or law professors walking to NYU getting repeatedly hit in the head with snow and ice while being cursed at. Picture the Parks Department employees who keep Washington Square Park clean being treated this way, or Sanitation workers picking up trash being hit by a crowd while they fled. Finally, imagine congregants exiting a mosque, synagogue, or church, maliciously hit in the head with snowballs at close range, long after they made it clear that they wanted no part of it. So what makes Monday’s incident different? I only see two ways it could be. One is if a person thinks the New Yorkers who work as police are less deserving of their dignity and safety than everyone else. When I read the bios of the people who’ve made the most strident defenses of the crowd in the park, I can’t help but conclude many of them are looking for reasons to be glad the responding officers were humiliated, because they don’t like the police. The other way it could be different is if you have lived a life where you have never been surrounded by bullies who used the pretext of a snowball fight to hurt you. The most charitable explanation is therefore that the mayor has never had this happen to him, and so he has no idea what it feels like. Nobody deserves it, let alone the city’s uniformed public servants. That is why the conduct we witnessed in the park was a crime, even if the most appropriate charge is a comparably minor one. The histrionics of the police union haven’t been helpful because they are as much a caricature as people laughing the incident off as harmless — what happened was not on the level of a bona fide assault on an officer, the kind that occurs when they fight it out with a robbery suspect, or get in the middle of drunks throwing punches. But the union was right in criticizing the mayor for denying that what took place hurt police officers, was against the law, and demanded action. If something like this happens again, I invite the mayor to turn to the wisdom I learned growing up in 20th-century Brooklyn. If you wanted to rope a stranger into a snowball fight, you could toss one snowball at them, aiming for the legs. If they didn’t join in, you smiled and let them pass. You definitely didn’t surround them and unload snowballs on their head as they walked away. In the era I am from in Bensonhurst, that person and his friends would soon be back. With baseball bats. I am not recommending that type of retaliation, but I understand what motivates it. As Snowballgate grinds on longer than most people want it to, it seems to be settling in the right place. The police have released [images](https://www.amny.com/news/nypd-images-teens-snowballs-washington-square-park/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the most egregious attackers, and one, after being arrested on assault charges, has been [arraigned on a misdemeanor](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/video/charges-reduced-to-misdemeanor-in-nypd-snowball-fight-arrest-1/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). If the NYPD’s track record of apprehending people who’ve assailed its officers is any indication, other arrests will follow. The mayor, as of late Friday afternoon, has been silent on the NYPD’s decision to pursue suspects and level charges. People will be watching closely to see how he handles the next incident where the city’s police are subject to a humiliating indignity, especially one that rises to the level of a crime. And for the rest of us, the lesson is as simple and pure as the driven snow: Don’t throw anything at the police. ### A New Mayor’s Trial By Snow URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-snow-emergency-response/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:25.000Z In the brief time that Zohran Mamdani has been a household name for New Yorkers, he has been plagued by criticisms of inexperience. “He’s young,” they say, and it’s true — he is the youngest person, in fact, to hold the title of mayor in a century, and the first Millennial to do so. “He doesn’t know City Hall,” they say — also true, as he’s spent his time as a lawmaker in Albany. “He’s never managed anyone” — fair, as his staff of a handful in the State Assembly pales in comparison to the 300,000-plus people he’s suddenly overseeing. Then came a record winter, a major challenge for any mayor, let alone a new one. A “bomb cyclone” levelled half of the country in late January, followed by 13 days of sub-zero temperatures in New York City, which meant all that snow just wouldn’t melt. And just as residents were donning thinner coats, another blizzard — the ninth largest in recorded history — dumped 22 inches onto LaGuardia Airport this week. It’s a blessing in disguise for a man who won more on sweeping promises than on management competence. There is perhaps no better crash course in city operations than an extreme weather event like a snowstorm — a time when our government’s capacity to *act* instead of just *legislate* is put on full display to the public. And though Mamdani took some fair [hits](https://gothamist.com/news/facing-historic-blizzard-mamdani-says-nyc-learned-lessons-from-last-snowstorm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for management, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the first storm, the cold wind in his face will serve his mayoralty well over the long run, forcing him to grapple with the daunting reality that grand ambitions are nothing without day-to-day government competence. Like my friend Hayden Clarkin [wrote](https://x.com/the%5Ftransit%5Fguy/status/2026377062601072756?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): “Every politician must understand that the public feels delivery and not policy.” As most New Yorkers know, snowstorms are legendary tests for mayors. The disastrous “Lindsay Blizzard” of 1969, for example, laid bare the notion that John Lindsay, like Mamdani, was also young (44, not 34) and not up to task. A 2010 storm, which first found Michael Bloomberg in Bermuda, didn’t help the image he was already battling of a billionaire being out of touch with New Yorkers. Disasters are not make-or-break events for mayors, per se, but they can deepen views that voters might already have of them. For Mamdani, this past month not only provided a premier “stress test” for a socialist’s managerial chops, but also offered Hizzoner a rare opportunity to prove himself to New Yorkers. He mostly passed, and where he didn’t, he learned valuable lessons that should serve him well. Chief among them: that a manager must adapt on the fly. After the bomb cyclone in late January, the Mamdani administration placed an emphasis on the plow. The mayor’s earliest videos were shot in Sanitation garages. With the city’s now well-tested online tracker showing plow activity live for all to see, Mamdani was spotted high-fiving and waving to drivers. This focus makes sense: People are conditioned to take how passable the streets are as the leading barometer of how well their city is doing during a storm. But the infrastructure we traverse each day is much more granular than that. There were problems. Bus riders trudged through stops encased in snow. For days, crosswalks remained treacherous for pedestrians, let alone those with disabilities or strollers. Citi Bike stations went untouched for a long stretch, infuriating users. The plows are essential, of course, especially for emergency vehicles. But in a city where most trips are taken by foot, these daily perils matter. The City and the mayor noticed — and in the second storm, it focused on making sure more than just the street was passable. Mamdani’s travel ban expedited plowing. City workers prioritized bus stops and shelters. In the first storm, the city likely waited too long to call on and pay New Yorkers to shovel. Earlier alerts in this week’s blizzard raised the headcount (and pay) to over a thousand New Yorkers signing up to help. In the first storm, complaints came in that heating centers were insufficient or ill-positioned. This time, more than double were deployed. In the second, emergency workers, paid $30 an hour, cleared sidewalks and intersections and bike lanes all across the city. The second time around, Lyft, which manages and operates Citi Bike, didn’t [delay](https://x.com/vinbarone/status/2025977390686413147?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in digging out docks. And later, the mayor [said](https://x.com/joeanuta/status/2026006789758841137?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the city has begun geotagging bus stops and crosswalks to monitor their conditions in future storms. As the saying goes: Don’t waste a crisis. Perhaps most significant was Mamdani’s change of course on encampment policies. When he came into office, he said encampment sweeps clearing homeless people off the streets and into services would be a thing of the past, and paused the policy. Then, when people tragically died in the cold — at least 20 of them [over 18 days](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/02/13/nyregion/nyc-winter-snow-storm-cold-deaths.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — Mamdani reminded New Yorkers that none of them technically had been in encampments. But still, it didn’t dull the pain; many of the dead had still been unhoused and likely would've been helped by more aggressive policies bringing them indoors. So before the second storm, Mamdani shifted his encampment policies, taking up a more proactive posture to get people out of the elements. After cutting 311 queue times, his administration also started directing people to call 911 for faster responses. (It’s early, but thus far, no street deaths have been reported after storm two.) An honest responsiveness shows a new administration willing to think smartly on its feet. Mamdani’s habits as a communicator are also evolving in ways that seem to serve him well. In the election, he changed the paradigm of how politicians in New York communicate with people. His remarkable rise was fueled, in large part, by his uncanny ability to distill complex issues into catchy clips — and look like he was having the most fun of anyone doing it. His transition and first few weeks in office followed the same playbook: an endless reel of appearances practically everywhere you looked. The snowstorms flipped this script. For the first time, Mamdani had to use that platform to translate potentially life-or-death information to New Yorkers in real-time — a serious vibe shift for an otherwise fuzzy presence. He didn’t skip a beat: he often spoke directly to New Yorkers, touting his now-signature black jacket; he somehow spoke with every TV anchor, radio station and influencer I follow (my friends elsewhere noticed and messaged, too); and he FaceTimed a student to announce a snow day. Mamdani should also take to heart the truism that the message can get away from you fast: Many New Yorkers saw it as a stumble when he failed to forcefully condemn the pelting by snowball of cops in Washington Square Park. During an emergency, mayors are often talking to people who either didn’t vote, or at least didn’t vote for them. Clear and present communications with a feedback loop is critical to making sure New Yorkers feel seen and heard. In the words of a famous former mayor: “How’m I doin’?” It’s too early to parse what lasting effect the storms will have on Mamdani, if any — whether it will cement him as a man who can manage as opposed to a naive guy with big ambitions. The next tough choice, and the next, and the next, will shape that perception. Navigating a snowstorm requires a different skill set than, say, negotiating a tough budget. But the city is actually seeing him grow in office. Mark the line on the doorframe and expect him to get taller soon. ### Criminal Risk Assessment and the Character Trap URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-birth-cohort-affects-criminal-outcomes-robert-sampson/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:25.000Z Over the past three decades, successive birth cohorts in the United States have come of age in very different worlds of crime and its control. These shifting contexts shape people’s life chances in ways that challenge the belief in stable, individual propensities to commit crime and in timeless rules for predicting risk. Focusing on the life course of different birth cohorts — on *when* *we are* rather than who we are — reveals the power of the birth lottery of history. This matters because common risk-assessment practices pervade the criminal justice system and extend well beyond it. Formal risk instruments are used to inform [pretrial release](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/probation-and-pretrial-services/evidence-based-practices/pretrial-risk-assessment?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [probation](https://bja.ojp.gov/program/psrac/basics/what-is-risk-assessment?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) decisions, while criminal history information is used in sentencing, employment screening, [tenant screening](https://smartscreen.clearscreening.com/criminal-history-laws-for-tenant-screening/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and occupational licensing. With the emergence of [AI tools](https://partnershiponai.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Report-on-Algorithmic-Risk-Assessment-Tools.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and large-scale databases, predictive risk assessment is accelerating. But prognostications like these rest on assumptions of an individual’s stable criminal propensity or character. New research exposes the perils of this approach, revealing how rapidly changing times challenge common notions about prediction and enduring propensities to commit crime. To isolate social change in life experiences — or when, not who, we are — requires a departure from the usual developmental approach of tracking one group of children born at the same time. To meet this challenge, my research team studied multiple cohorts of over 1,000 Chicago children coming of age over the past three decades. Consider Darnell Jackson and Andre Lewis (both pseudonyms), one born in the mid‑1990s and the other in the early 1980s. They shared the same race, the same city and the same economic, family and neighborhood backgrounds. Yet children born in the 1980s, like Andre, held different tickets in the birth lottery of history and came of age in a very different social world than those born just over a decade later, like Darnell. Andre’s cohort witnessed the rise of drug‑related violence, became teens during the murder epidemic of the early 1990s and lived through rising incarceration and aggressive drug policing. By contrast, when children born in the mid-1990s arrived, violence was plummeting and drug arrests in Chicago had fallen by 90% while disorder arrests dropped nearly 100% between 1995 and 2020\. Children in Darnell’s cohort were lucky in other ways too. Lead exposure, known to impair child development, declined sharply, and when they turned 25, incarceration had dropped to its lowest point in over 25 years. These are just two individuals, of course, but they reflect the broader picture. By the time they were 20, children of the mid-1990s were arrested at half the rate of kids born a short time earlier, in the early to mid‑1980s. The younger cohorts were also less likely to witness gun violence and use guns as adults. You might think these differences are due to usual suspects like demographic composition, poverty or early life conditions that varied across cohorts. But that’s not the case. Even after I accounted for factors like race, family socioeconomic status, parental criminality and childhood neighborhood disadvantage, large gaps in life trajectories persisted. Here’s what’s also surprising: The decline in arrest rates between cohorts was strongest for the most disadvantaged — particularly poor Black youth. So among the poorest children especially, things got much better, which is not what we might expect from today’s popular narrative of decline. These findings challenge the growing risk assessment paradigm that cuts across the political aisle. The Senate’s [bipartisan criminal justice reform bill of 2018](https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ391/PLAW-115publ391.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) called for the development of new risk assessment and prediction tools. Yet in my data, risk assessment instruments trained on kids born in the 1980s using factors like family poverty, first-generation immigrant status, low self-control, male sex and having a single parent overpredicted the arrest probability of children born in the mid‑90s by more than 50%. This large overprediction is due to both changing crime and the shifting relationship of predictive factors with arrest. History is baked into criminal records, in other words — which, in this case, leads to a systematic gap between actual and predicted arrest patterns across birth cohorts. This bias exists within all racial groups and among those arrested as juveniles, so it is a unique form of bias. It also exists for absolute as well as relative rankings. This matters because even a prediction algorithm that rank-ordered properly — the usual practice — might successfully identify the highest-risk individuals even if they don’t pose a high risk in absolute terms. As in medicine, absolute risk matters most. The implications for justice are troubling. Inflated risk predictions may lead individuals to be denied bail, sentenced more severely, denied a job or [rejected for an apartment](https://www.propublica.org/article/landlords-use-secret-algorithms-to-screen-potential-tenants-find-out-what-theyve-said-about-you?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These mechanisms can trigger further criminalization, leading to what I call the “character trap,” a self-reinforcing cycle that labels and punishes individuals based on assumptions about their stable criminal character. This can backfire, severing social connections and blocking opportunities for those criminally labeled, leading them to conform to the very same negative predictions. And when certain individuals or groups repeatedly commit or are arrested for crimes, they are typically deemed to possess a criminal character. This idea manifests in terms like “chronic offenders” or “superpredators.” To be clear, mine is not a call to abandon individual responsibility, punishment or even predictive tools. Humans are biased too, of course, so machines are not the enemy. But recognizing the challenge of social change is a first step to pragmatic solutions. At a minimum, updates to criminal information systems are needed. To decide who gets released before trial, New York City used risk assessment instruments that were unchanged for nearly two decades. We can imagine how outdated the prediction models are in less-resourced departments. Yet updating alone cannot solve the problem. We also need to incorporate into our prediction models the changing way common risk factors forecast future behavior across successive birth cohorts. This will not be easy. We need to invest in the science of studying societal and organizational changes, both to improve predictive performance and to advance knowledge about how the changing world around us influences human behavior. Perhaps the deepest challenge is cognitive bias in the face of a changing world. Perceptions of past crime waves, with images of superpredators, rampant immigrant criminality and chronic offenders looming large, still drive policy. The [Executive Order from the White House in 2025](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/strengthening-and-unleashing-americas-law-enforcement-to-pursue-criminals-and-protect-innocent-citizens/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, can be read as unleashing anew the superpredator logic and prison‑filling mandate of prior decades, despite clear evidence of falling crime. That’s fighting the last war on crime. Despite good news on declines in arrest, incarceration, violence and gun use, we continue to look for the Andres of the world when there are more Darnells. We should focus less on predicting individual criminality or a supposed criminal character and more on cultivating the institutional and environmental conditions that prevent crime and help us meet the unexpected challenges that will come. Put a bit differently, perhaps we need to be thinking more about the morality of societies than the morality of individuals. ### Evidence Over Intuition URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/jennifer-doleac-book-review/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:25.000Z Over the past decade or so, the field of criminal justice reform has seemed to tilt on its axis. Thanks in no small part to Black Lives Matter, what had been for many years a fairly technocratic, under-the-radar area of endeavor became the stuff of front-page news — and yet another battleground in the culture wars that have consumed so much of American life. As the environment became more and more politicized, many intellectuals effectively turned themselves into cheerleaders, signing on to support either Team Social Justice or Team Tough-on-Crime, no matter the issue at hand. Others were cowed into a dull silence, wary of sticking their heads above the parapet to voice their real opinions on hot-button topics. Our public discourse has been much impoverished as a result. Against this backdrop, economist Jennifer Doleac has been a one-woman conversation starter. She is the rare public thinker with the courage to speak her convictions, come what may. Of course, speaking your truth doesn't always make you friends. In 2022, when she was a professor at Texas A&M, Doleac found herself in the eye of the storm when she started collecting and publicizing [#MeToo allegations](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/economics-sexual-harrassment-women-sexism/672239/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of abuse and harassment from female economists. The following year, when Doleac was named senior vice president at Arnold Ventures, one of the largest funders of criminal justice research in the country, [left-wing activists protested her appointment,](https://www.slowboring.com/p/more-courage-less-fear?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) upset that she had conducted research suggesting that the widespread availability of naloxone has had some unintended negative impacts. Sociologist [Alex Vitale](https://x.com/ian%5Ft%5Fadams/status/1634951703341711360?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the author of "The End of Policing"and a member of Zohran Mamdani's transition committee, issued a stinging public denunciation: "She has been unwilling to engage with those who disagree with her views, has no standing in the communities most affected by policing and incarceration, and is deeply distrusted by most of my intellectual and political colleagues." (Full disclosure: Vital City has received several grants from Arnold Ventures.) Upon landing at Arnold, Doleac quickly found herself enmeshed in yet more controversy. When she publicly criticized a study of college-in-prison programs conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice for its methodological weakness, she drew a strong rebuke from Vera's president, [Nick Turner](https://www.vera.org/news/impact-over-orthodoxy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): "By privileging a rigid research standard and creating divisions over methodological differences, Doleac is giving comfort to the opponents of reform." Doleac doesn't address any of these incidents in detail in her new book, "The Science of Second Chances: A Revolution in Criminal Justice" (Macmillan), but neither does she seek to avoid contentious debates. Instead, she comes out swinging, amply demonstrating that she is still willing to call 'em like she sees 'em. "Good research doesn't always tell us what we want to hear," she announces. In "The Science of Second Chances," Doleac makes the case that instead of defaulting to locking people up, the criminal justice system should err on the side of leniency, giving those who have committed offenses multiple opportunities to get their lives back on track. While her thesis would seem a run-of-the-mill, left-wing argument, Doleac's commitment to data means that she is not content to just parrot standard-issue Democratic talking points. Indeed, over the course of her book, Doleac throws cold water on a host of ideas and initiatives embraced by progressives. She suggests that efforts to "ban the box," which limit the ability of employers to uncover the criminal histories of job applicants, have backfired, making things worse for the intended beneficiaries. She dismisses the evidence on gun violence interrupters as "thin" and writes positively about the crime-fighting possibilities of DNA databases and electronic monitoring devices. She avers that incarceration is sometimes effective at reducing reoffending, citing the example of Norway, where prisons take rehabilitation much more seriously than they do in the United States. The list goes on. But Doleac is nothing if not an equal opportunity truth-teller. Throughout "The Science of Second Chances," she takes up many causes that will no doubt vex conservatives, arguing — again, rooted in research findings — that we should spend more money on early education, health care, summer jobs for kids, cognitive behavioral therapy and direct cash transfers to people coming out of prison, among other things. In issuing all of these judgments, Doleac is trying to make a larger point: "We need to let go of trusting our intuition — which often leads us astray — over evidence on what is effective in practice." Doleac believes deeply in the power of social science. She cites dozens of studies to support her arguments and goes out of her way to credit a myriad of researchers by name. In doing so, "The Science of Second Chances" essentially functions as a literature review for lay readers. Instead of pursuing esoteric questions of interest only to a narrow band of her peers, one of our most prominent criminal justice researchers has taken the time to distill the wisdom of her field for the general public. Every academic discipline should be so lucky. (Academics will note that Doleac exhibits a strong preference for the kinds of "causal research" conducted by economists over other forms of knowledge. Qualitative research and studies conducted by criminologists rarely feature in "The Science of Second Chances.") There are, of course, limits to what social science can tell us. (Indeed, Vital City devoted [an entire issue](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-7) to this topic.) Much, perhaps most, of what government does has never been subjected to rigorous evaluation. Perverse incentives constrain the choices of researchers, limiting the types of questions that get answered and the types of studies that get published. Government officials operate on a much faster time clock than academic researchers, who typically require years to complete their work. And our messy, complicated world often doesn't lend itself to randomized trials or even the kind of natural experiments that Doleac highlights throughout her book. Sometimes we really do need to trust our intuition — in many cases, it is all we have to go on. Still, for all its limitations, I would much prefer to live in the world that Doleac imagines, where evidence-based policymaking is the norm, rather than the alternative. In general, anecdotes and ideology are good for storytelling but bad for policy. On the right, these forces tend to encourage an instinct to "back the blue," come hell or high water. On the left, they lead to a distrust of the "carceral state" in almost every circumstance. This kind of black-and-white thinking isn't a very accurate reflection of the world — in real life, law enforcement isn't always trustworthy and the coercive authority of government is often a force for good — but it does offer the benefit of simplicity. The science-based approach to criminal justice reform that Doleac advocates offers no such comfort. "The world is complicated, and uncomfortable trade-offs are inevitable," she declares. Epistemic humility is a recurring theme in "The Science of Second Chances*.*"Notwithstanding all of the confident declarations made by politicians and advocates that "we know what works," the truth is that we don't really know how to prevent crime without spending an exorbitant amount of money or significantly eroding the kinds of freedoms that make life worth living. "Most good ideas we try won't work," Doleac writes. Even the programs that Doleac views approvingly tend to have rather modest effect sizes. While academics might get excited about a 10% reduction in recidivism, the general public is unlikely to share their enthusiasm. Criminologist [Joan Petersilia](https://www.innovatingjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/daring%5F2%5Ffail.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) once offered the following assessment of the state of criminal justice research: "The data now supports the mantra that 'some things work for some people, some of the time, in some settings.' It's not as catchy as 'nothing works' or 'everything works,' but it is a truer and more nuanced understanding." "The Science of Second Chances"is a powerful affirmation of Petersilia's appraisal. Over the past decade, Michelle Alexander's "The New Jim Crow" has become a staple of college curricula, assigned in [more than 4,000 classes since 2012](https://www.cmcforum.com/post/claremont-professors-find-lack-of-ideological-diversity-in-university-syllabi?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A despairing look at enduring racial disparities in the criminal justice system, "The New Jim Crow" literally encourages readers to see the world in black and white. Perhaps as a result, it has sparked a passionate response, encouraging many young people to dedicate their lives to criminal justice reform. With its cool presentation and commitment to evidence, "The Science of Second Chances" is unlikely to engender such enthusiasm — moderates, data nerds and policy wonks rarely take to the barricades — but that doesn't make it any less valuable. Indeed, with any luck, it too will become required reading on college campuses, helping readers develop a more nuanced perspective on criminal justice reform and underlining just how difficult it is to achieve solutions to the public safety problems that continue to plague us. ### The Invisible Thread That Connects Cases of Excessive Force and Low Clearance Rates URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/ice-impunity-police-law-enforcement-accountability/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:26.000Z Accountability is as American as apple pie. Indeed, some [90% of Americans](https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/01/CAP-Public-Safety-Polling-November-2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) support doing more to catch a greater percentage of people who commit crimes. By the same token, the explosive reaction to the shootings of [Renée Nicole Good](https://abcnews.go.com/US/minneapolis-ice-shooting-minute-minute-timeline-renee-nicole/story?id=129021809&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Alex Pretti](https://www.wsj.com/us-news/videos-contradict-u-s-account-of-minneapolis-shooting-by-federal-agents-fbe1e488?gaa%5Fat=eafs&gaa%5Fn=AWEtsqdl3S55ueBbya-s8kw5blAX%5FxA-11rcCKAdW54yLx9h3yHDBmg9plzdns-cE4Q%3D&gaa%5Fts=6977eb6b&gaa%5Fsig=YgF1tblsDjo6cmtIXQRq%5F83WRmNNp7fo6f4500-Eko3DsuN1pAYjpY7bKryl2jdH%5Fdf7ClmH7diWLGoas8GfaQ%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) demonstrates that the public also demands accountability for those with a badge. Law enforcement is a core government function, but officers are subject to human nature just like the rest of us. When a criminal or an officer believes there will be no serious consequences for egregious conduct, the predictable result is more egregious conduct and more tragedy. Yet impunity largely persists, whether it's for the [90% of nonfatal shootings](https://download.ssrn.com/2026/1/20/6062074.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFMaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQCdwVALYM7zK%2FJ5H6S1wXIbFzwqwh2J8%2B46c84SCW9rkAIhAJNDh%2FHasZZjg8GMgLay79VHrfpsCTlTbWZ3fPCiZcitKr4FCBwQBBoMMzA4NDc1MzAxMjU3IgxMUC0ef4p8hINT%2B38qmwUB9YGWKVivjcfBHUx5Vflci%2BVf7RF9BGLJEi4zbz%2BC8DVRvRK09bWyQozmPRAQrRmvgBiENzHAPRMS817d9FiVvbak1kk7BMlgRbg9%2FMiMc87bUDLSPipWbTeov4qfsdC07IhG3iYf%2BzPmen512v2O6%2BLvMFmOfS8tngxSYD5QqnzdvINH%2BuwWErxFQR6RBIYDo%2FNDvMeK03awgJU9YPDgh8X4y2plIuJ6ccGFe%2FlPyEbarEeDEZxLOKnn1L%2FnGEKStBRVhJEs22NpHLSN3CMBdWddZ49nBkBBMp3LQnWZbn5ZCPm8FsslaboR5Gfapc8RqABHqUmjMSPFUHD7%2Fmyv8FZQ9oaZVLmyowlRjcPqZZdbFXV2%2F9xICGqlToX3ePd5GhPPfgoJAdMUSrVEUPVlIbSw6yzkR49iROK6%2FbI2azvIVXvceRq6SIkaJOupMy7nCNQ3FdYZyJDPsEAREu2lxEa2Qgai%2BAeNf2Sb%2BIIotmPUOu9HoX1bqT6jqoOBSo6mRmflgIA2LD5AXGbv4QgANB1%2BoRtYD4UjuUMlLOd9YV2FHYISb8kswSmcEQQv4AhNQQ2Sdie0idliyBQuPOZ1oy7exgYLx4eJLljp5%2FjFIrWc4ZvAFyKMy2VXeWBheQ5TCBg3xj0h8Y6ymlnxHrrNEXHkIFRaywEvh9TQmnspJY2k%2FQnTkJuIGLmC%2FuiBp5s3Vcp6%2Bexs3eSE5qe2nFZPhww66lUZ00PjqZkCaXkq%2BvhZlnd%2FUATdAskGfNlu0SWZQ1G7isOpJCRhgD6YFjI3zN%2BvhgStStFtAdj5uffkMqaKEX4om5yOmKFLXhV3EkswwGHIluiQLLO0G5fuQATmFMxDVkrabT3RaVoDf9DgekbZ1sYPPzIG9jlRMLqvjswGOrABFuovA6Eq8%2FB0oiZk0KpL3L82qCXfanEArZ4zwJ2wadTevwFS2cn9b1bhXP3kMe8LBiJ5s3192xj5lLSyJaYRCVAXyWOyPIgNKHVJqK0GFQlb67qfEhKtE0SMk6g0XUiiiAgfeTf4SBqjStZqILG7IS%2Bjqb30zi5TDuFmL%2FVJR5nwUlq13%2F%2BE%2B9nX9Z9eANDjRHUq8plBbxy8ouheNVJWoHo5Z%2FYRG3MqJFzJ8V2SvWI%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20260204T194137Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWETUYAKWGD%2F20260204%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4%5Frequest&X-Amz-Signature=d378891fc53ab733ef58ad4f70d131c0894bbc6051d92a0f2e25a2eb4c6da66e&abstractId=6062074&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that continue to go unsolved or for what appears to be a growing number of [excessive force cases involving federal immigration agents](https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2026/0203/homeland-security-excessive-force-ice-immigration?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=In%20more%20than%20a%20dozen,in%20the%20face%20and%20head.). Impunity is a political loser and a policy nightmare, but in different contexts it's embraced by the most extreme elements of the right and left. One side insists that those with a badge can do no wrong; the other too often [underestimates the role of police visibility](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1359178924001010?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the right place and at the right time in deterring and solving crime. But both positions miss the mark**.** Neither law enforcement officers nor street criminals can be unleashed to violate the law without consequence. Either scenario invites impunity, eroding the social compact through which we form and fund government to protect us. Of course, when comparing street crime with abuses by law enforcement, the causes of impunity are largely different. In the former case, police are too often unable to identify and arrest the culprit. In the latter, as we're seeing with the two Minneapolis shootings, investigations often suffer from a lack of will and independence. But if we keep accountability as our north star in both contexts, we can do better. A related challenge is low [clearance rates](https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2024/12/policing-crime-public-safety/680854/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a measure of the share of reported crimes that are solved. In 2024, 35% of homicides [went unsolved by the Minneapolis Police Department](https://www.mprnews.org/story/2025/10/10/st-paul-solved-more-crimes-had-drastically-fewer-homicides-in-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as did some 77% of non-fatal shootings. While [many other cities](https://www.murderdata.org/p/blog-page.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) had a worse record, these figures mean that many perpetrators were left free to commit additional offenses. When criminals believe they won't be identified, arrested and prosecuted, they have little reason to refrain from violent acts. We need a strategic approach to end that impunity. [Research](https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2024/12/policing-crime-public-safety/680854/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggests there are real crime-reduction dividends to focusing more on increasing clearance rates than on the severity of punishment. A [review](https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/five-things-about-deterrence?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the National Institute of Justice finds that the likelihood of being caught has a stronger preventive effect than harsher penalties. Likewise, economists analyzing changes in arrest probabilities [have found](https://www.nber.org/papers/w28523?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that increases in the risk of apprehension are associated with measurable reductions in violent crime. This means departments across the country should invest aggressively in detectives, forensic labs and investigative technologies that improve the prospects of solving violent crimes. A city that solves a greater share of its murders, shootings and armed robberies sends a clear and tangible message: Violence will not go unpunished. States are increasingly recognizing that they have a role as well. In their 2026 legislative sessions, [Pennsylvania](https://www.palegis.us/legislation/bills/2025/hb1511?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Utah](https://legiscan.com/UT/bill/HB0137/2026?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are looking to enact grant programs that boost crime-solving capacity at the local level, especially in under-resourced rural areas. [Texas](https://rightoncrime.com/texas-finally-has-a-plan-to-solve-more-crimes-now-it-must-be-funded-%EF%BF%BC/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Missouri](https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=650.040&bid=57651&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) took this step last year, although Texas [still needs to fund](https://www.statesman.com/opinion/columns/your-voice/article/texas-finally-plan-solve-crimes-now-funded-21219123.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its grant program. The cooperation of the community also plays a role in the quest to boost clearance rates. [Research](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235225000522?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) indicates that too often, victims and witnesses hesitate to come forward because they don't trust police, don't think police can protect them from those they are "snitching" on or believe nothing will change even if they do. This illustrates the value of policing strategies that [build relationships](https://www.journalcswb.ca/index.php/cswb/article/view/244/736?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with community members, as well as [procedural justice training](https://policing.counciloncj.org/assessing-the-evidence/vi-procedural-justice-training?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that ensures officers treat those they encounter with dignity. Just as we must hold a greater percentage of offenders accountable for their actions, we must shine the lens of accountability on excessive force used by the very agents sworn to protect our lives and liberties. The Minneapolis shootings and their aftermath are a powerful case in point. The [Good](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-agent-resigns-investigation-shooting-renee-good-minneapolis-source-rcna255702?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Pretti](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/26/us/pretti-minneapolis-shooting-dhs-investigation.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) cases are not being independently investigated, as federal authorities [boxed out](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/25/us/federal-exclude-minnesota-shooting-investigations.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) state investigators. [One analysis](https://www.propublica.org/article/why-local-state-police-rarely-investigate-ice-cbp-fbi?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that in 6 of 12 shootings by federal immigration officers since September, there has been no investigation by local police. Indeed, perhaps because ICE and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents often [lack the same training and protocols](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/09/nx-s1-5671120/homeland-security-expert-talks-about-ices-truncated-training-after-hiring-blitz?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as officers in local police departments, their excesses risk surrendering recent [gains in public trust](https://news.gallup.com/poll/647303/confidence-institutions-mostly-flat-police.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in police. Gallup found that 51% of Americans in 2024 had confidence in police compared with 43% in 2023\. Though it is challenging to pinpoint the reasons for this uptick, many states, cities and law enforcement agencies embraced transparency accountability measures after the murder of George Floyd. Now, [many police chiefs](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/30/us/its-all-just-going-down-the-toilet-police-chiefs-fume-at-ice-tactics.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text='It's%20All%20Just%20Going%20Down%20the%20Toilet':,setting%20back%20efforts%20to%20improve%20public%20trust.) are rightly worried that their hard-earned gains could be eroded insofar as undocumented immigrants and people of color are [less likely to report crime](https://www.chicagotribune.com/2025/11/03/911-calls-midway-blitz-little-village/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [reality or perception of local police collaboration with ICE and CPB](https://policingequity.org/when-law-enforcement-meets-ice-how-a-loss-of-local-autonomy-puts-public-safety-at-risk/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When it comes to earning public confidence, there is no substitute for holding officers of all types accountable, but how do we do it? We at the Council on Criminal Justice have provided a [blueprint](https://counciloncj.org/task-force-on-policing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In addition to requiring [independent investigations](https://harvardlawreview.org/forum/vol-128/enhancing-accountability-and-trust-with-independent-investigations-of-police-lethal-force/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of officer-involved shootings, the [national database of officers decertified](https://policing.counciloncj.org/assessing-the-evidence/ix-decertification?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for proven misconduct should be revived. This ensures that the [small percentage of officers](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/police-misconduct-peer-effects/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who chronically abuse their authority cannot simply obtain work at another department that is unaware of their past. We must also make better use of body-worn cameras. Though [80%](https://www.rstreet.org/research/the-past-present-and-future-of-police-body-cameras/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of law enforcement agencies regularly use the devices, [fewer than a quarter](https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2026/01/24/ice-bodycams-cameras-shootings-immigration/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20latest%20figures%2C%20which%20were%20compiled%20in,many%20of%20those%20cameras%20are%20in%20use.) of ICE and CBP agents wear body cameras,. Even so, the policing task force found that they [are often inactive and that the public faces excessive barriers](https://policing.counciloncj.org/assessing-the-evidence/x-body-worn-cameras?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to obtaining footage. Another critical step is to [rein in broad qualified immunity](https://policing.counciloncj.org/assessing-the-evidence/iv-effectiveness-of-police-training?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that shields officers from consequences when constitutional rights are violated. Such immunity makes it [almost impossible](https://reason.com/2026/01/27/the-feds-who-killed-alex-pretti-are-heavily-shielded-from-being-sued-blame-the-supreme-court-for-that/?utm%5Fcampaign=reason%5Fbrand&utm%5Fcontent=&utm%5Fmedium=social%5Freason%5Fnon%5Fpaid&utm%5Fsource=twitter&utm%5Fterm=) to successfully sue the officers who shot Petti, even if the evidence demonstrates their conduct was objectively unreasonable. This is primarily because the plaintiff must prove the conduct was [clearly established](https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/Schwartz%5FQualifiedImmunity%5F88UCLR605.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as unlawful by a published court opinion in that jurisdiction involving almost the exact same fact pattern. In 2020, Colorado took a [balanced approach](https://jlsp.law.columbia.edu/2024/04/17/searching-for-judges-who-hear-analyzing-the-effects-of-colorados-abolition-of-qualified-immunity-on-civil-rights-litigation/?cn-reloaded=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by removing this requirement and at the same capping the amount any officer would pay out at $25,000 in the absence of criminal intent. Though police agencies across the nation indemnify officers in [more than 99% of cases](https://www.generalservices.state.nm.us/wp-content/uploads/9%5F18%5F20%5FNYULawReview-89-3-Schwartz.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), reforming qualified immunity provides a financial disincentive through indemnification and risk-based insurance rates to hire and retain officers with a chronic history of abuses and settlements. Confronting impunity on both sides of the badge brings us closer to a justice system that protects the safety of every American while also earning their trust. ### The NYPD’s Crime-Reduction Strategy: Chief of Department Michael LiPetri in Conversation URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nypd-crime-strategy-questions-michael-lipetri/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:25.000Z *New York City recorded fewer than 700 shootings in 2025, the lowest total since the NYPD began tracking the statistic. For a city that saw nearly 2,000 shooting victims in 2021, the turnaround is striking: 1,020 fewer people shot in four years.* *What's going on, and how does that progress compare to what's happening with other crimes? Chief of Department Michael LiPetri, who oversees the Department's crime strategies, sat down with Vital City to walk through the mechanics: hyperlocal "violence reduction zones" where shootings, shots fired and street robberies overlap; thousands of officers deployed on foot during peak hours; and narcotics and gang enforcement concentrated in the same tight geography.* *As Vital City makes clear in* [*its year-end crime report*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/crime-in-new-york-city-trends-statistics)*, the picture isn't uniformly rosy. Assaults have risen stubbornly since 2020\. Juvenile involvement in gun violence hit its highest recorded percentage. And the Bronx, despite leading the city in shooting reductions, still demands disproportionate resources.* *LiPetri explains what the data show, what they don't and where the Department is quietly reassessing its approach under Commissioner Jessica Tisch and Mayor Zohran Mamdani.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Vital City:** The NYPD had a banner year on shootings and murders. Can you put that in historic perspective and explain what you think the main drivers have been? **Michael LiPetri:** It's amazing. I sat in this office as commanding officer of the Chief of Department's Office during our previous banner years — 2017, 2018 and 2019\. So to say that we're now under 700 shootings in New York City, especially after what transpired in the summer of 2020, is incredible. The credit goes to the men and women out there. We focused on very small areas with a high propensity for violence. When we overlaid shooting incidents, shots fired and street robberies, we saw they lie on top of each other regardless of precinct or borough boundaries. The No. 1 crime strategy is field deployment. We put thousands of officers in those areas on foot patrol at the right times. Officers coming out of the academy don't have weekends off their first year or year-and-a-half — they're all working Friday, Saturday and Sunday nights. We reached maximum force figures during those long summer nights, and the momentum continued through the fourth quarter. Four out of five geographic boroughs had a 25% reduction in shootings. Brooklyn had a 15% reduction only because we broke the record the year before and then broke it again. In South Jamaica, Queens — the 103rd, 105th, 113th and 115th precincts — there were 23 shootings in 2025 compared to 51 in 2024. But field deployment was only part of it. We focused narcotics enforcement within the violence reduction zones. Every week, I got a report on what percentage of narcotics arrests were within those zones. We asked our field intelligence officers to provide intelligence on recidivists, parolees and modus operandi for officers on foot posts. We asked our gun violence suppression division to focus in these areas. Housing developments within the zones were part of it; transit lines and stations within the zones were part of it. It was a force multiplier. This is the fifth year in a row we've been over 3,000 gun arrests. Prosecution has never been better. We share more data with the DA's offices than ever before. I give them all our zone maps and say, "This is where we're focused — you need to be focused here also." **Vital City:** Over the decades, we've seen remarkable reductions, but traditionally, violence has concentrated in the same places. Are you seeing geographic areas change? And what's the nexus between narcotics enforcement and violence? **LiPetri:** We are focused on trigger pullers and robbery recidivists. With the data mining and automation we can do, if someone is a suspect in two different shooting incidents, we know that. My thing has always been: If this person has been around gun violence twice in six months as a suspect, you really need to look at them. That's why the criminal group database is so important. If I'm looking at a crew with 20 members in the database, I can see how many are incarcerated, how many are out, how many shooting incidents they've been involved in as suspect, victim or perpetrator. I might see a crew involved in 27 violent incidents in the past year and say we need to focus our resources there. **Vital City:** Can you explain the linkage between today's victim being tomorrow's shooter? **LiPetri:** Approximately 65% to 70% of our shootings have a gang or crew nexus. Retaliation is highly likely. When we identify which crew member was shot or perpetrated a crime, we look at which crews are aligned with them and who their adversaries are. We overlay that with housing developments or small pockets they might frequent. The field deployment is built into all of this. We document the specific method of flight for every geographic borough. I can look at a shooting and know whether they're using Citi Bikes, vehicles or walking between developments. All this intelligence is shared with officers every night. CompStat in 32 years hasn't changed that much — what's changed is our analytical ability to get granular by embedding civilian data scientists with experienced law enforcement professionals. **Vital City:** There's been this incredible achievement in murders and shootings, but assaults have been rising. What's fueling that? **LiPetri:** Assaults have been stubborn, rising year over year since 2020\. Last year was driven by three categories: assaults on NYPD officers, up 53; assaults on other public servants like conductors, correction officers and nurses, up 104; and domestic violence victims, up over 350. On domestic violence, we made some decisions. We were having trouble with complainants becoming uncooperative, and victims were speaking to many different officers — the domestic violence unit, the patrol officer, then a detective. So we put it all under the detective bureau. The same person who catches the case deals with the victim and advocates. We're already seeing results. We also ramped up our warrants teams to focus on misdemeanor domestic violence, not just felonies. **Vital City:** Domestic violence often involves an escalating scale of behavior that may end in homicide. How do you think about anticipating that? **LiPetri:** That's why we have high-propensity lists and top 10 offenders within each precinct and housing PSA. A good, seasoned investigator knows the questions to ask. They can look at a victim and see they were a victim of harassment a month ago and ask follow-up questions. They have access to the whole case folder and can identify individuals with multiple incidents — sometimes with different victims but the same perpetrator. **Vital City:** What do you make of the reported increase in mental illness associated with these attacks? And how will the new Department of Community Safety work? **LiPetri:** I can't speak to the mayor's community safety plan — I haven't been briefed. But on unprovoked assaults, we absolutely tie a high percentage of those offenders to prior mental illness contact with the NYPD. The data shows that. But here's something I don't think I've been asked: We had 250 fewer people shot than in 2024 and 1,020 fewer shooting victims than in 2021 — from 1,876 to 856\. How many lifelong injuries prevented? How many deaths? And we were down over 500 stabbing and slashing victims. The violent crime picture is incredible. **Vital City:** Let's talk more about stabbings and slashings. How do you see that trajectory? **LiPetri:** We've never had more cutting instrument recoveries. We've focused on transit — recovering cutting instruments during enforcement or when someone's arrested for something else and is found in possession. We know 80% of transit crime is on trains and platforms, and we've really increased enforcement there. **Vital City:** Lightning round. First, the aging of the offender population — violence used to be a young man's game, but now we're seeing it clustered in people's 30s. Second, what's interesting that no one would know from looking at CompStat? Third, what's going on with the Bronx? **LiPetri:** The Bronx led the city with 86 fewer shooting incidents — a 25% decrease. We've put enormous resources there across detective bureau, transit, housing and patrol. We're taking a hard look at some things we're not ready to announce yet. On juvenile crime: Last year was the highest percentage of shooting victims under 18, shooting perpetrators under 18 and juveniles arrested in possession of a gun. We started tracking this about eight years ago and have never seen it this high. In September, at my direction, we focused on school zones before and after dismissal. We've seen a sharp decrease in violent crime in those school cars citywide. ### The Top Five Crime and Justice Stories of 2025 URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/biggest-crime-justice-stories-america-2025/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:26.000Z Disappearing data. Sweeping cuts to federal justice grants. A historic drop in homicide. 2025 was an undeniably tumultuous year on the nation's criminal justice landscape. As an incoming presidential administration imposed its vision with vigor, policymakers, practitioners, researchers and advocates adjusted to new realities, and communities long plagued with high rates of violent crime cautiously celebrated a continuing decline. Channeling DJ Casey Kasem's famous "American Top 40," we count down the top five developments that captured the most attention and held the greatest implications for future criminal justice policy and practice — and take some peeks at what 2026 may bring. ## **5\. Data about crime and justice came under attack**. Beginning in January, the Trump administration and its Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) took [thousands of federal data sources offline](https://counciloncj.org/federal-data-in-the-crosshairs-whats-at-stake-for-public-safety/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or altered or eliminated them outright. The casualties included a database on police officer misconduct and statistics on racial and ethnic disparities in the juvenile justice system. The credibility of law enforcement statistics also came under fire, particularly in New York City, Chicago and other communities where falling crime numbers conflicted with the Trump administration's portrait of urban dystopia. Nowhere was this skepticism more visible than in Washington, D.C. Amid resistance to President Donald Trump's deployment of 2,000 National Guard troops to the nation's capital, congressional Republicans [challenged reports of a decline in violent crime](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/14/us/politics/house-republicans-dc-crime.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the District and accused police commanders of manipulating data by downgrading violent incidents to lesser offenses — even while other data from D.C. hospital emergency rooms were showing similar declines in shootings. The police chief denied tampering with the numbers but resigned. Historically, concerns over accurate and timely data have kept researchers and academics up at night but captured little public notice. In 2025, however, data reliability took center stage, in part because of the president's [firing of the Bureau of Labor Statistics director](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/sep/17/labor-statistics-chief-trump-erika-mcentarfer?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over what he perceived as poor job growth numbers. Public officials, reporters and other stakeholders should scrutinize obscure statistical systems and processes; shining a light on them would tend to spark improvements. But undermining trust in the fundamental credibility and accuracy of the nation's data systems — systems that are the envy of the world — has consequences that can harm law enforcement agencies and public safety. Perhaps when (and if) the numbers in 2025 and 2026 tell a positive story, the inevitable partisan clashes will focus more on crime strategies than on the soundness of the statistics. ## 4\. Criminal justice funding was on the chopping block. As part of an unprecedented push by DOGE to slash federal spending, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in April [canceled grants](https://counciloncj.org/doj-funding-update-a-deeper-look-at-the-cuts/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) initially valued at about $820 million to a wide range of law enforcement, violence intervention, juvenile justice and other programs. Coming in the middle of budget cycles, the cuts actually eliminated some $500 million in program dollars, causing large-scale layoffs and forcing some agencies to close. Organizations providing training and technical assistance to the field were hit particularly hard, while money spent on data collection for research studies and other partially completed projects turned into pointless investments, as work stopped midstream. On a human level, not only did the cuts [disrupt the lives and careers](https://www.npr.org/2025/11/10/nx-s1-5552704/doj-crime-prevention-public-safety-grant-cuts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20cuts%20affected%20hundreds%20of%20organizations%20around,ability%20to%20consider%20appeals%20and%20reimburse%20organizations.) of thousands of dedicated frontline crime-prevention and -intervention staff, they removed these professionals from working with at-risk youth on the nation's streets. Almost no one would argue that federal justice programs are universally efficient or that some of the funded programs simply weren't producing sufficient results. Indeed, many inside and outside of the criminal justice ecosystem believe it has become too sprawling and could use a round of streamlining and consolidation. But aside from targeting grants that contained triggering buzzwords like "gender," the administration's cuts appeared to lack a clearly defined public safety strategy. An appeals process is now underway, though a new head of the DOJ's grantmaking agency, the Office of Justice Programs, has yet to be nominated. While the cuts caused significant setbacks for many crime and justice workers and their organizations, 2026 may bring the restoration of some grant funding, as challenges have led to a reversal of several grant eliminations. On Jan. 14, the Department of Health and Human Services [cut $2 billion in funding](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/14/health/samhsa-funding-cuts.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for mental health and addiction services (to some 2,000 programs nationwide) only to reverse those cuts a mere 24 hours later in the face of bipartisan outcry from lawmakers and the public. The severed slate of justice programs is unlikely to be revived en masse, but the stronger ones, especially those with patrons on Capitol Hill, have a decent shot. ## 3\. The postpandemic justice system reboot made strong headway. In 2025, [courts made substantial progress](https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/chief-justice-canady-courts-are-making-headway-in-clearing-case-backlogs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the massive backlogs caused by widespread system shutdown and disruption during the pandemic. In-person trials became the norm again, case processing times shortened, pretrial systems stabilized, supervision agencies normalized operations, and reentry programming and service delivery gained momentum. Police ranks continued to bounce back as well, recovering from hits inflicted during the pandemic and the George Floyd-related protests of 2020\. There's still a long way to go — recruitment and retention are a big challenge for many departments. [The correctional workforce also shrank](https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) during the early COVID-19 years, and while some gains have been made, staffing levels there remain down. The flip side of unclogging the justice system's pipes meant more people made it through the process to jail or prison. The revived postpandemic system [ticked up the incarcerated population in 2023](https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/correctional-populations-united-states-2023-statistical-tables?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) after 15 years of decline. Surely, the long-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the criminal justice system and [criminal justice policy](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12562?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) will take time to play out. And with so much volatility in the system, and crime and arrests [trending down](https://counciloncj.org/who-gets-arrested-in-america-trends-across-four-decades-1980-2024/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it's hard to predict what's in store for the incarceration rate in 2026\. But in [one of the most interesting pieces](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/06/prisoner-populations-are-plummeting/683310/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) last year, Keith Humphreys of Stanford University estimated that the prison population will "fall off a cliff" over the next decade, driven down by declining rates of juvenile crime. ## 2\. Public perceptions of crime did not align with the data. With high-profile incidents of political violence, National Guard troops deployed to cities and dramatic footage of ICE enforcement actions flooding screens everywhere, 2025 gave Americans ample opportunity to think about crime — and [some surveys](https://news.gallup.com/poll/695519/mood-subdued-crime-unity-concerns-rise.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showed public anxiety about it on the rise. Despite data showing overall crime numbers falling, [political rhetoric](https://apnews.com/article/fact-check-trump-portland-oregon-protests-antifa-203826406efb7420911ae756b4331f60?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) often implied it was spiraling upward, and [subway killings](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/08/us/charlotte-murder-conservatives-crime.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), other random violence and street-level disorder kept many people on edge. As a general rule, the disconnect between perceptions and reality when it comes to crime trends is complicated and cause for concern. If people form views of crime and criminals from sloppy news stories and social media feeds, or proclamations by agenda-driven lawmakers, poor policy — and the vilification of certain groups of people — can result. Nowhere is this more evident than with respect to the belief that immigrants are responsible for a wildly disproportionate share of crime and violence in America. Two decades of research — using different samples, different methodologies and different units of analysis ([city-level macrodata](https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032317-092026?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [individual-level microdata](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10964-013-0045-z?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) — show that immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, commit less crime than native-born Americans. And despite popular assumptions, that finding does not reflect [under- or overreporting](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10940-016-9314-9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of crime among immigrants. A recent [New York Times analysis](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/12/04/us/ice-arrests-criminal-records-data.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that most immigrants arrested in recent national, statewide and citywide crackdowns (including those in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles) do not have a criminal record here. This does not mean, of course, that immigrants don't commit crimes or that removing those who are dangerous won't improve community safety. It does mean that the right question for public policy is how to target the violent repeat offenders, secure our borders and deter illegal immigration without causing widespread panic, tearing families apart unnecessarily and creating conflicts between citizens and law enforcement that end fatally, as happened with the Minneapolis shootings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti. Failing to do so will further erode public trust in the legitimacy of law enforcement and American government. ## 1\. Homicide likely fell to a historic low. The violent crime drop underway in the U.S. is not only real, but it is large and extends across geographical boundaries and city sizes. Continuing a trend that started two years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2025 decline includes a staggering [estimated 20% drop in homicide nationwide](https://counciloncj.org/crime-trends-in-u-s-cities-year-end-2025-update/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with some cities experiencing their lowest number of murders since the 1960s. These trends are consistent across multiple crime indexes, police data sources and organizations that use a combination of FBI and local agency numbers, including the [Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ)](https://counciloncj.org/crime-trends-in-u-s-cities-mid-year-2025-update/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the [Real-Time Crime Index](https://realtimecrimeindex.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [NORC Crime Tracker](https://livecrimetracker.norc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#home). New York City in particular recorded one of its smallest [yearly murder totals](https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-on-track-for-near-record-low-number-of-homicides-in-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on record. As of Dec. 31, 2025, the city of more than 8 million people had recorded 307 murders, a decrease of 86% from the 2,245 killings [logged in 1990](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/dataviz/new-york-city-homicides-and-homicide-rates-1800-2023) and of 33% since 2020 (when there were 462 murders). Theories about what's driving the drop and credit-taking claims are abundant, but, at this point, there's scarce evidence to back up any single explanation. We do have some strong suspects, though, as explored in [the latest CCJ report](https://counciloncj.org/crime-trends-in-u-s-cities-year-end-2025-update/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [an expert roundtable](https://counciloncj.org/event-recording-whats-driving-the-crime-decline/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that followed. Chief among them are changes in criminal justice policy and practice (including a combination of more targeted and proactive law enforcement and scaling of community violence intervention programs), advances in crime-fighting technologies (especially the proliferation of integrated surveillance systems) and shifts in society and culture (including declining alcohol consumption and youth spending more time home alone). We still don't fully understand what powered the great crime drop that began in the 1990s and especially [in the years after the height of the pandemic](https://www.cbsnews.com/video/what-drove-2025-decline-crime-across-us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), so divining what's behind the trends of the last three years is a tall order. But that is all the more reason to double down on rigorous, independent research. Because when it comes to public safety and justice, we need more hard evidence and less guesswork. ### Gang Databases Are Crucial to Shooting Reduction Efforts URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nypd-gang-database-shooting-reduction/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:26.000Z Fair and effective policing is required to both reduce shootings and ensure public support. Essential to the task is accurately identifying individuals who are most at risk of being shooters, gunshot wound victims or both. But the NYPD's Criminal Group Database, colloquially known as the "gang database," is a frequent target of reformers, who say it mistakenly sweeps in too many people. The [critics' claim](https://theintercept.com/2019/04/25/bronx-120-report-mass-gang-prosecution-rico/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), specifically, is that New York City's gang database produces enhanced targeting of people based on questionable allegations of gang membership. These concerns have motivated City Councilwoman Althea Stevens and Public Advocate Jumaane Williams to [propose a bill](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6632643&GUID=4604B635-C83C-4448-9AA5-1F670D42592D&Options=&Search=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) intended to abolish the database. [They have questioned](https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2025-02-24-1000-am-committee-on-public-safety/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), without rigorous empirical evidence, the violence-reduction efficacy of the Criminal Group Database, noted a lack of transparency in gang membership designations and decried the fact that 99% of people in the database were Black or Hispanic. Disproportionality alone, however, does not establish bias. It must be evaluated against victimization and offending patterns. It is well known that shootings are not a democratic crime when it comes to race and place. [In 2024](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis%5Fand%5Fplanning/year-end-2024-enforcement-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City shooting victims were primarily Black (67%) or Hispanic (29%). Fewer than 3% of shooting victims were Asian or Pacific Islander, and about 1% were white. Shooting suspects (65% Black, 33% Hispanic) and arrestees (64% Black, 32% Hispanic) have the same racial demographics. These racial characteristics closely match the almost exclusively nonwhite entries in the NYPD Criminal Group Database. In October 2025, the NYPD gang database had only [8,563 individuals identified](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doi/oignypd/web/report.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), representing only 0.1% of New York City's 8.5 million residents. [By one estimate](https://www.city-journal.org/article/nypd-criminal-group-database-gang-violence-crime?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), upward of 65% of New York City shootings involve gang members as victims, perpetrators or both. Importantly, [shootings tend to occur in Black and Brown neighborhoods](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00027162231173324?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) characterized by concentrated disadvantage and disinvestment that lead to limited access to safe and affordable housing, quality education, gainful employment, clean air and water, and transportation. Preventing recurring gun violence in these neighborhoods is clearly a matter of social justice. Investments need to be made to address the underlying structural conditions that generate persistent gun violence. It is equally important to recognize that these neighborhoods need immediate relief from the associated economic, social and psychological burdens of fatal and nonfatal shootings. [Effective policing](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/policing-gun-violence-9780199929283?cc=us&lang=en&&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is key to the success of any comprehensive effort to reduce shootings in the near term. Police departments can reduce shootings in cities by focusing on the gangs, drug-selling organizations, street robbery crews and other criminally active groups involved in a disproportionate share of fatal and nonfatal shootings. Group-involved violence stems from personal disputes, drug-market business, ongoing gang rivalries and other conflicts. [A study of more than 20 cities](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-25/beyond-broken-windows-what-really-drives-urban-crime?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that, on average, less than 1% of a city's population was involved in gangs, drug crews and other criminally active groups, but were connected to more than 50% of a city's shootings and homicides. The public safety implication is clear: Shootings can be controlled by focusing on and changing the violent behaviors of a small number of very risky people. The NYPD has been a pioneer of ["precision policing"](https://manhattan.institute/article/precision-policing-a-strategy-for-the-challenges-of-21st-century-law-enforcement?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) strategies that focus law enforcement attention on the small number of violent criminals who harm communities and seek to work with neighborhood residents to increase public safety in affected neighborhoods. Rigorous evidence suggests this approach works in preventing gun violence. [An evaluation of precision-policing gang "takedowns"](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.22323?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in New York City housing projects between 2011 and 2019 found that shootings in and around public housing communities fell by approximately one-third in the first year after the enforcement action was launched. No evidence was found of substantial displacement, which is to say, there was no sign that gun violence just moved elsewhere. This was a meaningful reduction. [The NYPD maintains](https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2025-02-24-1000-am-committee-on-public-safety/chapter/importance-of-reducing-gun-violence-and-the-role-of-the-criminal-group-database/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the Criminal Group Database is critical to such strategic efforts and important to solving violent gun crimes. That tracks with [how the Department uses the database](https://www.city-journal.org/article/nypd-criminal-group-database-gang-violence-crime?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): After gang-involved shootings, the NYPD rapidly deploys resources to prevent retaliation by rival gangs and advance investigations to quickly hold shooters accountable for their crimes. The NYPD associates these actions with achieving its record low of [688 shooting incidents in 2025](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR001/nypd-safest-year-ever-gun-violence-fewest-shooting-incidents-shooting?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). More broadly, gang databases are part of an evidence-based gun violence reduction strategy known as ["focused deterrence."](https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/framework-for-addressing-violence-and-serious-crime/F82356B840A48359FE04C019FD5E357B?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [These programs](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12682?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have been shown to be [effective in many cities](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1745-9133.70012?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The goal of focused deterrence is first to focus on high-risk individuals and then stop further violence through a strategic blend of law enforcement, social services and community-based action. For example, after a gang shooting, officers and their partners need to identify gang members who are likely to retaliate and who are likely to be shot. Knowing which gangs are involved and their membership is necessary to do this. > While no system is free from error, the research literature suggests that formalized gang databases with clear inclusion criteria and oversight may reduce — rather than exacerbate — the risks associated with purely individual, intuition-based determinations of gang involvement. People living in high-crime neighborhoods, particularly young men of color, bear a disproportionate policing burden. Though these young men are overwhelmingly uninvolved in crime, they are far more likely to be stopped and questioned by police than youth living in more affluent neighborhoods, certainly an infringement of their civil liberties. The NYPD remains under the [supervision of a court-appointed monitor](https://www.nypdmonitor.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to ensure that its stop-and-frisk practices are lawful and not generating excessive racial disparities. Since 2011, NYPD stops have [fallen by roughly 97%](https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/How%5FMany%5FStops%5FAct%5FFinal.pdf??ref=vitalcitynyc.org), sharply reducing the burden young men of color experience. But stop-and-frisks [continue in smaller numbers](https://www.nypdmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/963-Twenty-Fifth-Report-of-the-Independent-Monitor.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the burden disproportionately falls on Black and Latino men. A key question is whether abolishing the NYPD Criminal Group Database would lessen the undeserved policing burden on youth of color or, rather, unintentionally increase it. We know of no academic research that has studied this question for New York City or any other city. Related academic work is possibly suggestive. [An important study](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20171003&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) examined the effect of "banning the box," that is restricting employers from asking about job applicants' criminal histories. The authors used an audit study where fictitious black and white individuals applied online for jobs. Prior to ban-the-box implementation, they found that employers that asked about criminal history were 63% more likely to call applicants with no record. However, they also found that white applicants received 7% more callbacks before ban-the-box. After its implementation, this gap increased to a whopping 43%. In short, when employers were not able to ask about criminal history, they were far more likely to discriminate against Black candidates. [Other studies](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/705880?af=R&mobileUi=0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have found similar patterns of racial discrimination in employment outcomes when prior criminal histories were not available to prospective employers. Boston's experience is also informative. In the early 1990s, and prior to that, Boston did not have an effective, much less focused, deterrence strategy for dealing with gang violence. The result was twofold: With the introduction of crack, the city experienced a period of uncontrolled gang violence; Black youth were indiscriminately and frequently stopped by police. The latter happened most dramatically after the [Carol Stuart murder in 1989](https://apps.bostonglobe.com/metro/investigations/2023/12/charles-stuart/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), when young Black men, no matter who they were or their circumstances, were, in the language of the police, "tipped upside down." The Boston police had no idea who might have been responsible. Similarly, without its Criminal Group Database, the NYPD would not have a reservoir of timely intelligence on gangs and gang dynamics to focus its deployments and investigations in the wake of shootings. The resulting harm could be twofold: A diminished capacity to control gun violence in traumatized neighborhoods and a broadening of police enforcement activities to identify and apprehend shooters. Though we can't say for certain, the evidence suggests that banning the NYPD's gang database could have just the opposite effect that reformers intend. Without having specific knowledge about who is gang-involved, officers may well stop a far broader set of individuals, increasing the policing on innocent individuals, particularly young people of color. Decades of psychological research on judgment and decision-making raise important concerns about relying solely on individual officers' discretion to determine gang membership. When decisions must be made under time pressure, stress and incomplete information — conditions that typify street-level policing — human judgment is known to rely heavily on [cognitive shortcuts](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1738360?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [and heuristics](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2011-26535-000?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A [large body of research](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2018-70006-003?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [demonstrates that such circumstances](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15598112/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) increase susceptibility to confirmation bias and stereotype-based reasoning, even among well-intentioned professionals. [Experimental](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2002-08203-006?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [studies](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/511799?seq=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) further show that racial stereotypes can shape perceptions of criminality and threat when objective criteria are absent or unclear. [Organizational research on street-level bureaucracy](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7758/9781610447713?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also finds that discretionary decision-making without standardized rules leads to inconsistency and "drift" across officers and units. In contrast, extensive evidence from [psychology](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10752360/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [decision science](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.2648573?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) indicates that structured, rule-based or actuarial classification systems consistently outperform unaided professional judgment in risk assessment and categorization tasks, producing more reliable and equitable outcomes. While no system is free from error, this literature suggests that formalized gang databases with clear inclusion criteria and oversight may reduce — rather than exacerbate — the risks associated with purely individual, intuition-based determinations of gang involvement. None of this is to say that the NYPD's gang database is beyond reproach. Research makes clear that gang databases suffer from vague inclusion criteria, weak oversight, a lack of due process and potential law enforcement biases about who is involved in gang activity. [A recent study](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Pyrooz/publication/382623580%5FPulling%5FBack%5Fthe%5FCurtain%5Fon%5Fthe%5FCalifornia%5FGang%5FDatabase%5FEvidence%5Fof%5FRacial%5FEthnic%5Fand%5FGender%5FDisparities%5FAmong%5F222%5FLaw%5FEnforcement%5FAgencies/links/66a79fbe75fcd863e5e8680a/Pulling-Back-the-Curtain-on-the-California-Gang-Database-Evidence-of-Racial-Ethnic-and-Gender-Disparities-Among-222-Law-Enforcement-Agencies.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) found young men of color were overrepresented in the California gang database (CalGang) and raised questions as to whether these disparities could be explained by legal factors and whether the database properly balanced public safety value with individual rights. The NYPD has faced similar questions. In response to [a 2023 Office of the Inspector General report](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/reports/pdf/2023/16CGDRpt.Release04.18.2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Department tightened its inclusion and removal criteria. It is certainly possible that the NYPD Criminal Group Database could benefit from further examination and reforms. A more focused and targeted database would increase police efficiency, lower gun violence rates even further and lessen the civil liberties burden — the primary benefits of a focused policing approach. But those who champion eliminating the gang database entirely might harm the very individuals they say they want to protect. ### How To Deploy AI To Improve Policing in New York URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-to-deploy-ai-policing-nyc-nypd/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:26.000Z The New York City Police Department has long stood at the forefront of developments in policing and public safety. In the early 1900s, for example, it led the country in the collection and use of fingerprints in criminal investigations, when, for a time, its [fingerprint archive](https://www.mcny.org/story/photographs-fingerprints?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was larger than the federal government's. In the decades that followed, the Department experimented with tools such as [digital mapping](https://iris.unive.it/retrieve/3312c516-36a2-4110-9e9e-cc81270d3be9/Pasquinelli%20%20-%20Arcana%5FMathematica%5FImperii.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and CompStat, pioneering an empirical approach to crime-fighting and resource allocation. Many argue that these innovations have improved life for New Yorkers; they have certainly influenced the practice of policing across the country. Yet here we are in the heyday of AI, with accelerating improvements arriving every month and with these new tools transforming [software engineering](https://techcrunch.com/2026/02/12/spotify-says-its-best-developers-havent-written-a-line-of-code-since-december-thanks-to-ai/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [health care](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2825%2902464-X/fulltext?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [education](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-025-97652-6?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [beyond](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adh2586?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In this new world, it's unclear whether the Department can still claim a reputation as a national leader in policing innovation. As of March 2025, the Department's [official stance](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/oti/downloads/pdf/reports/2024-algorithmic-tools-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was that it had not permanently adopted any new AI systems since rolling out an algorithm, [*Patternizr*](https://www.wsj.com/articles/nypd-built-bias-safeguards-into-pattern-spotting-ai-system-11572514202?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that I helped develop when I was the Department's director of analytics 10 years ago. A natural instinct for the Department might be to break out of this innovation funk by seeking out AI tools that accelerate crime-fighting objectives. But we're fortunate that crime rates for many offenses are plunging, both [here in New York](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR002/nypd-fewest-shoooting-incidents-shooting-victims-murders-january?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [across the country](https://jasher.substack.com/p/2025-year-in-review-a-remarkable?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At the same time, a concerted push to test crime-fighting AI carries serious risks — best represented by Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE's) recent unencumbered embrace of technologies like [phone geofencing](https://www.404media.co/inside-ices-tool-to-monitor-phones-in-entire-neighborhoods/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [phone-hacking spyware](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/10/17/ice-surveillance-immigrants-antifa/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which has Americans on edge about law enforcement use of AI-driven surveillance. More broadly, a [majority of Americans](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2025/09/17/how-americans-view-ai-and-its-impact-on-people-and-society/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are wary about the potential societal risks of AI. At the same time, while crime is falling, many of the City's key reform efforts have stalled. Despite [widespread public support](https://assets.aclu.org/live/uploads/2025/04/IPM%5FNY%5FApril-28.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for diverting some 911 calls to nonpolice responders, New York City's call-diversion program — aka B-HEARD — saw a [substantial portion](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/new-audit-comptroller-finds-over-a-third-of-eligible-mental-health-calls-did-not-get-a-b-heard-team-response-for-untracked-reasons/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of eligible calls fail to receive program services. The federal monitor established by Floyd v. City of New York in the wake of the Department's disastrous stop-and-frisk policies has been in place for 13 years, with [recent reports](https://legalaidnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/STATUS-REPORT.-Twenty-first-Report-of-the-Independent-Monitor.-Document-filed-by-Mylan-L.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the monitor noting the NYPD's continued noncompliance with important court orders. And the City looks [certain to miss](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/01/timeline-closure-rikers-island/376662/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the legally mandated deadline to close Rikers next year, with horrid conditions on the island continuing to decimate the credibility of our justice system. This constellation of factors presents an unusual opportunity for Mayor Zohran Mamdani and Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch: accelerate reform efforts through the adoption of AI in contexts where this technology promises to improve outcomes. This focus would help the NYPD build the policymaking muscle it needs to develop effective policies around the responsible use of AI, preparing it for potential deployments of ethical crime-fighting tech in the future. And in an era of extreme budgetary pressure, these technologies present a rare chance for the mayor and the Department to advance key justice priorities while keeping costs down. Of course, there are many reasons why reform efforts have stalled — including lack of adequate staffing and the negotiation of tricky political questions — where technology cannot help. But a couple of examples highlight where AI has the potential to make a real difference in these efforts: first in the AI-supported expansion of 911 diversion, and second in AI-assisted review of police conduct in body camera footage. As my colleagues at the [Policing Project](https://www.policingproject.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) noted in a [couple of recent](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/calling-the-cops-less-often) [Vital City articles](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-devil-is-in-the-details-of-911-dispatch), New York City has struggled to divert nonviolent 911 calls, like those involving a mental health crisis, away from police response. The City's B-HEARD pilot, launched in 2021, diverted [thousands of calls](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-behavioral-health-emergency-assistance-response-divisions-effectiveness-in-responding-to-individuals-with-mental-health-crises-and-meeting-its-goals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) away from police response, with many of those served connecting with community-based care. But these thousands of calls represent a mere 0.01% of the city's total call volume. This places New York City behind national leaders like Minneapolis, which has diverted 9% of calls and recently set an ambitious target to divert 20% of calls. The largest constraint on B-HEARD is staffing, where technology is unlikely to help much. But if the City is able to hire more alternative responders, the natural next hurdle will be devising validated criteria that identify more nonviolent calls suitable for alternative response, and then training the City's call takers and dispatchers to act on these new criteria. AI could accelerate this process in a number of ways. First, AI could review historical calls for missed opportunities for diversion, providing empirical evidence for new call diversion criteria. Once these criteria are drafted, AI could simulate and stress test their use: first on historical calls, and then in parallel to actual call taking to evaluate whether they would work in practice. Once these criteria are finalized, AI could accelerate the training of call takers and dispatchers by simulating callers in a zero-risk practice environment, helping staff get repeated exposure to tricky situations so they'd be ready to act in high-pressure, real-world scenarios. AI could scale up quality assurance monitoring once new diversion criteria are in place, finding opportunities for improved staff performance — at a cost much cheaper than hiring employees to do this quality assurance at the same scale. A different context where AI could advance reform efforts is in tapping the Department's enormous body-worn camera footage archive. In theory, this repository is a tremendous public asset, providing an opportunity to detect and correct problematic or risky officer behavior before tragic incidents occur, as well as to identify models of excellent policing worth holding up as exemplary. This vision for body cameras is what drove support for their rollout across the country; indeed, one of the [key conditions](https://ccrjustice.org/files/Remedy%20Decision%20Summary%20-%20Final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the Floyd ruling in 2013 was that the NYPD pilot the use of body-worn cameras. But the NYPD has neither the personnel capacity nor the budget to review most body camera footage using traditional approaches. As of 2019, [about two years'](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?GUID=D661482E-99BA-4A99-8805-DF4DEDAA0C8B&ID=7951413&M=F&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) worth of video was recorded and stored by the Department every *week*. It's impractical for the Department to hire humans to review footage at this scale; thorough review would require a staff of [hundreds of new analysts](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?GUID=D661482E-99BA-4A99-8805-DF4DEDAA0C8B&ID=7951413&M=F&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to watch this footage full-time. A well-trained AI tool could review all footage and isolate short clips of officer behavior — both good and bad — for supervisor review. This tool would likely cost much less than what it would cost to hire hundreds of analysts. A handful of private-sector vendors, including Truleo and Polis, have built technology that can support this goal. Recognizing this promise, the NYPD [announced a pilot](https://gothamist.com/news/the-nypd-is-using-ai-to-analyze-body-camera-footage-civil-rights-activists-have-privacy-concerns?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with Truleo in the fall of 2023\. But since its announcement, there has been neither public communication on the results of the pilot nor any indication of whether the Department intends to proceed with a permanent contract. This lack of communication is a lost opportunity to build credibility around the deployment of AI in service of reform at the NYPD. It's worth noting that even reform-oriented applications of AI present tricky policymaking challenges for the Department and the City. The Department will need to allay concerns that AI algorithms used to review BWC footage and 911 calls are being used as a covert surveillance tool or that sensitive BWC footage or 911 call audio is used to train commercial AI models. The Department will need to convince its staff that these algorithms won't automatically impose discipline but will flag short clips of footage or audio for review, deferring any decision-making to human supervisors. Besides surveillance risks, those who have dabbled in generative AI might have been alarmed by new modes of failure: [hallucinations](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/25/us/prosecutor-artificial-intelligence-errors-lawyers-california.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (incorrect or fake but convincing claims), [sycophancy](https://openai.com/index/sycophancy-in-gpt-4o/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (AI saying whatever it thinks you want to hear) or [deepfakes](https://abcnews.com/Politics/trump-shutdown-troll-democrats-deepfake-memes-threatening-targeted/story?id=126185886&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (synthetic images or video that are indistinguishable from authentic media). Automated systems have the potential to [perpetuate biases](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1915768117?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found in training data. There are plenty of good ideas on how to reduce these risks, both through careful design of technology as well as the policies that surround their use. But convincing a skeptical and nervous public — and the Department's uniformed force — that appropriate safeguards are in place is a bigger challenge. In light of recent scandals, it's not clear that the NYPD is thinking about these risks. In 2020, for example, [reporters at BuzzFeed found](https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that over 40 members of the Department had signed up for Clearview AI using free trial accounts. These members ran over 11,000 searches on Clearview's database of people's faces, which were scraped from millions of social media posts without user consent. The NYPD scrambled to release [clearer guidance](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr0313/press-release---nypd-facial-recognition-policy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) around the proper use of facial recognition a few weeks later, but the reputational damage was done. In response to public pressure — and likely a desire to avoid new scandals like officers' unsanctioned use of Clearview AI — the NYPD has adopted a crude approach to internal use of AI. For a time, the NYPD had a blanket policy of blocking all access to chat-based interfaces like ChatGPT and URLs that ended in "ai" (such as clearview.ai), fearing inappropriate use and data leakage. But this approach is shortsighted if staff resort to using their personal phones for access to AI platforms. We need the Department to proactively recognize and reduce these risks through more mature policies and training. In the meantime, a locked-down agency will struggle to accomplish any goal — including those in service of justice reform. The NYPD will function fine if these reforms continue to stall. It's our most vulnerable residents who will pay the price for the City's lack of innovation. ════════════════════════════════════════ Outside of New York City, a stampede of private-sector vendors is aggressively pursuing contracts to deploy AI in law enforcement agencies [across the country](https://www.jai-t.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Anyone who has been to the International Association of Chiefs of Police conference in recent years has seen its exhibition hall filled with vendors touting apparently revolutionary [AI-powered crime-fighting products](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/10/cop-companies-want-all-your-data-and-other-takeaways-years-iacp-conference?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And these vendors are finding customers across the country: American law enforcement agencies are using AI to [transcribe jail calls](https://alaskapublic.org/news/public-safety/2025-09-23/anchorage-police-adopt-ai-to-analyze-investigative-data?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for detectives, drive [unmanned cruisers](https://cbs12.com/news/local/miami-unveils-pug-the-nations-first-ai-powered-police-cruiser-miami-deade-sheriffs-office-mdso-artificial-intelligence-police-unmanned-ground-october-3-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [flag officers](https://media.api.sf.gov/documents/PoliceCommission10423-SFPD%5FPolice%5FCommission%5FPresentation%5F2023-07-19.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with past patterns of misconduct. Even the historically lethargic MTA is one step ahead of the NYPD in testing AI to [deter fare evasion](https://gothamist.com/news/modern-nyc-subway-gates-tested-by-the-mta-use-ai-tech-to-track-fare-evaders?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [detect erratic behavior](https://gothamist.com/news/mta-wants-ai-to-flag-problematic-behavior-in-nyc-subways?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Several recent events have underscored concerns about the private sector's full-court embrace of AI for public safety. Amazon's [Super Bowl commercial](https://www.geekwire.com/2026/what-rings-search-party-actually-does-and-why-its-super-bowl-ad-gave-people-the-creeps?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for its Ring camera network reminded Americans that if the tech company can automatically track a lost dog in a neighborhood, it can probably automatically track people, too (emails [leaked yesterday](https://www.404media.co/leaked-email-suggests-ring-plans-to-expand-search-party-surveillance-beyond-dogs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggest this is indeed a goal). The public's uneasy reaction to this ad caused Amazon to [void a collaboration](https://www.theverge.com/report/879320/ring-flock-partnership-breakup-does-not-fix-problems?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with another surveillance provider, Flock Safety, which has its own track record of [questionable policy](https://apnews.com/article/immigration-abortion-license-plates-cameras-cc5f29df94a29ee2c6c2feb2151c8f5e?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And in the last few days, the FBI announced it was able to [recover footage](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cybersecurity-experts-nancy-guthrie-surveillance-footage-recovery/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from a Google Nest camera many days after Nancy Guthrie's disappearance — an apparent discrepancy with the company's policy for accounts like Ms. Guthrie's, which says such footage will only be accessible for a few hours. Adding to these concerns, we don't know whether most marketed AI tools work as claimed or whether they'd make any difference in real-world practice. The most discussed generative AI product in policing is Axon's "Draft One," which uses transcriptions from Axon's body cameras to write a draft crime narrative for officers. While [Axon claims](https://www.axon.com/getstarted/draft-one?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) use of Draft One will reduce report-writing time by 50% — a salivating prospect, given the administrative burdens associated with law enforcement reporting duties — independent researchers ran a peer-reviewed [randomized experiment](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-024-09644-7?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and found that the use of Draft One didn't reduce report-writing times compared to status quo practice. That's not to mention the [potential pitfalls](https://komonews.com/news/local/king-county-prosecutor-tells-police-not-to-use-ai-artificial-intelligence-for-official-reports-for-now-errors-concerns-law-enforcement-perjury-criminal-justice?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that may arise in court when officers are cross-examined about a narrative they didn't write themselves, including words they don't know. Surprising results from experiments like this one underscore why it's crucial to pilot and evaluate promising new technologies before they are fully adopted. Any such effort at the NYPD — including those in service of reform goals — must be credibly and rigorously evaluated before new technologies are rolled out permanently. These evaluations are essential because they will help policymakers and the public understand if AI lives up to its promise and whether there's any evidence for its misuse or abuse in practice. And technology is not the only unproven piece of this new puzzle. We also lack compelling evidence on which *policies* will be effective at preventing misuse and abuse of AI. Careful iteration and learning via testing and evaluation is the only real way to make progress on these open and important questions. In theory, it's possible that such evaluations are already happening inside the NYPD, but it's hard to know for sure — with the lack of transparency around its Truleo pilot serving as a prime example. The Department did pilot another AI technology recently as part of a transparency requirement under the City's new POST Act: [Evolv scanners](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2024/03/mayor-adams-nypd-commissioner-caban-pilot-new-technology-additional-clinicians-be?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to detect firearms on people entering subway stations. But messaging around this pilot's intent left a lot of room for improvement. In advance of the pilot, then-Mayor Eric Adams called it a ["sputnik moment"](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2024/03/transcript-mayor-adams-nypd-commissioner-caban-pilot-new-technology-additional?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the City and said, ["I think it's good technology."](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2024/07/evolv-gun-detection-tech-rolling-out-nyc-subway-stations-week/398274/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) These enthusiastic comments suggested that the City was conducting a pro forma pilot of a technology it had already determined to be useful. But these preliminary conclusions [were dubious](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/subway-gun-scanners-the-wrong-tech-in-the-wrong-place). After the monthlong experiment, the Department had recovered [zero guns](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2024/10/results-are-evolv-gun-scanners-recover-zero-guns-subways/400522/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but had 118 false hits — almost 10 times as many as the 12 knives they had recovered in the same time span. Although the former mayor had a penchant for gaffes, framing this pilot as an objective test would have saved the City a lot of embarrassment when it didn't end as hoped. It's also [no secret](https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2025-02-19-1000-am-committee-on-public-safety/chapter/nypds-use-of-ai-technologies-in-patternizer-shotspotter-and-facial-recognition/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the City and the NYPD have struggled to define what counts as AI. Although the City [passed a law](https://intro.nyc/local-laws/2022-35?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2022 requiring City agencies to disclose use of "algorithmic" tools on an annual basis, the mandate doesn't appear to include technology that most people would consider to qualify as AI. While the NYPD's use of facial recognition and ShotSpotter — both of which make use of algorithms — are included in the City's annual AI inventory, not included are the Department's Truleo pilot or its numerous [license plate readers](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public%5Finformation/post-final/License-Plate-Readers-NYPD-Impact-and-Use-Policy-2.4.26-FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Traditional algorithmic technologies like fingerprint matching and DNA analysis aren't qualified. They're older methods, to be sure, but they use algorithms the same way. Whether a tool qualifies as new "AI" technology is a distraction from the deeper question at stake: whether government can wield new police powers to keep the public safe while respecting civil rights and minimizing undue costs imposed on its denizens. Put this way, current struggles with AI are the newest example of the fundamental challenge of the justice system, which has always been a delicate balancing act between the state's extreme power and safeguards against the irresponsible, overbearing or unequal use of this power. We've been struggling with this balance for a long time — illustrated by the fact that 4 of the 10 constitutional amendments in the 1789 Bill of Rights guard against government overreach in criminal procedure. But in the past, it's taken us a long time to strike an acceptable balance. With fingerprints, for example, it took [decades](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/721/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of [litigation](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/470/811/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [mistakes](https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2018-02/s1105.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) before we devised mature policy on when fingerprints could be taken, how matches would be documented and challenged, and who could access this sensitive information. Today, AI is evolving so fast that we don't have decades to spare. We need a competent public sector that can draw from historical parallels — and learn from the ineffective or effective ways we've curbed overreach in the past — to address new threats posed by AI, all while finding opportunities for its responsible use. In New York City, an earnest effort to design technology that builds state capacity on stalled reform efforts is a good place to start. To kick-start this process, the Department can draw on our city's deep bench of public-interest talent. I have many colleagues who run applied research labs in the city's numerous universities who would be eager to help the NYPD. Reasonable voices in the city's civic tech and advocacy community could assist the Department in thinking through the risks inherent in new AI technologies. Resources outside the city can assist, including [other agencies](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2024-01-24%5Fpm%5F-%5Ftestimony%5F-%5Faguilar.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) pioneering responsible adoption and national organizations like the Council on Criminal Justice, where a new [Task Force on AI](https://counciloncj.org/artificial-intelligence/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (on which I am serving) is drafting guidelines on the safe and effective use of AI technologies in justice settings. Historically, the NYPD has been reluctant to ask for help — e.g., at last year's ["Pilot Pitchfest,"](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/an-antidote-to-doge-strengthening-urban-policy-entrepreneurs) where the Department was absent from a crowd of over 20 City agencies pitching research and technical projects to over 1,000 volunteers. Reconsidering this reluctance would help the Department rekindle its capacity for responsible innovation. In tandem, the Department needs to begin the slow process of reestablishing internal capacity like it had 10 years ago, when there were multiple civilian experts working across the agency alongside exceptional uniformed staff. AI's disruption has brought about a new moment where capable technical talent is easier to hire: [Massive recent layoffs](https://www.challengergray.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Challenger-Report-December-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have made it possible to recruit experienced technologists who are tired of supporting the tech sector's march toward [enshittification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enshittification?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and who want to make a positive difference in the world instead. Aside from hiring new civilian staff, the Department needs to better support talent that matures within its own ranks. An unfortunate ["brain drain"](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/inside-city-hall/2025/01/24/nypd-detectives--endowment-association-president-on-retaining-detectives?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed out many talented uniformed members who could be helping devise a responsible and informed path forward on the Department's use of AI. Confusing, inconsistent and spotty information about the NYPD's use of AI has only served to raise fears among the public that new technologies are being used in an irresponsible way. The mayor has a talent for wonky, policy-dense communication; the NYPD should consider adopting his approach in helping the public learn about responsible innovation at the Department. In particular, the Department should show — not tell — the public how it is making responsible use of these new technologies. And to do so, it can spotlight the Department's many diverse, talented and passionate civil servants who work hard to do the right thing and keep our city safe. Implementing these changes would improve the NYPD's ability to adopt AI responsibly, promising concrete benefits to the city's most vulnerable residents while reducing the risk of improper use. But the benefits wouldn't stop there. The NYPD occupies a special position — both by virtue of its internationally respected brand and its incredible size (with more sworn officers than [most American states](https://bjs.ojp.gov/media/67846/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) — from which it can lead the nation in the safe development and testing of these new technologies. With both an effective commissioner and an idealistic yet pragmatic mayor in office, this seems like an unusual moment where the right leaders are in place to make this vision a reality. This kind of leadership is sorely needed. The AI genie is out of the bottle, and private corporations are leading the development of AI in justice settings. While the private sector is a crucial engine for innovation, our institutions have ceded too much leadership to technology companies, which aren't incentivized to serve the public interest. Instead, we need a competent public sector, accountable to the public, that can identify the narrow path forward between ineffective, sclerotic government and limitless technology that — if unchecked — will impinge on our civil liberties. It's a narrow path. But it's one we can and must do our best to travel down. ### New York City’s Crime Puzzle URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-city-gun-violence-down-major-crime-high/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:26.000Z History, polls and comparative data show that New York City has more major crime than it should. Gun and lethal violence are down, but overall major crime is too high. That has been the story of New York's major crime in 2025 and for the last four years. We need to properly diagnose the problems of the present to adjust policy for the future. ## Where things stand Historical perspective is essential. In the 1950s, New York City's major crime fluctuated between 1,800 and 2,000 index crimes per 100,000 residents. Crime began to rise in the 1960s, peaking at around 10,000 crimes per 100,000 in the early 1980s and again from 1988 to 1990. Over the next three decades, crime declined, making New York the safest big city in the United States. From 2016 to 2019, index crime reached lows not seen since the 1950s. New York City had a crime rate of 1,987 index crimes per 100,000 residents in 2017; 2,043 in 2018; and 2,030 in 2019. (Unless otherwise noted, major crime or crime refers here to the federal definition of [seven index crimes](https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/glossary.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They include murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny/theft and motor vehicle theft.) Crime then increased during the Adams administration (between 2022-2025) to levels not seen since the first year of Mayor Bloomberg's term in 2002, reaching approximately 3,000 index crimes per 100,000 residents (or nearly 250,000 index crimes per year). Crime decreased by 3% from 2024 to 2025 — but it remained around 45% above the 2017 level. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27610975?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TwSSjumLDRDi8SSjkLkvElMtA8Jf9HMeLx0M%5FNMA3%5F8/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Public opinion surveys also show that people think crime is too high. In September 2025, the [New York Times/Siena Poll](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/09/09/polls/nyc-mayor-poll-likely-voters.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that crime ranked as the most important issue for the largest share of likely voters in the 2025 mayoral election (27%), surpassing the cost of living (26%) and housing/rent prices (19%). [That same month](https://sri.siena.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SNY-September-2025-Poll-Release-9-16-25-FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), only [25% of registered voters](https://sri.siena.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SNY0925-Crosstabs-2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) thought crime in New York City had "gotten better" over the last year. Finally, the city's trend dynamics differ markedly from those of the rest of the state and the nation. In the United States, index crime was down 8% in 2024 and another 10% in preliminary 2025 data, to its lowest level since 1960\. Index crime in 2025 is estimated to be 25% lower than in 2019\. Index crimes in upstate New York were down 7% in 2024, and a double-digit decrease is estimated for 2025, resulting in the lowest crime levels in six decades. So while New York City remains one of the safest big cities in the United States, there is no reason to celebrate current crime rates based on the three criteria discussed above. As I see it, there are three burning questions about crime in New York City in 2025: 1. Why were gun and lethal violence totals down in 2025, but not major crime overall? 2. Why was major crime down elsewhere in 2025 but not in New York City? 3. How can we return the city's crime rate in 2026 to the levels of 2016-2019 and reduce crime by 70,000-80,000 crimes? This assessment offers preliminary answers to these questions and outlines a road map for areas that need immediate attention. ## Why were gun and lethal violence down in 2025, but not major crime overall? New York City, which started to track shootings in the 1990s, registered more than 5,000 shootings in 1993\. Shootings fell in the 1990s and 2000s, but New York City still had over 1,100 shootings in the last year of the Bloomberg administration. From 2017 to 2019, New York had three consecutive years with fewer than 800 shootings per year. Then, shootings doubled in 2020 and 2021, and the targeted work of reducing shootings renewed. In 2025, for the first time, New York City had fewer than 700 shootings in a calendar year (688), a total that's 9% lower than the prior low, and a new record. That is remarkable. In 2025, New York also had the third-lowest murder rate (305 murders, or 3.6 murders per 100,000) since the postwar historic low of 1951 (244 murders, or 3.1 murders per 100,000). That's near the lows of 2017 (292 murders, or 3.4 murders per 100,000) and 2018 (295 murders, or 3.5 murders per 100,000). There is no question that the City's [data-driven strategy](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR001/nypd-safest-year-ever-gun-violence-fewest-shooting-incidents-shooting?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — starting with the work of the police and prosecutors taking down gangs and removing guns from the streets — along with record-high investments in violence interruption and community-based programming, is helping to successfully drive down gun violence. That said, it is worth noting that New York City's progress in reducing gun and lethal violence is nothing out of the ordinary when compared to current national and local dynamics. After [three years of declines](https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/pages/home) (11% in 2023, 15% in 2024, and a preliminary 18% in 2025), the U.S. murder rate in 2025 is expected to hit its lowest postwar level (from 1946 to the present), or approximately 4.1 murders per 100,000 in 2025. Similarly, sharp decreases in murders have occurred across the country. For example, [Los Angeles had the lowest homicide rate](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-01-06/la-me-homicide-stats?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) recorded since 1959\. [Chicago homicides fell](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/crime/chicago-homicides-in-2025-fell-to-lowest-level-in-60-years-cpd-says/ar-AA1TD8t4?ocid=BingNewsSerp&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the lowest level in 60 years after a 30% drop in 2025\. [Philadelphia's 2025 homicides](https://philadelphia.today/2026/01/philadelphia-2025-homicide-rate/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) hit their lowest total since 1966\. [San Francisco](https://www.cbsnews.com/sanfrancisco/news/sf-2024-homicide-rate-lowest-in-decades-officials-say/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) recorded its lowest number of murders in over six decades in 2024 and then went lower still in 2025, recording its lowest number of murders since 1954\. In 2025, among the 17 most populous cities in the United States (those with more than 800,000 residents), three cities had a murder rate lower than New York's: San Jose, San Diego and San Francisco. We also see more progress in reducing gun violence in upstate New York in the jurisdictions under the [Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) program](https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ops/gunviolencereduction/index.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The [nationally recognized](https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Investing-in-Intervention-02.14.18.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) initiative provides State funding to local law enforcement agencies and supports 28 jurisdictions (including Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Yonkers and Long Island, among others) in 21 counties. As in New York City, after record years in the 2017 to 2019 period (679 shootings in 2019), gun violence almost doubled upstate in 2020 and 2021\. In 2022, shootings started to decrease. After setting a record low in 2024 with just 587 shootings, shootings in upstate GIVE jurisdictions [went down again in 2025](https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/tableau%5FGive%5FShooting%5FActivity.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by another 17% to 475\. That's 30% fewer shootings than the 2019 low. To give a sense of the gap between upstate and the city's performance, New York City would need to have 163 fewer shootings than it did in 2025 (from 688 to 525 shootings) to be on par with the reductions upstate. Similarly, compared to the low of 2019 (248 murders or 2.2 murders per 100,000), the 2025 upstate murders were down by more than 10% by September. Although we do not have the final number for all murders, upstate murders by firearm were down 25% in 2025\. Based on preliminary data, the upstate murder rate is likely to be between 5% and 10% lower than the prepandemic low of 2019, outpacing the New York City decline. What accounts for this variation in performance between New York City and the rest of the state or other big cities in the United States? We must always bring a measure of humility to connecting cause and effect in crime declines. But other places seemed to have been more successful in utilizing the components that have also been the hallmark of New York's past success: a combination of data-driven precision policing, deterrence-focused strategies driven by police and prosecutors (including hot-spot policing, gang takedowns and the daily work of the multiagency [Gun Violence Strategies Partnership](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/new-york-city-gun-violence-strategic-partnership/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), along with investments in non-law enforcement initiatives that reduce mortality, from summer youth employment and violence interruption programs to streetlights and other environmental design. In short, when it comes to gun violence and homicide, New York City is historically safe and is experiencing positive year-over-year trends. The [numbers for January 2026](https://compstat.nypdonline.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are impressive and point to an acceleration in the downward trend. But New York from 2022 to 2025 has not been leading the nation as it once did. This is a notable thing in and of itself. But what gets especially interesting is comparing the City's ability to drive declines in gun violence and homicide to its seeming inability in 2025 to significantly move the needle in a positive direction when it comes to other types of offenses. ## Why was crime down elsewhere but not in New York City? The United States overall experienced unprecedented new lows in major crime in 2024 and 2025. The [2024 crime victimization survey](https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/cv24.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (covering crimes experienced from July 2023 to November 2024) already indicated a downward trend and the fact that crime victimizations were near historic lows. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27611025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1iGxJa4wLs7zR4zCVrrrf0HQY%5Fd8xy9HUrp%5FuJqBMZTk/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) In 2025, the [FBI Crime Data Explorer](https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/pages/home) dashboard indicates that index crime is down roughly 11% nationwide, following an 8.5% decrease in 2024\. The estimated 2025 crime rate (approximately 1,876 crimes per 100,000) fell to levels not seen since 1960, when there were 1,887 index crimes per 100,000. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27611062?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1BRQoph6beC8vn66KJKTrSKxYtpHh7qogAD%5FVbLzE3P4/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) All major cities in the United States, including the group of 17 cities with more than 800,000 residents, experienced decreases in index crime in 2025\. Los Angeles crime was down 15%, Chicago down 16%, Houston down 12%, Phoenix down 10%, Philadelphia down 6%, San Antonio down 14%, Dallas down 11%, Fort Worth down 17%, San Jose down 7%, Austin down 6%, Charlotte down 7%, Columbus down 20% and San Francisco down 25%. By comparison, New York City was down 3%, lagging behind the pack. Outside the confines of New York City, New York State experienced double-digit reductions in crime, and new lows. A review of available preliminary 2025 data suggests that the estimated 2025 upstate crime rate of approximately 1,400 crimes per 100,000 was the lowest rate since 1965\. In the first eight months of 2025, violent crime decreased by 13% and property crime decreased by 16%, according to data from the [FBI Crime Data Explorer](https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/pages/explorer/crime/query) Discovery Tool and the State's [Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS](https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/tableau%5Findex%5Fcrime%5Fby%5Fagency.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). Nothing exemplifies the problem of crime in New York City more than the rise in aggravated assaults and larcenies. Under Mayor Adams, in 2024, aggravated assaults were at 2000-2001 levels. Felony assaults, the most serious assaults, were up to levels not seen since 1997, and once again they were up in 2025 at a time when murders and shootings were declining at a remarkable rate. Larceny was above its 2000 level. Aggravated assaults and larcenies account for 80% of all index crimes. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27611151?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tcSWY9ueFFvdcuHkXObFS76ZN0NYThp%5Fc-JBI7UAVa8/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27611187?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Kg3HftdGe9NRa9QNoK21haZF3-c2J3vaOOVCkgtRw24/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Why is New York City lagging behind the state and the nation in crime declines, when [30 years ago it led the state and the nation](https://www.amazon.com/City-That-Became-Safe-Lessons/dp/0199324166?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), setting an example of how to reduce victimization and disorder? Why hasn't the City been able to implement a strategy that effectively reduces both lethal violence and crime overall? Several factors may explain this. However, one likely contributing factor is the mismanagement and incompetence of the Adams administration. While New York State was establishing new partnerships across jurisdictions to address various crime problems, from motor vehicle and retail thefts to the rise in domestic violence and aggravated assaults, the City fell short. One area where the partnership took place, the subway, saw significant progress — the [lowest levels of crime in 16 years](https://abc7ny.com/post/nyc-safety-subway-crime-lowest-level-16-years-ridership-8-gov-kathy-hochul-says/18298460/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ## How do we return to the city's recent lows? The City's goal should be to return crime rates to the levels of 2017-2019, which means reducing crime by at least 70,000 incidents annually. Why is New York City lagging behind other places? Four dynamics seem to separate New York City from other places. There is one strategy that does not seem to work in New York City — the deterring effect of certain, swift and fair enforcement — and three initiatives that have not been explored and are worth pursuing. First, what not to do. Looking at the first three quarters of each year, arrests went up from 141,063 in 2022 to 212,486 in 2025\. Arrests are up 50%, yet crime is almost on par with 2022, the first year of the Adams administration. Increasing the number of arrests by itself is not an effective approach: For an arrest to have an effect on crime, a prosecutor needs to have enough evidence to prosecute successfully. But today, prosecutors are expressing their doubt about the quality of the evidence through their rising declination rates: Prosecutors currently decline to prosecute 18.5% of all arrests, up from 10% in 2019, and 54% of arrests are dismissed, up from 45% in 2019\. The outcome is that only 1 in 4 cases results in a conviction, compared to roughly a 50/50 split prior to the pandemic. (To be clear, conviction does not equate with incarceration, as 60% of convictions result in probation, fines, conditional discharges and other noncarceral outcomes.) In the 2010s, the [perceptual deterrence theory](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-22890-013?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [showed that](https://crimejusticelab.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Criminology-Public-Policy-2024-Braga-Disorder-policing-to-reduce-crime-An-updated-systematic-review-and.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the [certainty of the outcome](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691148649/when-brute-force-fails?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is [more important](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315724393-8/beyond-deterrence-david-kennedy-mark-kleiman-anthony-braga?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than the [severity](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/less-law-more-order-9780275990770/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It is possible to reduce crime, unnecessary enforcement and incarceration if we have a strong strategy that emphasizes [swiftness, certainty and fairness](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12258?msockid=02e6b9c65b9760742129af565a186122&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The City must return to an enforcement that deters criminal conduct. So what else should New York City leaders and policing practitioners do, then? There are three specific initiatives worth pursuing given the current resources available. First, there is the need for a place-based, borough-based strategy. The Bronx's crime rate is approximately 3,750 crimes per 100,000 residents, which is 25% higher than the city's average. The Bronx crime rate remains nearly unchanged from its 2000 level, when it was around 3,900 crimes per 100,000\. Using CompStat data that only measure the seven major felony offenses, the Bronx had 13% more offenses in 2025 than under Giuliani in 2001\. More importantly, from 2001 to 2025, felony assaults increased by 64% and grand larcenies rose by 108%. The City needs a comprehensive place-based plan for the Bronx and beyond. The NYPD seems to agree and has announced [a new initiative for the Bronx](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/PR003/commissioner-tisch-new-strategies-keep-new-yorkers-safe-improve-officer-training-and?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). You cannot fix the city without fixing the Bronx. Second, a recent report from the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice shows that the age curve is changing, locally and nationally. The share of felony arrests for individuals under 18 years old and those aged 18 to 24 has decreased from 37% of all felony arrests to 31%. However, the share for the group aged 35 to 44 has increased from 16% to 22%. From 2018 to 2024, the number of felony arrests for the 35-44 age group almost doubled from 4,376 to 8,437\. Equally important, as the rearrest rate for the age group under 25 years old has remained stable, the felony rearrest rate for the 35-44 age group has increased from 24% in 2018 to 33% in 2024\. They recidivate more often. That group now has the highest rearrest rate of all groups. Further, the violent felony rearrest or recidivism rate has also increased from 16% in 2018 to 26% in 2024\. An analysis of the Rikers population also shows that this group has, on average, more open cases than their young counterparts. The City needs a comprehensive, people-centered plan for this age group, similar to the many initiatives available for youth and young people, such as summer youth employment. The City needs to develop a specific program for this cohort and understand a fundamental finding from [Robert Sampson](https://robertjsampson.com/projects/lifecourse?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on crime and life courses: There are significant cohort differences in the historical contexts through which individuals come of age. Cohort fortunes diverge due to crime and enforcement rates. Third, the [OCA Pretrial Release](https://ww2.nycourts.gov/pretrial-release-data-33136?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) dashboard was created with DCJS to aid in studying the 2019 bail reforms. The tool indicates that, for the last available time period, from June 2024 to June 2025, the overall rearrest rate in the New York City Criminal Court was 19% (18% for release-on-own-recognizance cases and 16% for bail-set cases). (Note: There were 200,745 arraignments during this period.) By comparison, the rearrest rate was 44% (15,778 out of 36,066) for cases on supervised release or nonmonetary conditions. If there is a warrant for failure to appear in court or other reasons (9,863), the rearrest rate for people on supervised release increases to 72% (7,079 out of 9,863). These are cases in which the risks of flight, noncompliance with court conditions and reoffending are highly correlated. These individuals are under the supervision of the court and the City; the City needs a comprehensive network analysis and plan for this group. This is not a comprehensive strategy, but rather some of the steps that are needed in the months ahead to reduce crime in certain areas, just as the City has reduced gun violence. For a comprehensive initiative, much more work is needed to develop a crime strategy similar to the plan that brought crime and violence to the lowest levels in decades in the 2016-2019 period. ### How Prevention Reduced Crime and How To Get More of It URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-prevention-reduced-crime-suggestions-analysis/ Last updated: 2026-06-23T14:01:03.000Z Today, broadly shared events are rare. We are divided by politics and scattered into increasingly insular networks, so it is not surprising that we are having trouble digesting the news: [In 2025, crime declined](https://johnkroman.substack.com/p/the-quietest-crime-story-of-the-year?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) almost everywhere and in [all major crime categories](https://jasher.substack.com/p/2025-year-in-review-a-remarkable?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And not just a little, but by record-breaking amounts, as five of the seven categories showed the largest one-year decline since modern national crime statistics began in 1960\. In these situations, we collectively tend to cling to comforting beliefs. In the case of the crime decline, that means [nodding along](https://johnkroman.substack.com/p/why-has-crime-declined-part-deux?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with those who point to policing and, particularly, to tactical enforcement and strategic initiatives undertaken this year. But that wasn't why crime went down practically everywhere in 2025\. I think there is powerful evidence that crime went down practically everywhere because of a nationwide embrace of prevention. We can be excused for failing to understand this because this prevention strategy was poorly marketed, and, in some cases, even unintentional. In 2022, more than $350 billion [in COVID-19 state and local recovery funds](https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) began flowing to every state, and from there to counties, cities and townships. The dollars replaced state and local revenue lost to the pandemic and were used to maintain vital public services. That sounds ponderous, as public finance discourse often does. But what those dollars purchased in large part were more teachers, counselors and clinicians at a moment when they were scarce. These are the people who interact directly with young people at the greatest risk of violence and victimization to develop opportunities for them and to reduce the risks they face. The term for this work is "prevention." What we set out to do was stabilize reeling social supports. We did that, but we also removed risks and created opportunities on a grand scale. As we move into the second half of the decade, we do so on a high note, at least with respect to reported crime. But most of the next steps under consideration today are focused on fragments of success and do little more ambitious than memorialize recent gains. However, if the decline in crime was driven by deep investment in prevention delivered through existing social structures, then the next step toward even steeper declines requires even more robust support for these local systems. \*\*\* To show that federal funding of prevention is the largest single contributor to the crime declines, it must be true that the decline, like the federal investment, was national in scope and not driven primarily by local factors. How broad was the 2025 crime decline? For the first time since 2014, every measure tracked in the FBI's national crime statistics shows a decline. If the data from the [Real Time Crime Index](https://realtimecrimeindex.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which looks at data from policing agencies serving about one-third of the U.S. population — bear out, the decline from 2024 to 2025 will be record-breaking or nearly so in every crime category. Every large city, save one or two, showed a decline in violence, some to almost pre-Vietnam War levels. The downward trend has momentum and may be accelerating, with homicide declining by 6% [in 2022](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-2022-crime-in-the-nation-statistics?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), followed by 12% [in 2023](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-2023-crime-in-the-nation-statistics?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), 15% [in 2024](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-2024-reported-crimes-in-the-nation-statistics?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and a 20% decline [in 2025](https://realtimecrimeindex.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Cities that generally failed to benefit from the [Great American Crime Decline](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12103-022-09714-4?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the 1990s, like Baltimore, experienced unprecedented declines (31% in homicide from 2024 to 2025). Cities often vilified for their lack of safety, such as San Francisco, had 2025 homicide numbers equal to levels last seen during World War II (1942). Already the safest megacity in the United States, New York City still had a substantial year-over-year decline in homicide in 2025 (21%). The only possible conclusion from these data is that the 2025 decline in crime was a national phenomenon. It follows, then, that the causes of the decline were national in scope. This comes as a surprise to followers of Tip O'Neill and his "all politics is local" mantra. While the politics of crime may well be centered in small places, and crime itself is a hyperlocal phenomenon, the crime decline occurred more or less everywhere. \*\*\* Skeptics would begin their deconstruction of the "prevention drove this crime decline" argument by noting that post hoc ergo propter hoc is a classic logical fallacy: Just because an event occurred before the outcome it aims to achieve does not mean it is the cause. One counter is simply to test competing hypotheses to determine if they are of sufficient scope and scale to present as plausible alternatives. [Policing changed little in scale](https://www.policeforum.org/trending5jul25?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) recently, as the year began with about the same number of sworn officers as at the beginning of the prior year. Firearm purchases declined in 2025 — but only by about 1%, according to [The Trace](https://www.thetrace.org/2020/08/gun-sales-estimates/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The trajectory of crime is very different today as well: Crime was increasing going into the pandemic, and it has since accelerated downward, so this is likely not merely a return to long-term trends. Demand for and harm from synthetic drugs [is declining](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but less steeply than in 2024. The case for massive federal investments in state and local governments' funding of broad prevention is comparatively strong. Between March and May of 2020, [more than 1.25 million Americans](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CES9093000001?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) lost local government jobs. To provide a sense of scale, [this is approximately equal](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/06/6-facts-about-the-us-military/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=As%20of%20the%20end%20of,while%2014%25%20are%20stationed%20internationally.) to the total number of active-duty military personnel across all six branches. By 2022, this number starts to turn around, and employment begins to grow. By the end of 2024, there were more local government employees than there were before the pandemic. This past year, local employment grew even more. For more scalar context, the $350 billion investment in state and local government is about 67% of the $550 billion [state and local governments spent](https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/criminal-justice-police-corrections-courts-expenditures?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on police and courts during this same period. The growth in the number of local government employees is compelling not because of the number of employees, but because of what those employees do in their jobs. Teachers and police officers are generally paid by the local government. So too are counselors, coaches, behavioral health clinicians and other social work and social service providers. Critically, these investments include state funds directed locally toward all manner of violence prevention and intervention. These were investments directly in the people who work directly with young people who are at the greatest risk of violence and victimization. The [Brookings Institution has shown](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-did-u-s-homicides-spike-in-2020-and-then-decline-rapidly-in-2023-and-2024/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for instance, that new funds were used to address chronic absenteeism that emerged during the pandemic, and this correlates with local crime declines. \*\*\* So, what does the future hold? It is hard to be terribly optimistic. Partially because, while we have all been exposed to the Ben Franklin aphorism that an ounce of prevention is a pound of cure, putting off for tomorrow what you can have today is deeply challenging to human beings. Thus, funding for prevention is rarely popular, partially because we lack the philosophical orientation to give credence to a prevention-based crime-fighting policy architecture. Successes from prevention are statistical rather than personal. There is no potential victim for politicians to point to and explain how their prevention policy protected that person. Picking up on the second point, the decline in crime is unlikely to be sustainable, because our conceptions of safety mechanisms are too narrow to move to the next, lower level of crime prevention. Our dialogue is too constrained. We talk mainly about levels of police manpower and task forces as plausible means to improve public safety. We do not talk about broad prevention levers like education and behavioral health as ways to reduce crime. Doing that requires a philosophical shift. This is not a new idea. Americans strongly prefer technological solutions to philosophical changes. [Writing in the journal Science](https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 1968, U.C. Santa Barbara professor Garrett Hardin states, "An implicit and almost universal assumption of discussions published in professional and semipopular scientific journals is that the problem under discussion has a technical solution." Hardin argues that there is no technological solution to many key problems. He cites the nuclear arms race as one in which every technological advance undermined national security. More directly on point, Hardin finds the same problem of the limits of technology in the production of pollution. Pollution is often used as a metaphor for crime policy reforms. Both produce bad outcomes for bystanders who become unwilling victims of crime or consumers of pollution. But, in Hardin's theory, technocratic solutions will always fail to protect the commons, as technology will always be suboptimally deployed. Policing, for instance, is a public good that everyone can use and no one can be excluded from its benefits, including deterrence. Hardin shows that public goods are always overused and underfunded, a universal effect known as the tragedy of the commons. In crime policy, the technological solution is coercion, or its modern cousin, deterrence, which also has technological limits, just as pollution deterrence or nuclear deterrence do. Deterrence is a public good and thus underprovided. My argument here is not that policing is somehow unsuccessful. Rather, I believe that effective policing is a necessary but insufficient precondition for public safety. But policing has limits. I would argue that gains are available if police use DNA more broadly in criminal investigations, for example, or focus more on clearing cases. But with the current crime decline, we may have reached an asymptote where each step gets us halfway closer to that limit, but each step is half as big as the last, until we are only taking the tiniest baby steps toward safety. \*\*\* How do we solve pollution problems? Hardin argues instead for shared temperance through "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected." Traditionally, this means taxes and laws for those who prioritize individual property rights over the public good by polluting. But there is no reason this cannot also lead us to prevention. To do this requires a rather profound change in moral philosophy, at least with respect to crime policy. Hardin notes that "the morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time it is performed." The idea is this: > A hundred and fifty years ago a plainsman could kill an American bison, cut out only the tongue for his dinner, and discard the rest of the animal. He was not in any important sense being wasteful. Today, with only a few thousand bison left, we would be appalled at such behavior. The argument for temperance through prevention is essentially the same. One hundred and fifty years from now, will leaving a struggling child, or a struggling school, or a struggling place behind in the interest of protecting personal property be considered appropriate or appalling? Hardin would argue that if the system's state remains unchanged, moral reasoning will remain unchanged as well. I would argue that the way to change the system's state is to invest more in prevention and to use temperance rather than coercion to nudge it toward a more humane state. How we do this is straightforward: We simply broaden our conception of public safety mechanisms to include universal prevention, like schools and behavioral health. And why not? What we have seen in the last four years is evidence that doing this is not just humane but effective. ### CompStat, Meet SafeStat URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/compstat-safestat-public-safety-nyc-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:26.000Z New York City is a global exporter of culture and capital ("Seinfeld"! Wall Street!), but in the world of government data nerds, one of its most enduring exports is a management tool that has been adopted across the globe: CompStat. Developed by the NYPD in the 1990s, CompStat was a deceptively simple innovation. It tracked measures of crime at the precinct level, created forums for holding commanders accountable and reinforced a basic management insight: You cannot manage what you do not measure. The model spread to police departments all over the country and birthed "Stat" programs across federal, state and local governments for everything from pothole repair to child welfare caseloads. At their best, [performance stat programs](https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/performancestat-potential-leadership-strategy-producing-results?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) enabled a relentless focus on outcomes that energized accountability, rapid innovation and a push for results. But three decades later, as New York stands up a new Department of Community Safety, we need a new innovation. The rigor of CompStat needs to be harnessed to a new measure that can tell us more about whether city residents feel safe. When my team [interviewed mayors](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/insight/mayor-to-mayor-police-accountability/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across the country recently, we asked each one: "What is your top priority?" The answer was almost always public safety. Next we asked, "How do you measure it?" Imagine my surprise when mayors said to us, "We don't have a way to measure whether people feel safe. And we need one." CompStat measures crime reports and police activity. But it does not measure public safety directly. Mayors have dashboards filled with proxies: shootings, burglary reports, arrest rates. These are measures of system activity and system failure. They tell us how busy the police are and how often residents report that specific laws are broken. But none of them answer the fundamental question that mayors — and residents — actually care about: Do people feel safe in their city? Without a reliable outcome metric, we pour resources into interventions without a feedback loop to tell us if they are working. And policymakers continue to make promises to historically disinvested communities without an objective measure to use to see if their promises have actually been achieved. To move to governing for outcomes, New York needs to invent a new metric — one that measures safety not merely by the absence of crime but by the presence of vibrant community life. ## Safety shows up in how people act One way of finding out whether people feel safe is to ask them. But to have a performance measure you can really manage toward, it needs to be as inclusive, real-time and easy to gather as possible. While micropolling is gaining ground in some cities, surveys and polls are usually expensive and slow to run, plus have such low response rates that they skew whose voices get heard. Is there a way to represent everyone's experience much more equally without having to continuously ask them to respond to intrusive questions? This feels especially important to me since we've heard from many community members that they are frustrated and fatigued with research and "community engagement" that doesn't lead to tangible change. What are some other indicators that might give us real insight on how communities are experiencing safety actually looks like? Because they're constantly in touch with residents, mayors possess an instinct for what safety looks like outside of their dashboards. [We asked them](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/insight/beyond-crime-statistics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "If you were dropped into a strange city with no access to their crime data, how would you know if it was safe?" They answered immediately that they'd look first to the use of public space. They'd want to know: Are women jogging alone after dark? Are children playing in parks? Can they ride their bikes outside in their neighborhood? Are people strolling easily, or do they walk looking over their shoulders? Crucially, these mayors' instincts are shared by the residents we talk with as well. In St. Paul, Minnesota, we interviewed young people from neighborhoods most impacted by violence. We asked them what they would do if their neighborhood felt safe to them. They said safety meant being able to hang out in a park, play outside or walk without scanning for threats. One 17-year-old participant [told us](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/insight/new-measures-of-public-safety/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "I would love to just be able to go outside without worrying that something will happen to me, when someone else will just do something violent, and yeah, having walks without worrying." If families in a neighborhood don't let their kids use the local park, that is a data point. If foot traffic on a commercial corridor evaporates at 8 p.m., that is a signal. These behaviors are the "revealed preferences" of public safety. Measures of revealed preference are how we assess many other areas of urban policy. We measure the success of a transit system by ridership, not by asking people if they like the bus. We measure the vitality of a housing market by demand. We should measure public safety by the degree to which residents trust their environment enough to inhabit it. There may be drawbacks to using perceptions of safety as a metric. What if feelings of safety are based on inaccurate perceptions of crime, for example? Survey data for the past few decades [show an ongoing gap](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/04/24/what-the-data-says-about-crime-in-the-us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) between the perceptions of crime and actual measured crime rates (though people tend to believe that crime increases are worse nationally than locally). Many city leaders right now are celebrating violent crime rates dropping to historic lows in their cities but may not see those drops leading to historic improvements in perceptions of safety (though overall perceptions may have [improved somewhat](https://news.gallup.com/poll/697124/crime-seen-less-serious-second-straight-year.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2025.) Mayors we talked with were frustrated with resident perceptions of safety that they felt were based not on personal observations but on alarmist media, true crime shows or social media and neighborhood apps that drive engagement by amplifying a sense of vulnerability to crime. However, the divergence between measurements of crime data and resident perceptions underlines the importance of finding a way to better understand how residents are experiencing the city. Reducing crime does not necessarily increase resident sense of safety. One reason is that many factors outside of crime may influence perceptions of safety. One mayor told us that his residents told him that one of the major factors driving their sense of public safety was the number of discarded needles in public areas. Another mentioned community members asking for help from the city with blighted lots that made the neighborhoods feel more dangerous. Many of the factors that mayors and residents described as influencing their sense of safety (the presence of individuals experiencing severe mental illness, blight, unlit walking paths etc.) sit outside the purview of law enforcement. A metric that draws on the behavior of residents to answer the question "Do people in this community feel safe to use public space here?" would allow a mayor to capture much more than crime stats alone will show. ## Designing the metric New York has a unique opportunity to operationalize this insight. The incoming administration and the new Department of Community Safety should test a "Felt Safety Index" based on observable behavioral data. Call it SafeStat. The ultimate goal would be to build a [composite index of stable indicators](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/insight/beyond-crime-statistics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that track the use of public space. This might include anonymized, aggregated cellphone location data to track foot traffic patterns in parks and commercial corridors; data on playground usage; or counts of pedestrian density at key times of day. Measures that show whether residents feel safe enough to walk alone to a bodega after dark or to let their kids play outside after school. This approach would move us from focusing lagging indicators (crime reports) to leading indicators (community vitality). The City would need to validate these measures against self-reported senses of safety and test their robustness to other inputs (weather, holidays). But if we could create reliable measures that helped us tell whether people were acting as though they felt safe, this new form of CompStat (SafeStat?) could unlock accountability and innovation in areas that have long been overlooked. If the City deploys a team of credible messengers or installs new lighting in a neighborhood, a behavioral metric would allow us to see — in near real time — if residents vote with their feet and change their behavior in those spaces. And if an area of the city reads as unsafe on SafeStat, leaders and community members would have an accountability tool that would allow them to keep pushing until they saw meaningful change. In a [recent interview](https://after-hours-with-jamie-rubin-a-vital-city-audio-project.simplecast.com/episodes/reducing-crime-by-improving-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Elizabeth Glazer described the [Mayor's Action Plan for Neighborhood Safety](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/neighborhood-stat/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), an initiative of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice that brought together law enforcement, a wide set of City agencies and community members to codesign approaches to improving public safety. Glazer said the central question of MAP was "What's important to neighborhoods? What's actually driving their sense of safety, or not? And what can you actually do about it?" Glazer said, "The idea of MAP was there are so many things that compose safety, and one crucial piece of it is the experience of people living in neighborhoods. They should be not just the subjects of patrol, but should themselves be the people who are saying, 'Look: Here are some ideas that we need to push forward in order to be safe.'" A SafeStat metric that showed whether residents felt their community was safer could allow for the structured measurement and accountability that could allow deep community engagement programs like MAP to direct more City funds to resident-centered solutions generation and testing. ## Governance and trust Is it as simple as creating the tool and deploying it? Of course not. The power to measure behavior is also the power to surveil, which makes the governance of this data an important design question. Rather than being held by the NYPD or City Hall, this data could be held in a **Community Data Trust**. The City could help a community or neighborhood designate a third party nonprofit entity to hold the data gathered from the community. Community members could approve a charter that would govern the mission of the trust and how to gather, store and share the data. They could elect trustees with a fiduciary duty to oversee the use of the data. The Community Data Trust could then share the data back with the City to contribute to efforts to improve public safety within the community, but with greater transparency and trust from community members. Taking the data out of the hands of the government itself would allow residents to say to the City: "Policing actions have gone up, but our data show that seniors are still too afraid to walk to the grocery store. This intervention isn't working — we need to try something new." ## The next export Imagine a mayor's dashboard that displays not just the count of tragedies, but a trend line of community confidence. If it flatlines despite a surge in police overtime, we know to pivot. Resources would finally flow toward outcomes, rewarding the organizations and leaders that actually change the way people live. New York invented CompStat, changing the way the world polices. It is time for New York to invent what comes next: a system that holds government accountable not just for controlling crime, but for cultivating the freedom to live without fear. ### Does Mayor Mamdani Have a Public Safety Strategy? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-public-safety-strategy-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:11:28.000Z In the early 1990s, when New Yorkers murdered one another at a clip of 2,000 a year (compare this to the 309 murders in 2025), I served as a federal prosecutor, heading up the Organized Crime Unit in the Southern District of New York. My storied predecessors had laid low the mob through a series of landmark racketeering cases, but I began to turn attention to [New York's street gangs](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB864778788738127000?gaa%5Fat=eafs&gaa%5Fn=AWEtsqdTqRj5u0xhUVcVCIvIww8-a5PD2HhYdHLprTeD1PUyZZudR9dgeV8YQ69z-Vc%3D&gaa%5Fts=6995d6eb&gaa%5Fsig=TjNZKQ%5FHdme9uPGxsgEvLEyxREVuF3uNiSqGBa-1mwKQE6VDBoj3kXfl5N-BG7palI1gYuXNwIrMFY8eWhlihQ%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — who, while much less famous than La Cosa Nostra and with monikers not at all as picaresque as Vincent "The Chin" Gigante and Anthony "Tony Ducks" Corallo, wreaked carnage in the city's poorest neighborhoods. To give some sense of relative scale: In 1992, a bloody war for succession inside the Colombo crime family left 12 people dead. That [same year, more than 30 people died](https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/01/opinion/treat-new-yorks-gangs-like-a-crime-family.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in a three-block area in the Bronx after two street gangs whose names have been forgotten got into a rivalry. This marked a [new entry of the feds](https://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/19/us/using-the-racketeering-law-to-bring-down-street-gangs.html?searchResultPosition=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into the world of violent street crime, which had been the exclusive purview of local prosecutors. I was in close touch with Washington because for every racketeering indictment we wanted to file, we needed approval from the mothership Department of Justice. My colleague there never failed to start each conversation by asking: "How many people have you put in jail today?" At the time, not 15 years distant from the Vietnam War, it didn't seem out of place to be measuring progress by body count. In fact, it was positively modern to be measuring anything at all, let alone setting a goal like reducing crime. The New York City Police Department had only recently staked its reputation on what seemed at the time an either incredibly foolhardy or courageous claim: that they could control crime. And yet through a department-wide, painstaking and disciplined twice-weekly look at what the numbers were saying and where the cops were deployed — which everyone now knows as CompStat — they were able to mobilize the department to help drive a crime reduction that was nothing short of miraculous. While there were many factors behind the drop in crime, the "New York miracle" stands as one of the steepest and most durable reductions in the history of recorded crime. I recite this ancient history because, like living with a kid whose growth spurts you don't notice, it's often hard to see how far we've come in thinking about crime. We're way beyond that "aha" moment that crime is controllable. We now understand that many people and conditions, beyond cops, affect crime. Crime has more than one cause and so requires more than one solution. Strong evidence shows that, well before anyone is arrested, a change in someone's conditions can affect a life's course. For example, [summer youth employment reduces arrests for violent crime](https://www.nber.org/digest/202104/nycs-youth-summer-jobs-program-and-rate-criminal-activity?page=1&perPage=50&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by double-digit percentages in numerous cities where it's been implemented. [Street lighting](https://www.nber.org/papers/w25798?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), in randomized controlled trials in New York City, has been shown to drive down serious crime by 36%. While no one is shouting (yet!) "turn on the lights" when crime goes up, this among many approaches both strengthens civic life and also reduces crime. What makes a city hum is more often than not also what keeps crime low. All of this poses a unique opportunity for an ambitious and creative mayor like Zohran Mamdani. He ran on a platform that hinted in this direction, suggesting that his public safety plan would look beyond the police to engage a wide variety of civic resources. At a conceptual level, this makes perfect sense. But now comes the hard reality of governance. How does Mamdani turn these vague inclinations into a concrete plan? What role will the police play in all of this? And perhaps most important, who in the administration is responsible for public safety? The good news is that many of the pieces of a blended strategy that keeps the use of police force to a minimum and focuses on the promotion of vibrant civic life are already in place. Among just a few: [The Mayor's Action Plan for Neighborhood Safety](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which I helped to launch when I was the director of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, brings together residents, a score of city agencies and community-based organizations to address issues relating to neighborhood life [in a civilian "NeighborhoodStat"](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/nstat-should-be-key-to-mamdani-public-safety-plan); the Brownsville Alliance has been modelling a program that provides [largely civilian response to 911 calls](https://www.wnyc.org/story/when-two-block-stretch-brownsville-policed-itself/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); the [Crisis Management System](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/press-releases/nycs-crisis-management-system-interventions-reduced-gun-violence-by-21-comptroller-landers-report-finds/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) fields scores of violence interrupters to quell disputes before they turn deadly. These are all pieces of what can and should be a [larger safety strategy](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/civic-life-can-create-safety), of which the police are an important piece, but not the only part. But someone needs to put all of these pieces together and figure out how they should intersect with the formal criminal justice system and how progress should be measured. The criminal justice system — and all the systems that it touches, like agencies dealing with homelessness and mental illness — doesn't run itself. It is vast, sprawling, crosses many domains, and reports to many bosses. Within the criminal justice system itself, the mayor oversees the police and the jails, but prosecutors are independently elected, judges and prisons are under the state, and defenders owe an obligation only to the zealous defense of their clients. As the mayor will soon discover, if he hasn't already, any strategy requires a deft touch, a bit of gravitas and a way to navigate among the different interests to produce a common goal. Without clear goals and constant attention, the entire enterprise devolves to entropy. To be fair, the new administration is not even two months old. But thus far its public safety plans seem modest, cramped and rudderless. The two visible pillars, the creation of a new Department of Community Safety and the use of the Police Department, stand in awkward and unbalanced counterweight to one another. Left unanswered: What are the public safety goals? How will these two pieces connect to one another and to the larger network of agencies and entities? Who will synthesize the work into a strategy? How will the public know whether they have achieved results? As sketched so far, the Department of Community Safety will house many civilian-run programs related to crime and justice, from violence interrupters to organizations offering alternatives to jail and prison, reentry services and B-HEARD, a civilian-only response to calls relating to people in mental distress. The new department has turned out to be a Rorschach test, with each group filling it up with meaning. From the point of view of some advocacy groups that have rankled under previous forms of city control, it represents an opportunity to have more prominence and control over their activities. From the point of view of some in the business community and in law enforcement, it seems a naïve and dangerous way to address crime, a "defund" agenda in sheep's clothing. To work, both the department and its relationship to the rest of the city need to be better defined. As described, DCS seems to be the inheritor of the tradition of the turn to civilianization of many functions that have traditionally been the purview of the police or that the police have accreted over time because, well, they are there. Prominent among these functions are interactions with people living on the street, sometimes suffering from serious mental illness. This strand of thinking evolved not just as an affirmative search for the best way to achieve safety but also as a reaction to a bitter and brutal history of police violence and wanton patrolling, concentrated most often in traditionally Black neighborhoods in our city and beyond. These excesses have been well-documented, from the [LaGuardia](https://www.archives.nyc/blog/2019/3/1/the-mayors-commission-on-conditions-in-harlem-1935?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Kerner Commissions](https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/national-advisory-commission-civil-disorders-report?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to Ferguson and George Floyd and, in our own city, where the practice of widespread stop and frisks reached a citywide high of almost 700,000 stops before being declared unconstitutional by a federal court. It has been a phantom limb, an unerasable reminder of the misuse of force and authority, and the role of race that may be a part of the motivation behind DCS. Deaths of people suffering from mental illness at the hands of police have become the most prominently expressed reason for DCS. With the recent deaths of 18 people in the cold, questions have sharpened about what DCS will do and how a massive expansion of civilians responding to calls of mental distress without the police will operate. The unanswered questions here could stand in for questions about DCS as a whole. B-HEARD has [struggled, answering only a third of eligible mental health calls](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/new-audit-comptroller-finds-over-a-third-of-eligible-mental-health-calls-did-not-get-a-b-heard-team-response-for-untracked-reasons/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), failing to stabilize those it does respond to and overall suffering from a lack of governance. This is not surprising because — putting aside the looming issue of whether a civilian-only approach is best — it does not have adequate places to bring people in need. That is, [the rest of the system is not built out or coordinated so that B-HEARD can function](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways). Beyond B-HEARD, what is the role and function of DCS? It is unclear. Right now, it looks like a rearrangement of the many programs run by nonprofits that already operate in the city. They are united under the DCS umbrella less by topic than by form. Each of those needs to be coordinated and connected to the various systems that surround it. For example, diversion programs need judges (and prosecutors who make recommendations) to be confident that they will place defendants in them. Violence interrupters need connections to the Police Department so that they have, at a minimum, additional information about where violence is brewing. And the City, which spends hundreds of millions of dollars a year on nonprofits, needs to carefully track what results they are producing and ideally hold them accountable. This is a tall order even when the City directly supervises its workers. But it becomes even more challenging when, through a glass darkly, the City has to eke out performance through the contracting process. Without knowing that this is the case, I guess that DCS was conceived as a counterweight to police and police alone occupying the field of safety. I understand and appreciate that instinct. But as presented, the department does not appear to have the power or place or mandate to be that balance. In fact, the lack of clarity over function, governance and connection leaves the field of public safety to the police. Of course, police will always be a part of safety when force is necessary. They can do things that no one else can do. They have the budget, manpower, range and coverage of the city to be the mainstay as they have been for decades. But they can't and shouldn't do everything. As has become plain over the decades, public safety is about more than investigation, arrest and prosecution. It touches on many aspects of visible distress — homelessness and mental illness. It can be secured through many avenues — the design of public places, the development of work and of housing. Pulling back the camera to the great array of ways to reduce risk and control behavior — at the heart of crime reduction — shows why the police department alone is not a public safety strategy. But because of their size and prominence, despite knowing all this, the city defaults to the primacy of the police. Structurally, the police commissioner reports directly to the mayor. Symbolically, the mayor and [even presidents](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/nyregion/biden-new-york-gun-violence.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) traditionally make the pilgrimage to police headquarters when there is a crime announcement, the police commissioner doesn't come to City Hall. In a world where all the resources that contribute to public safety were mobilized, the police department and the other civic resources important in this endeavor, whether housed in DCS or arranged another way, would report to one responsible person in City Hall, preferably a deputy mayor for public safety with the power to devise and execute on a blended and coordinated strategy. What has always been 3-D chess — trying to make a criminal justice system with no boss and many cross currents function well — has now become even more complex with an erratic president driven by vindictive and destructive impulses. The entry of the feds into the world of street violence in the 1990s is a stark contrast to the aggressive and brutal presence of the president's growing army of ICE agents. We do not know whether that presence will grow and how it might, among many other things, threaten the relationship of New Yorkers to the NYPD and require new safety strategies. We face some uncertain times ahead that will require New York City to marshal all its resources in the most focused way. We will likely face cuts from the federal budget that could send us hurtling off a fiscal cliff even steeper than the one that the mayor has recently spoken about. And there are so many other twists and turns that we cannot even guess now. But we should expect that the feds' diabolical inventiveness this past year in undermining the law, untrammeled by any restraints of custom, history or decency, is prologue to the next three. The antidote to all of this will be the creation of a citywide strategy led by someone who thinks broadly — and every day — synthesizing the power of both enforcement and civic authorities toward common goals. What is the plan? ### The State of Crime in New York City: 2025 and Beyond URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-in-new-york-city-trends-statistics/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:11:51.000Z ### The big picture New York City made progress on public safety in 2025\. Shootings and murders fell to historic lows, and most major crime categories declined compared to the year prior. These improvements reflect gains in the city's most serious forms of violence. But it is not good news across the board. New York City has not returned to its 2019 prepandemic levels for most crimes, and its recovery has been slower than that of many peer cities. In two areas in particular, things are not so rosy. Felony assaults increased for the sixth year in a row, now reaching a level not seen since 1997\. This is a significant problem, as this is a serious and high-volume offense that outnumbers murders by 97 to 1\. And after a promising start to 2025, major crime rose in the final months of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024, creating worries that the positive trends that marked the earliest part of Jessica Tisch's term as commissioner may not be sustained. There is another issue also that swims against the general narrative of "crime is falling" and may be the reason why many New Yorkers feel uneasy. When we look at *all* reported offenses, not just the seven major crimes, these are about 25% above pre-pandemic levels and at a level not seen since at least 2006, when these crimes were more consistently tracked. These crimes — harassment and misdemeanor assault, among others — are far more numerous than major crimes (579,549 vs. 121,756). And they are more visible, more felt in everyday life because unlike murder, which is highly concentrated in geography and relatively rare, these are citywide, above and below ground. They consist of the punch, the shove and the shout on the street and the subway, and are daily signals of insecurity. Understanding the complex crime picture beyond the well-deserved victory laps around murders and shootings will be crucial for Mayor Zohran Mamdani if he is to successfully translate campaign promises into pragmatic policies, including the planned establishment of a Department of Community Safety. This report first summarizes what happened in 2025, then examines the key nuances beneath headline declines, and finally outlines the trends to watch in the coming years. ## 2025: safer than 2024, but not yet recovered from pandemic highs In 2025, New York City experienced modest declines in major crime compared to 2024\. Totals in most of these categories fell compared to 2024, continuing a downward trend from the pandemic peak. However, overall major crime in 2025 remained substantially higher than it was in 2019, the last full year before COVID destabilized communities and New York City, like most U.S. cities, experienced a surge in violent crime from which it is still recovering. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26985192?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Ip1jiOLje6zHTAK0oBFdXOaXmzMDhonoIeaLU06Hb5g/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Looking back over the past 30 years, the steep drop in crime seems worth the moniker of "New York miracle." It is not just that the sheer number of crimes committed has declined, but also that the kinds of crimes New Yorkers suffer most often have changed. This horserace-style chart is like watching a movie of New York history as, for example, car thefts — once so common that ["Nothing in Car" signs and Bensi boxes](https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/16/automobiles/a-sign-of-the-times-no-more-signs.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) marked the culture of 1990s New York — drop from first to fourth place while felony assault climbs from fifth place to become the second most common major offense. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27572522?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1X4y1-elHc1Evd5cstx%5FbkD1eSXK0CYTSXn%5FulNnRyyk/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Shootings and murders fell to historic lows** Some crimes have fallen below prepandemic lows. Shootings are at their lowest level since consistent records began in 1993, while murders are lower than they've been in every year since the 1950s, except for 2017 and 2018\. The city also experienced more shooting- and murder-free days in 2025 than in any year since 2019\. This is another, and perhaps more intuitively understandable, way to measure safety, again reflecting how much lethal violence has declined in New York City. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26769061?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1WMYdpqVSgLV%5FOaUPOzOOPVvDgxuvqgplrV3-2BVzp1o/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26768975?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1BtooeA6rywbKxIwk-jY05ttSCjytHWyOMpzcMloUZFI/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **An asterisk: New York is recovering more slowly than other big cities** Despite low homicide levels, New York City's reduction in this category since the prepandemic period has been modest compared to other large cities and the nation overall. Since 2019, New York City has experienced a roughly 3.1% reduction in murders — less than a third of the national decline and smaller than nearly all other large cities. In absolute terms, New York remains safer than most large cities. In relative terms, however, its recovery has lagged. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26942014?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1zAcYFg%5F261aV2qHS6yiCFMq1itrjEBTTFtd7E%5FjtCh0/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26955266?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1%5FSNLylcCUZO1o8r0WdKlxajvNOKAwLvkOd0oK%5FYb%5FII/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Beyond murders and shootings, most other crimes, especially assaults, remain above prepandemic levels** Despite the good news on shootings and murders and significant declines in most crime categories between 2024 and 2025, most major crime categories remain above their 2019 levels. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26966401?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tVECxKo7uTfDP97BkpHmhMDYFUkASgm88oSra-TZMDQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) It is also notable that **crime declines were not uniform throughout the year**. The largest reductions compared to the same period in 2024 occurred in January and February. By contrast, November and December 2025 recorded higher crime levels than in 2024, raising questions about whether the downward trend will continue into 2026, beyond the cold-weather months when crime traditionally declines as people stay indoors. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27513317?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/151tRULQAFsV0lnhPmZz2FN06r%5FKjfwyyfiEMPOJjrIc/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Perhaps the city's single most troubling trend is that** [**felony assaults**](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/120.05?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — defined as assaults that intentionally cause serious physical injury, involve use of a weapon or dangerous instrument, or victimize a protected worker or individual — have been a persistent and growing problem in the city and are the highest they have been since 1998\. This is a significant problem not only because the crime is fearsome, but because its overall numbers are high: Felony assaults outnumber murders 97 to 1 (29,841 vs. 309). Total felony assault counts have risen 84% since 2008, when they were at their lowest level, 44% since 2019 and 1.3% between 2024 and 2025. Misdemeanor assaults, defined as those that intentionally cause physical injury without use of a dangerous weapon, also rose year after year from 2020 through 2024\. They declined by 3.3% in 2025 — the first drop since the pandemic period began. Total assaults, both felony and misdemeanor, remained 23.2% higher in 2025 than they were in 2019. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27695732?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17er7EojFqoSNG4fZlrZYQDK0xZtkVa7Tkbi%5FzeDeWjw/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Domestic violence remains a central and often under-recognized driver of serious crime.** In 2025, 39% of felony assaults were classified as domestic violence, a share consistent with recent years. And domestic incidents — those involving members of the same family or household, including spouses, intimate partners, parents and children — also accounted for a persistently high share of murders and rapes. Because these offenses typically occur behind closed doors, they are less responsive to traditional street-level enforcement and instead require sustained coordination across policing, social services and the courts. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26984895?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Kgoa2izMV1zQukxH1ZS1faWN-Nk0L912hE0eTPoP9wY/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **The total volume of crimes experienced by New Yorkers is up 25%.** While official record-keeping in New York City and across the country focuses on the seven major crimes (and sometimes shootings) we have outlined above, it is often the increasing incidence of crime, even if termed "minor," that affects the quality of daily life of New Yorkers. The top 10 crimes by volume, many of them considered "less serious" crimes, account for more than three-quarters of all reported crime. Misdemeanor assaults outnumber shootings 91 to 1\. Petit larcenies, which refer to small thefts of under $1000, outnumber shootings 158 to 1. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27514899?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27514132?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tX8KSBUndx2TkMolkH9S5t795dcETVWzNp3LqRhw3SM/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) An increase in the count of a given crime does not necessarily mean that the city is less safe. **Some counts are highly sensitive to policing strategies**; for instance, if police decide to escalate or dial back on fare-beating or drug-possession enforcement, the counts for those crimes will surge even though the incidence of the offense may not have changed much from year to year. To account, roughly, for this phenomenon — so crime fluctuations are not skewed by changes in police enforcement — we have isolated [crime counts that rely on victim and witness reports](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xkCVZN6sQr44CE9t6JDl8H%5FApobnYv%5FxvkhtXAJzeTg/edit?gid=0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#gid=0) from others. Even with this adjustment, victim- or witness-reported crimes remain 21% above prepandemic levels and higher than any year since at least 2006, indicating that New Yorkers' unease on the streets reflects real conditions rather than perception alone. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27517413?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nKldKB3EW-qQ0%5Fx-b6p626PCF-2aGAh6%5F4WKhW%5FNPCI/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **What about the subways?** Crime on platforms and trains is of outsized concern for New Yorkers because the subway is New York City's mobile public square, the place where millions of people come together on a daily basis. Adding to anxiety is that trains are enclosed spaces where people can't easily remove themselves from dangerous situations. As a result, even though crime is a very rare occurrence on the subway, incidents — whether rare horrific ones or more common quality-of-life problems — reverberate through the city, provoking concern. In 2025, the issue was a political football as well, as federal officials used it [in a pretextual way to threaten funds to the City](https://abcnews.com/US/judge-blocks-trump-administration-withholding-counterterrorism-grant-new/story?id=126593842&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27637936?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1%5FSvgaogh%5FK4ptuEUtwB%5F0PNbAEWaO3YWak1vCNm08gA/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) By some measures, crime is getting lower, even touted by the governor as the ["lowest levels in a generation" in 2025](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/safer-subways-governor-hochul-announces-subway-crime-track-reach-lowest-levels-generation-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Measuring based on total crime counts, that is true (ignoring the peak of the pandemic, when crime counts were for a brief period extremely low because ridership hit unprecedented lows). By another measure, crime underground is not at record lows. Once ridership is taken into account, the rate of major crime per ride remains approximately 13.4% higher than prepandemic levels. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26956155?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1oAhXBDGQXLlJFmBjDUftvBhIUcA%5FOfRQxut6zt0JHG8/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27518027?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1il6O1D409yvVOU0igD%5FcgHPUOo4nBOXbNr8HhorPTHk/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27607918?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1u2MKZOE6Ee6A-VqZb7%5FiU7CNqoey9zraRqpPWsqxr0k/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Total subway crime counts are highly sensitive to police enforcement. Shifts in police presence and intensified fare-evasion enforcement can raise overall counts without a comparable increase in actual victimization. For example, in 2025, there were 34,559 total crimes on the subway, of which 13,725 were related to fare evasion. Focusing on victim- or witness-reported crimes shows a pattern similar to major subway crimes: Total counts have declined since the pandemic, but the per-ride rate remains 21% higher than in 2019. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/story/3584921?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## What to watch for under a new administration **Public safety, trust and accountability**The Mamdani administration took office on Jan. 1, promising a new approach to public safety policy — one that relies [less on police enforcement and more on civilian interventions](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1a7ejjSZWWIAcxfcWnkYaqvnjihTb0LAOQkj8g10-npg/edit?tab=t.0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#heading=h.2gazcsgmxkub). There are some glaring challenges, as we have noted: the rising number of assaults; the overall volume of crimes, even as murders and shootings decline; the stubborn problem of domestic violence. Here, we note a few other issues that require attention from the potential threat posed by federal enforcement, to some fundamental issues in the functioning of the justice system, including the decades-long spiraling violence in the jails. **Increasing federal immigration enforcement in New York City** No description of the public safety and law enforcement landscape in New York City would be complete without a mention of federal immigration enforcement, which has ratcheted up across America. Nationwide, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection agents are arresting far more individuals suspected of immigration violations — usually a civil, not a criminal offense — in the interior than under previous administrations. The majority of these individuals are not suspected of any criminal activity, but enforcement itself has become a significant source of fear among many immigrant New Yorkers. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27696978?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1b8EovM%5FAUDRpmgRPMKmOyYpRe-RG0QqdlxMRXbke8p8/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) We note this even though it is not an issue that New York City or New York State controls, because it can affect the life of the city and the functioning of its justice system. We have seen elsewhere that a sudden influx of ICE and/or the National Guard affects the lives of residents, whether documented or not; can damage the economy as people are afraid to go out; and can harm civic life as residents fear taking their children to school and using public parks. The conduct of ICE agents — including [brutality complaints](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2026/01/27/minnesota-ice-violence-lawsuits?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [a documented failure to abide by basic constitutional guarantees](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trump-appointed-judge-rules-ice-025732180.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — is destructive by itself, but also has an effect on local law enforcement and its own ability to build a relationship of trust with New Yorkers. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27681605?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TE0xqkTA2PqHk4NUKf7oChO%5FYJ6O5sSj0L%5FFkrVmNkc/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Hate crimes** remain a persistent issue in New York City, with 68% more reported hate crimes than there were in 2017\. Jewish New Yorkers have accounted for a majority of victims in recent years. These offenses affect the daily life of all New Yorkers and determine whether they are at ease in the city or fear attack. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26966966?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17FAjE-zjOAXYR9vXNn6VKPeHlsDWgsAP90JZmUo8Xrw/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) How police interact with the public affects their ability to address crime. Here we look at stops and frisks, complaints against officers and clearance rates, a measure of the number of cases being solved and thus, directly and indirectly, a measure of the confidence that New Yorkers have in the police's ability to help them. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27591529?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YUHE2Qfe6MU8L7avBzglpB7HmksIYQHo4o1LN8M8iX0/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The number of misconduct allegations against police officers more than doubled during the administration of Mayor Eric Adams. Abuse-of-authority allegations constitute the majority of complaints and account for much of the recent increase in total allegations. These cases generally involve claims of improper stops, searches, questioning or arrests. Some of the post-2021 rise may reflect a structural change in oversight, as beginning in 2022, the Civilian Complaint Review Board gained authority to open investigations without a civilian complainant, which can increase case volume independent of underlying misconduct. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/22163700?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TVWZNiVmHGlO8otIcJu%5F52QDiOno7jx3m%5F3tl0TzAME/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) While Mamdani has said he does not support defunding the NYPD and will maintain current police staffing levels, his past criticism of the department and focus on alternative models have generated public interest in how policing strategies and tactics will evolve going forward. How police training, accountability and community relations change under new leadership will shape not only enforcement outcomes but also public trust in the criminal justice system. **Justice system operations** The role of prosecutors, defenders, courts and incarceration are also important when creating a strategy to reduce crime. While there are many parts of the criminal justice system, two metrics are particularly worth monitoring because they reflect the health — or lack of health — of the larger system: clearance rates and dismissal rates. A clearance rate is the proportion of cases the police solve, measured as a percentage of the number of crimes. The police define clearances as the percent of cases that result in an arrest (meaning that a judge or grand jury has determined there is probable cause that the person has committed a crime) or that the department "exceptionally" clears, for example, in the case of a person against whom evidence was sufficient to charge, but the person has died. Because solving a case requires evidence, and more often than not the evidence is in the form of a witness coming forward, clearance rates are a good marker of the confidence of New Yorkers in the department. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27590425?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1npyT13gAGe6Usozl2wbAiRwQ4urGhR0DjIdZNbmVVJU/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27628953?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1XfDnoJ8z7sfHlLq4d7cytEFWuKr2TuYIr2pIZ%5FOSdY8/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) How a case proceeds through the system can be a canary in the mine for where there are problems, just as clearance rates can be a signal of New Yorkers' willingness to cooperate with police. Dismissal rates can be a marker of different problems at different points. In New York City, the dismissal rates are very high overall and contrast with dismissal rates in the rest of the state, showing a troubling variation in the administration of justice and potentially undermining confidence in the system. At arraignment — the first appearance of a person before a judge after arrest — approximately 20% of cases do not proceed to the next stage (indictment). Of that 20%, a remarkable 52% are dismissed, giving new meaning to the notion that "the process is the punishment." For the 80% that do make it past arraignment, an astonishing 75% are dismissed. Looking further into the reasons for dismissal, at least two seem that they could be remedied: dismissal for speedy trial reasons or for a legally insufficient instrument, meaning that the evidence did not support the charge. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27682211?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1T8e2a8T0ooHg1ZzxPM3OIIdsgOdtSNVWxsirNXEdLTs/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27196814?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17C7guK1-iJsyrUfP-AHvA42GMdleyyKDVrcAq3Xb%5FtI/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27196283?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nj3ZY0VDTmOx-OVgavyHxRMIJtSYMxKLZsMFsJgezCM/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Jails** The city's jails have a long and brutal history of violence and mismanagement. In 2015, following a suit by the U.S. Department of Justice, the city agreed to a consent decree in Nunez v. City of New York that put the jails under a judicially supervised monitor. The aim of the consent decree was to reduce the unconstitutional levels of violence. Since 2015, [violence has soared](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-state-of-new-york-citys-jails-year-end-2024) [well above the levels considered unconstitutional in 2015](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/conditions-inside-the-citys-jails-continue-to-be-violent-a-data-story). In the face of this abject failure, the court took a highly unusual step of appointing a [receiver](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/can-a-receiver-bring-enduring-change-for-the-better), called a "remediation manager" here, who has broad executive power, beyond any commissioner, to remedy the wrongs. As this federal official, now named, gets situated and his working relationship with the city's new correction commissioner is defined, the city must address violence on Rikers Island, including use of force by correction officers, deaths, stabbings and slashings and the average length of stay of those incarcerated there. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/story/3578021?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27605793?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1RfRMPFihPaezVAjLr6eTM1NFjzm2nkfkc4ithVV8EEQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27605819?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ErEvxrjlXhZCuDvm4VGLhaiNnccA9XZb6jZV9K%5FLJwA/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27647243?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Egh0fYIsamqDcQw5veY07B3n0Ym-gyqkTtsg9dycHI4/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27647329?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1%5FsQSORnY7yYe-3AHWqppJRxQ%5FbojhUFDlIx0s8hXRnQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### Historic Declines, Contested Borders URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-reduction-trends-immigration-enforcement/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:26.000Z There are six violent deaths in William Shakespeare's "Romeo and Juliet," a tale of love and tragedy set in 14th century Verona — then, as now, a prosperous city in northern Italy. With 28 named characters, the play's death rate is a sobering 21%, a reflection of the brutal reality of the place and time in which the story unfolds. Renaissance Italy is often remembered for its flourishing trade, rising prosperity and the creation of some of the most celebrated works in the Western canon. But it was also, by modern standards, an extraordinarily violent society. As Manuel Eisner documents in his [seminal work](https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-abstract/41/4/618/468305?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on homicide across European history, the murder rate in 14th century Florence — just 145 miles south of Verona — may have reached 150 per 100,000 residents. That level of violence is unmatched today in any American city and would be seen only in a handful of the most distressed communities anywhere in the United States. By contrast, the U.S. homicide rate in 2024 was roughly five per 100,000\. In New York City — the nation's flagship metropolis — it was 4.7, fully 97% lower than Florence's medieval peak. While the comparison is selective, it is perhaps notable that a 97% decline in homicides compares favorably to the effectiveness of another remarkable lifesaving intervention: vaccination. Indeed, two doses of the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine are estimated to be about [97% effective](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1703309?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at preventing infection. A century ago, measles killed roughly 8,000 Americans annually. In 2024, it killed none. Through vaccination, disease had effectively been eliminated as a cause of death in the United States — until the antivaccination movement, encouraged by new leadership in Washington, [gave the measles virus a new lease on life last year](https://www.cdc.gov/measles/data-research/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), when it caused three casualties. Of course, we cannot quite make the same assertion about homicide, which still claims roughly 17,000 American lives each year. And yet viewed through a long historical lens, the conclusion is unavoidable: To a remarkable degree, modern societies have inoculated themselves against lethal violence. Were the United States to experience the homicide rate of 14th century Florence, more than half a million Americans would be killed by other people each year. The long-run decline in homicide is nothing short of astonishing. What makes 2025 exceptional, however, is that the short-run trends are astonishing as well. According to a recent [Council on Criminal Justice report](https://counciloncj.org/crime-trends-in-u-s-cities-year-end-2025-update/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), large U.S. cities saw homicides fall by roughly 21% in 2025, following an already remarkable 15% decline in 2024\. Homicide rates are now about 25% lower than in 2019, before the sharp pandemic-era spike. In Philadelphia and Baltimore, homicide is as low as it was [in the mid-1960s](https://jasher.substack.com/p/the-cities-that-saw-historic-murder?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In San Francisco, one must look back to 1942 — when many young men were overseas fighting World War II — to find a comparably low rate. When measles deaths plummeted in the 1920s, the explanation was clear: Vaccination worked. The causes of the post-COVID-19 homicide decline, by contrast, remain elusive. There is no shortage of theories, including a generalized return to normalcy after the pandemic, but many familiar explanations do not fit the facts. Poverty has barely changed. The unemployment rate is essentially the same as it was in 2022\. Police staffing is flat or declining. The prison population has stabilized after a decade-long fall from its 2008 peak. Nor can this decline plausibly be attributed to the long-lag effects of legalized abortion or lead abatement, factors sometimes credited with contributing to the crime drop of the 1990s. Understanding what went right in 2024 and 2025 is critical. Without a clear account of the forces behind this decline, policymakers risk squandering a rare opportunity to learn how to sustain and deepen gains in public safety. The contributors to this volume take up that challenge. They identify the most consequential public safety developments of the year, examine how New York City compares with other major U.S. cities, analyze what police have focused on in 2025, consider what advocates and officials should prioritize in 2026 and — critically — grapple with the central question of why 2025 proved to be such an extraordinary year for public safety. Contributors also engage the other defining public safety story of 2025: a dramatic and highly visible escalation of interior immigration enforcement. ## What happened to crime in 2025? [**Alex Piquero**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/biggest-crime-justice-stories-america-2025)[ and **Adam Gelb**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/biggest-crime-justice-stories-america-2025) set the stage by identifying what they see as the five most important crime and justice developments of the year. They describe mounting attacks on federal crime data and a growing distrust of official statistics as well as deep and abrupt cuts to federal justice grants, disrupting prevention efforts and meaningful progress in rebooting courts, policing and corrections after pandemic shutdowns. They also highlight a sharp disconnect between public fear of crime and mounting evidence that crime is falling. Their essay underscores the historic nationwide drop in homicide — reaching lows in some cities not seen since the 1960s — while emphasizing how much remains unknown about its causes and how essential rigorous, independent research will be for future policy. > A central tension of the moment: There is extraordinary progress in reducing lethal violence alongside more limited progress in addressing the everyday challenges in everyday safety. New York City [led the nation](https://www.amazon.com/City-That-Became-Safe-Lessons/dp/0199324166?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) during the great crime decline of the 1990s and achieved an extraordinary 50% reduction in homicide between 2010 and 2019\. While the city had a banner year in 2025 with respect to homicides and shootings — which were down by 21% and 20% respectively — Vital City's [**End of Year Crime Report**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/crime-in-new-york-city-trends-statistics) suggests that recent public safety trends in the city are actually something of a mixed bag. Indeed, with respect to murders, the city's 20% decline mirrors national trends and is broadly similar to peer cities like Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia. What's more, assaults, robberies, burglaries and especially motor vehicle thefts remain notably higher than they were in 2019\. Crimes on the subway also remain elevated, which, given the universality of subway travel among city residents, forms the basis for widespread discontent even as murders and shootings are in free fall. This is despite an increase in street stops and the rate at which crimes are cleared by arrest. Together, the data suggest that although the police have successfully engaged [the power few](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-007-9044-y?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who drive the problem of lethal violence, they have not solved the problem of illegal behaviors that have a broader base of participation. Building upon the end-of-year crime report, [**Marcos Soler**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-york-city-gun-violence-down-major-crime-high) emphasizes that while the city has since reached historic lows in gun violence and homicide — largely mirroring state and national trends — it has failed to reduce overall crime. Total reported crime remains roughly 45% higher than its 2017-2019 low and declines now lag behind those in other large U.S. cities. Soler attributes this divergence to policy and management failures under the Adams administration, pointing to sharp increases in assaults and larcenies that now dominate citywide crime. He contends that simply increasing arrests has been ineffective because diminished certainty of prosecution [has eroded deterrence](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0735648X.2025.2527065?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#d1e132). To restore New York to its prepandemic crime levels, Soler calls for a renewed focused deterrence strategy, place-based interventions in high-crime areas such as the Bronx, people-centered strategies for high-recidivism adults aged 35-44 and stronger supervision and accountability for individuals on pretrial release. In a provocative essay that gets right to the crux of the matter, [**John Roman**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-prevention-reduced-crime-suggestions-analysis) asks why 2025 was, in fact, such a banner year. He argues that the nationwide crime decline was not driven by changes in policing or incarceration — the traditional levers of crime control — but by large-scale federal investments in prevention. Pandemic recovery funds, Roman suggests, stabilized and expanded local social services by funding teachers, counselors, clinicians and prevention workers, thereby reducing risk and creating opportunity for the young people most vulnerable to violence. What makes this argument especially compelling is its scope: Because the decline was broad and consistent across cities and evident across crime types, Roman contends that the cause must be a national one. Alternative explanations — changes in police staffing, gun availability, drug markets, or long-term demographic trends — fall short. Based on his hypothesis, Roman warns that enforcement-only strategies have diminishing returns and argues that sustaining crime reductions will require a philosophical shift toward prevention as a central public safety strategy. ## What should the police be doing? In a Vital City interview, NYPD Chief of Department [**Michael LiPetri**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/nypd-crime-strategy-questions-michael-lipetri) offers a rare window into the Department's operational strategy, explaining how New York drove shootings to a historic low in 2025 — fewer than 700 citywide — through highly targeted, data-driven policing. The approach emphasizes hyperlocal "violence reduction zones," intensive foot patrols during peak hours, coordinated narcotics and gang enforcement and sophisticated analytics to identify high-risk individuals, groups and locations. Close collaboration with prosecutors and sustained gun arrests reinforced deterrence and produced broad declines in shootings and homicides, including notable gains in the Bronx. At the same time, LiPetri acknowledges the limits of these successes. As Soler observes, assaults — particularly domestic violence, assaults on public servants and unprovoked attacks often linked to mental illness — remain stubbornly high. The Department is responding by restructuring domestic violence investigations to be more victim centered, increasing warrant enforcement, focusing on transit and school zones, and reassessing strategies for persistent problem populations and places. The interview captures a central tension of the moment: There is extraordinary progress in reducing lethal violence alongside more limited progress in addressing the everyday challenges in everyday safety. To this end, what should the Police Department be thinking about in 2026? This is a key question at any time but is an especially important question during a period in which there is a new mayoral administration that has a philosophy on crime control that is notably different from that of the prior administration. Where can the new administration and the NYPD, staffed by senior personnel who have served previous administrations, find consensus? And which issues are most critical when it comes to maintaining public safety? [**Anthony Braga**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/nypd-gang-database-shooting-reduction)[ and **Christopher Winship**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/nypd-gang-database-shooting-reduction) argue that gang databases — including the NYPD's Criminal Group Database, [which Mayor Mamdani staunchly opposed](https://gothamist.com/news/at-first-joint-presser-mamdani-says-nothing-as-tisch-defends-nypd-gang-database?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as a candidate — remain essential tools for reducing gun violence and should be reformed rather than abolished. Critics contend that such databases are discriminatory and overly broad. Braga and Winship counter that gun violence in New York is highly concentrated among a small number of individuals involved in gangs and crews and disproportionately harms Black and Hispanic communities — the same populations overrepresented in the data. [Research shows](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/pam.22323?%5F%5Fcf%5Fchl%5Ftk=HNQOVBTe2xnaTGSHeTU%5FKg0ZYb.HEi8DCdeYqMKDYK8-1770751524-1.0.1.1-RshP4Ml2FYKTCDtJmIjihom05o5hTc3VF.NCTBQgJxU&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that focused, data-driven policing targeting high-risk groups can substantially reduce gun violence without displacing crime. Eliminating these databases, they warn, could lead to more indiscriminate policing by forcing officers to rely on subjective judgment, which is more prone to bias. Reform — clear criteria, transparency, oversight and due process — offers a better path forward. [**Alex Chohlas-Wood**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-to-deploy-ai-policing-nyc-nypd) argues that artificial intelligence provides an extraordinarily powerful opportunity for the NYPD to deploy its limited resources more effectively. Drawing on his experience developing Patternizr — an early AI tool used by NYPD detectives to identify patterns based on crimes' modus operandi, Chohlas-Wood argues that the Department has fallen behind as AI has advanced rapidly elsewhere. Carefully tested systems, he suggests, could improve officer training through analysis of reams of body-worn camera footage, automate freedom of information requests and reduce administrative inefficiencies. Chohlas-Wood urges proactive but cautious adoption, emphasizing that practice must be grounded in transparency, rigorous evaluation and collaboration with outside experts to enhance legitimacy while maximizing learning. ## Should public safety be reconceived? [**Gloria Gong**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/compstat-safestat-public-safety-nyc-mamdani) closes the public safety section by questioning whether conventional crime metrics ultimately fail to capture what matters most — how people actually experience safety in public spaces. While CompStat revolutionized crime tracking, Gong argues that it fails to measure what residents care about most: whether they feel safe. She proposes a new metric — a citywide "Felt Safety Index" — built from real-time, anonymized behavioral data such as foot traffic, park usage and patterns of public presence. The goal is a next-generation CompStat tool that treats safety not merely as the absence of crime, but as the presence of confident, vibrant public life. A decade ago, such an idea might have seemed utopian. Today, given the explosion and democratization of data, it feels firmly within reach. ## Immigration enforcement and public safety The other defining public safety story of 2025 is a dramatic escalation in the scale and visibility of interior immigration enforcement by federal authorities — culminating in the killing of two U.S. citizens in Minneapolis by Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Border Patrol agents. There is much that can be written about this topic, but, for starters, it is fair to wonder whether undocumented immigrants do, in fact, make the United States less safe. While the scholarly literature is clear that immigrants, as a whole, [do not increase](https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032317-092026?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) violent crime rates and are [less likely than U.S. natives](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=3382542&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to end up in a state prison pursuant to committing a serious crime, studying the effect of undocumented immigrants specifically is a little harder to do due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate data. Still, several conclusions are well supported. Most research finds that undocumented immigrants are [not an important driver](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9125.12175?%5F%5Fcf%5Fchl%5Ftk=m3d.CfQpnBs0rrvtHc5mg5tVnTIbqhYxgvYARBNg5WQ-1770232300-1.0.1.1-0o.xIk5ZTes3A6jT9fe7F5HuNzOBE9v8NTF5LbRK.Ik&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of violent crime and are [not disproportionately represented](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=3382542&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in state prisons. Moreover, ICE's own data show that, in 2025, [only about 13%](https://www.cato.org/blog/5-ice-detainees-have-violent-convictions-73-no-convictions?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of detained individuals had prior convictions for violent or property crimes — suggesting that enforcement targeted a population at lower risk of serious offending than those typically arrested by local police. This finding aligns with [earlier research](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/680935?casa%5Ftoken=QIYgtsIE1NgAAAAA:%5F-1UU8PzrSwoIdENmtlXwfpXW8eZ6UlNqb2dwg4EV5onx%5FENE5FA-dd32xtZmiszH1MAoZzl-ow&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the Secure Communities program, which expanded federal-local cooperation on immigration enforcement during the Bush and Obama administrations. While investments in local policing reliably [improve public safety](https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-criminol-111523-122746?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Secure Communities — and the increase in removals it produced — did not generate measurable crime reductions. Beyond empirical debates lies a deeper conflict over the appropriate role of federal immigration enforcement in local communities: how such enforcement should be carried out, how constitutional norms should be respected and how federal law enforcement officers should be trained, managed and held accountable. These questions intersect with enduring disputes over federalism, the balance of power between states and the federal government and the meaning of sanctuary policies. [**Erwin Chemerinsky**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/trump-sanctuary-cities-funding) addresses the constitutional limits of federal authority, arguing that President Donald Trump's threats to withhold federal funds from so-called sanctuary cities are unlawful. Supreme Court precedent, he explains, bars the federal government from coercing states and localities into enforcing federal law, and only Congress and not the president may attach conditions to federal spending. Courts have previously struck down similar efforts. Chemerinsky also clarifies that sanctuary cities do not shield undocumented immigrants from enforcement — they simply decline to assist federal authorities, often for practical reasons such as encouraging crime reporting and protecting public health. With respect to the tactics employed, [**Brandon del Pozo**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/minnesota-ice-alex-pretti-policing) sharply criticizes recent ICE actions in Minneapolis — particularly the killing of Alex Pretti — as emblematic of reckless and illegitimate force that corrodes public trust. He contrasts ICE's conduct with the norms of professional municipal policing, emphasizing restraint, legitimacy and accountability. Del Pozo argues that low training standards, quota-driven enforcement, erratic use of force and resistance to oversight have damaged ICE's credibility and weakened community safety. He suggests that this moment offers municipal police departments an opportunity to model legitimate policing by deepening reforms, engaging communities transparently and pairing enforcement with preventive strategies. The volume concludes with [an interview with **Jeh Johnson**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/questions-answers-trump-noem-dhs-ice), former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, who reflects on the Trump administration's aggressive interior enforcement strategy. Johnson criticizes the deployment of large, militarized federal immigration forces into local communities, warning that it fuels fear, undermines safety and erodes trust between residents and law enforcement. Echoing del Pozo, he notes that a fixation on arrest quotas departs from traditional enforcement priorities and has intensified resistance in sanctuary cities such as New York. Johnson calls for better training, stronger emphasis on de-escalation and a more collaborative relationship between federal and local authorities, suggesting that ICE itself may require a fundamental rethinking of its mission and public role. When it comes to serious violence, 2025 was a banner year for public safety in cities across the United States. The homicide rate in large U.S. cities is as low as it was during the early 1960s and, for a majority of Americans, the country has never been safer in their lifetimes. Yet it's not clear that the public has noticed. Do people actually feel safer? Do Americans even believe the crime data in a world in which truth sometimes takes a back seat to ideology? In such a world, the challenge for politicians and policymakers is not only to achieve greater safety but to ensure that Americans feel safer. Given that [crime is concentrated](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9125.12070?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to a considerable degree in a small number of places, this is a challenge. Most Americans live in communities in which crime is uncommon. Their beliefs about crime then center on what they believe is happening in places in which they probably spend little time. A [recent New York Times article](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/06/us/san-francisco-super-bowl.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) captured this phenomenon well, observing that tourists who flocked to San Francisco for the recent Super Bowl were surprised to find that the city was pleasant and not postapocalyptic as they'd heard about in social media postings. Indeed, San Francisco experienced only 30 murders during the past 12 months, a rate of homicide among the lowest in the United States and only slightly higher than European capitals such as Paris and Brussels (and, in fact, lower than Berlin). But will anyone believe it? ### Governments That Get Results URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/gloria-gong-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:27.000Z *Policymakers spend enormous energy debating what government should do. But who's paying attention to whether it actually gets done? Gloria Gong runs Harvard's Government Performance Lab, where she's spent 11 years sending teams into more than 100 state and local agencies to work on that exact question. In this episode of "After Hours with Jamie Rubin," Gong explains why government defaults to process over outcomes, how a Detroit violence intervention program cracked the code on results-driven contracting and why her lab mostly skips New York City — which she says has the best government talent bench in the country but makes a terrible model for everywhere else. She also tells the story of how her husband's carefully maintained list of her passions saved her from a career in corporate law.* *As always, you can listen to the episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/governments-that-get-results/id1794619189?i=1000749185914&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/77UfMDWfGbpXOn5TVnufIh?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Jamie:** Gloria, thanks for being here. **Gloria:** Happy to be here. **Jamie:** Why don't we start by you describing what you do for a living? **Gloria:** Absolutely. I run a lab at the Harvard Kennedy School called the Government Performance Lab. We have an unusual model for an academic setting. We focus specifically on questions around design and implementation of social services, not just the policy, in part because the thing that we noticed when we started this is that there was so much work that goes into that initial question on what should government do. But a lot of times people are asking that in this complete ivory tower way of, in a perfect world, what should government do? And no one seemed to be noticing that those things didn't actually happen once all the policymakers walked away and handed the initiative to some agency to actually implement. So we really focus on the questions around when you hand something to an agency and ask it to get it done, what actually happens in that black box and how can you make it happen better so that services actually get delivered for people? And so we do this by actually sending people out to partner with state and local governments to help them design and test innovative new fixes to their services or their operations, to actually see whether we can improve service delivery. **Jamie:** And so you do it on a consulting basis? **Gloria:** Harvard is absolutely not allowed to use the word consulting, but we do a thing that might look similar to people who have seen consultants, which is that we send really talented, early career staff out to sit with government side by side with their staff and actually help them figure out what to do, how to do it, how do you actually do the design? **Jamie:** What's the scope and the spec for doing this? Do they come to you and say, look, we want to solve homelessness in Des Moines or something? You then take that away and come back with a plan and then go help them implement? Or is it they have the plan and you help them? What's the model? **Gloria:** What we typically do is we'll put out a call for applications on a particular topic that we've heard from a bunch of governments represents a common concern. So we did this recently around places that were trying to improve their coordinated entry systems for homelessness, places that are trying to improve their placements into permanent supportive housing. We just ran a big cohort of governments that are trying to set up alternative emergency response programs, and we're very oversubscribed, so we might get like 70 applications for five slots in a cohort or something like that. But then we'll take that group of governments and work with them intensively, maybe over one to one and a half years to actually figure out what does it take to do this intervention and what do we learn from it? And then we'll try to take the learnings from that and hand it, spread it to the other governments who weren't able to get the direct assistance. **Jamie:** Got it. Just through education and writing and all that kind of stuff. **Gloria:** We've run custom executive education courses at Harvard, but we also do just a lot of very practitioner-focused creation of materials and tools. And we also run these communities of practice. So for example, on alternative emergency response, we've done cohorts of like 15 to 16 governments that were all working on setting those programs up. But then we also created this community of practice that has like 450 government leaders from other cities who aren't necessarily in the cohort, but we're sharing out the information that we learn with them as quickly as we can. **Jamie:** Having been in government, it sounds like the kind of thing that you always hope somebody will do. I worked for the governor for five years. I don't remember ever getting plugged into something like this. **Gloria:** Our big insight, which is not going to sound interesting to anyone who knows anything about government, but it turned out to be exciting in the academy, is that there's just almost no support for anyone past that first level of executive leadership. And it's all the folks who are doing things. So everyone who has a question of how will we create these, expand these pre-K seats, how will we send out these new teams? There's nothing for them. And so that's what we're trying to focus in on: those doers who have very little support from external places. **Jamie:** So it's what people who have not been in government call the gigantic bureaucracy. Basically, as you said, government is starved for resources. There is no level of government that has the resources it needs. Period. **Gloria:** The way we describe what we do when we talk to mayors or governors about coming in is that we say, look, we really deeply are not on that team that thinks government's incompetent. You have a bunch of staff who are very capable. They can do really, really good work. They are probably maxed out keeping the trains running. These are big, hard things to run. It's very hard to ask the same people to design new train tracks, and that capacity to think about what's a system that we should shift to a lot of times also needs to be protected. They need to be firewalled from the emergencies in the day to day. So that's often the role that we're trying to play for folks, is to be able to come in and say, let us be a team that's firewalled a little bit from the daily emergencies that can help you try to figure out how are we going to go from the system we have today to the system we want to get to. **Jamie:** And how did you get to this place? Were you in government at one point or were you just a junkie? **Gloria:** Just a junkie. **Jamie:** Okay, great. So how did you get to this place? **Gloria:** So I was actually in law school. I had a clerkship and an offer from a law firm. What they say to everyone is, well, you have something you want to do, but what you should do first is you should clerk for one to two prestigious judges. Then you should go work for five to six years at a law firm. And at that point you should start doing the thing that you want to do. **Jamie:** I just want to pause for a second. I don't know who's still telling people that kind of stuff, but we need to figure out who that is because that's extraordinarily bad advice. It wasn't good advice when I was in law school and it's not good advice now. **Gloria:** I went to the career services folks my first year and I was like, I'm really interested in public service. And they're like, oh, you know what you should absolutely use your summers to work at corporate law firms to make sure that isn't what you want to do. And I was like, well— **Jamie:** Such bad advice. **Gloria:** I think I just said it's not what I want to do. **Jamie:** It's like no other area of your life would somebody tell you that. Once you know what you don't want to do and what you want to do, what you should do first is do more of what you know you don't want to do, just to make sure. **Gloria:** So the funny thing about this is this specific advice, which was given to me by so many people, and also taken by so many people in my cohort. They have some stat that they tell you, which is like 90% of you came in saying that you want to do something in public interest, but 90% of you will exit to the top corporate law firms. And the thing that was funny for me about it now sitting where I am, is that a bunch of people took that advice because the thing that was sitting behind it was people telling them, oh, you'll be able to lateral from that to anything you want to do. And now that I'm sitting on the side of hiring, I'm like, that is not true. Five years at a corporate law firm does not prepare you to run an agency or do many of these other things. **Jamie:** You're definitely right. I mean, it doesn't prepare you to run anything really. **Gloria:** It might, but I think everyone just got told you will definitely be able to go from this into anything and nobody said, yeah, you will have spent six years doing something that you at least said at the beginning was not what you wanted to do. That's very expensive. **Jamie:** And honing a bunch of skills that probably are not going to translate necessarily unless what you wanted to do is be a government lawyer or something like this. **Gloria:** That just never was said to me. **Jamie:** Yeah. Okay, got it. All right. So you dodged the bullet or what happened? **Gloria:** Yeah, so the short version of the story is I have a little bit of contrary instinct, so I'd been working internationally previously on human rights China stuff, and I was like, I think I want to work on U.S. domestic things. And so everyone was like, great: White House, DOJ. That's where our connections are. And I was like, oh, well what about state and local? And everyone I talked to was just like, I don't think that's a thing, or we don't know anyone there. So that made me be like, okay, I want to go that direction. When people would tell me, we don't know anything about that, I was like, well, great. That means there's more of a need there. So I started looking into state and local, no connections out of YLS— **Jamie:** Yale Law School. **Gloria:** Yeah. For years. **Jamie:** Well, by the way, not 100% true. So for example, I regularly tell the people in the career services office that if anybody comes through wanting to talk about state and local government, they should absolutely send them to me, and I've been doing that for 10 years. **Gloria:** There you go. So I was like, I'm going to go this other direction. Then the other thing that basically happened is my husband saved me. So I had signed up to do this clerkship law firm thing and he was like, hey, just tell me really quickly about what you're excited about about this. And I said whatever you gear yourself up to say in the interview. So I was like, something, mergers, acquisitions. And he's like, okay, that's awesome. Well, because I care about you so much, I keep a list of the things you're passionate about so that I can support you and whatever your dreams are. So I'm just going to open it up real quick and write mergers and acquisitions right here under women and children and intergenerational poverty. And I was like, yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, I got it. I'm not okay. **Jamie:** So parenthetically, your husband sounds like—I mean, I'm embarrassed that I don't think I've ever really done that for Gretchen, but what does he do just out of curiosity? **Gloria:** He's an awesome person. He's amazing. He does strategy stuff. **Jamie:** He is a saint. Say he is a partner to love. **Gloria:** Get out of here. All right, fine. **Jamie:** Anyway, the long and short of this is I asked my judge if I could have a hot second to look at other things, which I did not realize at the time—massive. Very— **Gloria:** You're not supposed to do that. You're not supposed to do that. He was incredibly generous. He was like, yes, please feel free to look around. I found Jeff Liebman in this moment where he'd come back from the White House and I was like, hey, I want to start the state and local thing. We got coffee and by the end of it he was like, hey, why don't you come and just start this with me right now? Don't take the bar, don't clerk. Just let's just do the thing we want to do right now. So that's what I've been doing. **Jamie:** Great. Oh, so you've been doing it really since graduation? **Gloria:** Yeah. **Jamie:** Okay. Having done this now for 11 years, I guess, and having seen all of the stuff you've seen and having advised governments, there's a very obvious question, which is when do you decide that you need to go put it into practice? **Gloria:** Someone asked me the other day if I was keeping a list of all the people I'd want to work for. **Jamie:** Oh, that's an interesting question. **Gloria:** It was a great question. I don't know the answer to it, but it did make me think there are some people who are really inspiring. I think I want to work for a team and that's why I've been where I am. Where I've been so long, my team is amazing. **Jamie:** Yeah. How many states and locals have you worked with? **Gloria:** Over 100. **Jamie:** Yeah. A hundred. So I mean, you must have seen every flavor of competence and not competence. **Gloria:** Yes. **Jamie:** Okay, got it. I mean, all the other things aside, do you at least feel like you could do this? You could get into the game directly? **Gloria:** I mean, of course. That's what I'm saying. If you see a team that you want to support, you're like, I'd love to support that person, go ahead and put me in. **Jamie:** So you've been there for 11 years. Give me one of your favorite teams to work with, and we'll stipulate that you love everybody equally, but if you had to go back in time and start again, you would start with? **Gloria:** Lisa Morrison Butler when she was running the Chicago Department of Family and Social Services just ran a great team. They had great strategy people. They really were trying to figure out how can we realign all of our spending and contracting around clear outcomes. We're working with Governor Wes Moore's senior cabinet right now. They have just pulled in a ton of very competent people. They've been dealt a tough hand, just in terms of the things happening in their state, but they're really trying to push on his vision around child poverty and how to help families in the state. **Jamie:** Oh, interesting. So he's given them a mission generally. **Gloria:** He announced that he was going to eliminate child poverty. And he gives these funny talks where he's like, every person on his staff is like, don't say eliminate— **Jamie:** Don't say it. Don't do it. **Gloria:** Exactly. And then of course, what always happens, you come in, there's the bridge collapse, all these things happen. But he's pulled together a really strong group of people who are doing really good work on how do we move our infrastructure forward in terms of AI, digital, the actual core capabilities of the state so that we can layer on top questions like how can we get people benefits faster and quicker? How can we serve more families who are at risk of falling into poverty and those kinds of things? **Jamie:** So one from Chicago, one from the state of Maryland. Okay. Have you worked in New York? I'm just curious. **Gloria:** We've done a little bit here. We tend not to work in New York for two reasons. One is New York actually has an unbelievable talent bench. From what I've seen, the folks in government in New York are the top talent bench in government in the U.S. out of some of the top federal roles. You guys have a great talent bench here. And so we tend to think, don't take water to the sea. You don't need extra people necessarily. The second reason is pilot projects done in New York tend to not translate into scalable solutions elsewhere, because literally every city in the country would be like, hmm— **Jamie:** Yes. **Gloria:** That means nothing to us. We have none of those resources, none of that infrastructure. And we are a tiny fraction of the size. You do a project in New York if you want to have direct impact, because it's such a huge direct impact in New York is phenomenal because it's just so big. But if you're trying to say, can we do it here because it can be a model for what's done elsewhere, it's just often not the case. **Jamie:** I think it's interesting. I mean, there are institutions in New York, so for example, the Furman Center, which is at NYU, the housing center run by people who I know well, all of whom have been in government in the housing world. They're spectacular. When I became the board chair of NYCHA a couple years ago, I thought, okay, great. I know a lot of people. I will be the bridge to NYCHA for lots of people who should be helping and never have. Great. So I went and sat down with my friends at Furman and I explained what the strategy was going forward, which made a lot of sense. And they were like, that's awesome. And I said, I'm sure you guys have been helping NYCHA along the way because you have all these resources and you have analytics and you're thinking about things to do. Blank face. And I said, how is it possible that you've got a third of all the public housing in the country within two feet of you in the five boroughs? And they said the same kind of the same thing you did, which is it's so big, it's kind of not relevant to anybody else. And so if we want to be relevant to everybody else and be sort of scalable, we have to go elsewhere. And also, it's not that NYCHA doesn't need help, but they really do have a lot of resources that other places don't have. **Gloria:** We try to do these knowledge exchange things between different cities. And the trick if you bring New York in is they'll be like, okay, well the first thing you should do is have your internal analytics team. And everyone's like— **Jamie:** Okay. And that would be who? **Gloria:** Exactly. They're like, take your 20-person data team. **Jamie:** It's incredible. Yeah. Now it's funny because you say that because if you—I mean just taking NYCHA or really, but this is true of any agency that I've had any interaction with. They will all tell you they're understaffed and I can tell you for sure NYCHA is understaffed. And I don't think you'd find another agency that would say different. We have 600,000 residents. We have 12,000 staff, and most of them are in the field, and that's just, you wouldn't, if you were running a private company that housed that number of people, you would have four or five times the number of people in the field. But for whatever reason, we do have a breadth of functionality. So to take your example, we do have an analytics department, but we also have other needs. It's just we can't hire—if we could hire five more people in the field and give up the analytics, that wouldn't really make any sense. **Gloria:** Exactly. **Jamie:** So it's just very, very challenging. So if you had to say, I don't know if you've done this, I've read some of the other stuff you wrote—spoiler alert, you and my mom— **Gloria:** And my mom. **Jamie:** And I didn't see anything in particular that was like, here's everything I've learned from a high level over my time here. If you were writing a book, you would say, okay, well what are the five magic keys to running a good government or something like that. Have you ever thought about it that way? **Gloria:** I love that question. I can give you my version of it right now. And the funny thing is, it's going to be the same thing I'm saying in every piece. I only have two ideas, but one of them is we don't see people focus on outcomes enough. There's so much focus on process. And that's such an easy thing to say. It's a really hard thing to do. You just default immediately to being like, well, we had the meetings. We did the town hall. And the ability of a leader to say, we are trying to get something done. We're just going to measure if that gets done and work backwards from getting that done. Not to say, well, if we do a lot of meetings, that counts. **Jamie:** I think that's a great—again, I co-sign that. I think I've never—it doesn't happen in government for the most part. Nobody in government gets rewarded for outcomes. Do you think that's why it is or is there something else going on? **Gloria:** I think that's partly why you do process things because it's a risk mitigation thing. **Jamie:** Mm-hmm. **Gloria:** I just wrote a case about this thing that Mike Duggan did when he was mayor in Detroit, where they shifted their community violence intervention funding to be outcomes-focused on did you drop shootings in your zone. I think it's an incredibly innovative approach to a type of funding that people are doing all over the country but isn't really being connected to accountability around outcomes. Really innovative design. They let the providers design their intervention. So it was much less micromanaged. **Jamie:** So this is for nonprofits? **Gloria:** Mm-hmm. These tiny nonprofits. **Jamie:** Yeah. **Gloria:** Community violence interrupting groups. Community violence interrupters are super proximate to their communities, from the communities. They base it around outcomes. I taught this teaching case around it that I'm hoping we can teach to government leaders in the different programs we do at the Kennedy School. And I was teaching it to this class of students and I break them up into sections where I'm like, okay, you guys think from the mayor's team perspective, you guys think from procurement and legal, you guys think from the provider's perspective, and we use it to tease out what's hard about this. And the kids on the mayor's team—one kid raised his hand, he's like, sorry, let me just see if I understand this. I have all this money from ARPA and I could do two things. I could set up a thing that's called Office of Violence Prevention and have a ribbon cutting, and then let them just go spend the next three years setting up an office. And there is zero downside to me. And I get to say I started an office that has violence prevention in the name, or I could say to the community, I'm going to put this money towards bringing shootings down and we're going to measure it and put it out in dashboards. **Jamie:** Yes. **Gloria:** And he was like, that sounds like it's only political downside. So much risk. Why? Where do you get this kid? **Jamie:** Well, but it's exactly to your point, right? Everyone we see who's doing outcomes-based work is taking a risk, because they really are trying to get the thing done. There's so much more safety around doing process, where you can say, yeah, I named a person and we did a task force, and then we have a committee. And the people who are like, look, I really want to push around this are doing it because they're actually trying to get it done and they care, but not because all the political rewards are set up that way. **Gloria:** I hope you weeded them out quickly before they get into government. **Jamie:** That was the core insight that they were pointing out, was like, hey, this is a hard thing. This is a hard thing for a leader to do. **Gloria:** Yeah, it is. **Jamie:** Actually, stay at Harvard kid. You're doing okay. Yeah, you go. Sorry. Look, that is, it's probably true because the one thing that politicians in general, elected officials are really good at, more or less, is figuring out what it is that's going to get them reelected. **Gloria:** I do think there's a separate set of reasons we don't focus on outcomes, which is—and this is a lot of the stuff that we focus on—it's actually not what the structure is right now. So you say you're trying to do something as an elected official. People get together and do this policy work or whatever. You then hand it off to an agency to implement and then it goes through a set of standard processes. The agencies, where typically—unless it's a thing that the agency has direct control over, which is the minority of things in government—you're going to send it out through procurement and a contracted provider is going to do it. Typically, a nonprofit. That process is almost never oriented around outcomes. **Jamie:** Yes. **Gloria:** So the contracts are not, we want kids in this community to have better reading scores and ultimately better economic mobility. It's you will create X number of seats and you'll invoice for those seats, and then all of the focus is around the compliance around that process. And so one of the issues that we focus on a lot is the translation between what you're trying to do and the way that it gets done. One of the main things that gets dropped out is what the thing was that you actually were aiming for. And you replace it with things where you're like, we will pay you to deliver showers at this shelter. **Jamie:** Yep. We're already down a rabbit hole and we didn't even get to your two, three, and four or five. **Gloria:** Same. Outcomes is pretty good. **Jamie:** But this one is interesting. I'm going to guess that you spent time around the performance bond, social impact bond world. **Gloria:** Yep. That's how we got started. **Jamie:** My prior is I don't believe in that stuff. Tell me what you think about it. **Gloria:** Social impact bonds? **Jamie:** Yeah. **Gloria:** So my short take on social impact bonds—the GPL started out as the Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab. My short takeaway on it was the third-party investor stuff ended up being too complicated and government can borrow at a lower rate. So also not necessary, as in government should be more risk-taking with the money it has. It doesn't need to pay investors to offset that risk. And the transaction costs were incredibly high because it was these very sophisticated financial transactions that the governments weren't set up to do. **Jamie:** Yep. **Gloria:** So we essentially were, after we tested it in a bunch of places, we were like, we don't need that piece. And governments came to us and said, they're like, actually, we can pay for stuff. The piece that they really liked that we have kept, and it's the backbone of the work that we do now, is the stuff around measuring outcomes. Get your contracts organized right and then do data-driven performance management around the thing that you're trying to deliver to actually figure out what is stopping this from happening and problem-solving in a really agile, fast way. So that piece— **Jamie:** Yeah. **Gloria:** Of social impact bonds. I actually think it was incredibly successful. **Jamie:** That makes sense to me. I had not followed the space really. We had some experience with it in New York State. We actually did the first, I think the first social services one we did was a recidivism one. Yeah. We did the CEO, right? **Gloria:** Yeah, yeah, yeah. Exactly. **Jamie:** So which did not work well. **Gloria:** Worked in the sense that you now have evidence. **Jamie:** We can talk about this some other time. **Gloria:** No, no. But actually this is part of it. Government should be finding out what works. **Jamie:** Totally agree. It just goes back to that— **Gloria:** Right conversation we were just having around whether people want that or— **Jamie:** It's great. It was great for us. But having said that, the missing piece there, which maybe doesn't matter, is the incentive structure, right or no? **Gloria:** There is a thing that I think is really tricky, which is who is going to buffer the risk for the provider if they don't get their outcomes payments? But what we learned in subsequent projects, like the original social impact bonds put a lot of the payments at risk. What we've learned in subsequent projects is you don't have to have as much of it at risk to still incent some of the same behaviors. And you can still drive the same kind of adaptation. So this project in Detroit that I was talking about, I think is a really nice example of this. They took their ARPA funding. They made these super generous operational budgets for the social service providers who got selected to do the community violence intervention. They then made also very generous incentive payments on top of it if they hit target. So it was— **Jamie:** Sort of a bonus. So you got the original payment— **Gloria:** But then it was a bonus. Yes, but it was a bonus. So the operational funds, and I think that's the right way to structure—what I would think was the next generation of results-driven contracts, which is you can't be putting the providers' operational funding at risk so that they're like, well, at the end of the year we might find out we're not going to make any money from this year. But if you cover their operational costs, then using performance incentives as bonuses, I think is really effective. **Jamie:** Are you seeing any of that in practice? **Gloria:** This Detroit project's my favorite one that I'm seeing right now. And I heard the mayor talk about it and I was like, this is so smart. I called my friend who was in the mayor's office and I was like, hey, this is a really, really smart program design. I want to write a case about it. And she's like, oh, Gloria, that was actually my project and she had worked at the GPL, so I was like, oh, darn it. We're not seeing any independently seeded version. **Jamie:** Oh, that's too bad. When was this? **Gloria:** It's now. This was now. **Jamie:** Okay. So all right, well, so it'll get out there. All right, so here's—we intended to talk about the article that you wrote for Vital City, and instead we ended up talking about the work that you do that led to that article and lots of other stuff. So I think we're just going to presume on your time and say, this is going to be part one of the conversation. And part two of the conversation is going to be about that article because that's free advice to the new administration, drawn on lots of other stuff. And if they're lucky, they'll find a way to drag you into helping. But one way or the other, it's very closely related. Okay. Great. Gloria, thanks a lot. **Gloria:** Yeah, thanks. ### Mayor Mamdani, Here’s What Mass Engagement Looks Like in Practice URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mass-engagement-mamdani-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:27.000Z [](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?display=page&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fmass-engagement-mamdani-nyc)[](http://www.twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fmass-engagement-mamdani-nyc&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fmass-engagement-mamdani-nyc&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)," goes a line from Walt Whitman's "Song of Myself." Each of us immediately recognizes its truth. What would our democracy look like if it, too, contained multitudes — embracing not only the multiplicity among us but the multiplicity within us? [Sixty-four percent](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/10/02/polls/times-siena-poll-registered-voter-crosstabs.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of Americans believe we are too polarized to solve our problems, a stark increase from just five years ago. Yet freed from rigid categories — progressive/conservative, urban/rural, migrant/native, Democrat/Republican — we are unpredictable and eccentric. Like the man who showed up to a mayoral rally in New York City, my home, wearing a "MAGA for Mamdani" hat. He was one of the [estimated 20%](https://www.aaldef.org/news/exit-poll-49-of-nyc-asian-american-voters-backed-mamdani-in-historic-mayoral-victory/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of New York City Trump voters who supported Zohran Mamdani for mayor. Our political machinery flattens the many complexities and internal contradictions of the electorate. Traditional polling methods, referendums and even our ranked-choice voting system tend to force complex human preferences into reductive choices. The 2016 Brexit referendum is a striking example: a binary vote — in or out — that forced people into opposing camps when their actual feelings about European Union membership were far more nuanced. In New York City today, we have a chance to do things differently. Mamdani won the mayoral election by mobilizing New Yorkers from all walks of life. His newly created [Office of Mass Engagement](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-establishes-office-of-mass-engagement-to-transform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) plans to sustain that energy beyond Election Day by embedding public feedback directly into city policy. But how do you genuinely engage a city of more than 8 million residents who speak an estimated [750 languages](https://languagemap.nyc/Explore/Language?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), hold diverse religious and cultural beliefs and live in radically different economic circumstances? And how do you do this in ways that surface real preferences — rather than amplifying voices that happen to align with the administration's predetermined goals? To his credit, Mamdani has already made a genuine effort to hear what his constituents want. Last December, he spent 12 hours listening to 142 New Yorkers at his '[The Mayor is Listening](http://youtube.com/watch?v=xj89tYvwr6k&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)' event. As he goes about his daily business, he is — at least so far — considerably more approachable than many past leaders of the city. But events like this won't scale to millions. And one-way listening, where many speak to one, can't capture the collective wisdom that emerges when people both speak and listen to each other. For close to a decade, I've overseen the deployment of a tool that offers a path forward: a nonprofit, open-source technology called [Polis](https://pol.is/home?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), designed to understand public opinion in its complexity. I've helped governments worldwide use Polis to gather input on everything from climate policy and urban planning to food pantries and mental health services. Across all these deployments, one pattern emerges consistently: Common ground exists even in the most fraught terrain. New York City is no exception — beneath the noise of competing interests and divided communities lies the same potential for unexpected consensus. Polis inverts the logic of typical social media. It's a tool for broad listening, rather than broad *casting* of opinions. It works like this: On each topic raised on Polis, participants — from thousands to tens of thousands, and scalable to hundreds of thousands — share their perspectives in tweet-length statements and vote "agree," "disagree," or "pass" on each other's statements. The Polis algorithm then breaks people out of their bubbles by showing them not just the statements they are likely to agree with, but also those they are likely to disagree with. The conversation is displayed as an interactive map and summarized by a large language model in real time, showing areas of agreement and disagreement. Consensus is reached when there is broad agreement across otherwise divided groups. Polis's most famous application is in Taiwan. After the 2014 Sunflower Movement opened space for citizen participation, the government invited [g0v](https://g0v.tw/intl/en/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (pronounced gov-zero) — a hacker community that rose to prominence during the movement — to prototype a process for mass engagement in policymaking. The result was [vTaiwan](https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xyhft%5Fv1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which combines in-person deliberation with virtual participation via Polis. Audrey Tang, a g0v member who helped design vTaiwan, later became Taiwan's digital minister. vTaiwan was not a patronizing experiment to make people feel like they were being heard. It solved real policy deadlocks. For example, the government had been trying for years to legalize online liquor sales, but alcohol merchants, e-commerce platforms and people concerned about underage drinking couldn't find common ground. When the issue went through vTaiwan, 450 stakeholders reached consensus within weeks and formulated recommendations the government went on to implement. The alcohol case wasn't unique. Under Digital Minister Audrey Tang's leadership from 2016 to 2024, vTaiwan tackled more than 28 issues ranging from Uber regulation to revenge porn, with [80%](https://info.vtaiwan.tw/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) resulting in government action. vTaiwan is [often framed](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/11/opinion/ai-democracy-government-authoritarianism.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as an example of how AI can invigorate democracy. The truth is actually the opposite: Democracy invigorated AI. The 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement is what initially inspired a group of Seattle-based technologists — led by Colin Megill — to build Polis. It was proprietary software at first, but Tang insisted that any tool used for public deliberation be fully transparent. So in 2016, Polis became open source, and it has remained so ever since. Yet in all of America, only Bowling Green, Kentucky, has used Polis at scale. Last year, I helped thousands of residents come together for citywide planning — proving they're not bowling alone in Bowling Green. Once the provisional capital of Confederate Kentucky, Bowling Green — a Republican-led city of about 75,000 — is now home to Western Kentucky University, two major Japanese aluminum plants and one of the highest per capita refugee populations in the nation. It's about an hour's drive from Nashville, one of the fastest-growing hubs in the South. City leaders were convening to plan for a doubling of Bowling Green's population in the coming decades. My Polis colleagues and I — with funding and support from Google — were invited to help. It was our first public-private partnership, but Polis's open-source license meant even Google's code contributions had to remain public. In March 2024, Bowling Green held a three-week digital town hall using Polis, and approximately 10% of the city's population participated online to share their perspectives on what the city could become by 2050\. To make sure the participants were as representative as possible, volunteers canvassed at local businesses and international grocery stores. They took iPads to soup kitchens, rural diners and flea markets. They talked to bored people in the DMV line, farmers at the agricultural gala, Afghan Uber drivers, fans at a college basketball game and congregants at local churches and the Islamic Center. They reached longtime locals, the recently arrived Burmese refugees and the Bosnian refugees who had arrived in the early 1990s. The Bowling Green Daily News pitched in by creating a mock issue from the year 2050, which was hand-delivered at 5 a.m. by a crew of volunteers. The city and county administration went all in. Doug Gorman, the judge executive of Warren County, a Republican and the highest elected official in the region, appeared on T.V., on the radio and at events promising residents that their elected officials would listen to what they had to say. "My perspective is growth can either happen to us, or it can happen for us," I heard Gorman say repeatedly. The multiplicity of views in Bowling Green — both individual and collective — were reflected on Polis. This happened because residents weren't choosing between preset options. Instead, they were sharing their own visions for the city's future and voting on each other's contributions — from what they valued in community life to what they hoped local leaders might address. Take two issues that emerged as salient to residents: more locally-sourced food options — meaning more farm-to-table restaurants, farmers markets and farm-based tourism — and allowing drag shows in public spaces. Locally-sourced food brought people together. Drag shows divided them. The most common stance was supporting both. But nearly as many favored locally-sourced food while opposing drag shows. Smaller groups opposed both, supported drag shows while opposing farm-to-table food, or didn't feel strongly about one or both issues. Every possible combination existed. Knowing someone's stance on local food gave you no information about their views on drag shows. People were not following a progressive or conservative script. And amid the multiplicity, shared priorities emerged: farm-to-table restaurants and year-round farmers' markets among them, but also protected farmland and support for small businesses. More green spaces and a well-maintained historic district. More social services, particularly for the elderly. More child care, venues for family activities, better schools and vocational training — especially in trades like electrical, plumbing and carpentry. More affordable housing, with stricter oversight of developers and incentives to reuse vacant buildings. More bike lanes, an enhanced bus system and a stop on the Amtrak line. More jobs that pay a living wage. Alongside all this, there were sharp disagreements about LGBTQ rights, about immigration, about who the town was for, and who it was not — statements that, when mapped, clustered with discussions about the role of churches in the community (issues Bowling Green will have to grapple with outside of Polis). City and county leaders are now using these and other insights — drawn from nearly 8,000 perspectives and over a million votes — to develop a comprehensive plan expected to be ready in 2027\. Ben Peterson, who leads the City-County Planning Commission, told me that hearing from the larger community gave them "the confidence for having the right conversations" with officials and developers alike. Unprompted, he noted that the amount of consensus surprised him. Zohran Mamdani won New York City not just by having strong opinions, but by finding common ground across divides. Governing will require expanding that common ground across neighborhoods, across boroughs, across countless competing priorities. The city could launch a pilot within the first 100 days on any mayoral priority — housing, child care, public safety or city-owned supermarkets. For example, CUNY's Brooklyn College used Polis during the pandemic to support food pantries — identifying what the community most needed, who needed it most and how to connect resources like neighborhood fridges and local gardens. Imagine the Office of Mass Engagement using this approach to augment the [Rental Ripoff Hearings to be held in every borough:](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/rental-ripoff?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) engaging tenants, landlords, housing advocates and developers to find where even divided stakeholders agree. City Council members could deploy Polis in their own districts to understand constituent priorities, inform legislative decisions or find common ground on local issues. This would complement participatory budgeting programs, which give residents decision-making power over capital projects like playground upgrades and library renovations. Participatory democracy can be tricky — any serious attempt to open new channels for direct public engagement upsets existing power structures. But as has been widely reported, Mamdani's listening event felt different. The participants gave it their all. They didn't come simply to be heard or to blow off steam; each came to help their mayor make policy. The Office of Mass Engagement can build on this momentum, helping build a real listening infrastructure that transforms how the city governs. If individuals contain multitudes, cities do too — and so must the democracies that govern them. ### An Underutilized Tool in the Fight for Good Government URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-department-of-investigation-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T16:45:09.000Z Very few mayors love the city’s Department of Investigation. There are understandable reasons for this. When the department makes headlines, it is rarely good news for the mayor. For example, in recent years, the Department of Investigation (DOI) in New York City has played a major role in the explosive investigations of Mayor Eric Adams and his top aides for corruption. Despite the potential that DOI could train its sights on his administration, Mayor Zohran Mamdani should actively seek to bolster DOI’s independence. A reimagined DOI would not only be very good for New York; it can become a model for how the federal government can reinvent the role of inspectors general going forward. At the federal level, IGs prevent and combat fraud, waste and abuse through audits, investigations and recommendations. IGs are appointed by the president, but report to both the president and Congress. Their removal requires prior notice to Congress. Historically, IGs have not been subject to turnover during changes of administration. Right now, federal IGs face an existential threat. In January 2025, President Trump [took the unprecedented step of firing](https://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/contributors/2025/02/07/inspectors-general-independence-trump-firing/78253578007/?gnt-cfr=1&gca-cat=p&gca-uir=true&gca-epti=z112828p000150c000150d00----v112828b0046xxd004665&gca-ft=270&gca-ds=sophi&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 17 IGs en masse at the end of the first week of his second term in office. And when the U.S. Agency for International Development IG appropriately exercised his jurisdiction by publicly reporting on the negative effects of freezing funding and mass firing at that agency, [the president retaliated by firing him as well](https://ig.ny.gov/news/hill-opinion-retaliatory-firing-usaids-inspector-general-travesty?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Subsequently, Trump has [appointed](https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/5277564-white-house-inspector-general-nominees/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) IGs with records of ethical lapses and political partisanship, leading many to question their independence. All this has left accountability and oversight of federal agencies in shambles. New York City can write a different story. [Under the New York City Charter](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCcharter/0-0-0-2399?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), DOI — led by an official appointed by the mayor with consent of the City Council — is charged with making any investigation directed by the mayor or Council as well as any study or investigation which the DOI commissioner believes to be “in the best interests of the city.” The Charter also mandates DOI’s specific investigative responsibilities for three high-profile city agencies — the police department, the Department of Correction and the New York City Housing Authority. All City department IGs report to DOI. DOI has often played a primary role in the criminal investigation of municipal corruption cases. The agency has subpoena power and a staff that includes criminal investigators. [In 2024, DOI made 370 arrests and 498 referrals](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/press-releases/2025/March/12CYend2024.03.06.2025FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for criminal prosecution. Crucially, in recent years, DOI has maintained its independence even as it helped lead criminal investigations of the mayor that it reported to. Before the Trump Justice Department withdrew the prosecution, Eric Adams was the first New York City mayor in over 150 years to be indicted while in office. That was in no small part due to the dogged investigations of DOI, led by then-[Commissioner Jocelyn Strauber. Strauber joined with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the FBI in announcing the indictment](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/new-york-city-mayor-eric-adams-charged-bribery-and-campaign-finance-offenses?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). U.S. Attorney Williams specifically praised the outstanding work of DOI in the case and Commissioner Strauber noted that DOI’s “unique access to City records and expertise in matters of City government make us a critical partner” in the investigation. According to Strauber, [at no time was the independence of DOI under threat](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/01/eric-adams-appointee-highlights-unprecedented-ethics-problems-in-city-hall-00321530?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This was a remarkable testament to DOI’s independence, and it stands in stark contrast to the state of federal IGs under Trump. In prior administrations, DOI’s independence has been questioned. Mayor Rudy Giuliani appointed a long-time friend, Howard Wilson, as his first DOI commissioner. DOI was removed from an investigation into the award of $43 million in city contracts after [federal authorities said](https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/13/nyregion/mayor-moves-an-ally-to-schools-post.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the inquiry, which had reached into the mayor’s cabinet, had been put at risk because Wilson had briefed Giuliani on the investigation’s progress. Mayor Bill de Blasio’s initial appointment to DOI, Mark Peters, was denounced because Peters had [previously served as DeBlasio's campaign treasurer](https://www.nydailynews.com/2014/01/18/mayor-de-blasio-nominates-mark-peters-to-head-department-of-investigations/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). De Blasio [eventually fired Peters](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/nyregion/mark-peters-de-blasio-doi.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) after a damning investigation of his conduct at DOI — but also after the agency had issued a series of critical reports of the administration. The Peters case is an interesting one — it raised concerns about independence based on both the prior relationship of the commissioner and mayor and the removal of a commissioner after DOI fulfilled its oversight role. Rather than relying on mayors and DOI commissioners to do the right thing, Mayor Mamdani and the Council should take strong steps to enhance DOI’s structural independence. Right now, the City Council must confirm the DOI Commissioner, and the mayor can only remove the commissioner after a public statement of cause. Those are essential features safeguarding DOI’s right to act as it sees fit. But a series of additional guardrails could further guarantee the agency’s independence. DOI commissioners could be appointed for a fixed term that does not overlap with the mayor’s term. City Council review could be required before any removal takes place. In the event of a vacancy in the commissioner’s office, it should be filled by a chief deputy who was also subject to City Council approval. Beyond that, the Mayor and Council and DOI leadership should reimagine and reinvent DOI’s role so it does more to make city government honest, efficient, effective and fair. This would be aligned with DOI’s broad powers delineated in the City Charter, which go beyond the investigation of corruption to include “the affairs, functions, accounts, methods, personnel or efficiency of any agency.” First*,* DOI should **focus on making City government work for those who need it most**. Pervasive economic inequality and the affordability crisis have eroded confidence in government at all levels. DOI should look hard at where the process seems rigged against the interests of low-income and working-class New Yorkers. A few examples: The Rent Guidelines Board is responsible for setting rent increases for rent-stabilized apartments based, in part, on increases in landlord cost. For years, tenants have questioned the validity of this price increase data — which is self-reported — and have argued that the price index of operating costs (PIOC) is “[one-sided](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/nyregion/06rent.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).” DOI could use its full investigative powers — including subpoena power — to assess the PIOC’s validity as part of the debate over a rent freeze. There is a 50 year history of fraud and corruption related to City leases for child care facilities. In 1976, City daycare leases were the subject of a grand jury investigation and were [“one of the biggest giveaways in the history of the city.”](https://www.nytimes.com/1976/06/04/archives/new-jersey-pages-morgenthau-investigating-leasing-of-daycare-units.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) A DOI investigation of current daycare center leases could detail how to minimize taxpayer cost and ensure that any move to universal childcare is protected from similar corruption. *Second,* DOI should **support effective government**. While the agency should never hold back on investigations or audits finding fraud, waste and abuse, it should simultaneously speak with an equally loud, clear voice when government is working effectively and efficiently and, perhaps more importantly, when failures are due to policy decisions rather than malfeasance or misadministration. For instance, cuts in federal SNAP funding will reduce the affordability of food for the [roughly 1.8 million city residents who currently receive benefits every month](https://www.osc.ny.gov/reports/budget/fed-funding-ny/nutritional-assistance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The Trump administration and congressional Republicans justified work requirements and a shift in administrative costs to states and local governments as ways to reduce or prevent fraud in the program. A DOI investigation could independently assess the fraud risk and determine the effect of SNAP cuts on New Yorkers’ access to needed benefits. *Third,* DOI should **put the public back into public integrity**. This means connecting productively with ordinary New Yorkers to help identify and combat potential government malfeasance. The City Charter already [requires DOI](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCcharter/0-0-0-2399?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to “conduct annual outreach campaigns to educate the public on forms of government corruption, fraud, and waste, and provide information regarding how the public can submit complaints to the department.” This should be done with much more vigor and imagination. [The City of Chicago Inspector General](https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/community-engagement/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, uses community engagement as one of its key metrics, tracking participation in community events to “listen to community concerns, talk about our work, and even initiate intakes for complaints or suggestions to make city government better.” And [the New York City Comptroller](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptrollers-office-kicks-off-new-resident-powered-audit-process-with-survey-and-roundtables-of-nycha-residents/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), along with other audit agencies, has used public engagement as a means of both determining areas of focus and methodology for its audits. *Finally,* **DOI should focus more intensively on results**.The true test of effective oversight is whether the work of the watchdog produces better government — less fraud, waste, abuse and corruption. The measure of effective oversight is not the number of audits or investigations, but the impact that those efforts have. Repeated investigations of an area of government may lead to multiple arrests and indictments. But if those investigations don’t also lead to programmatic reforms that prevent corruption and improve performance, oversight has not really succeeded. ### Too Cold for New York City’s Streets URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/explained-what-is-involuntary-removal-outdoor-deaths-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:27.000Z [](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?display=page&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fexplained-what-is-involuntary-removal-outdoor-deaths-nyc)[](http://www.twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fexplained-what-is-involuntary-removal-outdoor-deaths-nyc&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fexplained-what-is-involuntary-removal-outdoor-deaths-nyc&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *New York is enduring its coldest stretch in years, with temperatures set to plunge again this coming weekend. On Wednesday, Mayor Zohran Mamdani reported that 17 people have died outdoors during the freeze, including three from overdoses and one from unknown causes. (To compare these death totals to those in previous years, see* [*here*](https://x.com/nicolegelinas/status/2016639896941715924?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.) He said the City has placed more than 1,100 people in shelter, opened over 100 new low-barrier Safe Haven beds in Lower Manhattan and involuntarily removed 20 people from the streets.* *Those numbers prompt obvious questions. Is 20 involuntary removals a lot or a little? What does involuntary removal actually mean, and who has the authority to do it? Why can't the City simply bring everyone inside when temperatures turn deadly? And what, if any, is the role of Mamdani's approach to homeless encampments?* *The answers are more complicated than most people realize.* **As a general matter, what legal authority does the City have to remove someone from a public place against their will?** Two sections of the state's Mental Hygiene Law govern the great bulk of involuntary removal from sidewalks, parks and the like. [Section 9.41](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.41?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) authorizes police officers to make the call. [Section 9.58](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.58?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) extends that authority to specially trained and certified clinicians. In both cases, involuntary removal means one thing only: transport to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation. A psychiatrist then has up to 72 hours to determine whether the person should be admitted to inpatient care. Separate and apart from this, there's authority to uproot homeless encampments — which we'll get to in a bit. **What has to be true before someone can be removed involuntarily?** Two boxes must be checked for removals under the Mental Hygiene Law. First, the person must appear to be mentally ill — showing symptoms like incoherence, delusions, hallucinations or catatonia. This isn't a clinical diagnosis; that comes later. Second, the person must be engaging in conduct likely to result in serious physical harm to themselves or others. **Who actually performs these removals?** Police are involved in 100% of involuntary removals — because by definition, force is required. The only question is who makes the decision to involuntarily remove an individual. Monthly involuntary transports [averaged 652 in 2024 and 745 in 2025](https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiZWMwZGU5YTMtOTFiZS00NTYxLWIwMjItZDBkOTgwZDU5YzdkIiwidCI6IjM1YzgyODE2LTZjNTYtNDQzYi1iYWY2LTgzMTIxNjNjYWRjMSJ9&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (through October, reflecting the latest data available). Even when it's a clinician who has made the call to involuntarily transport an individual to the hospital, cops still do the physical work of getting the person onto the ambulance. No one expects nurses or social workers to physically compel someone who refuses to go. Involuntary removal, by definition, requires police involvement. **What changes when the temperature drops?** The involuntary removal criteria remain the same. But extreme cold changes how those criteria apply in practice. At 32 degrees, someone who appears well-bundled may not meet the threshold for danger to self. At 10 degrees, the calculus shifts dramatically. Refusing all efforts to come inside and insisting on sleeping outdoors in single-digit temperatures demonstrates both an extreme lack of awareness of danger and exposure to objectively life-threatening conditions. As a result, theerefusal itself might constitute conduct likely to result in serious harm. **Where do people go after an involuntary removal?** People are brought to hospitals. There's no such thing as involuntary removal to a shelter or warming center — those facilities aren't locked and can't by law hold anyone against their will. So for those who aren't thought to be mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others, voluntary acceptance of shelter remains the goal. Safe Haven or stabilization beds — there are about 4,000 of these low-barrier-to-entry shelters, with fewer rules than traditional shelters — and shelters with single rooms are typically the most effective sell for people thinking clearly enough to weigh their options. **When someone is brought to the hospital, what happens?** The person can be held for up to 72 hours while psychiatrists determine whether they meet criteria for involuntary admission to the inpatient unit. Admission (sometimes initially on an "emergency" 15-day basis under [Section 9.39](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.39?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and sometimes for longer under [Section 9.27](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.27?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) requires a more definitive finding of mental illness than was required for removal, plus affirmation of the finding of danger to self or others, by a psychiatrist (under 9.39) or by two psychiatrists or one psychiatrist and a psychiatric nurse practitioner (under 9.27). Many people never make it past the psychiatric emergency room. This is often because behavior that on the street appeared to be psychosis turns out to be the temporary effect of substances the person ingested. Once those effects wear off, if there's no apparent underlying mental illness, there is no basis to hold the person. Mayor Mamdani wants to limit police engagement with seriously mentally ill individuals and has said he believes in involuntary commitment [only as a "last resort."](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-talks-public-safety) It's as yet unclear how this posture will become policy and if so, how that might affect the determination of who gets brought into hospitals. **The Mamdani administration reported 20 involuntary removals during the recent cold snap. Is that a meaningful number?** Context matters. The City isn't canvassing every block looking for unsheltered people to bring in. Instead, the approach is more targeted: Outreach teams run by nonprofit groups focus on people who are known to be unhoused, typically at familiar locations, while police and sometimes EMS respond to reports from the public received via 911 and 311\. Many people encountered during extreme cold do agree to come inside, but many still refuse. A more aggressive street-by-street canvassing operation would likely yield far more — but would require police manpower the City has not deployed for this purpose. **Is ideological opposition to involuntary removal resulting in leaving people on the street during dangerously cold conditions?** The ideological divide over involuntary removal is real. But that divide concerns cases where harm is not imminent — situations where mental illness is causing deterioration but has not yet created an emergency. During extreme cold, imminence is not in question. Someone refusing to come inside at 10 degrees faces obvious, immediate, life-threatening danger. The limiting factor is not ideology about when to intervene — it is operational capacity to find everyone who needs help. **Does the Mamdani administration believe involuntary removals can happen without police?** The preference for non-police responses to mental health calls contemplates situations that will not result in involuntary removal — encounters where a skilled clinician can build rapport and convince someone to come inside voluntarily. When force is necessary, police are necessary. That is definitional, and no serious participant in this debate believes otherwise. **Mamdani has said none of those who have frozen to death have been in encampments. What exactly is an "encampment," and how does the term matter in this context?** An encampment is a structure — makeshift or otherwise — that someone builds around themselves on the street. A sleeping bag does not qualify. A shopping cart full of belongings does not qualify. The functional test under [city regulations](https://www.scribd.com/document/595747623/Encampments-Cleanups-DHS-PB-2022-009?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): If someone has more possessions than they can physically carry away, they have established an encampment. They have permanently affixed themselves to that location, demonstrating intent to make it a home. The definition is not based on group size. Many of the people who've died outside in this extreme cold were likely unhoused and could well have been mentally unstable. The question of whether they were in an encampment just speaks to whether they tried to claim a particular swath of public space as their "home." According to the City, that wasn't the case with these deaths. **What was the encampment policy under Adams?** Zero tolerance. Any reported encampment triggered a protocol: approximately 10 days' notice, followed by a scheduled sweep. On the designated date, a team including NYPD, Sanitation and DHS outreach workers would arrive. The structure would be dismantled and removed. Outreach workers and other staffers would offer shelter at that moment, typically while carting an individual's possessions away. **What's changing under Mamdani?** The dismantling stops. Outreach continues — teams will still engage with people in encampments and try to connect them with services and housing. But without a scheduled sweep, there's no definitive end date forcing the issue. Some who work closely with the homeless say [encampment sweeps and offers of service can and should complement one another](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/unhoused-new-yorkers-randy-santos-mamdani). **What should you do if you see a person on the street who seems unable to care for themselves during a period of extreme cold?** When a life might be in danger, the best course of action is to call 911\. During Code Blue, calls to 311 about vulnerable individuals on the streets are supposed to get routed to 911\. Then, if the system works as designed, both police and EMS respond. The officer can make an involuntary removal determination on the spot if the person refuses to come inside. **What about someone who seems mentally unstable but isn't facing weather danger — agitated, incoherent?** Verbal threats or menacing behavior warrant a 911 call. Someone sitting and talking to themselves should trigger a call to 311\. Response times will be slower, but someone will come. ### Hochul’s Going Nuclear. Environmentalists Should Cheer Her On. URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/hochul-nuclear-energy-climate-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:27.000Z It's every bit as bold as congestion pricing. Perhaps bolder. Kathy Hochul didn't just say nice things about nuclear power in her [State of the State address](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/remarks-prepared-governor-hochul-delivers-2026-state-state-address?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). She pledged her troth to it. Directing the New York Power Authority to undertake a gigawatt (1 GW, or 1,000 megawatts) of new nuclear electricity capacity, as the governor did [last summer](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-directs-new-york-power-authority-develop-zero-emission-advanced-nuclear-energy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), was one thing. Her promise now to augment that with 4 GW of privately financed and managed reactors makes for a whole new ballgame — and, paradoxically, one that may prove easier to sell to wary New Yorkers. Details are sketchy, but the possible benefits are tantalizing. By my calculations, five gigawatts of new nuclear power would be enough juice to dispense with half of the entire output of the state's gas-fired electric plants — and their malignant carbon emissions. (See endnote for link to this and other calculations.) The nukes would also help fortify the grid against blackouts, with none of the intrusive and costly battery storage banks required for equivalent solar and wind capacity. Gov. Hochul's initiative is well-timed. The state has done next to nothing to replace the enormous [carbon-free electricity supply it discarded](https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2025/04/30/5-years-on-the-indian-point-disaster-is-its-shutdown/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when it closed down Indian Point's two 1 GW reactors five years ago. Factoring in nuclear power's minuscule carbon footprint along with the reactors' late-life technical excellence, those 2 GW were providing a larger carbon benefit than the state obtained from all of its wind turbines, rooftop panels and solar farms combined in 2024, the most recent full year with available data. Lower carbon pollution and a "reliability backbone," to use the governor's term, are the most palpable benefits from going big on nuclear, along with well-paying union jobs and, quite possibly, lower electric rates and bills compared to a fossil-dependent grid subject to [increasingly volatile gas prices](https://www.nyiso.com/documents/d/guest/costs-behind-rising-electricity-prices-whitepaper?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Here's another less well-understood benefit from Hochul's nukes: leveraging more wind and solar. That's right. Getting those five nuclear gigawatts into the energy pipeline will, I believe, make it harder for the bad hombres in Washington to cancel indispensable renewable energy ventures like Empire Wind, the Atlantic Ocean complex off Nassau County's south shore that a federal judge this month [ordered](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/15/climate/empire-wind-court-ruling.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the Trump administration to let construction proceed on. By reframing green energy as nuclear and renewables — not just wind and solar, which still have NIMBY opponents as well as detractors on the right — Hochul is fashioning New York into a state of can-do climate hard hats that Trump messes with at his peril. ## **Nukes are the grid's energizer bunnies** Key to understanding these benefits is opening our eyes to the sea change in the operating record of the country's 90-odd nuclear power plants. Since 2000 — a full quarter-century ago — U.S. nukes have collectively averaged 90% "capacity factor" (a power plant's electricity output relative to its maximum possible output). That's a far cry from nuclear's early decades, when the average reactor's output rate was stuck at around 60%. It's as if underachieving Yankees shortstop Anthony Volpe (lifetime OPS: .662) blossomed into Yankees legend Joe DiMaggio (OPS: .977). [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27383785?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The change is profound. Nationwide, reactor downtimes have shrunk fourfold, from a 40% out-of-service rate to just 10% — mostly routine maintenance in times of low demand. That allows for less back-up capacity as well as less runtime needed for the grid's polluting fossil-fuel generators. The vastly improved reactor performance has also granted a new lease on life for a technology that, to many, couldn't be trusted to be a safe neighbor. ## **Why not just wind and solar?** Still, you could ask: Can't New York decarbonize its grid and keep it humming with solar and wind alone? The solar tribune Bill McKibben thinks so, as do legions of New Yorkers who drank deep from his 2025 book ["Here Comes the Sun"](https://wwnorton.com/books/Here-Comes-the-Sun/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and are already mobilizing against Hochul's new nukes. Instead, they say, New York should focus on somehow ratcheting up the state's wind and solar supply two- or threefold. (That's what it would take to match the climate value of the governor's 5 GW of nukes. Note that additional hydro-power from Quebec is no panacea; the nearly complete [Champlain-Hudson Power Express](https://chpexpress.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) transmission line from Quebec to downstate New York will provide only around [1 GW worth of new nuclear electricity](https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2025/04/30/5-years-on-the-indian-point-disaster-is-its-shutdown/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) running at high capacity factor, and is a one-off, besides.) Yet it should be plain as day that the quickest and cheapest way to decarbonize the state's grid is to build nuclear and renewables *in tandem* rather than going all-in on just one. If that's not obvious enough, just look under the hood of the all-renewables vision propounded by McKibben's West Coast energy guru Mark Jacobson, a Stanford professor with a [large public-facing profile](https://www.allamericanspeakers.com/celebritytalentbios/Mark+Z.+Jacobson/386877?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The mainstay of Jacobson's [energy sketch for New York](https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/21-USStates-PDFs/21-WWS-NewYork.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is 67 GW of offshore wind turbine capacity. That's more than 30 times the capacity of the Empire Wind I and II projects that Trump tried to thwart before Hochul seemed to get him to change his mind (in [a wise but controversial deal](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/kathy-hochul-nese-pipeline-empire-wind) in which she acceded to a natural gas pipeline). Permitting and erecting the equivalent of 30 more such projects — a venture necessitating 4,500 giant turbines — feels not just daunting but quixotic. Ditto, the 17-fold increase in solar farms and roofs that Jacobson's scenario requires as well. **Going big on nuclear upends the energy debate** True, undertaking new reactors is also no minor feat, largely on account of costs — I'll get to that in a moment. But it's worth considering how Hochul's gambit could recast not just New York climate and energy discourse but our nuclear power debate as well. In the wake of Hochul's play, the nuclear debate isn't whether a lone large reactor (or an equivalent brace of smaller ones) can cut carbon emissions. It's whether a state grid anchored by nuclear power and supplemented by renewables can outperform a solar-plus-wind-plus-hydro electricity system alone. Moreover, by setting an ambitious goal, New York State is no longer relegating the nuclear option to standalone, hence politically vulnerable, reactors but is pursuing just the type of holistic cost-reducing strategy that undergirded France's early successful nuclear program and underlies South Korea's current one. In addition, the proposal's big reach could shine a spotlight on reactor benefits and finally turn the page from long-expired nuclear myths. **The "Vogtle" fiasco isn't destiny** For decades, investments in U.S. nuclear power were stymied by memories of a 1979 slow-drip reactor meltdown that turned [a Jane Fonda movie released just days earlier](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0078966/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into prophecy, petrified opinion-makers in New York and decision-makers in Washington, heaped the nuclear industry with ridicule and soon saddled it with budget-breaking design changes. But the Three Mile Island calamity dates back almost half-a-century, a generation or two before Bitcoin, iPhones and Instagram. In the years since then, U.S. reactors have racked up nearly 20 times as much operating experience — every bit of it trouble-free. Today's scary scenario, endlessly flogged by opponents, concerns a *financial* meltdown at [Vogtle 3 & 4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vogtle%5FElectric%5FGenerating%5FPlant?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a grossly over-budget nuclear construction project in Georgia. Those overruns bankrupted the venerable Westinghouse Electric Corp. and are today burdening electricity consumers across Georgia — even as the plant itself [dependably churns out](https://world-nuclear.org/nuclear-reactor-database/details/Vogtle-4?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) gobs of carbon-free power. To detractors, Vogtle, the sole brand-new reactor venture to reach fruition in the United States in three decades, is proof positive that dreams of nuclear unaffordability invariably become nightmares. But reactor boosters have been busy dissecting the plant's torturous construction for lessons learned, as in ["Understanding Vogtle,"](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLyouH0mkPJXHR0hKW%5FiLkIBCsu5D5xO2b&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) an epic YouTube conversation between nuclear savant James Krellenstein and podcaster Chris Keefer. (Think "Marty Supreme" for reactor builders, except longer.) I researched nuclear power cost escalation exhaustively in the 1970s and 1980s, publishing [a book](https://www.komanoff.net/nuclear%5Fpower/PPCE%5FSummary.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the subject and representing officials in 15 states whose job it was to make investors pay for the overruns. I consider Vogtle not a harbinger but the death rattle of a cost virus that afflicted the U.S. nuclear sector even before Three Mile Island. Many years ago, what inflated nuclear costs was "the environment of constant change," as a prominent industry rep [termed the regulatory churn](https://inis.iaea.org/records/bzpza-3pn83/preview/10421637.pdf?include%5Fdeleted=0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) arising from one reactor mishap after another. In contrast, costs at Vogtle skyrocketed largely due to the singular blunder of starting major construction [before finishing the design](https://www.publicpowerreview.org/p/debunking-the-latest-antinuclear?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Additional Vogtle cost culprits also seem unlikely to pop up elsewhere: the COVID-19 pandemic hit midway through, atrophying supply chains that are now reviving globally. ## **Positive learning vs. negative** Differences of opinion on future reactor costs turn on disagreements over *learning*. Nuclear detractors look at increasing past costs and [see only "negative learning"](https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/0/896/files/2026/01/NY-Nuclear-Report-1-8-26-FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — costs inexorably rising as more reactors are built. Advocates see those same increases not as inherent in fission as a technology but the result of problems — project mismanagement, design immaturity, shriveled supply chains — that can be understood and fixed. But won't regulatory turbulence re-emerge, destroying the design stability needed to learn from each reactor project to the next? I consider that improbable, not because of potentially supine federal regulation but because of the competence demonstrated by U.S. nuclear builders and operators in the past quarter-century — and, over time, the exhaustion of the pool of mistakes that in the last century emerged one by one in construction or operation, feeding regulatory churn. One additional factor: The antinuclear power movement that once could force action on every reactor document's undotted "i" or uncrossed "t" has shrunk. Anti-nuke salience appears to have dwindled as Three Mile Island (and Chernobyl and Fukushima, not to mention Hiroshima and Nagasaki) have receded; as nuclear power's immense climate benefit comes to trump its hypothetical drawbacks; and as the vast quantity of electricity required to electrify everything from cars and trucks to making steel and heating homes outpaces even the fabulous progress in renewable energy and grid management. Gov. Hochul is betting that bucking the remnants of antinuke sentiment can deliver her and New York State a big win. Staking the state's energy future to a large new block of nuclear power is a bold environmental and economic gambit. So too was championing congestion pricing. She prevailed in that skirmish. Her chances here look good as well. *You can download a brief Excel sheet with the author's electricity and carbon comparisons* [*here*](https://www.komanoff.net/nuclear%5Fpower/Vital%5FCity%5Fnuke%5Fcalculations.xlsx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Where Juvenile Justice Goes From Here URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/juvenile-justice-close-to-home-nyc-results/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:27.000Z With a [new lawsuit](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/13/nyregion/new-york-children-solitary-confinement.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) alleging unconstitutional conditions in state youth facilities, calls to try more children as adults and [more than $1 billion](https://imprintnews.org/top-stories/new-yorks-raise-the-age-fund-receives-more-money-while-hundreds-of-millions-remain-unspent/249024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) sitting unused in a state fund to launch programs to help rehabilitate young people to which New York City has been denied access, youth justice is at an inflection point in the state and city. At such times, it's crucial that policymakers not only improve public safety, but treat young people humanely. When the City and State confronted a similar watershed moment 15 years ago, the changes we enacted — reducing youth incarceration and funding a raft of rehabilitative programs — reduced youth crime and improved decency in ways that reverberate to this day. ## An inflection point I know an inflection point when I see one. Around 2010, it was a watershed time for youth justice in New York. I was the City's Probation Commissioner then, and my colleagues and I had to wrestle with decisions not unlike those confronting the city and state today. In 2009, like today, the state's Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) had been sued — back then by the U.S. Department of Justice and Legal Aid — after the [2007 in-custody death](https://www.nyclu.org/press-release/childs-death-raises-concerns-about-procedures-and-oversight-ny-prison-facility-boys?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of a 15-year-old boy from the Bronx; he'd been killed in a harsh takedown by staff in the notorious Tryon Residential Center outside Albany. That happened within a year of a [scathing ACLU/Human Rights Watch report](https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/girls-abused-new-yorks-juvenile-prisons-say-aclu-and-human-rights-watch?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the girls' portion of Tryon. The same month that OCFS was sued, a gubernatorial task force [found](https://vera-institute.files.svdcdn.com/production/downloads/publications/Charting-a-new-course-A-blueprint-for-transforming-juvenile-justice-in-New-York-State.pdf?dm=1647370720&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "New York's juvenile justice system is failing in its mission to nurture and care for young people in state custody … \[damaging\] the future prospects of these young people, wast\[ing\] millions of taxpayer dollars, and violat\[ing\] the fundamental principles of positive youth development." DOJ's investigation [revealed](https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/nyregion/25juvenile.html?scp=1&sq=4%20youth%20prisons%20in%20new%20york&st=cse&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that "Anything from sneaking an extra cookie to initiating a fistfight may result in a full prone restraint with handcuffs … \[leading\] to an alarming number of serious injuries to youth, including concussions, broken or knocked-out teeth, and spiral fractures." OCFS Commissioner Gladys Carrión called her facilities ["toxic"](https://www.villagevoice.com/shutting-upstate-jails-for-city-kids-has-made-a-fiery-bronx-bureaucrat-a-host-of-enemies/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and proceeded to close dozens of them and increase funding for community alternatives. The facilities weren't just dangerous; they were patently failing at their core mission of rehabilitating young people. One 2010 state [report](https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/jj/documents/2010-jjagreport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) revealed an 89% recidivism rate for boys released from OCFS facilities. The coup de grâce for city leaders was the extraordinary, and growing, cost of youth confinement, which city and county leaders shared equally with the State. The cost per child per year to purchase brutality and a 89% recidivism rate was around [$260,000](https://www.aecf.org/blog/new-york-city-youth-to-be-shifted-out-of-state-run-facilities?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Fortunately, those crises spurred policy ingenuity. In December 2010, Mayor Michael Bloomberg toured an OCFS facility with Reverend Al Sharpton and announced a bold proposal. "The current system is not helping kids, it isn't helping taxpayers and it isn't helping public safety," he said. "\[W\]e need to stop sending kids miles away from their families and communities. And, instead, authorize the city to fully operate its own juvenile system here in the five boroughs." With that, a policy known as Close to Home was born. The Mayor tasked his staff to work with the governor's office to draft a bill transferring young people and resources from state to city custody, and had us initiate an intensive planning process to design a system that would remove hundreds of young people from harmful, distant state facilities into a City-run system. The [Dispositional Reform Steering Committee](https://www.nyc.gov/html/prob/downloads/pdf/reinvisioning%5Fjuvenile%5Fjustice%5Freport%5Frevised.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), co-chaired by Administration for Children's Services Commissioner Ron Richter and me, included representation from the City Council and the Mayor's Office, along with judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, police, education specialists, mental health professionals and advocates. With consultation from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Vera Institute of Justice and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, we conducted a deep dive into the City's youth justice data and looked at best practices nationally, even conducting site visits with our state counterparts. On the state side, OCFS provided hands-on oversight to ensure program fidelity and quality. OCFS staff supported local providers through training, coaching and technical assistance, helping them adopt best practices in youth-centered, community-based care. The Mayor's Office also regularly convened stakeholders to problem-solve implementation issues alongside OCFS' watchdog role. In the end, when the [Close to Home Act](https://ocfs.ny.gov/programs/rehab/close-to-home/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (C2H) passed in 2012, the State and City amassed huge savings from no longer sending kids to state custody, *plus* [$31 million](https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/funding-added-to-increase-security-at-close-to-home-juvenile-placement-facilities-march-2016.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) annually that the State transferred to the City, generated by savings from having fewer city kids in OCFS facilities. The City used those savings to provide intensive wraparound services near the communities where young people live. The Probation Department also adopted a new risk assessment instrument and state-of-the-art structured decision-making model that judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys had input into. The Administration for Children's Services designed and procured 300 residential beds from 11 different nonprofit organizations in 37 small, homelike facilities in or near the five boroughs. Because we provided judges with expanded options in lieu of commitment, the city was able to reduce by two-thirds the number of youth placed out of home, so most of those beds were never filled. All of that is what policy reform should look like when it's well thought out. There's coordination between agencies and between the City and State, not haphazard, headline-chasing "wins" that ultimately yield no lasting victories. The [outcomes of Close to Home were strong](https://justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/justicelab.columbia.edu/files/content/Justice%20Lab%20C2H%20Case%20Study%20FINAL%20%28Web%20Version%29%20%281%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=State%20OCFS%20juvenile%20facilities.,of%20conditions%20in%20OCFS%20facilities.). Within a few years, the city's juvenile courts placed no young people in state custody, a remarkable achievement for the nation's largest city. By 2016, as outcome data started to roll in, 91% of C2H youth had passed their academic classes; 82% had transitioned from C2H to a parent, other family member or guardian; and 91% were enrolled in community-based programs. The decline in the [city's juvenile arrest rates accelerated](https://justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/justicelab.columbia.edu/files/content/Justice%20Lab%20C2H%20Case%20Study%20FINAL%20%28Web%20Version%29%20%281%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from -24% in the four years preceding C2H's passage to -52% in the four years after its enactment. And of youth released from C2H placements, only 8% had their aftercare revoked for violations of the terms of their release, including rearrests. ## Flash forward Today, although young people make up only 11% of the violent crime arrests in New York City — down slightly from 12% in 2018 before policymakers raised the age of the state's juvenile courts so more young people were retained in the juvenile system — some have [called for trying more children as adults](https://nypost.com/2026/01/06/us-news/prosecutors-demand-changes-to-nys-raise-the-age-law-as-hochul-weighs-proposals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Further, the Administration for Children's Services is spending [$340 million](https://www.nydailynews.com/2023/12/21/nyc-seeks-to-grow-bronx-youth-detention-center-amid-spike-in-juvenile-crime/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to expand the city's juvenile detention capacity by 48 beds. As city and state leaders are poised to undertake expensive and harmful (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has [found](https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609a1.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that trying juveniles as adults increases their recidivism rates by 34%) solutions to perceived youth crime increases, they should look to a time of similar tumult for guidance. Here are a few takeaways from C2H's success story. **Get the right people on the bus** The advocates and City Council could have scuttled C2H legislation. Judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys could have refused to place kids in the new programs. The Department of Education's new school could have failed, or mental health services been inadequate. State and city negotiators could have cared more about turf than kids or public safety. Any of these would have meant more crime, worse outcomes, higher placement rates and an "F" grade for C2H. In "Good to Great*,"* management guru James Collins recommends getting the right people on the bus as a key ingredient to elevating business and government functioning. By bringing diverse stakeholders together and keeping lines of communications open between city and state officials, we not only gained important insights into how this radical new system should function but also garnered significant buy-in from those stakeholders. As his predecessor did with C2H, Mayor Zohran Mamdani should empanel divergent partners into a no-nonsense working group charged with the duty of examining real data (not media-generated hyperbole), costs and realistic options, to chart a course for the future of youth justice in the city that has consensus and can be implemented expeditiously. **Follow the data and best practices (and don't forget to innovate)** There's a need to focus on the small group of the city's young people committing a disproportionate share of very violent crimes. While it's true that there was a doubling of very serious violent juvenile crime arrests from 2018 to 2024, it's also important to [remember](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/reports/nyc-youth-crime-in-context-arrest-recidivism/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that (1) the overall proportion of youth arrests for violent crimes *dropped* slightly during this time and (2) the serious violent crime increase amounts to 334 arrests out of 1.7 million young people under age 18 in the city. Nationally, and here in the city, there's growing progress and innovation focusing on high-risk, hard-to-reach young people. When I was Secretary of Juvenile Services in Maryland, building on research showing that gun violence is concentrated by person and place, Baltimore Mayor Brandon Scott launched a police-based effort to focus resources on people at the highest risk of gun violence in the most violent area in the city, West Baltimore. The University of Pennsylvania's [independent research](https://crimejusticelab.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GVRS-Baltimore-Evaluation-Public-Summary-vFINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that there was a significant decline in gun violence in that neighborhood without displacement to the rest of the city (New York City, in collaboration with John Jay College and neighborhood credible messengers, has recently launched a similarly focused community-based effort in Staten Island). Working with grassroots credible messengers in the four jurisdictions that accounted for 80% of youth homicides in Maryland, my department mirrored that focused, resource-rich approach to youth under our supervision at highest risk of gun violence, launching [The Thrive Academy](https://djs.maryland.gov/Documents/publications/MD-DJS-Thrive-Academy-Joint-Chairmens-Report%5FFY2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In its first two years, *no participating youth* were homicide victims and four out of five had no subsequent gun arrests. UPenn will also independently evaluate Thrive. In March, the [National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform will issue a](https://nicjr.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) report outlining several other programs that combine cognitive behavioral therapy, relentless outreach and robust support services from [Chicago](https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5303292?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to [Oakland](https://www.air.org/resource/brief/implementation-study-findings-neighborhood-opportunity-and-accountability-board?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to [Boston](https://rocainc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to [New York](https://commonjustice.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with impressive results with "HR2" — high risk, hard to reach — youth. As a sign of how salient this population has become nationally, the report is being released on a keynote panel of the [National Conference of Juvenile and Family Court Judges](https://www.ncjfcj.org/event/2026-national-conference-on-juvenile-justice/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which is devoting a track of five additional workshops focused specifically on HR2 youth. New York City has a strong network of organizations with deep roots in communities that work with young people who have had contact with police, including community violence intervention, mentoring and parent support services — services that work for youth and community safety. Unfortunately, this work has been chronically underfunded in New York City. Following the evidence means not only focusing on, but investing in and scaling up projects like these. **Follow the money** Costs to institutionalize young people are extraordinarily high and yield remarkably disappointing outcomes. The annual cost to house a youth for a year in OCFS facilities has grown to nearly [$1 million](https://justicepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Sticker%5FShock%5F2020.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While some young people need to be in custody, confinement should be deployed parsimoniously, only after other options are exhausted. As collaborative as the City-State work was on C2H, that relationship deteriorated badly when Bill de Blasio was mayor and Andrew Cuomo, governor. Governor Cuomo allowed C2H funding to sunset five years after it started even though the State was saving buckets of money by no longer having New York City youth in its custody. That exclusion has persisted for more than a decade, weakening one of the state's most effective youth justice models. Worse, when state lawmakers raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from 16 to 18 in 2018, one of the last states in the nation to do so, *none* [of the $250 million](https://www.cityandstateny.com/opinion/2025/12/opinion-kids-are-alright/409928/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) allocated annually to help localities absorb additional youth into their youth justice systems was allocated to New York City. This exclusion has denied the city, home to the largest share of the state's court-involved young people, the resources necessary to sustain community-based responses and meet the law's goals. The expectation that the City can deliver reform without access to the same funding as every other county is both unrealistic and unjust. The real crisis in youth justice is not these laws; it is the State's persistent failure to fund and implement them equitably. State lawmakers need to redress this childish tiff between the governor's office and the state's largest city by fairly reallocating much of the largely unspent $1.6 billion that has accrued in that fund since Raise the Age was enacted in 2018\. Additionally, passing the proposed [Youth Justice Innovation Fund](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S643?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which would allow nonprofits to apply directly for a portion of those unspent funds, would help jump start innovation and provide much-needed services to young people. In 2010, when the state and city were at a youth justice inflection point, we didn't panic. We governed, acting carefully, decisively and collaboratively to improve youth outcomes, public safety and decency. By contrast, bromides like adding expensive locked beds or prosecuting more kids as adults provide only temporary relief, while the ulcer continues to fester below the surface. Governor Kathy Hochul and Mayor Zohran Mamdani have started on a positive youth justice note, with Hochul withdrawing her support for trying more juveniles as adults. They should now build upon that to make real improvements in safety and youth wellness. ### Evaluating Mamdani’s Diagnosis of New York City’s Budget Deficit URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/eric-adams-zohran-mamdani-nyc-budget/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T20:12:10.000Z With an air of indignation worthy of Captain Renault discovering gambling in the back room of Rick's Café, Mayor Zohran Mamdani announced in a late January City Hall press conference that he was shocked to discover that New York City is facing a deep budget deficit, of approximately $12 billion between the current and upcoming fiscal years. What is surprising about Mamdani's surprise is that New York City's dire fiscal condition has been widely known for the last year but was conveniently ignored by Mamdani and the New York City press corps during the mayoral campaign. Mamdani's close ally, New York City Comptroller Brad Lander, [estimated in August 2025](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/comments-on-new-york-citys-fiscal-year-2026-adopted-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that "the City will end FY 2026 with a gap of $4.2 billion (3.6% of total revenues), growing to $8.8 billion in FY 2027." The [Independent Budget Office](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/city-budget-overview/2025/2025-december-analysis-of-the-november-2025-financial-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the [Citizens Budget Commission](https://cbcny.org/sites/default/files/media/files/CBCPRESENTATION%5FNYC-NYS-FY26-Briefing%5F07172025%5F0%5F0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [New York State Comptroller's](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/reports/osdc/pdf/report-18-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) office issued similar forecasts during 2025. So how did New York City get into this position? Mamdani's explanation at his press conference was simple: the deficit was caused by a combination of "gross fiscal mismanagement" by Mayor Eric Adams and actions taken by former Gov. Andrew Cuomo (before he resigned in August 2021) to take money away from New York City. Mamdani is not entirely incorrect: Adams' budgeting practices and decisions made at the state level both played roles in contributing to the City's budget deficit. However, Mamdani ignores the larger contributors to the City's budget deficit, which he and his political allies had a direct role in creating. At a surface level, the sources of the budget deficit were identified by newly elected City Comptroller Mark Levine in his [FY 27 Budget Preview](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/fy-2027-budget-preview/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as being attributable to the loss of nonrecurring revenue received in prior years that will not be available in FY 27 and, especially, to chronic underbudgeting of expenses by the Adams administration. These two tables from Comptroller Levine succinctly lay out the differences in estimated budget gaps between the last budget of the Adams administration and current estimates and the specific areas of chronic underbudgeting: [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27485946?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27485654?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) But Levine's analysis does not address the *underlying* causes of the City's precarious budget condition. It is also instructive to understand why the City's financial condition is so much worse than that of New York State, which is in unusually good financial condition this year, largely because of a windfall in tax revenue. Two main factors explain why New York State is in a better position than the City in terms of revenue. First, in 2021, New York State increased its personal income tax on high earners (who account for roughly 40% of total income tax revenue in both the City and the State), as well as modestly increasing the State corporate income tax rate, while New York City's personal income and corporate tax rates were not increased. More importantly than the increase in tax rates, New York State benefited from the recent surge in personal income to a greater extent than New York City because a much higher percentage of the State's tax receipts come from personal income taxes (including the Pass-Through Entity Tax) and corporate income taxes than is the case for New York City. These taxes account for [nearly 80% of State tax receipts](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/reports/finance/pdf/2025-financial-condition-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but only for about [35% of City tax receipts](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/FY-2026-Adopted-Budget-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Although New York City's other revenue categories, such as property tax and sales tax, have also been increasing, the rate of personal income and pass-through tax revenue has grown at a higher rate, especially in the last three years, because of the booming stock market. On the expense side, New York City engaged in the unwise practice of using one-time federal pandemic aid to fund ongoing programs, while the State mostly used that revenue to build up reserves. Rather than ending or contracting these programs when the inevitable federal funding cliff arrived, the City just substituted its own funding to keep them going. Perhaps the most prominent example of this was the decision of Mayor Bill de Blasio to use roughly $1 billion in federal pandemic aid to greatly expand the city's 3-K early education program. When the temporary federal funding expired in fiscal year 2024, the City backfilled the spending out of its own budget. The baseline cost of 3-K in New York City is now $1.3 billion. Similarly, the City used temporary federal pandemic aid to expand the number of child care vouchers and subsidized slots. When the funding ran out in September 2024, it created a need for close to $900 million in funding annually [to avoid taking away childcare slots](https://nysfocus.com/2025/03/27/nyc-child-care-voucher-900-million?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The City effectively held these slots hostage to negotiate additional funding from the State. Ultimately, the State provided $350 million in additional funding in the FY 2026 enacted budget, but still stuck the City with the obligation to increase its own spending for this purpose by $350 million while accepting an increased City maintenance of effort requirement for child care spending of an additional $328 million. An even larger contributor to the City's current fiscal distress was the City Council's creation of new programs which New York City's tax base could not support. Ironically, in light of Mamdani making Adams the fall guy for the City's budget problems, Adams sought to resist a number of these expanded spending programs while Mamdani supported them. The most expensive of these new initiatives was the expansion by the City Council of the City's rental subsidy program, known as CityFHEPS. The original objective of the program is to prevent evictions by providing taxpayer-funded rental subsidies as a last resort to prevent homelessness. The cost of the CityFHEPS program was exploding even before the City Council adopted legislation to lower these barriers to entry and, in effect, create a massive new entitlement program to rental subsidies. As [noted by Comptroller Brad Lander in 2025](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/comments-on-new-york-citys-fiscal-year-2026-adopted-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Adams administration "estimated that expanding the eligibility rules would increase City costs by $17.2 billion over five years… \[while\] \[t\]he City Council estimated the cost of the package of laws over five years at $10.6 billion." Although the increased costs of the CityFHEPS expansion were repeatedly cited by both critics and supporters of the expansion bill, Mamdani supported the expansion while in the Assembly and pledged to implement it if elected mayor. Comptroller Levine estimates that the cost of the expanded CityFHEPS program in FY 27 will be approximately $2.5 billion, of which $2.0 billion is not reflected in the Adams administration budget. That's a significant sum, even in a budget that likely will exceed $120 billion. And as with child care slots, once awarded, the benefit will be hard to take away. Finally, another source of the City's current budget problems involves unfunded mandates from the state. The most prominent example was the law ordering the City to slash class sizes across the board, an initiative that the Independent Budget Office estimated will ultimately require New York City to spend approximately $1.6-$1.9 billion to be in compliance, in addition to requiring capital costs — bringing new classrooms online — that have been estimated to be well in excess of $10 billion. Levine's analysis estimated that the class-size reduction will cost New York City more than $500 million in FY 27 and more than $1 billion in FY 28 and going forward. As an assemblyman, Mamdani voted for the bill lowering class sizes and pledged to implement it as a candidate for mayor regardless of whether the State provided additional funding. While the fiscal vise tightened, the Adams administration avoided the day of reckoning mostly by aggressive cash management — using reserves from prior years, allowing unprecedented staffing vacancy levels in City agencies (which undermined operational performance) and stretching payment terms almost beyond the breaking point with the not-for-profit sector that delivers much of the City's social services. So while it's true that while Adams' budgeting practices didn't help, neither did a series of policy choices made by Mamdani's allies and supported by Mamdani himself. \*\*\* What of former Gov. Cuomo's role, who Mamdani blamed for the City's budget deficit along with Mayor Adams? (Disclosure: I served in the Cuomo administration in various capacities, and served as a policy advisor in his mayoral campaign.) Mamdani claims that the city is in this fix in large part because Cuomo reduced funding for various city programs between 2011 and 2021, in actions "too numerous to mention." One example Mamdani often cited during his campaign was New York State's 2011 decision to reduce funding for the Advantage rental subsidy program by $65 million. Cherry-picking individual perceived fiscal slights, however, ignores the bigger picture — namely, that state funding to the city has been growing and growing over the years. Under Cuomo, the aggregate funding increase and budget relief for New York City between 2011 and 2021 was approximately $15 billion — which then increased by another nearly $5 billion between 2021 and 2025\. One of the most significant sources of that increased funding was actually budget relief offered to the City by reducing its required contribution to Medicaid. The Cuomo administration froze the local contribution to Medicaid beginning in 2015\. By 2021, that action reduced New York City's required Medicaid contribution by more than $3 billion annually. That annual benefit is now $5 billion annually. That alone dwarfs the cost of any other individual program reductions to New York City over the last 10 years. \*\*\* Mamdani's larger argument is that New York City does not receive its "fair share" of total State funding, a disparity that he said needs correcting. But even establishing the baseline facts for this discussion is less straightforward than you might think. In his press conference, the mayor asserted that "New Yorkers contribute 54.5% of state revenue and receive only 40.5% back." However, as [EJ McMahon of the Empire Center](https://x.com/EjmEj/status/2016571700243058913?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), among others, points out, Mayor Mamdani's figure includes personal income taxes paid by commuters into New York City. Tax payments from New York City residents alone account for approximately [46.7%](https://islg.cuny.edu/blog/fiscal-flow-nyc-albany-press-release?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of total State tax revenue and a better estimate is that New York City receives back approximately [41%](https://islg.cuny.edu/blog/fiscal-flow-nyc-albany-press-release?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of State tax revenue. That is a much smaller difference in the "balance of payments" than Mamdani asserts. But what constitutes New York City's "fair share" of state revenue? Part of the point of taxation is redistribution — between income groups and between geographic areas that have more resources to those with less ability to meet their own needs. It's a truism to note that Blue states send more to the federal government than they receive back, but few would argue for dollar-for-dollar distribution parity. In terms of the relative financial strength of the City and the State, there have been several "reversals of fortune" between the City and the State over the last 50 years. During the New York City fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, the State stepped in to provide more support for New York City. To name one example, in 1976, it assumed full responsibility for the governmental funding of CUNY's senior colleges, which now stands at approximately $2.5 billion annually, while New York City spends approximately $600 million annually almost entirely for CUNY community colleges. Beginning with the Bloomberg administration, those fortunes shifted. New York City was in a stronger financial position and was able to increase spending at a higher rate than the State for nearly a dozen years. Since the COVID pandemic, for the reasons described above, the relative financial fortunes of the City and State have shifted once again. Today, in light of the State's stronger relative financial position, there clearly is no justification for unfunded State mandates like the small class size law, which applies only to New York City. \*\*\* A paradox of Mayor Mamdani's press conference is that while he complained about the budgeting process of the Adams administration, he would cite only trivial examples of spending decisions of the Adams administration that he would have made differently. As a result, most observers who have commented on the press conference have concluded that its primary purpose is to pressure the State to adopt Mamdani's campaign goals of increasing New York City income taxes and State corporate income taxes, with the proceeds directed to the City. Suffice to say that calling for these taxes to keep the lights on is a less compelling proposition than using the tax increases to fund bold new initiatives. Mamdani pledged to introduce a balanced budget, which is his legal responsibility, but he deferred until the release of his Preliminary Budget later this month the identification of any meaningful spending reductions, although he did suggest that the City might slow down the CityFHEPS expansion. He also pledged to work hard to find "efficiencies" in City government. Last week, after the press conference, he [signed an executive order](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-signs-executive-order-to-require-chief-savings-off?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to create "Chief Savings Officer" in every City agency. It's a good idea at the start of an administration to embark on a serious effort to identify operating efficiencies and program-savings opportunities. At the beginning of the Cuomo administration in 2011, I led an initiative called the Spending and Government Efficiency (SAGE) commission. We issued a report two years later that identified $1.6 billion in potential savings initiatives. Many of these initiatives were adopted while others were not. But the analysis that went into the Final Report (which ran to more than 100 pages) by itself helped the public better understand these issues and their impact on the Budget — something Mamdani said was one of his goals. Particularly if the City is willing to make ambitious use of AI and to take on sacred cows that inflate the cost of government, it should be possible to achieve meaningful savings and reduce the need to cut core programs. The obstacles to achieving these reforms are daunting, but if New York City is in a budget crisis, as Mayor Mamdani insists is the case, then why not take the attitude that "a crisis is a terrible thing to waste" and embark on an ambitious plan to make New York City's operations and spending programs more efficient? ### Continue Encampment Sweeps — But Do Them Right URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/unhoused-new-yorkers-randy-santos-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:27.000Z The trial for Randy Rodriguez Santos, the man accused of murdering four unhoused New Yorkers in 2019, is [underway](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/27/nyregion/santos-murder-homeless-chintatown-trial.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This case is horrific, but the violent death of people living on the streets is unsurprising. It happens all too frequently. The danger of being unsheltered has been compounded recently by the deep winter freeze. As many as 16 New Yorkers (as of this writing) have died as a result of the extreme cold. While we don't know their living situations, it's reasonable to assume that at least some were unhoused. Living on the streets is dangerous, whether you live alone or you live with one or more people in what is typically referred to as an encampment. This behavior also impacts all New Yorkers. Neighborhood residents and businesses are concerned about people living on the streets, and particularly by encampments. Expectedly, this issue was raised during the recent mayoral campaign. Then-candidate Zohran Mamdani made clear he rejects the blunt-force tactic of dismantling encampments without viable alternatives and he put efforts to address encampments on hold. This is the position he continues to take as mayor. Recently, he said, "the heart of this has to be the connection with services that they want, that they will use, that they will actually utilize." That perspective is right, but it shouldn't prevent us from addressing encampments. Indeed, the city should dismantle encampments — *and* connect those in encampments to the services and housing they want and need. We can't see this issue as an either/or proposition: either we prioritize clearing encampments over the needs and preferences of individual people, or we let people live in encampments as long as they prefer to. If we care about people and care about the city, we should not accept encampments as a permanent feature of urban life. It is not humane to allow people to live this way; it robs people of their dignity and puts their lives at risk. New York can and has done better than either letting people struggle in encampments or evicting them without providing an alternative, safe place to go. I have seen a different approach work, one that balances the needs of individual people with the understanding that encampments are bad for everyone. ## The risks of living on the streets According to the [National Bureau of Economic Research](https://www.nber.org/digest/202402/estimating-mortality-rates-us-homeless-population?page=1&perPage=50&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), mortality rates for unhoused people are 3.5 times higher than for housed individuals. Furthermore, according to the National Health Care for the Homeless Council, [traumatic injury is the second leading cause of death](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working%5Fpapers/w31843/w31843.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) among unhoused people under the age of 45, and people who live on the streets die on an average of 20 years earlier than people who are housed. We shouldn't just be concerned about higher premature deaths. People who live on the streets, according to the [Centers for Disease Control](https://www.cdc.gov/homelessness-and-health/about/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), experience higher rates of infectious and non-infectious diseases such as hepatitis, tuberculosis, HIV, diabetes, heart disease and more. Allowing people to live on the streets results in worse health, and therefore, unnecessary serious struggle and suffering. Nearly 20 years ago, when I was serving as an assistant commissioner at the New York City Department of Homeless Services under Mayor Bloomberg, encampments were a visible and growing concern. We faced many of the same challenges we see today: people who had been living outside for years, deep mistrust of government, untreated mental illness, substance use and a shelter system that too often felt ill-suited to people's needs. We understood that our choice wasn't between letting encampments languish and callously uprooting people with force. Rather, we created a dynamic, citywide list of encampments, informed by outreach teams, community members and other agencies. Each site became a focus of coordinated interagency work. Outreach providers took the lead, and they were supported by housing specialists, health professionals and city agencies responsible for the physical space itself. Crucially, we started with the people. Outreach teams spent time understanding who was living in each encampment and what they wanted. Not what was easiest for the system — but what would actually work for them. Did they want to move directly to permanent housing? Transitional housing? Which borough? Did they want roommates or privacy? Were there medical needs that had gone unaddressed for years? Plans were built person by person. Timelines were set based on readiness and available options. Outreach happened every day leading up to a move. Housing placements were often secured before an encampment was formally cleared. This was time-intensive and personnel-intensive work, and it was not perfect. Some people declined help. Some moved to another outdoor setting. But many ended up inside, in settings that made sense for them, with their belongings and dignity preserved. And critically, the City did not simply walk away afterward. Teams returned regularly to prevent repopulation and to make physical improvements like better lighting, repaired fencing and safer design that reduced the likelihood that encampments would re-form. Street homelessness [declined by 40% from 2006 to 2011](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704463804576291441663287036?gaa%5Fat=eafs&gaa%5Fn=AWEtsqdxNIO%5FL62fgDg2HBlZ2QyGAymwIUmYGZJ35rHQ96qXpepX9AFIzSJlEiZwJYU%3D&gaa%5Fts=6980c2f2&gaa%5Fsig=6y-d6yAKXNAxeFv1Vz1Q9JbReuYh4ArJRXgP9yBehBMNZ-I7fWUJ1MjCaLFbzF%5FimnR3OHifOjBT0-%5FSS3F1vw%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) because we were serious and deliberate about getting results. ## Compassion requires accountability One of the reasons this approach worked was that it was grounded in clear accountability. There was a single point of responsibility for street homelessness. Outreach providers were expected to produce outcomes. City agencies were expected to coordinate. And City Hall was paying attention. Over the years, fidelity to this model eroded as the political and policy approach shifted between the administrations and resource investment made responsibility more diffuse. The result has been more visible street homelessness, more encampments and more people struggling and at increased risk of dying early through violence or as a result of health challenges or extreme weather. The Mamdani administration has an opportunity to advance a humane, disciplined approach that aligns with its values. Importantly, New York now has far more, and better, options to offer people than it did two decades ago. Innovations under multiple administrations have helped fill out the continuum of care. De Blasio-era investments in [Intensive Mobile Treatment](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/program/intensive-mobile-treatment-imt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) created new pathways for people with serious mental illness who were failed by traditional programs. NYC Health + Hospitals has [expanded medical respite](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/mayor-eric-adams-nyc-health-hospitals-ceo-dr-katz-announce-expansion-of-innovative-program-to-keep-more-medically-vulnerable-homeless-new-yorkers-out-of-shelters/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [bridge-to-home](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/mayor-adams-and-nyc-health-hospitals-celebrate-opening-of-bridge-to-home-facility/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) programs that allow people to recover safely after hospitalization rather than being discharged back to the street. And recent state investments have brought new crisis and stabilization options into the system. Programs like SOS teams, short-term transitional units, and [ICL's STEPS](https://iclinc.org/institute-for-community-living-report-shows-new-program-increased-capacity-to-serve-new-yorkers-with-the-most-significant-mental-health-challenges-including-individuals-living-on-streets-and-subways/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) now exist to serve people with the highest acuity in the ways that best fit their individual needs. The issue today is not a lack of options. It is prioritization and coordination. People living in encampments should be offered choice and the resources they need and want. ## A both/and strategy A humane approach to encampments rests on a few core principles: First, we should be clear that encampments are not an acceptable outcome. People deserve better than a tent and a shopping cart, especially in a city with New York's resources. Second, clearing encampments must be inseparable from offering real, desirable alternatives that reflect people's needs and preferences. Third, outreach must be persistent, well-supported and accountable for outcomes. Fourth, the City must invest in preventing encampments from re-forming through design, ongoing outreach and rapid response. It is a people-first strategy that takes people seriously enough to insist on better. Mayor Mamdani is right that connection to services and housing must be at the heart of the City's response. But that connection must be paired with a clear commitment to ending street homelessness. New York has done this before. We have the values, experience, the infrastructure, and the tools to do it again. ### Technology Transformation Will Make or Break Progressive Governance URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdani-technology-innovation-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z Mayor Zohran Mamdani swept to victory on transformative promises: 200,000 units of affordable housing, free buses, universal childcare, City-run grocery stores. These can't be delivered by pushing harder on institutions without rebuilding the underlying machinery. Take affordable housing: projects need [four to eight years](https://thenyhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/NYHC-Tracker-2025-SpecialReport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=5) of approvals, financing and construction before move-in; November's Charter reforms [should shave six months](https://www.rosenbergestis.com/media/blog/industry-updates/nyc-voters-approve-significant-changes-to-accelerate-land-use-approvals?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) off those numbers. Making buses free could well lead to overcrowded routes, which likely requires hiring drivers — a huge challenge given that exams are only administered[ every 18 months](https://www.mta.info/careers/bus-operator?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A City-run grocery store, staffed and supplied through [standard civil service](https://www.eatingpolicy.com/p/robert-mosess-unfinished-business?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and procurement, would be lucky to open within three years. These would be constraints even in perfect political conditions, but the mayor faces headwinds that make his recent predecessors' playbook — coasting on growth while avoiding trade-offs — untenable. A [$12 billion inherited deficit](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-details--adams-budget-crisis-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) means Mamdani must wring efficiency from existing systems just to sustain current services, let alone deliver new ones. Which is precisely why Mamdani should overhaul the city's back-office IT department, the Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI), into a transformation engine with the authority, talent and political mandate to accelerate delivery across his entire agenda. ## **Technology as the unlock** City government as currently structured operates on timelines that delay or kill ambition. A few examples among many: Taking publicly funded affordable housing from first concepts to occupancy averages over [10 years](https://www.fasterhousing.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Neighborhood-scale rezonings, like Long Island City's recently approved [OneLIC](https://qns.com/2025/11/city-council-approves-onelic-neighborhood-plan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and its promised 15,000 units, regularly involve [a decade](https://qns.com/2017/11/plaxall-family-aims-revamp-long-island-citys-anable-basin-ambitious-15-year-project/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of negotiation, even if the Governor's [proposed SEQRA reforms](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/let-them-build-governor-hochul-unveils-landmark-reforms-cut-red-tape-and-build-more-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) pass. The tech sector has solutions that can help collapse such timelines. Some are big bets: modular construction can [erect housing in days](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OwfILenBS0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), digital twins can integrate real-time, citywide conditions to [increase bus speeds](https://www.digitalbluefoam.com/post/exploring-digital-twin-in-traffic-management-for-smart-transportation-systems?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#toc-singapore%E2%80%99s-intelligent-transport-system), autonomous buses [could run continuously](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/consortium-wins-8-1m-contract-to-deploy-driverless-public-buses-in-marina-bay-one-north-from-2026?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) without driver overtime, [warehouse robotics](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79tJIM8X6k4&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) could automate grocery logistics. AI implementations could have shorter horizons: [flagging compliance errors](https://www.gov.ca.gov/2025/04/30/governor-newsom-announces-launch-of-new-ai-tool-to-supercharge-the-approval-of-building-permits-and-speed-recovery-from-los-angeles-fires/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) before applicants submit and [approving straightforward permits](https://bakersfieldnow.com/news/local/bakersfield-launches-ai-powered-instant-permitting-system?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in minutes. AI can likewise empower the new [Office of Mass Engagement](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-establishes-office-of-mass-engagement-to-transform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to translate a city's worth of public input into consensus. Beginning to think through these tech propositions, big or small, exposes the daunting complexity of deploying such systems inside government. Each demands specialized technological expertise, comprehended and coordinated across agencies, and none fits neatly into existing city procedures, norms, skill sets or budgets. If AI opportunity in government, for one, is to match the accelerating hype, a confident institution must move with urgency, not let cautious process dictate agenda success. Without a deeper reconstruction, Mamdani's agenda will die a slow death within the bureaucracy he inherits. ## Rebuilding New York's transformation engine New York City already has the theoretical capacity to make this leap. OTI emerged at the [outset of the Adams administration](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2022/01/executive-order-3?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a consolidation of the city's IT department (DoITT) and NYPD Cyber Command with the Mayor's Offices of Data Analytics and the chief technology officer. His transition team's vision was to create a citywide innovation hub — one that would prototype, de-risk and accelerate technology adoption across all agencies. But that vision has so far failed spectacularly. Without direct mayoral backing and authority to override agency resistance, OTI became another siloed IT department, at times even adding procedural layers, such as the still unfinished [Critical Application Portfolio review](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/oti/downloads/pdf/about/strategic-plan-2022.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=19), which has effectively frozen agency software installations. It has not challenged citywide practices, stepped on commissioners' toes or pursued the grander vision of using technology and innovation to fundamentally transform government operations. Instead, under a CTO pulled from law enforcement, OTI [killed](https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-kills-internet-master-plan-for-universal-public-web-access?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) universal broadband in favor of corporate subsidies, alienating and eventually driving out the agency's civically-minded technologists. To fill the tech talent void, the agency pivoted to a sprawling network of vendors to build the flagship "MyCity" portal for New Yorkers to access everything from traffic tickets to school report cards. The result, however, has been a $100 million [boondoggle](https://nysfocus.com/2025/03/19/mycity-eric-adams-child-care?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) delivering a fraction of its promise. OTI can still become a transformation engine and durable vector for delivering Mamdani's agenda. There are precedents worth emulating in other cities. One is Boston's in-house civic innovation lab, the Mayor's Office of New Urban Mechanics, which describes its limited role as "[performing acupuncture](https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/file/2025/12/2025%20MONUM%20and%20Analytics%20Year%20in%20Review%5F0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=2)" on existing systems. Pennsylvania's [Office of Transformation & Opportunity](https://responsivegov.org/research/pennsylvania-red-tape-reduction-a-case-study/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) frames its mission as shepherding businesses through bureaucracy rather than building new institutional capacity. As Jennifer Pahlka, who led the Healthcare.gov rescue and helped launch the U.S. Digital Service, [recognizes](https://www.eatingpolicy.com/p/bringing-elon-to-a-knife-fight?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), achieving transformation requires an institution empowered to remake government itself. Those are models of what OTI, properly reimagined, can and should become in Mamdani's New York. ## What overhaul looks like Previous transformation attempts have foundered because tech offices can't hire tech talent themselves or spur other agencies to do so, nor do they have leverage over agencies to rewrite procedure, influence contract structure or force in-house development over established vendors. Overhauling OTI means first installing leadership with real authority — a commissioner with explicit mayoral backing to override agency objections and the courage to use it. That leader should then go out and get talent through every available channel: fellowships like [Urban Innovation Fellows](https://urban.tech.cornell.edu/urban-innovation-fellows/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and Bloomberg Philanthropies' [i-team](https://www.bloomberg.org/government-innovation/spurring-innovation-in-cities/i-teams-and-innovation-programs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [USDS](https://www.usds.gov/how-we-work?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)\-style tours of service and talent sharing with [agencies](https://edc.nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) operating outside of civil service. A model worth following for deploying that talent is [New Jersey's Office of Innovation](https://innovation.nj.gov/blog/2026-01-12-BNJlessons-part2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which embeds five-person innovation teams within city agencies to build high-impact tools and implement new processes. From there, a reinvigorated OTI should assert control over how the City buys technology and hires technologists, coordinating or absorbing functions now fragmented across the Mayor's Office of Contract Services, the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Citywide Administrative Services. [Deeper structural reforms to civil service rules](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-yorks-mamdani-ny-civil-service-system) and union contracts will require legislation and years of negotiation, and will provoke resistance. But a capable OTI need not wait. It can collapse permitting timelines, accelerate procurement and build tools that multiply agency capacity now, and push further as constraints loosen. Every OTI action should be aimed at delivering tangible benefits, not press release headlines. Digital governance leaders Estonia and Ukraine grounded their transformations in refreshingly [ambitious public targets](https://agenticstate.org/paper.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#introduction): putting 100% of services online, enabling one-minute interactions between the public and agencies and more. Equivalent targets in New York would be metrics such as halving housing start times, eliminating bus bunching and launching City-run grocery stores within a year while keeping them fully stocked. Mamdani insists government should be ["wedded to outcomes, not process"](https://www.derekthompson.org/p/what-speaks-to-me-about-abundance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); he must now use the communication prowess that made affordability a winning issue to show New Yorkers, and crucially, labor unions, that transcending old procedures means more jobs, more opportunity and a more livable city. Along the way, OTI should leverage technology's ability to promote transparency and give New Yorkers more meaningful ways to shape what's being built. Few will fault him for bold, [Hamiltonian](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/03/opinion/trump-liberals-government.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) attempts to consolidate the authority needed to bring about positive change. All will notice his grand promises going unfulfilled. ## The closing window The challenges Mamdani has chosen to take on are elemental: more affordable groceries means making it easier for people to feed their families; free childcare means giving parents a better chance to land a job and cheaper, more abundant housing means not being forced out of the city that raised you. Unfortunately, inertial forces threaten to strangle his attempts. The question is whether Mamdani will target these structural barriers quickly enough. The alternative is settling into the existing systems and hoping that this time will somehow be different. For the New Yorkers who elected him on transformational promises, hoping isn't enough. The machinery must be rebuilt, and that work can't start soon enough. ### Reducing Crime by Improving Neighborhoods URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/renita-francois-interview-neighborhood-safety/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:27.000Z *In the transition to a new city administration, the spotlight often falls on big promises — from making buses free to creating a brand-new Department of Community Safety. But as New York looks to innovate, it doesn't have to start from scratch. The building blocks for a more holistic, resident-driven approach to public safety already exist in the city's recent history.* *On this episode of After Hours, Jamie Rubin sits down with two architects of that history: Elizabeth Glazer, former head of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, and Renita Francois, former executive director of the Mayor's Action Plan for Neighborhood Safety (MAP).* *Together, they dive into the legacy of Neighborhood Stat — a model that treated safety not just as a matter for the police, but as a joint project involving sanitation, parks, and, most importantly, the residents themselves. From clearing needles in the South Bronx to build "serenity gardens" to using asset forfeiture for community reinvestment, Francois and Glazer argue that true safety is found in the details of the physical environment and the strength of local trust.* *As the Mamdani administration begins its work, Glazer and Francois offer a roadmap for "putting the public back in public safety" and a cautionary tale about why the data that drives these decisions must never be allowed to go dormant.* *You can listen to this episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/reducing-crime-by-improving-neighborhoods/id1794619189?i=1000746961580&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/5bDoU1pIXZarh35ucsMOdA?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Observation Decks for All New Yorkers URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/free-observation-decks-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z Of all the movie scenes set in New York City, my favorite is from "The Muppets Take Manhattan." About to give up on his New York dream, Kermit takes a trip up to the observation deck of the Empire State Building — where he has a change of heart. I'm staying!" he shouts to the city below: "You hear that New York? The Frog is staying!" So many New Yorkers know what it's like to feel down, out and hopeless, but to draw the inspiration you need from the city. You might get that inspiration from a friend, a neighbor, a stranger on the subway … or you might get it from the top of the Empire State Building. I don't know what income bracket the frog falls in, but could Kermit even afford to visit the top of Empire State today? Or would he take a look at the admission charge, swallow hard and pack his bags to head back to the swamp? When the Empire State Building opened in 1931, [a ticket up to the observation deck cost a dollar](https://time.com/5955419/empire-state-building-history/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). By 1984 (when "The Muppets Take Manhattan" came out), it was up to $2.75\. Today that's a little more than half the cost of the $5 add-on transaction fee. The cheapest ticket itself is $44, an increase over five times the rate of inflation since Kermit made his trip. And it's not just the Empire State Building — the other large observation decks, from the World Trade to Hudson Yards to Rockefeller Center, have comparable prices. Mayor Mamdani got elected largely on promises to address four key areas of expense for large numbers of New Yorkers: rent, food, transportation and childcare. The focus on these is admirable, and vitally necessary if New York is going to stay a leading global metropolis. But New Yorkers also deserve to enjoy their city, not just be content with putting food on the table and a roof over their head. Things that used to be an occasional treat for a typical family — a [ballgame](https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/04/business/its-not-just-the-super-bowl-going-to-a-game-is-becoming-unaffordable?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [a show](https://www.theatermania.com/news/story-of-the-week-why-are-broadway-ticket-prices-so-high%5F1768215/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a trip to the top of the Empire State — have become increasingly out of reach. Mamdani's focus on things like the cost of World Cup tickets or having a beer at Yankee Stadium demonstrates that he understands this basic dynamic. But while it's harder to see what city government can do to bring down the price of an international event in a New Jersey Stadium, the City does play an enormous role in making sure that New Yorkers have places of wonder and relaxation, pride and comfort, open and available to all. Upon appointing a new parks commissioner, Mamdani recently noted that, "In a city where almost everything costs something, our parks are … the rare corner of our city that are truly accessible and affordable to each and every person who calls the city home." This is because our parks are municipally owned. Most other examples of these corners of accessibility and affordability are also due to the public sector. For instance, the Metropolitan Museum of Art's "pay what you want" policy (although now only offered to New York State residents) is largely the result of the leverage the City holds as owner of the land that it sits on. Where costs have grown prohibitive is where the public sector isn't involved. Despite four large observation decks opening in the last 20 years, and one more (1 Times Square) soon to come, admission charges continue to skyrocket. No, I'm not about to argue that City Hall should take over the Empire State Building. Rather, we should use creative approaches to create free access to observation decks for all, taking the chances we have to add to these rare corners. My organization, [Regional Plan Association](http://www.rpa.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), looks at ways, big and small, to improve the quality of life for everyone in the tristate area. We first [proposed a free public observation deck](http://fourthplan.org/action/public-space-in-core?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in our 2017 [Fourth Regional Plan](http://fourthplan.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a long-term vision for improving equity, health, sustainability and prosperity in the region. Here's three ways we could go about it. First, we can leverage our land-use authority. The most illustrative example of this is offered by our neighbors across the pond. London, a city no less expensive than New York, has managed to open three [free](https://horizon22.co.uk/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [observation](https://skygarden.london/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [decks](https://www.8bishopsgate.com/lookout?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with views to rival those from its tallest building, the Shard. Reservations need to be made in advance, but they are free, open to all and generally available with a little planning ahead. The formula was simple: New skyscrapers needed planning permission to be built, and the City asked for these decks as a condition of that approval. According to Peter Rees, the former City Planning Officer for the City of London, "we made it clear we expected freely-accessible public facilities at the base and apex of the new towers. The result was a group of buildings that have free public sky-gardens or viewing platforms at the top." In New York, where new skyscrapers also often need some kind of municipal approval, a similar bargain could easily be struck. Second, we could negotiate with one of the existing observation decks to provide free access. We already provide free or discounted tickets and membership to 27 different New York cultural institutions through IDNYC — how about for one (or more) of our observation decks too? Lastly, the City itself owns several buildings. None of them feature the spectacular vistas of an Empire State Building, but all are still great options that would provide unique and inspiring views. The Municipal Building, whose deck has [been open before on special occasions like Open House New York](https://tribecacitizen.com/2017/10/16/show-us-your-roof-the-municipal-building/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), is the best and most likely candidate. Or we could go even bigger — why not do a bridge climb of one of the East River Bridges, similar to the [Sydney Harbor Bridge Climb](https://www.bridgeclimb.com/climb-the-iconic-sydney-harbour-bridge/?utm%5Fsource=google&utm%5Fmedium=cpc&gad%5Fsource=1&gad%5Fcampaignid=16508281869&gbraid=0AAAAAD1RBrJ46Gys5XuEEhleQPQD%5FZayP&gclid=CjwKCAiA95fLBhBPEiwATXUsxMVPSYrBv9KlUMm20vM%5F3e-8uQ0RoL4d1WvqWnvA7CHDbpYijyqjEhoCT-0QAvD%5FBwE&code=usd)? If there is one thing we've learned from the most recent election, it's that we don't have to be content in our ambitions when it comes to a more affordable New York City. "For too long in our city, freedom has belonged only to those who can afford to buy it," Mayor Mamdani said in his inaugural address. "Our City Hall will change that." The sky's the limit. ### Tokyo and London are Test-Driving Waymo. New York, Take Notes. URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/waymo-robotaxi-autonomous-driving-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z New Yorkers who travel to places like San Francisco, Austin, Phoenix and Atlanta might do double-takes, seeing fleets of cars with no driver at the wheel. Thousands more have watched viral videos of robotaxis, typically gliding down wide and sunlit boulevards, wondering if and when we'll be able to summon one ourselves, with fascination and/or anxiety. Waymo and its competitors have spent years refining autonomous vehicles in the Sun Belt, where streets are wide, weather is favorable and pedestrians are relatively sparse. (The exception is San Francisco, which can still hit the mark on wide streets and decent weather, at least more so than New York.) A robotaxi's ability to navigate a Phoenix arterial in perfect weather does not mean it is ready for Midtown gridlock in sleet, double-parked delivery trucks and cyclists threading the needle. Yet those are the conditions that will define success or failure in New York City. Scale offers another reality check: Waymo trips in all the cities where it currently operates totaled 64,000 per day, [a peak reached](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/08/waymo-paid-rides-robotaxi-tesla.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in November — the most recent data available. However, that's less than 8% of daily trips in New York's taxi and high-volume ridehail vehicles (a total of 830,984 trips, [according to NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission data](https://www.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/aggregated-reports.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from November 2025). Making a meaningful dent in New York's ridehail economy, if that's the goal, will require vastly more vehicles, trips and experience in navigating urban traffic. Soon, Waymos might be only a Metro-North ride away. As New York State [moves to legalize robotaxis outside the five boroughs](https://www.google.com/search?q=new+york+state+hochul+robotaxis&rlz=1C5CHFA%5FenUS1075US1075&oq=new+york+state+hochul+robotaxis&gs%5Flcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRigATIHCAIQIRigATIHCAMQIRigATIHCAQQIRigATIHCAUQIRigATIHCAYQIRiPAtIBCDM5MTVqMGo3qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Waymo is actively pursuing the approvals necessary to operate in New York City — where it's currently against both state laws and local rules. Essentially, as it does so, it is also beginning testing in two cities that look far more like ours: Tokyo, where it is running limited [test rides](https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/waymo-begin-data-collection-tokyo-with-driver-operated-test-rides-2025-04-10/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and London, where it plans to train driverless vehicles for rides across [100 square miles](https://www.ft.com/content/7e838cc1-7095-4921-ae87-4779fc10468a?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) this year, then launch with passenger service upon meeting approvals soon thereafter, in step with the [UK Automated Vehicles Act](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/10/contents?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The London and Tokyo deployments matter more to New York than any viral video from Arizona. Why? Because, though they're in foreign countries, they are far more similar to New York than Phoenix, Los Angeles or even downtown San Francisco will ever be. London and Tokyo are both dense, transit-rich cities with complex street environments, powerful pedestrian cultures, strong taxi industries, occasionally bad weather and constant competition for curb and road space. If robotaxis can function and add value in those places, they are far more likely to work here. Importantly, this isn't really about street safety. The odds are high that Waymos, which have [racked up an impressive safety record](https://www.theargumentmag.com/p/we-absolutely-do-know-that-waymos?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to date, will be deemed "safe enough" in London and Tokyo. New York should take note less on street activity and more on governance if we hope to allow Waymos to operate in — and contribute to — to public life. ## New York's robotaxi test track Waymo has plenty of hurdles to get past before it can even entertain the possibility of rolling out an Uber competitor (or partner) here. The company would need state government approval, city Department of Transportation functional testing (beyond the very limited test that the Adams administration [approved last year](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/08/mayor-adams--dot-announce-approval-of-first-application-to-test-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), and designing a new NYC Taxi and Limousine regulatory model — for number of licensed vehicles, insurance liabilities, and training requirements. (I use Waymo as a synonym for robotaxis throughout this piece because, while other companies are likely also vying for approval in New York, Waymo is miles ahead of the others across the country.) So what specifically will the London and Tokyo tests tell us, Mayor Mamdani and his newly tapped Taxi and Limousine Commission Chair Midori Valdivia? As I suggested earlier, there's probably not much to be learned on the safety front. When measured per mile driven, automated vehicles are already involved in far fewer crashes than human drivers, cutting injury-causing crashes by about 80% and police-reported crashes by more than half across Phoenix, San Francisco and Los Angeles, according to a [2024 study](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39485678/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Human driving is in some ways getting worse thanks to distractions; self-driving cars are getting more sophisticated by the day. And driverless vehicles don't get drunk, text while driving or experience road rage, nor do they add to the [growing numbers](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/business/uber-scrutiny-sexual-assault.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of accusations of sexual assault by drivers. Nor do they break the rules, while as every New Yorker knows, some human drivers take speed limits, red lights and turning rules as mere suggestions. The bigger reason I'm carefully following Tokyo and London is to help answer this question: Can robotaxis be ushered into New York in a way that genuinely adds value to city life and well-being, in ways articulated in the NYU Rudin Center's 2022 work, ["AVs: A Policy Framework?"](https://wagner.nyu.edu/impact/research/publications/avs-nyc-policy-framework?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) We should pay very close attention to several indicators in particular: **1\. The street ballet** New York's streets are akin to a mosh pit: Drivers are constantly made to avoid double-parked cars, zooming e-bikes, active package delivery trucks, buses trying to get to the curb, rushing emergency vehicles and jutting construction zones. These scenarios require constant alertness and patience from all drivers, human or robotic. London and Tokyo, while not as complex, present similar challenges. How will Waymos, which at least to date are very rule-bound, navigate these circumstances? Can they make tiny subtle judgments needed to keep the flow of traffic moving? What level of aggression will the vehicles tolerate from other road users? Will the vehicles stop behind a double-parked car for eternity? Will they honk at unaware pedestrians? Will the resulting street "dance" be closer to a ballet, with light, fluid movements, or more like a drunkard's walk, with randomized paths and perhaps unintended consequences? Essentially, will these vehicles help traffic throughput, or cause further delays? **2\. The "good neighbor"** Cities like New York, where congestion is a constant challenge, have the opportunity to require new road users to not just travel safely atop them, but also improve the underlying infrastructure. This can be accomplished in two ways: First, any deployment of new, technology-based vehicles should share data about road conditions with cities. This would help city planners locate obstacles like potholes, low-hanging tree branches, blocked bike lanes and (with the help of hard-braking data) hazardous intersections. If a Waymo sensor detects a missing street sign in the Bronx, that data should go straight to the DOT's repair queue. As automated vehicles share road conditions amongst themselves, they can also be required to do so with the city, presenting an opportunity to partner with the city through relevant data and safety improvements. As the UK continues to develop its data-sharing requirements (and related cybersecurity requirements) in its Automated Vehicles Act, London can tap into its authority and "good partner" goals by seeking these and other helpful data streams. Likewise, AV companies should actively contribute to physical improvements. For example, AVs rely on lane markings to ensure their positioning. As such, AV companies can help improve weather-worn lane markings, as well as other road safety features on which they rely, like bike lane separators and maintenance of traffic signals. (Ideally, all profit-generating road users, not only AV companies, would contribute to infrastructure maintenance funds. Curb improvements, bike lane maintenance and loading zone upkeep are all areas that could benefit from increased contributions from heavy users.) Both London and Tokyo have yet to establish the standards of good partnership that would earn these companies brownie points on the path from pilot to practice. However, their demands, and AV companies' responses, will be instructive to New York in seeking high-fidelity data that helps the DOT fix potholes and hazardous intersections. **3\. Interfacing with transit and human-driven ridehail** In New York, London and Tokyo, robotaxi ridership will likely compete with taxis, Ubers and, critically, subway and bus ridership. In New York and London, where congestion pricing was hard-fought and deliberately designed to limit the number of cars on city streets, the policy goal is clear: "choice riders," who can opt between private rides and public transit, should generally choose transit. It remains the most efficient way to move large numbers of people in dense cities, and too many vehicle trips (whether they are human-driven or automated) will produce congestion and gridlock. Although shifting from a crowded subway to a robot-driven journey sounds like an introvert's dream, widespread shifts of this kind would cannibalize both public transit and the existing ride-hailing market. In fact, according to [research by Obi](https://rideobi.com/waymo/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a rideshare data analytics company, riders in San Francisco paid a premium to ride in Waymo over Uber and Lyft — 30-40% more on the same routes. Like New York, Tokyo and London offer a variety of travel options: public transit, walkability and for-hire rides. From New York's perspective, the indicators to watch in London and Tokyo are: to what extent do riders choose robotaxis over public transportation, other ride services, or personally-owned vehicles? If people choose robotaxis over London's Tube or Tokyo's Metro, they may do the same for New York's subway, resulting in lower ridership, on-street gridlock and reduced transit services due to less farebox funding. Mode shift, even more than safety, may be the greatest risk robotaxis pose to New York City. It risks unraveling the hard-won victory of congestion pricing and forces a simple question: are robotaxis replacing existing ride-hail trips, or are they adding more cars to the street? If automation increases the total number of vehicle trips, congestion will rise, regardless of who, or what, is behind the wheel. **4\. The human factor** The final big question about this AI is a deeply human one: What will be the impacts on taxi drivers' livelihoods? In New York City, approximately [179,381](https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiMzlhMzA3NTItM2VkZS00NGM4LTgxYTQtNjRlMDc3MTkxMDkzIiwidCI6IjMyZjU2ZmM3LTVmODEtNGUyMi1hOTViLTE1ZGE2NjUxM2JlZiJ9&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) individuals were TLC-licensed drivers at the end of 2025; our new mayor made a name for himself as a staunch driver ally. Like so many other workers worried about AI taking their jobs, these workers are on the frontlines of fear. Both Tokyo and London share New York's respect for their local taxi driving forces, so the impacts felt there will be instructive. So the big questions are these: Will London and Tokyo require ride-pricing models that are comparable to human-driven rideshare? How does the driver-pay formula translate to a ride with no driver (but still requires cleaning, charging and maintenance)? According to [Gridwise Analytics](https://7021468.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/7021468/Gridwise%20Analytics%202025%20AV%20Impact%20Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a transportation data analytics company, ride-hail monthly gross driver pay (excluding tips) declined in Phoenix, Los Angeles and Austin, all markets offering autonomous rides, from July 2024 to July 2025\. Still, in San Francisco, driver pay actually increased, potentially offering policy lessons on pricing and driver pay formulas. Locally, the political alliance between the mayor and the drivers might help to develop compromise solutions, such as dynamically capping the number of vehicles to reduce congestion, or adding surcharges to Waymo rides to support a transition fund, which would support medallion debt relief, driver retraining or a pension-style supplement for long-term drivers whose livelihoods are being automated away. Another key human factor is accessibility. Here in New York City, [more than half of yellow taxis are wheelchair accessible,](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/tlc/downloads/pdf/annual%5Freport%5F2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and Uber and Lyft must provide "equivalent service" to riders with disabilities, in a nation-leading accessibility initiative. In London, [100% of taxis are wheelchair accessible](https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/passengers-and-accessibility?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), while Tokyo is [adopting similar vehicles](https://global.toyota/en/jpntaxi/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The big question: Will all city residents be served by robotaxis? How are London and Tokyo mandating the servicing of all riders? How will riders who require assistance to board and secure their mobility device into a vehicle be serviced if no driver is present, or locate a vehicle from a crowded curb if they are vision-impaired? Is New York willing to adopt a new technology that could potentially leave the [7.3% of residents with ambulatory disabilities](https://a816-dohbesp.nyc.gov/IndicatorPublic/data-explorer/accessibility/?id=2459&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#display=summary) behind? In short, as London and Tokyo move forward, New York should focus less on their technical performance and more on their governance. The real question is whether robotaxis strengthen or undermine the systems that make city life function: public transit, shared streets and the livelihoods of the people who depend upon them. If these cities and Waymo can pass those tests, they will deserve to earn a place on New York's streets — under rules that reflect the best thinking about how to let driverless vehicles share our streets. *Disclosure: Waymo has contributed funds to the NYU Rudin Center to support a forthcoming panel discussion on autonomous vehicles in New York. Waymo had no role in the research, analysis or views expressed here.* ### Urban Design as Social Infrastructure URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-parks-public-spaces-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z Zohran Mamdani's campaign for mayor treated New York's physical city not as backdrop, but as protagonist. Mamdani met (and, as mayor, has continued meeting) New Yorkers where daily life actually unfolds — on sidewalks, buses, subways, beaches and street corners — underscoring a simple truth: The physical city is where government shows up most tangibly in people's lives. Streets, parks, plazas, housing, transit, libraries, waterfronts and public buildings form the connective tissue of civic life. When these places are well designed, well maintained and well programmed, they function as social infrastructure, enabling relationships to form, civic trust to grow and communities to thrive. Investing in social infrastructure is therefore not just an urban design strategy — it is a way to make policy visible and effective on every block, every day. Today, investment and upkeep in this essential social infrastructure are fragmented and often depend on private fundraising or volunteer labor, leaving too many neighborhoods behind. This patchwork model undermines fairness — and makes it difficult to deliver improvements at the scale New Yorkers need. To deliver on Mamdani's promise of a fairer, more affordable city, the administration should create a social infrastructure plan to coordinate capital investment, maintenance and stewardship across agencies and communities In his early days as mayor, Mamdani has given every indication that he understands the importance of investing in the physical city to make the city a more livable place where people can connect and thrive. The appointment of Mike Flynn, the co-author of New York's first [Street Design Manual](https://www.nycstreetdesign.info/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to run the Department of Transportation is one of multiple steps in the right direction. Now, strong appointments and symbolic gestures must be matched with good policy. Making a citywide social infrastructure plan an early governing priority will serve as a practical blueprint for guiding investments in the physical city and the people who steward it. In practice, it's a framework to guide what gets created, where, and who maintains and programs these spaces over time. ## Public space as essential social infrastructure Mamdani understands that public spaces are not simply nice-to-have amenities; they are platforms for building civic trust, creating resilient neighborhoods and connecting New Yorkers to social and economic opportunity. His recent commitment to complete the redesign on [McGuinness Boulevard](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-announces-city-to-complete-redesign-on-mcguinness-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a safe streets project stalled by the Adams administration, is evidence of this. Beyond safety, well-designed public spaces can lower the cost of living by providing free or low-cost places to gather, rest, play, learn, meet neighbors and access services. Research consistently shows that access to quality public spaces strengthens social cohesion and trust in government. A [2017 Center for Active Design report](https://cdn.plataformaurbana.cl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/assembly-civic-engagement-survey.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that residents without access to quality parks report lower levels of connection and trust in government. The same can be said of libraries, [rec centers](https://nycfuture.org/events/putting-the-rec-back-in-nyc-parks-and-recreation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and other well-designed buildings and civic spaces maintained with pride. Features as simple as seating, greenery, shade and interactive programming can significantly increase social interaction and a sense of belonging, as Gehl (my urban design firm) found in ["Rx for Social Connection"](https://thebentway.ca/publication/rx-for-social-connection/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) research with The Bentway and the Dalla Lana School of Public Health. Public spaces also play a critical role in safety, broadly defined. [Environmental design](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/12/headway/philadelphia-gun-violence-environmental-design.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) features in urban spaces, such as greening vacant lots or improving street lighting, has been [associated with crime reduction](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/crime-and-the-built-environment). [New York City's Active Design Guidelines](https://www.centerforactivedesign.org/publications/active-design-guidelines-2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) correctly suggest that public spaces are vital to supporting public health. And new research from the [Shared Mobility Center](https://popresearchrobot.populartransport.net/disaster-proofing-communities-how-to-measure-and-invest-in-the-invisible-infrastructure-of-social-capital/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) connects social infrastructure to climate resilience. All of these positive outcomes come from treating public space not as a nice amenity but as essential social infrastructure, something the government must intentionally design, fund and sustain. ## From fragmentation to coordination New York has a long history of investing in the physical city, but these efforts have too often been fragmented, under-resourced and inequitable. Park maintenance relies heavily on private fundraising. Without it, [parks, especially in the outer boroughs, often don't meet the Department of Parks and Recreation's own standards for cleanliness, safety and accessibility](https://www.ny4p.org/news/new-yorkers-for-parks-releases-parks-2030-platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Many plazas and streetscapes depend on Business Improvement Districts for upkeep; [open streets and school streets depend on volunteer labor, complex permitting and costly insurance](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/03/14/open-streets-wont-survive-without-more-money-from-the-city-organizers-warn?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This patchwork model undermines scale and fairness. It also contrasts with Mamdani's commitment to relentless competence — a government that delivers faster, fairer and more visible results. While the city urgently needs more affordable housing, housing alone does not create thriving neighborhoods. Mamdani seems to understand this; he has spoken of parks as among the few spaces that are "truly accessible and affordable to each and every person who calls the city home," saying the goal of public spaces is to ensure that a "dignified life is available to each and every New Yorker." Residents badly need safe routes to schools, green space, convenient and dignified bus stops, libraries, plazas and non-commercial "third spaces" where people can simply be. Social infrastructure must be planned with housing, not added later if and when funding allows. A social infrastructure plan would mark an important shift for New York, serving as a practical implementation guide for programs from school streets to bus stops and helping to operationalize a people-first approach to governance that requires multi-agency involvement. Such a framework would move New York from patching together one-off wins to a reliable citywide system built on neighborhood planning models already put in place by the Department of City Planning. It would focus on five things: - assessing social and physical needs and assets in neighborhoods together - identifying priority neighborhoods where investment can deliver the greatest benefit - aligning public realm improvements with planned capital projects and service delivery - setting measurable outcomes related to affordability, safety, health and connection; and - establishing sustainable models for stewardship, programming and funding in partnership with community organizations and leaders Because social infrastructure functions as a network, no single agency can deliver it alone. Effective implementation requires a networked governance model, with clear accountability for coordination across agencies such as the Departments of Transportation, Parks and Recreation, Design and Construction, Housing and Preservation, Sanitation and even the new Mayor's [Office of Mass Engagement](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-establishes-office-of-mass-engagement-to-transform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This could mean strengthening the role of Chief Public Realm Officer created by Mayor Adams, perhaps creating a [deputy mayor of operations for the public realm, as a coalition of public realm advocates is calling for](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TGjJdKB4QYgMnTaSNiDfHKyHHGbToF-KogIAS%5FCgA0M/edit?tab=t.0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — or establishing a dedicated social infrastructure officer with a mandate to oversee the system, identify priorities and drive implementation. New York already has strong local precedents for how city agencies and community partners can work together to develop social infrastructure. At [Paseo Park](https://www.paseopark.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Jackson Heights, what began as an Open Streets pilot during the pandemic has become a permanent, multi-block civic asset supporting thousands of public school students and local residents alike. The new street furniture designed to slow vehicular traffic at intersections was designed and installed in close collaboration with the local community. The [city's pedestrian plaza program](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pedestrians/nyc-plaza-program.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is another example. By providing a clear application process and design toolkit, neighborhood organizations can apply to create their own plazas. [The Public Space Equity program](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pedestrians/equityprogram.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a tool to ensure neighborhoods with fewer financial resources can maintain these spaces as well. Scaling these efforts requires reducing red tape, standardizing permitting and insurance pathways, and making it easier for local organizations to occupy and activate public space. A people-first city invests not only in physical improvements, but in the systems that allow communities to use and care for them over time. ## Sweat the small stuff As he presses ahead, Mamdani should be mindful of the fact that investing in connection often means making straightforward, human-scale improvements: securing safe places for children to play, shaded seating at bus stops that double as platforms for community information, lighting that enhances safety without floodlighting neighborhoods and greenery that supports both mental health and climate resilience. On a recent [Brian Lehrer](https://open.spotify.com/episode/1cq1wu4Q63GxmLPfcM8goj?si=ZmmkCqB7RTue1DiPbyXRlg&nd=1&dlsi=7cf33771093d4b20&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) episode about "sewer socialism," the New Yorkers who called in made clear they were not asking for the moon — just basic quality urban design and upkeep: evenly paved sidewalks, painted crosswalks, street trees. This is not an argument against major citywide infrastructure projects. New York needs those too, from new pedestrian and bike bridges, as Sam Schwartz has recommended, to the redesign of Penn Station. Jens Kramer, the former four-term mayor of Copenhagen who was largely responsible for its transformation into one of the most livable cities in the world, has said that mayors have to identify how investments in citywide spaces are balanced with those in neighborhoods. The challenge is ensuring that flagship investments are matched by neighborhood-scale improvements that people experience every day. By heeding this wisdom, and by treating social infrastructure as essential civic infrastructure, Mayor Mamdani can position New York as a global leader in people-centered urban policy — strengthening the physical city as the backbone of health, connection and democracy itself. ### How Off the Rails Is ICE? A Q&A With Former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/questions-answers-trump-noem-dhs-ice/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z *With the nation's eyes on the ICE agents unleashed in Minneapolis and the chaos and bloodshed that have followed, Vital City turned to Jeh Johnson for sane answers on federal immigration enforcement.* *Johnson served as secretary of Homeland Security from 2013 to 2017, overseeing Immigration and Customs Enforcement during the Obama administration. He has close ties to New York City where, earlier in his career, he served in the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. He's no immigration dove: Under his watch, DHS pursued aggressive border enforcement and pushed cities to transfer undocumented individuals from local jails directly to ICE custody. But Johnson is now watching the Trump administration's immigration crackdown with alarm — particularly the deployment of thousands of masked, battle-armed federal agents to Minneapolis and other cities in what he describes as an apparent strategy to "prey on local immigrant communities."* *With New York potentially on the administration's list for an enforcement surge, Vital City spoke with Johnson about what it might mean for local law enforcement, why he thinks ICE may need a "major rebranding" and what advice he'd give Mayor Zohran Mamdani as the city navigates an increasingly volatile standoff with Washington.* **Vital City:** The Trump administration has significantly altered the composition and mission of federal law enforcement, investing resources in a [ramp-up of the ICE budget that now dwarfs other federal law enforcement offices, such as the FBI and DEA](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/21/nx-s1-5674887/ice-budget-funding-congress-trump?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At the same time, news reports note that FBI, DEA and other agents are being detailed to assist in ICE operations. What do you make of the massive infusion of dollars to increase ICE's manpower? What does it mean structurally for the balance of federal interests, how does it affect training, mission and deployment? **Jeh Johnson:** Without a doubt, President Trump campaigned on securing the border and immigration law enforcement. The bumper sticker was "mass deportation," but the more subtle message was prioritizing deporting "the worst of the worst." Securing the border and deporting "the worst of the worst" undocumented are two legitimate government objectives. Indeed, those were my objectives. To that end, while I was in office, we saw [some of the lowest levels of illegal border crossings in years](https://www.axios.com/2025/03/04/illegal-border-crossings-february-decline-trump?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and worked with city governments through our [Priority Enforcement Program](https://www.ice.gov/pep?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to encourage them to transfer those undocumented released from jail directly to ICE custody for deportation. The current administration seems to have gone far beyond this mandate. ICE has [reportedly set arbitrary numeric goals for arrests](https://www.axios.com/2025/12/04/trump-ice-immigration-arrests-deportations?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), without regard to prioritizing public safety. To the contrary, given the manner in which the current administration is pursuing the immigration mission, ICE is reviled in the very communities in which it must operate and the sanctuary city movement is turbocharged, to the detriment of public safety. As we speak, DHS \[the Department of Homeland Security\] has surged thousands of law enforcement personnel to Minneapolis and St. Paul though there has been no recent, great surge of illegal immigration into that area. I watch the videos of DHS personnel, masked and in menacing warfighting gear, and they appear to be looking for a fight with the local civilian population. ICE is now reportedly moving on to [Portland, Maine](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/were-being-terrorized-what-mainers-are-seeing-as-ice-launches-operation-in-the-state?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). From all appearances, the strategy seems to be to go from city to city to prey on the local immigrant communities there. It is hard to believe this is America. I also worry about the surge in recruitment of personnel to the sensitive immigration law enforcement mission. Across law enforcement, personnel need to be well-trained in tactics of de-escalation, so that a confrontation does not escalate into a loss of life. Renee Good did not have to die over the manner in which she blocked the street with her car. The confrontation that led to George Floyd's death started over a counterfeit $20 bill. New Yorkers will remember that Eric Garner died by chokehold in 2014 over allegations he'd been selling loose cigarettes. I also worry about the character of the people we are recruiting to the ICE mission. DHS personnel should look like America. The recruitment message ["defend your culture,"](https://x.com/DHSgov/status/1952718231455592667?lang=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which was at one point on the ICE website, is a dog whistle. America is a multicultural society. If you are a Mexican American in South Texas interested in law enforcement, that message says in effect "you need not apply." If you are a Muslim American in Minnesota or Michigan interested in law enforcement, that message says in effect, "you need not apply." **Vital City:** DHS was controversial when it was created in 2002 because it was such a massive agency and covered such a wide range of topics. How do you think it has worked out? Given the changing shape of the ICE mission and understanding that each administration will have its priorities, are there issues that it would be wise for the federal agencies to safeguard against, no matter what the administration? What changes might you suggest? **Jeh Johnson:** In the wake of 9/11, DHS was established primarily for the counterterrorism mission. Up until then, the United States did not believe we needed a "Ministry of the Interior" to address domestic security because we were separated from most of the rest of the world by two oceans. That assumption collapsed on 9/11\. The thinking then was that terrorism was an extraterritorial threat, therefore we must consolidate into one cabinet-level department the regulation of all the different ways someone can enter our country — land, sea and air. Therefore, CBP (Customs and Border Protection), ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), TSA (the Transportation Security Administration) and the Coast Guard were all merged into one department. People wonder why the Secret Service, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) and the cybersecurity mission were given to DHS as well. Like everything in Washington, DHS was a political compromise. In some respects we went too far in its creation and in other respects we didn't go far enough. As the character of the terrorist threat to the homeland has changed — it's now largely domestic-based, falling to the FBI to address — and immigration has become a political red-meat issue, DHS's primary mission has become immigration law enforcement. While I was in office, people used to approach me and say, "thank you for keeping us safe." Now, DHS is known primarily as DOD — the "Department of Deportation." Whether a Democratic or Republican administration, the secretary's time and effort is overwhelmingly on the politically volatile mission of immigration. The DHS model is now outdated for its original purpose. If I were king — and I'm not — I would start from scratch and create a large "Department of Public Safety" into which we place every federal law enforcement and security agency, including immigration, TSA and cybersecurity, deconflict all their missions, and leave all the prosecutors and civil litigators in Department of Justice. But this will never happen for multiple reasons and the FBI would fight mightily to stay in DOJ, where it enjoys relative autonomy. **Vital City:** There have been increasing concerns about the conduct and reach of ICE operations, up to and including abolishing ICE. Some of this has to do with what appears to be an extraordinary failure to follow basic tenets of constitutional policing, failures that have attracted the [attention and condemnation of local law enforcement](https://x.com/prem%5Fthakker/status/2013683292910850153?s=46&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What is your view? **Jeh Johnson:** I am opposed to the outright elimination of ICE, though it is becoming so toxic in communities across the country it may require a major rebranding. If you were opposed to the Vietnam War in the 1960s-70s, the answer was not the elimination of the Department of Defense. We need an agency to enforce the immigration laws. If we don't like the way the agency is doing that, we change the policy. If the leaders who promulgate the policy don't change it, we change the leaders. That's what elections are for. **Vital City:** ICE and the NYPD sometimes work together — but in other respects, federal law enforcement is at odds with or complicates the work of local cops. Can you talk about that tension and how you think it ought to be resolved? **Jeh Johnson:** High-profile confrontations like Minneapolis complicate the relationship in a way that is contrary to overall public safety. If ICE is toxic in a community like New York, the Mayor, the city council and even the police commissioner don't want the local police drawn into the toxicity. I encountered this with various sanctuary city laws and policies when I was secretary. I had to negotiate city-by-city with the mayor to arrive at a solution that worked for both of us. Simply storming a community with thousands of DHS law enforcement personnel unfamiliar with that community is not the answer. No responsible public official can want what is happening in Minneapolis right now. **Vital City:** The videos shared each day of ICE encounters with residents, as well as statements from DHS and ICE officials — even before the deaths of Good and Pretti — show apparent violations of law with respect to stops, detention and uses of force, as well as other troubling behavior such as the wearing of masks and the use of highly militarized equipment, from tear gas canisters to tank-like vehicles. What is your view of these abuses of power? If you were secretary, what would you do to address them? **Jeh Johnson:** There is a legitimate concern about appearing to overmilitarize domestic law enforcement. We had this very concern in the Obama administration in providing federal grants to local law enforcement for public safety. It can inflame the local civilian population. We see that playing out in real time right now in Minneapolis. Masks add to that toxic dynamic. Masks are not typical among local law enforcement, even in big cities with a crime problem. The NYPD do not wear masks, even when operating in dangerous neighborhoods. Masks detract from accountability. Whether on the federal, state or local level, law enforcement must always be accountable to the public they serve. Masks also increase the risk of impersonation by those not in law enforcement. **Vital City:** What is your view of the appropriate role, either for local prosecutors or for the USDOJ Civil Rights division, or any other accountability mechanism, in a situation such as the shooting of Renee Good by an ICE agent? **Jeh Johnson:** As a federal prosecutor in 1991, I once prosecuted a federal law enforcement officer for criminal civil rights violations. In 1992, I defended pro bono a New York City police officer accused of a homicide. Following an extensive grand jury investigation by the Manhattan DA, no charges were brought against the officer, who went on to be a hero on 9/11. Many law enforcement agencies require an investigation where there is a civilian death involving a law enforcement officer, even though no charges are ever brought. It lends to accountability and helps remove any suspicion of a cover-up. It is also true that, in general, no agency can investigate itself, except where there is a truly independent inspector general. If an IG \[Inspector General\] identifies a problem, the matter should then be referred to the Department of Justice. Federal agents have limited (not absolute) immunity from local prosecutions for conduct while on the job. But including local law enforcement in any investigation, and appointing local prosecutors as special assistant U.S. attorneys, can lend to credibility and accountability. It is also true that local law enforcement likely knows the community better, and can provide leads and access to evidence that the feds cannot reach. Arising out of the death of Renee Good, DOJ has threatened investigations of the governor and mayor, but there would appear to be no investigation of the shooting itself. Seems odd. **Vital City:** How do you think ICE activity, and the manner in which it is carried out, affects the legitimacy of local law enforcement and the willingness — in this case, of New Yorkers — to obey law enforcement commands and to otherwise cooperate. And relatedly, what kind of position does this put NYPD and other local police departments in? They may be called to a location to ensure ICE can execute on its lawful mission, while at the same time mediating with protestors/residents who may be angry at the role that PD is playing. **Jeh Johnson:** When I was secretary of DHS, I used to counsel ICE leadership, Tom Homan included, that one notorious incident in a community — the arrest of somebody's grandmother on the church steps or a high school student leaving class — can create a local uproar, turn us into pariahs, embolden the sanctuary city movement and completely undermine our ability to pursue our mission in that community. We see that exact scenario playing out now in Minneapolis, on steroids. In the current environment, the arrest of a single individual by ICE likely requires far more officers and equipment on the scene than it normally would, drawing people and resources away from other public safety missions. I suspect this dynamic is not now limited to Minneapolis. **Vital City:** What, realistically, could New York City do if the Trump administration insists on a Minneapolis-style confrontation? **Jeh Johnson:** New York City is unique. It is too large a city, with the largest police department in America. Even those who seem itching for a fight hopefully know better than to take on New York and New Yorkers. The New York City equivalent of the current federal presence in Minneapolis would deplete all of DHS nationwide. **Vital City:** If you could advise Mayor Mamdani on New York City's posture vis-a-vis immigration and the feds, what would you tell him? **Jeh Johnson:** This is not an opportunity to take a stand. Lay low. Don't provoke a fight politically. Focus on snow clean-up. ### What ICE’s Recklessness Teaches Us About Real Policing URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/minnesota-ice-alex-pretti-policing/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z In 2017, when I was the chief of police of Burlington, Vermont, I gave our highest award for valor to an officer who had faced down a robbery suspect making his getaway in a Volkswagen. Cut off at an intersection, the suspect threw his car in reverse and barreled toward the officer, who was running up the narrow street in pursuit. Gun drawn and pointed, standing in the path of the car, the officer knew he had a split second to save his life. He stepped to the side. The car passed inches from him, and he holstered his gun. He had a legal right to shoot, but he didn't. Later, he told me even if he'd killed the driver, the car still wouldn't have stopped. If he could save his life by getting out of the way, then there was no need to fire in the first place. Shooting, he concluded, wouldn't help him; it would just make the situation worse. "I knew it would be dangerous and futile," he told me. His medal of valor was for showing bravery and restraint. This is the essence of American policing done right. The New York City Police Department prohibited shooting at people in cars in 1972, having realized that shooting a driver does nothing to stop the car and turns a guided missile into an unguided one. The number of police shootings soon plummeted, and officers were no less safe. Many cities followed suit, banning or strongly discouraging shooting at cars. Beyond all of this, officers with good judgment don't need a policy to know when not to use reckless and counterproductive force, even if they are in danger. It is simply a hallmark of professionalism. Contrast this with the work of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, who killed Minneapolis resident Renée Good last January when one of them stepped in front of her car as she tried to drive away to avoid arrest. Instead of taking one quick step to his right and apprehending her the next day, the agent shot Good three times, twice after he'd already gotten out of the way and needed to fire through her driver's side window. Good lost control of her vehicle, careened into a parked car and died. In response, the federal government called her a domestic terrorist and hailed the officer as a hero, while his colleagues warned other citizens that people who didn't obey them could meet a similar fate. The Department of Justice ordered its prosecutors to see if they could dig up dirt about the political activities of Good and her wife. Six prosecutors resigned in protest; Good was a mother of three with no criminal record. ICE is an agency that literally embodies everything the people who police a democracy should be against. It has [low hiring standards](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/as-ice-boosts-recruitment-critics-concerned-over-changes-to-hiring-and-training-standards?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [perfunctory screening](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2026/01/ice-recruitment-minneapolis-shooting.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [a 47-day training program](https://people.com/ice-academy-training-shortened-47-days-under-trump-report-11881592?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that's shorter than nearly all municipal police departments' academies, and half the length of the training program for Minneapolis police. Its leadership imposes [a deportation quota](https://www.axios.com/2025/12/04/trump-ice-immigration-arrests-deportations?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on employees that forces them to make bad decisions, petty arrests and alienate vast swaths of the public. Many of its agents [wear masks](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article310480665.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) out of a strange mix of cowardice, brazen unaccountability and perhaps a desire to menace the public. Their [use of body cameras](https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/21/us/ice-cbp-cellphones-minnesota-mobile-fortify-invs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is spotty at best, and the agency is [trying to roll back funding for the ones they do use](https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2026/01/24/ice-bodycams-cameras-shootings-immigration/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They use tear gas and pepper spray against protesters so capriciously that a federal judge had to [order them to desist](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgprwlplqwo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And ICE agents continue to shoot citizens who protest them. Last week, agents killed Alex Pretti, a Minneapolis ICU nurse who was lawfully carrying a holstered handgun. By all video accounts, including [microsecond-by-microsecondbreakdowns](https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/01/25/minneapolis-shooting-video-gun/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by [media outlets](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D99WRV4aWVE&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), ICE agents opened fire after they had pepper-sprayed Pretti, thrown him to the ground, punched him, kicked him and pulled his firearm out of his waistband. Nevertheless, ICE's leadership and its federal overseers immediately demeaned the victim, spread lies about him, called the killing justified and obstructed the state of Minnesota from investigating the incident. In the view of many Americans, ICE is an agency that has lost its legitimate authority to govern us. > ICE is an agency that literally embodies everything the people who police a democracy should be against. All of this presents American police departments with a tremendous opportunity. Never before in our lifetime have they had a better foil than they have in ICE. Emerging from years of turbulence between the police and many communities, Americans worry the agency is the new face of U.S. law enforcement, and are starving for reassurance that their own police can be professional, accountable and capable of effectively doing their jobs while respecting rights and liberties. This isn't to say that critics of policing should feel lucky their home team isn't as bad as ICE. This is where the opportunity arises: the nation's attention is rightly focused on flagrant abuses at the federal level that constantly dominate the news and provide a clear moral compass for how police shouldn't behave. In the meantime, the Department of Justice has explicitly said it [will not investigate police departments for patterns of misconduct](https://capitalbnews.org/trump-doj-ends-police-reform-cases/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In other words, hardly anyone is looking at our nation's municipal police at the moment. Police departments that continue to engage, innovate and reform will be doing it because they ought to, not because anyone is breathing down their neck or protesting in front of headquarters. It will provide the ingredients they need to forge deep ties with their communities in good faith. So it is critical for police to continue with the things that have shown promise, even if they don't have to. Agencies should aggressively continue to target their city's most violent offenders, since this small number of people account for an outsized share of any given community's violence. They should train officers to keep themselves and the public safe while using an economy of force. Cities with subways should ensure they are places of fast and efficient transportation, not places for people to dwell or disrupt a commute. Simultaneously, police should implement or expand co-responder programs that bring clinicians to behavioral health crises rather than just police officers. They should explore ways for police and their counterparts to link people to housing, addiction treatment and social services as an alternative to defaulting to arrest as usual, since these measures reduce crime and disorder by better addressing the behavioral problems that can cause them. If police departments do these things with transparency and accountability, it will give millions of Americans a huge sense of relief at a time when many of them are watching the news and questioning the very legitimacy of the nation's law enforcement. The last embers of the ill-fated and infeasible police defunding and abolition movements have been extinguished, and not a moment too soon. Zohran Mamdani became mayor of New York only after decisively distancing himself from previous commitments to defund the police; he even pledged to keep on his predecessor's no-nonsense commissioner. Voters from Philadelphia to San Francisco have made it clear that public safety and quality of life matter greatly to them, and the police have a critical role in delivering these things. Amidst all this, we are witnessing a daily exhibit of some of the worst law enforcement practices in living memory. This mix of tragedy and opportunity has set the stage for a long-needed renaissance in American municipal policing. After spending 23 years in the profession and another six studying it, I am convinced there are more officers who would step out of the way of a car than shoot its driver. Americans need to know this, and they need to see it in practice. \`\`\` ### Trump’s Unconstitutional Coercion URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/trump-sanctuary-cities-funding/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:31.000Z If he carries out his threat to cut off funds to jurisdictions that resist his immigration policies, President Donald Trump will violate the Constitution. In [a speech on Tuesday, January 13](https://apnews.com/article/trump-sanctuary-cities-states-federal-funding-f0bb01398d9d955a498170e7334ce14a?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Trump announced that starting February 1, he will deny federal funding to any states that are home to local governments resisting his administration's immigration policies. This, of course, is not the first time Trump has made threats to jurisdictions that do not cooperate with deportation efforts led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). He tried to do exactly this in his first term, only for the federal courts to [declare his actions unconstitutional](https://law.yale.edu/sfalp/major-cases/sanctuary-cities?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Last year, just a day after the inauguration, Acting Deputy Attorney General (and now federal court of appeals judge) Emil Bove wrote a memo to the Justice Department calling on United States Attorneys to prosecute state and local officials who do not cooperate with the deportation efforts of the Trump administration. President Trump also has expressed this, saying that [state and local officials face prosecution](https://www.npr.org/2025/01/22/nx-s1-5271541/doj-immigration-trump-memo-prosecution?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for failing to assist his immigration policies. These pronouncements, which obviously are meant to intimidate state and local governments, ignore the constitutional limits on the ability of the federal government to coerce state and local governments to carry out federal mandates. The Supreme Court has long held that the federal government may not commandeer state and local governments and force them to administer federal mandates. In 1992, in [New York v. United States](http://google.com/search?q=new+york+v.+united+states+1992&rlz=1C5CHFA%5FenUS1075US1075&oq=New+York+v.+United+States+1992&gs%5Flcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqBwgAEAAYgAQyBwgAEAAYgAQyCAgBEAAYFhgeMggIAhAAGBYYHjIICAMQABgWGB4yCAgEEAAYFhgeMg0IBRAAGIYDGIAEGIoFMg0IBhAAGIYDGIAEGIoFMgoIBxAAGIAEGKIE0gEIMTQ3N2owajeoAgCwAgA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Court declared unconstitutional a federal law that required that every state clean up its nuclear waste by 1996 or face significant legal consequences. The Court held that this violates state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court explained that Congress can try to induce state and local governments to act, but forcing them to adopt laws or enact regulations is unconstitutional. For example, when Congress wanted there to be a 21 year old drinking age it said that every state receiving federal highway money had to adopt this or it would lose five percent of those funds. This was deemed to induce, but not coerce state and local governments to act. > Under the Constitution, state and local governments are not enforcement arms of the federal government and cannot be treated as such. The Court extended this in 1997, in [Printz v. United States](https://www.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1478?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), declaring unconstitutional a provision of the Brady Handgun Control Act that required state and local law enforcement departments to conduct background checks before issuing permits for firearms. Once more, the Court said that the federal government could do its own background checks, but it could not conscript state and local governments and compel them to administer a federal law. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, stressed that the federal government cannot require state and local governments to serve as its enforcement arm — and concluded that it violates the Tenth Amendment for Congress to commandeer the states and force them to administer a federal mandate. More recently, in 2018, in [Murphy v. NCAA](https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-476?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Court unanimously concluded that the federal government could not force New Jersey to have a law banning betting on college sports. Congress certainly could use its power to regulate commerce among the states to prohibit such gambling everywhere in the country. But the Court, in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, ruled that it violates the Tenth Amendment for Congress to compel that state legislatures adopt laws. Thus, the law is clear that Trump cannot force state and local governments to assist federal immigration officials. This would be impermissible commandeering. Indeed, this was the basis for declaring similar efforts in Trump's first term unconstitutional. Then, too, Trump adopted a policy to cut off federal law enforcement money to local governments that did not cooperate with ICE. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that this was unconstitutional. Also, California, during the first Trump term, adopted a law limiting state and local cooperation with federal immigration officials. A federal district court upheld this law as constitutional. There is a separate, important constitutional reason why Trump cannot unilaterally cut off funds: Only Congress, not the president, has the spending power and can set conditions on the receipt of federal money. The Supreme Court has held that the legislature can put strings on federal grants, but only if the conditions are clearly stated, they relate to the purpose of the program and they are not unduly coercive. Congress has not conditioned federal law enforcement money on state and local governments cooperating with ICE. As mentioned above, this is why Congress could say that state governments would lose five percent of their federal highway money if they did not set a 21-year-old drinking age: the condition was clearly stated, it related to the purpose of the highway funds and five percent was not unduly coercive. The Trump administration cannot add requirements that are not found in the federal spending law. > Throughout American history, it has been conservatives, and conservative justices, who have championed states' rights and federalism. Additionally, the Supreme Court has been clear that the federal government cannot coerce state and local action by withholding federal funds. In 2012, in [National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius](https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Court declared unconstitutional a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that required state governments receiving Medicaid funds to provide coverage to those within 133% of the federal poverty level. Those not complying would lose all federal Medicaid funds. The Court said that this was "dragooning" the states, impermissibly commandeering them to comply with a federal mandate. Such coercion, it ruled, violated the Tenth Amendment. But that is exactly what Trump is trying to do if he cuts off money to state and local governments for not adequately cooperating with federal immigration officials. He is using federal money to coerce state and local governments that disagree with his immigration policies. These cases reflect the Supreme Court's upholding of the basic principles of federalism, which safeguard the autonomy of state and local governments. These are not new, and they are not historically liberal. Quite the contrary: Throughout American history, it has been conservatives, and conservative justices, who have championed states' rights and federalism. That is why it is realistic to imagine that the Roberts Court, which so far has generally been supportive of President Trump, would be likely to rule against his administration if he carries through his threats to cut off federal funds to jurisdictions that do not cooperate with federal immigration authorities to his satisfaction. To be clear, despite the use of the phrase "sanctuary cities," that is a misnomer. No state or city can or does protect undocumented individuals from ICE enforcement or deportation. Rather, "sanctuary cities" are jurisdictions that say that they will not explicitly assist the federal government in its immigration efforts. In other words, the state or local government cannot literally provide sanctuary to anyone, but they also don't have to assist the federal government's immigration enforcement efforts. There are compelling reasons for cities to adopt such policies. Law enforcement agencies are understandably concerned that victims of crime and witnesses to crime will not come forward to the police if they fear deportation. This is not a new concern. In 1979, the Los Angeles Police Department adopted [Special Order 40](https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/2021/12/SO%5F40.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which provides that "Officers shall not initiate police action with the objective of discovering the alien status of a person. Officers shall not arrest nor book persons for \[violating\] the United States Immigration code." Public health officials worry that sick people, including those with communicable diseases, will not go for treatment if they fear that it could lead to their deportation. Education officials fear that parents will not send their children to school if they think it might lead to deportation. This is not hypothetical. Cities are reporting [significant absenteeism](https://edworkingpapers.com/ai25-1202?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in schools as parents fear ICE actions there. Under the Constitution, state and local governments are not enforcement arms of the federal government and cannot be treated as such. Federal authorities — such as ICE and border patrol agents — can enforce federal law so long as they do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution. But whether state and local governments wish to cooperate is entirely up to them. Cutting off funds from jurisdictions that don't assist ICE would be unconstitutional. ### How Criminals Get Their Guns URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/underground-gun-markets-urban-violence/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z Gangs, drug-selling crews and other criminal organizations generate a disproportionate amount of gun violence in U.S. cities. While these groups drive much of the shooting and homicide plaguing urban neighborhoods, most people (including many policymakers) don't understand how these dangerous actors actually acquire their weapons. City-level studies reveal the stark concentration of gun violence among criminal networks. Gang- and group-involved conflicts drive more than one-third of homicides in[ Chicago](https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/g/files/litvpz3631/files/problems/drive%5Fby%5Fshooting/PDFs/Block%5Fand%5FBlock%5F1993.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), half in[ Los Angeles' Boyle Heights area](https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph%5Freports/MR1764-1.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and nearly two-thirds in[ Oakland](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022427818821716?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A[ study](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-25/beyond-broken-windows-what-really-drives-urban-crime?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of more than 20 cities found that less than 1% of a city's population was involved in gangs, drug crews and other criminally active groups, but they were connected to over 50% of shootings and homicides. This concentration creates both a challenge and an opportunity. While a small number of high-risk individuals drive most gun violence, it also means that disrupting their access to firearms could have outsized effects on urban safety. Contrary to popular belief, gang members, drug dealers and other serious criminals generally do not obtain their guns by purchasing them from licensed dealers. Instead, they acquire weapons through informal transactions in underground markets supplied by guns diverted from legal commerce. A 2016 federal survey of state prison inmates found that[ fewer than 10% purchased their last firearm at a gun store or pawnshop](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/policing-gun-violence-9780199929283?cc=us&lang=en&&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Instead, gun criminals tend to acquire their firearms from family members, friends, acquaintances and connections to the underground economy such as fences, drug dealers and other "street" sources. This reality points to a crucial fact: The primary challenge isn't stopping criminals from buying guns legally — federal law already prohibits most of them from doing so. The real challenge is stopping the flow of weapons from legal markets into illegal ones. ## Inside the underground gun market Data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) provides a window into these underground markets.[ Between 2017 and 2021, ATF traced nearly 2 million crime guns recovered by law enforcement agencies](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-firearms-commerce-and-trafficking-assessment-nfcta-crime-guns-volume-two?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The patterns revealed tell a compelling story about how illegal gun markets operate. Most traced crime guns were semiautomatic pistols with medium and large calibers — the weapons of choice for urban violence. Pistols accounted for 68% of recovered crime guns, with their share increasing to 75% by 2021\. Almost half were 9mm firearms, primarily from quality manufacturers like Taurus and Glock, Smith & Wesson. Perhaps most revealing is what ATF investigators and researchers call "time-to-crime" — the period between a gun's last legal purchase and its recovery in a crime. Short time-to-crime periods indicate trafficking, as legitimate gun owners rarely have their recently purchased weapons show up at crime scenes. Between 2017 and 2021, 25% of traced crime guns were recovered within one year of purchase and 46% of traced crime guns were recovered within three years of purchase, and these percentages increased dramatically during the study period. Even more telling: Only 12% of traced crime guns were recovered from their original purchaser. Most had changed hands multiple times through underground networks, often very quickly after their initial legal sale. Crime gun traces also reveal the geographic patterns of illegal gun flows. Location data show that firearms migrate from states with less restrictive gun controls to states with more restrictive laws. States with strong gun controls like New Jersey (82%), New York (80%) and Massachusetts (67%) have high percentages of traced crime guns originally purchased in other states. Meanwhile, states with weaker controls like Texas (86%), Wisconsin (84%) and Ohio, Virginia and Indiana (all 83%) see most of their crime guns purchased locally. This interstate flow creates what law enforcement officials and researchers call "iron pipelines" — well-established trafficking routes that move weapons from states with lax gun laws to cities with stronger controls but higher demand from criminal networks. ## The pathways of illegal diversion [ATF investigation data](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-firearms-commerce-and-trafficking-assessment-nfcta-firearms-trafficking?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) reveals the specific channels through which guns move from legal to illegal markets. Unlicensed dealing by private persons (40.7% of cases) and straw purchasing from licensed dealers (39.5%) are the most frequent trafficking methods. Straw purchasing — where someone legally eligible to buy guns purchases them for prohibited persons — represents a particularly important pipeline. These buyers can receive significant markups for their services.[ Research in Boston](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9125.12187?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that gang members and drug dealers paid nearly 200% markup over fair market value for handguns acquired through trafficking networks. Other significant sources include theft from licensed dealers (17.3%), theft from private persons (7.9%) and increasingly, privately made firearms or "ghost guns." The number of these unserialized, homemade weapons recovered in crimes increased by nearly 1,100% between 2017 and 2021. Research in cities like[ Boston](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9125.12187?ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ Chicago](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4625574?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ New York City](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32888157/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) reveals how criminal networks facilitate gun access among their members. Gang membership significantly eases access to firearms through established supply lines and shared connections.[ As one gang member explained to researchers](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32888157/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): "Basically, people in gangs … they got guns ready … They know more people … got more connects." These networks don't just share weapons — they share suppliers. Gang members pool their connections, meaning that disrupting access for one member can affect the entire network's supply chain. Studies also show that gang members tend to acquire older firearms that have changed hands multiple times, suggesting they're purchasing from established trafficking networks rather than directly from recent legal sales. In[ Boston](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9125.12187?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), traced guns recovered from gang members had a median age of 14 years, compared to 10 years for guns recovered from non-gang members. Underground gun markets operate differently from legal markets due to their illegal nature. Research in[ Chicago](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4625574?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found these markets are "thin" — meaning few buyers, sellers and total transactions — with considerable friction that makes guns harder to obtain for some participants. This friction creates opportunities for law enforcement. The underground gun market doesn't operate under the law of one price. Instead, access and cost depend heavily on "who you know." Even within criminal networks, many actors cannot successfully purchase guns, while others — particularly gang members — have easier access through established connections. Privately-made firearms represent an emerging and concerning trend. These weapons, assembled from kits or parts, bear no serial numbers and are untraceable. While they required some technical skill in the past, today's kits can be assembled with basic tools and online instructions. In[ Oakland](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0091743522002808?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the percentage of ghost guns among all recovered crime guns increased from 1% in 2017 to almost 25% in 2021\. Research suggests criminals prefer these untraceable weapons for violent crimes, as they cannot be connected back to specific purchasers through ATF tracing systems. In 2022, the Biden administration enacted[ Final Rule 2021R-05F](https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/definition-frame-or-receiver/summary?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which included several important reforms such as a requirement for licensed dealers to identify privately made firearms with serial numbers before entering regulated commerce. Multiple states have also passed legislation regulating privately-made firearm commerce and possession. It remains unclear whether these reforms have produced the desired impacts. ## What works: disrupting underground markets Despite the challenges, research shows that law enforcement can effectively disrupt underground gun markets through strategic, problem-oriented approaches. The key is understanding local market dynamics and targeting specific trafficking channels rather than just focusing on possession. The[ gun market disruption strategy implemented as part of Boston's Operation Ceasefire](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2005.00353.x?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggests a successful model. Based on analysis of local gun trafficking patterns, the intervention focused enforcement on new handgun diversions from retail outlets. The strategy included expanded focus on both interstate and intrastate trafficking, attention to guns with short time-to-crime intervals, and systematic tracing and investigation of firearms used by violent gangs. The results were significant: The percentage of new handguns recovered by Boston police decreased substantially, suggesting the strategy increased the "effective price" of acquiring new firearms for criminal use. Similar approaches in[ Detroit, Chicago](https://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/12/4/225?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ Milwaukee](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-006-9073-2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have shown notable changes to local gun market dynamics. In[ Los Angeles](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-010-9113-5?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a simple intervention sending letters to new gun buyers about their legal responsibilities resulted in higher rates of theft reports — suggesting some buyers were using theft reports to distance themselves from future misuse. ## The path forward The evidence suggests several promising directions for reducing criminal access to firearms: **Focus on secondary markets**. Since criminals rarely purchase guns directly from dealers, closing loopholes in private sales and better regulating secondary markets could significantly impact criminal access. **Target trafficking networks**. Law enforcement should focus on the intermediaries — straw purchasers, brokers and traffickers — rather than just end users. **Comprehensive tracing**. All recovered crime guns should be traced and analyzed to identify trafficking patterns and suspicious purchase activities. **Problem-oriented approaches**. Successful interventions require understanding local market dynamics and tailoring enforcement strategies accordingly. This approach could be particularly effective in addressing local gun theft problems. **Interstate coordination**. The geographic patterns of gun trafficking require coordinated responses across state lines, particularly between source and destination jurisdictions. Stemming the flow of illegal guns to gangs and violent groups requires adequate resources and sustained commitment. Success against underground gun markets demands separating firearms trafficking strategy from broader gun politics and focusing on evidence-based approaches. Local police departments should take problem-oriented approaches to understand how criminals access guns in their specific jurisdictions and collaborate with federal and state partners to implement targeted interventions. The concentration of gun violence among small numbers of criminal actors creates an opportunity: disrupting their access to firearms could yield significant reductions in urban gun violence. The underground gun market isn't unstoppable. It operates with friction, inefficiencies and vulnerabilities that smart policing can exploit. But success requires understanding how these markets actually work — not how we assume they work — and designing interventions based on evidence rather than assumptions. As cities continue to grapple with gun violence, focusing on the supply chains that arm the most dangerous actors represents one promising path toward safer communities. ### A Crucial Tool in the Fight Against Pollution URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-local-law-97-enforcement-pollution/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:28.000Z Deep down in the basements of many of New York's large buildings sits an old, dirty beast: a decades-old oil- or gas-fired boiler. These boilers are our city's [top source](https://www.nyc.gov/content/climate/pages/initiatives/nyc-greenhouse-gas-inventories?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of pollution. Replacing aging, inefficient and polluting oil and gas boilers with energy efficiency upgrades and clean, energy efficient heat pumps that don't rely on fossil fuels is a big challenge. And though it costs something up front, it also gives us an enormous opportunity to reduce utility bills over time, create good jobs and slash pollution. In 2019, New York City enacted [Local Law 97](https://www.urbangreencouncil.org/what-we-do/driving-innovative-policy/ll97/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to meet the challenge. The city's landmark law — the first of its kind worldwide — covers roughly 50,000 buildings, all larger than 25,000 square feet. That's about half a football field, and any building from, say, a 4-6 story residential building to One World Trade Center is covered. Local Law 97 requires these buildings to reduce their pollution under annual limits. Any given building's pollution cap is defined by type and use, so a large property's limits over time take into account a sometimes complex mix of uses, which can have quite different energy use profiles. The law also sets specific standards for rent-regulated and public buildings. The statute's first pollution limit applied in 2024, which gave building owners five years to prepare. Every five years, the pollution caps will ratchet down. The initial 2024-2029 pollution limit is relatively easy to meet, while the 2030-2034 limit is much lower. As of 2023 — a full year before the law's first annual limits applied — [92% of large buildings](https://www.urbangreencouncil.org/what-we-do/explore-nyc-building-data-hub/local-law-97-progress/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) were below their initial five-year pollution caps. That's a major improvement from about 80% when the law passed in 2019\. In 2023, [49% of multifamily buildings](https://www.urbangreencouncil.org/what-we-do/explore-nyc-building-data-hub/local-law-97-progress/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) were already below the law's tighter 2030-2034 pollution limits, a full seven years "ahead" of schedule. That's up from about 25% when the law passed in 2019, which is also a major advancement for the city. It's quite likely that when the data is crunched, even more than 92% of buildings will be shown to have been in compliance with the law's 2024 limits. Indeed, at the current rapid pace of pollution reductions — with a few percentage points worth of buildings upgrading to better systems and practices per year — virtually 100% of covered buildings are on track to meet Local Law 97's pollution limits for 2024-2029\. Moreover, at that pace of improvement, compliance will remain close to 100% in 2030-2034, when the pollution limits become much tighter. Almost every week, [green building](https://be-exchange.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [experts](https://www.urbangreencouncil.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [advocates](https://www.nycommunities.org/ll97-in-action?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [government](https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Multifamily-Buildings-of-Excellence?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [academics](https://cunybpl.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [expert consortiums](https://retrofitplaybook.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [specialty](https://www.habitatmag.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [publications](https://www.skylight.nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) document another success story: a large building slashing its energy waste in response to Local Law 97\. Public energy use reporting by big buildings has been in place for about 15 years now under Local Law 84, enacted under Bloomberg. If a building is covered by Local Law 97, anyone can [easily look up](https://www.be-exchange.org/calculator/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its status. Energy efficiency is advancing rapidly as large buildings remedy wasteful, inefficient practices. And there are still plenty of "low-hanging fruit" energy efficiency opportunities: Many of the city's buildings are yet to implement easy upgrades, such as insulating exposed heating pipes; weather-stripping; switching to LED lighting; covering or removing window unit air conditioners in the winter and installing simple valves, vents and controls to reduce energy waste. Those upgrades cost something but pay off over time, sometimes in short order. Many building owners are also financing more complex energy efficiency upgrades and in the process saving themselves more than the cost of their financing through reduced operating costs. Yet the real estate lobby, which bitterly opposed the law's passage, has been hard at work trying to convince policymakers, political insiders and the media that Local Law 97 is unaffordable or impractical. Their goal is to roll back the law — or to defang enforcement by eliminating penalties. Advocates for Local Law 97, such as New York Communities for Change and our allies, are massively outspent by industry-financed [ad campaigns](https://nypost.com/2023/04/30/co-op-owners-rebel-against-massive-nyc-climate-law-costing-millions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Super PACs](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/26/nyregion/mamdani-opposition-attack-ads.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [PR](https://www.rebny.com/press-release/report-local-law-97-fines/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [work](https://www.ll97facts.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [big campaign donations](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/16/nyregion/eric-adams-fund-raising.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [front groups](https://www.amny.com/news/co-op-condo-owners-real-estate-local-law-97/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [astroturfed](https://www.homeownersforastrongerny.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [support](https://www.law.cuny.edu/publications-library/public-problems-and-private-landowners-lessons-from-new-york-citys-groundbreaking-climate-mobilization-act/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and a [lawsuit](https://www.climatecasechart.com/collections/glen-oaks-village-owners-inc-v-city-of-new-york%5F1b885d?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that took years to dismiss in the courts. Some of the arguments made by the law's deep-pocketed opponents are rank fear-mongering. For example, the $1.3 million Super PAC against Mayor Mamdani and Local Law 97 [distributed outrageous flyers](https://x.com/SaveNYC2025/status/1977054892205523256?s=20&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in co-op buildings claiming "your monthly maintenance will go up, possibly by $1,000 per month or more", amidst other outrageous claims. Such false messaging can genuinely scare people. Of course, it can cause them to turn against well-considered public policy. If only Local Law 97 could sue for defamation! Rebutting every argument we have heard would take a long write-up, indeed. But to take one leading complaint: the law's opponents commonly claim its penalties are "draconian." Under the law, buildings are to be charged up to $268 per ton if the property exceeds its pollution limit. Opponents take the worst-case scenario — in which a building does nothing to reduce its pollution — and multiply the total penalty out to tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars to make the legislation seem ridiculously punitive. But some of the covered buildings are billion-dollar properties. Even outer-borough co-op complexes' annual revenues from maintenance come to many millions annually. Per unit, Local Law 97 penalties will not be draconian. Divided by the number of units, potential penalties are not much bigger than nuisance parking-ticket level. For example, in 2023, a leading Local Law 97 opponent [claimed](https://www.amny.com/news/nyc-coop-condo-owners-local-law-97-climate/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the co-op complex he leads would pay $394,000 penalties in 2024, when the law's first pollution limit began. That sounds like a lot, but on a per unit basis it's only $135 because the building complex has [2,904 units](https://www.glenoaksvillage.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Meanwhile, the complex can simply avoid breaking the law by improving its energy efficiency — and as of 2023, 92% of buildings were under those 2024 initial limits. If a building doesn't exceed its pollution cap, there are no violations and no penalties at all, naturally. Far from "draconian," the dreaded penalties are more of a firm nudge in the right direction than an executioner's falling ax. Moreover, the law includes provisions to adjust pollution limits — loosen them — to take account for unusual, outlier circumstances not already fairly considered in the law's pollution cap formula for any given building. If a building is undertaking "good faith" action — defined as such by regulation and law — a building will be able to demonstrate its case for an easier path if it so chooses, and regulators can adjust its pollution limit. But of course, at the end of the day, there must be some penalty assessed on non-compliance or the law is easy to disregard. Local Law 97's success thus far came with very little support from the former mayor of New York, who was elected two years after it passed. When he was in office, Eric Adams [delayed enforcement](https://api-prod.gothamist.com/news/adams-wants-to-soften-enforcement-of-landmark-climate-law-that-aims-to-reduce-building-emissions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [opened loopholes](https://gothamist.com/news/major-nyc-climate-law-in-jeopardy-as-400-people-virtually-crash-buildings-meeting?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for landlords to evade pollution limits. Meanwhile, [much-hyped](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/climate/local-law-97-fines-co-ops-condos-slashed-city-council-bill?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) legislation to [gut Local Law 97](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W0EvFNg77tphs7SRn0gvyJNPbx9%5FuZxRzfczukagB0U/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) stalled amidst fierce grassroots opposition to a roll back. As political forces battle, dedicated public servants in multiple agencies — who rarely get the public praise they deserve — are implementing the law, which takes hard work, good judgment and real expertise. That's good news, but the job is far from done. Under Zohran Mamdani, the city should fully implement and enforce Local Law 97. In the near term, Mamdani should take enforcement actions against the [tiny minority](https://www.nyc.gov/site/buildings/dob/pr-dob-mayorgsd.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of building owners who are thumbing their noses at the law by not getting below the law's pollution limits — or even failing to report at all. These buildings unfortunately tend to be very wasteful in their practices, as they are at the very high end of energy use per square foot and therefore outsized drivers of pollution in the city. They typically waste real money and add to the city's air pollution because they haven't implemented even some of the basics of energy efficiency. Deeply unfortunately, the scare campaigns and the now-dismissed lawsuit against the law have led some owners to believe that the law will never be enforced — and that they therefore can just ignore it to no consequence. That's a serious mistake. (It also implies widespread problems in their properties that should be remedied, not further covered up.) 2024 public data on each building and its compliance will soon be available. Local Law 97 will expose some owners who have been swimming naked in the ocean as the tide runs out. The City should also [close regulatory loopholes](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F6akBERobrDlSEfb2sYXmHXe3OE46NvmuZX61OtLUQY/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that allow building owners too much leeway to purchase Renewable Energy Certificates in place of reducing pollution. It should properly issue the many necessary further rules, regulations and guidelines for the law, which detail everything from how building owners can apply for an adjusted pollution limit for 2030 and onwards to a critical formula defining how much pollution the law attributes to the electric grid from 2035 onward as part of the calculation of any given building's total pollution. These are technical tasks that require ongoing expertise and effective civil servants — and so far, talented staff in multiple agencies covering this program have done a good job. With the State, the City needs to reauthorize the J51 tax credit for energy efficiency, which lapsed at the end of December (Hochul recently proposed to do this at the state level, so between her and Mamdani's commitment, this particular ball is set to roll). By 2035, the City should allocate hundreds of millions of dollars more per year to energy efficiency investments in affordable housing, in addition to properly maintaining NYCHA. Mamdani's already made a strong choice in appointing Ahmed Tigani as his Department of Buildings commissioner, the top post at that key agency. In the next several years — perhaps the length of a two-term Mamdani mayoralty — the City should pursue a multi-pronged strategy to accelerate energy efficiency upgrades. First, it should [drive down the cost](https://www.urbangreencouncil.org/funding-the-future-of-decarbonization-live-from-urban-green-conference/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of energy efficiency equipment and services by aggregating demand and using the City's financing and credit to backstop a loan fund for owners to tap for standardized loans, which would lower borrowing costs and thus make larger capital upgrades cheaper. Secondly, it should expand its [already-considerable work](https://accelerator.nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [educate owners](https://cunybpltraining.org/course-catalog/becs-2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [contractors, firms](https://education.urbangreencouncil.org/public-on-demand?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [workers](https://cunybpltraining.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on best practices. Third, it should increase the scale and ease-of-use of existing subsidy programs delivered by [government](https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Multifamily-Building-Programs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), utilities through [ratepayer programs](https://www.coned.com/en/save-money/rebates-incentives-tax-credits/rebates-incentives-for-multifamily-customers/electric-heating-and-cooling-technology-for-multifamily-buildings/heat-pump-incentives?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [nonprofits](https://be-exchange.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that [help finance](https://nyceec.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and offer [free expert help to execute](https://accelerator.nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) energy efficiency upgrades. Finally, the City should run a major public education effort to teach the general public about the necessity of climate action and its opportunity for energy bill savings and good jobs. Mamdani and the City Council should also push Gov. Hochul to begin the state's [Clean Air Initiative](https://capandinvest.ny.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (aka "Cap and Invest"), which would cap pollution statewide and make polluters fund investment into reducing pollution, including that which comes from dirty oil and gas boilers. Similarly to congestion pricing, the program was ready to be introduced, but in a major surprise even to her own agencies, the Governor delayed the program at the eleventh hour. The program is now in a similar limbo to the one congestion pricing stood in before Hochul waved it forward, although a [court ordered the state to proceed](https://nysfocus.com/2025/10/24/new-york-climate-law-regulations-trial-clcpa-decision?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with it after climate justice groups sued, an order the Governor is currently [appealing](https://nysfocus.com/2025/10/30/clcpa-ruling-hochul-appeal-new-york-climate-law-cap-invest?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The City should also advocate that in future decades, the State allocates much more funding, raised from progressive revenue sources, than even the Clean Air Initiative would provide. This would help make it financially beneficial for every building owner to go entirely fossil-free. For example, the City should push the State to enact Sen. Gustavo Rivera and Assemblymember Al Stirpe's [Bucks for Boilers](https://www.bing.com/search?FORM=K413DF&PC=K413&q=bucks+for+boilers+rivera&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Act, which would pay for heat pumps and energy efficiency upgrades and phase out all oil and gas boilers over time. Fortunately Mamdani, for whom affordability is presumably a larger priority than reducing pollution, clearly understands the importance and value of Local Law 97\. Energy efficiency, after all, lowers utility bills over time. Mamdani has [repeatedly pledged](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/13/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-climate-law-97.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to fully implement and enforce the statute. He has demonstrated a [grasp of the issue's specifics](https://www.facebook.com/nychange/videos/mayoral-forum-february-6th-2025/1355424332142943/), from applying penalties on recalcitrant owners to lowering the cost of heat pumps and extending the generous [J51 tax credit](https://www.skylight.nyc/articles/resources/what-is-the-j-51-jax-abatement?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for energy efficiency for low- and middle-income co-ops and condos. While in the Assembly, Mamdani also helped defend Local Law 97 when then-Governor Andrew Cuomo [attempted to override it at REBNY's behest](https://nysfocus.com/2021/02/18/cuomo-override-nyc-climate-law?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the state budget process. As Mamdani points out, fighting climate change and lowering bills aren't incompatible, even though major energy efficiency upgrades add up front costs that are typically financed over time. Indeed, how can New York City be affordable in future years if [about 30% of it chronically floods](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/10/15/nyregion/new-york-climate-flooding-solutions.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? Decades ago, our buildings used coal and the city choked on pollution. While that seems unthinkable now, the coal lobby of its day tried to hang on to its profits then, too. The coming decades will bring another transition: from polluting oil and gas to heat pumps and energy efficiency. As in his electoral campaigns, Mamdani should power past the fearmongering of vested interests and stick to his guns on Local Law 97. ### Supporting Children Who Experience Violence at Home URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/children-domestic-violence-acs-family-court/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:29.000Z Who decides what's best for children? These days, many people believe that the government should, to the extent possible, stay out of it. But what happens when parents are harming each other and/or the children? What is the government's role then? Policymakers thinking about this question tend to focus on child protective services, or the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) as it is called in New York City. ACS's actions — or lack of action — make headlines, drive debate and frustrate advocates. But the overwhelming majority of children in New York City who are experiencing violence at home are *not* in ACS custody or even under ACS supervision. They often do have cases being heard before judges in Family Court, however — because one parent, a grandparent, or another relative has filed custody, visitation, guardianship or order of protection cases. In these scenarios, judges are being asked by the family itself to help stop the violence. Unfortunately, many of these families fall through the cracks when it comes to accessing services. Children in ACS custody and their parents get government assistance — but families with histories of domestic violence that have never been under ACS's watch are effectively forgotten, even when kids are in desperate need of help. That's a huge blind spot that needs to be addressed. As I saw firsthand when I was on the bench, once a case reaches Family Court, it is rarely easy to figure out what is best. Families are often marked by histories of intergenerational trauma, racial bias, abuse, mental health issues, substance use, economic hardship and more. In the middle of these cases, there are children who — because of their age, a lack of resources, family conflict or all of the above — may not have a voice or a choice in the matters that affect them the most. For families entangled with ACS, there are well-established rules and procedures intended to ensure that kids get the help they need. But when ACS is not involved, it is up to the litigants to decide what to put in the paperwork that the Court sees. Frequently, these litigants, most of whom don't have lawyers, focus on violence between the adults and issues around "fair" parenting. Judges may not even know whether a child has been hit or witnessed violence — the adults filing out the paperwork are doing so based on their own perspective, not what the children have experienced. The Court's forms don't help in this regard: court statistics don't track allegations of violence towards children in custody or order of protection cases. It is difficult to address what we don't even see. > Many parents simply won't take advantage of services if they think that ACS is lurking around the corner. The Children's Law Center, the organization I now lead, has been working on trying to figure out the scale of the problem. Conservatively, based on triangulating sources, we estimate that between a third and a half of all the children whose fates are being decided in Family court custody, visitation and guardianship cases come from families that have experienced domestic violence. There were over 150,000 of these filings in New York City Family Court in 2024, so that is a lot of children. Until just 25 years ago, children could be removed from their own home just for witnessing a parent experience domestic violence. In the seminal case of[ Nicholson v. Scoppetta](https://nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2004/2004%5F07617.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the New York Court of Appeals set an important new standard. It said kids should not be removed from a home just because their parent has been a victim of domestic violence. It may seem obvious that a parent does not become unfit just because they were a victim of violence, but it required litigation to set the standard. After Nicholson, the City generally stopped charging the protective parent — meaning the one who tried to shield his or her child from the abuser — with neglect. But children who remained with their non-abusive parent during a domestic violence case were considered effectively under the control of the Administration for Children's Services and subject to intrusive home visits and the risk of being removed. Thanks to two recent appellate decisions, [A.R. v. ACS](https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-first-department/2025/motion-no-m-1247-m-1268-m-1483-nn-00057-24-docket-no-nn-00057-24-appeal-no-4207-case-no-2024-06363.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Sapphire W.](https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-second-department/2025/2023-10606.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), ACS is no longer automatically able to put children who are exposed to domestic violence under its supervision. Generally, ACS's rationale for supervising the home was to make sure the abuser didn't come back. But children under ACS supervision often feel unsafe in a different way. They want to be with the family they know and love. It is very rare for children to want to go into foster care. The Appellate Court rulings are therefore an important step in recognizing children's rights to self-determination and family integrity. But ironically, these decisions may mean that children and their parents are less able to access services. Remaining at home in the care of a parent is only one basic priority when it comes to court proceedings. Another is to try to prevent more exposure to violence and provide access to vital programs and services — from therapy to supervised visitation to legal counsel — to support the children's well-being. Right now, most services for children exposed to domestic violence remain tied up in systems connected to ACS. This produces a strange distortion: Children and parents who are actively under supervision of the child protective agency or are in foster care are able to access a lot more services than other kids who experience violence at home. So, for example, kids not under ACS supervision rarely have a safe place to see a parent. In practical terms, this means that kids may not see their other parent for six months or a year while they wait for services. They don't get access to counseling or housing support or childcare vouchers. Nor do they have a right to an attorney. Those services should be available to all kids who have been exposed to violence in the home. Kids shouldn't have to be subject to ACS supervision to get the help they need to be safe and maintain relationships with both parents. The Children's Law Center [recently released a report](https://www.clcny.org/news/report-children-exposed-to-domestic-violence-face-barriers-to-care/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that documents the experience of children who are outside the child protective system but exposed to violence in the home. Our analysis suggests that fewer than a third of children exposed to domestic violence in Family Court were connected to any therapeutic or social services at all. ACS not long ago issued [a strategic plan](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/acs/pdf/PressReleases/2025/three-year-strategic-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that aims to increase access to services for families that are not subject to official ACS supervision. The problem is that many families are understandably reluctant to get services from the very agency that has the power to remove a child from the home. At the Children's Law Center, we represent more than 5,000 children each year. That includes a client we'll call Jennie, who recently told us that she was being sexually abused by two men living in her father's apartment. Luckily, the judge in her case assigned an attorney for her and we were able to get her to a safe place without involving ACS. But finding services for her or a program to help her dad? That was much harder to do. Stopping the violence is critical but preventing further harm is also essential. As someone who has worked in family justice for over 30 years — and as someone who grew up in a home marked by violence — I don't have all the answers, but I do have some ideas about how to fill the child-sized holes in our safety net. We must start building the infrastructure for community-based, voluntary services for children exposed to domestic violence outside the Administration for Children's Services. Many parents simply won't take advantage of services if they think that ACS is lurking around the corner. A good first step would be to recognize that children in custody, visitation and guardianship cases have a particular need for services. Resource coordinators should be embedded in all Family Courts, so that service referrals become a standardized component of court proceedings. The new mayor could have it both ways: reducing ACS involvement in families' lives while also reducing the impact of violence on children by separating the issue of children exposed to violence at home from child welfare debates. At the legislative level, we should pass the bill authorizing the [Child and Family Wellbeing Fund](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S6431?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The state legislature should also ensure that all children who have been exposed to domestic violence have a right to counsel in Family Court. The interests of children often overlap with those of one or both parents, but not always. Providing young people with their own attorney is the best way to ensure that their voice is truly represented as decisions about them are being made. Kids want to be safe, but they also want to see both parents, and they deserve access to support. Let's make sure they have the right to be heard. ### Small Children, Big Looming Policy Questions URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-universal-childcare-policy-questions/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:29.000Z Just days into his term, Mayor Zohran Mamdani scored a significant win when he and Gov. Kathy Hochul [announced a pathway to universal, free child care in New York](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/transcript--mayor-mamdani---governor-hochul-to-launch-free-child?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). For New York City, the pathway begins with major investments in “2-Care,” free child care aimed at 2-year-olds. By all appearances, Mamdani and his team are adopting a reasonable and responsible strategy: communicating an ambitious end goal while designing a step-by-step process to get there. This increases the likelihood that Mamdani will be able to avoid stumbling blocks around promising too much too quickly; in New Mexico, Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham is already [running into a major challenge](https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local%5Fnews/new-mexico-lawmakers-spending-plan-wont-fully-fund-free-child-care/article%5F6757d75c-55f3-40e9-bc7a-9ad9bf2402eb.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as the state legislature threatens to meet less than 10% of the budget request needed to fully fund that state’s universal free child care initiative. That said, Mamdani still has difficult choices ahead, as any new policy inevitably brings tradeoffs. Here, I highlight five areas that are likely to prove thorny. ## Site prioritization One challenge with a phased-in approach is that it may be a number of years — maybe even into Mamdani’s potential second term — before some families start seeing benefits from the new child care investments. The mayor has indicated the 2-Care plan will begin this fall with 2,000 slots in high-needs neighborhoods, rising to roughly 10,000 slots by the end of 2027\. (It’s estimated that around 55,000 slots will be needed in total, given the percentage of families likely to take advantage of the offering) This is sensible, and reflects how the City rolled out 4K and 3K, although the scale-up for 4K was much faster due to the ability to lean heavily on public school infrastructure. There may be an obstacle ahead, however, as [reporting suggests](https://www.nydailynews.com/2026/01/13/hochul-state-of-the-state-plan-to-deliver-child-care-for-nyc-2-year-olds-may-fall-short-of-need/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Hochul’s planned state investment will cap out somewhere north of 30,000 slots. Mamdani will need an answer to how he plans to close the gap in the later years of the rollout. While projections so far out — before the initiative has even gotten underway or there is a sense of economic conditions in, say, 2030 — cannot be ignored, it’s worth noting the details are less vital. That said, even among and within high-need neighborhoods, there may be 2-Care winners and losers. Mamdani will therefore need to determine and communicate a fair system for determining where the free seats go — and to what type of child care sites — and also whether the benefits flow through individual families or through programs open to anyone in a given geographic area. The downside risk is ending up in a situation where, as social policy analyst Leah Libresco Sargeant [posted on X](https://x.com/LeahLibresco/status/2009345208211919064?s=20&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), there are “big disparities between the 2yo in Apt 5J who is getting $37,500/year to support care vs the 2yo in 11B who doesn’t.” The planned expansion of child care subsidy vouchers, which will occur alongside the 2-Care launch, should help mitigate this risk (and also offer benefits for parents with children below the age of two), but it is unlikely to eliminate it entirely. ## Educator pay parity New York City’s child care workforce is fragmented in a way few other places can comprehend. Some child care workers are employed by community-based nonprofits, some by the Department of Education, some by Head Start agencies, some by private providers — which range from large national for-profit chains to single-site mom-and-pop centers — and some, especially home-based providers, are self-employed. This patchwork is a legacy of the city’s size and [particular child care history](https://www.the74million.org/zero2eight/new-york-citys-60-year-old-fight-for-universal-child-care/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): New York was the only state in the nation to use substantial state and local funding to continue operations of World War II-era child care centers, and some city providers track their origins back even further to the days of settlement houses. There are also multiple unions involved. Sometimes several employers of record (and several unions) are present at the same program site. In his campaign, Mamdani pledged to “bring up wages for childcare workers — a quarter of whom currently live in poverty — to be at parity with public school teachers.” That’s easier said than done, and not only because at least one-fifth of child care educators in community-based settings [make less than the DOE minimum](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/FN23-085S.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for those with equivalent credentials, and equalization will cost millions. Figuring out how to equitably compensate all of these educators is going to be a headache, because there is no single answer that will satisfy everyone. Focus on bringing up pay among educators in private settings may lead to complaints that they are getting paid more despite often lacking many of the credentials as DOE-employed educators. Focus on recruiting new educators into the field with generous starting pay may lead to complaints that veteran educators are being ignored. Focus on improving the pay of educators in two-year-old classrooms may lead to complaints among educators in infant classrooms down the hall. Many of these complaints are entirely valid. The best path likely leads through a classic compromise that leaves everyone a little unhappy but serves the larger goals of the project. Washington, D.C. has been largely successful in balancing competing demands [within their Pay Equity Fund](https://www.mathematica.org/projects/washington-dc-early-childhood-educator-pay-equity-fund-impact-and-cost-effectiveness-study?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which has contributed to raises of $10,000 or more for some child care educators and substantial growth and stability within their child care workforce. ## Inclusion of home-based child care providers Speaking of displeased groups, the question of home-based (also known as family child care) providers looms large. Many of these providers, who operate licensed programs out of their homes and apartments, felt excluded from or disadvantaged by the 4K and 3K expansions; for instance, small home-based providers were ineligible for 4K contracts as the City prioritized center- and school-based settings. These providers — of which there are approximately 6,500 spread throughout the city — are particularly important for younger children whose parents may be less comfortable with center-based settings, and home-based providers frequently offer more flexibility in terms of hours and languages spoken. Yet as a [2025 report](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/69558138575781688a76dbf7/1767211320269/Dignified+Pay+for+Quality+Care-+What+New+York%E2%80%99s+Family+Child+Care+Providers+Need+to+Thrive.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from researchers at the New School suggests, pay rates for home-based providers can be as low as half that of center-based providers, and the City has struggled to pay many home-based providers in a timely and effective manner. To his credit, Mamdani seems to recognize this, stating during his press conference with Hochul that, “we will deliver care by working in partnership with child care providers, especially home-based providers who have been doing this work without thanks or recognition for far too long.” There are, of course, meaningful differences between home-based providers and center-based providers in terms of cost structures and operations; supporting both simultaneously is feasible but tricky. Importantly, doing so will require some flexibility, as a one-size-fits-all regulatory system will not work. The 4K and 3K expansions clearly missed the mark when it came to this part of the sector. Ensuring that home-based providers are fully included in the policy design process, and navigating the tension between home-based and center-based providers, will be paramount to the success of 2-Care and further efforts. ## Whither “family, friend and neighbor” care? Along the same lines, the plans announced to date are light on details regarding how ‘family, friend, and neighbor’ (FFN) caregivers — people like grandparents or close friends who provide regular child care to one or two children, but who are not licensed home-based providers — may or may not be included in the 2-Care system. The group was not mentioned at the recent press conference. This is an active conversation across the country; for instance, in New Mexico’s expanded child care system, these types of caregivers can register with the state and receive $750 a month per eligible child. There are again tradeoffs here: Including FFN caregivers expands the pool of providers and meets the preferences of substantial numbers of families that prefer to intimately know their child’s caregivers, but FFN providers can also be difficult to incorporate into a publicly funded system due to the inherent informality of the arrangements. Grandparents obviously aren’t unionizing, but there are open questions about what type of regulation and accountability is needed when public monies are involved. ## Communicating costs Finally, as Sargeant’s post illustrates, the cost figure being bandied around — approaching $40,000 a year per child, when you divide the $73 million initial investment by the 2,000 kids to be enrolled — may raise some eyebrows. In an objective analysis, the figure is perfectly defensible: It reflects the true cost of care in a high cost-of-living city where commercial rent is expensive and a competitive wage for child care educators is not $10 an hour. Getting the figure down significantly would require cutting back on plans to boost educator compensation, which works directly against the goals of scaling up the workforce to meet demand and of high-quality classrooms run by well-trained practitioners who don’t constantly turn over. Indeed, the figure is close to the [New York average](https://nysfocus.com/2025/08/06/does-new-york-spend-more-per-public-school-student-than-any-other-state?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of over $36,000 per K-12 student, and public school classrooms can have many more children per educator. There simply isn’t a long menu of options for reducing the costs of delivering child care because so many costs are fixed, most notably personnel and facilities. Important services sometimes require significant funding, and it makes no more sense to nickel-and-dime child care than it does to nickel-and-dime fire departments. That doesn’t change the fact that these are very large numbers. It will be important, then, that Mamdani continues explaining to a public not steeped in the economics of child care where the cost figures come from and why they are necessary and worthy investments. In the end, none of the challenges facing Mamdani and his team are insurmountable. So far, the Mayor seems to be applying lessons from the 4K and 3K rollouts and setting his administration on a road to success. How the mayor’s office navigates the visible boulders and the not-yet-visible ones that will surely appear (such as the Trump administration’s [recent attempt to freeze federal child care funding to New York and four other states](https://www.hhs.gov/press-room/hhs-freezes-child-care-family-assistance-grants-five-states-fraud-concerns.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) will help determine how far he’s able to take the city’s families over the coming years. ### Mamdani as Mr. Fix-It URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/just-fix-it-after-hours/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:29.000Z *Grand visions win elections, but functional governance is what keeps a city running. In this season premiere of "After Hours,"Jamie Rubin and Vital City founder Liz Glazer dig into a pragmatic to-do list for the new Mamdani administration: 11 tangible fixes for the first 100 days,* [*the first installment of Vital City's new "Just Fix It" project*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/government-improvements-mamdani-can-tackle-in-the-first-100-days)*. They discuss why unsexy improvements — like dismantling some of the city's 350 miles of scaffolding, turning on more outdoor lights to reduce crime, and clearing out the "spaghetti" of obsolete commissions — are critical to restoring New Yorkers’ faith in government. As Liz argues, there is no public policy without turning government gears that make it happen.* *You can listen to this episode, “Just Fix It,” on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/mamdani-as-mr-fix-it/id1794619189?i=1000745087582&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/44AWHFZgMPcILbPKY1oWXy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Mayor Mamdani, Here’s the Real Reason New Yorkers’ Groceries Cost So Much URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nyc-grocery-cost-explained/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T20:23:12.000Z The first few days of 2026, as Zohran Mamdani’s term as mayor began, were frigid. Returning home after a trip, I came home to an empty fridge. Rather than brave the sub-zero temperatures to bike to the Wegmans at the Brooklyn Navy Yard like I normally do, I walked to my local CTown grocery store to stock up. What I found was something New Yorkers have long griped about from our local chains: shockingly high prices. What first caught my eye were the price of four kiwis (organic, gold): $9.99 at the CTown, compared to [$6.99 at Whole Foods](https://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/product/zespri-produce-organic-gold-kiwi-16-oz-b079jmtdh4?clientContext=132-2359637-1053152&openid.pape.max%5Fauth%5Fage=31536000&openid.identity=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2Fap%2Fid%2Famzn1.account.42TIMLJXP7BG2HC5L7S5PXXXYQ&openid.op%5Fendpoint=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2Fap%2Fsignin&openid.pape.auth%5Ftime=2025-12-30T11%3A47%3A30Z&siteState=133-3799680-3932515&openid.signed=assoc%5Fhandle%2CaToken%2Cclaimed%5Fid%2Cidentity%2Cmode%2Cns%2Cop%5Fendpoint%2Cresponse%5Fnonce%2Creturn%5Fto%2CsiteState%2Cns.pape%2Cpape.auth%5Fpolicies%2Cpape.auth%5Ftime%2Csigned&stashKey=58a6851e-cb1c-42e4-8a15-c5ffd6fbbfdf&openid.return%5Fto=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wholefoodsmarket.com%2Fredirect%3FisUsingEagerSSO%3Dtrue&serial=3&openid.assoc%5Fhandle=amzn%5Fwfm%5Fweb%5Fsso%5Fus&openid.ns.pape=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fextensions%2Fpape%2F1.0&openid.mode=id%5Fres&openid.pape.auth%5Fpolicies=http%3A%2F%2Fschemas.openid.net%2Fpape%2Fpolicies%2F2007%2F06%2Fnone&openid.sig=hghq9wt9x8lTRVPB9D1%2BrY%2FGgZ0spASupXxAWG7wR0oUodHglT5pl1WmNNnQEOm3XmWkF%2FnYY0yi%2BxwI2H4XcHjsBFjk8IewoacZuirD8CegVGR0EMMvGjqgSxyewVSbmIwSJ4LVeZ0whMful%2BAuCssUjpBQyOtmcBI5ANAHAT%2F2ESh5xH5yFbvhDQkZvgywoc7aUcOMmx6EfkBBlgAtGLdZo7n6OPPFJiHQq0T6xjnVm6ajP16plK7XVADv6Yrh%2FecY4xbYMpQnsfxWyCTRt1vFXmcI6D08X%2Ff70XNQwTC90kePg7oyOOqvGsys42CHLg7gjMLDdVEkYK%2F5lJ3rpA%3D%3D&isUsingEagerSSO=true&openid.claimed%5Fid=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2Fap%2Fid%2Famzn1.account.42TIMLJXP7BG2HC5L7S5PXXXYQ&openid.response%5Fnonce=2026-01-05T01%3A18%3A06Z2955020289834651257&openid.ns=http%3A%2F%2Fspecs.openid.net%2Fauth%2F2.0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Then I started looking for my less extravagant staples — a pound of chicken thighs was $9.99 at the CTown, while the same exact brand goes for [$6.79 at Wegmans](https://www.wegmans.com/shop/categories/5598035?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); bananas that are [$0.79 a pound at Wegmans](https://www.wegmans.com/shop/categories/2957468?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are $1.29 at the CTown. Mamdani rode to the mayorship thanks to a relentless focus on affordability, promising to freeze the rent in stabilized units and make the buses free. And so it went with groceries too: “As mayor, I will create a network for city-owned grocery stores,” [he said in a TikTok video](https://www.tiktok.com/@zohran%5Fk%5Fmamdani/video/7447528235836902686?lang=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) posted after launching his primary campaign in 2024, “whose mission is lower prices, not price gouging.” He proposed to start with a pilot program of [one city-owned grocery store per borough](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/12/nyregion/grocery-stores-city-owned.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mamdani has identified a real issue, but his proposed solution is unresponsive to the problem. There are [few examples of government-run grocery stores](https://www.modernretail.co/operations/unpacked-the-history-of-city-owned-grocery-stores-and-how-public-private-partnerships-have-worked-in-other-markets/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the U.S., and the skills that it would take to even act as a landlord to one are not ones that New York City is known for. Libraries routinely [clock](https://www.bklynlibrary.org/themes/custom/bklyn/April-2024-Canarsie-Library-Community-Meeting.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [in](https://www.bklynlibrary.org/locations/pacific/future?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [at](https://databook.wegov.nyc/p/LQQ122-RG%5Frego-park-library---replacement-facility?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) $2,000 or more per square foot to build or renovate, and the New York City Housing Authority’s buildings are [full of empty storefronts](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2021/06/01/nychas-vacant-retail-spaces-leave-experts-confused/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The City would struggle to resist pressure by unions to agree to less productive practices and to pay higher wages than in most of the private sector, as it has even in its current role simply permitting grocery stores. Other politicians have proposed to tackle the problem of high costs at independent grocers through local antitrust policy. Operating on the theory that when big chains get cheaper wholesale food prices, they place smaller, locally owned supermarkets at a disadvantage not justified by their scale, a [bill in the state legislature](https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default%5Ffld=&leg%5Fvideo=&bn=A09212&term=&Summary=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) would force wholesalers to disclose the terms they offer large grocery chains, and have the state judge whether those terms are fair. The attorney general and ultimately judges would then be able to determine whether decisions to not do business with a specific retailer have a “commercially reasonable justification,” whether sales to one retailer would lead to “unreasonably diminished availability” for another and whether there are “genuine efficiencies” in vertical integration. The pro-mom-and-pop politics are appealing, but New York often struggles with even the core competencies of government, so it remains to be seen how well it would regulate competition in the low-margin, opaque wholesale market for groceries. A better solution would be to work with the private sector to make it easier to open new grocery stores, stimulating competition in the sector the traditional way — by increasing supply. To bring better produce at lower prices to New Yorkers, Mamdani should apply an abundance mindset to grocery stores. The same logic that’s led him to come around to embrace a housing agenda that seeks to enable the private sector to build many more apartments should inform his approach to food. Doing this makes great economic sense, but it would involve challenging ingrained political attitudes about protecting small businesses from national competition. Before going further, we should stop, step back and look at the city’s supermarket landscape through clear eyes — to understand what makes owning and operating a store different here than just about anywhere else in America. New York City used to have a thriving ecosystem of local mom-and-pop greengrocers offering quality produce at reasonable prices, but these are shutting down as [aging owners retire](https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/nyregion/korean-grocers-a-new-york-fixture-are-on-the-decline.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and their kids find better career prospects elsewhere. Of the larger remaining supermarkets, many are cooperatives with common branding and suppliers — CTown, Foodtown, Associated and Key Food, chief among them — but different owners depending on their location. The local chains left cannot match the passion and work ethic of the old greengrocers. The cooperative brands were formed in the 20th century to create economies of scale in purchasing across the region, but they cannot match the buying power or technology of 21st century national chains. Chains like Gristedes and Morton Williams specialized in managing the difficult logistics of Manhattan, but Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s cracked that code years ago. Cost-saving innovations like self-checkout — or even consolidated lines for registers — elude the local chains, some of which have also [signed union contracts](https://www.ufcw1500.org/your-rights/frequently-asked-questions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=q.%20which%20food%20stores%20in%20new%20york%20are%20unionized?). > The same logic that’s led Mayor Mamdani to come around to embrace a housing agenda that seeks to enable the private sector to build many more apartments should inform his approach to food. The grocery business has become heavily consolidated not only [in the U.S.](https://farmaction.us/grocery-retail-the-last-link-in-the-monopoly-chain/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but throughout the developed world — in Switzerland, the top two grocers [control 80% of the market](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/agribusiness/coop-overtakes-migros-in-core-business/90267923?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Many of the chains now growing in the U.S. are now not just national, but international. The owner of Germany’s Aldi Nord bought Trader Joe’s decades ago, while Aldi Süd is opening stores across the United States and New York City under the Aldi brand. The Aldis’ major German competitor, Lidl, is now opening stores in New York City as well. It is simply not realistic for New York City to fight the trend toward more consolidated chains, and consumers will keep suffering as long as we keep trying. National and international chains are making inroads into the city already, and if New York politicians can accept the benefits of welcoming in all grocers rather than trying to exclude those they deem unworthy, there are many available policy levers to further stimulate competition in the sector. The lowest-hanging fruit is to simply legalize selling groceries in more of the city. The most egregious planning barrier is that grocery stores over 10,000 square feet are [not generally allowed as-of-right](https://zr.planning.nyc.gov/article-iv/chapter-2/42-162?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in so-called “M” districts, which are the easiest places to find sites large enough to accommodate the large stores that national grocers are used to. Many of these districts are mapped in places that are not what people have in mind when they think “industrial” — mixed-use neighborhoods with lots of housing like stretches of Williamsburg’s Bedford Avenue and almost all of Gowanus, even post-rezoning, are in fact mapped as industrial districts. To open a full-sized grocery store in these areas, a developer must seek a “special permit,” which requires the full City Council to get together and vote for an exception to the rules. This is a long, uncertain process, and has in the past even been an invitation to corruption. Most famously, the City Council uses this power to [keep out Walmart](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/nyregion/walmart-opts-out-of-city-mall-after-facing-labor-opposition.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the behest of unions and community groups. Thwarted in its plans to open a store in East New York — a low-income Brooklyn neighborhood that could desperately use more grocery options — the nation’s largest grocer instead serves New Yorkers with a store just beyond the Queens/Nassau line in Valley Stream, [rumored to be](https://www.reddit.com/r/walmart/comments/aga6jg/busiest%5Fwalmart/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the busiest Walmart in the country. New Yorkers with a car and the willingness to schlep beyond city limits — or pay the Instacart premium — get access to cheaper groceries; the rest get locked out. When politicians are willing to approve a grocery store, the price can be high. My beloved Brooklyn Navy Yard Wegmans was part of a [torturous public-private partnership](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiral%27s%5FRow?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#Redevelopment) that involved preserving an old mansion and building lots of questionable non-grocery retail and office space that remains mostly vacant to this day. Whole Foods cut a deal to open the store in Gowanus, at Third Avenue and Third Street, in exchange for preserving a similar historic building (which also still sits vacant), along with installing solar panels over the parking lot (which at the time were more expensive than they are today) and wind turbines that [can’t even power a microwave on a windy day](https://www.visionairwind.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/HoYi-Brochure-May-2020.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — shiny, spinning objects intended to lull politicians into a “yes” vote like a baby’s crib mobile. As for corruption, in 2003, Brooklyn Councilman Angel Rodriguez was sentenced to [prison](https://www.ourmidland.com/news/article/Ex-NYC-Councilman-Gets-Prison-Term-7180702.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for trying to extort over $1.5 million in cash and benefits from a developer in exchange for voting to allow the Red Hook Fairway (now a Food Bazaar) to open. Fascinatingly, the special permit requirement can be avoided entirely by building underground, where space doesn’t legally count toward the 10,000-square foot limit. Subterranean construction is an expensive proposition, but it’s how the Whole Foods managed to open up a store in a cellar on Bedford Avenue, which would otherwise require a full City Council vote. Trader Joe’s resorted to the same underground zoning hack on nearby Kent Ave. These national chains spare Williamsburg residents the [much higher prices](https://www.reddit.com/r/williamsburg/comments/1pzwwa5/brooklyn%5Fharvest%5Fmarket%5Fprices%5Fversus%5Fwhole%5Ffoods/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the aboveground Brooklyn Harvest nearby, in a commercial district where a Council vote was not required. > National and international chains are making inroads into the city already, and if New York politicians can accept the benefits of welcoming in all grocers rather than trying to exclude those they deem unworthy, there are many available policy levers to further stimulate competition in the sector. Grocers with deep pockets, a premium reputation and hardcore fanbases may occasionally jump through these hoops — managing mercurial councilmembers, building expensive underground stores, maybe even playing along to pay a bribe — to win permission to open stores near well-heeled residential neighborhoods like Park Slope and Fort Greene. But most grocers in most neighborhoods won’t even try. Beyond all these barriers to opening grocery stores in industrial districts, the city has simply not zoned enough land for development in residential and commercial districts. Most existing buildings in New York City are small, and modern grocery stores require large, clear spaces that are easiest to provide in new buildings. When neighborhoods don’t allow new buildings — either for traditional not-in-my-backyard reasons, or more “progressive” justifications like trying to hold off growth that they don’t feel serves existing residents — they also don’t get new supermarkets that serve all of their residents. Even outside of mapped industrial districts, developers often shove grocery stores underground (Manhattan and downtown Brooklyn especially are full of them), due simply to the general shortage of zoned capacity in a city ridden with NIMBYs. Building underground is more expensive than building above ground, but at least it doesn’t count toward zoning limits. The City also has a program called [FRESH](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/citywide/food-retail-expansion-support-health-fresh?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#fresh%5Fexpansion) that gives incentives to open new grocery stores, but the program does not apply citywide, and in many of the places where the program does apply, it [only offers financial incentives](https://zola.planning.nyc.gov/about?layer-groups=%5B%22building-footprints%22%2C%22fresh%22%2C%22street-centerlines%22%2C%22subway%22%5D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — not the zoning bonuses available elsewhere. Even in neighborhoods where they do apply, they are useless if politicians won’t agree to zoning for new buildings at all. There are additional zoning obstacles. While the City has mostly removed parking requirements for housing, off-street parking is [still required for grocery stores](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/10/21/upshot/parking-mandates.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in much of the city. The zoning code contains a number of waivers for parking requirements for smaller uses, but grocery stores are often too large to qualify. Food is as critical as housing, and parking should not be a barrier to building grocery stores any more than it should be for housing. Many grocers, especially national chains, would still demand it, but that should be their choice. Beyond zoning barriers to opening new grocery stores, New York City’s grocery supply chain is aging. Fresh meat and produce must be purchased daily, and the Bronx’s Hunts Point Produce Market, the city’s traditional wholesale market, is physically obsolete. The market’s organization as a co-op on City-owned land adds multiple layers of complexity to any effort to invest in proper warehouses to replace the diesel-powered refrigerated trailers that have proliferated. Subsidized efforts like [using congestion pricing money to upgrade the facility](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/01/23/new-fridge-units-planned-for-hunts-point/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) may show some results, but the private sector should also be allowed to play more of a role. The city should zone more of its private land for denser warehouses and cold storage facilities. > When neighborhoods don’t allow new buildings, they also don’t get new supermarkets that serve all of their residents. Mayor de Blasio’s Department of City Planning tried to fix the problem of restrictions on warehouse development in northern Brooklyn, but planners were [stymied by now-Brooklyn Borough President Antonio Reynoso](https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2019/04/22/north-brooklyn-rezoning-plan-dead-in-the-water-982378?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), then a city councilmember. He felt the plan to allow [denser non-residential development](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/brooklyn/north-brooklyn-industry-plan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the industrial parts of Williamsburg, Greenpoint and Bushwick did not include enough restrictions on non-industrial uses. His fear turned out to be largely unwarranted given the subsequent outerborough retail and office crash and the boom in industrial demand during the pandemic, but markets change faster than politics can react, and the plan died. Councilmembers should learn from Reynoso’s blunder and accept planners’ expertise, and Mamdani should make another push on this front. There are other levers, too. Grocery stores are complex logistical operations, and road and curbside congestion slows deliveries, driving up costs and leaving perishables to rot. Congestion pricing was a good start, but charging the full $15 fee, expanding the program beyond the Manhattan core, and cracking down on box-blocking and creating more loading zones could make deliveries easier. Another ingredient is slow city bureaucracy. Even after an operator leases a storefront, it often sits empty for months as agencies must grant approvals and carry out inspections. Agencies like the Department of Buildings and the Fire Department should streamline the code requirements to renovate space to meet grocers’ needs, and approve new facilities more quickly. s A last idea is making better use of the humble elevator — and reducing the high price of electricity here. In other countries, freight elevators are an important tool for moving food around and into storage, with one grocery store developer in Germany saying he would [always install one](https://admin.centerforbuilding.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Elevators.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=108) in a store in a place as dense as New York City. Here, though, elevators [cost three times as much to build](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/08/opinion/elevator-construction-regulation-labor-immigration.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and even more to operate as in Western Europe, so workers often move food into grocery basements by hand or with janky conveyor belt-like devices. The mayor could drag the elevator industry into the 21st century by adopting globally harmonized standards for devices, spurring competition in an oligopolistic market. Grocery stores are also [electricity-intensive businesses](https://rkenergygroup.com/case-study-nyc-supermarket/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with high demand for refrigeration, so anything the governor can do to bring more generation and transmission online would be helpful. Gov. Cuomo closed the Indian Point nuclear reactors, a big step back for the state and city. The New York City grocery market stands out nationally in a number of ways, and will never look exactly like the rest of the country. The city is dense and customers are more likely to arrive on foot than by car, making it a proving ground for national retailers to [try out](https://www.grocerydive.com/news/whole-foods-daily-shop-convenience-prepared-foods-small-format-new-york-city/727172/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) more urban, small-footprint concepts that can later be rolled out to other dense U.S. cities. And New York’s ethnic diversity means there will always be demand for foods that national retailers don’t stock — H Mart started selling Asian groceries in Woodside in Queens before expanding across the United States and then abroad, and NetCost Market has spread the Eastern European concept it started in southern Brooklyn to [Pennsylvania and Florida](https://www.netcostmarket.com/locations/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But grocery abundance can only be achieved by balancing what makes the city unique with the scale that national retailers can bring. Local chains that have something special to offer should be allowed to thrive, and those that New Yorkers resent having as their only options should be allowed to fail. To do that, policymakers need to focus on breaking down barriers to competition, letting New Yorkers vote with their wallets and sort the rest out. ### Mamdani’s Affordability Dilemma: The Challenge of Making New York City Housing Less Expensive URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-housing-affordability-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:29.000Z New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani is being roundly, and appropriately, praised for the affordability focus of his campaign. Household budgets across the country are being squeezed as rents, home prices and the cost of other critical consumption goods rise faster than incomes. These affordability pressures are particularly acute in high-cost cities like New York. But what can Mamdani actually do to make the city more affordable? There's good news and bad news. The bad news is that many of the drivers of affordability are largely beyond the scope of any mayor's power, from rising insurance and utility costs to increased tariffs and a weakening labor market. Meanwhile, mayors have limited ability to raise revenues, and volatile federal funding streams undermine policy responses. It's fundamentally difficult for policymakers at any level of government to make housing — the largest component of household spending — more affordable in the short- or medium-run. Markets typically address affordability through increased supply. If the demand for bagels increases, and prices start to rise, producers can quickly make more bagels, which should lower prices. But it's not so easy to increase the supply of homes. Most obviously, there is a limited supply of land within a city, and zoning limits the amount of new housing that can be created on each site. Even when land is available, regulations make it extremely difficult and time-consuming to secure appropriate permits. Further, even the most aggressive supply policies can only increase the supply of housing by a few percentage points. Austin, Texas, which now leads the nation in the rate of new construction, [is on track to build about 15,000 units in 2025](https://www.credaily.com/briefs/apartment-construction-surges-in-south-2025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That's a stunning accomplishment, but it only amounts to about 3% of the city's existing housing stock. In New York, the number of new units completed reached 34,000 in 2024, the highest annual total in decades, but this was less than 1% of the existing housing stock. And of course, some units fall out of the stock too, so the total housing stock in Austin and New York grew by even less than these amounts. At this pace, it's difficult to make visible progress in increasing supply during a mayor's term. A second challenge is the rising costs of construction. While this increase is happening throughout the country, it's happening off of a higher base in New York City. Mamdani's housing plan assumes the creation of new affordable housing at a cost of $500,000 per unit, *with* union labor. This is an admirable goal, but it won't be easy. Affordable housing developers say that per unit costs in the city now run considerably higher than this. The lengthy, complex and risky process of securing approvals to build housing, along with the significant regulatory requirements, design requirements and approval processes all add significantly to construction costs in New York. The costs of construction labor and materials — so-called "hard costs" — are also higher in New York City than in other cities. According to an annual survey conducted by the construction management company [Turner and Towsend, the hard costs of high-rise construction in New York are higher than in any other city in the world, and the hard costs for low-rise construction are among the highest in the world](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/why-it-costs-so-much-build-new-york-city-0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). High labor costs are a key reason, as are strict licensing rules and building code requirements that call for more expensive materials, which are even more expensive today given the Trump Administration's tariffs. Liability and workers' compensation insurance also tend to be higher in New York City, partly due to the state's unique [scaffolding law](https://nycosh.org/initiatives/scaffold-safety-law/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which holds contractors and building owners strictly liable for any injury occurring on the job. Any reduction in construction costs will involve some difficult trade-offs. Another obstacle to creating more affordable housing is the limited supply of funding to create dedicated affordable units. [The City relies heavily on federal funds to support its affordable housing initiatives,](https://furmancenter.org/stateofthecity/view/ii-federal-programs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but that funding is now uncertain. Tax credits for the construction of new affordable homes are also limited in number. The tax-exempt bonds that are needed to use most tax credits are also limited, and housing must compete with other priorities for their use. Furthermore, these funds cover only a fraction of the total development costs. Moreover, federal funding for rental assistance is limited, with only about one in four eligible households across the country receiving assistance. Cities are constrained in their ability to raise these additional dollars through local taxes by both legal and political limits. They must balance their budgets, and spending a lot more than other cities on redistributive programs like affordable housing can be risky as affluent households may seek to avoid the taxes by moving to other states and localities. Even if the City could build housing more cheaply, another challenge is the rising cost of operating and maintaining that housing, especially given New York's very old stock of housing. [Close to 40% of housing units in New York City were built before 1940](https://popfactfinder.planning.nyc.gov/explorer/selection/106f9a16111bb5c091e4c7c251fe63fd9ed5b365?acsTopics=hou-housingOccupancy%2Chou-unitsInStructure%2Chou-yearStructureBuilt%2Chou-rooms%2Chou-housingTenure%2Chou-yearHouseholderMovedIntoUnit%2Chou-vehiclesAvailable%2Chou-occupantsPerRoom%2Chou-value%2Chou-mortgageStatus%2Chou-selectedMonthlyOwnerCostsAsAPercentageOfHouseholdIncomeSmocapi%2Chou-grossRent%2Chou-grossRentAsAPercentageOfHouseholdIncomeGrapi&source=acs-current), and as buildings age, they inevitably need more repairs. Some owners, perhaps especially owners of rent-stabilized buildings, have deferred maintenance due to thin operating margins, which makes the costs of upkeep all the more challenging. Meanwhile, utility costs are rising, and property insurance costs continue to escalate, driven by climate threats, liability lawsuits, and higher construction costs. Even landlords just trying to break even may need to increase rents to cover these rising costs. Mamdani has limited tools to address these macro challenges. Finally, the mayor is also limited in what he can do to limit demand pressures. Much of housing demand is driven by macro factors like interest rates, demographic shifts, rising income inequality and the postpandemic increase in demand for space and privacy. Of course, the ultimate Catch-22 for any mayor is that making a city more livable also generally means making it more desirable and expensive. All that said, the good news is that there are some things that Mamdani can do to help drive down the cost of living. First, he can and should do more to facilitate the creation of housing. City of Yes and the recent ballot proposals are welcome steps forward, but there is more that the new administration can do to reduce regulatory barriers to new housing. The mayor can use targeted neighborhood rezonings to upzone near transit stations, where new homes will not bring as many cars. There is also room for new homes in the city's low-density neighborhoods through adding "gentle density" — duplexes, triplexes and small apartment buildings that would not fundamentally change the look and feel of the neighborhoods. Housing added near transit should not be subject to minimum parking requirements. [In other parts of the city, developers are required to provide off-street parking when they create new housing, which adds significantly to the cost of construction.](https://furmancenter.org/files/publications/furman%5Fparking%5Frequirements%5Fpolicy%5Fbrief%5F3%5F21%5F12%5Ffinal%5F2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Relatedly, the mayor can also help to boost the number of new, affordable housing units created by working to make the large number of acres in the city owned by the city, state or federal government; faith-based institutions and other nonprofits easier to develop. And Mamdani's administration can help to reduce construction costs by scrutinizing the building code to identify opportunities for reforms that would lower costs without sacrificing much safety, [such as allowing plastic water pipes](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/why-it-costs-so-much-build-new-york-city-0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), moving the city's building code requirements closer to those of other large cities in the U.S. The city might also look for ways to harness AI to improve coordination and avoid duplication over the myriad inspections and approvals required. Facilitating the creation of different types of housing is valuable too. The City of Yes rezoning made it possible to convert buildings to single-room occupancy housing, and to allow accessory dwelling units in some areas. Both those types of housing could help provide housing for smaller, low-income households, but it will require creativity and determination to bring the finance, insurance, construction, utility and other industries together, along with the permitting agencies, to actually spur significant construction, conversion and operation of these housing types. The mayor can also do more to preserve the existing stock of affordable housing. Every administration must balance the need for preservation against the need for new supply. Preservation can be both cheaper and more climate-friendly than demolition and new construction. This includes the critical task of preserving the city's public housing units, which need about $80 billion in capital repairs, according to New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) estimates. The mayor should ask his deputy mayor of housing and planning to focus on improving the capacity of the housing agencies to monitor the conditions and management of subsidized buildings, and reviewing the balance between requiring adequate reserves and avoiding unnecessary financing costs. The mayor should also firmly support NYCHA's plans to renovate its buildings using a variety of different approaches and reassure residents [that they will still be protected from higher rents and arbitrary evictions](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/Impact-Of-The-RAD-on-Childrens-Residential-Mobility-Health-and-Well-Being-in-New-York-State.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Given [the dilapidated condition of many of NYCHA's buildings](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/housing-and-buildings/2025/2025-september-how-federal-budget-changes-could-reshape-nycha.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=1%20NYCHA%20carries%20out%20federal%20housing%20programs,day%2Dto%2Dday%20operations%20and%20for%20longer%2Dterm%20capital%20improvements.), the alternative is simply not tenable. The high cost of housing is driven not just by construction costs but also by the cost of maintaining and operating housing. The mayor can prioritize in his Albany agenda legislation and budget appropriations to enact reforms and provide subsidies to help stabilize finances for the subset of rent-stabilized buildings for which operating costs exceed rental revenues while at the same time maintaining the affordability of the rents for existing tenants. That would require reimagining the hardship exception process, which promises to give relief (but rarely, if ever, does) to building owners facing particular challenges. The Mayor should work with both the state legislature and the state Division of Housing and Community Renewal to make the process less time-consuming and costly, less rigid and more attuned to the different challenges that various types of rent-regulated buildings face. Even buildings that require exceptions, however, must remain affordable to existing tenants, so adopting a government subsidy, especially for low-income tenants, may be necessary. Mamdani will need to work with the governor and his former colleagues in the state legislature to make those reforms and to reconsider some of the most restrictive features of the 2019 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act in order to allow for modest increases in rents when a tenant moves out, and when owners make investments in their buildings, without incentivizing harassment of existing tenants. As for reducing operating costs, the mayor could advocate for some of the sensible property tax reforms that have been proposed over the years to reduce the disproportionate burden on rental buildings (such as ending the under-valuation of high-end co-ops and condos by [valuing them in the same way as 1-3 family homes and small rental buildings and adjusting the share of total taxes paid by rental buildings](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/propertytaxreform/downloads/pdf/final-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). But the mayor would have to spend political capital to make such reform a priority in Albany. The mayor also could work with his former state colleagues to create a property insurance fund specific to affordable housing. As for utility costs, the mayor could support energy retrofits and critical home repairs and modifications, including for moderate- and middle-income homeowners, to allow them to reduce their utility bills, keep their homes and age in their communities. Finally, the mayor could push to reform the systems and processes to place people into affordable homes. It takes far too long for families in need to work their way through the City's Housing Connect matching system — [over the past four fiscal years, the median time it took to approve an applicant for an income-restricted apartment ranged from 142 to 192 days](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2025/hpd.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Unfortunately, affordable homes may sit empty while the eligibility and matching processes drag on. The City should scrutinize eligibility rules and documentation requirements to find ways to reduce administrative burden and streamline approvals. For households that are lucky enough to receive a housing voucher, it can take months to find a suitable unit and a willing landlord. Many fail and have to return their voucher to the city. Some of this reflects the tough housing market in New York, but the city could do more to experiment with different approaches to landlord outreach and inspections. It's not enough to design new tools to promote affordability; the City must do everything it can to ensure that residents can actually take advantage of the resources the city has to offer and can access them during their most acute times of need. None of this is easy, and none of this is quick. It may take years to accomplish these reforms, and it may take more years for them to visibly improve affordability. But to live up to the promise of his campaign, Mamdani needs to continue to stay focused on affordability — not just while campaigning, but also while governing. ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched in 2022 as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*. We were betting that in a time of hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and engaging writing on how to make cities better.* *Our readers answered with a resounding yes, and helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *We have ambitious plans for the months ahead: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decision-makers, strengthening our data analysis and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help. We're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* ***If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*** [***Become a supporter***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-sitetop?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***today.*** *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### Revealing Hidden Signals in City Hotline Data URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/revealing-hidden-signals-in-city-hotline-data/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:29.000Z Could a surge in 911 and 311 calls actually be a sign that things are getting better? That's the provocative question raised by researchers affiliated with the [Bloomberg Center for Cities at Harvard](https://cities.harvard.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in a [recent study published in Justice Quarterly](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07418825.2025.2557333?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Analyzing years of hotline data from Buffalo, the research team found that rising call volumes were not necessarily a signal of worsening conditions, but an indicator that residents were becoming more willing to engage with their community and with city government. Their case study centers on Buffalo's long-running [Clean Sweep](https://www.buffalony.gov/849/Clean-Sweep?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program, which began primarily as a block-by-block code-enforcement effort and has since evolved into a more comprehensive model combining outreach, repair and service coordination. Since the mid-2000s, Clean Sweep teams — consisting of city staff and police officers — have been deployed to historically underserved neighborhoods. Teams go door to door, speak directly with residents, and then carry out a coordinated set of actions within a concentrated area over the course of a week: repairing sidewalks, boarding vacant properties, clearing lots, removing trash and connecting residents to social services. When researchers examined 911 and 311 calls before and after these interventions, striking patterns emerged. In the six months *following* a Clean Sweep intervention, residents were 42% more likely to call 911 about drug-related crimes compared to residents near similar properties that did not receive the intervention. They were also 9% more likely to submit 311 service requests related to issues such as trash or graffiti. These findings are revealed in the recent [report](https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/effects-place-based-intervention-resident-reporting-crime-and-service-needs-frontier?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "The Effects of a Place-Based Intervention on Resident Reporting of Crime and Service Needs" — challenging the assumption that an uptick of distress calls is a sign of escalating problems. Instead, the findings suggest that changes in reporting behavior may be an indicator of evolving trust, access and community-government relationships. A companion qualitative [study](https://www.cities.harvard.edu/research/the-impact-of-city-led-neighborhood-action-on-the-coproduction-of-neighborhood-quality-and-safety-in-buffalo-ny/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) digs into why the Clean Sweep approach appears to shift reporting behavior. Bloomberg Center for Cities researchers identified three interlocking insights: responsiveness, trust and self-efficacy. ## What data can conceal Residents in underserved neighborhoods described feeling ignored by city services for years. But the visibility of consistent, place-based engagement changed that dynamic. As one resident put it, "It brings the message that we're important … that our place is important to the city." The program's structured outreach includes city staff and community-oriented police officers walking door to door, introducing themselves and listening. These interpersonal interactions helped rebuild trust. One police officer noted, "I've found \[with\] the more positive interactions … the more there's a sense of safety and people's bravery \[to report crime\] increases." Once residents began to see tangible results, many reported a growing sense of agency. "We know what we need to do, but sometimes we need a push — the Clean Sweep is a little push," one resident said. Others described forming block clubs, calling 311 themselves or simply feeling more empowered to take care of their street or neighborhood. Together, these place-based dynamics help explain how a focused intervention can shift not only residents' willingness to report problems, but also their inclination to take collective action. The research also makes clear, however, that certain conditions are necessary for this shift to occur. An increase in call volume, on its own, is an incomplete signal. The Bloomberg Center for Cities researchers emphasize the importance of pairing quantitative data with qualitative insight — combining hotline records with community interviews, field observations and neighborhood context to understand what the numbers actually reflect. The findings also highlight the value of longitudinal data and interagency coordination. The Buffalo analysis was possible in part because the city invested in open data systems that allowed 911 and 311 calls to be linked to property-level information. That transparency not only enabled rigorous evaluation; it also reinforced residents' sense that government was paying attention and responding. ## What can Mayor Mamdani do with these findings? Rather than launching an entirely new initiative, the Mamdani administration could build on existing programs and stitch them together into something more resident-centered and consistent. Citywide sanitation efforts such as [CleaNYC](https://edc.nyc/program/cleanyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Get Stuff Clean](https://www.nyc.gov/content/getstuffdone/pages/get-stuff-clean?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) already operate at scale, but they primarily measure success through outputs — bags of trash collected, baskets emptied — rather than through resident engagement or responsiveness. Pairing cleanup operations with structured door-to-door outreach, modeled on Buffalo's Clean Sweep, could make city presence more visible and meaningful in historically underserved neighborhoods. Two other initiatives launched under Mayor Adams could also be better coordinated to approximate a Clean Sweep-style approach. [Community Link](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/community-link.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) brings multiple agencies together to address persistent quality-of-life issues involving sanitation, mental health, housing code enforcement and infrastructure. Meanwhile, the NYPD's [Q-Teams](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/08/mayor-adams-and-nypd-commissioner-tisch-expand-quality-of-life-t0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Q%2DTeams%20are%20comprised%20of,alternative%20to%20using%20enforcement%20tools.) program — spearheaded under Commissioner Jessica Tisch — focuses on responding to 911/311 calls related to low-level quality-of-life complaints at the precinct level, such as noise, illegal parking and public drug-use. There is also the [Mayor's Action Plan for Neighborhood Safety](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/learn-about-map?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a place-based initiative launched in 2014 aimed at improving public safety and quality of life in historically disinvested public housing developments operated by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). Aligning these efforts — through predictable schedules, shared geographic focus and clear interagency roles — could transform episodic cleanups into sustained, trust-building neighborhood interventions. Finally, New York City already has one of the country's most robust 311 and increasingly accessible 911 data systems. That infrastructure is critical to understanding when rising call volumes reflect worsening conditions versus growing civic engagement. Given the potential for misinterpretation as well as reporting biases, as documented by New York's [City Council](https://council.nyc.gov/data/311-agency/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), qualitative research is critical to understanding what the numbers are really saying. For urban leaders and data analysts alike, the lesson is clear: Combining data with interpersonal engagement is a viable pathway to improving block-level conditions, strengthening trust in government and increasing social cohesion. As the Harvard researchers show, these efforts change not just what gets reported — but who feels empowered to speak up and act. *This article draws on research from the Bloomberg Harvard City Leadership Initiative and its partner institutions, including Robb et al. 2025; Dickens et al. 2025.* ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched in 2022 as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*. We were betting that in a time of hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and engaging writing on how to make cities better.* *Our readers answered with a resounding yes, and helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *We have ambitious plans for the months ahead: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decision-makers, strengthening our data analysis and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help. We're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* ***If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*** [***Become a supporter***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-sitetop?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***today.*** *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### Mamdani, Like Mayors Before Him, Can Have a Foreign Policy URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdani-trump-maduro-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:29.000Z Mayor Zohran Mamdani's vocal criticism of the U.S. attack on Venezuela reminds us that New York City mayors have their own foreign policy. The city's global economy and its ever-changing but always huge immigrant population give millions of its residents a personal stake in things that happen in other parts of the world. Though of course there are times when far-away events can be a distraction from the job of running municipal government, in this town, it typically comes with the territory. Over the weekend, Mamdani[ called President Trump](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/world/americas/mamdani-trump-venezuela-maduro.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to register his disagreement with the dramatic, possibly illegal United States military operation that arrested Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The recent influx of tens of thousands of Venezuelans to New York makes the matter relevant here. So does the Manhattan location of Maduro's indictment and arraignment. Since most Venezuelans seem pleased that Maduro has been removed from power, the mayor's posture appears a matter of principle, not politics. Mamdani ran and was just sworn in on a platform of affordability. A case can be made that he would do well to keep his eye on the ball. Yet when international events awaken the conscience of a large segment of the population the mayor represents and challenge his own beliefs, leadership requires that he voice his opinion. It has happened many times before. On Oct. 15, 1969, Mayor John Lindsay (1966-1973) ordered flags on municipal buildings flown at half-staff to protest the Vietnam War and in remembrance of those who died in it. He also objected to the cost in national treasure at a time when New York needed federal support to address domestic problems — a liberal version of America First. He was praised by the war's opponents and condemned by its supporters. Lindsay's focus on problems beyond America's borders was not an anomaly for the modern mayor. Since New York has long been home to the nation's largest Jewish population, matters affecting Jews and the sole Jewish state have often featured prominently in mayoral politics. Mayor Fiorello La Guardia (1934-1945) straddled principle and politics in the 1930s. He was quick to condemn Adolf Hitler's antisemitism but slower to denounce fellow fascist Benito Mussolini, who was more popular with Italian voters. William O'Dwyer (1946-1950) was mayor when the United Nations voted at the organization's temporary headquarters in Flushing, Queens, to create two states in Palestine — one Jewish and one Arab. As May 15, 1948, approached — a date Israelis now celebrate as Independence Day and Arabs mourn as a catastrophe — war loomed between Jewish Zionists and Arab opponents. During World War II, O'Dwyer had been a brigadier general who served as executive director of the War Refugee Board, charged with saving Jews from annihilation in Nazi-controlled countries. Not quite half a century later, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat — freedom fighter to some, irredeemable terrorist to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and many others — was in town in 1995 during the 50th anniversary of the creation of the United Nations. Giuliani ordered him removed from a city-sponsored concert at Lincoln Center celebrating the event. The U.S. Department of State and others denounced the breach of diplomatic protocol. Many New Yorkers applauded the bold act. Now, considerable controversy surrounds Mamdani's [decision to revoke many executive orders](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/04/nyregion/mamdani-revoke-israel-orders.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) issued by his predecessor, Mayor Eric Adams, including one that expanded the definition of antisemitism and another that barred city employees and agencies from boycotting or divesting from Israel. Mamdani, who canceled every order signed by Adams after he was indicted on federal corruption charges, declared it a matter of "good government" to reject unilateral decisions made by a mayor with compromised credibility — not a statement about Israel. Now, Israel and New York watch and wait to see[ whether Mamdani will try to take additional steps](https://www.timesofisrael.com/what-are-mamdanis-policy-proposals-that-could-directly-impact-jewish-new-yorkers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — including potentially severing some New York [investments](https://forward.com/opinion/771562/zohran-mamdani-israel-investments-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in and [partnerships](https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ak1rq4x30?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with Israel or even [ordering the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu](https://x.com/jacobkornbluh/status/1925719752040697933?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a move that would test state, federal and international law. Mamdani's posture reflects his personal beliefs and a dramatic change in the sentiment of many New Yorkers, including many Jews, towards Israeli actions. Once-reflexive support for the Jewish state has become conditional for many. The grotesque attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023 prompted an Israeli military response that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and caused a humanitarian crisis affecting millions. Many New Yorkers find the Israeli actions too harsh to condone. Israel may well be a special case when it comes to foreign policy, but it is far from a category of one. In 1988, Mayor Edward Koch (1978-1989) traveled to Northern Ireland. While there among British hosts, he declared its troops should not be considered an occupying army. This was an about-face from his longstanding position on "the Troubles." He returned home to a streets-of-New-York earful from his Irish American constituents and reverted to his earlier stand. The episode earned him criticism in Britain, Ireland and the United States. Respect for ancestral homelands is a tradition for New York City mayors that moves with the times. When Irish, Italians and Jews dominated the electoral landscape, candidates for mayor routinely made a point of visiting Ireland, Italy and Israel. David Dinkins, New York's first Black mayor, welcomed South Africa's moral leader and later president, Nelson Mandela, to New York in an inspiring celebration of the end of that nation's racist Apartheid system and later traveled to South Africa himself. Adams visited Ghana out of respect for his ancestral roots. Mamdani, an immigrant like O'Dwyer and Mayor Abraham Beame (1974-1977), visited his native Uganda during his recent campaign and publicly cherishes his South Asian heritage. Symbolism matters in politics. New York has long been America's most important Catholic city and its most important Jewish city. Mamdani's extraordinary political rise and our large Muslim population, perhaps as many as 1 million people by some estimates, makes New York the nation's most important Muslim city as well. Emotions surrounding ethnic identity and religious conviction have caused conflict for thousands of years and New York is hardly immune. By simultaneously engaging in foreign policy debates and advancing pluralism within the city, a mayor like Mamdani can demonstrate how engagement need not be fundamentally divisive. During the 20th century, the many nations of Europe living side by side in a territory the size of a continent led to two world wars. When people from all of those same nations, plus Asians, Africans and Latin Americans, found themselves living side by side on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, the result was New York City. We are counting on Mayor Mamdani's statesmanship and he is counting on the rest of us to keep the faith that makes New York the great city it is. ### Congestion Pricing, One Year In: A Qualified Success URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/one-year-into-congestion-pricing-in-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:31.000Z A full year on, let's call New York congestion pricing — the much-beloved and much-reviled policy to charge automobiles $9 to enter Manhattan below 60th Street — what it is: a successful work in progress. Before the first-in-the-nation plan went into effect on Jan. 5, 2025, proponents promised that the policy would bring entrenched Manhattan gridlock to heel, while foes predicted far-reaching economic and environmental harm. Gov. Kathy Hochul, fearing electoral consequences, [delayed its implementation](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-congestion-pricing-meltdown-and-its-aftermath). The [then-incoming Trump administration](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/why-trumps-attempt-to-kill-congestion-pricing-must-fail) promised to kill the program in the crib. The benefits have proven to be robust, though perhaps a bit less than advertised and not yet transformational. Although they will expand as the toll revenues transmute into long-lasting improvements in citywide transit service, making them transformational *now* will require implementing a suite of ancillary measures designed to allow more efficient use of the city center's street grid. Happily, any costs incurred so far have been difficult to discern. Yes, some $700 million has been paid in vehicle tolls (one-quarter of them as new taxi and Uber surcharges paid by customers); and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which designed and operates the vehicle entry fees into Manhattan's central business district, probably expended a similar amount designing and constructing the tolling system. But, contra the sky-will-fall predictions, congestion pricing is producing no noticeable social injury. [Manhattan businesses haven't fled](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/real-estate/manhattans-financial-district-transforms-fleeing-tenants-thriving-offices?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [The city's economy hasn't contracted](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-22/nyc-congestion-pricing-is-the-controversial-program-working?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Putative spillover areas like the South Bronx [aren't seeing more trucks and dirtier air](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/09/19/komanoff-data-show-fewer-trucks-in-the-so-bronx-after-congestion-pricing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). *Mirabile dictu*: the birth of a major public policy initiative has been attended by little if any disruption. The absence of palpable costs isn't surprising to congestion pricing advocates like me. The theory underlying congestion charging is as close as economics ever comes to axiomatic: *Society is made better off when the negatives (sometimes called externalities) of goods or activities are covered — that is, included — in their price*. That is true with taxing cigarette purchases and pricing emissions from coal-fired power plants. And it is proving particularly true in the case of Manhattan driving, where each minute of using a car in the eight-square-mile district south of 61st Street subjects the other vehicles in the vicinity to [a collective two-minute time loss](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/11/city-traffic-congestion-pricing-costs/675923/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (to say nothing of obstructions and worse to people on foot or bicycling) — an unpriced harm that, until a year ago, had never been systematically priced in any U.S. city. The toll and taxi levies have been set at [a small fraction](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2022/01/27/opinion-the-congestion-pricing-toll-really-should-be-80?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of what a cold calculation of New York City driving's costs would dictate. That is fine. Also fine, I venture to say, is that the toll was pared back by 40% when New York Gov. Kathy Hochul postponed its start-up from June 2024 to this past January. While a $15 toll may have been closer to a transportation sweet spot, the actual $9 charge during most hours hews closer to governing reality. Here are what I consider the key metrics from tolling's inaugural year (some figures necessarily extrapolated to all of 2025 from the first three quarters), followed by a look at ways New York City and State can extend congestion pricing's reach and expand its bounty. ## Key metrics Any policy as far-reaching and innovative as congestion pricing will manifest in diverse ways. *Net toll revenues* and *faster vehicle travel speeds* are especially salient politically as well as substantively. The statutory pledging of toll revenues to transit investments guaranteed the full-throated backing of New York's vocal transit-advocacy community. While the promise of faster car and truck trips wasn't enough to secure similar support from motorist interests, it served as an important public and political talking point during the nearly six-year span from legislative enactment to the start of toll collection. Shortly after the tolls launched a year ago, I expected them to net $60 million or more a month and boost traffic speeds by 4 to 5% in the congestion zone and 1 to 2% outside. Those figures came from [my Excel traffic model](http://www.nnyn.org/kheelplan/BTA%5F1.1.xls?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which I continually update, that state officials used in writing the 2019 authorizing legislation. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27009151?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Results thus far are more humdrum. According to [MTA figures](https://metrics.mta.info/?cbdtp/revenueexpenses&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), monthly revenues minus expenses are struggling to reach $50 million. As for traffic flow, the early euphoria of freer-flowing streets has dissipated. While some rebound in traffic [was expected](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/01/15/komanoff-why-im-not-scrutinizing-traffic-data-yet-its-the-rebound-effect-stupid?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), data culled from Ubers and yellow cabs in motion suggest that travel speeds within the zone today are barely surpassing those from a year earlier. Nevertheless, transit trips [are up](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/transit/2025/12/18/mta-celebrates-ridership-gains--lower-crime-as-congestion-pricing-pays-off?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as are [broader economic indicators](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-22/nyc-congestion-pricing-is-the-controversial-program-working?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from foot traffic to storefront leasing rates. Bonds secured by the toll revenues are [enabling the MTA](https://www.amny.com/news/mta-subway-signal-upgrades-accessibility-congestion-pricing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to install subway station elevators and speed its system-wide overhaul of track signals, promising faster and more-accessible transit which in turn portends further ridership gains and car reductions. ## Countering the traffic current Traffic's seeming imperviousness to the congestion toll hasn't happened in isolation, but in a very car-centric society at a particular point in time. America is chronically awash in traffic, and driving's post-COVID's "recovery" has been relentless. Thanks to cheaper gas, bulkier vehicles, housing shortages in city centers and burgeoning next- or same-day delivery, [gridlock is worsening](https://www.npr.org/2025/12/05/nx-s1-5611164/traffic-congestion-record-high?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in most U.S. metro areas. New York's Manhattan core is additionally seeing surging e-commerce trucking, more bicycle-borne food deliveries over ever-longer distances and even what looks to the naked eye to be a rise in obstructive driving behaviors abetted by slackened enforcement. And even as the combined number of fare trips in taxis and Ubers [hasn't budged](https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiMzlhMzA3NTItM2VkZS00NGM4LTgxYTQtNjRlMDc3MTkxMDkzIiwidCI6IjMyZjU2ZmM3LTVmODEtNGUyMi1hOTViLTE1ZGE2NjUxM2JlZiJ9&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), taxi cruising for fares has grown, along with the number of waiting Ubers taking up road space. For a decade now, New York has required GPS devices in taxis and Ubers to upload each fare trip's co-ordinates to municipal computers. From crunching some 200 million trip records, I determined that during the three years from the start of 2022 to the end of 2024, travel speeds in the Manhattan congestion zone (south of 60th Street) *fell at an average rate of 5% a year*. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/27009024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Had that pattern continued unabated, *speeds in the zone would have fallen another 5% in 2025*. Thanks to the new toll, Manhattan defied the trend, even as congestion pricing's power to combat gridlock was obscured by the moving baseline built on the new traffic stressors. ## Is there a shortfall in congestion revenues? Yet those traffic forces can't explain a seeming shortfall in the toll revenues: the $10 million or more gap between my projection of $60 million a month in net revenue and the $50 million monthly net that the MTA is reporting. More data sharing by the MTA could shed some light. To its credit, the authority maintains a [web dashboard](https://metrics.mta.info/?cbdtp/vehicleentries&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of digital revenue collection at each toll "portal." What the authority hasn't made available is *uncollected* revenue as well as toll expenses, such as: - *The number of car entries to the zone that qualify as same-day "repeats," which are exempt from a second toll.* I modeled these at just 1%. If the true number is much higher, say 10%, that would trim the congestion revenues by $3 million a month. - *The number of vehicles avoiding the congestion toll altogether* by virtue of official status, license plate tampering or detection failure. I assumed a 4% rate, consistent with [established non-toll-paying rates](https://www.mta.info/document/138551?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at MTA bridges and tunnels. [Recent reporting](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/12/24/hey-insurance-companies-heres-some-driver-fraud-in-plain-sight?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on insurance and registration fraud suggests the rate may be much higher. Tripling my figure to 12% would translate to $6 million less revenue each month. - *How are tolling expenses being booked, and how big a cut is going to the tolling contractor?* Are the toll system's nine-figure capital costs being front-loaded? Same question for MTA's planning costs during the tortuous approval process. Ditto the mitigations promised to low-income drivers and South Bronx residents facing potential traffic spillover (which evidently [has not materialized](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/09/19/komanoff-data-show-fewer-trucks-in-the-so-bronx-after-congestion-pricing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). Some of this data may already be public. But until the MTA assembles it, no one on the outside can fully validate the extent to which congestion pricing is hitting or missing its revenue targets. ## Juicing up congestion pricing Some help on the twin fronts of traffic and revenue will come via the [$3 increases](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/transportation/congestion-pricing-begins-what-know?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the congestion charge planned for the start of 2028 and 2031\. By my modeling, each upward bump will immediately add one to two percentage points to the travel speed gain and also bring in $20 million more in monthly tolls. Also on the horizon is the congestion charge "carrot" of better subways paid for by the congestion revenues. The prospective impact is immense: a doubling or even tripling of the single-digit speed gains from the toll "stick" alone. But the timeframe for transit improvements is often more generational than overnight. To improve traffic flow sooner and help congestion pricing live up to its full promise, New York needs to get more creative — and assertive — in imposing price discipline on use of its streets and roads. Here are four ways to do that: **1\. Reconfigure the taxi and Uber surcharges as a per-minute charge:** The same in-vehicle GPS that demonstrated the pre-2025 Manhattan traffic slowdown makes it child's play to peg the taxi and Uber congestion surcharges to trips' in-zone minutes. Replacing the flat-rate $0.75 charge on yellows and $1.50 on Ubers with a nickel-a-minute zone charge for yellows and a dime for Ubers would boost vehicle travel speeds in the congestion zone by almost a full percentage point while keeping the total take the same. **2\. Uber stockpiling fee:** Yellow cabs still largely "cruise" for fares, but Ubers trawl — sitting while waiting to be pinged. [Charging Ubers](https://www.komanoff.net/cars%5FII/FHV%5FStockpiling%5FQ&A.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) an additional 5 cents for each non-fare minute spent within the zone would free up enough curb and road space to trigger another one percentage point rise in speeds. (Self-driving Waymos, if they're ever allowed in the city, should be subject to a similar charge, with revenues going to transit.) **3\. Charge e-commerce delivery vehicles for occupying zone space:** The e-commerce industry is largely immune to congestion pricing: its vans and trucks enter (and pay) just once but take up space all day. [Charging e-commerce vehicles](http://www.komanoff.net/cars%5FII/Taming%5FNYC's%5FE-Delivery%5FGridlock.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for each minute they are inside the zone would close that loophole. The inevitable changes in truck logistics would also tilt some consumers back toward brick-and-mortar retail. **4\. Per-mile food-delivery fee:** [Charging app companies](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2024/11/05/komanoff-reining-in-deliverista-distances-is-the-key-to-safety?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) like DoorDash and Uber Eats for each mile their food orders must be delivered (beyond an initial free mile) would incentivize customers not just to order from nearby but also to pick up or even make their own dinner. The *deliverista* sector might shrink, but everyone's safety and sanity — the cyclists' included — would get a lift. These are just starters. Our governor and mayor could also: tie the congestion charge more closely to vehicle size, as [Paris does](https://urban-mobility-observatory.transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/paris-introduces-triple-parking-fees-suvs-2024-02-12%5Fen?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with parking fees; institute curb pricing, beginning in the congestion zone, where space is most dear; and finally do away with parking placards — as New York State's "Fix NYC" report [recommended](https://www.komanoff.net/cars%5FII/Fix-NYC-Panel-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2018. A year in, congestion pricing is a work in progress. Its supporters can bemoan Gov. Hochul's downscaling the toll to $9 from the intended $15, but without that concession, the toll might not have come to pass at all. The apparent disappearance of the ballyhooed initial traffic gains, though disappointing, need not spell stasis over the long haul. Slightly lackluster revenue is a concern, but transparency, tweaks and the $3 toll bumps will help mightily on that score. That the groundbreaking congestion toll exists at all in the face of such intense opposition is no small miracle. Transit advocates met the dark moment in June 2024 with [uproarious rallies](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/01/05/strangers-not-strangers-how-i-greeted-the-start-of-congestion-pricing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) demanding the governor "flip the switch." She did, and both congestion pricing and New York transit are now moving fully into the light. *You can download the author's congestion pricing spreadsheet at* [*http://www.nnyn.org/kheelplan/BTA\_1.1.xls*](http://www.nnyn.org/kheelplan/BTA%5F1.1.xls?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). *The spreadsheet tab "Run-up to CP" derives many of the figures in this post. The author acknowledges the analytical contributions of Todd Schneider and Jeffrey Zupan.* ### Remembering a Talented, Troubled Knick URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/remembering-michael-ray-richardson/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:30.000Z *This week on After Hours, Jamie takes a detour from New York politics to explore a deeply personal piece of the city's basketball history: the life and legacy of Michael Ray Richardson, the electrifying Knicks guard whose career was derailed by cocaine addiction in the 1980s. Jamie sits down with writer Jake Uitti, who co-authored Richardson's autobiography "Banned: How I Squandered an All-Star NBA Career Before Finding My Redemption," to discuss what made "Sugar Ray" such a distinctive talent and how Richardson rebuilt his life after his ban from the league.* ### 2025: A Look Back URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/2025-a-look-back-most-read/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:30.000Z The year just passed was a busy one for New York City: We elected a new mayor, said a long goodbye to the current one, implemented congestion pricing, obsessed over housing affordability, saw a federal judge call for a receiver to oversee the city’s jails, fended off Trump administration provocations, and more. Here's what our readers read the most — and some selections our editors found especially compelling. ‎ ‎ # Your favorites [**Zohran Mamdani’s Real-World Constraints**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdanis-real-world-constraints) **by Carl Weisbrod** The incoming mayor has grand plans — and serious logistical obstacles. [**State of the City on Crime 2024**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/vital-signs-state-of-the-city-on-crime-2024) **by Vital City and Paul Reeping** New York City may be getting safer, but it lags prepandemic conditions in many categories. [**Just the Facts on New York City Subway Crime**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/just-the-facts-on-new-york-city-subway-crime) **by Aaron Chalfin, John Hall and Paul Reeping** The city’s subway system is far safer than many people think, though stubborn problems remain. [**How Zohran Mamdani Could Succeed as Mayor**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-zohran-mamdani-could-succeed-as-mayor) **by Bradley Tusk and Jamie Rubin** Two pragmatic political veterans chart the course for the young, ideologically ambitious mayor to serve the city well. [**The State of Crime in New York City at Midyear 2025**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-state-of-crime-in-new-york-city-at-midyear-2025) **by Vital City** Despite major declines in shootings and murders, felony assaults remain at 20-year highs. [**Zohran Mamdani and Andrew Cuomo Aren’t as Different as You Might Think**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-and-andrew-cuomo-arent-as-different-as-you-might-think) **by Josh Greenman** The two leading contenders for mayor made unions and others big promises that will be very hard to keep when reality comes calling. [**Guess What? Government Is Already in the Grocery Business**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/government-is-already-in-the-grocery-business) **by Nevin Cohen** Many have made Mamdani’s proposal to create a few low-cost, publicly owned supermarkets into a punchline — but is the idea really that radical? [**New York Is Not Broken**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/is-new-york-broken) **by Greg Berman** Federal leaders and even some local aspirants speak as though the city needs an urgent rescue. That’s at odds with basic indicators, and of the enduring feel of city life. [**My First Adult Apartment**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/my-first-adult-apartment) **A Survey** Our [housing issue](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-14) presented a range of concrete solutions to the city’s most pressing crisis. Here, a range of New Yorkers shared their experience paying the rent for the first time. [**New York’s Housing Crisis: Self-Inflicted and Solvable**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-yorks-housing-crisis-self-inflicted-and-solvable) **by Annemarie Gray** How did New York get so unaffordable, and how do we get out of the bind? A sweeping overview of the problem. ‎ # Our favorites [**What To Do (and Not To Do) About People in Crisis on Streets and Subways**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) **by Vital City** Pragmatic recommendations for the incoming administration for how to address one of thorniest problems in New York City life. [**Jane Jacobs 2.0: Training AI to Make Cities More Humane**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/training-ai-to-make-cities-more-humane) **By Edward Glaeser and Carlo Ratti** Two leading academics explain how they used AI to analyze historical film footage, revealing that modern pedestrians walk faster and linger less than they did in William Whyte’s era. [**What Mamdani Can Learn from a de Blasio Administration Safety Innovation**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/nstat-should-be-key-to-mamdani-public-safety-plan) **by Renita Francois and Abdul Nasser Rad** Two public policy practitioners argue that the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Safety and NeighborhoodStat, if built up, could serve as foundational blueprints for the incoming mayor [**A Department of Community Safety: Theory Meets Practice**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/mamdani-department-of-community-safety-where-theory-meets-practice) **by Gloria Gong** A leading government practitioner diagnoses some of the operational hurdles of shifting public safety responsibilities from the NYPD to an alternative civilian agency. [**Percy Sutton, Eric Adams and the State of Black Political Power in New York**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/percy-sutton-eric-adams-and-the-state-of-black-political-power-in-new-york) **by Basil Smikle Jr.** A political veteran compares Percy Sutton’s mastery of "inside-outside" politics with Eric Adams’s struggles, warning that Adams’s decline creates a vacuum in Black political power. [**Reality Check: Who’s the Guard Really Guarding in U.S. Cities?**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/reality-check-whos-the-guard-really-guarding-in-us-cities) **By Vital City** President Trump sent the National Guard to a number of U.S. cities — and blustered about sending them to more. Are these really the most dangerous places in America, in desperate need of federal help? [**New York City’s Catholic Church at a Crossroads**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-catholic-church-at-a-crossroads) **by Eileen Markey** The first American pope arrives at a time when New York’s parishes are on the defensive, protecting their increasingly immigrant congregations from federal hostility. [**A Tale of Two New Yorkers: Didarul Islam and Zohran Mamdani**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-tale-of-two-new-yorkers-didarul-islam-and-zohran-mamdani) **by Brandon Del Pozo** What a fallen police officer taught a political aspirant about the changing face of the much-pilloried NYPD. [**Mamdani’s Facilitators, Frenemies or Foes**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/mamdanis-facilitators-frenemiesor-foes) **by David Schleicher** Mamdani’s success will hinge not only on his political acumen, but on allies, friends and political opponents with their own incentive structures. [**Andrew Cuomo Sees a City in Crisis. Do Voters?**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/andrew-cuomo-sees-a-city-in-crisis-do-new-york-voters) **by Harry Siegel** The former governor ran on a message that New York City, teetering on the bring, needed a strong hand to bring it back to safety. Was the city he sought to lead the same city New Yorkers are living in? ‎ ‎ ‎ # Charts that defined our year **How government helps — and fails to help — people in crisis on streets and subways** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atw_z3nyclf9ohtj_bridgestonowhere-12-8-png-auto-format-compress-1776259660443.jpg) **The progress made — and yet to go — on serious crime** **An overstretched NYPD?** **Where Trump sent (or wanted to send) the cavalry** **The truth about youth crime** ### From Crisis Response to System Coordination URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/system-coordination-in-crisis-response-to-high-acuity-homelessness/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:30.000Z In her recent Vital City essay, ["A Department of Community Safety: Theory Meets Practice,"](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/mamdani-department-of-community-safety-where-theory-meets-practice) Gloria Gong captures a hard truth about New York's homelessness and mental health crisis: "Compassionate crisis response is essential, but without relentless follow-up, people spiral right back into the same subway stations and emergency rooms." This is exactly the missing layer of coordination and accountability that the Collaborative on Housing for Health (CH4H) aims to address. This Collaborative, which we help lead, is a coalition of some of New York's largest health, housing and human-services providers working in partnership with the Department of Social Services (DSS) to better understand a specific challenge we call "high-acuity" homelessness. This term describes a cycle that can occur when people without stable housing experience significant behavioral health issues and move between streets, shelters, hospitals and jails. When someone experiencing homelessness gets caught in this cycle, it can worsen their preexisting health problems and make it all the more difficult to reach stable housing. Our newly released [roadmap](http://www.housingforhealthnyc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) effectively writes the next chapter to Gong's argument: how New York can move from reactive crisis response to sustained system coordination that serves New Yorkers with the most complex needs. In a city with vast resources and decades of investment in homelessness services, many New Yorkers understandably ask why so many people are still visibly struggling and unhoused. One key reason is that, over the past several decades, the nature of homelessness has changed. While 97% of New Yorkers experiencing homelessness are stably connected to shelter or transitional housing, a small subset of single adults in the system face far more complex behavioral health needs that can drive cycles of crisis. The system designed to support people has not kept pace with this changing demand. Much of New York's supportive housing and behavioral health infrastructure was built to address psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Today, however, a significant share of adults experiencing homelessness live with co-occurring complex challenges — layering health-related conditions brought on by deep histories of chronic trauma and homelessness, compounded by behavioral health conditions such as personality disorders and substance use disorders. These conditions require very specialized kinds of care. Whereas individuals with psychotic disorders often respond well to medication paired with therapy, many increasingly common behavioral health conditions can cause rapid shifts in mood and difficulty maintaining stable relationships with care teams, making them more challenging to serve with traditional supportive housing models. What they often need instead is specialized psychotherapy as the primary treatment, combined with steady, long-term support. This requires sustained engagement to help individuals move along a long, nonlinear path toward stability. Without that, they are more likely to cycle between public systems not designed to serve them. The City's data shows this pattern playing out. About 1% of individuals in the shelter system — or about 1,000 individuals over a recent two-year period — account for a vastly disproportionate share of crisis system use, cycling repeatedly through shelters, emergency rooms and short jail stays — at immense human, health and financial cost. This finding comes from a novel DSS analysis linking data across hospitals, shelters and jails. The insight is crucial: There is a finite, knowable population, not an abstract or unbounded challenge. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/aurrlhnyclf9ocws_acuity-desktop-auto-format-compress-1776259660508.png) Credit: NYC Department of Social Services In interviews with more than 60 people who have experienced homelessness, the Collaborative heard stories that bring the data to life. Many described being discharged from hospitals or jails directly back to the streets, with no continuity of care and no clear pathway to stability. "It was so frustrating and exhausting to go from the hospital to the streets or from the hospital to a traumatic shelter because I would always end up right back in the hospital," one participant told us. Again and again, people described seeing not the continuous, coordinated care they needed, but a series of program hand-offs, "discontinuations" for noncompliance and long stretches of falling through the gaps between criminal justice, health and housing systems. The analysis also reveals system gaps that keep people stuck in crisis. Many people leaving jail get almost no support reconnecting to housing or treatment. The city lacks sufficient psychiatric beds and step-down programs, so people who need ongoing care cycle back through emergency rooms. All of this is happening despite the best efforts of thousands of skilled, dedicated City and nonprofit provider staff. The problem isn't a lack of commitment or that existing programs don't help people. It's that the system doesn't give providers what they need to succeed with the highest-acuity New Yorkers, and most programs were never designed to offer the kind of tailored, continuous support this population requires. Making matters worse, providers face real disincentives: It is hard work to serve people with high-acuity health needs in programs lacking the structures to do so successfully. This work can lead to staff burnout, and the system rewards programs for delivering a service, sometimes regardless of whether someone actually achieves long-term stability. These barriers stem from how the system is structured, not primarily from lack of resources — and, in some ways, *in spite of* increased public resources. In recent years, significant investments — particularly the state's [historic commitment to expanded mental health services](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-legislation-improve-mental-health-care-and-strengthen-treatment-serious?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — have added important new programs and resources to the system. These investments represent real progress and have brought much-needed capacity to areas in need of support. At the same time, the growth in programs has not yet been matched with stronger coordination among them, as no single entity is responsible for helping people move from crisis settings to treatment and housing. Improving handoffs between programs is essential to maximizing the impact of these investments. At the city level, New York has also made significant strides toward creating the kind of continuity this population needs. For example, the City has expanded Intensive Mobile Treatment (IMT), a model that stays with a person across settings, providing long-term, flexible care through hospitalizations, incarceration or street homelessness. Major providers, including one of our organizations, the Institute for Community Living, have developed [step-down programs](https://iclinc.org/institute-for-community-living-report-shows-new-program-increased-capacity-to-serve-new-yorkers-with-the-most-significant-mental-health-challenges-including-individuals-living-on-streets-and-subways/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that bridge people from IMT to community-based services. These models show what's possible when care is continuous and coordinated, but they only reach a fraction of the New Yorkers who need that level of support. Together, our quantitative and qualitative insights point to the same conclusion that Gong articulated: The fundamental challenge is that there is an absence of any single accountable actor responsible for follow-through in the hardest cases. The solution is to realign existing programs and funding streams so providers have the accountability, flexibility and incentives they need to succeed. The Collaborative on Housing for Health has developed and will test a model designed to do that, right now, using the tools we already have. We call it a "service pathway." The service pathway is the Collaborative's signature innovation: a practical but ambitious way to knit together the city's existing programs and services to meet people where they are and support them long enough for recovery to take hold. Under the model, one qualified nonprofit provider, known as a "pathway lead," will take full responsibility for serving a defined group of high-acuity New Yorkers from the moment they're identified through stabilization in permanent housing. For example, when someone is discharged from the hospital, the pathway lead will immediately connect them to housing, schedule mental health appointments and support them so they actually attend — rather than handing them off to another agency. Crucially, the same team will stay with that person through crisis, transitional housing and into permanent supportive housing, filling the gaps people currently fall through. Cross-agency contracts will make those responsibilities clear and trackable, with the goal that no one slips back into crisis. And most importantly, organizations will be held accountable for outcomes, rewarding prompt responses, reduced crisis use and stable housing rather than simply counting services delivered. This is a major shift: For the first time, there will be a single point of accountability to own the most complex cases and support someone's full journey out of crisis. The service pathway model will also give providers the tools and shared criteria they need to recognize when someone is experiencing high-acuity homelessness and connect them to the right level of care. Today, frontline staff lack both a common definition and practical ways to identify these cases. Every time a person experiencing high-acuity homelessness walks into an emergency room or is discharged from a jail, this is an opportunity to intervene with a connection to robust support before the next crisis. Under the service pathway model, high-acuity cases are defined consistently across common crisis points. Data can then be linked and surfaced through existing systems to help route people to specialized services more quickly and effectively. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/aurrcxnyclf9ocxm_pathways-desktop-auto-format-compress-1776259660705.png) Credit: CH4H, "Service Pathways: The System Change NYC Needs Now" report The service pathway approach will soon be piloted through a partnership between DSS, the Collaborative and leading nonprofit providers, with support from The Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust. The pilot will test how service pathways can integrate funding streams, align accountability and demonstrate measurable results for the people most visible — and most let down — by our current system. To inform future policy changes and public investments, we will also map the supply of housing and services against the needs of individuals in acute crises, making bottlenecks visible and quantifiable. By bringing together major housing and service providers with the resources to address a challenge that cannot be solved by any single agency, this pilot will serve as an incubator for system innovation. Over the long term, its successes could be replicated across broader populations. Now is a rare moment of opportunity for New York to tackle high-acuity homelessness: Federal budget cuts and fiscal constraints are placing increased focus on cost-effective solutions, momentum is building across the field to close long-standing gaps in care for this population, and political attention to behavioral health and public safety is intensifying just as a new mayoral administration prepares to take office. This is the moment for transformation. The infrastructure is already in place: The data systems, the provider network and the funding streams all exist. What's needed now is alignment — a shared expectation that the highest-need New Yorkers are not "too hard to serve," but too important to leave to chance. Compassionate crisis response, [as Gong wrote](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/mamdani-department-of-community-safety-where-theory-meets-practice), must be matched by persistent follow-up. The service pathway model delivers exactly that: one accountable provider, coordinated care from crisis to housing and the realignment of existing resources around outcomes rather than activity. And it speaks to something all New Yorkers share — a belief that no one should be left to struggle alone in a moment of crisis, and our support system should give our neighbors with the greatest needs a real chance at recovery. *The article you just read took weeks of research, interviews with experts, and careful analysis. It's the kind of rigorous, solutions-focused work that takes time, and support from readers like you makes it possible.* *Vital City launched three years ago on a bet: that New Yorkers craved calm, evidence-based ideas in a hyperpartisan moment. You proved us right. And together, we've built something rare: a civic institution that influences policy without ideology.* *To meet this moment, we need to grow, and we need your help to do it.* *Your gift will help us expand our operational capacity, and publish more of the practical policy ideas that are cited by decisionmakers, used in college classrooms, and referenced on the campaign trail.* *Will you join us?* [***Become an inaugural supporter →***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### Just Fix It: 11 Governance Improvements The Mamdani Administration Can Tackle in the First 100 Days URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/government-improvements-mamdani-can-tackle-in-the-first-100-days/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:30.000Z *Zohran Mamdani ran for mayor on a platform of big, transformative ideas,* [*many of them dependent on other layers and levels of government*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdanis-real-world-constraints)*. But as every New Yorker knows, day-to-day life is shaped less by grand visions than by the basic machinery of city government — and too often, that machinery is stuck. While Mamdani's mayoralty will be a test of his ambitious proposals, it will also be a test of small- and medium-bore management. *Just Fix It* is Vital City's contribution to helping him pass that test: a running list of concrete, doable ways to unstick the gears of city government and make it work better for all New Yorkers.* *This installment was prepared with the help of Sarah Feinberg. Cara Eckholm and many others provided essential guidance and will continue to inform our work on this project going forward. In the weeks and months ahead, we will continue to surface practical suggestions from people who know the system best — current and former agency staff, nonprofit partners and the everyday New Yorkers who routinely deal with, and often trip up trying to navigate, New York's bureaucracy.* *Send your ideas to* [*justfixit@vitalcitynyc.org*](mailto:justfixit@vitalcitynyc.org)*; if you wish to remain anonymous, we will honor your request.* ## 1\. Know when to (scaf)fold 'em **The problem:** Sidewalk sheds are unsightly and a nuisance in neighborhoods. **The Mamdani administration should:** Ratchet up enforcement and offer new incentives for building owners to complete repairs faster to remove sidewalk sheds. **The fine print:** There are currently [more than 8,200 sidewalk sheds](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/buildings/html/sidewalk-shed-map.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) covering more than 350 miles of New York City streets; nearly 4,000 have been active for more than a year, nearly 2,000 for more than two years and more than 1,100 for more than three years. While scaffolding has a role to play — assisting in active renovation projects and protecting pedestrians from the possibility of falling construction debris — it's egregiously overused, and stays up far too long. When so many sidewalks are cast in shadow, it's ugly, dangerous and dispiriting. There's been notable progress of late. The Adams administration's[ Get Sheds Down](https://www.nyc.gov/content/getstuffdone/pages/sidewalk-sheds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) initiative began to address this blight. [New local](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/03/26/2824/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) laws will elongate the facade inspection period for some buildings, allow netting in place of sheds and make other important changes. [Attractive new shed designs](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/11/mayor-adams-unveils-new-designs-for-sidewalk-sheds-and-scaffoldi?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are coming online. All these are welcome, but the incoming administration must go further. In the first 100 days of his administration, Mayor Mamdani's team should deploy inspectors to the longest-standing sites — like the 1,120 sheds that have been active for more than three years — and put a plan into place with building owners to remove these structures. Agencies should assist building owners in navigating permitting and exploring technologies such as drone inspections, and the Department of Buildings must aggressively enforce deadlines. ## 2\. Rein in placard abuse **The problem:** Parking placards are routinely abused, creating dangerous situations and effectively announcing that government employees think the rules don't apply to them. **The Mamdani administration should:** Rationalize the process for granting placards, and deem all unofficial parking placards moot. Declare a no-tolerance policy for placard and parking abuses. **The fine print:** Abuse of parking rules by official vehicles remains rampant. Corridors like Schermerhorn and Tillary Streets in Brooklyn have essentially become illegal parking lots for placard-bearing vehicles, often those associated with [the NYPD](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/illegal-parking-and-failed-governance-ai-study-of-nypd-enforcement). Meanwhile, [countless placards](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/press-releases/2024/April/17LL6.Rpt.Release.04.03.2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are used and abused by a range of other officials who may have no good reason to need them. This [sends a pernicious signal that people on public payroll can break the law with impunity](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/parking-placard-and-license-plate-arrogance). The City should conduct an exhaustive review of all of the placards issued, starting from scratch on justifications and reducing the total number allowed, granting them only for necessary purposes. Technology can pave the way forward: by transitioning all physical placards to a digital, barcode-based system scannable by any traffic agent. Currently, thousands of unofficial placards, such as easily photocopied laminates, are in circulation. A digital registry would instantly identify invalid permits, allowing the City to tow violators and reclaim the curb for the public. To address rampant parking abuse by NYPD vehicles, the incoming administration should also [take initial steps to move all parking enforcement back to the Department of Transportation](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/11/17/streetscape-bike-bus-lanes-parking-enforcement-trafficzohran-mamdani-eric-adams/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ## 3\. Shed some light on crime **The problem:** New York City's public spaces are defined by their vibrancy, but after dark, many neighborhoods are marred by "dark zones" where inadequate infrastructure actively discourages civic life and invites criminal activity. **The Mamdani administration should:** Scan the city's dark places with high crime rates and, working with residents who understand the local landscape, install permanent, high-quality street lighting to foster public activity and deter serious offenses. **The fine print:** Public safety is often viewed through the lens of enforcement, but enhancing the physical environment offers a powerful, non-punitive alternative. Rigorous [randomized controlled trials (RCTs)](https://www.nber.org/papers/w25798?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) conducted in New York City public housing found that increasing street lighting led to a 36% reduction in serious crimes such as murder, robbery and aggravated assault. Effective lighting does more than illuminate a sidewalk; it serves as a catalyst for civic life by making residents feel safe enough to occupy public spaces, creating natural surveillance that discourages criminal behavior. The City has historically relied on [tower lights](https://www.newyorker.com/culture/the-new-yorker-documentary/the-controversial-floodlights-illuminating-new-york-citys-public-housing-developments?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that signal a haphazard, reactionary response. A smarter and more sustainable approach involves strategically investing in permanent fixtures that integrate into the neighborhood fabric. By focusing on these low-cost infrastructure improvements, the administration can reclaim the night for New Yorkers and drive down crime rates by strengthening the bonds of community life on the ground. ## 4\. Appoint a single commander for people in crisis **The problem:** Responsibility for the estimated 4,000 New Yorkers living on the streets and subways — many of whom suffer from serious mental illness or addiction — is currently scattered across a dozen siloed agencies. But because no one "owns" responsibility for this specific population, vulnerable people cycle through a never-ending churn of ERs, jails and shelters, compromising those people and the public space more broadly. **The Mamdani administration should:** Designate a single, high-level authority within City Hall to engage this population, coordinating budgets, data and operations across agencies to ensure every person in crisis is tracked to a stable outcome. **The fine print:** New York City spends billions annually on street homelessness, yet the results are often diffuse and inconsistent because agencies prioritize their own administrative mandates rather than the journey of the individual. A person may be removed from a subway station by the NYPD only to be discharged from a hospital hours later without any connection to the housing or treatment they actually need. This fragmentation creates "cliffs" where the city's most vulnerable residents are routinely lost in the bureaucratic shuffle. To break this cycle, the new mayor must establish a [unified management hub](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) in City Hall that uses an integrated, by-name data platform to monitor progress for each of these individuals, by name, in real time. This would go a long way not just to coordinating city agencies but also having a single point of contact for the state, which plays a large role in this issue. This leader's success should be measured by results: housing placements, stabilized health and reduced justice-system involvement. By centering accountability in one office, the administration can ensure that every encounter with a person in distress serves as a gateway to permanent stability. ## 5\. Curb curbside chaos **The problem:** Cars and trucks blocking the bus lane and the curb lane with double parking and deliveries cause congestion throughout the city and create dangerous situations for drivers, bicyclists and pedestrians. **The Mamdani administration should:** Expand on the MTA's Automated Camera Enforcement program, which uses cameras and on-the-ground enforcement to stop double parking and free up the curb lane for traffic. **The fine print:** Congestion in New York is often driven by minor disruptions such as double-parking and blocked lanes that ripple outward to gridlock the entire grid.[ The incoming administration wants to speed up buses while continuing to drive down traffic fatalities. To meet these goals, ](https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/mta-bus-route-segment-speeds-beginning-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)the City [should prioritize clearing the curb lane through a data-driven approach](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/11/30/gridlock-sams-transportation-list-for-mamdanis-first-100-days/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The administration can begin by expanding automated enforcement against the most corrosive violations.[ Recent state legislation](https://www.mta.info/agency/new-york-city-transit/automated-camera-enforcement?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has authorized graduated fines for repeat offenders, providing a powerful tool for deterrence. By combining specific neighborhood toolkits with rigorous enforcement of bus and bike lanes, the City can ensure traffic flows for all New Yorkers. The expansion of the MTA's Automated Camera Enforcement (ACE) program on buses offers real promise. These cameras don't just ticket for bus lane violations; they can now penalize cars double-parked in the lane next to the bus, which often cause the bottleneck. Working with the MTA to roll these cameras out to every bus route in the city could speed the flow of buses and all traffic. ## 6\. Reform city hiring and civil service **The problem:** The outdated NYC civil service program that governs much of city hiring is broken: As of November 2025, there were more than 14,000 vacancies and it can take months to grade civil service entry exams. **The Mamdani administration should:** Dramatically overhaul and streamline the City hiring and civil service system to make it more efficient, which will allow the administration to be better able to attract high-quality talent. **The fine print:** New York City government faces a staffing crisis, with the[ City Comptroller's dashboard](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/for-the-public/nyc-agency-staffing-dashboard/historical-vacancy-rate/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showing a vacancy rate more than double its pre-pandemic level. The good news is there is enthusiasm to serve; when Mayor-elect Mamdani's transition team stood up an[ informal application portal](https://www.transition2025.com/apply?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) it attracted more than 70,000 resumes in a matter of days. The bad news? It's harder than it should be to become a public servant in New York. For civil-service-exempt employees — which describes many of those seeking positions with Mamdani — the process is weighed down by a bureaucratic and budgetary morass. Even more difficult to navigate are the rules that govern thousands of rank-and-file government employees who get their jobs through [New York's civil service system](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-yorks-mamdani-ny-civil-service-system): an outdated, arcane set of rules, [codified in state law](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVS?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that advantages insiders and effectively disincentivizes talented candidates. To even participate in this system, an applicant must sit for a test (typically offered less than once a year), then wait months for results, then sit on a hiring list for months or even years. Not surprisingly, by the time promising candidates receive a job offer, they have long since moved on to other opportunities. Even though the system is written into law, the city administration can take strong steps to modernize it. The new mayor should issue an executive order directing immediate fixes. The Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) should move to offer every exam more frequently and significantly reduce the seven-month average wait time for exam results. Simultaneously, the administration must deploy immediate administrative fixes supported by[ reports from the comptroller](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Understaffed-Underserved.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the[ 5Boro Institute](https://fiveboro.nyc/staffing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), plan to add exempt titles, and modernize the technology for civil service exams and recruitment. And the mayor should set the stage for a long-term fix by convening a panel of experts to publish findings and recommendations for legislative overhaul within 100 days. ## 7\. Harness the potential of AI **The problem:** AI is underused by City government. Bureaucratic rules remain a maze, and government service delivery is far too inefficient. Emerging tools can answer questions — and help government find solutions. **The Mamdani administration should:** Invite the private sector to compete to build an AI tool that delivers clear, government-verified answers to a wide range of questions, while aggressively exploring ways to use AI (with human oversight) to do the work of government more efficiently. **The fine print:** Over the last few years, the use of AI has exploded. While this technology is still in its infancy, it is clear that it is here to stay. [Private citizens](https://www.hugema.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [have repeatedly shown](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-lawless-state-of-new-yorks-streets) [how to harness](https://statescoop.com/citizenlab-community-planning-technology-government/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [existing data streams](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/14/realestate/affordable-housing-rent-stabilized-website.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to serve the public better. New York City government needs to catch up. The Mamdani administration should move rapidly on two fronts. First, use AI to answer questions. Whether a tenant is checking building requirements ("What kind of lighting is my landlord required to provide in my building lobby?") or a citizen is looking for the latest city-subsidized affordable apartments in their area, they should be able to easily and swiftly get accurate, actionable responses in plain language. In 2023, the Adams administration launched a[ chatbot](https://nyc-business.nyc.gov/nycbusiness/contactus?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that often gave bad or even illegal guidance — a clear misfire. It's time for a well-thought-out take two. Simultaneously, the Mamdani administration should pioneer uses of AI within city government to improve government efficiency and service delivery. This might include aggregating complaint data to pinpoint and address citywide and neighborhood-specific trends, analyzing city-run CCTV feeds to better manage streets and [using big data to flag potential corruption](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/government-should-harness-the-power-of-ai-to-combat-corruption-while-preserving-managerial-discretion) in agency spending as early as possible. Combining, mining and analyzing city data, AI can help design better bus routes, plan street work and more. The City could further this work by beginning to digitize millions of documents that aren't currently digitized — but it need not wait. There is ample electronic data to crunch in order to make human decision-making more rapid and precise. ## 8\. Retool the budget office **The problem:** The Office of Management and Budget plays an outsized role in city government, but it's usually as the penny counter and the Bureau of No. It needs to be a more proactive partner in efficient service delivery. **The Mamdani administration should:** Put the M back in OMB, directing the office to modernize and advance its analytical capabilities to improve efficiency of government service delivery. **The fine print:** The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in City Hall exerts immense influence over the City's ability to function. OMB not only oversees the City's budget, creates the City's economic forecast and predicts the impact of tax policies; it also has the power to decide which projects get funded and why. However, it often operates siloed in its role as a fiscal gatekeeper — as the Bureau of No — rather than a strategic partner. At a time when the next mayor brings big ambitions to expand the role of government with limited resources, the office will need to be much more operations- and execution-minded, moving to find efficiencies and savings that actually service delivery. OMB has access to a vast amount of financial and performance data. It should embrace technological tools and data analytics, including those nested in the City's Office of Technology and Innovation, to develop new strategies and publish their findings for agencies and New Yorkers alike to learn from. And understanding whether city priorities were smartly and sufficiently funded shouldn't require an accounting degree or a translation service. OMB should democratize its reporting, allowing both insiders and the public to understand where all the dollars really go. A simple question like "How much does DSNY spend on new garbage bins annually?" should have a simple, findable answer. A reformed OMB would publish this data in an interactive, searchable dashboard, empowering the public, City Council and journalists. Such transparency and data sharing would signal a fundamental culture shift. ## 9\. Clean the clutter **The problem:** Year after year, executives and legislators create their own smattering of new offices, boards, working groups and reports. Administrations rarely do the hard work of decluttering the bureaucracy — leading to inevitable redundancies, inefficiency and waste. **The Mamdani administration should:** Rationalize the many interagencies and offices and streamline their functions. Then continue the work to eliminate unnecessary reports, boards and redundant staffing. **The fine print:** Over the generations, New York City's government has grown by accretion, with successive administrations adding offices, staff and mandates that now clutter the organizational chart with overlapping functions. All told, government has more than 120 agencies and offices. To name one recent, ironic example: The Adams administration [named a Chief Efficiency Officer](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2023/08/mayor-adams-appoints-denise-c-clay-city-s-chief-efficiency-officer?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with a small staff. The office ran into other competing management offices and ultimately never presented any findings to the public. In the end, it appears it did little more than add a new box on an org chart. It's not that nobody's tried to streamline government. Every administration reorganizes the government in their image, and Mamdani will do the same. But he should pair this with an intelligent reexamination of the new offices created under previous administrations. As a part of the initial executive order organizing the government, the incoming administration should announce a 100-day process to identify redundant, overlapping and vestigial boards, commissions and reporting requirements — and then lay out a process to rationalize them. This may mean, for starters, collapsing the stray commissions, boards and offices into the most relevant related agency. ## 10\. Let the sunshine in **The problem:** The public has the right to know how the mayor and his team are conducting the city's business — and transparency is a tonic for creeping cynicism in government. **The Mamdani administration should:** Set a new bar by becoming the most transparent mayoral administration in history. Release a comprehensive daily schedule, push out information quickly, turn around FOIL requests in days not weeks and make leaders available for regular engagement and questions — on any and all topics. **The fine print:** The mayor-elect has promised a new day for transparency and public service in New York. To demonstrate to the public that the administration has nothing to hide, his administration should land on the side of transparency over secrecy on all issues. Schedules for the mayor and deputy mayors should be released on a routine basis. Lists of all visitors invited to City Hall or to the mayor's residence — including lobbyists, government officials and members of the public — should be released as well. The mayor should hold frequent press conferences in which members of the media are allowed to ask questions about whatever topic they choose. The administration should also take a hard outlook at improving the[ NYC Open Data portal](https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While thousands of datasets are available, they are often difficult to find or search. By centering Open Data in its tech platform — and helping guide the public and researchers to better access this information — the administration can broaden accountability and improve the workings of government. The administration should proactively release datasets that are frequently sought under Freedom of Information Law — such as police disciplinary records or detailed budget modification codes — treating the press as a partner in accountability. ## 11\. Open more doors to affordable housing **The problem:** The process to help move New Yorkers into permanent housing is time-consuming, confusing and redundant, keeping people in shelter longer than necessary and costing the city money. **The Mamdani administration should:** Streamline the process to obtain CityFHEPS vouchers. **The fine print:** CityFHEPS vouchers — which stands for City Fighting Homelessness and Eviction Prevention Supplement — are one of the primary tools the City uses to help pay for people to move out of homeless shelters and into permanent housing, covering a substantial portion of monthly rent. These payments — which [go as high as $2,600 per month](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/FHEPS/HRA%5F146z%5FE.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for a family of one or $3,000 for a family of four — are sizable, but they are more cost-effective and lead to better social outcomes than prolonging stays in shelter. Yet today, obtaining and making use of such a voucher requires navigating a bureaucratic labyrinth of [more than 100 distinct steps](https://winnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Win-REBNY-Voucher-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a crushing administrative burden detailed in [Council reports](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/06/10/2899/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ City Comptroller audits](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-on-the-department-of-homeless-services-determination-of-temporary-housing-benefits-for-families-with-children/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This forces homeless New Yorkers to navigate a maze of "shopping letters," unit searches and redundant "pre-clearance" reviews, often requiring the same documents to be submitted multiple times. Compounding this friction, the nonprofit providers tasked with helping these clients lack access to shelter censuses and have no authority to approve leases, effectively acting as powerless intermediaries. The mayor can torpedo this administrative blockade through executive action. The administration should immediately abolish the separate "pre-clearance" review in favor of a concurrent timeline and enforce a strict 48-hour rule for apartment inspections to ensure the City operates at market speed. Crucially, the City should grant trusted nonprofits the power of "presumptive eligibility" — allowing them to sign leases and house tenants immediately while verification happens in the background — and direct the Office of Technology and Innovation to launch a unified digital portal to finally end the era of lost PDFs. *The article you just read took weeks of research, interviews with experts, and careful analysis. It's the kind of rigorous, solutions-focused work that takes time, and support from readers like you makes it possible.* *Vital City launched three years ago on a bet: that New Yorkers craved calm, evidence-based ideas in a hyperpartisan moment. You proved us right. And together, we've built something rare: a civic institution that influences policy without ideology.* *To meet this moment, we need to grow, and we need your help to do it.* *Your gift will help us expand our operational capacity, and publish more of the practical policy ideas that are cited by decisionmakers, used in college classrooms, and referenced on the campaign trail.* *Will you join us?* [***Become an inaugural supporter →***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### What is the Future of ‘Renewable Rikers’ Island? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-future-of-renewable-rikers/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:30.000Z The election of Zohran Mamdani as New York City's 111th mayor is expected to usher in significant policy shifts at City Hall. One area certain to receive fresh attention is the fate of Rikers Island — the 415-acre land mass situated in the East River between the Bronx and Queens and home to one of the nation's largest and most notorious jail complexes. For decades, human rights advocates have sounded the alarm regarding the violence, cruelty and inhumane conditions facing detainees (the vast majority of whom are awaiting trial), the dangers to Correction Department officers, the enormous cost of running this complex (hundreds of thousands of dollars per detainee per year) and the failure of the corrections system to prepare those confined there to successfully re-enter society. This year alone, [14 people have died](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/12/07/rikers-island-detainee-dies-14th-death-in-nyc-jails-this-year/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Department of Correction's custody. Rikers as we know it rightly remains on the path to closure. In 2017, in the [first](https://urldefense.com/v3/%5F%5Fhttps://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6de4731aef1de914f43628/t/5b96c6f81ae6cf5e9c5f186d/1536607993842/Lippman%2A2BCommission%2A2BReport%2A2BFINAL%2A2BSingles.pdf%5F%5F;JSUlJQ!!NO21cQ!DechEb%5Fu0C5tBXwyXaDtzbJQtyqDmzKe0ex4Hwh%5FXDjj-9r-gcSDu7aN%5FFv338s40jz9OKJYiWGFzOD78GGSCJNi$?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of [more than a dozen authoritative reports](https://urldefense.com/v3/%5F%5Fhttps://www.morejustnyc.org/reports%5F%5F;!!NO21cQ!DechEb%5Fu0C5tBXwyXaDtzbJQtyqDmzKe0ex4Hwh%5FXDjj-9r-gcSDu7aN%5FFv338s40jz9OKJYiWGFzOD78MgN7aRX$?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Independent Commission on New York City Criminal Justice Reform — chaired by former Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, Jonathan Lippman — branded the Rikers Island jail system "an international symbol of despair and damage" and concluded that ending incarceration there was "a moral imperative." In 2021, the City Council [enacted historic legislation](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2021/02/11/2069/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) mandating an end to incarceration on Rikers Island by August 2027 — and charting a better course for the island's future. Significantly, this ["Renewable Rikers" legislation](https://intro.nyc/local-laws/2021-16?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — spearheaded by then-Councilmember Costa Constantinides — directed planning for post-incarceration land uses on Rikers Island for "sustainability and resiliency purposes." The administration of outgoing Mayor Eric Adams missed intermediate implementation deadlines and wobbled in its dedication to achieving the Renewable Rikers statutorily mandated August 2027 closure date. Progress in constructing the borough-based jailhouses, where detainees are supposed to be housed when Rikers is shuttered, has proceeded slowly. At this point, they're not scheduled to be completed until 2029, 2031 or 2032. Even though it is likely that efforts to scale up community-based mental health resources, invest in supportive housing, speed pre-trial processing and accelerate completion of the borough-based jails will pick up steam under the Mamdani administration, meeting the August 2027 end-to-incarceration date for Rikers looks somewhere between implausible and impossible. While attention has been focused on whether incarceration at Rikers will end in August 2027 or sometime thereafter, the question of what Rikers Island's post-incarceration future will look like — whenever that future formally begins — has been largely ignored as of late by the city's policy-debaters and decision-makers. That should change. The transformation of Rikers Island into a world-class example of sustainable redevelopment, green jobs and reparative justice would be a legacy accomplishment for Mayor-elect Mamdani. In case anyone was wondering, Rikers Island is ill-suited for residential development. It is largely constructed out of landfill composed of garbage and coal and incinerator ash. The result is an unstable foundation and frequent releases of methane, a highly flammable greenhouse gas. The island is also poorly served by public transportation and lies within a stone's throw of LaGuardia airport; height restrictions are imposing; disruptive noise and jet fumes are unavoidable. As the sponsors of the Renewable Rikers legislation understood, the island — because of its size and separation from populated neighborhoods — is a unique in-city location for erecting environmentally beneficial infrastructure, once the physical structures of its ignominious past are demolished. To that end, the 2021 Renewable Rikers legislation directed city agencies to prepare feasibility studies analyzing the potential for such innovation. The New York City Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") released [one of these little-noticed studies](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dep/downloads/pdf/about/rikers-island-wrrf-feasibility-study-march-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in March 2024\. It concluded that constructing a state-of-the-art wastewater treatment plant on Rikers Island would offer "a multitude of benefits that are not possible with the existing" system. According to the study, a modern wastewater treatment plant on Rikers would improve water quality in New York harbor; produce renewable green energy; capture stormwater and lessen in-city flooding; improve the Department's operations and efficiency; and reduce the impact of the Department's existing sewage plants on adjacent neighborhoods in the South Bronx and northern and eastern Queens. DEP Commissioner Rohit Aggarwala, in the study's introduction, wrote that a new Rikers Island wastewater treatment plant could "transform DEP's operations…," "would be technically feasible…," and could well be "similar in cost" to rebuilding and upgrading the nearby aging sewage plants (which will be necessary as those decades-old plants reach the end of their useful lives). A [second study](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/climate/downloads/pdfs/Rikers-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was released by the Mayor's Office of Climate and Environmental Justice in February 2024\. This one focused on the feasibility of building renewable energy infrastructure on Rikers Island. Its conclusions were similarly upbeat. It found that constructing a major solar installation, a large-scale battery storage facility (that could release clean energy into the grid during periods of peak demand), and an offshore wind converter station presents a "feasible" and "compelling alternative" to the city's "current antiquated energy …infrastructure." Another promising land use that could slide in alongside these energy and wastewater treatment operations would be a contemporary organic materials composting facility. An NRDC analysis prepared by former Sanitation Commissioner Brendan Sexton concluded that establishing a major food scraps and yard waste composting plant on Rikers — on the scale of the Department's Staten Island composting operation at Fresh Kills — would be feasible, cost-effective and necessary to achieve the city's ambitious climate and waste reduction goals. Since the release of the two feasibility studies in 2024, however, nothing has happened. The Eric Adams administration [has failed to move things forward](https://queenseagle.com/all/2023/8/25/adams-administration-continues-to-miss-rikers-closure-deadlines?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It hasn't transferred land or buildings on the island that are no longer being used for incarceration purposes out of Department of Correction control, as the Renewable Rikers statute requires. And it has only sporadically convened the Rikers Island Advisory Committee, which by law was directed to advise City Hall on future uses of the island "for sustainability and resiliency purposes." An immediate next step is for City Hall to build upon the feasibility studies and map out a detailed master plan for a re-imagined Rikers Island. Fortunately, [legislation advanced by Councilmember Sandy Nurse and her colleagues](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6860227&GUID=0F9E83C3-E45B-4E90-815A-DF3F1B1A2B5A&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to direct exactly that has already been prepared and vetted and is awaiting a vote in the City Council. The closure of Rikers Island may be delayed — but the brighter future of this piece of land should not be indefinitely put on hold. Imaginative thinking. Smart development. Improved public services. Renewable Rikers offers it all. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani can turn an island of shame into a showplace of sustainability. Under his leadership, a new Rikers Island can become part of his legacy of advancing not only social justice, but also savvy job-producing, green infrastructure redevelopment on a grand scale in the nation's largest city. *The article you just read took weeks of research, interviews with experts, and careful analysis. It's the kind of rigorous, solutions-focused work that takes time, and support from readers like you makes it possible.* *Vital City launched three years ago on a bet: that New Yorkers craved calm, evidence-based ideas in a hyperpartisan moment. You proved us right. And together, we've built something rare: a civic institution that influences policy without ideology.* *To meet this moment, we need to grow, and we need your help to do it.* *Your gift will help us expand our operational capacity, and publish more of the practical policy ideas that are cited by decisionmakers, used in college classrooms, and referenced on the campaign trail.* *Will you join us?* [***Become an inaugural supporter →***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### The Other Side of Affordability URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/job-creation-and-upward-mobility-for-affordability-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:30.000Z Solving New York City's affordability crisis will require more than tackling the soaring cost of living. The next mayor also needs a plan for the other side of the equation: raising incomes and building wealth. Throughout the mayoral campaign, Zohran Mamdani understandably focused on the immediate pressures New Yorkers feel every day — rising rents, childcare costs, transit fares and the price of groceries. What received far less attention was why and how his administration might improve economic mobility: helping more New Yorkers move out of poverty, achieve economic stability and reach the middle class. Lowering costs is important, but it can only take New Yorkers so far. Since the pandemic, New York City's median rent has risen at twice the rate of median incomes, according to the Center for an Urban Future's analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Policymakers can't make the city more affordable for all if paychecks continue to fall behind. Mamdani has proposed one significant idea to bolster incomes: raising the city's minimum wage to $30 by 2030\. Boosting the minimum wage beyond the current $16.50 is an important step. Indeed, the increases from $7.25 in 2013 were arguably the leading factor in [reducing poverty](https://povertycenter.columbia.edu/sites/povertycenter.columbia.edu/files/content/Publications/PT%20reports/NYC-Poverty-Tracker-Minimum-Wage-Increase-2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) prior to the pandemic. But it's not enough just to boost the number of New Yorkers who can get by in this high-cost city; a lot more New Yorkers need options that will help them get ahead. That requires more than just increasing the base wage, but also setting up individuals to access the well-paying jobs that are growing in the city's economy and build wealth. The consequences of limited economic mobility are visible everywhere. Last year, [76%](https://robinhood.org/reports/poverty-tracker-data-snapshot-inflation-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of New Yorkers said they cut back on basic necessities or savings. Poverty is [rising again](https://robinhood.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PT%5FAnnual24%5Ffinal%5Fdigital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and many households earning well above the poverty line face [intensifying financial strain](https://unitedwaynyc.org/true-cost-of-living/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Beneath those trends is a deeper challenge: While there are now more high-wage jobs in the city than before the pandemic, more than one million working-age New Yorkers are unemployed, underemployed or stuck in low-wage jobs, according to the Center for an Urban Future's analysis of Census data, including 556,696 full-time workers earning minimum wage, 252,500 unemployed New Yorkers, 208,454 part-time workers who want full-time jobs and 111,171 college graduates working in low-paying jobs that don't require a degree. Unless city leaders make expanding economic mobility a priority on par with lowering costs, the city will attempt to solve a two-sided problem with a one-sided strategy, and too many New Yorkers will still struggle to get ahead. Economic mobility, however, has almost no conventional political constituency. There are no rallies for higher college attainment rates or expanded apprenticeships. No daily headlines demanding a stronger role for nonprofit small-business lenders or more on-ramps to high-wage careers. That's why mayoral leadership is so important: While the work rarely garners headlines, the impact can be transformative. And while subsidizing life in the nation's most expensive city will come at a significant public cost, major action to expand economic mobility will generate revenue over time, as more New Yorkers move into decent jobs, stable careers and home or business ownership — strengthening the tax base and the city's economy for the long term. As of today, Mamdani proposes funding most of his biggest policy proposals by raising taxes on the wealthy and corporations. But a rising tide for all would broaden the fiscal base for more robust economic mobility programs and a stronger safety net, while giving the next mayor effective options that do not require state action. New York already has many building blocks in place: CUNY programs that dramatically improve completion rates, employer partnerships that open pathways to good jobs, community lenders that help small businesses grow and job training models that lead to careers. What's missing is focus and scale, along with a commitment from City Hall to champion what works and move on from what doesn't. Taken together, these efforts can form the backbone of a serious economic mobility strategy for New York — one that matches the scale of the affordability challenge. Here are five concrete, achievable steps the new administration can take to jumpstart an economic mobility agenda. 1. **Help thousands more low-income New Yorkers earn a degree.** In most of the city's best-paying industries, 75-90% of workers hold a bachelor's degree. Yet only 24% of Hispanic New Yorkers and 32% of Black New Yorkers have one — a [gap](https://nycfuture.org/research/closing-nycs-college-attainment-gap?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that sharply limits access to good jobs. Expanding CUNY ACE — one of the most effective tools for boosting bachelor's completion — should be a top priority. ACE combines personalized advising, financial support and structured pathways that increase graduation rates by as much as 40%, but it currently serves just 3% of eligible students. Scaling ACE to reach 30% of full-time students over five years, and launching a CUNY Flex model for part-time students, would enable thousands more New Yorkers to move into family-sustaining careers and [generate billions](https://nycfuture.org/research/playing-new-york-citys-ace-card?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of dollars in additional lifetime earnings. As a first step, the next mayor should double ACE funding to about $22 million per year and seed CUNY Flex with an initial $10 million pilot. 2. **Scale up more of the city's micro-businesses.** Entrepreneurship is one of the most powerful pathways to intergenerational wealth, yet too few of the city's 20,000 Black- and Latino-owned firms ever grow from very small businesses into medium-sized or large businesses. Minority-owned employer businesses generate just 45% of the revenue of white-owned counterparts, in part because they struggle to access capital, navigate procurement or break into major supply chains. The City Council [funded](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/06/30/2915/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a small pilot last year to begin addressing this gap, but the next mayor should take this seed investment to the next level. Launching a full-scale [NYC Minority Business Accelerator](https://nycfuture.org/research/scaling-minority-owned-businesses?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — modeled on [Cincinnati's successful program](https://minoritybusinessaccelerator.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/MBA%5FAnnualReport-2022%5F2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — would help hundreds more small firms tap into private-sector procurement and supply chains and reach a whole new echelon of growth. 3. **Launch an NYC AI Service Corps.** Thousands of young New Yorkers have earned computer science degrees or completed high-quality tech training programs, yet still can't secure that critical first job. Employers increasingly want work experience, not just credentials, leaving many talented graduates sidelined. There is now an oversupply of recent tech graduates for the first time on record, according to analysis by the Center for an Urban Future, and monthly job postings for software developers plunged by nearly 50 percent from 2021-2022 to 2023-2024, according to NYCEDC. An NYC AI Service Corps — a paid, six-month fellowship placing recent grads in small businesses, nonprofits and city agencies — would give participants hands-on experience building AI tools, improving data systems and solving real operational challenges. Fellows would gain the networks and confidence needed to enter a fast-changing industry, while helping organizations across the city modernize and compete. The initiative could launch with $10 million in city funding and a private-sector match, and later expand into a [pay-it-forward](https://nycfuture.org/research/5-ideas-to-advance-economic-mobility-in-nyc-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) model in which organizations that hire their fellows repay a portion of wages into a pool that funds future cohorts. 4. **Enlist 100 of New York's largest employers in creating middle-class pathways.** The New York Jobs CEO Council — launched by Jamie Dimon and other CEOs to create clear, skills-based pathways into good jobs for CUNY students and graduates of nonprofit training programs — has already helped spark more than 40,000 hires of low-income New Yorkers into family-sustaining roles. But while this ambitious intermediary is succeeding in bridging the gaps between employers and education and training providers, only about 30 of the city's largest employers are currently involved. The next mayor should build on this success by recruiting the [next 100](https://nycfuture.org/research/5-ideas-to-advance-economic-mobility-in-nyc-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) large and mid-sized employers to open well-defined, skills-based hiring pathways for CUNY students and graduates of career training programs, with the goal of hiring another 100,000 lower-income New Yorkers into well-paying jobs over the next 10 years. 5. **Create a citywide youth entrepreneurship initiative.** Young New Yorkers are entering one of the toughest job markets in years, with very few entry-level openings and limited opportunities to earn beyond a shrinking number of minimum-wage jobs. In this difficult economic landscape, the mayor should help more young people start and scale entrepreneurial ventures. Entrepreneurship isn't easy, and it isn't for everyone, but it will need to become a viable pathway for more young New Yorkers to achieve economic self-sufficiency — building on the homegrown successes of entrepreneurs such as [Hamid Cruz](https://build.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/BUILD.org-Annual-Report-2020-2021.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), who launched a successful business in high school before going on to become the first in his family to graduate college. Moreover, research suggests that entrepreneurial education is linked to higher earnings even for those who don't ultimately launch businesses. The mayor should launch the city's first major youth entrepreneurship initiative, featuring start-up competitions in schools, libraries and CUNY campuses; mentorship programs that pair the city's top entrepreneurs with cohorts of young founders; and technical assistance geared toward turning ideas into viable ventures. While each of these ideas can generate meaningful results on its own, expanding mobility also requires an economy that's creating far more good jobs. That will mean reducing some of the bureaucratic hurdles that slow business growth, building a massive amount of new housing, taking an evidence-based approach to public safety and continuing to invest in the things that make New York livable and competitive — culture, parks, transit and the public realm. The next mayor is right to do everything he can to make New York more affordable. But if the goal is to help more residents actually afford to live here, he'll need to focus just as much on boosting incomes and building wealth as on keeping costs down. *The article you just read took weeks of research, interviews with experts, and careful analysis. It's the kind of rigorous, solutions-focused work that takes time, and support from readers like you makes it possible.* *Vital City launched three years ago on a bet: that New Yorkers craved calm, evidence-based ideas in a hyperpartisan moment. You proved us right. And together, we've built something rare: a civic institution that influences policy without ideology.* *To meet this moment, we need to grow, and we need your help to do it.* *Your gift will help us expand our operational capacity, and publish more of the practical policy ideas that are cited by decisionmakers, used in college classrooms, and referenced on the campaign trail.* *Will you join us?* [***Become an inaugural supporter →***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### What To Do (and Not To Do) About People in Crisis on Streets and Subways URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:30.000Z How can the toughest problems of urban life be addressed in a serious, sustained way? The purpose of this series, which began with [“What To Do (and Not To Do) About Subway Safety”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-subway-safety-nyc-policy-recommendations) and will continue with installments on disorder, policing and other topics, is to deliver to policymakers the best ideas distilled into steps that can be taken now and longterm changes that must undergird sustained achievement. We assembled prominent practitioners and researchers to discuss the complicated problem of individuals who are unhoused and living with serious mental illness (SMI) and drug addiction on New York City’s streets and subways. In this issue, more than any other we have examined, the data are sparse and atomized, and the evidence of “what works” is frail. But policymakers have no choice but to act even when there is no randomized controlled trial to guide them. Here, we relied on the deep experience of those addressing these issues to fashion practical recommendations — the repeating theme is that for a solution to endure, the City must steel itself to synthesize data and test results. This document contains our chief recommendations. It is supplemented by three companion papers: [a look at what the data tell us and fail to tell us about this population](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-the-data-show-people-in-crisis-on-the-streets-and-subways), [a detailed description of the way the system currently works](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-the-system-works-for-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) and [a look at how other large cities handle these problems](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/case-studies-from-large-cities-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways). Our deep gratitude goes to the many people who helped shape these recommendations. Many of them are listed at the end of this document. We also extend special thanks to the Achelis and Bodman Foundation, Arnold Ventures, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the Public Welfare Foundation, the Charles H. Revson Foundation, the Teagle Foundation and the Tow Foundation, who are helping to support Vital City. We appreciate the work others throughout the city are doing to assemble and advance similar recommendations, including [The Collaborative on Housing for Health,](https://www.housingforhealthnyc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and consider our work complementary to theirs. While we make recommendations here, they are in part based on and honor the hard work of public servants who grapple with these enormously complex problems every day. ## The Problem To Be Solved Of all the hard urban problems, none tests New York’s capacity for effective governance quite like this one: people occupying public places while living with SMI, addiction and other maladies. It is a problem that touches first principles — how government cares for vulnerable people in distress and how to ensure public spaces remain safe and accessible for the public’s use. And it exposes the limits of government knowledge, coordination and intervention. New York lacks a reliable, citywide picture of who these New Yorkers are, what conditions they live with, who connects with them for support and which interventions actually change their life course for the better. Policymakers, advocates and the broader public argue about whether this is a public health problem or a public safety problem — when, in truth, it is both. Layered atop that is a hard question of agency: When illness and addiction distort a person’s judgment, obscure their insight or diminish their ability to acknowledge the problems they face, how should the City balance a person’s autonomy with its obligation to protect life and the shared use of public space? Unlike challenges that respond to standardized playbooks, these individuals’ needs shift quickly. Progress is nonlinear, and durable results hinge on sustained work that, to be effective, must be bespoke to the particular condition of each person. All of those uncertainties are further aggravated by the loose relationship that government and other entities often have to the evidence — such as it is — that might guide government actions. People who are homeless have a right to occupy public space, like anyone else. But as with every person, there are limits on how public space is shared. They do not have a right to create encampments, to use drugs in public view or to harass others. Nor do they have the right to violate the rules of the subway system, which is primarily for transit. When public places become places where crises routinely play out, other New Yorkers can feel uneasy or unsafe, and in some cases, there is genuine danger — to these vulnerable individuals themselves and to the wider public. The City, including in this last administration, has tried many things over several decades. New York City, with support from New York State and federal partners, spends billions annually across a sprawling range of programs: street outreach and mobile intervention; 911 and 311 crisis response; inpatient and step-down care; a vast, specialized shelter system; low-barrier options, including Safe Havens and stabilization beds; jail and hospital reentry services; and supportive and affordable housing. A glossary of many of these terms is part of our companion document, [“How the System Works (and Doesn’t).”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-the-system-works-for-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) Recently passed legislation codifies the criteria for involuntary removal from the street, and both the City and the State have expanded the use of outreach teams comprising police and clinicians. Still, New Yorkers, City agencies, nonprofits and the myriad who work every day on this issue report a common frustration: The same individuals cycle through subways, ERs, courts, incarceration, shelters and streets, in a seemingly never-ending churn. New Yorkers seem to be paying too much for motion and not enough for durable results. Two problems, in particular, plague the efforts to address these hard problems. First, no one “owns” the issue — so no one is held accountable when an individual isn’t successfully linked with stable housing and care. Second, the fragmentation of the efforts — data, accountability, goals — means that it is oriented toward crisis, not durable solutions. There are many committed individuals and groups serving and interacting with unhoused people, including those living with mental illness, but coordination and accountability are diffuse or nonexistent. But the system is organized mainly by agency, geography and category of service rather than by individuals in need, and is most often mobilized in response to crisis. Successful follow-through focused on the needs of a particular person from day to day, much less month to month, is rare. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani plans to establish a Department of Community Safety to coordinate outreach and response to this vulnerable population. Our experience suggests that the success or failure of the City’s engagement with unstable homeless New Yorkers will not hinge on whether a new department is added to the current mix of many agencies working in this space. Rather, the next mayor’s broader management strategy will be crucial to whether a new department adds value or becomes yet another layer and level of siloed bureaucracy. To ensure operations and implementation are successful, Mamdani will need to establish, for all City government, a clear goal and focus to achieve measurable progress in this space. One place within the government — we recommend the Mayor’s Office for having the authority and span sufficient to coordinate multiple entities — must have the mandate, accountability, data and resources to ensure that each person who is in crisis has the support through and beyond crisis to get to treatment and housing placement. The shorthand for this accountability is: “Who is ultimately responsible to the mayor for real and enduring progress in ensuring housing and treatment for this vulnerable population?” As we detail below, this will require a major effort by the City to assemble information about people and how they are served and to steel itself to learn relentlessly what works and what doesn’t. Based on our analysis of successful programs from other states and lessons learned from past administrations in New York City, the following recommendations focus on addressing the needs of the relatively small group of unsheltered individuals who present a danger to themselves or others, either through mental instability or debilitating addiction. By staying focused and filling the service gaps for this most complicated population, the City will necessarily strengthen and improve the system for all homeless people living with mental illness and/or a substance use disorder. To ensure this goal is met, services must no longer be siloed by agency and geography, but rather structured such that government and nonprofits are assigned to individuals and tasked with addressing their complex needs, across bureaucratic barriers and over time. Providers should be measured by their results, and, backlighting everything, the City should be fiercely committed to continually evaluating effectiveness. This is necessary for making nimble operational decisions regarding what to replicate and what to correct. And, for the long haul, the City must also commit to put in place a stable and durable policy to change conditions for the better. There must be a common agreement both that public places are for public use, and that the aim is ultimately to ensure each unsheltered person is housed and supported with the services that will make their lives stable and safe. ## How the System Works (or Doesn’t) On any given night, [about 4,000 people](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are living on the streets and subways in New York City. Perhaps half of them — there is no perfect estimate — live with SMI, addiction and other profound problems. Over decades, the City has built a vast web of public and nonprofit providers to reach, house and treat this population. An incomplete catalog: Teams of outreach workers from organizations like the Bowery Residents’ Committee and the Center for Urban Community Services fan out daily. Police officers are often the first to encounter people in desperation or outright crisis; under the law, they are empowered to take individuals to hospitals, where doctors and nurses determine if they need psychiatric care and judges may order involuntary commitment. A relatively new innovation, the co-response team, which consists of police and clinicians, seeks to make informed judgments about people’s needs and connect them to appropriate services. In the past few years, there has been additional focus on “alternative response,” in which civilians engage with people in need on the street without the police. Intensive Mobile Treatment (IMT) teams work with the highest-need people who have substantial criminal justice involvement. Temporary shelter placements and supportive housing — apartments with a wide array of wraparound help to address needs — are coordinated through the Department of Homeless Services (DHS) and other agencies. Prosecutors and courts get involved when people are accused and convicted of crimes. Court-ordered evaluations, known as 730 exams, provide an early opportunity to examine an individual for fitness to proceed and to route a person to treatment if they are found incapacitated. While in custody, those living with SMI — about a [fifth of the jail population](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at any given time — can be housed in specialized units. Upon release, reentry programs are available to connect individuals to treatment, housing and other services. If convicted of a crime and transferred to State custody, there is a range of treatment, specialized beds and units for individuals with SMI. The result is an elaborate and poorly coordinated ecosystem that costs taxpayers billions each year. For policymakers and the public alike, keeping track of the panoply of programs and acronyms can be dizzying. Those wishing to understand how these programs fit together can start with Vital City’s crash course [here](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-the-system-works-for-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways). For every attempt to engage, for every handoff from one nonprofit or government agency to another, there is a potential cliff — where people in need fail to get the help they need, further aggravating the likelihood of crisis. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atw_z3nyclf9ohtj_bridgestonowhere-12-8-png-auto-format-compress-1-1776259662371.jpg) ## Principles for Action - **Affirm and enforce that public spaces are for public purposes.** Streets, subways and parks are shared civic resources. When they are used in ways that block access, compromise safety or depart from their intended function, the City has an obligation to ensure their fair, cooperative use. - **Set a citywide goal of providing stable housing and care for each person in distress, recognizing that attention must be sustained beyond crisis.** People who are unhoused and suffering from mental illness and other maladies should have access to permanent housing and care suited to their needs for as long as necessary to achieve stability. - **Ensure clear responsibility for meeting goals and relentlessly focus on learning what works and what doesn't.** Today, accountability regarding this population is diffuse and in some cases nonexistent. Responsibility for results must be the hallmark of the system. - **Coordinate across systems with contracts oriented around results, not activity.** All activity should be oriented toward common goals with publicly available metrics that measure results, not simply activity. - **Lead with health, support with safety.** When a person is in psychiatric distress, the response should be guided by health professionals, with police ready to ensure safety and legitimacy when needed. Success depends on effective coordination and cooperation. ## Summary of Recommendations ### 1\. Affirm and enforce public space norms while unifying all City action around stable housing and care. The City should consistently enforce rules that keep public spaces usable while ensuring every removal is paired with concrete offers of treatment, shelter and a pathway to permanent housing. ### 2\. Put one accountable City Hall leader in charge of the entire system. A single mayoral authority should coordinate all agencies, data, contracts and actions across health, housing, transit, police and courts to focus on outcomes rather than activity. ### 3\. Treat housing as the essential foundation of stabilization. The City must rapidly scale and streamline direct placements into supportive or hybrid housing-with-services, removing bureaucratic barriers and prioritizing people with the highest needs. ### 4\. Focus outreach, treatment and enforcement on the small group driving the most instability. Using integrated justice, health and homelessness data, the City should concentrate intensive treatment, housing and supervision on the highest-risk individuals and locations. ### 5\. Use involuntary removals strategically and always as a gateway to sustained care. When danger is clear, involuntary transport and psychiatric treatment should be used more consistently and should always be connected to continuous outreach, treatment and housing rather than cycling people back to the street. ### 6\. Reform contracts and rationalize hundreds of millions of dollars in spending around outcomes, not activities. The City should pay providers on time, consolidate fragmented funding, track costs per person across systems and shift to outcome-based contracting tied to durable stability. ### 7\. Follow the evidence and rigorously evaluate every strategy. The City should fast-track pilots, measure outcomes across systems, fund independent evaluations and stop or scale programs based strictly on demonstrated results. ### What not to do Avoid punitive or symbolic actions — like police-only strategies or encampment sweeps without housing — and stop expanding unevaluated programs or treating all cases the same. Instead, tailor interventions and measure outcomes. ## Recommendations in detail ### 1\. Affirm and enforce that public spaces are for public purposes while unifying City action under a common goal of providing stable housing with necessary supports. The City must not stand by while people in active psychiatric or substance use crisis, or those who are teetering on the verge of crisis, unravel in public view. This is both because of the well-being of the person in crisis and because of the threat or perceived threat presented, both of which are corrosive to the fabric of the city. The numerous agencies and entities involved in this issue must operate in unison under a common goal that will orient and direct action and provide for sustained attention for those in need. That common goal is to provide stable housing for each person along with the tailored services needed to maintain stability. Specifically, the City should: - **Codify the principle in agency protocols.** City and State agencies like the NYPD, DHS, Department of Parks and Recreation and Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) should make clear in their training and operating guidelines that public spaces are not to be used as encampments, sites of open-air drug use or places where people remain in active psychiatric distress. Frontline staff should be directed that behavior cannot be ignored when it violates the law. - **Effect removals from the subways and other public spaces and ensure consistent, coordinated outreach connecting people to services.** The first set of recommendations in Vital City's "What To Do (and Not To Do) About" series [focused on subway safety](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-and-not-to-do-about-subway-safety) and made clear that police and outreach workers should "remove from the system those who violate the rules or present risks." We second that here. The subway's rules are designed to ensure New Yorkers can travel efficiently and safely. Aboveground, the rules for removal may vary by location. But in all cases, the goal should be to prevent deterioration in public and connect people with necessary treatment and housing. - **Set clear expectations through public messaging.** The City should mount a campaign to reinforce that streets and especially subways are not acceptable living spaces and to highlight the help available. This can acknowledge and reinforce these important norms and invite the public to report serious safety or health concerns via 311, helping to identify locations where conditions are deteriorating and outreach is urgently needed. - **Pair removals with advance notice whenever feasible, and with concrete offers of care aimed at permanent housing and services.** Enforcement alone is insufficient if it simply displaces the person. Every removal should lead to services oriented toward securing housing, treatment and other help. This is a tall order. But beginning with the relatively small number of highest-acuity individuals can help the City build the staffing, coordination and operational pathways needed for a more organized system. ### 2\. Organize people, programs, access to data and focus on results under a single City Hall lead. New York needs a single accountable leader at City Hall with the power, authority and means to oversee the response to people living on the streets beset with SMI and drug addiction. Diffuse accountability produces inconsistent standards and misaligned incentives as agencies optimize their own workloads instead of outcomes for the person or the community block. This leader must control budgets and contracts and have the authority to compel privacy-compliant data sharing. They should also oversee an operational hub that assigns a lead agency to each person and formalizes State-City coordination. With that mandate, the City can measure what matters and own results rather than activities. We recognize that this reorganization is no small task, but the current arrangement has not worked. As structured, it cannot succeed. Much work has been done by those involved in these issues every day, and informal working groups with deep knowledge of the system abound. Specifically, the City should: - **Designate one Mayor's Office official as the chief City official responsible for this population.** This office should convene all relevant entities, set goals and expectations and ensure coordination. It should also map the web of interactions across systems and set clear accountability standards for outreach, follow-up, housing and treatment. This coordinating authority must sit in the Mayor's Office so it can direct agencies, ensure goals are met, mobilize resources to support implementation and have the authority to coordinate effectively with state agencies (e.g. the MTA, the New York State Office of Mental Health and the New York State Office of Addiction Services and Supports, among others). Mayor-elect Mamdani's proposed Department of Community Safety would house some (perhaps all) of the outreach and response teams, but it does not solve the coordination and direction problem — which will remain multiagency by definition, necessarily involving the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), NYC Health + Hospitals (H+H), DHS, the NYPD and other City departments, as well as offices, departments and agencies at the State and federal levels. - **Integrate justice, health and homelessness data under the City's Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence as the backbone.** The City should build a single, privacy-compliant, by-name picture that matches arrests, hospitalizations, involuntary transports, Medicaid claims and outreach contacts to flag high-risk individuals in real time. Incorporating justice data streams, this can help close the well-documented divide between public health and criminal justice systems, much of it driven by tradition and mistrust rather than law. Such a platform can vastly improve and inform outreach and intervention efforts. - **Hold regular multiagency "case conferences."** The individual in charge of coordination should convene daily or weekly meetings where frontline teams and supervisors discuss the highest-priority individuals and assign tasks. No two individuals present precisely the same challenge. This tight feedback loop mirrors successful models such as veteran homelessness case conferencing, New York City's gun violence reduction strategy, the "Top 50" lists and [multidisciplinary task forces](https://www.nysemdt.org/faqs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) elsewhere in the state. Public safety risk should be included in considering the highest-priority individuals. - **Aggregate and analyze knowledge.** While individual cases must be managed better, the City simultaneously needs a much clearer, 35,000-foot view of the population as a whole. It should build a single, integrated picture of the problem across agencies. It should establish a comprehensive assessment of the correct alignment of resources needed to achieve the vision of overcoming street homelessness by mapping the churn and flow of individuals and their needs. And for public consumption, it should publish the "known unknowns" and a plan to close system gaps. - **Reorient contracts to ensure their specifications are based on individuals and outcomes.** The City's current contracting with nonprofits is siloed by agency and geography, creating a tangled web of bureaucracies. Dozens of nonprofits contract across City agencies, spending many hundreds of millions of dollars annually. These organizations can hold multiple contracts with single agencies and often contract with several agencies simultaneously. Contracting should be restructured and sufficiently funded so that [payments are based on outcomes, not inputs](https://ssir.org/articles/entry/homelessness-services-redesign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and so that organizations are assigned to individuals and not arbitrary geographic or bureaucratic realms. These outcomes should include but not be limited to: longitudinal health outcomes, justice-system involvement and housing placements. - **Explore other contracting reforms to improve coordination and accountability.** Contracts with providers should require shared data systems and standardized consent processes to enable responsible information exchange among providers. Outreach areas should be aligned geographically to reduce overlap and strengthen accountability and follow-up. - **Compel privacy-compliant data sharing.** Building on existing platforms such as the "Top 50" lists of especially troubled individuals and DHS' StreetSmart, intended to be a coordinated tracking system, the City must compel more privacy-compliant data sharing. City Hall should identify gaps in data sharing and clarify whether they stem from legal, policy or technical barriers. Where information is incomplete or siloed, agencies should execute new data-sharing agreements or pursue legislative remedies as needed to ensure that outreach, hospital and housing systems operate from a shared picture of each person's status and needs. For example, the Times Square Alliance has proposed reforms that let multidisciplinary teams share information across health, housing and safety systems while maintaining confidentiality. Modeled on [California's AB 210](https://homeless.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AB-210-Fact-Sheet-6.20.2018.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), such legislation would authorize controlled data sharing among qualified providers and create the foundation for a unified outreach and care system. - **Focus on the highest-need people first in a tightly scoped 100-day pilot.** Some have suggested that such a pilot should initially be constrained geographically to a single precinct or community district — plus nearby transit hubs. Others note the limitations of a geographically bounded pilot because the issues cross borders. The City should choose whichever model they can use best to test a fully coordinated, data-driven approach to address unsheltered homelessness. Empower a City Hall lead and on-the-ground operations manager to unify all outreach, clinical, housing and enforcement efforts within clear geographic boundaries. Establish daily field briefings, weekly interagency case conferences and monthly strategic reviews to align actions and remove system barriers. Use a shared, secure data platform to track every individual by name, assign a single accountable lead agency per person and monitor progress from first contact through placement in housing or treatment. Treat the pilot as a learning lab — capturing real-time lessons about staffing, legal and policy obstacles; data integration; and cost per successful outcome — to produce by Day 100 a detailed, public plan for scaling citywide, including resource, workforce and policy requirements. The Times Square Alliance is working toward a [version of this in West Midtown](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/66026f9a23bc03c74d23035a/691e2e60914f0603a75cff91%5FTimes%20Square%20Street%20Crisis%20Pilot%20Proposal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atxjfhnyclf9oh0f_systemcomparison-12-8-png-auto-format-compress-1776259662252.jpg) ### 3\. Make housing a central piece of the solution For the unstable, unsheltered homeless population, providing housing without treatment is woefully insufficient, and treatment without housing leaves them vulnerable to a vicious cycle of circumstances that can reverse improvements in their mental health. The value of “housing first” has been studied in multiple cities across the nation and the globe. Within the United States, Community Solutions has shown in [15 cities](https://community.solutions/built-for-zero/the-movement/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) how setting a goal of “functional zero” street homelessness and holding relevant agencies accountable can significantly improve the lives of street homeless people. Evidence from other cities, and New York City’s own past successes, proves its value. [Houston moved more](https://www.cfthhouston.org/houston-facts-info?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) than 32,000 homeless people directly into apartments over the last decade, cutting its homelessness by 63%. New York City itself reduced veteran homelessness [by nearly 90% since 2011](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/housing-first/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by rapidly housing every veteran in need. For people struggling with SMI and related problems, housing must be accompanied with services — meaning it must be supportive. But today, there is a combination of problems: either not enough units, a mismatch between the type of units available and the types of units needed, or [bedeviling bureaucratic barriers](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/01/06/homeless-supportive-housing-eric-adams-statistics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that keep existing and appropriate units vacant even when there are individuals in need of them. In June 2025, [officials reported](https://gothamist.com/news/to-fill-empty-apartments-for-homeless-people-nyc-will-first-start-tracking-them?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 5,092 vacant apartments — about 2,200 of which were offline for repairs — prompting new City Council legislation to track vacancies, underscoring that filling existing stock is a fixable management problem. The City’s coordinated entry system is not universally used, so many placements never reach the shared pipeline. The landscape is fragmented across dozens of programs, agencies and categories, leaving specialty beds vacant. On the front end, the application process is slow and paperwork-heavy — creating an especially high hurdle for people living unsheltered. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atyak3nyclf9oibh_casestudiesinendingchronichomelessness-12-12-png-auto-format-compress-1776259661845.jpg) Specifically, the City should: - **Scale up direct street-to-home placements.** The City must immediately expand its successful Street-to-Housing pilot, which moves individuals from welcome centers directly into vacant single-room occupancy units with on-site support staff. The pilot [successfully housed 130 people](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/01/30/successful-program-to-battle-street-homelessness-in-nyc-undermined-by-bureaucratic-barriers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in units that had been sitting vacant for an average of 568 days, proving the model's efficacy and its ability to utilize existing, underused housing stock. This expansion should directly address the paradox of vacant supportive housing units by targeting them for the highest-need population. Whenever possible, individuals should be routed around the shelter system and directly into permanent or semipermanent housing with services. Programs like Volunteers of America's ["Street-to-Housing"](https://www.voa-gny.org/mayor-announces-launch-of-street-to-housing-pilot-with-voa-gny/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) should be scaled up. - **Streamline eligibility and remove bureaucratic barriers.** The City should override, reduce or overcome onerous documentation requirements that delay housing placements. For example, City Council [Intro 1100-2024](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6902534&GUID=6B40A9F7-E838-4C16-98C5-97BF6F32F036&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which would allow time spent incarcerated to count toward chronic homelessness for City-funded housing, should be enacted to overcome the hurdle that current regulations pose to people who would otherwise qualify for housing. The City should simultaneously accept existing clinical evaluations, eliminating redundant paperwork, and devise a single placement packet that follows a person through the process instead of restarting files at every step. - **Expand the supply of supportive housing.** The City must [continue](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/news/press%5Freleases/2025/pr-hope-7-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to increase the number of permanent supportive housing units earmarked for people coming from chronic street homelessness. This includes exploring innovative models that expand housing alternatives including shared housing options and single-room occupancy units with private baths and shared living spaces. - **Establish a real-time "flow desk" and make CAPS the single front door.** CAPS is the City's internal database for matching people to supportive housing and other placements. It should serve as the unified entry point for all referrals. Every provider and funder should be required to list vacancies and status updates in CAPS, with automatic escalation for any unit vacant more than 30 days. A public dashboard should display vacancies, number of days vacant and next actions, and future contract compliance should depend on full participation in CAPS. [San Francisco's Housing Vacancy Dashboard](https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiNmYyZDgzYjctNmVlNi00MDdlLThkMGUtY2ZlNWI1NjI4OGVjIiwidCI6IjIyZDVjMmNmLWNlM2UtNDQzZC05YTdmLWRmY2MwMjMxZjczZiJ9&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a model worth learning from. - **Pay for speed and staying power.** The City should link funding to faster lease-up times and require daily vacancy reporting. It should also fund mobile clinical teams to stabilize high-need tenancies and enforce prompt-pay standards so providers can keep units filled. ### 4\. Concentrate outreach, treatment and enforcement on the small group whose instability most endangers themselves or others. While many unsheltered New Yorkers obey the law, when offenses occur they unsettle the public, making New Yorkers wary of the trains, sidewalks and parks that define public life. Arrests involving this population have risen 38% since 2022\. Charges skew toward low-level property and drug offenses, both of which take a toll on our public spaces. Assaults are common as well. Most people are arrested only once. But a small subset is picked up repeatedly and accounts for a disproportionate share of bookings. These incidents concentrate in a limited set of locations, and there is substantial overlap between homelessness, SMI and jail admissions. This suggests the City should triage the small number of individuals and locations that drive most harm. Then it should integrate outreach, treatment, shelter and enforcement in a system designed for repeated contacts rather than one-off interventions. Doing this well requires breaking down data silos across the areas of health, human services and justice so these systems work together rather than at cross-purposes. Specifically, the City should: - **Use routine police encounters to open doors to care.** Police are a constant presence in the places where unsheltered New Yorkers live, and it is neither realistic nor desirable to separate them from this work. The City should [strengthen existing NYPD-to-DHS referral protocols](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public%5Finformation/public-pguide3.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) so that any meaningful contact, even a low-level enforcement like a summons, can trigger a handoff to outreach and care. Referral outcomes should be tracked to ensure these connections are timely, consistent and effective. - **Scale up models proven effective in the most acute cases by building on the symbiotic relationship between IMT and the Step-Down Treatment Ensures Personal Success (STEPS) model.**[IMT](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/nyregion/mental-health-intensive-mobile-treatment.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which deploys multidisciplinary teams that blend public safety with behavioral health — is uniquely effective for the highest-acuity individuals, those with histories of violence and criminal justice involvement. The City should also clear the current waitlist while simultaneously implementing STEPS, a transitional model that allows stable clients to "graduate" from IMT. An [evaluation](https://iclprd.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICL-STEPS-Bi-Annual-Report-FINAL-2.5.25.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by NYU's McSilver Institute on Poverty shows STEPS’ significant effects in achieving housing stability and avoiding criminal justice involvement while reducing costs and freeing up scarce, high-intensity IMT slots for those currently languishing without care. - **Deploy Forensic Assertive Community Treatment as the default clinical response for the high-frequency / high-harm few.** These intensive teams — made up of clinicians, peers and justice-system liaisons — should coordinate closely with outreach workers and, when needed, police. The aim is to ensure that when someone in this highest-need group is encountered, they can move directly from the street into housing with treatment and sustained support. - **Make justice-involved supportive housing (JISH) a far more common discharge pathway from Rikers Island jails for individuals with SMI or repeated homelessness.**[JISH](https://shnny.org/uploads/CSH-FUSE-Evaluation.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a promising model, can enable sharp declines in jail, shelter and crisis-care use, so the City should build on what already works at scale. Officials should use integrated data to trigger more routine JISH referrals before release and reserve units for those cycling through jail, hospitals and the streets. It should hold DOHMH, H+H and the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice jointly accountable for placements, housing retention and reductions in jail readmissions. - **Use involuntary removals strategically for the small subset of people at clear and imminent risk.** The City should ensure each involuntary removal is tied to a clear stabilization plan, with a bed and clinical follow-up arranged prior to discharge. It should treat police, hospital and court encounters as opportunities to interrupt dangerous deterioration, not as routine returns to the street. ### 5\. Escalate outreach and use involuntary removals strategically For individuals who present a danger to themselves or others who will not accept help voluntarily, the City needs to employ involuntary mechanisms in a way that improves results for the people affected, instead of cycling them through shelter, hospital and jail. The goal must be removal with treatment and housing. The law permits involuntary transport to a hospital when a person is a danger to themselves or others, a definition of danger that includes one’s inability to care for their own basic needs. It further allows an individual to be held for treatment if they continue to meet the statutory criteria for involuntary admission. Both authorities should be used more fully and assertively for those who repeatedly cycle through crises. At the same time, every instance of involuntary transport or commitment should be viewed not as an end, but as the beginning of a sustained intervention. Specifically, the City should: - **Improve the productivity of street outreach and clinical capacity, and assess where police are a necessary part of the process.** The City should first assess whether there are enough outreach teams with the kinds of skills that can connect people in need to stable housing. The relevant data to assess capacity are not currently public. But discussions with nonprofits and government strongly suggest the need for a more organized, person-oriented and sustained approach. Alongside this assessment, the City should determine what mix of skills — from clinicians to social workers to police — is required. - **Empower more responders to initiate emergency removals.** Practically and legally, police are needed to effect most removals where a person is believed to be a danger to themselves or others. To increase timely intervention, the State should consider [learning from Durham, North Carolina](https://ssir.org/articles/entry/homelessness-services-redesign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and expand the authority to involuntarily transport someone to other trained professionals such as paramedics or outreach-team supervisors. This would reduce delays and overreliance on police, who don't always have the clinical training to know what they are seeing. - **Pair involuntary removal with continuous outreach and placement support.** When someone is taken involuntarily to a hospital, an assigned outreach team should remain responsible through treatment, discharge and housing placement. The protocol should automatically alert housing and care coordinators at admission so planning begins on Day One. Each involuntary intervention must trigger a full-cycle response, ensuring that every person enters a sustained pipeline of treatment, housing and follow-up rather than cycling back to the street. - **Track and evaluate outcomes of involuntary interventions.** Because coercive measures demand heightened scrutiny, the City should rigorously monitor what happens after involuntary removal or court-ordered treatment, tracking outcomes such as housing stability, ER visits and arrests to assess effectiveness and refine the approach. - **Build comprehensive case files for hospital referrals.** The City should ensure that when people are brought to hospitals through involuntary removal or referral, clinicians receive a full history of prior contacts, interventions and risks. Equipping doctors with this context enables better-informed decisions and reduces the risk of revolving-door discharges. - **Reform Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) to broaden its impact.** AOT under Kendra's Law can be a powerful tool, but it should be modernized to reach more people. This includes tailoring it for diagnoses beyond schizophrenia / bipolar disorder, expanding mental health professionals who can be involved in court decisions beyond physicians (e.g., psychiatric nurses) and integrating it with priority housing placements (a proposal [the governor has advanced](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-proposes-strengthening-involuntary-commitment-laws-and-kendras-law-provide?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). ### 6\. Reform contracting and rationalize the budget New York spends heavily on responding to SMI and homelessness — an estimated $4.6 billion of the City’s budget, with the vast majority of that spending going to operate the city’s massive shelter network, where some 90,000 people sleep on any given night. However, the problem is complicated by fragmented funding sources and siloed agencies. The City cannot tell how much it spends on a single individual as they cycle through the streets, programs, hospitals, jail and shelter because funding is tracked by service, not by person or outcome. This fragmentation obscures critical trade-offs. A [City comptroller report](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/housing-first/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on Housing First strategies laid bare the challenge: Supportive housing costs $68 per day per person versus $1,414 for jail or $3,609 for hospitalization. Yet agencies continue to fund expensive emergency responses because they cannot see the full picture. Simultaneously, contracts reward activity over outcomes, and chronic payment delays force nonprofits to float City services. Rationalizing the budget means buying results, paying providers on time and publishing an honest, multiyear price tag for the full plan. It means investing in housing and clinical care today to avoid ER and jail costs tomorrow. The City is not starting from scratch. HPD’s fiscal year 2026 capital plan calls for committing [$12 billion](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/ccp/fy26/ccp-09-25a.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in City subsidies for affordable housing over the next four years, including at least [$1.8 billion for supportive and special needs housing](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/City-Government/Capital-Commitment-Plan/2cmn-uidm/explore/query/SELECT%0A%20%20%60pub%5Fdate%60%2C%0A%20%20%60projtype%60%2C%0A%20%20%60projtype%5Fdesc%60%2C%0A%20%20%60budline%60%2C%0A%20%20%60budline%5Fdesc%60%2C%0A%20%20%60funding%60%2C%0A%20%20%60num%5Fyrs%5Fprsnt%60%2C%0A%20%20%60yr1%5Ffy%60%2C%0A%20%20%60year1%5Famt%60%2C%0A%20%20%60year2%5Famt%60%2C%0A%20%20%60year3%5Famt%60%2C%0A%20%20%60year4%5Famt%60%2C%0A%20%20%60year5%5Famt%60%0AWHERE%0A%20%20%60pub%5Fdate%60%20IN%20%28%2220250930%22%29%20AND%20caseless%5Fone%5Fof%28%60budline%60%2C%20%22HD0222%22%29/page/filter?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That is enough to build more than [10,000 supportive units](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/snh-shlp-term-sheet.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — sufficient to house every unsheltered New Yorker. Additionally, social service agencies will spend nearly [$8 billion in fiscal year 2026](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/adopt25/adopt25-bfa.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on homeless shelters, rental assistance, public assistance, mental health programs, and substance abuse initiatives. Much of this agenda could be paid for simply by spending these billions more effectively to stem the inflow of people into shelter. This efficiency extends to operations. The City and State already support multiple different kinds of outreach and response teams. Whether deploying city workers or nonprofit employees, utilizing civilians is generally less expensive than funding police officers. The cost effectiveness of this response depends on the City’s ability to steel itself to figure out what works for whom, and deploying those teams accordingly. New York is not exceptional. Eugene, Denver, and Houston addressed their homelessness problems with fewer resources and smaller tax bases. According to the Lincoln Land Institute’s [Fiscally Standardized Cities database](https://www.lincolninst.edu/data/fiscally-standardized-cities/access-fisc-database/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City collected 20% more total revenue per capita in 2022 than Denver, twice as much as Houston, and 1.7 times more than Eugene. While legitimate differences exist — those cities have lower housing costs and no right to shelter — we have the means. To coordinate and rationalize the city’s spending on troubled unhoused people, the City should: - **Perform an initial, rapid assessment of the degree of need for additional staffing — and of what kind — for outreach and response.** This assessment is the first step towards synthesizing the multiple different approaches from the city, the state and nonprofits and assessing what additional resources, if any, are needed. With many of the outreach and response responsibilities possibly moving over to the new proposed Department of Community Safety, this is an irreducible minimum necessary step. - **Perform a citywide assessment of the number of potential sites for supportive housing and the allocated budget amounts.** Another irreducible minimum necessary step towards solving the issue of those living with serious mental illness on the street. - **Reassess and renegotiate contracts to buy better outcomes, not volume.** The City should [rebid or amend agreements to align incentives with results](https://ssir.org/articles/entry/homelessness-services-redesign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). - **Pay providers on time and at full, transparent cost.** Late payments are a [major challenge](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/nonprofit-nonpayment/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to nonprofit operations. The City should set a strict prompt-pay standard with automatic interest, provide mobilization advances on new contracts, adopt standardized indirect/overhead rates and inflation indexing, and clear existing invoice backlogs via a centralized portal. - **Consolidate fragmented funding into unified budget lines with transparent allocations.** The City should create a single SMI/homelessness budget dashboard that systematically tags and tracks federal, State, City and philanthropic dollars by provider, program and outcome. This would enable the City to follow funding more clearly — across DOHMH, DHS, H+H, NYPD, FDNY, the Department of Correction and other agencies — and enhance accountability. - **Implement cross-agency individual tracking and outcome-based funding that follows the person, not the program.** To rationalize budgeting, the City should assign each individual a unique identifier across all agencies and providers to track their complete service journey and total cost. It should then pilot bundled payment models where a lead provider receives a single allocation to coordinate all services for high-utilizers — housing, clinical care, crisis response — with payment tied to stabilization outcomes (days housed, hospitalizations avoided, jail stays prevented). ### 7\. Follow the evidence Ultimately, neither crisis nor ideology should guide New York City’s approach to dealing with the challenges of this population; results should. To that end, the City should approach these solutions with a measure of humility and demand rigorous and independent evaluations of all of its programs so that it can adapt strategies at multiple steps along the way. The next mayor should cut strategies that fail to yield results and redouble investments as soon as solid evidence of their success emerges. To do this, the City should: - **Create a fast-track pathway for evidence-based innovations.** Establish a [mechanism for piloting](https://ssir.org/articles/entry/homelessness-services-redesign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and scaling new approaches without waiting years for full request-for-proposal (RFP) cycles. Set aside flexible funding and preapproved contracting pathways that allow successful pilots to shift quickly into ongoing programs. - **Identify and align key outcome metrics.** City Hall should [standardize outcome metrics](https://ssir.org/articles/entry/homelessness-services-redesign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across systems to determine whether initiatives should continue, expand or end. This should include metrics that capture the connection or lack of connection to different programs across the system (e.g., from outreach to treatment placement). All service providers and government agencies should be onboarded and trained on their responsibilities and expectations for how they will engage with data collection and reporting. - **Develop an evaluation framework that is aligned with system response.** The City should adopt a [standardized evaluation framework](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) tailored to each stage of the system, allowing for meaningful comparisons across providers and models. The City should support mixed-method evaluation designs to capture a broad set of outcomes. Findings should feed directly into program and funding decisions. - **Prioritize evaluations for programs with no rigorous evaluation.** Expanded programs that [have never undergone independent evaluation](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) should be first in line for analysis. Evaluators should be allowed to choose the most appropriate methods — qualitative, quantitative or hybrid — to assess impact. - **Ensure accountability mechanisms in contracting to continue or stop programs.** City contracts should include clauses requiring programs to continue, expand or end based strictly on evaluation results. ## What not to do **DON’T abandon supportive housing or Housing First programs.**[Decades of research](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6581117/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) show housing is highly effective. **DON’T remove police from the equation, but balance their use.** Some situations involve genuine threats where only trained police officers can ensure safety. The key is a balanced deployment where police serve in a supporting role when necessary, and their routine contacts with people in need for a wide range of reasons can serve as vital linkages to care. **AVOID using criminal law as a pretext or default means for managing illness-related behavior.** Arresting people for minor infractions that stem from mental illness is a temporary fix for the general public and is usually counterproductive for the person with an illness. Enforcement should focus on serious or dangerous conduct and on repeated refusals to stop unlawful behavior, not on the behavioral symptoms of a person’s illness or low-level acts that pose no real threat. **DON’T conduct encampment sweeps without offering services and housing.** Clearing a homeless encampment without providing a better alternative is a local, temporary measure that displaces the problem. Any cleanup must be paired with intensive outreach and transportation to a waiting bed. **DON’T shuffle people between systems without continuity.** Every transition — from jail to community, hospital to shelter — should be purposeful and managed with seamless handoffs and continuous case management to break the cycle of people falling through the cracks. **DON’T treat all cases the same.** Homeless individuals with SMI have a range of complex problems that require different responses. Interventions should be tailored to the individual, using the full range of available tools rather than a single uniform response. **DON’T create or expand programs when evidence is lacking.** Pouring more money into fragmented or unproven efforts will not yield results. Growth must be strategic and coordinated, aimed at creating a leaner, smarter system, not just a bigger one. Providers and City officials should partner with independent researchers to evaluate not just services delivered but actual improvements in health, safety and quality of life. ## Advisors We are grateful to a core group of people listed below who generously gave their time and wisdom, meeting as a group and individually, in writing and in conversation, as Vital City worked through these recommendations. We are particularly grateful to the many talented writers, researchers and doers who helped produce these recommendations, including Allie Meizlish, Archana Jayaram, Tamiru Mammo and Gail Nayowith. The recommendations are Vital City’s and do not necessarily reflect the positions of any person or institution listed below. Any errors are our own. **ALEX CROHN,** deputy commissioner of strategic initiatives, NYPD **DENNIS CULHANE,** University of Pennsylvania **BRANDON DEL POZO,** Brown University **LINDA GIBBS,** Bloomberg Associates; former NYC deputy mayor for health and human services **DAVID GREENBERG,** CFO, Vibrant Emotional Health; former deputy director, NYC Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget **JOHN HALL,** NYPD / MTA Police Department (ret.) **HILLARY KUNINS,** former executive deputy commissioner, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene **JONATHAN McCLEAN,** CEO, CASES **MEG REISS,** Chief Assistant District Attorney, New York County **CHERYL ROBERTS,** executive director, Greenburger Center for Justice **BRENDA ROSEN,** CEO, Breaking Ground **JODY RUDIN,** CEO, Institute for Community Living **BRIAN STETTIN,** senior advisor on severe mental illness, NYC Office of the Mayor **TERRI TOBIN,** Chief Advisor, NY/NJ HIDTA. **ANNE WILLIAMS-ISOM,** former NYC deputy mayor for health and human services There are many other people in the New York State and New York City governments as well as in the numerous nonprofits who work tirelessly on this issue and who shared their knowledge of how things actually work, not just as they appear on paper. A partial list of the agencies and offices include: the New York City Mayor’s Office, the Office of the Comptroller of New York City, the New York CIty Police Department, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the New York City Department of Homeless Services, Fountain House, Times Square Alliance, among others. We are deeply grateful for their time and advice, and for their service to the people of New York City. ════════════════════════════════════════ *New York is entering an historic and pivotal transition. Mayor-elect Mamdani faces big problems on housing, safety, mental health, transit, and more.* *Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer clear, practical guidance rooted in evidence. Ideas that could actually be implemented and work.* *But to meet this moment, we need to grow.* *That’s why, this year, for the first time, we’re asking our readers to support Vital City directly. We’re aiming for 700 inaugural supporters by December 31.* *Your support will help us expand our editorial capacity, strengthen our operational support, and continue delivering thoughtful, relevant and informative work in 2026.* *If this article informed your thinking, challenged you, or helped you understand the city more clearly, please consider supporting the work behind it.* [***Make your tax-deductible gift and help us reach 700 supporters.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Vital City ### What To Do (and Not To Do) About Subway Safety URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-to-do-about-subway-safety-nyc-policy-recommendations/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:31.000Z *The research and analysis on which many of these recommendations are based follows here. It was produced by* [*Aaron Chalfin*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/aaron-chalfin)*, associate professor of criminology at the University of Pennsylvania;* [*Paul Reeping*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/paul-reeping)*, director of research at Vital City; and* [*John Hall*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/john-hall)*, a retired police professional and a National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement Advancing Data and Science scholar.* [Download PDF](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Key2uUWGYJXNJYZMJLs4EMM7dZt3xtYJ?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) How can the hardest problems of urban life get solved in a sustained way? The line from problem to solution is never a straight one. It is bent by the demands of the moment, the vagaries of politics, the availability of money and people, and more. But there is “smart money.” It comes from the long experience of people working inside government and in other institutions that shape government policy, as well as from researchers who have painstakingly examined what works and what doesn’t, and the public who has experienced it. This project aims to deliver to policymakers the best ideas, distilled into steps that can be taken now and the long-term changes that must undergird sustained achievement. We assembled prominent researchers and practitioners to produce actionable advice on reducing subway crime and disorder in New York. Sometimes the recommendations are backed by deep data. Sometimes there is no, little or uncertain data to help untangle what to do. But policymakers have no choice but to act even if there’s no randomized controlled trial to guide them. Here we relied on what we know about the basic principles of why crime happens and how disorder can be tamed to provide some guidance. What follows is the “smart money” on what to do. The data that underlie these recommendations can be found in our companion document, [**“Subway Safety: What the Data Show,”**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1phQOWGcFVkbIb2YNzil8EwYTC8HqNBZH/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and where not in that document, we provide links. We offer these ideas, honoring the hard work of public servants who grapple with these enormously complex problems every day. Our deep gratitude goes to the many people who helped shape these recommendations through in-person convenings, one-on-one conversations, writing and analysis. Many of them are listed at the end of this document. We also extend special thanks to Arnold Ventures and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, who are helping to support this effort. ## The problem to be solved: Violent crime and disorder in the subways While violent crime in New York City’s subways is an exceedingly rare event, each crime reverberates due to the central importance of this shared public space, its close quarters and the high likelihood that witnesses will see and cameras will capture any given offense. Although rare, the incidence of violent crime has increased significantly over the past few years, and its nature has changed. Felony and misdemeanor assaults — the shove, the punch and the life-altering attack — too frequently committed by seriously mentally ill individuals, have tripled since 2009\. Over the same period, “instrumental” violence motivated by the desire for money or property has been declining. New Yorkers’ underground jitteriness is not just caused by crime. It is amplified by a sense of disorder: erratic behavior and other conduct not necessarily rising to the level of criminal offenses, such as the unkempt and troubled panhandling or sleeping on subway cars. The dilapidation of some subway infrastructure also contributes to unease: dark and untended stations with peeling paint, dripping pipes, bad lighting and poor sightlines. Despite the decay of some stations, these are warm and sheltered places that have often become the dwellings of people who are suffering from untold physical and mental problems. This use of the subway system for something other than transit also [diminishes the sense of safety](https://www.mta.info/document/131806?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the general commuting population. What are the solutions? The data and expertise Vital City has synthesized point to a mix of approaches. We start with some key ideas and caveats while acknowledging how much good work is already underway by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), the City and many others: - **The nature of criminal activity — rare, diffuse and hard to predict — makes it hard to address with precision policing or precision outreach.** The subway system, with 4.2% of the city’s violent crime, already uses 8% of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) manpower. And it is likely that, whether they take the form of enforcement, outreach or improving the physical environment, efforts will always be overbroad because of the rarity and diffusion of the issues. - **Although subway violence is relatively rare, that does not mean that it feels rare to the traveling public.** Just one violent crime has a magnifying effect [**as news of it travels**](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-rare-is-crime-on-the-subway). - **Many of the issues driving violence and fear stem from mental health and substance use challenges that people may face their entire lives.** Even if the effect of an initial approach to address intersecting issues of crime and serious mental illness or homelessness — whether arrest, commitment, supportive housing, respite or something else — is temporary, the solutions must be sustained and will be expensive. - **Police, while important, will have limited effect on their own because of the layered aspects of the problems.** For that effect to last, they need to be deployed according to a sustainable plan rooted in where and how crime happens — not performative surges. - **Police must be complemented by calibrated use of clinicians, social service workers and civilian outreach workers playing their part.** And who plays what part and whether there exist enough people to play those parts are pieces of the puzzle. - **How people feel and how they act can be influenced by the design, look and feel of the built environment.** The research is compelling that the nature of our physical surroundings and the learning from the world of behavioral science can have outsize effects on ensuring civility and compliance with rules underground. - **Success requires unified governance and coordination.** Those participating in the unified command must be in constant communication, sharing data and analysis built into program design from the start, relentlessly focused on results, with clear leadership structures linking agencies, service providers, law enforcement and community organizations. Leadership and partnership among the agencies must be built into government structures, not subject to changes in political leadership over the years or fleeting reactions to spikes in crime. - **The City and the State are already investing about $700 million a year in day-to-day efforts to make the subways safe, and billions in capital improvements**, according to an analysis conducted for Vital City. Our recommendations seek to use what exists with the maximum effect possible, reshape where necessary and, when part of a sustained plan with clear goals and accountability, make recommendations for investments. ## The most important recommendations, summarized **1.) Make clear that the subways are for transit** **2.) Establish a unified governance system** **3.) Use police more effectively** • Recalibrate staffing • Integrate station responsibility with precinct commanders • Provide clear guidance on quality-of-life enforcement • Improve officer engagement and accountability • Ensure police rapidly attend to customer complaints • Use technology to improve response **4.) Improve response to those suffering from serious mental illness, those who are unhoused and others** • Consider establishing diversion intake hubs • Remove from the system those who violate the rules or present risks • Systematically track interactions • Strengthen co-response and other outreach efforts • Facilitate involuntary removals • Ensure that a case, whether involving services or a crime or both, does not end at removal **5.) Incorporate both physical fixes and behavioral change campaigns into station management** • Implement design strategies that enhance rider experience and safety • Implement behavioral interventions to increase compliance with the law • Enhance station management and maintenance ## What not to do • Massively increase police presence underground at the expense of aboveground policing • Invest in firearm-scanning technology for subway stations • Rely on fare evasion enforcement as a violent-crime reduction measure ## Recommendations in detail ### 1.) Make clear that the subways are for transit Too often, the public views the subway system merely as a place to tolerate between points A and B. Making clear that rules of conduct exist for a reason — and building a new culture of stewardship that includes all who use the system — is imperative. All those who run the subways and ride the trains must be committed to the common understanding that the subways are for transit. The system’s purpose is to move people safely, swiftly and efficiently from one place to another. Other socially sanctioned purposes can be allowed, but nothing that interferes with safe, pleasant and efficient public transport should be tolerated. This is a message that the MTA has championed. But it must be embraced by riders, subway operations, law enforcement and outreach workers. It won’t happen spontaneously, at least at first. Here, the City and the State must lead with clarity, vigor and purpose to: – **Ensure the express adoption of this philosophy to orient how police, outreach workers, clinicians, tollbooth operators, conductors and the many other people who work in the subway system do their jobs.** Doing this would also promote a spirit of cooperation and participation in riders. - **For police and outreach workers:** Remove people who violate rules, sleep, urinate, panhandle, use drugs or use the subway as a dwelling or for something other than transit. - **For riders:** Begin with basics — awareness campaigns and announcements by public officials, public service announcements and signs to make clear to all the rules of ridership and their consequences. This approach and more will help to build a culture of involved bystanders. - **For transit workers:** Be in more regular contact with riders to promote compliance with the rules and maintain clear lines of reporting issues. When transit workers observe an individual or a condition that the rules require to be addressed, that worker must report through a clear chain of command. Transit workers cannot be asked to be law enforcement, but reporting issues to law enforcement should be immediate. - **For everyone:** Complement this with a concerted public education campaign through statements by public officials, citywide advertising and more. – **Initiate a coordinated campaign to reestablish the clear rule that subways are for transportation.** – **Launch a new citizen reporting mechanism to flag violations of the rules.** All platforms and cars should be equipped with QR codes enabling riders and officials to easily identify and track the precise location of problems, flagging violations with the MTA or NYPD, as appropriate. The MTA and NYPD should share this data regularly so the public can hold the agencies accountable for addressing key issues. If there are multiple and unused routes to report problems, they must be streamlined or bundled into existing mechanisms like 311. – **Formally and consistently ban people from the system who have been serially convicted of harming MTA employees or committing sex crimes against riders, in accordance with** [**current law**](https://codes.findlaw.com/ny/penal-law/pen-sect-65-10/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=%28k%2D2%29%20%28i,facility%20or%20conveyance%20of%20the), and support [legislative efforts to expand bans](https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/gpb%5F17-transit%5Fbans-memo.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to cover assaults on riders and MTA contractors. – **Give local companies and civic organizations the opportunity to take more ownership of stations to contribute to their beautification and maintenance.** ### 2.) Establish a unified governance system The MTA, a creature of the State, runs the New York City Transit system. But they do not control all the resources that are necessary to ensure a safe and efficient ride. Though MTA Police patrol a few major station hubs, the NYPD remains almost entirely responsible for policing the system’s 472 stations and thousands of platforms and trains. Various City departments, from the Department of Homeless Services to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to the NYPD, have roles in tracking, treating and, if necessary, removing unstable people with serious mental illness, drug addiction and other overlapping maladies from the system. Nonprofit providers under various contracts with the government provide key services to unsheltered or ill individuals in the transit system, with various levels of accountability for performance. **While there is much effort devoted to connecting the complicated work of all these agencies, ensuring that there is a permanent, stable and streamlined system of governance and accountability — that lives at the operational, not political level — is key to progress. The MTA and the City should establish an interconnected governance system organized around a single repository of shared data, such as daily metrics of law enforcement incidents, social service interactions and customer complaints. This governance system must also be relentless in determining the results of each effort so that the initiatives can be continued, corrected, replicated or replaced.** Because this effort will bring together many different agencies and entities, each reporting to different bosses, the governance will have to operate more as a federation with a facilitator than in a traditional command-and-control model. This approach has been enormously successful in the [Gun Violence Strategy Partnership](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/six-ways-new-york-can-spare-more-people-from-shootings) meetings which have taken place every weekday for the past three years, bringing together prosecutors, police, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Correction and others to track the cases of shooters, to enhance evidence and to strengthen prosecutions. The facilitator of this new federation should be a career public servant, or, if a political appointee, a person agreed upon by both the City and the State who is broadly respected among the different participants and considered immune from political pressure. It must be the work of career public servants to embed the discipline of accountability into governmental structures and avoid the problem of data sharing, analysis, follow-up and continuity being subject to political fortunes. Specifically, a unified command would: – **Provide a single source of data and analytics support — collected and disseminated in as near to real time as the data sources permit — to direct deployment of resources and ensure** [**effectiveness**](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07418825.2023.2264362?scroll=top&needAccess=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#abstract)**.** – **Have a laserlike focus on the** [**few thousand individuals**](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dhs/downloads/pdf/hope/hope-2024-results.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **in the system who most need assistance and whose removal will have the greatest impact in improving safety and quality of life for riders and improving life conditions for the individuals.** – **Ensure that social workers, psychiatrists, police, MTA personnel and others tasked with helping those with needs related to mental illness or housing all have integrated and up-to-date data** on their case histories and criminal arrest histories while adhering to privacy concerns and other legal restrictions. – **Receive regular reports from MTA employees** charged with monitoring and improving station and train conditions. – **Publish regular public reports knitting together trends on safety and disorder** from police, transit, mental health personnel and other relevant agencies — and identifying areas in need of attention. **Provide regular public assessments of the success or failure of the various initiatives.** ### 3.) Use police more effectively The rarity, randomness and mobility of subway crime mean that the usual police strategies that have found success on the surface — for example, hot-spot policing — will not work with the same precision underground. While a small number of hub stations that serve the largest number of customers account for an outsize share of violence in the system on a per-rider basis, the risk of violence is very diffuse. And while on the surface, offenders tend to commit crimes near where they live or spend time, people who commit crimes on the subway are by definition highly mobile. On the surface, the majority of the most serious violence is committed by a small number of individuals. On the subways, a large share of the frequent offenders are homeless or severely mentally ill. This population is less likely to be deterred through traditional means and thus pose a unique challenge for law enforcement and others. In the NYPD Transit Bureau today, unlike with patrol precincts, the Department doesn’t rely on a data-driven staffing model. This leads to an overreliance on temporary deployments and overtime. As a result, transit frequently operates in crisis mode, perennially running up big bills in overtime, pulling manpower from above ground and often depending on temporary staff not trained in the particulars of patrolling underground. What the “right” number of NYPD transit officers is or where they should be deployed appears very much up in the air. We do not address here other important components of enforcement, such as effective prosecution. But with a doubling in recidivism rates, this is an important area to understand. Modernizing transit police staffing comprises a series of components: **Recalibrate staffing to ensure a properly trained, supervised and deployed force** Currently budgeted with [2,583 officers](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/056-NYPD.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Bureau routinely pulls in non-transit-trained personnel to meet basic coverage needs, while racking up $150 million in [overtime](https://nypost.com/2023/12/22/metro/nypd-cops-received-more-than-150k-in-overtime-for-subway-patrols-as-data-shows-decline-in-crime/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) expenses. These surges have ranged from [200](https://gothamist.com/news/gov-hochul-wants-a-cop-on-every-overnight-nyc-subway-train?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [1,000](https://www.amny.com/nyc-transit/nypd-another-surge-cops-subway-system/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) officers, pulled from administrative assignments, patrol and detective squads. The unique policing environment in the subway system requires specialized safety training, including knowledge of the third rail and other train operations. A staffing plan should not be boom-and-bust. Most needs are knowable. Just as the police anticipate summer spikes in shootings above ground and adjust deployments accordingly, the police should also plan for increased underground activity in winter, ensuring adequate presence. Working together with the unified command, this approach would also permit effective staffing of co-response teams as well. To build a more effective and less reactive transit staffing plan, the NYPD should: - **Undertake a zero-based staffing analysis to build a personnel plan based on needs and crime levels.** - **Build a data-driven, seasonally sensitive staffing model.** Rather than continuing to rely on historical staffing levels or arbitrary percentages of total Department strength, a new model should follow the proven success of the Police Department’s summer deployment strategy for gun violence, tailored to the subways’ seasonal needs: anticipating increased underground activity in colder months and adjusting resources accordingly, including boosting academy recruit allocations to meet seasonal demands. - **Convert excessive overtime costs into additional permanent positions** filled by properly trained transit officers. - **Base deployment decisions first on violent crime patterns, then on disorder and quality-of-life complaints.** Since violent crime is relatively rare, its concentration drops off sharply after the highest-risk stations. Quality-of-life complaints are numerous enough to guide additional station deployments. - **Dedicate personnel to address specific problems in specific places**, with focused coverage of hub stations based on violent crime data, complemented by quality-of-life enforcement informed by MTA customer complaints in other locations. - **Enhance de-escalation training.** Given transit officers’ frequent encounters with special populations in confined spaces, they should be prioritized for comprehensive de-escalation training. **Integrate responsibility for stations with the local precinct commander** - **Make aboveground precinct commanders operationally responsible for nonhub stations**, enabling them to tailor crime reduction strategies to each station’s specific crime conditions and to ensure seamless integration in combating neighborhood crime. **Provide officers with clear guidance to address quality-of-life issues and appropriate training to effect the guidance** Transit officers need precise, actionable guidance for addressing quality-of-life violations in the subway system. - **Police should implement a graduated response model, not a zero tolerance model.** This should begin with first evaluating an individual’s need for medical intervention, move to removing disruptive individuals from the system when necessary and reserve arrest for cases of persistent or egregious violations. - **For certain predetermined transit-disruptive violations, officers must, at a minimum, remove the individual from the system.** Examples of New York City Transit rules and regulations that, if violated, can be highly disruptive include: unauthorized access to tracks; lying on floors, platforms, stairways or conveyances; and interfering with train operations. If officers recognize signs of behavioral health issues, they should follow specialized protocols. This ensures that while maintaining subway safety and order, officers respond appropriately to individuals who may need mental health support rather than enforcement action. - **The NYPD and MTA must establish and communicate to officers, riders and others the list of “must-engage” offenses that mandate officer response, particularly targeting behavior that disrupts transit operations or poses risks to users.** Training must minimize ambiguity in decision-making, ensuring officers understand exactly when and how to engage with transit rule violators based on these defined priorities. **Improve officer engagement and accountability** The heavy reliance on overtime to staff police deployments brings officers to the subway who are often unfamiliar with the environment, assigned to temporary posts, not directly accountable to transit bureau leadership and otherwise distracted. Effective rule enforcement and strategic engagement require officers to be actively involved in their work, with a clear sense of purpose and well-defined deployment directives when not responding to quality-of-life complaints. To foster this level of engagement: - **Assign specific responsibilities to transit posts**, as designated by the commanding officer, including Transit Order Maintenance Sweeps, platform patrols, train rides and addressing persistent quality-of-life conditions. - **Conduct regular oversight of assignments through frontline supervision** to ensure compliance with directives and NYPD policies, including regulations on cellphone use and professional conduct while in uniform. **Ensure police swiftly attend to customer complaints, whether the complaints relate to conditions or crime** Current data reveal [a troubling trend](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Social-Services/311-Service-Requests-from-2010-to-Present/erm2-nwe9/data%5Fpreview?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): In 2024, officers dismissed two-thirds of all 311 complaints in the subway system as unfounded, unnecessary or “condition gone on arrival,” reflecting a broader pattern seen across other 311 response categories. The Police Department must prioritize responding to quality-of-life complaints in the subway, with supervisors regularly auditing response times, follow-up actions and officer conduct to ensure accountability. Specifically: - **Installing QR codes in every subway car**, with information uniquely identifying the car, would create an accessible, direct channel for riders to report issues, complementing the existing 311 and customer complaint systems and demonstrating the MTA’s commitment to passenger engagement and system improvement. - **Regular audits, real-time performance monitoring and transparent reporting mechanisms** can strengthen accountability and reinforce best practices. **Use technology to improve police response** Stations are spread across the city, many desolate at night and lacking the natural observation present at street level. Tunnels are not internet-connected, further complicating communications. Technology can alleviate these problems. While we recognize this is a longer-term goal, achieving it would further rationalize resources and boost efficiency and effectiveness: – **The NYPD and MTA should work to establish a dedicated** [**real-time crime center**](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07418825.2023.2264362?scroll=top&needAccess=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#abstract) building on the MTA’s existing camera network and enhanced by AI-powered behavior-detection technology. - The center would serve as a force multiplier for the distributed transit police force, providing continuous monitoring for unusual behavior patterns across the system and enabling rapid response coordination for in-progress incidents. The technology would expand response capabilities, particularly in remote or isolated areas where maintaining consistent police presence is challenging. - The center should be staffed for 24/7 monitoring, with clear protocols for coordinating with transit officers and regular evaluations of the technology’s effectiveness. This investment would significantly enhance the Department’s ability to prevent and solve transit crimes. ### 4.) Improve the response to those suffering from serious mental illness, those who are unhoused and others Of all the hard problems that policymakers want to solve, one stands out for its humbling complexity: People with often-overlapping behavioral health concerns such as serious mental illness and substance use, who may also be unhoused, comprise the most persistent and high-profile challenges to order and safety on the subway. According to an NYPD analysis, two-thirds of individuals with the most subway arrests in 2022-2023 had documented histories of homelessness or mental illness. This percentage increased to 89% among those also arrested for subway violence. Of course, a tiny percentage of those who struggle with serious maladies commit crimes or present a threat to others. Indeed, those suffering with serious mental illness and substance abuse and who lack housing are often themselves victims of crimes. Because of the complexity of these issues, Vital City is working with a second group of expert practitioners and researchers to forge practical and humane solutions to the challenges that many of this population present with respect both to crime and disorder. Here, we sketch a direction and some principles — and will return in the late spring with more detailed recommendations. Here are the principles we are focusing on: - The subway’s fundamental purpose is to provide safe and efficient transportation, and any behaviors compromising this purpose require focused **action and adequate resources**. - The State, the City and nonprofits must **coordinate across systems** to ensure the subways are for transit, share data and results, and recalibrate as results are understood. This is what the recommendation for a unified command would produce. - Any wholesale strategy to address those living underground must **find the balance between policing and services**. This means enforcement should not happen without concrete offers for help appropriate to the individual, including transport to that service. - If and when a service is refused, then **enforcement must proceed**. Much here could be learned from the intensive efforts by the City in joint response and at the end of subway lines, where many who are both without shelter and suffering from severe mental illness congregate in the evenings. - Any sustainable approach must seek to **address behavioral health needs through effective treatment, services and interventions** when conditions lead to disruptive behaviors, implementing evidence-based approaches that reduce future disruptions by meeting these underlying needs. The “intervention” cannot end at “removal,” but rather must continue with a sustained commitment of City services for the duration of the person’s needs. - Where a person suffering from severe mental illness commits a crime, **a different track through the criminal justice system** must be similarly sustained and must care for the person’s illness. With these principles in mind, we are exploring the following policy steps, noting again how much focus and creativity the MTA and the City are bringing to this issue: **Consider establishing diversion intake hubs** - Many cities have had success in creating all-in-one centers where police and outreach workers can routinely bring individuals either to follow through with enforcement actions or connect them with mental health help, substance-use treatment, housing and other services. New York City should explore this model as a means of diverting individuals from the criminal justice system toward appropriate treatment and support. **Remove from the system those who violate the rules or present risks** - Those who break MTA rules in ways that interfere with the operations of the subway system and inhibit the ability of commuters to travel should at a bare minimum be removed from the system. If in the course of executing such a removal they can be connected with services, this should be a parallel priority. **Systematically track interactions** - Contacts between people with serious mental illness, people with substance use issues and unhoused people and social service providers, police officers or MTA employees are not seamlessly shared in real time. They must be. **Strengthen co-response and other outreach efforts** - Innovative teams created by the City and MTA that combine police with nurses and other social service practitioners, like the Subway Co-Response Outreach Teams (SCOUT) and Partnership Assistance for Transit Homelessness (PATH), are an essential tool for engaging individuals in crisis and connecting them to the services they need to stabilize, including hospital treatment. But New York City must attend relentlessly to what is effective and what is not. Here there is much to learn from the City’s own experience, as well as other cities, as to deployment: when and where to deploy, what kinds of teams and at what level of clinical expertise, and how the service-offer and the enforcement are coordinated. Before expansion, some of these basic questions about efficacy must be answered, then tracked in real time. **Facilitate involuntary removals** - State law currently lacks clear guidelines for involuntary removal from the subway system, leaving too much room for interpretation. The law should be amended to give police and others clearer authority to intervene and remove individuals when they are at substantial risk of harm due to their inability to meet basic needs like food, shelter or medical care. **Ensure that a case, whether involving services or a crime or both, does not end at removal.** - Attention must continue to be paid to the person and their welfare. ### 5.) Incorporate both physical fixes and behavioral change campaigns into station management The subway system’s physical environment and rider behavior significantly influence both actual safety and perceptions of safety. [Research](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10940-020-09490-6?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that environmental design and behavioral interventions can effectively reduce crime and disorder without relying solely on enforcement. Among the many attractions of this approach is that it has a [“neighborhood effect”](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691195216/changing-places?srsltid=AfmBOor%5FXN-QpISzk%5FI3hse6fqmDCO3maEuVzA5xdVhfCt4-6zXcebh%5F&ref=vitalcitynyc.org); that is, physical changes have a wholesale impact on the behavior of all the individuals within their ambit, while enforcement proceeds person by person. Evidence from transit systems worldwide demonstrates that thoughtful modifications to physical spaces and targeted behavioral strategies can create lasting improvements in safety and compliance. International examples offer valuable lessons, as do standout domestic cases. [The Metro system](https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/166372.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Washington, D.C., for instance, maintained significantly lower crime rates than peer systems through integrated design features like resistant materials, controlled access points and enhanced sightlines. Studies in European transit systems suggest that [strategic deployment of staff](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1477370809337881?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [targeted behavioral interventions](https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/8/4/98?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) can reduce fare evasion and improve compliance with system rules. The MTA has been particularly active and innovative in thinking about both physical design and behavior change. These recommendations build on those ideas. **Implement design strategies that enhance rider experience and safety** Incorporating good design principles into planned renovations can improve security without requiring stand-alone security-focused capital projects. Natural surveillance should be the foundation of this approach. Specifically: - Integrated into the MTA’s organized analysis of the physical condition of subway stations, platforms, mezzanines and passageways should be **an assessment of the role that physical changes might play in reducing crime and disorder**. Different stations may be attracting different types of crimes, and doing a more thorough analysis — one that makes note of various design characteristics that may be facilitating crime — would be helpful in informing station-specific changes. - Station layouts should be designed or modified to **maximize open sightlines and minimize visual obstructions** on platforms and in corridors. - **Eliminate shadows and dark areas** with improved lighting systems, and position station booths and customer service areas to **maximize staff visibility**. - The MTA should **create consistent design standards** across new and renovated stations to establish system identity, installing clear and well-placed wayfinding signage to reduce passenger confusion. Clear boundaries between public and restricted areas help define appropriate uses of space. - **Physical infrastructure improvements should focus on durability and security.** This means installing vandalism-resistant materials for surfaces and fixtures, designing seating and waiting areas that discourage extended loitering, creating sufficient space around fare barriers to prevent crowding and positioning emergency exits to be visible but not vulnerable to misuse. - **Station management facilities should be integrated into these designs**, with staff areas positioned to maximize natural surveillance of high-risk areas and clear sightlines between station booths and critical areas. **Implement behavioral interventions to increase compliance with the law** The MTA has taken a promising step with its current solicitation seeking behavioral science expertise to address fare evasion. It is an important issue not only because of hundreds of millions in lost revenue but because of the signal it sends about the toleration of lower-level disorder. Enforcement alone cannot reverse what has become a significant shift in social norms around fare payment. The solicitation focuses on developing detailed rider personas and testing multiple intervention strategies. Going forward, the MTA should: - Ensure the selected behavioral interventions are tested through rigorous pilot programs - Develop clear metrics for evaluating both compliance improvements and cost-effectiveness using validated measures of fare evasion - Create a framework for rapidly scaling successful interventions systemwide - Integrate behavioral strategies with physical improvements to fare-control areas - Maintain complementary enforcement strategies while behavioral interventions are implemented **Enhance station management and maintenance** The MTA’s recently launched Re-NEW-Vation Program, enhanced by Gov. Hochul’s commitment to systemwide LED lighting upgrades, provides a foundation for improving station conditions. Improved lighting has been shown to reduce crime above ground. Early customer feedback suggests promising results; this momentum should be leveraged to create a comprehensive approach to station management that recognizes the connection between maintenance, disorder and crime. Building on this, the MTA should: - Establish clear metrics that evaluate both maintenance standards and security outcomes - Create rapid-response policies for graffiti and vandalism removal - Develop regular auditing procedures that assess physical conditions alongside quality-of-life concerns - Coordinate existing [LED lighting installation](https://www.mta.info/press-release/mta-announces-plan-system-wide-safety-upgrade-brighter-led-lighting-every-subway?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with other station improvements to enhance overall effectiveness - Rigorously evaluate the Re-NEW-Vation Program’s impact on both station conditions and security outcomes, including specific assessments of how improved lighting affects crime and disorder. Lessons learned from this assessment can inform the expansion of successful elements systemwide, creating a sustainable model for integrated station management that enhances both the passenger experience and system security. ## What not to do **DO NOT reactively surge nontransit police officers on the subways.** If the subways accounted for the biggest crime hot spots in the city, concentrating more police in the subway system might make sense — but this is not the case. Approximately 4% of the city’s violent crime occurs in the subway system, and the [data suggest that on a per person-hour basis](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/underground-safer-than-the-surface), the streets are still probably more dangerous than the subways. Taking patrol officers off their regular beats in high-crime neighborhoods and taking highly trained detectives away from criminal investigations to patrol the subway likely yields some problematic trade-offs. **DO NOT invest in new technology that allows law enforcement to scan for individuals who are carrying firearms into a subway station.** While such technology may have its uses in certain situations, very few subway crimes are committed using a firearm. Investments in gun-scanning technology are costly and logistically difficult; those resources are better spent on police manpower or mental health services. **DO NOT rely on fare evasion enforcement as a violent-crime reduction measure.** Fare beating is a real problem to be solved, and we support the rollout of new turnstiles that are more impervious to cheating. But one recurring suggestion for how to promote safety within the subway system is to concentrate significantly more police enforcement at the turnstiles. While this idea fades in and out of fashion (now out), it is persistent and worth underscoring that it is an inefficient way to promote safety: - Individuals arrested for fare beating represent only 7% of all fare beaters identified by law enforcement — a highly selected subset. These individuals typically have less serious criminal histories than those arrested for violent or disorderly conduct in the transit system, and even less serious criminal backgrounds than the average citywide arrestee. - Moreover, [the MTA estimates](https://metrics.mta.info/?subway/fareevasion&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that approximately 10%-14% of riders fare beat, amounting to around 150 million fare-beaten rides each year. This underscores that even the 7% of identified fare beaters who are arrested represent an extremely small fraction of all those who evade fares. - Deploying police to monitor turnstiles wastes valuable resources, as most violence occurs on trains and platforms. Reassigning officers to these higher-risk areas would significantly improve public safety and security effectiveness. ## Advisors We are grateful to a core group of people, some of whom are listed below, who generously gave their time and wisdom in meeting as a group and individually, in writing and in conversation as Vital City worked through the recommendations. The recommendations are Vital City’s and do not necessarily reflect the positions of any person or institution listed below. Any errors are our own. **Bridget G. Brennan**, New York City Special Narcotics Prosecutor **Ken Corey**, University of Chicago Crime Lab; former chief of department, New York City Police Department **Aaron Chalfin**, associate professor of criminology, University of Pennsylvania **Vishaan Chakrabarti**, architect, urbanist and author based in New York City **Jeremy Feigelson**, special counsel, Metropolitan Transportation Authority **Sarah Feinberg**, founder, Feinberg Strategies LLC; former president and CEO, New York City Transit **Linda Gibbs**, former deputy mayor of health and human services, City of New York **Francia Henry**, president, MION Consulting; former deputy chief of plans and programs for police, security and safety, Metropolitan Transportation Authority **Nancy La Vigne**, dean, Rutgers School of Criminal Justice; former director, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice **John Macdonald**, professor of criminology and sociology, University of Pennsylvania **Brandon del Pozo**, assistant professor, Warren Alpert Medical School, Brown University **Jerry Ratcliffe**, professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Temple University **Meg Reiss**, first assistant district attorney, New York County **Marcos Soler**, deputy secretary for public safety, New York State **Claire Weisz**, founding partner, WXY architecture + urban design There are many other people in New York State and New York City government who shared their knowledge of how things actually work, not just on paper. A partial list of the agencies and offices they represent includes the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York City Mayor’s Office, the New York City Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget, the New York City Police Department, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and NYC Health + Hospitals. We are deeply grateful for their time and advice, and their service to New York City. ### How the System Works (or Doesn’t) URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-the-system-works-for-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:32.000Z *This is one of three supporting documents connected to Vital City’s recommendations on serious mental illness and homelessness,* ## *A profile of the population* *On any given night, about* [*4,000 people*](https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC%5FPopSub%5FCoC%5FNY-600-2024%5FNY%5F2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *are living on the street in New York City. That figure, drawn from a point-in-time count, understates the scale of the problem: Because people cycle in and out of unsheltered homelessness, the number of unique individuals affected over the course of a year is likely much higher.* *New York isn’t alone among American cities in facing this issue: In fact, the scale of the problem is not especially bad by some measures. Unlike most large U.S. cities, which have larger unsheltered populations as a portion of all homeless individuals, New York guarantees a temporary bed to anyone who needs one. This legal* [*right to shelter*](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/shelter/resources/resources.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and the network of facilities that go with it keep roughly 95% of homeless people indoors, leaving a concentrated group with acute needs and a demonstrated reluctance to accept a shelter bed (or sometimes even a nonshelter bed) on the street. In a dense city, the visibility of this troubled population can fuel perceptions of disorder and personal risk that exceed the problem’s actual scale.* *Within this population, needs and circumstances vary widely.* [*Many people grapple*](https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC%5FPopSub%5FCoC%5FNY-600-2024%5FNY%5F2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *with serious mental illness and/or substance use disorders. Some have conditions such as* [*schizophrenia*](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6880407/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*bipolar disorder*](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7282102/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *that respond to sustained treatment and support; others live with* [*personality disorders*](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11110170/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *that require long-term psychosocial care.* [*Co-occurring substance use*](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4833089/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *is common and complicates engagement; to the untrained eye, a seeming mental illness crisis may in fact be drug-induced psychosis that wears off when the drug’s effects subside. Another complicating factor is traumatic brain injuries (TBI), which is estimated to affect* [*more than half of people experiencing homelessness*](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7859891/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=People%20experiencing%20homelessness%20are%20at,to%20severe%20TBI%20%5B10%5D)*.* *While it’s true that a person who is homeless is more likely to be a victim than a perpetrator, unstable people living on the street can indeed pose serious safety risks. In 2024, 1,285 street-homeless people were arrested for assault, a rate more than 20 times that of the total city population. Yet criminal offending isn’t a factor in prioritizing who gets the most focused attention, even on the City’s* [*“Top 50” lists*](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/13/nyregion/jordan-neely-top-50-mental-illness.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— the informal name for the internal rosters used to coordinate work on the most serious subway and street cases.* *Particular crimes committed by these individuals loom large and heighten public fear. There was the fatal 2022* [*subway shoving*](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/nyregion/martial-simon-michelle-go.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *of Michelle Go in the Times Square-42nd Street station and, more recently, the 2024* [*stabbing spree*](https://abc7ny.com/post/ramon-rivera-indicted-fatal-stabbing-3-people-manhattan-grand-jury/15677086/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *across Manhattan that left three people dead. Untreated illness and addiction also often manifest as erratic behavior that many experience as threatening. For the individuals themselves, surviving in public without effective care means worsening health, criminal justice involvement, vulnerability to victimization and repeated emergencies, often resulting in an unbroken cycle through the street, shelter, ER and jail akin to* [*those Dr. Ross MacDonald identified*](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29176106/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *in his analysis of Rikers Island “hot spotters.”* ## *What government currently does about the challenge* [*Billions of public dollars*](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/071-DHS.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *are spent each year on both homelessness and behavioral health, yet this specific cohort remains too disconnected from sustained attention, typically cycling through brief and redundant contacts with police, hospitals and shelters before returning to the street. The visible churn convinces the public that government cannot care for the most vulnerable people or maintain order in common spaces.* *Of course, even if everything ran like clockwork, there would be crises and failures. These are bedevilingly difficult cases to manage. Government and nonprofit providers put an enormous amount of thought and commitment into addressing difficult circumstances. But far too much effort, money and time are squandered because multiple systems operate in parallel — the police, 911 and 311, EMS, homeless-services outreach teams, public hospitals and nonprofit providers. Each has different mandates, funding sources, data systems and protocols. Handoffs are inconsistent; information is siloed; continuous case management and accountability are absent. Outreach teams often* [*lose track*](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *of clients once cases move outside their geography or specialty. Hospitals frequently discharge psychiatric patients back to the street after* [*brief observation*](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/planning/docs/comprehensive-psychiatric-emergency-program-annual-summary.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *because longer-stay treatment beds and step-down options are scarce. Judges who see mentally ill or drug-addicted defendants have few viable pathways to secure treatment instead of jail because effective programs* [*have limited slots*](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*. At Rikers Island,* [*an estimated one-third of people*](https://citylimits.org/opinion-enhancing-access-to-supportive-housing-is-key-to-criminal-justice-reform/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) *admitted in 2023 were homeless before arrest; upon release,* [*only about 3% of detainees*](https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2024/07/Brad-H-53rd-report-final-2024%5F06%5F28-email.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *with serious mental illness were connected to supportive housing, with most returning to shelters or the street.* ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atw_ihnyclf9ohtm_homelessnessspending-12-8-png-auto-format-compress-1776259663235.jpg) ### *1\. Contact with individuals in crisis and what follows* *It’s not easy to get one’s arms around all the opportunities for official intervention — the many ways in which a seriously mentally ill or otherwise unstable homeless person living on the street encounters police, mental health professionals, social workers and others — but it’s important to try to see the current tangled system in all its complexity.* *There are two primary ways unsheltered individuals in public spaces with serious mental illness will make contact with the system: police dispatch (i.e., 911) in response to a crisis, and outreach teams (sometimes civilian, sometimes a mix of police and civilian) that initiate contact with individuals even when there is no reported emergency.* *After an encounter, police (usually) can transport an individual involuntarily to a hospital for a psychiatric assessment if they’re in psychiatric distress and qualify for transport, which under the law is defined as presenting a danger to themselves or others, a definition that includes the inability to take care of their own basic needs. If the person does not qualify for involuntary transport, then they could either be arrested if alleged to engage in criminal activity, or offered to be connected to different services (e.g., housing).* *Not all people who live on the street are in the throes of crisis, but crises happen with some level of frequency. New York City’s behavioral health crisis response still defaults to 911, with police and EMS as the primary responders. The NYPD fields more than* [*150,000 calls*](https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2024-09-23-1000-am-committee-on-mental-health-disabilities-and-addiction/chapter/designation-of-individuals-as-emotionally-disturbed-persons-edps/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Both%20NYPD%20and%20FDNY%20categorize,responded%20to%20118%2C387%20EDP%20calls) *each year involving psychiatric distress (a number that includes people who are housed). Police are usually present for three reasons: the possibility of violence, social workers’ preference for backup in unpredictable situations and the legal requirement that only police can carry out involuntary transports.* *Alongside 911, 311 serves as the City’s* [*nonemergency intake*](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Social-Services/311-Service-Requests-from-2010-to-Present/erm2-nwe9/about%5Fdata?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and routing line for homeless-related concerns. In 2024, the* [*DHS*](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(Department of Homeless Services) handled about two-thirds of these calls, and the NYPD handled the remaining third. Among the City’s outreach efforts, co-response teams — the MTA’s* [*clinician-led SCOUT*](https://www.mta.info/document/135741?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(Subway Co-Response Outreach Teams), a daytime program conducted in partnership with DHS, and* [*PATH*](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2024/10/mayor-adams-new-co-response-operation-focused-serving-more-new-yorkers-need-on?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(Partnership Assistance for Transit Homelessness), an overnight program led by the NYPD, DHS and the City’s public hospital system — are among the most recently conceived initiatives. These teams work to actively find and engage people in distress instead of waiting for a call to come in. Their models pair mental health clinicians with police officers to handle crises together, combining treatment expertise with public safety backup. (Though they are expanding, they remain small: SCOUT began with two pilot teams and is* [*slated to reach roughly 10*](https://www.mta.info/document/135741?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *by year’s end. PATH does not publish similar numbers.)* *There is growing interest, including by Mayor-elect Mamdani, in the City’s* [*B-HEARD*](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division) pilot — unarmed teams of clinicians and EMTs dispatched to eligible mental health 911 calls instead of police — as an alternative. The program’s current footprint in 31 precincts (of 78) and roughly 15,000 calls handled in 2024 remains a small amount relative to need. And, as with many if not all of the programs and approaches, there has been no reliable (or publicly available) assessment of what kinds of problems B-HEARD is effective at addressing and what it is not.* *B-HEARD was* [*modeled*](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/new-york-city-announces-new-mental-health-teams-to-respond-to-mental-health-crises/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *on CAHOOTS in Eugene, Oregon, pairing health professionals with responders for behavioral health crises, but it does not fulfill the same role. CAHOOTS (Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets) combines crisis response with sustained, proactive outreach in the community, while in New York City that outreach is handled by separate street outreach teams rather than B-HEARD. B-HEARD focuses on reacting to selected 911 calls during limited hours instead of serving as a default, community-based alternative. The result is often trading one type of responder for another rather than changing how and when help reaches people.* *Both strategies, B-HEARD and involuntary transports, suffer from an* [*absence*](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-behavioral-health-emergency-assistance-response-divisions-effectiveness-in-responding-to-individuals-with-mental-health-crises-and-meeting-its-goals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *of sufficient publicly reported outcome measures to tell policymakers whether these responses actually improve stability, reduce repeat crises and connect people to care. This makes it difficult to evaluate their effects and determine whether they’re as effective as other nonpolice alternative response programs (e.g.,* [*Denver’s STAR*](https://www.urban.org/research/publication/evaluating-alternative-crisis-response-denvers-support-team-assisted-response?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(Support Team Assisted Response)).* ***This raises a crucial recurring theme: The orientation of the current system — to deal mainly with point-in-time crises instead of sustained attention to a particular person throughout their life course — means that neither government nor anyone else with responsibility has a panoramic view of how any one individual is doing after the crisis.*** *Much of the* [*public reporting*](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/03/mayor-adams-keeps-mental-health-week-moving-announcing-11-000-engagements-3-000-services?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *on these efforts remains focused on activity — contacts, referrals and transports. But there is little known about durable results such as housing retention, reduced crisis recurrence or diversion from the justice system. Without those measures, it is difficult to know whether scaling up is translating into lasting impact.* *By contrast, several civilian outreach models have expanded in recent years. State OMH’s (Office of Mental Health’s)* [*SOS*](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/adults/sos/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(Safe Options Support) teams* [*grew from four to 20*](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/resources/newsltr/docs/omhnewsfall2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *between 2022 and 2025, with press coverage citing State data showing* [*800 people placed into permanent housing*](https://cbcare.org/wp-content/uploads/Safe-Options-Support-Newsletter-4-28-25.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *in New York City from April 2022 to April 2025 after 58,000 engagements. SOS teams are multidisciplinary groups (clinicians, peers and care managers) who do persistent, field-based outreach both topside and underground, stay with people to help navigate paperwork and appointments, and broker placements into Safe Haven / stabilization beds and supportive or permanent housing.* *The City has made numerous concerted efforts to knit together the fragmented system and focus on those in greatest need. One example is the* [*StreetSmart*](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/evidence/dhs-integrated-case-management-overview.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *application. StreetSmart, a project of the Department of Homeless Services, is a digital by-name list — a shared, person-specific roster used by City-contracted outreach providers to track individuals living unsheltered and to record engagements and progress over time. This is a real innovation. Unfortunately, it excludes many nonprofits that are not under City contract and therefore are not bound by the City’s privacy rules. Health, housing and police data are not integrated, and health-privacy rules restrict certain types of data sharing. These gaps make it difficult to measure outcomes or coordinate care effectively.* ### *2\. Involuntary Transport & Hospitalization* *After a response or outreach team makes contact with an unsheltered individual, the next step is assessing whether the individual is in psychiatric distress. If an individual is in crisis, both police and clinicians have the power of involuntary removal to a hospital (under New York State Mental Hygiene Law Sections 9.41 and 9.58). The current administration has* [*leaned into*](https://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/adams-makes-push-for-involuntary-commitment/article%5F053e4a1b-e727-483f-b7ff-57a41f78febf.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *involuntary transport to hospitals under the Mental Hygiene Law as part of its strategy. It’s unclear whether expanded use of involuntary transport will break existing cycles or worsen them — an uncertainty the City should resolve through rigorous evaluation. It is critical that the City learn what the results are so that it can determine how most effectively to implement the law. In 2024, police initiated about* [*7,000 involuntary transports*](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/issue-briefs-and-reports?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(*[*Section 9.41*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.41?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*), roughly two-thirds of which originated from 911 calls. Clinicians accounted for another 661 (*[*Section 9.58*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.58?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*). There is no public accounting of whether the removals in 2024 are more or fewer than in the past. Also, while* [*57% of individuals*](https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiOTRjZDNlZWYtZTdjZi00ZDNmLTkxODItNDc3NDFjZmMzNTBmIiwidCI6IjM1YzgyODE2LTZjNTYtNDQzYi1iYWY2LTgzMTIxNjNjYWRjMSJ9&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *transported pursuant to an order issued by a clinician (9.58) are admitted, there is no public reporting on how many individuals are admitted into psychiatric care after a police transport (9.41).* *Once at the hospital, a person can be held for a short evaluation under* [*Section 9.40*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.40?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, typically lasting up to 72 hours. This evaluation typically occurs in a* [*CPEP (Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program)*](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/queens/services/behavioral-health/psychiatry/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *unit, the designated psychiatric emergency department. If doctors determine that the person still needs inpatient care, they may be admitted under* [*Section 9.39*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.39?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, which allows up to 15 days of emergency hospitalization. For people who continue to need treatment, the hospital can extend the stay under* [*Sections 9.27*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.27?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*9.37*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.37?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, based on certification by doctors and a psychiatrist, for up to 60 days. If more time is required, the hospital must seek a court order under* [*Section 9.33*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.33?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to keep the person longer. A small number of* [*extended-care units*](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/innovative-new-unit-for-patients-with-severe-mental-illness-opens-at-nyc-health-hospitals-elmhurst/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *provide about 90 to 120 days of treatment, and there are also* [*medical respite beds*](https://www.health.ny.gov/health%5Fcare/medicaid/redesign/sdh/respite.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *for patients with physical health needs.* *If an individual is not admitted or discharged, options are extremely limited. Even if admitted to psychiatric care, individuals* [*may face prolonged waits*](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2024/03/dinapoli-percentage-new-yorkers-mental-illness-rose-available-psychiatric-beds-declined?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *in emergency departments due to psychiatric boarding — when patients remain in the ER for extended periods because no inpatient psychiatric beds are available. There are few alternatives for those not admitted and difficulty accessing long-term or supportive housing options to ensure stability after discharge.* *It is also worth noting that some constraints concerning long-term psychiatric care stem from State and federal financing and regulatory rules that limit what care is available and for how long, notably Medicaid’s* [*IMD exclusion*](https://www.nami.org/advocacy/policy-priorities/improving-health/medicaid-imd-exclusion/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, which generally prevents federal funding for adults aged 21 to 64 receiving care in psychiatric facilities with more than 16 beds.* ### *3\. Treatment and other services* *While improving the initial response to individuals in crisis is often presented as central to solving the problem, changing who initially responds when a crisis happens is not enough. If an individual is not admitted to a hospital or arrested, what happens next is typically what matters most. Same-day clinical access?* [*Intensive Mobile Treatment*](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/program/intensive-mobile-treatment-imt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(IMT), which provides support and treatment in streets, shelters and public spaces? Detox and* [*step-down care*](https://iclinc.org/institute-for-community-living-report-shows-new-program-increased-capacity-to-serve-new-yorkers-with-the-most-significant-mental-health-challenges-including-individuals-living-on-streets-and-subways/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*? Supportive housing with services? And is there a smooth transition to this help?* *Without the right resources at the right moment, most encounters eventually result in the person cycling back to emergency rooms, shelters or the street. B-HEARD can reduce police call volume, and it might reduce the risk of a given incident escalating, but it does not address the underlying problem of “What next?” or necessarily address the underlying problem motivating the report.* *Again, the “What next?” question rears its head. The City does not publish systemwide data on how many of the police-initiated transports result in admission or for how long or what happened to the person upon release.* *Treatment following inpatient hospitalization is crucial.* [*Assisted Outpatient Treatment*](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, which is court-ordered under Kendra’s Law, gives individuals psychiatric treatment plans to follow once they’ve been stabilized. It is an important piece of the puzzle, especially given evaluations both* [*within*](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/ps.2010.61.10.976?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and* [*outside*](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.prcp.20240162?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *of New York that have found it to be effective in reducing psychiatric episodes and improved outcomes.* *OMH’s* [*Assertive Community Treatment*](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/act/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(ACT) shows* [*promising evidence*](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17329462/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Results%3A%20%20Of%20the%2052,studies%2C%20assertive%20community%20treatment%20subjects) *of stabilizing housing and reducing psychiatric crises. ACT serves adults with the highest, ongoing psychiatric needs; multidisciplinary teams provide community-based care with small caseloads, 24/7 crisis coverage and time-unlimited support for as long as the person benefits. Similar to ACT, the Mayor’s Office of Community Mental Health has implemented IMT teams that serve adults with serious mental illness who are often street- or shelter-based, recently incarcerated or repeatedly hospitalized. IMTs meet people in the field at points of crisis or transition (street, ER or jail/prison discharge) and remain engaged as long as clinically needed, often many months, until a step-down is appropriate. For IMT, however, a 2024* [*City comptroller audit*](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/nyc-comptroller-audit-exposes-major-management-gaps-in-intensive-mobile-treatment-imt-for-new-yorkers-with-severe-mental-health-challenges/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *found issues with tracking outcomes and program management. Incarceration data were not regularly tracked and treatment engagement was inconsistently measured. Reviews of providers varied in quality, follow-up on corrective actions lagged and the program still lacks transparent, system-level reporting to demonstrate durable outcomes — a gap also highlighted by a* [*New York Times investigation*](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/nyregion/nyc-mental-illness-breakdowns.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *into the City’s fragmented mental health response. However, mobile treatment capacity is constrained: The City funds* [*31 IMT teams*](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-on-intensive-mobile-treatment-initiative-carried-out-by-department-of-health-and-mental-hygiene/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *serving fewer than 1,000 clients, with similar pressure on State-funded ACT teams.* *It is also worth noting that some constraints concerning long-term psychiatric care stem from State and federal financing and regulatory rules that limit what care is available and for how long, notably Medicaid’s IMD exclusion, which generally prevents federal funding for adults aged 21 to 64 receiving care in psychiatric facilities with more than 16 beds.* ### *4\. Shelter and housing placements* *Housing must be a central part of the approach to stabilizing people who lack it and are on the verge of psychiatric crisis. But even when the City can identify and reach people with the highest needs, individuals are typically routed to places that are, by design, temporary, including ERs;* [*crisis respite centers*](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/crisis-emergency-services-respite-centers.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*;* [*Safe Havens*](https://www.nyc.gov/html/hhsaccelerator/downloads/pdf/DHS%20Safe%20Havens.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, which are low-barrier, small-scale programs that provide private rooms and flexible rules for people coming directly from the street, who often resist traditional shelters due to their safety records, strict curfews, sobriety requirements and other rules;* [*stabilization beds*](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, which are low-threshold beds for a high-functioning population; general shelters; or short jail stays.* *Some of these placement failures could be addressed by increasing Safe Haven and stabilization beds, speeding documentation, expanding mobile treatment capacity and improving handoffs.* *Supportive housing — permanent affordable apartments with on-site services — is by far the most crucial component of any system to help this population. Yet today, approvals do not reliably translate into placements for unsheltered individuals. Despite the* [*strong evidence base*](https://shnny.org/images/uploads/NY-NY-III-Interim-Report.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) *concerning the effectiveness of supportive-housing programs, outreach programs have struggled to secure housing placements.* [*In 2024*](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/01/06/homeless-supportive-housing-eric-adams-statistics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, outreach teams secured supportive-housing approvals for 955 unsheltered people, but only 175 (18%) obtained a unit, often due to process barriers; at the same time, more than 4,100 supportive-housing units sat vacant. Unsheltered homeless people don’t just suffer from mental illness and addiction; they lack, and need, some community. Here, clubhouses like those run by* [*Fountain House*](https://www.fountainhouse.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *have helpfully expanded in recent years, giving individuals a psychologically healthy place to go during the day and a connection with related services. A person who is connected with others is more likely to get the help they need when they need it.* ### *5\. Criminal justice interactions and what follow* *In some instances, the initial interaction with police stems from criminal behavior. In 2024, NYPD recorded 15,274 arrests of unsheltered New Yorkers. Most commonly, these arrests are for petit larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses or assault charges.* *When a police officer makes an arrest, the defendant is charged and brought before a judge for arraignment. At arraignment, the judge has the option to release the individual on their own recognizance pending the resolution of the case, release with certain conditions or set bail and hold the individual in detention. In the case of homeless individuals, lack of stable housing is sometimes considered by judges in determining risk of flight, and any amount of bail could effectively result in being held in jail pending trial if they are unable to afford it.* *For individuals who appear to have a serious mental illness, judges will sometimes order an exam under Criminal Procedure Law 730 (”730 exam”), to determine whether the individual is an* [*incapacitated person*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/730.10?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— a defendant who “as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.” For underlying misdemeanor charges, a finding of incapacitation results in the* [*dismissal of the underlying misdemeanor case*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/730.40?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *as well as care and treatment in an appropriate institution for up to 90 days. For felony cases, longer orders of commitment are possible, and the status of the underlying criminal case will depend on whether or not it is ultimately indicted by the prosecutor. In cases of an indicted felony, the individual can be held in a State forensic psychiatric facility for up to* [*two-thirds of the maximum sentence*](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/730.50?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *if the patient had been found guilty of the underlying felony. It is also worth noting that the process of 730 exams can often lead to many case delays and a much lengthier stay of incarceration or time in a psychiatric facility for individuals with serious mental illness.* *In the absence of a 730 exam, prosecutors still have many tools at their disposal for individuals living with serious mental illness and/or substance use disorder. Included in these options are* [*mental health*](https://ww2.nycourts.gov/mental-health-courts-overview-27066?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *and* [*drug-treatment courts*](https://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/problem%5Fsolving/drugcourts/overview.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, as well as the possibility for treatment as a condition of a plea deal or as part of a final sentence.* *For those who are living with serious mental illness who are held in jail, there are specialized units called* [*CAPS*](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doc/media/caps.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *(Clinical Alternative to Punitive Segregation) units, as well as therapeutic beds, which provide treatment for individuals with serious mental illness while incarcerated. If convicted of a crime and transferred to State custody, there is a* [*continuum of care*](https://doccs.ny.gov/medical-services?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *for incarcerated individuals offered by OMH, including the* [*Central New York Psychiatric Center*](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/cnpc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *as well a statewide network of clinics, crisis beds and intermediate care program beds.* *Upon release, reentry services are available through nonprofits, NYC Health + Hospitals programs and other City programs, such as the* [*Community Justice Reentry Network*](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/community-justice-reentry-network/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, that provide a variety of connections to treatment, care, housing and employment resources.* *These are hard cases. Providing services to people living with mental illness is much more complex than providing food to the hungry. Many people of greatest concern do not realize they are ill, a condition known as* [*anosognosia*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anosognosia?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Anosognosia%20results%20from%20physiological%20damage%20to%20brain,hemisphere%2C%20and%20is%20thus%20a%20neuropsychiatric%20disorder.)*. Others carry trauma or deep distrust of systems and may refuse help repeatedly. Even a well-functioning system is likely to fail more often than it succeeds. But today, batting averages are dangerously low. The system’s flaws are clear: Information is siloed, coordination across agencies is thin, services are poorly matched to need and unevenly distributed, connections are not sustained as symptoms change over time and there is little culture of disciplined self-assessment or course correction. As with every other aspect of engagement with those living with serious mental illness and/or homelessness, the description of the system process does not always align perfectly with delivery. Often there are* [*not enough services, treatment programs, beds or housing options*](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Safer-for-All.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to meet the needs of the individuals these were created to help.* ## ***Appendices*** # *NYC homelessness & mental health budget (2024)* | Agency | Line Items | Amounts (2024) | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | -------------- | | [DHS](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2023/03/DHS.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) | Outreach, Drop-In, Reception | $303.7M | | [DHS](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2023/03/DHS.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) | Family Shelter Operations, Intake, Administration | $1.1B | | [DHS](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2023/03/DHS.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) | Adult Shelter Operations, Intake, Administration | $969.16M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Mental Health Services | $601.56M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Alcohol and Drug Prevention, Care and Treatment | $153M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Developmental Disabilities | $10M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Administration | $52M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Correctional Health Services | $285M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | B-HEARD | $13M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Mental Health Service Corps | $12M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Just Home | $1M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | DOHMH (Transfer) | $37M | | [FDNY](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/057-FDNY.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | B-HEARD | \- | | [FDNY](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/057-FDNY.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Emergency Medical Services | $427M | | [OTI/311](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Office-of-Technology-Innovation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | 311 | $61M | | [OTI/311](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Office-of-Technology-Innovation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | 911 | $101M | | [OTI/311](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Office-of-Technology-Innovation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Administration, Operations | $66M | | [NYPD](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/056-NYPD.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Transit | $291M | | [NYPD](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/056-NYPD.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Training | $136M | | | TOTAL | $4.62B | | TOTAL | $10.4B | | ## *The evidence backing various policy approaches* *The evidence table below does not attempt to rate the level of evidence for the programs indicated. Instead, it aims to be illustrative and provide an overview of what data and research are available for the programs.* # *NYC programs: evidence and evaluation* | Category | Program Name | Description | Size and Stats | Evaluation | | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Crisis Response and First Response Programs | | | | | | | [B-HEARD](https://nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/nyc-health-hospitals-launches-the-largest-mental-health-alternative-response-system-in-the-nation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division: health and mental health-only response to 911 calls; operated by FDNY EMS and H+H | 33,000 responses citywide (2024) | NYC EvaluationCity Council [evaluation found](https://council.nyc.gov/data/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/B-HEARD-Evaluation-One-Pager-September-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 88% of calls were resolved without police, EMS or hospital transport, with higher success in non-housing conditions. | | | [Subway Safety](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/opinion/nyc-subway-homeless-mental-health.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Subway Safety Unit) | Operation to clear the subway of homeless people, involving NYPD and social workers (initially a temporary NYPD pilot); homeless people relocated to shelters and/or hospitalized; program has been the subject of legal challenges | 1800 outreaches1150 subway removals (2024-to-date) | NYC EvaluationNo city evaluation has been performed; [advocacy groups](https://accountablepolicies.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Case-Review-3.22.23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have raised concerns about quality of outreach. | | | [Directive 25](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/19/nyregion/eric-adams-involuntary-hospitalization-mentally-ill.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (NYPD Directive 25) | Directed "street homeless" individuals with mental illness to be involuntarily hospitalized. | Unknown citywideAt least 2000 interactions (2023-to-date) | NYC EvaluationNo city evaluation has been performed; [advocacy groups](https://accountablepolicies.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Case-Review-3.22.23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have raised concerns about implementation quality and protections against involuntary care. | | | [MCTs](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/crisis-emergency-services-mobile-crisis-teams.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Mobile Crisis Teams) | Nonpolice mental health response for individuals in crisis; may be accessed via 311/988 | 200,000 responses citywide (2023) | NYC EvaluationAn [evaluation of a different city effort](https://jmhsprograms.com/content/dam/web/jmhsprograms/documents/press-release/MobilecrisisExpansion.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) resulted in reductions of arrests, psychiatric hospitalizations and emergency room visits. | | | [CPEPs](https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/crisis-emergency-services-cpep.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Programs) | State-regulated 24/7 psychiatric emergency programs; recent State capital expansion initiative | 11 programs through H+H (2024), additional programs through private hospitals | No NYC EvaluationAn evaluation of a similar program in the[ Midwest](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/acem.14374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[finds effective results](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/acem.14374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). | | | [AOT](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Assisted Outpatient Treatment) | Court-ordered outpatient treatment administered via OMH/localities | 47,000 investigations, 96% petitions granted | NYC[](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/ps.2010.61.10.976?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)a href="https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/NYDPH-report.pdf?utm\_source=chatgpt.com" target="\_blank">and State EvaluationsIndependent [statewide evaluation](https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/NYDPH-report.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) (2009) found reductions in hospitalization, homelessness, arrests and incarceration for AOT recipients. [City evaluation](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/ps.2010.61.10.976?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also found the program effective. | | | Medical Respite | State-funded and H+H-run short-term medical respite beds for people exiting hospitals who are homeless | 75 beds | No NYC Evaluation[A systematic review](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23728025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that similar programs reduce hospital readmissions, inpatient days and admissions, and improve housing outcomes. | | | [TIL](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/runaway-homeless-youth/transitional-independent-living.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Transitional Independent Living) | Department of Youth and Community Development residential programs for youth (short-term crisis and long-term) | Unknown | No NYC Evaluation | | | [ECUs](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/innovative-new-unit-for-patients-with-severe-mental-illness-opens-at-nyc-health-hospitals-kings-county/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Extended Care Units) | H+H hospital-based psychiatric extended-care units. | 60 beds (2024) | No[](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7838487/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)NYC EvaluationA [systematic review](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7838487/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of rehab / extended-stay settings found that the most consistent outcome was reduced subsequent inpatient service use after discharge. | | | [Fountain House Clubhouses](https://www.fountainhouse.org/about/clubhouse-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Free, voluntary, member-led clubhouse serving \~2,000 adults with serious mental illness | \~2,000 members (2023) | NYC Evaluation An [NYU study](https://www.fountainhouse.org/assets/05201?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showed 21% Medicaid cost savings from reduced hospitalizations. | | | Bridge to Home | H+H program providing noncongregate medical respite / step-down beds | 46 beds (2024) | No NYC Evaluation[A systematic review](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23728025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that these programs reduce hospital readmissions, inpatient days and admissions, and improve housing outcomes. | | Housing | | | | | | | [Safe Havens](https://www.nyc.gov/html/hhsaccelerator/downloads/pdf/DHS%20Safe%20Havens.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Low-barrier, service-rich beds for street-homeless people; placements coordinated via DHS Joint Command Center | \~4,000 beds (2025)City combines this count with stabilization beds. | No NYC EvaluationA [Ward Family Foundation evaluation](https://www.va.gov/HOMELESS/docs/GPD/providers/EvidenceBaseSupportingLowDemandHousing.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) found in another jurisdiction that from 2011-2013, 55% of veteran participants were moved into stable housing | | | [Supportive Housing](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/supportive-housing.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Permanent housing with on-site services; mixed funding (City/State/federal); includes scattered-site and congregate | 40,472 units, 94% occupancy (2025) | NYC[](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/28351/412024-The-Corporation-for-Supportive-Housing-s-Returning-Home-Initiative-System-Change-Accomplishments-after-Three-Years.PDF?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)Evaluation[Evaluation found](https://shnny.org/images/uploads/NY-NY-III-Interim-Report.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) net public cost savings and reduced service use vs. eligible non-tenants; [Urban Institute](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/28351/412024-The-Corporation-for-Supportive-Housing-s-Returning-Home-Initiative-System-Change-Accomplishments-after-Three-Years.PDF?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) study showed similar findings. | | | [Stabilization Beds](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Short-term, low-barrier stabilization sites for unsheltered individuals | City combines this count with Safe Havens. | No NYC Evaluation[A systematic review](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8427990/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) of homelessness interventions, including stabilization beds, was found to outperform other services to improve residential stability. | | | [Drop-in Centers](https://www.nyep.uscourts.gov/reentry/NYC%20Homeless%20Shelters.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | DHS-contracted centers offering basic services and case management | 9 centers (2025) | No NYC Evaluation | | | [RHY](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/runaway-homeless-youth.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Runaway and Homeless Youth) | Department of Youth and Community Development shelters for youth / young adults experiencing homelessness | 60 beds (2025) | No NYC EvaluationA Los Angeles, California, [study of a similar youth drop center](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6450788/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) found a positive impact for participants. | | Justice Involved | | | | | | | [JISH](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/08/04/2935/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Last%20year%2C%20the%20Council%20succeeded,held%20in%20pre%2Dtrial%20detention.) (Justice-involved / jail in-reach supportive housing) | Justice-involved / jail in-reach supportive housing (program naming varies) | 120 units (2025) | NYC[](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282107665%5FNYC%5FFrequent%5FUsers%5FFUSE%5FInitiative%5FEvaluation%5Fof%5Fa%5FSupportive%5FHousing%5FIntervention?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)Evaluation [Evaluation found](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282107665%5FNYC%5FFrequent%5FUsers%5FFUSE%5FInitiative%5FEvaluation%5Fof%5Fa%5FSupportive%5FHousing%5FIntervention?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that justice-involved supportive housing significantly reduced cycling between public systems, days spent in jail and shelter, and use of crisis care health services. | | | [Transitional Housing](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/transitional-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | MOCJ-funded short-term housing options for justice-involved individuals (various sponsors) | 1000 beds (2023) | NYC Evaluation[Descriptive data](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/transitional-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) provided by MOCJ show that participants had a lower rearrest rate. | | | [Just Home](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/036-22/nyc-health-hospitals-department-housing-preservation-development-new-housing-for?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/0) | Supportive housing initiative for medically vulnerable people leaving custody; funded by H+H and working with HPD and service providers | 83 units | No NYC EvaluationAn evaluation of [a similar program in Ohio](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25716/412632-Supportive-Housing-for-Returning-Prisoners-Outcomes-and-Impacts-of-the-Returning-Home-Ohio-Pilot-Project.PDF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that participants had greater housing stability and were significantly less likely to be rearrested, convicted or reincarcerated. | | | Drug Treatment Courts | Statewide problem-solving courts focusing on substance use | Unknown | NYC Evaluation[Center for Court Innovation evaluation](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23826/412867-A-Statewide-Evaluation-of-New-York-s-Adult-Drug-Courts.PDF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that participants were less likely to be arrested. | | | [HOPE](https://knowledgebank.criminaljustice.ny.gov/heroin-overdose-prevention-and-education-hope-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Heroin Overdose Prevention and Education) | Prearraignment diversion program run by the Richmond County District Attorney's Office (Staten Island) | Unknown | NYC EvaluationAn [MOCJ evaluation](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HOPE-Report-2.19.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that a Richmond County HOPE pilot reduced recidivism. | ## *National models and programs* *Programs from across the U.S. that have been referenced as potential models to introduce in New York City.* # *Case studies from other large cities* | Category | Program Name | Description | City / Jurisdiction | Evaluation | | ----------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Crisis Response and First Response Programs | | | | | | | [STAR](https://www.denvergov.org/Government/Agencies-Departments-Offices/Agencies-Departments-Offices-Directory/Public-Health-Environment/Community-Behavioral-Health/Behavioral-Health-Solutions/STAR-Program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Support Team Assisted Response) | Embedded in 911 and coordinated by Denver Public Health and Denver 911; staffed by mental-health clinicians and paramedics (not police or fire) | Denver, CO | Denver Evaluation [Descriptive data](https://cdphe.colorado.gov/star-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) find no police calls, no arrests and no injuries. A [CEBP evaluation](https://behavioralpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Piza-et-al%5FSTAR-Evaluation%5F5.3.21.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found no significant impact on nearby serious or violent crimes. | | | [HEART](https://www.durhamcountync.gov/4687/HEART-Program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Holistic Empathetic Assistance Response Teams) | Civilian clinicians and peer responders dispatched through 911 or 311 for nonviolent crises. Data are tracked under the City's racial-equity framework. | Durham, NC | Pilot Evaluation Descriptive data of pilot year [show promise](https://www.durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/View/54631/RTI%5FDurham-HEART-Pilot-Program-Report-May-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and is planned for evaluation. | | | [Albuquerque Community Safety](https://www.cabq.gov/acs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | A stand-alone 911-response department staffed by behavioral-health clinicians, peer support workers and outreach specialists who respond to calls for mental-health, homelessness and substance-use concerns; no police dispatch | Albuquerque, NM | No Formal Evaluation | | | [SCRT](https://www.sf.gov/street-crisis-response-team?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Street Crisis Response Team) | Part of the City's "crisis response continuum." Each team includes a paramedic, behavioral-health clinician and peer specialist responding to behavioral-health 911 calls. | San Francisco, CA | San Francisco Evaluation Evaluation is [in process](https://prise.ucsf.edu/project/evaluating-san-franciscos-street-crisis-response-team-as-a-model-for-mental-health-and-substance-use-treatment-for-adults-experiencing-homelessness/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). | | | [CIRCLE](https://mayor.lacity.gov/sites/g/files/wph2066/files/2023-10/CIRCLE%5FFAQ%5FEnglish%5FSpanish%5F10.2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Crisis and Incident Response through Community-Led Engagement) | Civilian outreach teams staffed by community-based organizations that respond to nonemergency 911 calls involving unhoused people and behavioral crises; integrated through 311 and coordinated by the Mayor's Office of Public Safety | Los Angeles, CA | No Formal Evaluation Program data show [14,000 incidents diverted and 1,000](https://mayor.lacity.gov/news/confronting-mental-health-crisis-mayor-bass-announces-circle-program-expansion-westside?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) individuals were referred to mental and behavioral services. | | | [Street Response Team](https://www.portland.gov/streetresponse?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Civilian alternative response program for responding to mental health emergencies | Portland, OR | Portland Evaluation[Descriptive evaluation findings](https://www.pdx.edu/homelessness/PSR-Evaluation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found a 3.5% reduction in total calls responded to by police and a 19% reduction in police response. | | Behavioral Health Treatment and Hospitalization | | | | | | | [CMHP](https://www.jud11.flcourts.org/Criminal-Mental-Health-Project?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Criminal Mental Health Project) / Miami Model | A comprehensive mental health diversion program built to eliminate the criminalization of mental illness; utilizes prebooking and postbooking jail diversion; employs the SOAR model to expedite access to federal benefits | Miami-Dade County, FL | No Formal Evaluation[Descriptive program data](https://www.jud11.flcourts.org/docs/Jail%5Fdiversion%5Fthe%5FMiami%5Fmodel%20CNS%202020.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) find CMHP to provide an effective and cost-efficient solution for individuals with serious mental illness and co-occurring serious mental illness. | | | [Judge Ed Emmett Mental Health Diversion Center](https://www.theharriscenter.org/location/judge-ed-emmett-mental-health-diversion-center?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Law enforcement transports individuals identified with mental health needs directly to the Diversion Center instead of jail, based on voluntary participation. The process takes an officer 11 minutes compared to 4 hours for jail booking. 24/7 diversion drop-off for police transporting people in behavioral crisis instead of jail or ER. | Houston / Harris County, TX | Houston EvaluationEvaluation found that program participants who were homeless experienced [reductions in psychiatric hospitalizations](https://mhneedscouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Harris-Center-Jail-Diversion-Evaluation-2022-09-30-Final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the long term, but not short term. | | | [CBH](https://cbhphilly.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Community Behavioral Health) | A City-controlled managed-care organization integrating Medicaid behavioral-health dollars into a unified delivery system focused on recovery, housing and harm reduction | Philadelphia, PA | Philadelphia Evaluation[External quality review](https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dhs/documents/healthchoices/hc-services/documents/CBH-2023-MY-2022-ATR-Final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of descriptive data finds improvements in reducing psychiatric hospitalizations. | | | [Crisis Now Framework](https://crisisnow.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CrisisNow-BusinessCase.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | 24/7 crisis system with regional crisis call centers, mobile teams and short-term stabilization facilities | Arizona, statewide (Maricopa County pioneer) | No Formal Evaluation An [exploratory process evaluation](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.202000114?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is in progress. | | | [Crisis Response Center (Sequential Intercept Model)](https://www.samhsa.gov/communities/criminal-juvenile-justice/sequential-intercept-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Diversion by law enforcement that uses a "no wrong door" policy, meaning no exclusions based on payer status, intoxication or involuntary status; features a dedicated entrance to expedite law enforcement drop-off, taking officers about 10 minutes | Tucson, AZ | No Formal Evaluation | | | [CM](https://www.recoveryanswers.org/resource/contingency-management/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Contingency Management) | An evidence-based treatment primarily for stimulant use disorders (like cocaine or methamphetamine); uses incentives, often cash payments, for specific positive behaviors such as providing clean drug tests | General practice (e.g., San Francisco pilot) | Systematic Review Review finds CM to be [an effective treatment](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2782768?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) for individuals with opioid use disorder. | | | [MAT](https://americanaddictioncenters.org/addiction-medications?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Medication-Assisted Treatment) | Utilizes medications like methadone or buprenorphine (Suboxone) to treat opioid use disorder; can include flexible take-home policies and delivery services to increase access and stability | General practice (e.g., San Francisco) | San Francisco Evaluation [Evaluation finds](https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.10.21267477v1.full.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) that MAT reduces hospitalizations and improves stability. | | | [MAP](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3726334/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Managed Alcohol Use Program) | Stabilization and harm-reduction intervention for people with alcohol use disorder, sometimes involving managed alcohol programs where clients are given small amounts of alcohol; also known as "wet housing" | General practice (e.g., San Francisco) | Systematic Review[Review finds](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9311344/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) MAPs a promising harm reduction intervention. | | Housing | | | | | | | [HRH](https://heller.brandeis.edu/opioid-policy/community-resources/harm-reduction-housing/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Harm Reduction Housing) | Provides stable living environments without sobriety mandates; offers 24/7 harm reduction supplies, counseling and medical oversight on-site to reduce the risks associated with drug use, such as using alone | Boston, MA | No Formal Evaluation | | | [Temporary Shelter Provision (Winter Shelter Beds)](https://www.lahsa.org/winter-shelter?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Provision of additional temporary shelter capacity during the winter months | Los Angeles County, CA | Los Angeles Evaluation [A study finds](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VXFef56O8z5ltzTfvJzeQXXfsCfZiy6i/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) these programs reduce unsheltered homelessness as well as crime and ER visits. | | | [Tiny Cabins / Tiny Homes](https://dignitymoves.org/san-francisco/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Noncongregate, cost-effective interim housing options; San Francisco's first cabin community was established quickly on borrowed private land for temporary use | San Francisco, CA | No Formal Evaluation | | Justice Involved | | | | | | | [LEAD](https://leadbureau.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Let Everyone Advance with Dignity) | Case management diversion for low-level offenses, replacing arrest with community-based care | Seattle, WA (replicated nationally) | North Carolina Evaluation [Participants are less likely](https://psychiatry.duke.edu/sites/default/files/2023-01/Duke%20LEAD%20Evaluation%20Full%20Report%5FUpdated%201-24-23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to have arrests and outpatient behavioral visits as well as higher utilization of medication. | ## ***Glossary of terms*** ### *Systems, agencies and programs* ***311/911 Systems*** *311/911 are the City’s call systems consisting of nonemergency (311) and emergency (911) dispatch lines, routing homeless concerns through 311 and psychiatric crises through 911.* [***988***](https://nyc988.cityofnewyork.us/en/crisis-services/mobile-crisis-teams/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *988 is the City’s suicide and crisis call system, which can also dispatch DOHMH operated MCT teams to individuals in crisis.* [***AOT***](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Assisted Outpatient Treatment (Kendra’s Law)*** *AOT is authorized by a 1999 State law (Kendra’s Law), consists of court-ordered treatment plans and mandates medication, therapy and case management for individuals with severe illness and treatment noncompliance history. The petition can be filed by a range of individuals including a hospital director, psychiatrist, psychologist, probation officer or family members.* [***CIDI***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/cidi/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence*** *CIDI is the Mayor’s Office data hub. It consists of integrated databases linking City systems and coordinates cross-agency data integration.* [***DHS***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— NYC Department of Homeless Services*** *DHS is the City agency that funds and operates shelter systems, street outreach providers and street outreach nurses, and manages temporary living (e.g., Safe Havens).* [***DOHMH***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene*** *DOHMH is the City agency that operates behavioral health programs, deploys mobile crisis teams and coordinates mental health strategy with H+H and nonprofits.* [***H+H***](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— NYC Health + Hospitals*** *H+H is the City’s public hospital system, which operates emergency departments, CPEPs, Correctional Health Services at Rikers and different treatment and transition programs (e.g., Just Home).* [***HUD***](https://www.hud.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development*** *HUD is the federal agency that funds housing vouchers and homelessness assistance programs including Continuum of Care and HUD-VASH.* [***MOCJ***](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice*** *MOCJ is the mayor’s coordinating office for criminal justice policy. It manages diversion and reentry initiatives and oversees supportive housing programs for justice-involved individuals.* [***OASAS***](https://oasas.ny.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Office of Addiction Services and Supports*** *OASAS is the New York State agency that funds and operates substance use treatment programs, funds harm reduction and recovery services and oversees addiction treatment policy statewide.* [***OMH***](https://omh.ny.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— New York State Office of Mental Health*** *OMH is the New York State agency that funds and operates psychiatric programs and institutions and oversees mental health policy statewide.* [***OTDA***](https://otda.ny.gov/hearings/request/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance*** *OTDA is the State agency that administers emergency aid programs, funds supportive housing grants and oversees temporary assistance policy.* [***SAMHSA***](https://www.samhsa.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration*** *SAMHSA is the federal agency that funds behavioral health block grants, supports State and local programs and sets national behavioral health policy.* [***VA***](https://www.va.gov/resources/helpful-va-phone-numbers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs*** *VA is the federal agency that operates veteran health facilities, runs HUD-VASH housing programs, and provides mental health services for veterans.* ### *Crisis outreach and treatment programs* [***ACT***](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/act/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Assertive Community Treatment*** *ACT teams are operated by the New York State Office of Mental Health. They consist of psychiatrists, nurses, social workers and peer specialists, and provide 24/7 field-based treatment for adults with severe mental illness.* [***B-HEARD***](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division*** *B-HEARD is a City pilot program staffed by FDNY and H+H. It consists of unarmed clinician-EMT teams and responds to mental health 911 calls in select precincts.* [***CPEP***](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/services/mental-health-services/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program*** *CPEP are 24/7 psychiatric emergency programs funded by the State and operated by City hospitals, providing critical crisis and evaluation services to individuals with serious mental illness.* [***CTI***](https://www.criticaltime.org/cti-model/background/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***\- Critical Time Intervention*** *CTI, founded in New York City, is a time-limited, evidence-based case management model employed by SOS teams that provides intensive support during periods of transition for individuals in crisis and cycling between systems.* [***EOL***](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2022/the-subway-safety-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— End of Line*** *EOL are multiagency teams working at end-of-line stations as part of the Subway Safety Plan, connecting individuals to services.* [***FACT***](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/act/forensic-act-program-addendum.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Forensic Assertive Community Treatment*** *FACT teams are a specialized ACT model. They consist of behavioral health clinicians and criminal justice liaisons and provide integrated treatment and supervision for people with serious mental illness involved in the justice system.* [***Fountain House Clubhouses***](https://www.fountainhouse.org/about/clubhouse-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Free, voluntary, member-led spaces administered and run by Fountain House, serving adults with serious mental illness in New York City.* [***IMT***](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/program/intensive-mobile-treatment-imt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Intensive Mobile Treatment*** *IMT teams are operated by DOHMH. They consist of clinical staff similar to ACT composition and treat people with serious mental illness who are homeless, recently incarcerated or repeatedly hospitalized.* [***MCTs***](https://nyc988.cityofnewyork.us/en/crisis-services/mobile-crisis-teams/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Mobile Crisis Teams*** *MCTs are operated by DOHMH. They consist of clinician-led rapid-response units and respond to psychiatric crises dispatched through 988 or hospital networks.* [***Medical Respite***](https://www.health.ny.gov/health%5Fcare/medicaid/redesign/sdh/respite.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Medical respite is funded by the State and operated by H+H, offering short-term medical respite beds for people exiting hospitals who are homeless.* [***PATH***](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/10/mayor-adams-celebrates-one-year-anniversary-of-path-co-response-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Police and Transit Homelessness Co-response Program*** *PATH operates primarily overnight; consists of joint teams from NYPD, DHS and H+H; and responds to homelessness in subway and transit systems.* [***SCOUT***](https://www.mta.info/document/135741?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Subway Clinician Outreach Unit Teams*** *SCOUT operates primarily during daytime hours, consists of clinician-led teams partnered with MTA and DHS, and provides outreach in the subway system.* ***Situation Tables*** *Cross-agency meetings (police, clinicians, outreach, housing) reviewing the highest-risk individuals and coordinating targeted interventions.* [***SOS***](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/adults/sos/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***Teams — Safe Options Support*** *SOS teams are funded by OMH, consist of multidisciplinary outreach workers and conduct street outreach to connect unsheltered individuals to housing and other services.* ### *Housing and shelter programs* [***JISH***](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/08/04/2935/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Last%20year%2C%20the%20Council%20succeeded,held%20in%20pre%2Dtrial%20detention.) ***— Justice-Involved Supportive Housing*** *JISH is a housing model that consists of apartments with intensive supervision and clinical services both for justice-involved individuals with serious mental illness exiting jail or prison.* [***Safe Haven Beds***](https://www.nyc.gov/html/hhsaccelerator/downloads/pdf/DHS%20Safe%20Havens.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Safe Havens, funded and operated by DHS, are low-threshold residential housing for street homeless individuals. They consist of single rooms with reduced rules (pets allowed, no curfews, couples permitted) and serve a high-need population who decline traditional shelters.* [***Stabilization Beds***](https://arc.net/l/quote/wcwofbuo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Stabilization beds, funded and operated by DHS, are short-term, low-threshold beds for individuals transitioning from the street to more permanent housing. They are typically less service-intensive than Safe Havens.* [***Supportive Housing***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/supportive-housing.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Supportive housing is permanent affordable housing consisting of independent units with on-site case management and clinical services, and serving people with mental illness, disabilities or chronic homelessness.* [***Street-to-Housing Pilot***](https://www.voa-gny.org/services/street-to-home-pilot-program/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Street-to-Housing is a pilot run by the Volunteers of America, consisting of single-room units with on-site supports to place individuals directly from the street into housing without shelter system entry.* ### *Legal frameworks and mental hygiene laws* [***MHL 9.41***](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.41?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***(Police Removal)*** *MHL 9.41 is a State mental hygiene law provision authorizing NYPD officers to transport individuals for psychiatric evaluation. It applies when someone poses danger to themselves or others or cannot meet basic needs.* [***MHL 9.58***](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.58?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***(Clinical Removal)*** *MHL 9.58 is a State mental hygiene law provision authorizing licensed mental health professionals to order transport to hospitals. It applies under similar danger criteria as 9.41.* [***MHL 9.40 / 9.39 / 9.27 / 9.33***](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/TBA9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *These are State psychiatric hospitalization statutes consisting of progressive commitment periods. They require escalating levels of clinical and judicial authorization:* - *9.40: Up to 72-hour evaluation* - *9.39: Up to 15-day emergency hospitalization* - *9.27 / 9.37: 60-day commitment with physician certification* - *9.33: Court-ordered extended hospitalization* [***Kendra’s Law***](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Kendra’s Law is a 1999 State statute. It established AOT following a homicide by a person with untreated schizophrenia and authorizes court-ordered outpatient treatment.* [***AB 210***](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill%5Fid=202120220AB210&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***(California)*** *AB 210 is California legislation. It authorizes data sharing across health, housing and safety providers with confidentiality protections; it is cited as a model for cross-system coordination.* ### *Data and coordination initiatives* [***CAPS***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycccoc/caps/caps.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Coordinated Assessment and Placement System*** *CAPS, operated by New York City’s Continuum of Care (CoC), is the City’s internal database for matching individuals to supportive housing and other placements.* [***CoC***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycccoc/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Continuum of Care*** *New York City’s CoC is the HUD-mandated coordination system that consists of City agencies and nonprofit providers. It allocates federal homelessness funding and organizes service delivery.* [***StreetSmart***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *StreetSmart is DHS’ digital platform. It consists of a database tracking outreach contacts by name and records engagement and progress of unsheltered individuals.* [***SPOA***](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/providers/resources/mental-illness-single-point-of-access.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Single Point of Access*** *SPOA, operated by DOHMH, helps connect people with serious mental illness to the appropriate providers.* [***Top 50 Lists***](https://arc.net/l/quote/elhioega?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Top 50 lists are internal by-name rosters that identify the most vulnerable or frequently encountered individuals. They are used to prioritize interventions in subways and on streets.* ### *Funding and contracting* [***Outcome-Based Contracting***](https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/the-basics/outcomes-based-contracting/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Outcome-based contracting is a proposed payment model for New York City nonprofits. It ties funding to results like housing stability or reduced crisis recurrence and shifts from activity-based to results-based reimbursement.* [***Bundled Payments***](https://www.cms.gov/priorities/innovation/key-concepts/bundled-payments?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Bundled payments are a proposed funding structure. They consist of single-payment streams covering all services for an individual (housing, care, outreach) and make one provider accountable for coordination.* ***Prompt Pay Standard*** *The prompt pay standard is a proposed contracting reform that requires timely payments to nonprofit providers and aims to prevent cash-flow crises that delay service delivery.* ### *Clinical and behavioral concepts* [***SMI***](https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Serious Mental Illness*** *SMI is a diagnosable mental, behavioral or emotional disorder — such as bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder and schizophrenia — that substantially interferes with a person’s life and ability to function.* [***Co-Occurring Disorders / Dual Diagnosis***](https://nida.nih.gov/research-topics/co-occurring-disorders-health-conditions?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *“Co-occurring disorders” refers to concurrent mental illness and substance use disorder. Common among street homeless populations, co-occurring disorders require integrated treatment approaches.* [***Anosognosia***](https://www.nami.org/about-mental-illness/common-with-mental-illness/anosognosia/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Anosognosia is a psychiatric symptom consisting of lack of awareness of one’s own mental illness. It contributes to treatment refusal in disorders like schizophrenia.* [***Psychosis***](https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/understanding-psychosis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***/ Drug-Induced Psychosis*** *Psychosis is a mental state involving loss of contact with reality. It can be triggered or worsened by substance use and includes symptoms like hallucinations and delusions.* [***TBI***](https://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-information/disorders/traumatic-brain-injury-tbi?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***— Traumatic Brain Injury*** *TBI is a neurological injury caused by external physical trauma to the head due to assault, falls and accidents, ranging from mild concussions to severe brain damage.* *════════════════════════════════════════* *New York is entering an historic and pivotal transition. Mayor-elect Mamdani faces big problems on housing, safety, mental health, transit, and more.* *Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer clear, practical guidance rooted in evidence. Ideas that could actually be implemented and work.* *But to meet this moment, we need to grow.* *That’s why, this year, for the first time, we’re asking our readers to support Vital City directly. We’re aiming for 700 inaugural supporters by December 31.* *Your support will help us expand our editorial capacity, strengthen our operational support, and continue delivering thoughtful, relevant and informative work in 2026.* *If this article informed your thinking, challenged you, or helped you understand the city more clearly, please consider supporting the work behind it.* [***Make your tax-deductible gift and help us reach 700 supporters.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Vital CityThis is one of three supporting documents connected to Vital City’s recommendations on serious mental illness and homelessness,* [*“What To Do (and Not To Do) About People in Crisis on Streets and Subways.”*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) *Find* [*"What the Data Show"*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-the-data-show-people-in-crisis-on-the-streets-and-subways) *here and* [*"Case Studies from Other Large Cities"*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/case-studies-from-large-cities-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) *here.* [Download PDF](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tc0vOUB5vkV6ekkac-0%5FFw5trNJQeAds/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Print PDF ## A profile of the population On any given night, about [4,000 people](https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC%5FPopSub%5FCoC%5FNY-600-2024%5FNY%5F2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are living on the street in New York City. That figure, drawn from a point-in-time count, understates the scale of the problem: Because people cycle in and out of unsheltered homelessness, the number of unique individuals affected over the course of a year is likely much higher. New York isn’t alone among American cities in facing this issue: In fact, the scale of the problem is not especially bad by some measures. Unlike most large U.S. cities, which have larger unsheltered populations as a portion of all homeless individuals, New York guarantees a temporary bed to anyone who needs one. This legal [right to shelter](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/shelter/resources/resources.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the network of facilities that go with it keep roughly 95% of homeless people indoors, leaving a concentrated group with acute needs and a demonstrated reluctance to accept a shelter bed (or sometimes even a nonshelter bed) on the street. In a dense city, the visibility of this troubled population can fuel perceptions of disorder and personal risk that exceed the problem’s actual scale. Within this population, needs and circumstances vary widely. [Many people grapple](https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC%5FPopSub%5FCoC%5FNY-600-2024%5FNY%5F2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with serious mental illness and/or substance use disorders. Some have conditions such as [schizophrenia](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6880407/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or [bipolar disorder](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7282102/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that respond to sustained treatment and support; others live with [personality disorders](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11110170/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that require long-term psychosocial care. [Co-occurring substance use](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4833089/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is common and complicates engagement; to the untrained eye, a seeming mental illness crisis may in fact be drug-induced psychosis that wears off when the drug’s effects subside. Another complicating factor is traumatic brain injuries (TBI), which is estimated to affect [more than half of people experiencing homelessness](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7859891/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=People%20experiencing%20homelessness%20are%20at,to%20severe%20TBI%20%5B10%5D). While it’s true that a person who is homeless is more likely to be a victim than a perpetrator, unstable people living on the street can indeed pose serious safety risks. In 2024, 1,285 street-homeless people were arrested for assault, a rate more than 20 times that of the total city population. Yet criminal offending isn’t a factor in prioritizing who gets the most focused attention, even on the City’s [“Top 50” lists](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/13/nyregion/jordan-neely-top-50-mental-illness.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — the informal name for the internal rosters used to coordinate work on the most serious subway and street cases. Particular crimes committed by these individuals loom large and heighten public fear. There was the fatal 2022 [subway shoving](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/nyregion/martial-simon-michelle-go.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of Michelle Go in the Times Square-42nd Street station and, more recently, the 2024 [stabbing spree](https://abc7ny.com/post/ramon-rivera-indicted-fatal-stabbing-3-people-manhattan-grand-jury/15677086/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across Manhattan that left three people dead. Untreated illness and addiction also often manifest as erratic behavior that many experience as threatening. For the individuals themselves, surviving in public without effective care means worsening health, criminal justice involvement, vulnerability to victimization and repeated emergencies, often resulting in an unbroken cycle through the street, shelter, ER and jail akin to [those Dr. Ross MacDonald identified](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29176106/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in his analysis of Rikers Island “hot spotters.” ## What government currently does about the challenge [Billions of public dollars](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/071-DHS.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are spent each year on both homelessness and behavioral health, yet this specific cohort remains too disconnected from sustained attention, typically cycling through brief and redundant contacts with police, hospitals and shelters before returning to the street. The visible churn convinces the public that government cannot care for the most vulnerable people or maintain order in common spaces. Of course, even if everything ran like clockwork, there would be crises and failures. These are bedevilingly difficult cases to manage. Government and nonprofit providers put an enormous amount of thought and commitment into addressing difficult circumstances. But far too much effort, money and time are squandered because multiple systems operate in parallel — the police, 911 and 311, EMS, homeless-services outreach teams, public hospitals and nonprofit providers. Each has different mandates, funding sources, data systems and protocols. Handoffs are inconsistent; information is siloed; continuous case management and accountability are absent. Outreach teams often [lose track](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of clients once cases move outside their geography or specialty. Hospitals frequently discharge psychiatric patients back to the street after [brief observation](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/planning/docs/comprehensive-psychiatric-emergency-program-annual-summary.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) because longer-stay treatment beds and step-down options are scarce. Judges who see mentally ill or drug-addicted defendants have few viable pathways to secure treatment instead of jail because effective programs [have limited slots](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/safer-for-all/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At Rikers Island, [an estimated one-third of people](https://citylimits.org/opinion-enhancing-access-to-supportive-housing-is-key-to-criminal-justice-reform/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) admitted in 2023 were homeless before arrest; upon release, [only about 3% of detainees](https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2024/07/Brad-H-53rd-report-final-2024%5F06%5F28-email.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with serious mental illness were connected to supportive housing, with most returning to shelters or the street. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atw_ihnyclf9ohtm_homelessnessspending-12-8-png-auto-format-compress-1-1776259663294.jpg) ### 1\. Contact with individuals in crisis and what follows It’s not easy to get one’s arms around all the opportunities for official intervention — the many ways in which a seriously mentally ill or otherwise unstable homeless person living on the street encounters police, mental health professionals, social workers and others — but it’s important to try to see the current tangled system in all its complexity. There are two primary ways unsheltered individuals in public spaces with serious mental illness will make contact with the system: police dispatch (i.e., 911) in response to a crisis, and outreach teams (sometimes civilian, sometimes a mix of police and civilian) that initiate contact with individuals even when there is no reported emergency. After an encounter, police (usually) can transport an individual involuntarily to a hospital for a psychiatric assessment if they’re in psychiatric distress and qualify for transport, which under the law is defined as presenting a danger to themselves or others, a definition that includes the inability to take care of their own basic needs. If the person does not qualify for involuntary transport, then they could either be arrested if alleged to engage in criminal activity, or offered to be connected to different services (e.g., housing). Not all people who live on the street are in the throes of crisis, but crises happen with some level of frequency. New York City’s behavioral health crisis response still defaults to 911, with police and EMS as the primary responders. The NYPD fields more than [150,000 calls](https://citymeetings.nyc/meetings/new-york-city-council/2024-09-23-1000-am-committee-on-mental-health-disabilities-and-addiction/chapter/designation-of-individuals-as-emotionally-disturbed-persons-edps/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Both%20NYPD%20and%20FDNY%20categorize,responded%20to%20118%2C387%20EDP%20calls) each year involving psychiatric distress (a number that includes people who are housed). Police are usually present for three reasons: the possibility of violence, social workers’ preference for backup in unpredictable situations and the legal requirement that only police can carry out involuntary transports. Alongside 911, 311 serves as the City’s [nonemergency intake](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Social-Services/311-Service-Requests-from-2010-to-Present/erm2-nwe9/about%5Fdata?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and routing line for homeless-related concerns. In 2024, the [DHS](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Department of Homeless Services) handled about two-thirds of these calls, and the NYPD handled the remaining third. Among the City’s outreach efforts, co-response teams — the MTA’s [clinician-led SCOUT](https://www.mta.info/document/135741?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Subway Co-Response Outreach Teams), a daytime program conducted in partnership with DHS, and [PATH](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2024/10/mayor-adams-new-co-response-operation-focused-serving-more-new-yorkers-need-on?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Partnership Assistance for Transit Homelessness), an overnight program led by the NYPD, DHS and the City’s public hospital system — are among the most recently conceived initiatives. These teams work to actively find and engage people in distress instead of waiting for a call to come in. Their models pair mental health clinicians with police officers to handle crises together, combining treatment expertise with public safety backup. (Though they are expanding, they remain small: SCOUT began with two pilot teams and is [slated to reach roughly 10](https://www.mta.info/document/135741?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by year’s end. PATH does not publish similar numbers.) There is growing interest, including by Mayor-elect Mamdani, in the City’s [B-HEARD](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division) pilot — unarmed teams of clinicians and EMTs dispatched to eligible mental health 911 calls instead of police — as an alternative. The program’s current footprint in 31 precincts (of 78) and roughly 15,000 calls handled in 2024 remains a small amount relative to need. And, as with many if not all of the programs and approaches, there has been no reliable (or publicly available) assessment of what kinds of problems B-HEARD is effective at addressing and what it is not. B-HEARD was [modeled](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/new-york-city-announces-new-mental-health-teams-to-respond-to-mental-health-crises/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on CAHOOTS in Eugene, Oregon, pairing health professionals with responders for behavioral health crises, but it does not fulfill the same role. CAHOOTS (Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets) combines crisis response with sustained, proactive outreach in the community, while in New York City that outreach is handled by separate street outreach teams rather than B-HEARD. B-HEARD focuses on reacting to selected 911 calls during limited hours instead of serving as a default, community-based alternative. The result is often trading one type of responder for another rather than changing how and when help reaches people. Both strategies, B-HEARD and involuntary transports, suffer from an [absence](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-behavioral-health-emergency-assistance-response-divisions-effectiveness-in-responding-to-individuals-with-mental-health-crises-and-meeting-its-goals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of sufficient publicly reported outcome measures to tell policymakers whether these responses actually improve stability, reduce repeat crises and connect people to care. This makes it difficult to evaluate their effects and determine whether they’re as effective as other nonpolice alternative response programs (e.g., [Denver’s STAR](https://www.urban.org/research/publication/evaluating-alternative-crisis-response-denvers-support-team-assisted-response?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Support Team Assisted Response)). **This raises a crucial recurring theme: The orientation of the current system — to deal mainly with point-in-time crises instead of sustained attention to a particular person throughout their life course — means that neither government nor anyone else with responsibility has a panoramic view of how any one individual is doing after the crisis.** Much of the [public reporting](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/03/mayor-adams-keeps-mental-health-week-moving-announcing-11-000-engagements-3-000-services?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on these efforts remains focused on activity — contacts, referrals and transports. But there is little known about durable results such as housing retention, reduced crisis recurrence or diversion from the justice system. Without those measures, it is difficult to know whether scaling up is translating into lasting impact. By contrast, several civilian outreach models have expanded in recent years. State OMH’s (Office of Mental Health’s) [SOS](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/adults/sos/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Safe Options Support) teams [grew from four to 20](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/resources/newsltr/docs/omhnewsfall2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) between 2022 and 2025, with press coverage citing State data showing [800 people placed into permanent housing](https://cbcare.org/wp-content/uploads/Safe-Options-Support-Newsletter-4-28-25.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in New York City from April 2022 to April 2025 after 58,000 engagements. SOS teams are multidisciplinary groups (clinicians, peers and care managers) who do persistent, field-based outreach both topside and underground, stay with people to help navigate paperwork and appointments, and broker placements into Safe Haven / stabilization beds and supportive or permanent housing. The City has made numerous concerted efforts to knit together the fragmented system and focus on those in greatest need. One example is the [StreetSmart](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/evidence/dhs-integrated-case-management-overview.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) application. StreetSmart, a project of the Department of Homeless Services, is a digital by-name list — a shared, person-specific roster used by City-contracted outreach providers to track individuals living unsheltered and to record engagements and progress over time. This is a real innovation. Unfortunately, it excludes many nonprofits that are not under City contract and therefore are not bound by the City’s privacy rules. Health, housing and police data are not integrated, and health-privacy rules restrict certain types of data sharing. These gaps make it difficult to measure outcomes or coordinate care effectively. ### 2\. Involuntary Transport & Hospitalization After a response or outreach team makes contact with an unsheltered individual, the next step is assessing whether the individual is in psychiatric distress. If an individual is in crisis, both police and clinicians have the power of involuntary removal to a hospital (under New York State Mental Hygiene Law Sections 9.41 and 9.58). The current administration has [leaned into](https://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/adams-makes-push-for-involuntary-commitment/article%5F053e4a1b-e727-483f-b7ff-57a41f78febf.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) involuntary transport to hospitals under the Mental Hygiene Law as part of its strategy. It’s unclear whether expanded use of involuntary transport will break existing cycles or worsen them — an uncertainty the City should resolve through rigorous evaluation. It is critical that the City learn what the results are so that it can determine how most effectively to implement the law. In 2024, police initiated about [7,000 involuntary transports](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/issue-briefs-and-reports?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ([Section 9.41](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.41?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), roughly two-thirds of which originated from 911 calls. Clinicians accounted for another 661 ([Section 9.58](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.58?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). There is no public accounting of whether the removals in 2024 are more or fewer than in the past. Also, while [57% of individuals](https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiOTRjZDNlZWYtZTdjZi00ZDNmLTkxODItNDc3NDFjZmMzNTBmIiwidCI6IjM1YzgyODE2LTZjNTYtNDQzYi1iYWY2LTgzMTIxNjNjYWRjMSJ9&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) transported pursuant to an order issued by a clinician (9.58) are admitted, there is no public reporting on how many individuals are admitted into psychiatric care after a police transport (9.41). Once at the hospital, a person can be held for a short evaluation under [Section 9.40](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.40?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), typically lasting up to 72 hours. This evaluation typically occurs in a [CPEP (Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program)](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/queens/services/behavioral-health/psychiatry/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) unit, the designated psychiatric emergency department. If doctors determine that the person still needs inpatient care, they may be admitted under [Section 9.39](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.39?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which allows up to 15 days of emergency hospitalization. For people who continue to need treatment, the hospital can extend the stay under [Sections 9.27](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.27?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or [9.37](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.37?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), based on certification by doctors and a psychiatrist, for up to 60 days. If more time is required, the hospital must seek a court order under [Section 9.33](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.33?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to keep the person longer. A small number of [extended-care units](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/innovative-new-unit-for-patients-with-severe-mental-illness-opens-at-nyc-health-hospitals-elmhurst/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) provide about 90 to 120 days of treatment, and there are also [medical respite beds](https://www.health.ny.gov/health%5Fcare/medicaid/redesign/sdh/respite.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for patients with physical health needs. If an individual is not admitted or discharged, options are extremely limited. Even if admitted to psychiatric care, individuals [may face prolonged waits](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2024/03/dinapoli-percentage-new-yorkers-mental-illness-rose-available-psychiatric-beds-declined?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in emergency departments due to psychiatric boarding — when patients remain in the ER for extended periods because no inpatient psychiatric beds are available. There are few alternatives for those not admitted and difficulty accessing long-term or supportive housing options to ensure stability after discharge. It is also worth noting that some constraints concerning long-term psychiatric care stem from State and federal financing and regulatory rules that limit what care is available and for how long, notably Medicaid’s [IMD exclusion](https://www.nami.org/advocacy/policy-priorities/improving-health/medicaid-imd-exclusion/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which generally prevents federal funding for adults aged 21 to 64 receiving care in psychiatric facilities with more than 16 beds. ### 3\. Treatment and other services While improving the initial response to individuals in crisis is often presented as central to solving the problem, changing who initially responds when a crisis happens is not enough. If an individual is not admitted to a hospital or arrested, what happens next is typically what matters most. Same-day clinical access? [Intensive Mobile Treatment](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/program/intensive-mobile-treatment-imt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (IMT), which provides support and treatment in streets, shelters and public spaces? Detox and [step-down care](https://iclinc.org/institute-for-community-living-report-shows-new-program-increased-capacity-to-serve-new-yorkers-with-the-most-significant-mental-health-challenges-including-individuals-living-on-streets-and-subways/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? Supportive housing with services? And is there a smooth transition to this help? Without the right resources at the right moment, most encounters eventually result in the person cycling back to emergency rooms, shelters or the street. B-HEARD can reduce police call volume, and it might reduce the risk of a given incident escalating, but it does not address the underlying problem of “What next?” or necessarily address the underlying problem motivating the report. Again, the “What next?” question rears its head. The City does not publish systemwide data on how many of the police-initiated transports result in admission or for how long or what happened to the person upon release. Treatment following inpatient hospitalization is crucial. [Assisted Outpatient Treatment](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which is court-ordered under Kendra’s Law, gives individuals psychiatric treatment plans to follow once they’ve been stabilized. It is an important piece of the puzzle, especially given evaluations both [within](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/ps.2010.61.10.976?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [outside](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.prcp.20240162?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of New York that have found it to be effective in reducing psychiatric episodes and improved outcomes. OMH’s [Assertive Community Treatment](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/act/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (ACT) shows [promising evidence](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17329462/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Results%3A%20%20Of%20the%2052,studies%2C%20assertive%20community%20treatment%20subjects) of stabilizing housing and reducing psychiatric crises. ACT serves adults with the highest, ongoing psychiatric needs; multidisciplinary teams provide community-based care with small caseloads, 24/7 crisis coverage and time-unlimited support for as long as the person benefits. Similar to ACT, the Mayor’s Office of Community Mental Health has implemented IMT teams that serve adults with serious mental illness who are often street- or shelter-based, recently incarcerated or repeatedly hospitalized. IMTs meet people in the field at points of crisis or transition (street, ER or jail/prison discharge) and remain engaged as long as clinically needed, often many months, until a step-down is appropriate. For IMT, however, a 2024 [City comptroller audit](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/nyc-comptroller-audit-exposes-major-management-gaps-in-intensive-mobile-treatment-imt-for-new-yorkers-with-severe-mental-health-challenges/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found issues with tracking outcomes and program management. Incarceration data were not regularly tracked and treatment engagement was inconsistently measured. Reviews of providers varied in quality, follow-up on corrective actions lagged and the program still lacks transparent, system-level reporting to demonstrate durable outcomes — a gap also highlighted by a [New York Times investigation](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/nyregion/nyc-mental-illness-breakdowns.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into the City’s fragmented mental health response. However, mobile treatment capacity is constrained: The City funds [31 IMT teams](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-on-intensive-mobile-treatment-initiative-carried-out-by-department-of-health-and-mental-hygiene/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) serving fewer than 1,000 clients, with similar pressure on State-funded ACT teams. It is also worth noting that some constraints concerning long-term psychiatric care stem from State and federal financing and regulatory rules that limit what care is available and for how long, notably Medicaid’s IMD exclusion, which generally prevents federal funding for adults aged 21 to 64 receiving care in psychiatric facilities with more than 16 beds. ### 4\. Shelter and housing placements Housing must be a central part of the approach to stabilizing people who lack it and are on the verge of psychiatric crisis. But even when the City can identify and reach people with the highest needs, individuals are typically routed to places that are, by design, temporary, including ERs; [crisis respite centers](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/crisis-emergency-services-respite-centers.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); [Safe Havens](https://www.nyc.gov/html/hhsaccelerator/downloads/pdf/DHS%20Safe%20Havens.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which are low-barrier, small-scale programs that provide private rooms and flexible rules for people coming directly from the street, who often resist traditional shelters due to their safety records, strict curfews, sobriety requirements and other rules; [stabilization beds](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which are low-threshold beds for a high-functioning population; general shelters; or short jail stays. Some of these placement failures could be addressed by increasing Safe Haven and stabilization beds, speeding documentation, expanding mobile treatment capacity and improving handoffs. Supportive housing — permanent affordable apartments with on-site services — is by far the most crucial component of any system to help this population. Yet today, approvals do not reliably translate into placements for unsheltered individuals. Despite the [strong evidence base](https://shnny.org/images/uploads/NY-NY-III-Interim-Report.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) concerning the effectiveness of supportive-housing programs, outreach programs have struggled to secure housing placements. [In 2024](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/01/06/homeless-supportive-housing-eric-adams-statistics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), outreach teams secured supportive-housing approvals for 955 unsheltered people, but only 175 (18%) obtained a unit, often due to process barriers; at the same time, more than 4,100 supportive-housing units sat vacant. Unsheltered homeless people don’t just suffer from mental illness and addiction; they lack, and need, some community. Here, clubhouses like those run by [Fountain House](https://www.fountainhouse.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have helpfully expanded in recent years, giving individuals a psychologically healthy place to go during the day and a connection with related services. A person who is connected with others is more likely to get the help they need when they need it. ### 5\. Criminal justice interactions and what follow In some instances, the initial interaction with police stems from criminal behavior. In 2024, NYPD recorded 15,274 arrests of unsheltered New Yorkers. Most commonly, these arrests are for petit larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses or assault charges. When a police officer makes an arrest, the defendant is charged and brought before a judge for arraignment. At arraignment, the judge has the option to release the individual on their own recognizance pending the resolution of the case, release with certain conditions or set bail and hold the individual in detention. In the case of homeless individuals, lack of stable housing is sometimes considered by judges in determining risk of flight, and any amount of bail could effectively result in being held in jail pending trial if they are unable to afford it. For individuals who appear to have a serious mental illness, judges will sometimes order an exam under Criminal Procedure Law 730 (”730 exam”), to determine whether the individual is an [incapacitated person](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/730.10?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a defendant who “as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.” For underlying misdemeanor charges, a finding of incapacitation results in the [dismissal of the underlying misdemeanor case](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/730.40?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as well as care and treatment in an appropriate institution for up to 90 days. For felony cases, longer orders of commitment are possible, and the status of the underlying criminal case will depend on whether or not it is ultimately indicted by the prosecutor. In cases of an indicted felony, the individual can be held in a State forensic psychiatric facility for up to [two-thirds of the maximum sentence](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/730.50?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) if the patient had been found guilty of the underlying felony. It is also worth noting that the process of 730 exams can often lead to many case delays and a much lengthier stay of incarceration or time in a psychiatric facility for individuals with serious mental illness. In the absence of a 730 exam, prosecutors still have many tools at their disposal for individuals living with serious mental illness and/or substance use disorder. Included in these options are [mental health](https://ww2.nycourts.gov/mental-health-courts-overview-27066?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [drug-treatment courts](https://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/problem%5Fsolving/drugcourts/overview.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as well as the possibility for treatment as a condition of a plea deal or as part of a final sentence. For those who are living with serious mental illness who are held in jail, there are specialized units called [CAPS](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doc/media/caps.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Clinical Alternative to Punitive Segregation) units, as well as therapeutic beds, which provide treatment for individuals with serious mental illness while incarcerated. If convicted of a crime and transferred to State custody, there is a [continuum of care](https://doccs.ny.gov/medical-services?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for incarcerated individuals offered by OMH, including the [Central New York Psychiatric Center](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/cnpc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as well a statewide network of clinics, crisis beds and intermediate care program beds. Upon release, reentry services are available through nonprofits, NYC Health + Hospitals programs and other City programs, such as the [Community Justice Reentry Network](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/community-justice-reentry-network/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that provide a variety of connections to treatment, care, housing and employment resources. These are hard cases. Providing services to people living with mental illness is much more complex than providing food to the hungry. Many people of greatest concern do not realize they are ill, a condition known as [anosognosia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anosognosia?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Anosognosia%20results%20from%20physiological%20damage%20to%20brain,hemisphere%2C%20and%20is%20thus%20a%20neuropsychiatric%20disorder.). Others carry trauma or deep distrust of systems and may refuse help repeatedly. Even a well-functioning system is likely to fail more often than it succeeds. But today, batting averages are dangerously low. The system’s flaws are clear: Information is siloed, coordination across agencies is thin, services are poorly matched to need and unevenly distributed, connections are not sustained as symptoms change over time and there is little culture of disciplined self-assessment or course correction. As with every other aspect of engagement with those living with serious mental illness and/or homelessness, the description of the system process does not always align perfectly with delivery. Often there are [not enough services, treatment programs, beds or housing options](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Safer-for-All.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to meet the needs of the individuals these were created to help. ## **Appendices** # NYC homelessness & mental health budget (2024) | Agency | Line Items | Amounts (2024) | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | -------------- | | [DHS](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2023/03/DHS.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) | Outreach, Drop-In, Reception | $303.7M | | [DHS](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2023/03/DHS.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) | Family Shelter Operations, Intake, Administration | $1.1B | | [DHS](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2023/03/DHS.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) | Adult Shelter Operations, Intake, Administration | $969.16M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Mental Health Services | $601.56M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Alcohol and Drug Prevention, Care and Treatment | $153M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Developmental Disabilities | $10M | | [DOHMH](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/816-DOHMH-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Administration | $52M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Correctional Health Services | $285M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | B-HEARD | $13M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Mental Health Service Corps | $12M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Just Home | $1M | | [H+H](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/819-H-H-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | DOHMH (Transfer) | $37M | | [FDNY](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/057-FDNY.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | B-HEARD | \- | | [FDNY](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/057-FDNY.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Emergency Medical Services | $427M | | [OTI/311](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Office-of-Technology-Innovation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | 311 | $61M | | [OTI/311](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Office-of-Technology-Innovation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | 911 | $101M | | [OTI/311](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2025/03/Office-of-Technology-Innovation-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Administration, Operations | $66M | | [NYPD](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/056-NYPD.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Transit | $291M | | [NYPD](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/056-NYPD.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Training | $136M | | | TOTAL | $4.62B | | TOTAL | $10.4B | | ## The evidence backing various policy approaches *The evidence table below does not attempt to rate the level of evidence for the programs indicated. Instead, it aims to be illustrative and provide an overview of what data and research are available for the programs.* # NYC programs: evidence and evaluation | Category | Program Name | Description | Size and Stats | Evaluation | | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Crisis Response and First Response Programs | | | | | | | [B-HEARD](https://nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/nyc-health-hospitals-launches-the-largest-mental-health-alternative-response-system-in-the-nation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division: health and mental health-only response to 911 calls; operated by FDNY EMS and H+H | 33,000 responses citywide (2024) | NYC EvaluationCity Council [evaluation found](https://council.nyc.gov/data/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/B-HEARD-Evaluation-One-Pager-September-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 88% of calls were resolved without police, EMS or hospital transport, with higher success in non-housing conditions. | | | [Subway Safety](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/opinion/nyc-subway-homeless-mental-health.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Subway Safety Unit) | Operation to clear the subway of homeless people, involving NYPD and social workers (initially a temporary NYPD pilot); homeless people relocated to shelters and/or hospitalized; program has been the subject of legal challenges | 1800 outreaches1150 subway removals (2024-to-date) | NYC EvaluationNo city evaluation has been performed; [advocacy groups](https://accountablepolicies.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Case-Review-3.22.23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have raised concerns about quality of outreach. | | | [Directive 25](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/19/nyregion/eric-adams-involuntary-hospitalization-mentally-ill.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (NYPD Directive 25) | Directed "street homeless" individuals with mental illness to be involuntarily hospitalized. | Unknown citywideAt least 2000 interactions (2023-to-date) | NYC EvaluationNo city evaluation has been performed; [advocacy groups](https://accountablepolicies.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Case-Review-3.22.23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have raised concerns about implementation quality and protections against involuntary care. | | | [MCTs](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/crisis-emergency-services-mobile-crisis-teams.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Mobile Crisis Teams) | Nonpolice mental health response for individuals in crisis; may be accessed via 311/988 | 200,000 responses citywide (2023) | NYC EvaluationAn [evaluation of a different city effort](https://jmhsprograms.com/content/dam/web/jmhsprograms/documents/press-release/MobilecrisisExpansion.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) resulted in reductions of arrests, psychiatric hospitalizations and emergency room visits. | | | [CPEPs](https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/crisis-emergency-services-cpep.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Programs) | State-regulated 24/7 psychiatric emergency programs; recent State capital expansion initiative | 11 programs through H+H (2024), additional programs through private hospitals | No NYC EvaluationAn evaluation of a similar program in the[ Midwest](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/acem.14374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [finds effective results](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/acem.14374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). | | | [AOT](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Assisted Outpatient Treatment) | Court-ordered outpatient treatment administered via OMH/localities | 47,000 investigations, 96% petitions granted | NYC[ ](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/ps.2010.61.10.976?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)a href="https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/NYDPH-report.pdf?utm\_source=chatgpt.com" target="\_blank"> and State EvaluationsIndependent [statewide evaluation](https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/NYDPH-report.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) (2009) found reductions in hospitalization, homelessness, arrests and incarceration for AOT recipients. [City evaluation](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/ps.2010.61.10.976?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also found the program effective. | | | Medical Respite | State-funded and H+H-run short-term medical respite beds for people exiting hospitals who are homeless | 75 beds | No NYC Evaluation[A systematic review](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23728025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that similar programs reduce hospital readmissions, inpatient days and admissions, and improve housing outcomes. | | | [TIL](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/runaway-homeless-youth/transitional-independent-living.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Transitional Independent Living) | Department of Youth and Community Development residential programs for youth (short-term crisis and long-term) | Unknown | No NYC Evaluation | | | [ECUs](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/innovative-new-unit-for-patients-with-severe-mental-illness-opens-at-nyc-health-hospitals-kings-county/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Extended Care Units) | H+H hospital-based psychiatric extended-care units. | 60 beds (2024) | No[ ](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7838487/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)NYC EvaluationA [systematic review](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7838487/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of rehab / extended-stay settings found that the most consistent outcome was reduced subsequent inpatient service use after discharge. | | | [Fountain House Clubhouses](https://www.fountainhouse.org/about/clubhouse-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Free, voluntary, member-led clubhouse serving \~2,000 adults with serious mental illness | \~2,000 members (2023) | NYC EvaluationAn [NYU study](https://www.fountainhouse.org/assets/05201?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showed 21% Medicaid cost savings from reduced hospitalizations. | | | Bridge to Home | H+H program providing noncongregate medical respite / step-down beds | 46 beds (2024) | No NYC Evaluation[A systematic review](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23728025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that these programs reduce hospital readmissions, inpatient days and admissions, and improve housing outcomes. | | Housing | | | | | | | [Safe Havens](https://www.nyc.gov/html/hhsaccelerator/downloads/pdf/DHS%20Safe%20Havens.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Low-barrier, service-rich beds for street-homeless people; placements coordinated via DHS Joint Command Center | \~4,000 beds (2025)City combines this count with stabilization beds. | No NYC EvaluationA [Ward Family Foundation evaluation](https://www.va.gov/HOMELESS/docs/GPD/providers/EvidenceBaseSupportingLowDemandHousing.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) found in another jurisdiction that from 2011-2013, 55% of veteran participants were moved into stable housing | | | [Supportive Housing](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/supportive-housing.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Permanent housing with on-site services; mixed funding (City/State/federal); includes scattered-site and congregate | 40,472 units, 94% occupancy (2025) | NYC[ ](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/28351/412024-The-Corporation-for-Supportive-Housing-s-Returning-Home-Initiative-System-Change-Accomplishments-after-Three-Years.PDF?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)Evaluation[Evaluation found](https://shnny.org/images/uploads/NY-NY-III-Interim-Report.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) net public cost savings and reduced service use vs. eligible non-tenants; [Urban Institute](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/28351/412024-The-Corporation-for-Supportive-Housing-s-Returning-Home-Initiative-System-Change-Accomplishments-after-Three-Years.PDF?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) study showed similar findings. | | | [Stabilization Beds](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Short-term, low-barrier stabilization sites for unsheltered individuals | City combines this count with Safe Havens. | No NYC Evaluation[A systematic review](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8427990/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) of homelessness interventions, including stabilization beds, was found to outperform other services to improve residential stability. | | | [Drop-in Centers](https://www.nyep.uscourts.gov/reentry/NYC%20Homeless%20Shelters.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | DHS-contracted centers offering basic services and case management | 9 centers (2025) | No NYC Evaluation | | | [RHY](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/runaway-homeless-youth.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Runaway and Homeless Youth) | Department of Youth and Community Development shelters for youth / young adults experiencing homelessness | 60 beds (2025) | No NYC EvaluationA Los Angeles, California, [study of a similar youth drop center](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6450788/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) found a positive impact for participants. | | Justice Involved | | | | | | | [JISH](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/08/04/2935/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Last%20year%2C%20the%20Council%20succeeded,held%20in%20pre%2Dtrial%20detention.) (Justice-involved / jail in-reach supportive housing) | Justice-involved / jail in-reach supportive housing (program naming varies) | 120 units (2025) | NYC[ ](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282107665%5FNYC%5FFrequent%5FUsers%5FFUSE%5FInitiative%5FEvaluation%5Fof%5Fa%5FSupportive%5FHousing%5FIntervention?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)Evaluation[Evaluation found](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282107665%5FNYC%5FFrequent%5FUsers%5FFUSE%5FInitiative%5FEvaluation%5Fof%5Fa%5FSupportive%5FHousing%5FIntervention?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that justice-involved supportive housing significantly reduced cycling between public systems, days spent in jail and shelter, and use of crisis care health services. | | | [Transitional Housing](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/transitional-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | MOCJ-funded short-term housing options for justice-involved individuals (various sponsors) | 1000 beds (2023) | NYC Evaluation[Descriptive data](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/transitional-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) provided by MOCJ show that participants had a lower rearrest rate. | | | [Just Home](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/036-22/nyc-health-hospitals-department-housing-preservation-development-new-housing-for?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/0) | Supportive housing initiative for medically vulnerable people leaving custody; funded by H+H and working with HPD and service providers | 83 units | No NYC EvaluationAn evaluation of [a similar program in Ohio](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25716/412632-Supportive-Housing-for-Returning-Prisoners-Outcomes-and-Impacts-of-the-Returning-Home-Ohio-Pilot-Project.PDF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that participants had greater housing stability and were significantly less likely to be rearrested, convicted or reincarcerated. | | | Drug Treatment Courts | Statewide problem-solving courts focusing on substance use | Unknown | NYC Evaluation[Center for Court Innovation evaluation](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23826/412867-A-Statewide-Evaluation-of-New-York-s-Adult-Drug-Courts.PDF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that participants were less likely to be arrested. | | | [HOPE](https://knowledgebank.criminaljustice.ny.gov/heroin-overdose-prevention-and-education-hope-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Heroin Overdose Prevention and Education) | Prearraignment diversion program run by the Richmond County District Attorney's Office (Staten Island) | Unknown | NYC EvaluationAn [MOCJ evaluation](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HOPE-Report-2.19.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that a Richmond County HOPE pilot reduced recidivism. | ## National models and programs *Programs from across the U.S. that have been referenced as potential models to introduce in New York City.* # Case studies from other large cities | Category | Program Name | Description | City / Jurisdiction | Evaluation | | ----------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Crisis Response and First Response Programs | | | | | | | [STAR](https://www.denvergov.org/Government/Agencies-Departments-Offices/Agencies-Departments-Offices-Directory/Public-Health-Environment/Community-Behavioral-Health/Behavioral-Health-Solutions/STAR-Program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Support Team Assisted Response) | Embedded in 911 and coordinated by Denver Public Health and Denver 911; staffed by mental-health clinicians and paramedics (not police or fire) | Denver, CO | Denver Evaluation[Descriptive data](https://cdphe.colorado.gov/star-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) find no police calls, no arrests and no injuries. A [CEBP evaluation](https://behavioralpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Piza-et-al%5FSTAR-Evaluation%5F5.3.21.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found no significant impact on nearby serious or violent crimes. | | | [HEART](https://www.durhamcountync.gov/4687/HEART-Program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Holistic Empathetic Assistance Response Teams) | Civilian clinicians and peer responders dispatched through 911 or 311 for nonviolent crises. Data are tracked under the City's racial-equity framework. | Durham, NC | Pilot EvaluationDescriptive data of pilot year [show promise](https://www.durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/View/54631/RTI%5FDurham-HEART-Pilot-Program-Report-May-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and is planned for evaluation. | | | [Albuquerque Community Safety](https://www.cabq.gov/acs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | A stand-alone 911-response department staffed by behavioral-health clinicians, peer support workers and outreach specialists who respond to calls for mental-health, homelessness and substance-use concerns; no police dispatch | Albuquerque, NM | No Formal Evaluation | | | [SCRT](https://www.sf.gov/street-crisis-response-team?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Street Crisis Response Team) | Part of the City's "crisis response continuum." Each team includes a paramedic, behavioral-health clinician and peer specialist responding to behavioral-health 911 calls. | San Francisco, CA | San Francisco EvaluationEvaluation is [in process](https://prise.ucsf.edu/project/evaluating-san-franciscos-street-crisis-response-team-as-a-model-for-mental-health-and-substance-use-treatment-for-adults-experiencing-homelessness/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). | | | [CIRCLE](https://mayor.lacity.gov/sites/g/files/wph2066/files/2023-10/CIRCLE%5FFAQ%5FEnglish%5FSpanish%5F10.2023.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Crisis and Incident Response through Community-Led Engagement) | Civilian outreach teams staffed by community-based organizations that respond to nonemergency 911 calls involving unhoused people and behavioral crises; integrated through 311 and coordinated by the Mayor's Office of Public Safety | Los Angeles, CA | No Formal EvaluationProgram data show [14,000 incidents diverted and 1,000](https://mayor.lacity.gov/news/confronting-mental-health-crisis-mayor-bass-announces-circle-program-expansion-westside?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) individuals were referred to mental and behavioral services. | | | [Street Response Team](https://www.portland.gov/streetresponse?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Civilian alternative response program for responding to mental health emergencies | Portland, OR | Portland Evaluation[Descriptive evaluation findings](https://www.pdx.edu/homelessness/PSR-Evaluation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found a 3.5% reduction in total calls responded to by police and a 19% reduction in police response. | | Behavioral Health Treatment and Hospitalization | | | | | | | [CMHP](https://www.jud11.flcourts.org/Criminal-Mental-Health-Project?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Criminal Mental Health Project) / Miami Model | A comprehensive mental health diversion program built to eliminate the criminalization of mental illness; utilizes prebooking and postbooking jail diversion; employs the SOAR model to expedite access to federal benefits | Miami-Dade County, FL | No Formal Evaluation[Descriptive program data](https://www.jud11.flcourts.org/docs/Jail%5Fdiversion%5Fthe%5FMiami%5Fmodel%20CNS%202020.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) find CMHP to provide an effective and cost-efficient solution for individuals with serious mental illness and co-occurring serious mental illness. | | | [Judge Ed Emmett Mental Health Diversion Center](https://www.theharriscenter.org/location/judge-ed-emmett-mental-health-diversion-center?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Law enforcement transports individuals identified with mental health needs directly to the Diversion Center instead of jail, based on voluntary participation. The process takes an officer 11 minutes compared to 4 hours for jail booking. 24/7 diversion drop-off for police transporting people in behavioral crisis instead of jail or ER. | Houston / Harris County, TX | Houston EvaluationEvaluation found that program participants who were homeless experienced [reductions in psychiatric hospitalizations](https://mhneedscouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Harris-Center-Jail-Diversion-Evaluation-2022-09-30-Final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the long term, but not short term. | | | [CBH](https://cbhphilly.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Community Behavioral Health) | A City-controlled managed-care organization integrating Medicaid behavioral-health dollars into a unified delivery system focused on recovery, housing and harm reduction | Philadelphia, PA | Philadelphia Evaluation[External quality review](https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dhs/documents/healthchoices/hc-services/documents/CBH-2023-MY-2022-ATR-Final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of descriptive data finds improvements in reducing psychiatric hospitalizations. | | | [Crisis Now Framework](https://crisisnow.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CrisisNow-BusinessCase.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | 24/7 crisis system with regional crisis call centers, mobile teams and short-term stabilization facilities | Arizona, statewide (Maricopa County pioneer) | No Formal EvaluationAn [exploratory process evaluation](https://psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.202000114?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is in progress. | | | [Crisis Response Center (Sequential Intercept Model)](https://www.samhsa.gov/communities/criminal-juvenile-justice/sequential-intercept-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Diversion by law enforcement that uses a "no wrong door" policy, meaning no exclusions based on payer status, intoxication or involuntary status; features a dedicated entrance to expedite law enforcement drop-off, taking officers about 10 minutes | Tucson, AZ | No Formal Evaluation | | | [CM](https://www.recoveryanswers.org/resource/contingency-management/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Contingency Management) | An evidence-based treatment primarily for stimulant use disorders (like cocaine or methamphetamine); uses incentives, often cash payments, for specific positive behaviors such as providing clean drug tests | General practice (e.g., San Francisco pilot) | Systematic ReviewReview finds CM to be [an effective treatment](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2782768?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) for individuals with opioid use disorder. | | | [MAT](https://americanaddictioncenters.org/addiction-medications?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Medication-Assisted Treatment) | Utilizes medications like methadone or buprenorphine (Suboxone) to treat opioid use disorder; can include flexible take-home policies and delivery services to increase access and stability | General practice (e.g., San Francisco) | San Francisco Evaluation [Evaluation finds](https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.10.21267477v1.full.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) that MAT reduces hospitalizations and improves stability. | | | [MAP](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3726334/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Managed Alcohol Use Program) | Stabilization and harm-reduction intervention for people with alcohol use disorder, sometimes involving managed alcohol programs where clients are given small amounts of alcohol; also known as "wet housing" | General practice (e.g., San Francisco) | Systematic Review[Review finds](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9311344/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) MAPs a promising harm reduction intervention. | | Housing | | | | | | | [HRH](https://heller.brandeis.edu/opioid-policy/community-resources/harm-reduction-housing/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Harm Reduction Housing) | Provides stable living environments without sobriety mandates; offers 24/7 harm reduction supplies, counseling and medical oversight on-site to reduce the risks associated with drug use, such as using alone | Boston, MA | No Formal Evaluation | | | [Temporary Shelter Provision (Winter Shelter Beds)](https://www.lahsa.org/winter-shelter?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Provision of additional temporary shelter capacity during the winter months | Los Angeles County, CA | Los Angeles Evaluation[A study finds](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VXFef56O8z5ltzTfvJzeQXXfsCfZiy6i/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) these programs reduce unsheltered homelessness as well as crime and ER visits. | | | [Tiny Cabins / Tiny Homes](https://dignitymoves.org/san-francisco/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) | Noncongregate, cost-effective interim housing options; San Francisco's first cabin community was established quickly on borrowed private land for temporary use | San Francisco, CA | No Formal Evaluation | | Justice Involved | | | | | | | [LEAD](https://leadbureau.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Let Everyone Advance with Dignity) | Case management diversion for low-level offenses, replacing arrest with community-based care | Seattle, WA (replicated nationally) | North Carolina Evaluation [Participants are less likely](https://psychiatry.duke.edu/sites/default/files/2023-01/Duke%20LEAD%20Evaluation%20Full%20Report%5FUpdated%201-24-23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to have arrests and outpatient behavioral visits as well as higher utilization of medication. | ## **Glossary of terms** ### Systems, agencies and programs **311/911 Systems** 311/911 are the City’s call systems consisting of nonemergency (311) and emergency (911) dispatch lines, routing homeless concerns through 311 and psychiatric crises through 911. [**988**](https://nyc988.cityofnewyork.us/en/crisis-services/mobile-crisis-teams/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 988 is the City’s suicide and crisis call system, which can also dispatch DOHMH operated MCT teams to individuals in crisis. [**AOT**](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Assisted Outpatient Treatment (Kendra’s Law)** AOT is authorized by a 1999 State law (Kendra’s Law), consists of court-ordered treatment plans and mandates medication, therapy and case management for individuals with severe illness and treatment noncompliance history. The petition can be filed by a range of individuals including a hospital director, psychiatrist, psychologist, probation officer or family members. [**CIDI**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/cidi/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence** CIDI is the Mayor’s Office data hub. It consists of integrated databases linking City systems and coordinates cross-agency data integration. [**DHS**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— NYC Department of Homeless Services** DHS is the City agency that funds and operates shelter systems, street outreach providers and street outreach nurses, and manages temporary living (e.g., Safe Havens). [**DOHMH**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene** DOHMH is the City agency that operates behavioral health programs, deploys mobile crisis teams and coordinates mental health strategy with H+H and nonprofits. [**H+H**](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— NYC Health + Hospitals** H+H is the City’s public hospital system, which operates emergency departments, CPEPs, Correctional Health Services at Rikers and different treatment and transition programs (e.g., Just Home). [**HUD**](https://www.hud.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development** HUD is the federal agency that funds housing vouchers and homelessness assistance programs including Continuum of Care and HUD-VASH. [**MOCJ**](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice** MOCJ is the mayor’s coordinating office for criminal justice policy. It manages diversion and reentry initiatives and oversees supportive housing programs for justice-involved individuals. [**OASAS**](https://oasas.ny.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Office of Addiction Services and Supports** OASAS is the New York State agency that funds and operates substance use treatment programs, funds harm reduction and recovery services and oversees addiction treatment policy statewide. [**OMH**](https://omh.ny.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— New York State Office of Mental Health** OMH is the New York State agency that funds and operates psychiatric programs and institutions and oversees mental health policy statewide. [**OTDA**](https://otda.ny.gov/hearings/request/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance** OTDA is the State agency that administers emergency aid programs, funds supportive housing grants and oversees temporary assistance policy. [**SAMHSA**](https://www.samhsa.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration** SAMHSA is the federal agency that funds behavioral health block grants, supports State and local programs and sets national behavioral health policy. [**VA**](https://www.va.gov/resources/helpful-va-phone-numbers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs** VA is the federal agency that operates veteran health facilities, runs HUD-VASH housing programs, and provides mental health services for veterans. ### Crisis outreach and treatment programs [**ACT**](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/act/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Assertive Community Treatment** ACT teams are operated by the New York State Office of Mental Health. They consist of psychiatrists, nurses, social workers and peer specialists, and provide 24/7 field-based treatment for adults with severe mental illness. [**B-HEARD**](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division** B-HEARD is a City pilot program staffed by FDNY and H+H. It consists of unarmed clinician-EMT teams and responds to mental health 911 calls in select precincts. [**CPEP**](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/services/mental-health-services/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program** CPEP are 24/7 psychiatric emergency programs funded by the State and operated by City hospitals, providing critical crisis and evaluation services to individuals with serious mental illness. [**CTI**](https://www.criticaltime.org/cti-model/background/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **\- Critical Time Intervention** CTI, founded in New York City, is a time-limited, evidence-based case management model employed by SOS teams that provides intensive support during periods of transition for individuals in crisis and cycling between systems. [**EOL**](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2022/the-subway-safety-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— End of Line** EOL are multiagency teams working at end-of-line stations as part of the Subway Safety Plan, connecting individuals to services. [**FACT**](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/act/forensic-act-program-addendum.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Forensic Assertive Community Treatment** FACT teams are a specialized ACT model. They consist of behavioral health clinicians and criminal justice liaisons and provide integrated treatment and supervision for people with serious mental illness involved in the justice system. [**Fountain House Clubhouses**](https://www.fountainhouse.org/about/clubhouse-model?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Free, voluntary, member-led spaces administered and run by Fountain House, serving adults with serious mental illness in New York City. [**IMT**](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/program/intensive-mobile-treatment-imt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Intensive Mobile Treatment** IMT teams are operated by DOHMH. They consist of clinical staff similar to ACT composition and treat people with serious mental illness who are homeless, recently incarcerated or repeatedly hospitalized. [**MCTs**](https://nyc988.cityofnewyork.us/en/crisis-services/mobile-crisis-teams/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Mobile Crisis Teams** MCTs are operated by DOHMH. They consist of clinician-led rapid-response units and respond to psychiatric crises dispatched through 988 or hospital networks. [**Medical Respite** ](https://www.health.ny.gov/health%5Fcare/medicaid/redesign/sdh/respite.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Medical respite is funded by the State and operated by H+H, offering short-term medical respite beds for people exiting hospitals who are homeless. [**PATH**](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/10/mayor-adams-celebrates-one-year-anniversary-of-path-co-response-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Police and Transit Homelessness Co-response Program** PATH operates primarily overnight; consists of joint teams from NYPD, DHS and H+H; and responds to homelessness in subway and transit systems. [**SCOUT**](https://www.mta.info/document/135741?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Subway Clinician Outreach Unit Teams** SCOUT operates primarily during daytime hours, consists of clinician-led teams partnered with MTA and DHS, and provides outreach in the subway system. **Situation Tables** Cross-agency meetings (police, clinicians, outreach, housing) reviewing the highest-risk individuals and coordinating targeted interventions. [**SOS**](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/adults/sos/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Teams — Safe Options Support** SOS teams are funded by OMH, consist of multidisciplinary outreach workers and conduct street outreach to connect unsheltered individuals to housing and other services. ### Housing and shelter programs [**JISH**](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/08/04/2935/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Last%20year%2C%20the%20Council%20succeeded,held%20in%20pre%2Dtrial%20detention.) **— Justice-Involved Supportive Housing** JISH is a housing model that consists of apartments with intensive supervision and clinical services both for justice-involved individuals with serious mental illness exiting jail or prison. [**Safe Haven Beds**](https://www.nyc.gov/html/hhsaccelerator/downloads/pdf/DHS%20Safe%20Havens.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Safe Havens, funded and operated by DHS, are low-threshold residential housing for street homeless individuals. They consist of single rooms with reduced rules (pets allowed, no curfews, couples permitted) and serve a high-need population who decline traditional shelters. [**Stabilization Beds**](https://arc.net/l/quote/wcwofbuo?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Stabilization beds, funded and operated by DHS, are short-term, low-threshold beds for individuals transitioning from the street to more permanent housing. They are typically less service-intensive than Safe Havens. [**Supportive Housing**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/supportive-housing.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Supportive housing is permanent affordable housing consisting of independent units with on-site case management and clinical services, and serving people with mental illness, disabilities or chronic homelessness. [**Street-to-Housing Pilot**](https://www.voa-gny.org/services/street-to-home-pilot-program/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Street-to-Housing is a pilot run by the Volunteers of America, consisting of single-room units with on-site supports to place individuals directly from the street into housing without shelter system entry. ### Legal frameworks and mental hygiene laws [**MHL 9.41**](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.41?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **(Police Removal)** MHL 9.41 is a State mental hygiene law provision authorizing NYPD officers to transport individuals for psychiatric evaluation. It applies when someone poses danger to themselves or others or cannot meet basic needs. [**MHL 9.58**](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.58?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **(Clinical Removal)** MHL 9.58 is a State mental hygiene law provision authorizing licensed mental health professionals to order transport to hospitals. It applies under similar danger criteria as 9.41. [**MHL 9.40 / 9.39 / 9.27 / 9.33**](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/TBA9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) These are State psychiatric hospitalization statutes consisting of progressive commitment periods. They require escalating levels of clinical and judicial authorization: - 9.40: Up to 72-hour evaluation - 9.39: Up to 15-day emergency hospitalization - 9.27 / 9.37: 60-day commitment with physician certification - 9.33: Court-ordered extended hospitalization [**Kendra’s Law**](https://my.omh.ny.gov/analytics/saw.dll?dashboard&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Kendra’s Law is a 1999 State statute. It established AOT following a homicide by a person with untreated schizophrenia and authorizes court-ordered outpatient treatment. [**AB 210**](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill%5Fid=202120220AB210&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **(California)** AB 210 is California legislation. It authorizes data sharing across health, housing and safety providers with confidentiality protections; it is cited as a model for cross-system coordination. ### Data and coordination initiatives [**CAPS**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycccoc/caps/caps.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Coordinated Assessment and Placement System** CAPS, operated by New York City’s Continuum of Care (CoC), is the City’s internal database for matching individuals to supportive housing and other placements. [**CoC**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycccoc/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Continuum of Care** New York City’s CoC is the HUD-mandated coordination system that consists of City agencies and nonprofit providers. It allocates federal homelessness funding and organizes service delivery. [**StreetSmart**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) StreetSmart is DHS’ digital platform. It consists of a database tracking outreach contacts by name and records engagement and progress of unsheltered individuals. [**SPOA**](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/providers/resources/mental-illness-single-point-of-access.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Single Point of Access** SPOA, operated by DOHMH, helps connect people with serious mental illness to the appropriate providers. [**Top 50 Lists**](https://arc.net/l/quote/elhioega?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Top 50 lists are internal by-name rosters that identify the most vulnerable or frequently encountered individuals. They are used to prioritize interventions in subways and on streets. ### Funding and contracting [**Outcome-Based Contracting**](https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/the-basics/outcomes-based-contracting/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Outcome-based contracting is a proposed payment model for New York City nonprofits. It ties funding to results like housing stability or reduced crisis recurrence and shifts from activity-based to results-based reimbursement. [**Bundled Payments**](https://www.cms.gov/priorities/innovation/key-concepts/bundled-payments?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Bundled payments are a proposed funding structure. They consist of single-payment streams covering all services for an individual (housing, care, outreach) and make one provider accountable for coordination. **Prompt Pay Standard** The prompt pay standard is a proposed contracting reform that requires timely payments to nonprofit providers and aims to prevent cash-flow crises that delay service delivery. ### Clinical and behavioral concepts [**SMI**](https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Serious Mental Illness** SMI is a diagnosable mental, behavioral or emotional disorder — such as bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder and schizophrenia — that substantially interferes with a person’s life and ability to function. [**Co-Occurring Disorders / Dual Diagnosis**](https://nida.nih.gov/research-topics/co-occurring-disorders-health-conditions?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) “Co-occurring disorders” refers to concurrent mental illness and substance use disorder. Common among street homeless populations, co-occurring disorders require integrated treatment approaches. [**Anosognosia**](https://www.nami.org/about-mental-illness/common-with-mental-illness/anosognosia/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Anosognosia is a psychiatric symptom consisting of lack of awareness of one’s own mental illness. It contributes to treatment refusal in disorders like schizophrenia. [**Psychosis**](https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/understanding-psychosis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **/ Drug-Induced Psychosis** Psychosis is a mental state involving loss of contact with reality. It can be triggered or worsened by substance use and includes symptoms like hallucinations and delusions. [**TBI**](https://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-information/disorders/traumatic-brain-injury-tbi?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **— Traumatic Brain Injury** TBI is a neurological injury caused by external physical trauma to the head due to assault, falls and accidents, ranging from mild concussions to severe brain damage. ════════════════════════════════════════ *New York is entering an historic and pivotal transition. Mayor-elect Mamdani faces big problems on housing, safety, mental health, transit, and more.* *Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer clear, practical guidance rooted in evidence. Ideas that could actually be implemented and work.* *But to meet this moment, we need to grow.* *That’s why, this year, for the first time, we’re asking our readers to support Vital City directly. We’re aiming for 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\.* *Your support will help us expand our editorial capacity, strengthen our operational support, and continue delivering thoughtful, relevant and informative work in 2026.* *If this article informed your thinking, challenged you, or helped you understand the city more clearly, please consider supporting the work behind it.* [***Make your tax-deductible gift and help us reach 700 supporters.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### What the Data Show URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-the-data-show-people-in-crisis-on-the-streets-and-subways/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:31.000Z *This is one of three supporting documents connected to Vital City's recommendations on serious mental illness and homelessness,* [*"What To Do (and Not To Do) About People in Crisis on Streets and Subways."*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) *Find* [*"How the System Works (or Doesn't)"*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-the-system-works-for-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) *here and* [*"Case Studies from Other Large Cities"*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/case-studies-from-large-cities-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) *here.* New York City's homelessness, mental illness and crime challenges cannot be understood — or solved — without reliable, integrated information. We compiled every publicly available dataset we could locate, from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's point-in-time counts and the New York City Department of Homeless Services (DHS) shelter censuses to NYPD arrest and complaint files. Instead of a coherent archive, we found a patchwork: Critical fields are redacted or never collected, time frames rarely align and comparable metrics live in agencies that seldom share records. When the City's own practitioners must fly blind, it is no surprise that residents, advocates and policymakers struggle to agree on the scale or nature of the problem. Fragmentation is most acute at the fault line between criminal justice agencies and the social service providers who manage shelters, street outreach and behavioral health care. Legal and technical barriers to data exchange — like federal health privacy law (HIPAA) worries, state confidentiality statutes, incompatible software and simple mistrust — meaning police, courts and jails see only the "public safety" slice of a person's history, while clinicians and case managers remain unaware of justice involvement that shapes housing and treatment options. This siloed architecture contributes to the predictable "revolving door" — street to emergency room to shelter to precinct to jail to street — each stop adding trauma and cost without resolving the underlying need. These structural blind spots make public accountability nearly impossible. Program outcomes cannot be tracked, duplication of effort goes unnoticed, and evidence-based budgeting becomes guesswork. The analysis that follows therefore serves a dual purpose: It distills what the existing numbers do reveal about the intersection of homelessness, mental illness and crime, and it maps the yawning gaps that must be closed if the City hopes to manage the problem rather than merely react to its most visible symptoms. Although the data are fragmented, it still allows us to sketch a picture of this population. ## New York City's unsheltered population has grown over the past decade. - January 2024's HOPE count, the annual tally of unsheltered homeless individuals, was 2.4% higher than 2023. - The 2024 count is 7.3% above the 2020 prepandemic level. - The count of unsheltered homeless individuals is up 23.3% since 2014. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23327699?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## The point-in-time counts likely only represent a fraction of the total population. - Point-in-time counts provide only a one-night snapshot and miss the many people who cycle in and out of unsheltered homelessness over the year. - [Other U.S. cities](https://escholarship.org/content/qt46n649n0/qt46n649n0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) find annual unique counts run two to four times higher than their point-in-time snapshots. - In New York City, [outreach data](https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/how-many-total-people-are-homeless-in-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20between%20May%205%2C,unsheltered%20in%20that%20time%20frame) suggest that the number of people living in the subway system is at least three times the official point-in-time count. According to the Coalition for the Homeless, 9,231 individuals accepted transport to shelter between May 2020 and January 2022 — an average of roughly 5,300 people per year, several times the 2021 subway HOPE count of 1,280\. The true figure is likely higher, since these outreach totals reflect only successful engagements at end-of-line stations. - Applying conservative multipliers of 2 to 4 to the City's 2024 HOPE count (4,140) yields an annual range of roughly 8,000 to 16,000 unsheltered individuals over the course of a year, with a midpoint near 12,000. ## New York City has a very low unsheltered population compared to other large U.S. cities. - Even using these 8,000-16,000 estimates of the total, distinct annual unsheltered population, New York City's street homeless count as a percentage of population is low compared to many other cities. - With 97% of New Yorkers experiencing homelessness indoors, only 3% remain on the street — by far the smallest unsheltered share of any large U.S. city. New York City's unsheltered PIT share hovered around 5% for most of the past decade, dipping below that mark just twice — first in 2019 and again in 2024. - The 2024 record low stems not from fewer people outdoors but from a surge in shelter capacity for newly arrived asylum seekers, which swelled the overall census and drove the unsheltered percentage down. - West Coast hubs such as San Jose (25%), Los Angeles (30%) and San Diego/San Francisco (42%) leave the majority of their unhoused residents outside. - Midwestern and Sunbelt cities occupy the middle ground. Houston shelters 61%, Phoenix 57% and Dallas 71% — highlighting the wide national spread between New York City's right-to-shelter model and the West Coast's street-dominant reality. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23328307?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) - In other colder-weather peer cities, about 1 in 5 people experiencing homelessness live outside: Roughly [17.7% of Chicago's homeless population](https://news.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/2025%20Annual%20Report%20on%20Homelessness.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was unsheltered in January 2025 and [18.8% in Philadelphia](https://www.phila.gov/media/20240923121315/OHS-PIT-Count-Summary-Report-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in January 2024, according to official point-in-time counts from each city's homelessness agency. - Only four large cities have 1.5% or more of their total population in homelessness: Seattle (2.2%), Denver (2.0%), Los Angeles (1.8%) and New York (1.7%). New York is the sole member of that group that keeps the vast majority of this population indoors. - Los Angeles and New York City host a similar share of residents experiencing homelessness (about 1 in 55), but LA's street population count is 11 times larger (49,509 vs. 4,397) because 70% of its unhoused residents sleep outside, while New York City limits that figure to 3%. - **Because New York's right-to-shelter mandate keeps street homelessness near 3%, the remaining unsheltered population likely differs markedly from those in cities without such guarantees,** a distinction that may complicate the easy adoption of some evidence-based interventions tested elsewhere. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23327990?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23327037?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## 311 homelessness complaints in New York have risen faster than the underlying growth in the homeless population, reflecting both increased public concern and evolving protocols. - The number of 311 calls for homelessness-related issues tripled from 2019 to 2024. - New York City government received more than 82,000 homelessness-related 311 calls in 2024. - Several administrative changes — including enabling people to submit 311 complaints about subway-related issues, expanding which problems could be reported and adjusting how complaints were routed — contributed to the increase, complicating year-to-year comparisons. - In 2024, DHS handled about two-thirds (67%) of these calls — typically those that did not involve perceived or potential danger — and the NYPD handled the remaining 33%. - The two agencies moved at very different speeds: The median closure time was 45 minutes for NYPD versus 269 minutes for DHS. - There were also variable outcomes depending on agency. - NYPD reported that, in 58% of cases, they could not locate the person involved and referred the remaining 42% to DHS. Out of more than 30,000 cases, they documented resolving the underlying condition only about a dozen times. - DHS similarly could not find the individual in 45% of its cases, reported refusals of assistance in 12%, referred 6% back to NYPD and closed 18% for technical or administrative reasons. ## 311 calls for homelessness are very concentrated in specific parts of the city. - 50% of the 311 calls occur in 0.7% of the city's surface area as measured by census blocks. - Twenty-three distinct census blocks ranked among the top 100 locations for calls in 2022, 2023 and 2024\. All but one were in Manhattan, south of 57th Street; the exception was the block containing Moore Homestead Playground in Elmhurst, Queens. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23327717?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## The number and percentage of total arrests of street homelessness have been increasing over the past several years. - Total arrests of unhoused individuals on the street — on any charges — climbed 17.3% in 2024, rising from 13,017 to 15,274, and now stand 38.4% above their 2022 level. - Arrests of all other individuals increased 14.8% in 2024 and are 36.0% higher than in 2022. - A striking share of people living on the street interact with law enforcement in a single year. Using the rough rule of thumb that the January point-in-time count may reflect only one-fourth to one-half of the true unsheltered population, the 15,274 arrests of street-homeless people recorded in 2024 would touch somewhere between 42% and 82% of the unsheltered population. For context, the NYPD arrested about 1.7% of all city residents, meaning unsheltered New Yorkers were booked at roughly 24 to 48 times the per capita rate of the general population. This doesn't necessarily mean that this population is committing crimes at a dramatically higher rate; it may mean that police enforcement tends to be more focused on these individuals, or both. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23712142?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## One-time arrests dominate, but a tiny core of street-homeless New Yorkers is booked again and again. - Of the 6,942 unsheltered people arrested on any charge in 2024, 58.1% (4,033 people) were taken into custody just once. - A significant 22.9% (1,587 people) of this population was arrested three or more times. - A small number of people in this population are frequent offenders: 9.4% (653 people) logged five or more arrests, while 2.3% (157 people) hit double-digit arrests within a single year. Forty-three people, or just 0.6% of the street homeless population, were booked 16 or more times. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23713072?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Most of the arrests among this population, as with the general population, are for property crimes. - Analysis of the 2024 National Crime Information Center (NCIC) charge data for the 6,942 street-homeless arrestees reveal that larceny is the leading charge among street homeless individuals. More than a quarter of all unsheltered arrestees, 27.5% (1,907 people), were picked up for larceny at least once, generating 4,715 bookings, averaging 2.5 arrests per person. - Low-level drug cases are the second most common charge. One-fifth of arrestees (1,400 people) were charged with drug-related offenses (usually simple drug possession), producing 1,752 arrests — about 1.3 arrests per person. - Assault rounds out the top three, but at a much lower volume. Physical-force charges reached 18.5% of the cohort (1,285 people), responsible for 1,555 arrests (1.2 each). In 2024, New Yorkers overall had about 550 assault arrests per 100,000 people, while the unsheltered homeless population, roughly 12,000 people, had an estimated 13,000 per 100,000, about 20 to 25 times higher. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23713131?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Low-level property and drug charges drive arrests of unsheltered New Yorkers - Among unsheltered individuals arrested in 2024, petit larceny is by far the most common charge, accounting for 26% of cases — 3,940 arrests in total — which is more than three times the number for the next most common charge, simple drug possession, with 1,004 arrests. - Theft of services makes up 3.2% of arrests among unsheltered individuals, totaling 486 cases, the majority of which involve farebeating — highlighting how fare enforcement often functions as a point of entry into the justice system for people without stable housing. - Of the 1,200 assault arrests logged against street-homeless New Yorkers in 2024, 543 cases (45%) were misdemeanor assault in the third degree, 460 cases (38%) were felony assaults and 197 cases (16%) specifically involved assaults on police or peace officers (PL 120.08 or 120.05-3). - Around 16% of arrests for minor administrative or code violations in 2024 fell on unhoused individuals, indicating that routine ordinance enforcement disproportionately affects people living on the streets. This was before a sharp escalation in low-level enforcement, as subway violation arrests surged to 823 in the first quarter of 2025 — up 331% from the same period in 2019 and 146% in that period in 2024. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23713205?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23713268?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Housing instability and serious mental illness are disproportionately common among New Yorkers [cycling through Rikers Island](https://hhinternet.blob.core.windows.net/uploads/2025/05/correctional-health-services-patient-profile-metrics-april-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). - 26% of people in City jails are homeless or likely to be homeless when entering or leaving custody. - 56% are enrolled in jail mental health services and 21% meet the definition of serious mental illness. - These metrics demonstrate a strong overlap between homelessness, serious mental illness and jail admissions. ════════════════════════════════════════ *New York is entering an historic and pivotal transition. Mayor-elect Mamdani faces big problems on housing, safety, mental health, transit, and more.* *Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer clear, practical guidance rooted in evidence. Ideas that could actually be implemented and work.* *But to meet this moment, we need to grow.* *That's why, this year, for the first time, we're asking our readers to support Vital City directly. We're aiming for 700 inaugural supporters by December 31.* *Your support will help us expand our editorial capacity, strengthen our operational support, and continue delivering thoughtful, relevant and informative work in 2026.* *If this article informed your thinking, challenged you, or helped you understand the city more clearly, please consider supporting the work behind it.* [***Make your tax-deductible gift and help us reach 700 supporters.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### Subway Safety: What the Data Show URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-the-data-show-about-subway-safety/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:31.000Z What do we know about crime on New York City's subway system? A lot and a little. A lot, in that crimes that happen there tend to be covered intensely in the media — especially pushings and homicides, including notorious incidents such as the arson homicide at the Coney Island-Stillwell Avenue station late last year. It's been widely reported that there were 10 homicides underground in 2024, which, while statistically rare for a system that serves nearly 2 billion passengers per year, is unusually high compared to other recent years. Similarly, violence on the subways, while also statistically rare by many measures — there's a little under one violent crime per million rides — has risen substantially since the COVID-19 pandemic as well as over the longer span of time, including on a per-rider basis. But beyond data that compare the subway system to itself and that compare New York City's subways (generally unfavorably) to large transit systems in other global cities, there's little empirical research about crimes committed underground. As a result, researchers haven't learned much about its prevalence, where crimes concentrate, who the offenders are or what might be done to stop subway crime from happening. Based on decades of research, we do know quite a bit about where, why and how crime happens, at least above ground. Those basic principles — which establish, for instance, the tendency of crime to concentrate in a small number of places, the small number of people responsible for the largest proportion of serious crimes and the effect of the physical environment on behavior — are important, because they point us toward the most effective approaches to preventing and deterring crime, such as hot-spot policing, focused deterrence and place-based interventions such as remediating blighted properties, cleaning up vacant lots and improving street lighting. Is it the same underground, where quarters are close and people are especially mobile? We analyzed public data on crimes, arrests and subway usage to understand trends in subway crime, what drives crime in the subway system and thus what the most effective approaches would be to stem it. Here are the most telling facts we discovered: ## Crime trends **Subway violence, accounting for 4.2% of the total violent crimes in New York City, has increased since the pandemic but was increasing even before March 2020.** Despite declining ridership, subway violence increased markedly — by about 15% — from 2019 to 2024 and by 96% from 2014 to 2024\. The early months of 2025 have seen a notable decrease in subway violence. (Throughout this report, the term "violent crimes" refers to the following offenses: murder, robbery, rape, and felony and misdemeanor assault.) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21360754?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **The increase in subway violence over the last decade — as well as violence in the city's public spaces on the surface — is driven by noninstrumental violence, meaning motivated by animus rather than by monetary motives.** While robberies were nearly 1 in 3 violent subway crimes a decade ago, today they represent only 1 in 6 violent subway crimes. Felony assaults on the subway have more than tripled since 2009 even as robberies and grand larcenies are down by 18%. This tracks broader national trends as well as trends on New York City's surface, showing that violence is increasingly less likely to be due to instrumental or pecuniary motives and more likely to be due to personal animus. The rise in assaults could partly explain the recent uptick in murders which, while still rare, are up by an alarming amount. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21508866?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21485886?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **The increase in felony assaults on the subway in 2024 is partially driven by increases in assaults on police officers.** Assaults on police officers on the subway rose from 98 (17% of all felony assaults) in 2023 to 179 (31% of all felony assaults) in 2024\. There has been a steady increase in the number of assaults on police officers since the pandemic. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21691583?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **While subway violence has increased, so has violence in public spaces on the surface.** Subway violence is up by about 15% since 2019; street violence has risen by 16% over the same period. This suggests that whatever is happening on the subways reflects a broader phenomenon that has affected public spaces throughout the city. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21359910?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Gun violence on the subway system remains very rare.** Typically there are fewer than five shootings on the system per year among over 2 billion rides, which means that the risk of a shooting in the subway is likely to be substantially lower than it is on the street. This also suggests that large investments to keep guns out of the system may not ultimately yield correspondingly large improvements in safety. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21453382?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Since 2019, violent recidivism — defined here as the share of individuals who were arrested for a given type of crime in two consecutive years — has risen among subway offenders, doubling from 3% to 6% over this period.** While recidivism rose among all arrestees in New York City during this time period, in percentage terms, the increase is far larger for subway violence than among violent crimes in general. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21360870?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Concentration of risk **While most crimes occur during peak hours of ridership, on a per-person or per-ride basis, the subways are safest during peak hours of use and are considerably more dangerous at night.** While the risk of a rider being victimized is about 1 per million during rush hour, it is more than 20 times higher during the late night and early morning hours when fewer people are using the subway. This empirical regularity helps to explain the City's recent decision to deploy police officers on trains during the overnight hours. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21361207?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Similar to the surface, crimes are heavily concentrated within the system. Of the city's 472 stations, the 30 stations with the largest number of violent incidents account for 50% of violent crimes.** An important caveat here is that, in NYPD data, crimes are assigned to the nearest station even when they happen on trains, making it difficult to understand exactly where the crimes are happening — in the stations themselves, on mezzanines or on trains pulling into a given station. Many of these stations are the major transit hubs which serve the largest number of passengers. However, the stations where the risk per passenger is greatest are quite different. These stations tend to be used less frequently than the major hubs and to be located in the outer boroughs. The amount of violence at these stations, year to year, is not easy to predict. **The most vulnerable New Yorkers, the elderly in general and elderly women in particular, represent a very small share of the victims — between 1% and 3%, depending on how the vulnerable group is defined.** Two-thirds of the victims of subway violence are male, and people between the ages of 25 and 44 are most likely to be the victims of subway crime. ## Subway offenders **Subway crimes, like other crimes in New York City, are being committed by individuals who are older than many people might suspect.** Just 36% of arrestees for subway violence are under the age of 25, and only 14% are juveniles under the age of 18\. Half of arrestees are between the ages of 25 and 44, and 13% are over the age of 45. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21453836?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Violent subway offenders are getting older, not younger, which suggests that recent Raise the Age legislation is unlikely to be a major driver of the recent increase in violence.** Today, individuals arrested for violent crimes in public spaces are, on average, eight years older than they were 18 years ago. Violent subway arrestees are still slightly younger than violent street arrestees, but the difference in ages has diminished rapidly. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21361636?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Individuals with a violent subway arrest have more extensive criminal histories than those arrested for a violent street crime.** Violent subway arrestees are, for example, 6 times more likely to have other arrests for a violent subway crime than other arrestees. Likewise, while fare beating arrests are, in general, not very predictive of future subway violence, when compared to other arrestees, there is a greater propensity for violent subway arrestees to have a prior arrest for fare beating — potentially indicating that this is a population that spends more time in the subway system. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21453877?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Individuals with the largest number of arrests for subway crimes and subway violence are more likely than other arrestees to be homeless and mentally ill.** One NYPD analysis of high-volume subway offenders found that 41% were homeless at the time of their most recent arrest. Nearly two-thirds of those with the largest number of subway arrests in 2022 and 2023 had a documented history of homelessness or mental illness. Among those who also had an arrest for subway violence, 89% had a documented history of homelessness, mental illness or both. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21453965?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Disorderly conduct, fare beating and subway violence **Since 2019, citizen calls about disorderly conduct and arrests for disorderly conduct have more than doubled on the subway.** However, less than 1% of 911 calls reporting disorderly conduct on trains result in an arrest. In 2024, for example, only 221 arrests were made on the subway for disorderly conduct, aggravated harassment, criminal mischief, criminal nuisance and unnecessary noise combined, out of 28,329 calls concerning disorderly behavior among individuals or groups. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/21635886?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Although many violent subway offenders do have a history of skipping fares, the vast majority of people caught fare beating are not actually arrested but instead receive a summons. Of the small group who do get arrested for fare evasion—around 7% of those caught—statistics show they are less likely to commit violent offenses later on than other arrestees, and overall pose a lower criminal risk.** For example, fewer than 1 in 100 of those arrested for fare beating from 2016 to 2021 were subsequently arrested for a violent subway crime over the next two years. While this is a higher risk than violent crime arrestees on the surface, it is a far lower risk than among individuals who are arrested for disorderly conduct on the subways. Interestingly, a drug or disorderly conduct arrest below ground is more predictive of future subway violence than an arrest for a violent crime committed above ground. ### Case Studies from Other Large Cities URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/case-studies-from-large-cities-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:31.000Z *This is one of three supporting documents connected to Vital City's recommendations on serious mental illness and homelessness,* [*"What To Do (and Not To Do) About People in Crisis on Streets and Subways."*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) *Find* [*"How the System Works (or Doesn't)"*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-the-system-works-for-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) *here and* [*"What the Data Show"*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-the-data-show-people-in-crisis-on-the-streets-and-subways) *here.* A primary recommendation of the [Vital City report](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-people-in-crisis-on-streets-and-subways) relating to people living on the street with serious mental illness and other afflictions is rooted in a housing-led approach. The evidence that such an approach can work is strong. But this kind of proposal has met strong skepticism, focused on the city's extreme housing shortage, the severity of needs and government's limited agility in executing complex operations. We looked at three global cities that have more successfully addressed homelessness to understand whether the conditions that enabled progress there could be replicated in New York City. Each of these cities has starkly different cultures, programs, laws and governance structures. Yet they all arrived at successful solutions toward ending street homelessness. There are some important lessons that can be applied to New York City. ## Helsinki Finland is a strong social welfare state with a broad commitment to a high standard of living for all its residents. That includes benefits that support families with children, universal health care, education and basic income security. In fact, the [Finnish Constitution](https://fra.europa.eu/en/law-reference/constitution-finland-22?utm&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) includes the duty of the government to support each person's right to attain housing of their own choice. Despite these offerings, Finland experienced a significant surge in homelessness toward the end of the 20th century, driven by an urban housing squeeze that failed single adults, an economic crash and the rapid downsizing of psychiatric institutions without enough community housing and support to absorb people. Helsinki, the capital, with a population of 650,000, initially addressed the need through opening significant new shelter capacity and a progressive staircase approach to moving people from the streets to shelter, then working on housing from there. This initially cut street and shelter homelessness in half (from roughly 4,000 to under 2,000), but saw far less progress in reducing the number of people staying in shelter. Fifteen years in, even the decline in street homelessness stalled. In 2008, the national government abandoned the shelter-centric approach and pivoted to a housing-led solution, including a [commitment to bypass shelter and convert those resources and facilities to housing](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol22num2/ch4.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Many people experiencing long-term homelessness have co-occurring serious mental illness and substance use disorders. Helsinki paired a normal lease with on-site or mobile mental health and substance use disorder interventions, tenancy sustainment and harm reduction practices. Research shows that the stability of housing improves the likelihood that these kinds of services would help a person succeed. [Finland's Y-Foundation found](https://ysaatio.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/A%5FHome%5Fof%5FYour%5FOwn%5Flowres%5Fspreads.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the basics of stable housing — a fixed address, privacy and "domestic peace" — reduce crisis and make it more feasible to manage medications, keep appointments and build routines, making health and social problems easier to address. A [frequently cited Finnish estimate](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4679128/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) finds up to about €15,000 saved per person per year in reduced emergency health, social services and justice costs. Civic health improved as neighbor-relations teams mediated conflicts and prevented disturbances with landlords by applying casework services that were available on call, around-the-clock before crises spilled into the streets. This further contributes to reducing visible street homelessness and helps make public spaces feel calmer. As shelters and hostels in Helsinki were phased out or converted into permanent housing, the city went from roughly 600 shelter beds in 2008 to one permanent emergency center with just 52 beds by 2019\. Between 2008 and 2022, there was a [68% reduction](https://ysaatio.fi/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Kotiin-Kaakinen-2023-en-final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the total number of people experiencing homelessness in the capital, with street homelessness becoming a rare occurrence. ## Tokyo Japan's welfare culture is rooted in moral obligation rather than in individual rights or entitlement. It reflects traditions that emphasize family and community responsibility over state dependency. Social-service programs are generally rooted in work requirements, and the stigma of receiving public benefits remains an enduring challenge to connecting to people in need. Japan's welfare state is often described as "productivist" — designed to support economic participation rather than to provide universal coverage. Within this context, Tokyo also experienced a rapid increase in street homelessness in the late 1990s, primarily driven by unemployed single men brought about by Japan's economic collapse. The number of people living rough in Tokyo (a city of 14 million) [peaked at 5,798 in 1999](https://www.fukushi.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/documents/d/fukushi/homeless202401?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=%E7%B5%8C%E9%81%8E%E8%AA%AC%E6%98%8E%20%20%EF%BC%91%20%E6%9D%B1%E4%BA%AC23%E5%8C%BA%E5%86%85%E3%81%A7%E3%81%AF%E3%80%81%E5%B9%B3%E6%88%9011%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E3%81%AE5%2C798%E4%BA%BA%E3%81%8C%E3%83%94%E3%83%BC%E3%82%AF%E3%81%A7%E3%81%82%E3%81%A3%E3%81%9F%E3%80%82%20%EF%BC%92,%E6%B8%9B%E5%B0%91%E3%81%AE%E8%A6%81%E5%9B%A0%E3%81%AF%E8%87%AA%E7%AB%8B%E6%94%AF%E6%8F%B4%E3%82%B7%E3%82%B9%E3%83%86%E3%83%A0%E3%81%AE%E5%8A%B9%E6%9E%9C%E3%80%81%E5%9C%B0%E5%9F%9F%E7%94%9F%E6%B4%BB%E7%A7%BB%E8%A1%8C%E6%94%AF%E6%8F%B4%E4%BA%8B%E6%A5%AD%E3%81%AE%E5%8A%B9%E6%9E%9C%E3%80%81%E7%94%9F%E6%B4%BB%E4%BF%9D%E8%AD%B7%E3%81%AE%E9%81%A9%E7%94%A8%E3%81%AA%E3%81%A9%E3%81%8C%E8%80%83%E3%81%88%E3%82%89%E3%82%8C%E3%82%8B%E3%80%82%20%E4%BB%A4%E5%92%8C%EF%BC%96%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%91%E6%9C%88%20%E3%83%9B%E3%83%BC%E3%83%A0%E3%83%AC%E3%82%B9%E5%AF%BE%E7%AD%96%E3%81%AE%E7%8F%BE%E7%8A%B6%E3%81%AB%E3%81%A4%E3%81%84%E3%81%A6%20%E6%9D%B1%E4%BA%AC%E9%83%BD%E7%A6%8F%E7%A5%89%E5%B1%80). Since then, street homelessness has declined dramatically. [Official counts](https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h02407/government-survey-finds-japanese-homeless-population-continues-to-decrease.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Image%3A%20Number%20of%20Homeless%20People,in%20Japan%20According%20to%20Surveys) (conducted by visual daytime surveys) found 565 people living on the street in January 2025. In 2002, Japan passed its first [Homelessness Act](https://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/rlr21/legi.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), defining homelessness simultaneously as a human rights concern and a public-space challenge, with a high degree of expectation on those who are unhoused to take actions to overcome their own homelessness. In the years that followed the release of the Act, authorities cleared encampments from parks and riverbanks, motivated by a wide public demand for public access to shared spaces. These actions, however, were paired with a strong sense that public welfare should be deployed to support people through housing and services as essential to solving street homelessness. Like New York City, Tokyo government policy focuses on shelter for street homeless individuals. However, once a person has completed intake, there is great urgency to ensure national benefits and housing assistance are achieved quickly. This is enabled by a broad definition of eligibility. A person identified as unhoused is deemed automatically eligible for a comprehensive package of rental support, cash assistance and case management. Decisions about public assistance are generally made within 14 days; under the law, they must be completed within 30 days. Tokyo [treats housing as the first intervention](https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/addressing-homelessness-u-s-sweeps-versus-japans-public-assistance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); rent is paid as an automatic part of assistance to cover time-limited rent and stabilize people in ordinary apartments through local welfare offices. Behavioral and medical health help complement housing, but getting them is not a prerequisite to accessing housing resources. It is important to note that, simultaneously, Tokyo continues to rely on institutionalization of the mentally ill; Japan has a national capacity of [324,000 beds](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385730853%5FMental%5Fhealth%5Fand%5Fpsychiatry%5Fin%5FJapan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (a rate of 258 per 100,000 people, compared with 35 per 100,000 in the United States). This likely means the street homeless population there has less acute needs than we experience in New York, and accessing care when a severe level of need arises is comparatively easier. ## Houston The social welfare culture in Houston (population 2.4 million) — and more broadly in Texas — reflects a market-oriented, individualistic and charity-driven ethos, rooted more in local initiative and private responsibility than in strong government provision. In January 2011, [Houston's point-in-time count](https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/2d521d2c/files/uploaded/2011%5FPIT%5FExecutive%5Fsummary.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found 8,538 people homeless with over half unsheltered (4,440). This was a 25% increase from 2010. In response, the Coalition for the Homeless of Houston, the local entity responsible for receiving and dispersing federal homeless funding, began a coordinated effort to address the crisis. In 2012, they created a community plan that became the backbone of [The Way Home](https://www.thewayhomehouston.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with a focus on ending homelessness through permanent housing with supportive services. The Way Home was made up of more than 100 partners — including homeless service agencies, local governments, public housing authorities, the local Veterans Affairs office and other nonprofits and community stakeholders. The plan itself is driven by a desire to spend any available funds on housing rather than shelter. In 2014, then-Mayor Annise Parker publicly backed the effort, committing her political capital to reducing homelessness despite having little role in service delivery, which was provided through an independent nonprofit and the charitable sector. By addressing homelessness as a priority and invoking shared community responsibility, the mayor set the foundation for coordinated business and philanthropy investment in homelessness solutions. To achieve its [coordinated approach](https://www.usich.gov/news-events/news/coordinating-your-way-home-houston?utm&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Houston stood up a single point of coordinated access, adopted a common assessment tool, worked from a single by-name list and clarified who was accountable for outcomes across dozens of providers, with the Coalition as lead agency. Coordination with police and the behavioral health system was also instrumental in its success. Harris County's [Judge Ed Emmett Mental Health Diversion Center](https://www.texasjcmh.gov/media/mdddqwwd/starting-mh-court-harris-county-diversion-center-final-report-10092020.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) steers low-level cases to treatment. Clinicians are embedded in Houston's 911 call center through the [Harris Center's Crisis Call Diversion](https://www.theharriscenter.org/services/crisis-services?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They route these calls to a mix of clinician-only and clinician-with-police-officer teams for on-scene crises, depending on the severity of the conditions reported by the caller. In 2024, the system diverted 5,033 calls from police/EMS, and rapid response teams resolved 84% of these calls without law enforcement. The Harris Center's [Crisis Intervention Response Teams](https://www.theharriscenter.org/services/crisis-services?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) co-respond with the Houston Police Department or Harris County Sheriff's Office for behavioral health calls, doing assessment, safety planning and transport to treatment, not jail, whenever public safety considerations allow. An [independent evaluation](https://www.texasjcmh.gov/media/mdddqwwd/starting-mh-court-harris-county-diversion-center-final-report-10092020.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found participants were significantly less likely to be rebooked, and the county avoided about $5.54 in jail costs for every $1 invested. The Houston Recovery Center's [Sobering Center](https://houstonrecoverycenter.org/public-intoxication-substance-abuse-jail-diversion-sobering-center/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a standing alternative to address public intoxication. It has saved roughly 37,000 officer hours, letting police focus on priority crime while people sober safely and get connected to treatment. This same broad coalition of partners was able to quickly step up to meet needs during the COVID-19 pandemic, which further reinforced the strength of the coordinated response. The City of Houston and Harris County, together with the Coalition, launched a two-year, $65 million Community COVID Housing Program that accelerated permanent placements and paired them with encampment "decommissioning through housing," not enforcement alone. The partners later extended the effort with additional funding and [formalized a playbook](https://www.cfthhouston.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Texas adopted a statewide public-camping ban in 2021\. Since then, the city has decommissioned more than 90 encampments, with about [90% of these individuals moving into housing](https://www.governing.com/housing/how-houston-cut-its-homeless-population-by-nearly-two-thirds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Fewer encampments have meant less police involvement and fewer criminal citations. The city pointed to a coordinated, housing-first pipeline that reduced visible encampments and delivered durable results. The results are visible and sustained: [More than 32,000 people have been housed since 2012, roughly 9 in 10 still stably housed two years later](https://www.thewayhomehouston.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and a sustained drop in overall street homelessness ([down 75% to 1,100 in 2024](https://www.cfthhouston.org/data-and-research-archive?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) has made Houston a national reference point even through storms and leadership changes. This happened because the region centralized decisions, shared data and stuck to one objective across City Hall, the county, providers and the business community. ## Translating these successful models to New York City Given the policy, legal and cultural differences, this multicity review shows that cities do not need a single set of preconditions to overcome street homelessness. It has been achieved in places with different social welfare philosophies and benefits, and different motivations for their actions. What is common among them is the commitment to collective action through an approach that moves away from shelter-centric strategies and prioritizes, wherever possible, the swift movement of people from the street into stable housing with necessary supports. ════════════════════════════════════════ *New York is entering an historic and pivotal transition. Mayor-elect Mamdani faces big problems on housing, safety, mental health, transit, and more.* *Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer clear, practical guidance rooted in evidence. Ideas that could actually be implemented and work.* *But to meet this moment, we need to grow.* *That's why, this year, for the first time, we're asking our readers to support Vital City directly. We're aiming for 700 inaugural supporters by December 31.* *Your support will help us expand our editorial capacity, strengthen our operational support, and continue delivering thoughtful, relevant and informative work in 2026.* *If this article informed your thinking, challenged you, or helped you understand the city more clearly, please consider supporting the work behind it.* [***Make your tax-deductible gift and help us reach 700 supporters.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### What Mamdani Can Learn from a de Blasio Administration Safety Innovation URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/nstat-should-be-key-to-mamdani-public-safety-plan/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:32.000Z Despite [decreases in murders and shootings to prepandemic levels,](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-state-of-crime-in-new-york-city-at-midyear-2025) public polling and sentiment data suggest that New Yorkers still [don't feel safe](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/crime-perceptions-and-reality-in-new-york). This may be because, despite reductions in some crimes, [many city crime rates — especially assaults — remain stubbornly high](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-state-of-crime-in-new-york-city-at-midyear-2025). It may reflect a [disconnect between reality and sensationalist news reports](https://arc.net/l/quote/vqnibnij?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But a large part of the disconnect may be a measurement problem: The way we view safety varies widely depending on several factors ranging from the condition of the physical space we occupy to the levels of economic opportunity in a given neighborhood. For instance, a female New Yorker may consider catcalling and comments on the subway, something that isn't necessarily a crime and isn't captured in crime data, a violation of her sense of safety. Illegal commercial dumping near public housing units creates serious concerns for families and residents. Or, poorly lit areas in neighborhoods can significantly erode a tenant's feeling of security. Police, whose core job is to respond to and investigate crime, are and should remain an essential part of the safety apparatus. But in order to build a sustainable sense of security and well-being, there has to be a larger investment in a community's ability to stop crime before it has a chance to manifest. We already know things like addressing the [physical infrastructure of long-ignored neighborhoods](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8055100/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), promoting economic vitality through [job readiness](https://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2024/12/02/jhr.1122-12629R4?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [job-creation](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25477459/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), providing access to [treatment services,](https://www.nber.org/papers/w22610?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) improving [housing stability](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8496894/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and investing in our [young people and their development](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6094549/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are in fact the ounces of prevention that are worth pounds of cures — we just have to orient our policy priorities accordingly. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani's plan to create a Department of Community Safety is an important step to tackle the variety of public safety issues facing the city. But any policy has to be successfully implemented to make a real difference. In this case, the implementation plan has to include a solid approach to tracking results and communicating them back to the public — and as the old adage goes, you can't track what you don't measure. Fortunately, a foundation for coordinating and tracking safety approaches that are not just about crimes and arrests was laid during the de Blasio administration by the Office of Neighborhood Safety (ONS) in the Mayor's Office, prior to it being moved from City Hall to the Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD). As part of ONS, the team responsible for creating the Mayor's Action Plan developed NeighborhoodStat (NStat) — a management system that brings New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) residents together with all relevant city agencies to identify problems, coordinate solutions and track outcomes at both hyperlocal and systemic levels. When MAP was used as initially envisioned, it [not only improved safety](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/JJREC-MAP-Eval-Update-5-.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but also worked together with residents, with NStat at the center of the program's operations. ## **So how does NStat work?** [NeighborhoodStat](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/neighborhood-stat/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) brings together neighbors, community organizations and city agencies to convene in a series of local meetings where participants share, analyze and use data to identify public safety priorities and what they deem to be responsive [solutions.](http://solutions.in/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) MAP staff then track progress over time and report out regularly to ensure government accountability and responsiveness. In its early years, NStat was used in the NYCHA developments MAP focuses on to reclaim and activate [greenspace in East Harlem](https://patch.com/new-york/harlem/east-harlem-public-housing-residents-design-safety-improvements?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that had been a hotbed for illegal activity; to [secure capital investments](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/press-release/city-opens-new-teen-lounge-community-center-at-brownsville-houses/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to reopen a community center in Brownsville Houses that had been closed for 20 years, limiting safe space for young people in the development, despite the constant demand of residents to reopen; and to address [open air substance abuse in the Bronx](https://www.motthavenherald.com/2018/11/09/patterson-houses-anti-crime-initiative-puts-faith-in-green-spaces/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through a combination of physical space, mental health and stewardship interventions. That's not all NStat does. Each NStat identifies, tracks and monitors metrics relevant to site priorities to inform future NStat meetings. Better collection of on-the-ground data and insights helps identify chronic issues that often transcend a single neighborhood, giving city executives timely insights so they can develop more systemic, sustainable solutions to these challenges. When it works, NStat can extend ownership and accountability for a more comprehensive definition of safety, making more agencies answerable to the public for results on shared problems. For example, Brownsville's community center being closed on its own was problematic, but showed that the deeper issue was the territoriality in the neighborhood that prevented the youth of that development from venturing the short distance to a neighboring development to use their facilities and benefit from their programming. DYCD reopening a community center alone wouldn't solve the underlying issue. It would be an expensive band-aid that wouldn't address the underlying issue, which affects more neighborhoods than just Brownsville, and would require the support of several city agencies and nonprofit partners. Or consider what happened at Castle Hill Houses a few years ago. Residents [were grappling with a surge in illegal dumping](https://www.bxtimes.com/illegal-dumping-in-the-bronx/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): furniture and construction debris piled in courtyards, cracked sidewalks and poorly lit areas that felt unsafe, particularly for families with children. This wasn't a problem any single agency could solve. Through [MAP's NStat process](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/neighborhood-stat/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), MAP staff facilitated a series of meetings with residents, NYCHA, Sanitation, Parks, NYPD and other NYC agency partners to share information, analyze data and problem-solve collaboratively. The result [was a coordinated response](https://youtu.be/xRYNB5eO4vY?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While much can be said about the very insular way the NYPD deals with accountability, there's no disputing that the department has both internal (i.e., Compstat) and external accountability mechanisms (i.e., CCRB). Over the years, the department has created structures and systems that support the NYPD in mobilizing its workforce to achieve certain outcomes while also creating space for some form of civilian feedback. We'd be hard-pressed to find another agency that is required to withstand anywhere near the level of public scrutiny or engagement with the public on how they could be better. Indeed, many agencies have not shown they have the structure or systems necessary to be responsive to the needs of New Yorkers. Pushing the NYPD out front as the sole solution to crime and disorder lets other agencies off the hook. Rather than each agency responding separately or pointing fingers about who owns a given problem, NStat creates shared ownership and accountability for problems that cross jurisdictional lines. Outside of NStat, which is currently focused on a select number of NYCHA developments that are part of the MAP initiative, there's no citywide mechanism that routinely brings together agencies with residents to address safety concerns. While residents report issues constantly — via 311, to council members, at community board meetings — there's no formal framework for sustained problem-solving. The result? Trash [piles up](https://apnews.com/article/nyc-trash-garbage-bins-694694360479c6c31a75d55b4c784755?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), unsheltered people [struggle in public spaces](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2025/01/dinapoli-numbers-homeless-population-doubled-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and disinvested [infrastructure eventually collapses.](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/11/04/mitchel-houses-boiler-explosion-permits-expired/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The problem isn't always the lack of resources or policy innovation — it's the lack of political will, exclusion of the public from problem-solving and no shared organizational framework to ensure results across partners. ## **The case for NStat** MAP's core tenets — treating safety as a public health, place-based, community-driven challenge — are echoed in other cities and [lauded nationally](https://www.americanprogress.org/article/neighborhoodstat-strengthening-public-safety-community-empowerment/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Some of MAPs tenets are visible in Mayor Brandon Scott's [Public Safety Action Plan](https://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/ActionPlan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Baltimore, Mayor Brandon Johnson's [Neighborhood Safety Strateg](https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/sites/community-safety/home/PeoplesPlanforCommunitySafety.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)y in Chicago and former mayor [Tishaura Jones' Plan](https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/mayor/news/state-of-public-safety-2025.cfm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for St. Louis, all of which have seen results. Unfortunately, MAP, a signature initiative of the de Blasio administration and part of the Office of Neighborhood Safety, has been deprioritized under the Adams Administration with the move from the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice to [the Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD),](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/office-of-neighborhood-safety.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which lacks the political muscle necessary to effect change citywide. MAP's Nstat model requires those leading it to have the authority and visibility to get things done swiftly and efficiently. Quick wins, being able to honor commitments in a reasonable amount of time, can make the difference between having the trust and partnership of residents or not. There is a deep need for a leader who is empowered to facilitate and manage across agencies on safety priorities. One agency simply does not possess the authority to secure the commitments, resources and prioritized attention over another in the same way a mayoral unit does. Public safety requires innovation, rapid response and cross-cutting solutions that are not always in line with how our more bureaucratic, legacy agencies operate. Despite these changes, MAP remains a force on the ground in NYCHA communities across NYC, thanks to its network of community and resident partners, its wildly popular community engagement ethos and its innovative solutions to physical space and place-based challenges. Its proven success in the [original 15](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and now [30 developments](https://www.innovatingjustice.org/program/neighborhood-safety-initiatives/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) makes it ripe for the City to be able to translate the learnings to a citywide context. ## **Mamdani's next steps** The Office of Neighborhood Safety — where MAP, the Office to Prevent Gun Violence and the Atlas program sit — should be considered the foundation for Mamdani's future Department of Community Safety. And NStat can chart the way forward. There's no need to start from scratch when you have a significant knowledge base, evaluated strategies, existing resources and 10 years of lessons at your disposal. Also, there needs to be a concerted effort to better understand, measure and track safety beyond traditional administrative data. Between 2020-2022, the NYC Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ) funded something called the [NYC Neighborhood Navigator](https://map.cityofnewyork.us/ons-neighborhood-navigator/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which we were fortunate enough to have helped design, to support ONS' work. The objective of the tool was to create a neighborhood-level platform to support ONS programming which could be used by residents to track and measure safety and well-being as defined by MAP residents during NSTAT meetings — rather than relying solely on crime data or program utilization. While the transition out of MOCJ occurred before the tool could be implemented, and ONS was separated from the research infrastructure needed to sustain it, the Navigator illustrates what such a platform *could* offer: a community-grounded, multidimensional way to monitor safety and well-being that aligns with residents' lived definitions, not just police or administrative metrics. Today, the tool remains dormant, but its original vision points to what is still possible. Public safety cannot be improved or sustained by any one agency. The infrastructure to support the coordination and collaboration needed for agencies to work together to solve our most pressing and complex challenges does not yet exist at scale. But it can be built if the Department of Community Safety, leveraging the NStat model, creates it. ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decisionmakers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* *If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*[***Become an inaugural supporter today.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### Reality Check: Has Youth Crime in New York Risen After Raise the Age? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/youth-crime-in-new-york-after-raise-the-age/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:31.000Z *This is part of Vital City's ongoing series dissecting the data on matters of public controversy, especially in the realm of public safety. Read previous installments* [*about the National Guard and cities*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/reality-check-whos-the-guard-really-guarding-in-us-cities)*,* [*NYPD staffing levels*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-new-yorkers-should-know-about-nypd-staffing) *and* [*crime levels in Manhattan and Brooklyn*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/reality-check-how-safe-are-manhattan-and-brooklyn)*.* In April 2017, New York passed "Raise the Age," a law designed to stop automatically prosecuting 16- and 17-year-olds as adults, making it the last state in the nation to raise the age of criminal responsibility over the age of 16\. The law, phased in over two years, aimed to move teenagers out of adult jails and into facilities focused on rehabilitation. While critics frequently argue that Raise the Age precipitated a spike in youth crime, the data — with one significant caveat — generally does not support this claim. [Under the new system](https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/pdfs/RTA%5Fflowchart.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), 16- and 17-year-olds charged with misdemeanor offenses (other than traffic violations) are now classified as Juvenile Delinquents (JDs). Their cases are heard in Family Court, where proceedings are confidential. While they cannot be sent to adult jail or prison, they may still face placement in youth facilities. Those in the same age group charged with felonies fall into a new category called Adolescent Offenders (AOs). These cases begin in the Youth Part of the state Supreme Court, a newly created court part designed to adjudicate these types of cases, rather than in Family Court. However, more than 80% of these felony cases are eventually transferred to Family Court. Once transferred, the youth is treated as a Juvenile Delinquent rather than an adult criminal. Thirteen- to 15-year-olds accused of serious or violent felonies are classified Juvenile Offenders (JOs), a category that also existed before the passage of RTA. They are also tried in the Youth Part of the Supreme Court. While they receive lighter sentences than adults, they can still end up with a permanent criminal record unless a judge grants them a special status or transfers the case to Family Court. ## Youth crime trends before and after the reforms Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch has called for reforms to the law. "When the age of criminal responsibility went up, the age of criminal suspects went down," [she said in June](https://nypost.com/2025/06/03/us-news/youth-violence-has-skyrocketed-in-nyc-top-cop-jessica-tisch-reveals-as-she-blames-contentious-raise-the-age-law/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), adding: "Seriously bad things come from a consequence-free environment, and right now juveniles who commit crimes in New York City are living in a virtually consequence-free environment." Tisch is incorrect that the age of criminal suspects is declining. There is one serious area of concern: more youth are carrying illegal weapons and shooting those weapons. But that is a small fraction of criminal behavior in which young people are involved. Overall, the post-Raise the Age picture is one of declining youth crime as a percentage of overall crime. This week, the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice issued a report on ["NYC Youth Crime in Context,"](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/reports/nyc-youth-crime-in-context-arrest-recidivism/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) concluding that "in 2024, the youth share of citywide felony and violent felony arrests was the same as it was in 2018," and that "a small proportion of youth felony arrests (\~5%) are for the most serious violent felony crimes, where 16-17s have seen an uptick as a share of citywide crime, mostly in the past year." Further, it states: "Youth recidivism rates for all felony, violent, and serious violent offenses are stable or decreasing. Most youth are reoffending at or below 2018 levels." Vital City's data analysis provides additional context and insight. To begin, there is no evidence to date that the overall proportion of crime committed by youth — either property crime or violent crime — has risen in the wake of Raise the Age. In fact, as a percentage of crime, youth crime is lower today than it was in 2017, before RTA was implemented. Prior to RTA, the percentage of all crimes (the combined tally of felonies, misdemeanors and violations) committed by youth was already trending down. Since the passage of the law, the percentage of crime by youth is down further. The share of crimes committed by youth ticked upward in 2021, but the rate today remains below what it was before the law took effect. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26584528?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Looking specifically at felonies, the percentage committed by youth is also down. The percentages rose modestly in 2021 — but remain below pre-RTA levels. What about the seven major felony offenses that are often used as bellwethers of crime in New York (murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto)? Before passage of RTA, the percentage of these crimes committed by youth was trending down. Since the law's passage, the percentage of major felony crimes committed by youth has continued declining. The share of seven major felony offenses committed by youth increased after 2021, but it too remains below what it was before the law took effect. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26585377?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Violent felony offenses show the same pattern. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26585608?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Some critics of RTA argue that, in absolute numbers, total youth crime is up when compared to 2017\. This is true — but lacks crucial context. In New York City, felony offenses by people under the age of 18 have risen 13% over the pre-RTA period, and seven major felony offenses have increased 19%. In contrast over the same period, overall incidence of felony offenses has increased by 32%, and the seven major felony offenses have increased by 26%. Youth are a shrinking share of the serious crime problem. Furthermore, Raise the Age applies across the state, and [youth crime rates in other parts of New York are trending downward even in absolute terms](https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/juvenilearrests/index.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); New York City is an exception to the rule. Similarly, youth felony re-arrests — defined as a new arrest within one year of the original arrest — have stayed flat from 2018 to 2024, while adult re-arrests, particularly those 25 and older, have increased. The data [just released from the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice](https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/reports/nyc-youth-crime-in-context-arrest-recidivism/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that the rearrest rate for people under 18 years old charged with a felony was unchanged, from 33% in 2018 to 32% in 2024\. The rate was also unchanged for people 18 to 24 years old, from 30% in 2018 to 30% in 2024\. Meanwhile, it increased for people over 25 years old, from 24% in 2018 to 32% in 2024. The same trend applies to rearrests for people arrested for an initial violent felony offense. The rearrest rate for people under 18 years old went from 33% in 2018 to 32% in 2024 and from 25% in 2018 to 26% in 2024 — while it increased significantly for people over 25 years of age from 18% in 2018 to 24% in 2024. Taken together, this strongly suggests that a change in state law is not responsible for an increase in youth crime or the increase in overall crime in New York City since 2022. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26586297?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## An exception to the rule That's not the whole story, however. Critics highlight the link between the implementation of Raise the Age and gun violence dynamics — asserting that the law led to more kids with guns. Evidence does support this claim. The share of shooting suspects under 18 has risen since before Raise the Age took effect, even as shootings overall in New York City have fallen to historic lows. Before parsing the data, it's important to put shooting totals in a broader context: There have been 652 shootings so far this year and 111,878 major felonies overall, which is to say shootings are fortunately a small fraction of New York City's current crime problem. Related to this fact: any increase or decrease in shootings, even if large on a percentage basis, is a relatively small number. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26587176?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Still, New York City shootings in which the suspect is a youth have more than doubled as a percentage of all shootings, from 8% in 2017 to 18% in 2024 and 17% YTD 2025\. Given that the rise in youth-involved shootings clashes so dramatically with the overall decline in shootings and substantially outpaces overall youth crime increases, something very specific seems to be happening. Underscoring this is the fact that the share of shootings by youth is also increasing outside New York City. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26587564?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) What's going on? Youth arrests for felony criminal possession of a firearm are up from 7% in 2017 to 14% of all gun possession arrests in 2024. Why might more young people be carrying firearms? A specific provision in the law offers a plausible explanation. The most common gun charge in New York is criminal possession of a weapon, which applies simply for having a gun, even if it is never shown or used. Under the current law, however, a teenager charged with this felony will have their case automatically transferred to Family Court unless the prosecutor can prove that the youth either caused significant physical injury or explicitly displayed the firearm. Since gun possession charges rarely involve injuries or open displays of the weapon, these cases most often move to the Family Court. Consequently, young people may feel emboldened to carry guns, knowing that possession typically results in Family Court intervention rather than adult criminal consequences. More gun possessions by youth result in more shootings by youth. A breakdown shows the phenomenon affecting those under 16, as well as 16-, 17- and 18-year-olds. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26618289?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## How the new justice processes are playing out What is happening in court to cases handled differently under Raise the Age? In 2024, 388 Juvenile Offenders (13-15-year-olds accused of certain serious felony crimes) and Adolescent Offenders (16- or 17-year-olds) were criminally convicted, up from 183 in 2019. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26588605?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) With more serious cases, juvenile justice detention admissions have risen above pre-Raise the Age levels. In New York City, nearly 70% of admissions are for Juvenile Delinquents, with an average length of stay of 15 days. Adolescent Offenders account for approximately 20% of all admissions. Most Adolescent Offender admissions are for pre-trial detention, and the average length of stay for this group is more than 100 days. From 2015 to the present, the average daily population in juvenile detention has more than doubled, with more than 350 people each day in these facilities. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26588686?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## A changing landscape Crime trends since Raise the Age are inseparable from a broader shift in criminal activity in recent decades. New York City's age-crime curve no longer shows a sharp spike in criminal activity during the teenage years, peaking in the late teens, and then dropping off in the early 20s. Today, [people in their 30s are more likely to commit crimes than juveniles and adolescents](https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/pages/home). The world has changed, and any changes to Raise the Age should take that into account. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26588772?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decisionmakers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* *If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*[***Become an inaugural supporter today.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### A New Manhattan Project URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-the-future-of-ai-should-be-shaped-in-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:32.000Z Would you rather have the handful of individuals who design and control the world's artificial intelligence apparatus reside in Manhattan or Mountain View? Some might say it doesn't matter — isn't this, after all, a placeless technology? Isn't it a repository of deepfakes and bad takes, disconnected from the fleeting realities we treasure? Like watching "Oppenheimer,"we feel the relentless march of history again bringing us to the supposed brink of disaster for the many, all to benefit the few. But if the advent of artificial intelligence is indeed inevitable, shouldn't the thrall of New York City rather than the sprawl of Silicon Valley be its epicenter? Shouldn't a new Mayor Zohran Mamdani fight to make this so, and in so doing not only create a bigger source for our tax base, but better odds for the human race? What if the origination point of new technologies influenced their societal impact and outcome? A decade ago, I got a taste of this question as a design consultant for a Google subsidiary called Sidewalk Labs, which no longer exists despite some successful spin-offs and laudable thought experiments. [Famously](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/world/americas/google-toronto-sidewalk-labs-abandoned.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), surveillance concerns derailed Sidewalk's grand plan to build a new high-tech district on Toronto's waterfront. Meetings at Sidewalk were often like a game of coastal bumper cars with East Coast urbanites crashing into West Coast suburbanites. The New Yorkers would talk about the limitations on autonomous vehicles due to a finite number of urban traffic lanes — which today's debates about whether Waymo should operate in Gotham make all the more pertinent — while the Californians would talk about flying cars. In one clarifying moment, a Stanford engineer spoke, without irony, of a future implant in his future head that would seamlessly guide him as he drove to customized sightseeing locations. In yet another, a West Coast "architect" spoke of a housing solution that fully violated wheelchair and fire codes, about which he shrugged and said "we can override all that." Technology is never culturally neutral. It is a mirror and window into the society that creates it, including where that society lives. More than one tech exec has told me that most of the people who run our tech companies today are geographically isolated social misfits who want to create a different world in part because the one the rest of us inhabit eludes them. You might dislike tech billionaire Michael Bloomberg, but even as he flew in private planes he sometimes rode the subway as mayor, creating at least the semblance of eyeball-to-eyeball interaction among people of different means and miens. It's the difference between the friction that tech companies want to eliminate and the friction we want to celebrate. That positive social friction is not only the hallmark of New York City, but the building block of an emotional intelligence that could build more humane artificial intelligence. It is precisely that eyeball-to-eyeball urban energy that aspiring tech talent, like most young adults, want from their lives. Mayor Bloomberg helped diversify the economy by making New York an epicenter for technology companies, breaking the singular grip Wall Street had on the city's economy for decades prior. Cornell Tech on Roosevelt Island wouldn't exist if not for his administration; NYU Tandon and other institutions of innovation would be far weaker. Entire New York neighborhoods have been remade, for good and bad, by the influx of major tech companies into buildings new and old, from piers and historic structures to new skyscrapers. Technology company leaders may be reclusive suburbanites, but increasingly their lieutenants have sought out urbanity. That influx helped to transform a municipal budget of about $43 billion at the time of 9/11 to over $116 billion today, funds that helped pay for de Blasio's signature universal pre-K program, among other public goods. What a difference a decade makes. In 2019 Amazon's HQ2 was scared away from Long Island City by New York's left flank, who among other concerns loathed the tech giant's labor record and its threat to small businesses. But wouldn't we have been better off shaping Amazon's future here in America's organized labor capital — where it would've had to play by New York rules and acclimate to New York culture? That's what the late union stalwart [Hector Figueroa](https://www.nydailynews.com/2019/02/15/cutting-off-our-nose-to-spite-our-face-amazons-pullout-will-be-bad-for-the-very-workers-that-opponents-of-the-deal-claim-to-care-about/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [sanely argued](https://www.nydailynews.com/2019/02/15/cutting-off-our-nose-to-spite-our-face-amazons-pullout-will-be-bad-for-the-very-workers-that-opponents-of-the-deal-claim-to-care-about/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as [did](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/opinion/amazon-hq2-new-york.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) I. However repugnant you may find these technology giants, you must ask yourself whether "an out of sight out of mind" strategy that pushes them to suburban locations serves either our city or society better than locating them here, where our politics can influence them while we benefit from their economic activity. Mayor-elect Mamdani won on an ambitious affordability agenda, including free buses, expanded child care and new housing production, all of which will require public funding. It's unlikely that will all come from new taxes, particularly with the governor entering an election year. Perhaps our energetic new mayor can focus on targeted but expansive growth for the city's economy — thinking about how, if the inexorable wave of new A.I. technologies were to locate here in addition to the Bay Area, it could help us pay for our most dire social needs. Perhaps critical questions, like the voracious electricity demands of the A.I. industry, could help focus minds on helping us create a cleaner electrical grid, including new transmission capacity. Perhaps these new companies could locate along our beautiful but vulnerable waterfronts, helping us to meet our resilience goals in the face of sea-level rise. But most significantly, perhaps the collective culture of New York City, rather than the individualistic nature of California, could influence the purpose and performance of artificial intelligence and our common tech future because the people who create it would live in neighborhoods, ride mass transit and understand the glorious friction of our common bonds. Perhaps the camaraderie that our sidewalks and subways imbue could create empathy alongside efficiency, could create a world in which technology serves us, instead of perpetuating the nagging sense that it is we who will serve it. ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decisionmakers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* *If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*[***Become an inaugural supporter today.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### How Mamdani Can Deliver Free Buses — and Subways, Too URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-mamdani-can-delivery-free-buses-and-subways-too/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:35.000Z Of all the "far left" policies promoted by Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani, the promise to make buses free has gotten some of the most attention. This is true even though some of his other policies would be significantly more expensive or far less workable. For example, his own campaign estimates that universal free child care will cost [approximately $6 billion a year](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/10/06/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-nyc-policy-proposals.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), roughly equal to the entire budget of the New York Police Department. His affordable housing program calls for the city to spend approximately $10 billion a year. He has also proposed spending $1 billion for a new department focused on mental health outreach. Free buses are estimated to [reduce the MTA's revenue by $600 million to $800 million annually](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/infrastructure/2023/2023-february-estimating-the-cost-of-fare-free-local-bus-service.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a loss that would have to be made up somewhere. Supporters say the additional spending Mamdani's proposals would necessitate can easily be financed by raising taxes on higher-income New Yorkers and corporations. But for better or worse, the city has no authority to change its tax on incomes in any way. That ability rests with the state Legislature and governor, and Gov. Hochul has shown little interest in raising taxes to finance Mamdani's proposals. Her position on this matter is not likely to change as her race for reelection against a serious challenger from the Republican Party heats up. But there is an untapped funding source that could pay not just for free buses, but for free subways as well: parking fees. There are approximately [3 million parking spots in New York City](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/opinion/a-fix-for-new-yorks-parking-problems.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that allow people to store their vehicles overnight for absolutely no cost. Add them up, and those spaces occupy around 11,000 acres of land, or 5.6% of the city's total area. Mini-storage is a massive business in this space-starved city, but it's completely free for people to store one type of private good. This begs the question of why we are charging people to use environmentally friendly buses and subways, thereby discouraging their use, while providing free car storage for polluting, traffic-inducing, pedestrian-harming vehicles, thereby encouraging their use. It wasn't always this way. Free overnight parking [only began in 1954](https://www.city-journal.org/article/parking-madness?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At the time, the City rejected a parking tax of $60 per year (more than $500 in today's dollars). Why should we reconsider a decision that was made over 70 years ago? Because if the City metered all of its parking spots, it could collect $3.8 billion annually by charging just $3.47 per spot per day. The City could then transfer that revenue to the MTA to completely cover the approximately [$3.8 billion per year](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/03/MTA.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Operating%20Revenue/Expense%20Projections.%20The%20NYCT%20projects%20$5.8,depreciation%2C%20and%20other%20post%2Demployment%20benefits%2C%20in%202024.) the MTA would give up by ending fares on both buses and subways, making the city's mass transit system totally free. That $3.47 charge per day is an average. The charge could be higher in more dense and affluent areas and lower or nonexistent in poorer areas and for low-income or disabled people who need cars. Such a shift of expenses from transit riders to car owners should appeal to a mayor focused on affordability. Not only do many more lower-income New Yorkers rely on mass transit rather than private cars to navigate the city, but many more New Yorkers in general rely on mass transit rather than private cars. Making all public transit free would also encourage more trips to see friends and family, participate in the city's cultural offerings, attend work or classes, and, in general, participate in all that the city has to offer, thereby benefiting not only transit riders, but the city itself. Free subways could supercharge Mamdani's affordability agenda as they carry significantly more than twice as many riders as the city's buses and are heavily used by people commuting to jobs. Striking this deal — charging for parking in exchange for making transit free — would more than just enable the new mayor to live up to one of his key campaign promises. It would enable him to overdeliver on one of his promises, something that almost never happens in politics and could really excite New Yorkers. My back-of-the-envelope estimate doesn't even factor in all of the benefits. For example, the MTA plans to spend [$1.1 billion over the next five years just to upgrade fare gates at 150 subway stations](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/03/nyregion/nyc-subway-fare-evasion-mta.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), about a third of the system. This is an expense that will completely disappear along with the crime of fare beating, and the associated social and penal system costs. Although such savings would not directly inure the MTA, they could easily be used to further subsidize the MTA or provide other services for the city. Car owners would also benefit to some extent: They would waste less time looking for parking spots and driving around in traffic as more people choose mass transit to get around. The current policy of providing free storage for car owners was a mistake in the 1950s and it's a mistake now. After three-quarters of a century, the policy of charging for mass transit while providing free storage for car owners is overdue for some fresh thinking. ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decisionmakers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* *If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*[***Become an inaugural supporter today.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### The Rikers Receivership Risk — and Opportunity URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-rikers-receivership-risk-and-opportunity/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:35.000Z *Rikers Island is unsafe for its officers, inhumane for its inmates and a risk to the security of the people of the city.* *—*[Board of Correction Chair Peter Tufo, 1975](https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/15/archives/a-plea-to-prevent-rikers-island-jail-conditions-from-exploding-into.html?searchResultPosition=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *\[W\]e find that a deep-seated culture of violence is pervasive throughout the adolescent facilities at Rikers, and DOC staff routinely utilize force not as a last resort, but instead as a means to control the adolescent population and punish disorderly or disrespectful behavior…our investigation suggests that the systemic deficiencies identified in this report may exist in equal measure at the other jails on Rikers.* *—*[United States Attorney Preet Bharara, 2014](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1240461-department-of-justice-letter-about-rikers-island/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *The use of force rate and other rates of violence, self-harm, and deaths in custody* *are demonstrably worse than when the Consent Judgment went into effect in 2015… the current rates of use of force, stabbings and slashings, fights, assaults on staff, and in-custody deaths remain extraordinarily high…Worse still, the unsafe and dangerous conditions in the jails…have become normalized despite the fact that they are clearly abnormal and unacceptable.* *—*[U.S. District Judge Laura Swain, 2024](https://ecbawm.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Nunez-Dkt-803-Contempt-Order.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) I begin with this disturbing trip down memory lane not to engage in "adoration of the problem," to [paraphrase](https://burnsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Adoration-Of-The-Question.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) my friend the late James Bell, but as a reminder of how, in the entire tenure of everyone employed or confined at Rikers, it has been a dangerous, demoralizing place. With federal Judge Laura Taylor Swain on the brink of appointing a "remediation manager" — a receiver in all but name — to run city jails, Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani about to take the reins at City Hall, and the city's official position to[ terminate the era of Rikers Island jails](https://rikers.cityofnewyork.us/information/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=In%20October%202019%2C%20the%20former%20New%20York,permanently%20close%20the%20jails%20on%20Rikers%20Island.) arriving just around the corner in 2027, this[ half-century of pain and dysfunction](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/fifty-years-of-injustice-at-rikers) has a better chance of ending than, literally, ever. It will be beyond terrible if we blow it. ## History repeating itself From 2018 to 2022, I was an expert witness in a [Florida death penalty case](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2023/03/02/death-penalty-mitigation-specialists-rare-look?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of a man who had been incarcerated at Rikers in the 1970s when he was 16\. He was the same age as me and we grew up a few neighborhoods apart. In this capacity, I investigated conditions at Rikers during that period — and then saw recent conditions up close during my brief 2021 stint as Correction Commissioner, affording me a unique opportunity to compare the state of the jails nearly five decades apart. The lack of progress was stunning. I interviewed several former corrections officials as well as five men who had been locked up at Rikers as teenagers in the '70s. Although these men were all now in positions of responsibility ranging from nonprofit executive director to foundation president to reentry counselor, the trauma they experienced was as fresh as if it had happened a week earlier, often entering their thoughts and dreams. Three of them cried during their interviews; many said they had never told anyone what they shared. William vanden Heuvel, who served as Board of Correction chair in the 1970s, summarized the conditions they endured: "If we treated dogs the way we were treating these humans, there would be a march down Fifth Avenue protesting it. But it was hidden from view, not for security reasons, but because no one wanted to see what was going on." The same could be said about the Rikers I witnessed during my seven months as commissioner, despite all the legal attention, all the money the city was spending on it and the 2015 consent decree in Nunez vs. the City of New York. The only constant has been misery. ## Carpe diem That's why it is so important to seize this unprecedented moment, not only to close Rikers Island, but to make sure that the culture of violence doesn't migrate to new borough-based jails. Yet despite best intentions, I worry we're about to drop the ball — yet again. Federal law surrounding jail reform litigation deliberately holds receivership as a remedy of last resort, ordered by courts only after other less drastic steps have been taken. That's why it took a decade of escalating violence and [112 deaths](https://tillidgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-22-Monitors-Report.pdf?inline=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) before Judge Swain ordered the court takeover. Meanwhile, doing what I suspect they believed was their job, City lawyers fought receivership tooth and nail, arguing against it, suggesting they might [appeal ](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/whats-next-federal-court-takeover-rikers-island?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)the court's order, and asking Swain to review her order after she issued it (a request she roundly rejected). They even suggested that the commissioner Mayor Eric Adams had appointed serve as both the receiver and commissioner simultaneously for a five-year period, which would've hamstrung the incoming mayor from replacing her during his entire first term. While these efforts failed to block a court takeover, they may have watered down the ultimate order. Instead of a "clean" receivership like the one that succeeded in [turning around](https://justicelab.columbia.edu/news/Pros-Cons-Receiverships?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the Cook County (Chicago) juvenile detention facility, the judge has put a triumvirate of cooks in Rikers' kitchen. Under the current edict, there will be: (1) a court-appointed receiver with control over jail functions related to the lawsuit (in other words, almost everything); (2) a mayorally-appointed commissioner in charge of all other jail functions (details to be worked out between the receiver and commissioner and approved by the judge) and (3) a court-appointed monitor overseeing the court-appointed receiver. Even with crystal-clear lines of authority, Rikers is a bear to fix. This tripartite set of leaders is a recipe for disaster. Giuliani-era Commissioner Michael Jacobson [called](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/05/20/rikers-remediation-manager-laura-taylor-swain-receiver/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the structure "unbelievably confusing and unclear." Mayor Bloomberg's jails chief, Martin Horn, [agreed,](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/05/20/rikers-remediation-manager-laura-taylor-swain-receiver/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) saying, "I think the judge tried to split the baby." Former Cook County receiver Earl Dunlap wrote plainly, "the Receiver has no chance of succeeding unless he/she is the SINGLE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY subject to the Court's lawful orders." ## A "clean" receivership It doesn't have to be this way. When I was commissioner, I [raised the possibility of the City acquiescing to a receivership](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/fixing-new-york-citys-jails-a-federal-receiver-opening), prioritizing the creation of a robust package of powers to get the job done. If incoming Mayor Mamdani's team could withdraw the City's opposition to the receivership, they could work with plaintiffs and the court to design a structure that has a real chance of working. This would include a *lone receiver* (i.e. no commissioner, no monitor) who runs the jails exclusively, like they did in [Chicago](https://justicelab.columbia.edu/news/Pros-Cons-Receiverships?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and also [Hinds County](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2025/10/01/mississippi-hinds-county-jail-receivership?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Rare%20Oversight%20Begins%20at%20Hinds,Central%20Booking%20and%20Intake%20Center.) (Jackson), Miss. Under this setup, the current federal monitor would stay in place only long enough to transfer his functions to the receiver, as happened in Hinds County, where a federal judge [wrote](https://www.mississippifreepress.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/10517067151.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that, after 30 days, "the Court will be prepared to discharge…\[the\] Monitor unless the Receiver determines her services remain necessary." This would comport with the U.S. Justice Department's [guidance on monitorships](https://www.justice.gov/jm/1-20000-civil-settlement-agreements-and-consent-decrees-involving-state-and-local-governmental?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#1-20.100), which states that they "should be designed to minimize the cost to jurisdictions" and "must be accountable to the court, the parties, and the public," further recommending "monitorship term limits of two or three years." After 10 years at a cost of [$26.1](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/07/07/nyc-prisoners-suit-led-to-jail-reform-but-left-him-little-cost-taxpayers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) million, it's hard to argue that current federal monitor Steve Martin and his team should long coexist with the incoming receiver. The receiver should not only have unobstructed lines of authority but should also have what amounts to emergency powers over personnel to swiftly put a team in place to begin making changes. They should be able to procure fairly but quickly, without being stymied by the City's glacial procurement process; that would enable them to launch or expand programs to productively occupy people's time and to make repairs to Rikers' debilitating physical plant, where homemade shanks can be fashioned out of crumbling infrastructure. And the receiver should have the maximum budget authority permitted under federal law. Finally, the receiver should have the ability to petition the court to abrogate state and local laws, regulations and contracts when they stand in the way of fixing unconstitutional conditions, as the Cook County, Hinds County, and [California](https://clearinghouse.net/doc/24747/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) receivers were granted. For example, under the federal law, judges can, as a last resort, suspend measures permitting staff to abuse sick leave as well as state laws preventing the hiring of highly qualified supervisory staff. Unlimited sick leave was [abused so heavily](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/15/nyregion/rikers-island-jail.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) during my tenure that more than a third of my staff were out "sick" some days — especially on long summer weekends when staff seemed to fall "ill" more frequently. That kind of obvious abuse creates a cynical atmosphere inside the jails, with staff who actually do their jobs getting "stuck" on mandated double or triple shifts while "sick" staff [post pictures](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/nyregion/rikers-guards-sick-leave.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of themselves on Caribbean islands. Just because contracts *can* be abrogated doesn't mean they *should* be. City police have unlimited sick leave and face nowhere near the "sick out" problems that the Correction Department encountered. A smart receiver will sit down with labor to negotiate similar approaches to those at the NYPD, where sick staff must see departmental doctors to affirm their illness, but generous sick leave policies remain in recognition of their difficult jobs. Since violence is concentrated by person and place, a powerful receiver should launch a highly focused approach to make things safer at jails experiencing the most serious problems — those housing adolescents, people with long jail stays or mentally ill people, to name a few. When we did this in 2021 with the adolescent unit, where violence then was three times higher than in the remainder of Rikers, we engaged front-line staff and young people in a collaborative planning effort. We then trained staff and youth in those co-designed units in restorative practices, teaching them to "use their words" — instead of fists and knives — to resolve problems. This resulted in [no assaults on staff or fights among the young people](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/17/nyregion/rikers-island-vincent-schiraldi.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from fall of 2021 until the unit was dissolved by Adams' first commissioner, Louis Molina, early in his tenure in 2022\. Importantly, when staff on these units participated in this turnabout, absenteeism plummeted and they became proselytizers of the new approach among their peers. Vital City's [excellent series of articles](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/improving-conditions-on-rikers-island) offers many other hopeful approaches that have been shown to dramatically improve jail conditions. ## Hope floats Given the persistence of the problems that plague them, it's understandable that many New Yorkers think that the city's jails are beyond repair. This is not the case. I have witnessed several jails, prisons and juvenile facilities transform themselves from miserable, violent places into something far better, from San Quentin Prison to the San Francisco Jail to the Missouri Division of Youth Services to D.C.'s Oak Hill Youth Facility. Hopelessness is contagious, but so is hope. City jails may very well be on the brink of a new era. This is no time for half-measures. The court, city leaders and plaintiffs counsel should move forward boldly and deliberately to get the job done now. ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You answered with a resounding yes, and helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decisionmakers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* *If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us. *Become an inaugural supporter today.** *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decisionmakers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decisionmakers who need them.* *If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*[***Become an inaugural supporter today.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### New York City Needs a Smarter Way to Control Rents URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-needs-a-smarter-way-to-control-rents/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:31.000Z [](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?display=page&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fnew-york-needs-a-smarter-way-to-control-rents)[](http://www.twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fnew-york-needs-a-smarter-way-to-control-rents&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fnew-york-needs-a-smarter-way-to-control-rents&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New York City's rent stabilization system is caught in an impossible bind. Every year, the Rent Guidelines Board studies the economic data and, consistent with [state laws](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), votes on a single percentage increase to apply to roughly one million rent-stabilized apartments across all five boroughs. In 2025, they approved [increases of 3% for one-year leases and 4.5% for two-year leases](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/2025-26-apartment-loft-order-57/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and as always, both sides of the debate claim victory and defeat simultaneously. Tenant advocates — and Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani, who wants to freeze rent increases on these units for the next four years, regardless of what the data show — point to legitimate hardships. [Over half of New York's renters](https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/articles/2025/cordell-cleare/letter-sent-rent-guidelines-board-regarding-unacceptable?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are cost-burdened by their rent, according to the State Comptroller's Office. They're not making this up. But property owners also tell a true story: [The RGB's own reports showed a 6.3% surge in building operating costs](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/nyc-rent-guidelines-board-vote/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), yet increases didn't match that growth. [Financial records from thousands of rent-stabilized apartments](https://www.bisnow.com/new-york/news/affordable-housing/the-crisis-has-already-started-inside-the-finances-of-4300-rent-stabilized-nyc-apartments-129459?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) show dwindling cash, rising expenses and projections of deeper pain ahead. Many landlords are genuinely struggling to keep buildings maintained and financially viable. How can both sides be right? Because we're trying to solve a complex, varied problem with a single number. It's time to change the law. ## Three buildings, three realities Consider three rent-stabilized buildings across the city, all subject to the same 3% rent increase: [In one building in Crown Heights](https://patch.com/new-york/prospectheights/flippers-playbook-how-nyc-slumlords-terrorize-tenants-get-away-it?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), longtime tenants have lived in their apartments for decades, paying rents well below market rate. In recent years, these tenants have [filed a sudden surge of 311 complaints](https://prismreports.org/2025/04/03/nyc-rent-stabilization-tenants-landlords/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (ranging from heat and hot water problems, broken boilers, water leaks, crumbling ceilings and construction dust) which housing advocates recognize as a result of deliberate neglect by landlords; conditions designed to drive people out so the building can be emptied and enter the open market. Those practices have been substantially curbed by [2019's Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act](https://nlihc.org/resource/field-new-york-state-legislators-pass-housing-stability-and-tenant-protection-act-2019?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which eliminated vacancy decontrol, and by[ a 2024 law that closed the "Frankensteining" loophole, where landlords would combine two previously rent-stabilized units into one open-market unit.](https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/2024/brian-kavanagh/what-end-frankenstein-loophole-means-nyc-renters?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Those laws are substantial steps in the right direction, but they also underscore the need for strong laws to curb those seeking to exploit the system for profit at the expense of residents. Meanwhile, in the Bronx, a family owns two small buildings that have been in their family for generations. They're not wealthy; they're struggling. [With cash running low, they recently had to patch one building's roof as a short-term fix rather than undergo the major repair it actually needs](https://www.bisnow.com/new-york/news/affordable-housing/the-crisis-has-already-started-inside-the-finances-of-4300-rent-stabilized-nyc-apartments-129459?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They're not trying to empty their buildings or flip them to luxury; they're just trying to keep them standing. The same modest rent increase that does nothing to discourage the negligent landlord in Crown Heights also doesn't give this family enough to replace a failing roof. [And then there are gleaming new developments in Gowanus, built by a large real estate firm with dozens of properties across the city.](https://www.brownstoner.com/development/gowanus-rezoning-impact-new-construction-affordable-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) These buildings might have 200 units, including 20% designated as "affordable" under the city's Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH) program, meaning they're rent-stabilized. These buildings typically have a 24-hour concierge, a fitness center, a roof deck, and professional management that responds to maintenance requests within hours. The developer has economies of scale, favorable financing and diversified holdings that cushion any individual property's performance. For these buildings, the 3% increase is merely one line item in a sophisticated financial model. This is the fundamental flaw of our current system: It treats these three radically different situations identically. The same percentage increase applies to a well-maintained building in excellent financial health and to one teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. ## The problem with uniformity A one-increase-or-freeze-fits-all approach creates perverse outcomes. Responsible landlords who've invested in their properties and maintained quality housing get the same modest increases as slumlords who've racked up hundreds of violations while extracting maximum profit. Some of the city's most notorious landlords [have accumulated hundreds of violations at individual buildings](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/017-24/nyc-s-infamous-worst-landlord-surrenders-is-en-route-rikers-hpd-nyc-sheriff-s-office?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and even served jail time for their neglect. Yet, while neglecting their properties, they still collected the same rent increases as responsible owners. The system rewards the worst actors and penalizes (or at least fails to reward) the best ones. And it provides the same increases to deep-pocketed institutional developers as it does to mom-and-pop landlords operating on razor-thin margins. Meanwhile, tenants in poorly maintained buildings see their rents rise even as their living conditions deteriorate, while tenants in well-run buildings, whether a small family property or a professionally managed new development, may pay increases that exceed what's actually needed to maintain their homes. The numbers confirm what tenants and responsible landlords both know: Something is badly broken. Pre-1974 rent-stabilized units [now have an average of 1.76 maintenance deficiencies](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/how-nyc-can-better-track-condition-rent-stabilized-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — 75% more than newer stabilized units and 79% more than market-rate units. As of late 2020, [between 65% and 85% of open Housing Code violations in rent-stabilized buildings](https://www.centernyc.org/urban-matters-2/new-yorks-housing-is-falling-apart-heres-how-to-stop-that?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across the five boroughs had remained unresolved for a year or more, totaling over 550,000 violations. Yet the city already knows which buildings are the worst offenders. The Alternative Enforcement Program identifies [250 of the city's most distressed buildings each year](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/010-25/hpd-sharpens-enforcement-against-nyc-s-worst-apartment-buildings?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These properties have nearly 40,000 open housing violations, including over 9,000 immediately hazardous conditions like mold, rodents, lead paint and lack of heat or hot water. These represent roughly 3-5% of the regulated stock where conditions are so egregious there's no ambiguity about neglect. ## A smarter framework The solution isn't to abandon rent regulation (though many economists and editorial boards have been saying for decades that that's a better way). Affordable housing is too scarce and too critical to New Yorkers' survival. But we need to move toward a system that recognizes differences in both building quality and financial circumstances. The framework is straightforward: Tie rent increases to building conditions. Buildings in the Alternative Enforcement Program — the worst 3-5% with conditions beyond dispute — would receive zero rent increases until they come into compliance. Meanwhile, buildings meeting quality standards would receive adjustments that reasonably reflect operating cost increases. This [isn't a radical concept](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor). It's basic market logic: You get paid for delivering a quality product. Right now, rent stabilization severs that connection entirely. Landlords get paid the same whether they respond to repairs in 24 hours or 24 months, whether their heating systems work reliably or break down every winter. Creating differential rent guidelines would restore accountability. The RGB [already](https://www.thecity.nyc/2024/03/27/rent-hike-price-board-apartment-lease-guide/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) establishes different rates for lofts versus apartments, and for different lease terms. Alex Armlovich, a member of the RGB, has made a good argument that this [authority extends to creating distinctions based on building quality and maintenance records.](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor) The board could use its rulemaking process to establish tiers: Buildings in the Alternative Enforcement Program receive zero increases until compliance is achieved, while buildings meeting quality standards receive varied adjustments that reasonably reflect operating cost increases. For the struggling family owners, this would mean the increases they receive actually help them afford the roof replacement their building desperately needs. For the tenants in Crown Heights, it would mean their negligent landlord stops profiting from deliberate deterioration. And for the well-capitalized Gowanus developer already maintaining a high-quality building, it would mean continuing to receive reasonable returns on a well-managed property while knowing that if standards ever slipped, so would their revenue. ## Building a coalition [Incoming Mayor Zohran Mamdani won the Democratic primary and the mayoralty in part on promises to freeze rents for all four years of his administration](https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/rent-board-approves-increases-final-vote-stabilized-apartments-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It remains to be seen whether such freezes, assuming he can get them through the Rent Guidelines Board, will hold up against court challenges; by law, increases or freezes are supposed to be driven by data, not preemptive political pronouncements. But assuming they do, a citywide freeze applied to all buildings also creates real risks. It could undermine housing quality and potentially force some smaller landlords into distress or sale. [Many owners took out loans assuming they'd eventually raise rents, but 2019's Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act closed those loopholes, leaving thousands of properties financially underwater as loans come due](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2025/10/unable-raise-rents-owners-rent-stabilized-buildings-face-financial-trouble/409245/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A blanket freeze could accelerate this crisis. [Mayor-elect Mamdani has pointed to data showing that net operating income for rent-stabilized buildings increased by approximately 12% in recent years.](https://gothamist.com/news/amid-mamdanis-call-for-rent-freeze-nyc-board-approves-45-hike?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) But this aggregate figure obscures the reality: it lumps together all three types of buildings; the Crown Heights slumlord collecting rent while providing minimal maintenance, the struggling Bronx family owners and the well-capitalized Gowanus developer. It ignores that many buildings containing only rent-stabilized units are struggling financially even as others thrive. A targeted approach delivers on the promise without the collateral damage. Freeze rents for the worst landlords and those whose revenues are beyond healthy. Let responsible owners cover their costs. The message would be clear: We're standing up for tenants by holding landlords accountable, not by pretending that every building faces the same circumstances. [As one housing industry observer noted](https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/rent-board-approves-increases-final-vote-stabilized-apartments-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), applying the same rate to every rent-stabilized unit "doesn't make sense anymore. "We need rent increases "based on data and context." This also speaks to the economic diversity among property owners that's often ignored in housing debates. Some landlords are institutional investors with deep pockets and professional management teams. Others are families who own a single building and depend on rental income for their own housing security. A system that distinguishes between operators who maintain their buildings and those who don't is fairer to all groups than our current blunt instrument. ## The path forward The state can always change the law to allow such distinctions to be made, but we don't have to wait on Albany. The Rent Guidelines Board can use its rulemaking authority to establish differential guidelines based on building quality and other criteria related to financial health. The enforcement data already exists: The Alternative Enforcement Program (AEP) maintains a publicly updated list of the city's 250 most distressed buildings, refreshed annually based on violation records, making it straightforward to identify which properties should face rent freezes until they achieve compliance. The list could also easily be expanded as needed, if 250 buildings is deemed insufficient. The legal framework also exists. The RGB can set different rates for different categories. What's needed is political will. Yes, there are details to work out, but they are solvable. What's not solvable is the fundamental contradiction of our current system: trying to regulate a million diverse apartments, in thousands of different buildings, owned by landlords with vastly different resources and motivations, with a single annual percentage. Our city deserves a rent stabilization system sophisticated enough to match the complexity of the problem it's trying to solve. ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You answered with a resounding yes, and helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor-elect Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decision-makers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decision-makers who need them.* ***If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*** [***Become an inaugural supporter***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-sitetop?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***today.*** *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### Daylight Savings: A Safer, Cheaper and Quicker Way to Design Intersections URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-safer-cheaper-quicker-way-of-daylighting-intersections/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:38.000Z Across the country, cities are rethinking how they use streets. In New York City, one of the most fiercely contested issues is the design of intersections, largely focused on whether to keep corners clear of parked vehicles in order to make it easier for pedestrians and drivers alike to see around the corner, a change that's referred to as "daylighting." Safe-street advocates are rallying for universal daylighting at all intersections; a bill currently before the City Council would do just that. On the other hand, the city's [Department of Transportation](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/daylighting-and-street-safety.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) released an analysis earlier this year, while criticized by councilmembers and safe-street advocates for faulty use of data, claiming that daylighting does not necessarily make intersections safer. Many drivers and their representatives also argue that the [estimated](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/transit/2025/04/22/council-pushes-bill-to-remove-parking-within-20-feet-of-crosswalks-at-all-intersections?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (though [disputed](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/08/08/we-told-you-so-dots-anti-daylighting-scare-tactic-now-fuels-pro-car-pols?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) cost of over $3 billion could be better used elsewhere. The current debate focuses on providing clear curb space on both sides of all four corners of an intersection, with advocates saying this is required for better sight lines. DOT and others opposing a change claim that daylighting would take up too much curb space currently used for parking, and that daylighting in fact [encourages speeding](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/09/29/daylighting-bill-adds-street-danger/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), making streets more dangerous. Both sides are missing the real issue: there are different safety considerations at different areas of an intersection, and we need different design strategies to address each. Specifically, conditions are very different when drivers are entering an intersection than when they are exiting it. When drivers are entering, we want to optimize visibility. When drivers are exiting, improving cones of vision is no longer the issue; we just want to ensure that drivers stay far away from the curb, and slow down. Who amongst us has not almost had our toes run over by a driver making a right turn too close to the curb? This difference between vehicles entering and exiting has not been addressed in the discussion to date, or even by other[ design standards](https://nacto.org/publication/urban-street-design-guide/intersection-design-elements/visibility-sight-distance/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What is needed now is an informed design standard that prioritizes clear lines of sight when drivers are approaching an intersection, and provides a barrier in the curb lane for when they exit. Call it Daylight Savings. Developing this standard will save lives by improving upon the aspects of universal daylighting that actually contribute to public safety, and, as a bonus, it has significantly less impact on existing curb uses. A dispassionate geometric analysis of how intersections work would lead us to such a standard, which isn't political or ideological — just practical. ## A deeper dive into what's really going on at intersections ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgqhhnyclf9n1kc_image1-png-auto-format-compress-1776259665541.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | Four corner conditions = eight paths of travel. At a typical intersection, there are two primary causes of crashes: restricted visibility, and vehicle speed. We can design for both, but the optimum design solution is different at each side of a corner. Here's why. Each corner has two paths of travel for pedestrians, one crossing each street. With four corners, that makes eight paths of travel. Four of them involve drivers entering the intersection, and four involve drivers exiting it. In the diagram below of one corner, the top side has drivers entering the intersection, and the right side has drivers leaving the intersection. There are, of course, variations depending on one-way streets, bike paths and other issues. But let's keep it simple, and typical, for now. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgqihnyclf9n1ks_image2-png-auto-format-compress-1776259665739.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | With a vehicle parked near intersection: entering side. When drivers approach the intersection, vehicles parked close to the crosswalk can block sight lines for both drivers and pedestrians. Here's what it looks like in real life. The white truck on the left blocks sight lines for both pedestrians and drivers entering the intersection, creating an unsafe condition. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgnx3nyclf9n1ho_photo1-jpeg-auto-format-compress-1776259666474.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | Vehicle parked near intersection; entering side. Clearly, if there were no vehicle parked there, there would be a safety benefit due to the wider cones of vision for both the driver and the pedestrian. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgqvxnyclf9n1kx_image3-png-auto-format-compress-1776259666040.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | Without vehicle parked near intersection: entering side. However, for a driver exiting the intersection, the situation is different. Visibility for pedestrians of a moving vehicle exiting the intersection is already barrier-free. Removing parked vehicles at that (top) location doesn't improve sightlines or safety — instead, it allows drivers to make a wider, faster turn. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgq_hnyclf9n1kg_image4-png-auto-format-compress-1776259666298.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | Without vehicle parked near intersection: exiting side. This is the condition that the DOT correctly identifies as encouraging higher speeds. Not because of more or less visibility, but because of the well-understood and documented fact that cars travel faster on wider turning radii than on narrower ones. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgrl3nyclf9n1km_image5-png-auto-format-compress-1776259666428.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | With vehicle parked near intersection: exiting side. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgrannyclf9n1ks_image6-png-auto-format-compress-1776259666566.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | With planter or other barrier near intersection: exiting side. Conversely, a car or other obstacle in the curb lane here requires a driver to make a tighter turn, which naturally slows them down. Here's what this looks like in real life. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgo8hnyclf9n1jw_photo2-jpeg-auto-format-compress-1776259667095.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | Vehicle parked near intersection; exiting side. The white truck on the left does not impede views of vehicles exiting the intersection, and in fact slows traffic turning right onto this street, providing a safer condition. Unfortunately, the DOT's January 1 [Analysis Of Daylighting And Street Safety](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/daylighting-and-street-safety.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) fails to recognize the key differences between approach and exit sides of intersections, and thereby misses key differences. Instead, they suggest, counterintuitively, that increased visibility in general can in fact encourage faster vehicle speeds and actually contribute to driver/pedestrian crashes. In a recent [editorial](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/09/29/daylighting-bill-adds-street-danger/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the City's transportation commissioner and safe-streets advocate Ydanis Rodriguez argues that only "hardened" daylighting — meaning replacing a parked car with a physical barrier — can have safety benefits, while calling for more rigorous analysis. If the January 1 report is an indication, that rigor, beginning with a recognition that the issues are different at different areas, remains to be put into place. ## A better way Understanding the key differences in conditions at even the simplest of intersections suggests that a finer approach to the design of intersections is warranted. It's pretty simple, really: Intersection design should ensure better cones of vision on the *approach* side of an intersection and discourage high speeds at the *exiting* side. Of the eight start points for pedestrians, only the four "driver-entry" points would benefit from better sight lines. In contrast to the idea that full daylighting is always safer, the other four paths of travel would actually benefit from an object located near the crosswalk, be it a parked car, raised planter, bike rack or other public amenity. Since we can't guarantee that a car will always be parked there, it makes sense to place some sort of barrier that requires moving vehicles to make a tighter, and therefore slower, turn. Some advocates for universal daylighting have made the case that taking parking space away is, in and of itself, a good thing, and that daylighting also provides the opportunity to create [rain gardens](https://citylimits.org/opinion-how-daylighting-can-allow-nycs-streets-to-fight-flooding/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These are separate concerns from the safety issue, which is my focus here. A "Daylight Savings" approach, with no parking on the approach side but with a barrier at the curb lane on the exit side, whether it's 2 feet wide or 20, would result in a reduction of the effective turning radius for vehicles making right turns, thereby calming turning speeds at the moment pedestrians are most vulnerable, while still improving all relevant sight lines. This does not preclude parking at 50% of the locations. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/atgrqhnyclf9n1k4_image7-png-auto-format-compress-1776259666659.jpg) Credit: Jonathan James Cohn | Daylight Savings: No parking at entry, barrier at exit. Saving half the curbside space while providing a safer intersection. In short, if what we care about most is pedestrian safety, the debate shouldn't be over whether to allow or disallow automobiles at all eight locations of an intersection. There's good reason to bar cars from parking in four of those spots — while keeping them and even placing other smallish, turn-slowing objects in the other four. A Daylight Savings approach improves upon the true safety benefits of daylighting, while reducing construction and saving curb space. It's a lighter, quicker, cheaper — and maybe more politically palatable — way to achieve safer streets. ════════════════════════════════════════ *New York is entering an historic and pivotal transition. Mayor-elect Mamdani faces big problems on housing, safety, mental health, transit and more.* *Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer clear, practical guidance rooted in evidence. Ideas that could actually be implemented and work.* *But to meet this moment, we need to grow.* *That's why, this year, for the first time, we're asking our readers to support Vital City directly. We're aiming for 700 inaugural supporters by December 31.* *Your support will help us expand our editorial capacity, strengthen our operational support and continue delivering thoughtful, relevant and informative work in 2026.* *If this article informed your thinking, challenged you or helped you understand the city more clearly, please consider supporting the work behind it.* [***Make your tax-deductible gift and help us reach 700 supporters.***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### Taking Mamdani’s Revolution to the Streets URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/taking-mamdanis-revolution-to-the-streets/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:31.000Z New York City's streets have always been gritty. "A person upon arriving at home, after a day's business, finds himself rich in landed property clinging tenaciously to his clothing, boots, and sometimes to his hands and face," the New York Timeseuphemistically [observed](https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1874/02/14/79217172.html?pageNumber=3&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 1874. New Yorkers no longer have to wade through horse manure to get where they're going (with the exception of those traveling through parts of [Central Park](https://www.npr.org/2025/10/21/nx-s1-5558376/new-yorks-city-council-looks-to-ban-central-park-horse-drawn-carriages?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). But they face a slew of other dangers and unpleasantries, from reckless drivers to slow buses to double-parked cars and trucks. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani will come into office with a unique opportunity to address those challenges with bold transformations of the streetscape. Some of the streets policies Mamdani has [endorsed](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/07/04/beach-reading-zohran-mamdanis-answers-to-streetsblogs-mayoral-candidate-survey?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), like neighborhood-scale pedestrianizations and a massive expansion of bus lanes, may at first blush seem like radical changes. And in the current climate, they're likely to fuel no shortage of headlines about pedestrian-vs.-bike-vs.-vehicle culture wars, as previous streetscape changes have done. Anything that's viewed as a further "attack" on cars will be framed as indulgent and elitist. But the history of the city's streets reveals an ever-evolving urban circulatory system. New technologies and shifting political priorities have previously led to completely new uses of the public rights of way. Today, city streets are long overdue for redesigns that better reflect the needs and wants of contemporary New Yorkers.It would be difficult to cast a more fitting leader for this project than the Citi Bike-riding, bus-taking, halal-cart-dining avatar of New York City street life himself. ## The changing role of the street 19th-century streets could be nasty places. Still, they had other things going for them, as historian Christopher Wells vividly describes in the book ["Car Country."](https://uwapress.uw.edu/book/9780295994291/car-country/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Before cars, streets were public spaces akin to what we would today call plazas. [Photographs](https://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org/images/pedestrians-and-peddlers-in-new-york-city-1915/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [films](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=768Cm3WJY6I&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of city life from this era show streets filled with vendors, kids playing stickball games and a whole lot of milling about in the middle of the road. There were no lane markers or traffic signals for horse-drawn vehicles and streetcars, which could travel only as fast as the pedestrian throngs would allow. Studying a 10-hour period in 1915 at the corner of Fulton and Broadway, researchers counted approximately 220,000 pedestrians and 10,000 vehicles of all types. As car ownership increased, the role of the street in city life fundamentally changed. The auto industry understood that cars would never become the dominant mode of transportation if city streets retained their raucous mixture of activity. The industry launched an all-out public relations campaign, buying positive press coverage in newspapers, providing educational material to Boy Scout troops and schools and aggressively lobbying public officials. Their goal: to re-cast streets not as public spaces shared by diverse users and uses, but as thoroughfares for high-speed automotive transportation. Gradually, government and media latched on to the auto industry narrative. The transformation of New York City into a more car-friendly metropolis is often laid at the feet of Robert Moses. That's a terrible oversimplification. By the 1930s, in New York and cities across the country, streets were legally and culturally enshrined as the near-exclusive domain of cars, historian Peter Norton recounts in ["Fighting Traffic."](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262516129/fighting-traffic/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Traffic signals, crosswalks and one-way streets were instituted to allow for the more efficient flow of vehicles, consigning pedestrians to ever-narrower slices of the public right-of-way. Newly deputized traffic cops were unleashed to fight the novel crime of jaywalking, derived from the derogatory term "jay," a country bumpkin who arrives in the city and does foolish things like wandering into the middle of the road. Peddlers were banished from city streets, too, forced to abandon their trades or crowd into indoor facilities like Essex Market in the Lower East Side. Where they could, planners widened city streets to make more room for automobiles. On Midtown avenues like [Second](https://www.nytimes.com/1911/10/01/archives/sharp-contrasts-in-lower-second-avenue-now-called-the-east-side.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and Fifth, officials created new vehicle lanes by shrinking the sidewalks. On [Park Avenue](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2024/08/27/city-will-put-the-park-back-in-park-ave-but-details-bike-lane-road-diet-are-left-out?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the generous median went from a walkable promenade to a purely ornamental strip of green separating the speeding bi-directional traffic. The car-oriented consensus on street design held for decades, with a few notable exceptions. Greenwich Village activists led by Shirley Hayes successfully fought to [liberate](https://www.villagepreservation.org/2024/04/05/the-last-hurrah-for-traffic-in-the-square/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Washington Square Park from cars in the 1950s. Mayor Ed Koch established some of the city's first bus lanes in the 1980s, which speed trips for riders to this day. He also [built](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2013/02/01/ed-koch-1973-the-bicycle-must-be-included-in-nyc-transpo-system?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a handful of protected bike lanes, only to rip them out a few weeks later after they were mocked by Governor Hugh Carey. ## Restoring the balance It wasn't until the new millennium that city leaders began to test out a new approach to street design. As transportation commissioner under Mayor Michael Bloomberg from 2007 to 2013, Janette Sadik-Khan resolved "to restore the balance of the street and replace the vestiges of last century's planning dogma, which ignored the human experience on that street," she writes in her memoir, ["Streetfight."](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/318945/streetfight-by-janette-sadik-khan-and-seth-solomonow/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Times Square was a particularly egregious example. About 90% of the Crossroads of the World was dedicated to cars and just 10% to pedestrians, despite cars and pedestrians populating the intersection in roughly opposite proportions. One morning in 2009, Sadik-Khan and her team rolled construction barrels onto the asphalt, marking off a stretch of Broadway as a pedestrian plaza. Instantly, the intersection was transformed. Even as the New York Post howled, commuters had room to breathe, and tourists could gawk at the digital screens overhead unperturbed. Nor were automobiles the "losers": Collisions fell dramatically, and [traffic moved](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/broadway%5Freport%5Ffinal2010%5Fweb2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) slightly faster down Seventh Avenue after the closure as drivers no longer had to deal with a confusing oblique intersection. Sadik-Khan went on to create new pedestrian plazas at dozens of less famous crossroads, reclaiming 180 acres of city streets for pedestrians and bicyclists. She added hundreds of miles of bike lanes, using parked cars to protect them from traffic. She also redesigned hundreds of intersections to force drivers to make sharper, slower turns and to shorten the distance pedestrians had to cross. Many of Sadik-Khan's interventions began as "tactical urbanism" pilot projects using cheap, temporary materials. This way, she was able to sidestep arduous approval and review processes that surely would have doomed her ambitions. (Sometimes, as [with a planned bike lane on Prospect Park West](https://gothamist.com/news/prospect-park-west-bike-lane-lawsuit-will-never-die?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), approval was exceedingly slow nevertheless, thanks to a lawsuit.) Instead, she found that "the transformation of the street itself was the best example and catalyst for its approval." In other words, people voted with their feet. Business [boomed](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/2013-dot-sustainable-streets.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Times Square after Sadik-Khan banished cars. During her tenure, traffic fatalities declined to their [lowest level](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/dot-making-safer-streets.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since 1910\. By 2013, bike ridership was four times higher than it was a decade earlier. By 2023, the latest year for which citywide [data](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/bicyclists/bikestats.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is available, bike ridership in the city had doubled again, to more than 600,000 daily trips. Much of that growth has come from riders on Citi Bike, which Sadik-Khan helped establish in 2013\. Here, again, the transformation of the streets with bike racks and bright blue two-wheelers, deeply contentious at first, initiated a virtuous cycle. "More riders create demand for more biking infrastructure and invite more people to ride and to walk on increasingly safer streets," Sadik Khan wrote. ## After Sadik-Khan Something fundamental shifted in the city's conception of its streets following Sadik-Khan's tenure. Elected officials and the public could no longer view streets as the presumptive domain of cars alone. Subsequent mayoral administrations and transportation commissioners continued the general trend that Bloomberg and Sadik-Khan had set in motion. In fact, [bike lane installation](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/11/05/agenda-2026-the-new-mayor-must-sustain-the-citys-bike-boom?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) accelerated under Mayor Bill de Blasio — whose Vision Zero plan set out to slash pedestrian and traffic fatalities — before declining again during Eric Adams' term. The human-centric street transformations that New York City has undergone have moved the city closer to the original understanding of urban streets as shared public spaces. Yet the transformation has only been partial. Most streets, in most neighborhoods, retain their car-centric character from the middle of the last century. Dozens of miles of promised bike lanes and bus lanes remain unbuilt. Adams has [cast aside](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2024/08/26/anatomy-of-a-debacle-how-adams-put-safety-last-on-mcguinness-blvd?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) street redesign plans. Anxiety over a dwindling supply of street parking quashed the city's wildly successful outdoor dining experiment. So much excess road capacity produced by congestion pricing has yet to be reclaimed for people, bikes and transit**.** Mamdani has a chance to swing the pendulum back in the right direction. ## All eyes on Mamdani It would be a fitting mission for our mayor-elect to embrace. As much as any political or pop cultural figure in recent memory, Mamdani is a creature of New York City's streets. He launched his campaign doing man-on-the-street interviews in the Bronx. Since then, he built his brand by speed-walking, Citi-biking and sampling street food across the five boroughs. The Friday before the primary, he walked the length of Manhattan in his suit and tie. He's proposed some boundary-pushing policy proposals in this realm. In his [candidate Q&A with Streetsblog](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/07/04/beach-reading-zohran-mamdanis-answers-to-streetsblogs-mayoral-candidate-survey?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), he signaled his support for new pedestrianized neighborhoods, new bus lanes and an expansion of outdoor dining and open streets. It's difficult to predict how much political capital he will devote to these ideas while simultaneously seeking to make progress on his signature campaign promises. But his voter base should be a significant factor in his calculus. Mamdani won [majority public transit commuter precincts by 29 percentage points](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/11/04/us/elections/nyc-mayor-results-precinct-map.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), one of the biggest demographic cleavages in his victory over former Governor Andrew Cuomo. He has a historic mandate to prioritize alternatives to the car, should he choose to pursue it. There are three general areas that Mamdani has shown an interest in that could cumulatively represent a revolutionary leap in the city's conception of its streets. 1\. **Car-free or "low-traffic" neighborhoods**. It's not as wild as it sounds. Advocacy groups, business improvement districts and local electeds have been calling for such plans for [years](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2022/07/11/opinion-pedestrianize-the-financial-district-now?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Generally, the city's oldest neighborhoods, with narrow streets and lots of foot traffic, make the most sense for these kinds of schemes. With congestion pricing creating a little bit of breathing room in Manhattan, there's never been a better time to reimagine some of that space. The latest leader to echo the call is Lower Manhattan Council Member Chris Marte, who recently endorsed the [pedestrianization of the Financial District](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/08/29/pedestrianize-the-financial-district-lower-manhattan-council-member-says?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Similar plans have been floated for [SoHo/Nolita](https://sohobroadway.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SoHo-Broadway-Public-Realm-Framework-and-Vision-Plan-Final-Small-2021.10.12.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Downtown Brooklyn](https://www.downtownbrooklyn.com/public-realm-action-plan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and elsewhere. The Times Square Theater District, the Lower East Side nightlife district, the Williamsburg shopping district, and the West Village brunch district are all logical places for at least part-time pedestrianizations, when crowds are at their peak. These concepts come with fraught logistical challenges, including access for delivery vehicles and people with disabilities. But these are challenges that cities in other countries have solved in their own pedestrian districts. There's also a wide continuum of people-centric street plans ranging from larger-scale neighborhood pedestrianizations,to "[low-traffic neighborhood](https://www.openplans.org/low-traffic-neighborhoods?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" concepts that eliminate through traffic from narrow side streets. In the middle of that continuum is the "[pedestrian priority district](https://www.fastcompany.com/91378463/meatpacking-district-nyc-most-walkable-neighborhood?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" taking shape in the Meatpacking District. The neighborhood now features a mix of Sadik-Khanian pedestrian plazas at oblique intersections, temporary shared streets protected by elegant movable planters, and extensive landscaping in the style of the nearby High Line. One could imagine more populist pedestrian streets filled with independent vendors and food carts, or free concerts and events. **2\. World-class bus rapid transit**. Making buses free might marginally help improve bus speeds as boarding times shrink, though this is not guaranteed. (On routes in the city's 2023 fare-free buses pilot, travel times [increased](https://www.mta.info/document/147096?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as a surge in riders led to longer boarding times. As MTA chair Janno Lieber [points out](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/p/janno-lieber-on-free-buses-the-state?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), if people shift from subways to buses to save money, bus service could easily become strained.) The much more effective method of speeding buses is through infrastructure in and on the street. New York City has made some progress with bus lanes and busways in recent years. But the reality is that these lanes go disrespected far too often. The best bus rapid transit systems around the world have physically separated rights-of-way, protected by concrete curbs or other barriers. They have dedicated boarding platforms, all-door boarding, limited stopping patterns, and transit priority traffic signals. Many even have level boarding for subway-style, wheelchair-accessible service. Mamdani has [committed](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/07/04/beach-reading-zohran-mamdanis-answers-to-streetsblogs-mayoral-candidate-survey?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to bringing "true bus rapid transit" to New York, though his campaign [platform](https://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is relatively light on the details. He'll have a solid template with the [Flatbush Avenue](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/08/04/dot-reveals-transformational-plan-for-flatbush-ave-but-needs-to-get-the-details-right?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) bus improvement project, which includes some of the attributes described above. In addition to offering better transit service than typical Select Bus Service routes, it should also work wonders on the streetscape, making the public realm much safer and more pleasant for pedestrians. After shepherding this plan to fruition, Mamdani could tout it as a demonstration project as he rolls out world-class bus service to wider thoroughfares across the five boroughs. Transportation researchers Annie Weinstock and Walter Hook already have a handy [list](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/08/01/heres-a-bus-rapid-transit-plan-for-new-york-if-the-city-cares?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the most promising corridors. **3\. Comprehensive curb management.** Car-free streets and widespread rapid bus transit will inevitably necessitate better curb management. To see why, consider how the Flatbush Avenue redesign will mean that a single double-parked delivery truck will block the sole traffic lane. Or consider the potential demand for ride-hail pickups just outside the future FiDi pedestrian zone. To use road space more efficiently, curb space needs to be used more efficiently, too. The Adams administration has taken some initial steps in this direction by creating new [loading zones](https://www.amny.com/news/nyc-dot-adds-new-loading-zones-for-deliveries/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), starting a [trash containerization](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dsny/collection/containerization/m9-bins.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) pilot and encouraging companies like Amazon to use [electric cargo bikes](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pr2024/e-cargo-bike-on-city-streets.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for deliveries. What's missing is a comprehensive citywide curb management strategy that accounts for the many users and uses of the curb. Such a strategy could include providing dedicated curb space for taxis, ride-hail cars and delivery companies on every block, while also making them pay their fair share for that valuable resource. It would consider other uses of the curb, including [year-round outdoor dining](https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-lawmakers-and-businesses-plan-to-rally-for-year-round-outdoor-dining?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), electric vehicle charging, and secure bike parking. Paid curb parking outside of metered commercial districts, and residential parking permit programs would need to be part of that discussion as well. ## Back to the future Making a revolutionary leap in streets policy — akin to the automobilization of city streets a century ago — will be a difficult political fight, to be sure. But once plans are agreed upon, they can be accomplished [cheaper and faster](https://benjaminschneider.substack.com/p/the-fastest-cheapest-way-to-transform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than many of Mamdani's other priorities. Mamdani also has a chance to reset the political conversation around streets policy. Of course, safety is a central motivation, but it's not the only one. Redesigned streets can better reflect the technological, economic, political and cultural realities of the contemporary city. E-commerce and ride-hailing (including robotaxis, which will probably arrive in New York sooner or later) are facts of city life that the transportation system [needs to accommodate](https://www.slowboring.com/p/robotaxis-should-be-a-wakeup-call?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through both pricing and design. Those ride-hail vehicles have gummed up traffic, while also giving more people a compelling alternative to transit. To compete, buses need to be much faster, which can be accomplished through rapid bus transit. Bike ridership is already at historic highs, due in large part to the emergence of e-bikes and bikeshare. Those ridership figures can easily rise much higher, if people have [safe places to ride](https://medium.com/@patrickdaviscleary/bedford-avenue-protected-bike-lane-sees-65-increase-in-cycling-traffic-15a5a5689ab2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in every neighborhood. In the age of online shopping, restaurants and bars are increasingly the [lifeblood](https://www.wsj.com/real-estate/commercial/nyc-restaurants-retail-property-market-cdb22445?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of commercial neighborhoods. Giving them some extra room to spread out by way of outdoor dining can help drive more foot traffic to corridors that otherwise would feel desolate. Meanwhile, gathering in public has taken on a heightened significance in an era characterized by so much loneliness and mediation. Better street design can take us back to the future, when streets were true public spaces. We need more places to commune, to protest and just to hang out. Surely, that's a vision Mamdani could rally the people behind. *This essay is adapted from chapter 4 of "*[*The Unfinished Metropolis: Igniting the City-Building Revolution*](https://www.amazon.com/Unfinished-Metropolis-Igniting-City-Building-Revolution/dp/1642833533?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*," copyright © 2025, by Benjamin Schneider by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.* ════════════════════════════════════════ *Three years ago, Vital City was just an idea sketched out in a Lower Manhattan diner.* *Today, it's shaping how New York works. Our analysis drives citywide conversations. Our recommendations influence policy. Our events bring practitioners together.* *None of that happens without people like you, who share our work, engage with our ideas and believe in the potential of cities.* *This December, we're launching our first fundraising campaign. We're asking 700 people to become inaugural supporters and help us build a sustainable foundation for what comes next: more ambitious editorial projects, stronger data analysis, community events for urban policy practitioners and practical guidance for the new mayoral administration.* *If Vital City has ever helped you understand your city more clearly, we hope you'll invest in its future.* [***Make your tax-deductible gift by December 31 →***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-article?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### The Urban Optimist’s Holiday Gift Guide URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-urban-optimist-holiday-gift-guide/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:39.000Z ## Shelf improvement **Recent and forthcoming books by Vital City authors and urban policy thinkers we admire.** [**Back from the Brink: Inside the NYPD and New York City's Extraordinary 1990s Crime Drop**](https://www.mcnallyjackson.com/book/9780197797778?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Peter Moskos (2025)* A nuanced oral history of the people and policies behind New York City's drastic reduction in violent crime during the 1990s. [**Movement: New York's Long War to Take Back Its Streets from the Car**](https://www.mcnallyjackson.com/book/9781531508210?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Nicole Gelinas (2024)* Jane Jacobs' victorious fight against the development of the Lower Manhattan Expressway is a totemic moment in New York City history, but it's not the first or the last time New Yorkers mobilized to fight for a city designed for people, not cars. Gelinas' book walks us through the history of urban transit — good, bad and ugly. Read an excerpt [here](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/movement-new-yorks-long-war-to-take-back-its-streets-from-the-car-excerpt). [**The Nonprofit Crisis: Leadership Through the Culture Wars**](https://www.mcnallyjackson.com/book/9780197786307?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Greg Berman (2025)* Vital City's co-editor draws from decades of experience in nonprofit leadership to offer a sharp look at why nonprofits — especially those based in cities — are being strained by polarization, internal identity debates and resource pressures, and what genuine leadership now requires. [**The Lost Subways of North America**](https://www.mcnallyjackson.com/book/9780226829791?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Jake Berman (2023)* A richly illustrated atlas of the subway systems we built, dismantled or never completed — including New York's forgotten lines and unbuilt alternates. For a taste, read Berman's [review of the new MTA subway map](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-yorks-new-subway-map) and [his vision of how the system can evolve](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/expand-the-reach-of-the-subway-system-a-2125-map). [**The Architecture of Urbanity: Designing for Nature, Culture, and Joy**](https://www.mcnallyjackson.com/book/9780691208435?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Vishaan Chakrabarti (2024)* The Vital City contributing writer and architect makes an argument for humane, dense, connected cities, presenting a vision of architecture as a force for addressing our biggest social challenges and fostering joy. [**The Science of Second Chances: A Revolution in Criminal Justice**](https://www.booksaremagic.net/item/3Czr8TaWU98OrYRlyyKUOg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Jennifer Doleac (Forthcoming Feb. 2026)* An economist's rigorous, evidence-first examination of what actually works in rehabilitation and reentry. Doleac cuts through political slogans to identify the specific interventions that reduce recidivism and improve public safety. [**Unforgiving Places: The Unexpected Origins of American Gun Violence**](https://www.booksaremagic.net/item/9ZxRdsPjgutfOGU0M2k9wg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*Jens Ludwig (2025)* A groundbreaking work on what really drives firearm-related crime in cities. Genuinely eye-opening, even for those who thought they truly understood public safety. [**Survival of the City: Living and Thriving in an Age of Isolation**](https://www.mcnallyjackson.com/book/9780593297704?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Edward Glaeser and David Cutler (2022)* The COVID-19 pandemic brought cities to a crossroads, and in this book, Glaeser and Cutler consider how our metropolises can stave off a "doom loop" and make the most of the new normal. [**Paved Paradise: How Parking Explains the World**](https://booksaremagic.net/item/zroBIQl5na8wALQ%5FSVJrjQ?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Henry Grabar (2024)* The best recent book on a too-little-scrutinized need that's shaped and distorted contemporary cities. [**Marked by Time: How Social Change Has Transformed Crime and the Life Trajectories of Young Americans**](https://www.booksaremagic.net/item/5j6LaHiWPZekzLcXLzhQSg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Robert J. Sampson (Forthcoming Feb. 2026)* A landmark work from the Harvard sociologist that reframes the crime debate, arguing that the "when" of a person's birth — and the generational zeitgeist they inhabit — shapes their life course as much as their neighborhood or background. [**Unequal Cities: Overcoming Anti-Urban Bias to Reduce Inequality in the United States**](https://booksaremagic.net/item/E%5FyaYonK-A-piA79xtDJiw?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Richard McGahey (2023)* A structural, historical, evidence-rich examination of why urban America struggles against inequality and how policy can shift the terrain. [**Captain's Dinner: A Shipwreck, An Act of Cannibalism, and a Murder Trial That Changed Legal History**](https://www.amazon.com/Captains-Dinner-Shipwreck-Cannibalism-Changed/dp/B0DXD5K14B?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*Adam Cohen (2025)* A riveting true story of shipwreck, cannibalism and legal ethics by a Vital City friend and contributor. [**Candid New York: The Pioneering Photography of George Bradford Brainerd**](https://www.booksaremagic.net/item/e2TjfB8fybtbApWMHi44NA?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*Erik Hesselberg (2025)* A collection of vibrant Gilded Age snapshots by the city's first-ever street photographer. [**The Gilded Age in New York, 1870-1910**](https://www.mcnallyjackson.com/book/9780316353663?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*Esther Crain (2016)* And speaking of the Gilded Age — this book by the founder of Ephemeral New York chronicles it all. ## **The very New York objects section** **Almost everyone likes things.** [**Transit Museum Subway Map Coasters**](https://www.nytransitmuseumstore.com/coaster-setmap-hertz.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Functional and nostalgic. [**1807 Commissioners' Plan Map**](https://historicpictoric.com/products/historic-map-bridges-new-york-city-1871-reissue-1807-vintage-wall?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) An artifact of New York's foundational act of urban imagination, the grid. [**"A Century of The New Yorker" Tote**](https://shop.nypl.org/products/nypl-a-century-of-the-new-yorker-tote-bag?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The classic New Yorker tote bag has come to be a ubiquitous accessory on New York City's streets and subway platforms. This limited edition design celebrates the magazine's centennial. [**Miniature New York City Fire Escape Models**](https://www.etsy.com/market/miniature%5Ffire%5Fescape?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Some think they're eyesores. We think they're architecture. [**"I Finished the Power Broker" Mug**](https://shop.nyhistory.org/products/mug-power-broker?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Get it for them especially if they didn't (and you know they didn't). [**Just about anything from the Tenement Museum Shop**](https://shop.tenement.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[](https://shop.tenement.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Historically-inspired gifts with Lower East Side soul. [**Just about anything from the Queens Museum Shop**](https://queensmuseum.org/shop/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) One of the city's great cultural institutions deserves its place in the sun. [**Just about anything from the NYC CityStore**](https://a856-citystore.nyc.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Official store of the City of New York — magnets, memorabilia and municipal charm. [**Just about anything from the Hall of Science's CityWorks exhibit**](https://shop.nysci.org/collections/city-works?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) No infrastructure, no New York. [**Prints from the New York City Municipal Archives**](https://nycrecords.access.preservica.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) A treasure trove of historical photographs, drawings and maps, all available to order as prints. [**A vintage NYC bond**](https://newyorkarchivalsociety.org/bonds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) A redeemed NYC bond (1920s–1980s), each signed by a former Mayor. ## **Big Apple-arrel** **Wear your civic pride on your sleeve.** [**Antique New York Ball Cap**](https://onlyny.com/products/antique-new-york-ball-cap?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Classic typography, understated city pride. [**Big Apple Parade T-Shirt**](https://onlyny.com/products/big-apple-parade-t-shirt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Playful civic iconography; very New York. [**The Five Boroughs T-Shirt**](https://www.etsy.com/listing/4404309134/new-york-manhattan-brooklyn-queens-the?gpla=1&gao=1&&utm%5Fsource=google&utm%5Fmedium=cpc&utm%5Fcampaign=shopping%5Fus%5F-clothing&utm%5Fcustom1=%5Fk%5FCj0KCQiAubrJBhCbARIsAHIdxD9rTGhSX88smqJ6adD5IO3vtnhJBy8XE9IXNs2ZDOXCXuGqHwDvJdgaAiO6EALw%5FwcB%5Fk%5F&utm%5Fcontent=go%5F22607281367%5F181599613913%5F754746897786%5Fpla-360912201277%5Fc%5F%5F4404309134%5F12768591&utm%5Fcustom2=22607281367&gad%5Fsource=1&gad%5Fcampaignid=22607281367&gbraid=0AAAAADtcfRLmlui1Xs7Do6RTpPpQtxMMU&gclid=Cj0KCQiAubrJBhCbARIsAHIdxD9rTGhSX88smqJ6adD5IO3vtnhJBy8XE9IXNs2ZDOXCXuGqHwDvJdgaAiO6EALw%5FwcB) Manhattan and Brooklyn typically get most of the ink. Celebrate all five legs of the stool. [**Central Park Foliage T-Shirt**](https://onlyny.com/products/central-park-folliage-t-shirt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Graphic homage to the city's green heart. [**NYC Parks Logo Hoodie**](https://onlyny.com/products/nyc-parks-logo-hoodie?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Soft, durable, municipal-chic. [**"Report: 'It's Not Okay To Just Start Talking to People You Don't Know'" T-Shirt**](https://store.theonion.com/products/report-its-not-okay-headline-t-shirt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) We disagree with the sentiment but respect The Onion's right to be wrong. [**DSNY Home Waste Basket**](https://onlyny.com/products/dsny-home-waste-basket?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Design-forward sanitation culture — the perfect oddball NYC apartment accessory. [**Only NY × MoMA Community Wall Clock**](https://onlyny.com/products/only-ny-x-moma-community-of-new-york-wall-clock?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Functional, graphic, instantly "New York." ## **New York City experiences** **For people who prefer their urbanism in motion.** [**New York Transit Museum Membership**](https://www.nytransitmuseum.org/join/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Events, nostalgia rides and a quiet underground home for transit lovers. [**Municipal Art Society – Jane's Walk**](https://www.mas.org/janes-walk-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Give the experience of exploring neighborhoods through community-led storytelling. [**Big Onion Walking Tours**](https://bigonion.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) PhD-led neighborhood history walks — for the nerd in you. [**Essex Market Cooking Classes**](https://www.essexmarket.nyc/events?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Local, delicious and neighborhood-driven. [**Firehouse Cinema**](https://www.dctvny.org/s/firehousecinema?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) A fantastic new home for documentaries. [**Open House New York (OHNY) Membership**](https://ohny.org/support/membership/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Annual access to normally closed buildings, infrastructure and architectural gems. ## **Stocking stuffers for urbanites** **Little things that can do a lot** [**Pocket Decibel Meter**](https://www.amazon.com/s?k=pocket+decibel+meter&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) For recreational noise measurement. [**Muji Notebook Set**](https://www.muji.us/collections/notebook/products/planted-tree-paper-bleed-proof-notebook-5-pack?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) To jot down or sketch what you see on the sidewalk, subway or bus. [**Lux Meter**](https://www.homedepot.com/pep/TRIPLETT-Digital-Light-Meter-Lux-Fc-LT75/318390022?mtc=SHOPPING-BF-CDP-BNG-D27E-027%5F011%5FELECTRICAL%5FACCESSORIES-NA-NA-NA-PLALIA-NA-NA-NA-NA-NBR-NA-NA-NEW-NA-2024&cm%5Fmmc=SHOPPING-BF-CDP-BNG-D27E-027%5F011%5FELECTRICAL%5FACCESSORIES-NA-NA-NA-PLALIA-NA-NA-NA-NA-NBR-NA-NA-NEW-NA-2024-21871116195-178489370548-2448456200545&msclkid=e8f40e41abb614565696676f5ed9d685&gclid=e8f40e41abb614565696676f5ed9d685&gclsrc=3p.ds&gad%5Fsource=7&gad%5Fcampaignid=21871116195&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) For the person who has opinions about street lighting. [**A real digital SLR**](https://www.bhphotovideo.com/c/used/1076400/?smpm=bu%5Fuar&gad%5Fsource=1&gad%5Fcampaignid=17597921968&gbraid=0AAAAAD7yMh3DrykFgrSNnrgPjRcBUSHU7&gclid=Cj0KCQiAubrJBhCbARIsAHIdxD-ZGlnl4JXP5KDZTS7PAY4Jz5y1qXLzmg-48Xm82kYwN4OFLCVn1joaAgGdEALw%5FwcB&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) For those who are tired of getting lost in their phones rather than looking around, get a device that encourages active watching — and takes better pictures. New York's own B&H Photo has hundreds of options. ## **A taste of the city** **Sweet or savory, sitting down or standing up.** [**Chocolate from Li-Lac Chocolates**](https://www.li-lacchocolates.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Eating confections from New York City's oldest chocolate house is almost as enjoyable as seeing them get made. [**Small Axe Peppers Hot Sauce Three Pack**](https://smallaxepeppers.com/product/buy-new-york-city-hot-sauce-three-pack/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) All three of the hot sauces in this set are made from peppers grown in community gardens in the Bronx and Queens. [**Coffee from Brooklyn Roasting Company**](https://www.brooklynroasting.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Small-batch roasting, subscriptions available. [**Whiskey from Kings County Distillery**](https://www.kingscountydistillery.com/collections/whiskey?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Whether it's straight bourbon or grapefruit jalapeno moonshine you're looking for, the offerings from New York City's oldest distillery since the prohibition make a great addition to any bar cart. **A nice dinner somewhere** Just pick a restaurant and give it a call. ## **Subscriptions or donations to independent media** **We're proud to be part of a thriving nonprofit media ecosystem. Just as** [**we need your support**](https://donorbox.org/support-vital-city-2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)**, so do our cousins. Give a subscription or donation in a loved one's name.** [**THE CITY**](https://www.thecity.nyc/support?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New York's flagship nonprofit newsroom covering housing, transit, governance and accountability. [**Hell Gate**](https://hellgatenyc.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Worker-owned, sharp, funny, deeply reported coverage of NYC politics, arts, labor and absurdities. [**Gothamist / WNYC Member Support**](https://www.wnyc.org/support/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Local reporting + public radio + indispensable urban coverage. [**Streetsblog NYC**](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The daily must-read for anyone who cares about biking, transit, parking and street design. [**Untapped New York**](https://www.untappedcities.com/join/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Through online articles and tour guides, Untapped New York sheds light on the city's hidden gems. ## **For the person who has everything** [**A $128 million Manhattan penthouse**](https://www.zillow.com/homedetails/217-W-57th-St-127-128-New-York-NY-10019/2068952873%5Fzpid/?utm%5Fcampaign=iosappmessage&utm%5Fmedium=referral&utm%5Fsource=txtshare) Now on sale for $22 million off! ════════════════════════════════════════ *Vital City launched three years ago as an experiment. Our first "meeting" was me and Greg Berman, sitting in a diner in lower Manhattan sketching out the* [*first issue*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-1)*, betting that in a time of such hyperpartisanship, New Yorkers might be yearning for a calm voice, compelling evidence and angelic writing on how to make cities better.* *You answered with a resounding yes, and helped us grow into a trusted civic home for practical solutions.* *Now, as Mayor-elect Mamdani prepares to take office, Vital City is uniquely positioned to offer practical guidance to the new administration. We have ambitious plans for 2026: boosting our operational capacity, expanding our "What to Do (And Not to Do)" series, making academic research usable for decision-makers, strengthening our data analysis, and building a more robust community of urban policy practitioners.* *To do that, we need your help.* *For the first time ever, we're directly asking readers to support Vital City. Our goal is to add 700 inaugural supporters by December 31\. Your tax-deductible gift will help us expand our capacity, and ensure our ideas reach the decision-makers who need them.* ***If you value rigorous, solutions-focused policy work, we hope you'll join us.*** [***Become an inaugural supporter***](https://bit.ly/vc-eoy-sitetop?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ***today.*** *— Liz Glazer, Founder* ### Rolling the Dice? How New York City Came to Approve Three Vegas-Style Casinos URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-new-york-city-got-to-the-brink-of-hosting-vegas-style-casinos/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:38.000Z At first blush, casinos and New York seem like a strange marriage. New Yorkers like to be on the go. Nights out in the Big Apple can mean dinner and a Broadway show, seeing a concert at an underground venue, dancing at a downtown nightclub or any of the thousands of other options. Do we really need casinos on top of all that? Casinos lure people indoors, plying them with free drinks to keep them gambling for hours or until they run out of money. Yet three resorts are now [poised to open here by the end of the decade](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/12/01/casinos-queens-bronx-gambling-board-decision/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — as New York comes to the end of a long and winding approval process. How'd we get here? In 2022, legislators [voted](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/02/nyregion/casino-manhattan-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to allow state officials to award as many as three new casino licenses in the New York metropolitan area, the most lucrative market in the region if not the nation. An intense campaign that rivaled an electoral primary soon followed. Many of the city's most prominent developers partnered with multinational gaming companies, renowned architects and high-priced political consultants to prepare their resort proposals and convince New Yorkers to support them. Some proposals withered under scrutiny and were never presented publicly. Others were rejected by community leaders appointed by state and local elected officials. At the start of December, the state's Gaming Facility Location Board decided to dispense new licenses in the five boroughs to the remaining bidders: Bally's Corporation in The Bronx, and Metropolitan Park and Resorts World in Queens. They now move to the state Gaming Commission, which is expected to have the final say at the end of the year. Contentious as it has been, it has not been an easy process to follow. But with billions of dollars in future profits (and losses) at stake, it's worth taking a closer look at why the city's political, real estate and consultant class has had gambling fever. ## Why are we building casinos at all? Developers have wanted to open more casinos in New York for [many years](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/nyregion/casino-referendum-led-gambling-industry-to-spend-richly-in-albany.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In 2013, then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo drafted a ballot referendum to amend the state Constitution to allow seven new full-scale casinos, arguing they would create jobs and revitalize the state's economically depressed areas. Voters passed the amendment with [57%](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/referendum-to-expand-casino-gambling-in-new-york-is-approved.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the vote. But the law only authorized the state to award four licenses for sites upstate — while establishing a 10-year moratorium for resorts in New York City, Long Island and Westchester County. By 2022, state legislators included a measure in the state budget that ended the downstate moratorium, allowing the state to begin awarding new licenses a year early. ## Don't we already have casinos? Before 2013, the state had five Native American-run casinos, which are allowed under a completely different legal regime, and nine slot machine parlors at racetracks, known as "racinos." These aren't casinos, but they look a lot like them. Under a quirk of New York law, the state has [sponsored and subsidized horse races](https://www.nyrainc.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — on which spectators can bet — since 1899\. Those included Yonkers Raceway just to the north of the city and Aqueduct Racetrack in Queens. On their properties, developers bent but didn't break the law by opening up gambling halls that look and feel a lot like casinos. The gaming hall at a racino features the same games at a casino, such as blackjack, craps and poker, but on video screens rather than run by human dealers. Thus, the law technically allows them as being tantamount to the fully-by-chance lottery — not gambling as defined in the state Constitution. [The distinction](https://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/column/are-new-yorks-slots-and-vlts-constitutional/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) may not make much sense, but it has held up in court. ## Is there any demand for more casinos in New York? Developers and gaming companies certainly think there is, but it's complicated. The nation's casino gambling market is expected to rise from $76 billion in 2024 to $126 billion by 2033 due to the expansion of sports betting, new resorts and online casinos, according to a 2025 [report](https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/6169622/united-states-casino-gambling-market-report?utm%5Fsource=GNE&utm%5Fmedium=PressRelease&utm%5Fcode=35mgxb&utm%5Fcampaign=2097915+-+United+States+Casino+Gambling+Market+Forecast+and+Company+Analysis+Report+2025-2033+Featuring+Las+Vegas+Sands%2c+MGM%2c+Caesars%2c+SJM%2c+Wynn+Resorts%2c+Galaxy+Entertainment%2c+Hard+Rock%2c+Palms%2c+Boyd+Gaming&utm%5Fexec=chdomspi). Much of that growth has been due to mobile sports betting, a market New York leads the nation on by a [wide margin](https://nysfocus.com/2025/01/16/what-is-sports-betting-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The state brought in $1.7 billion in mobile sports revenue in the 2024 fiscal year, comprising [15%](https://nysba.org/the-state-of-new-york-gambling/?srsltid=AfmBOorJEBsynh6C8PJNAnLAFSdlBRh67vUIAjf02veTBdaOxBOvzE9%5F&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the nation's total sports revenue. Last month, the state recorded [$2.6 billion](https://www.igamingtoday.com/new-york-sets-new-u-s-record-with-2-64-billion-in-mobile-sports-wagers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in online sports wagers, the highest monthly total ever recorded in the country. But it's unclear whether the demand for online betting will transfer to a physical resort, much less three, in New York City. Some industry leaders believe the northeast's casino market is [already saturated](https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/03/18/northeast-casino-market-saturated-catskills-resort-offers-cautionary-tale/ESutL6sxiGz3hFltbX3FHO/story.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the presence of new attractions downstate could threaten those upstate and in suburban New Jersey and Connecticut. Only one of New York's upstate casinos has surpassed its annual revenue projections, while taxes paid by New York's casinos and racinos have fallen by 9% since 2019, the New York Times [reported](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/11/nyregion/nyc-casinos-revenue-taxes.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). On the other hand, it's possible that there are more than enough high-rollers and tourists — and [lower-income problem gamblers](https://www.deseret.com/opinion/2024/09/04/long-term-gambling-consequences/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), who tend to make casinos most of their money — to make this a winning bet. ## Who awards casino licenses and how do they determine who will win? Once the Legislature approved the expansion of casinos, it set off a complicated approval process. The New York State Gaming Commission started the process of awarding new licenses. The commission — whose members are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the State Senate — appointed five board members to something called the Gaming Facility Location Board, which has the responsibility of issuing the request for new casino applicants, leading hearings, setting license fees and assessing the winners. Its chair is former New York City deputy mayor and NYU Law Professor Vicki Been. Under the law, each application gets a point-based score across multiple criteria. The most weight is placed on a proposal's "economic activity," which includes capital investment, revenue projections, job creation, and how fast it can open (adding up to 70% of its score), followed by its impact on the community, workforce enhancements and diversity goals (each 10% of its score). That's not the only level of approval. Some bidders may need to get the City Council to [approve a rezoning](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2025/Casting%20the%20Dice%202025%5FVF.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or a street demapping or the state legislature to allow public parkland to be [alienated](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/05/parkland-alienation-bill-passes-senate-potentially-paving-way-cohens-casino/405615/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for their site to become a gaming resort. Once casino bidders submitted their proposals on June 27, 2025, the state convened local panels called Community Advisory Committees (CAC), comprising six members appointed by the mayor, the governor, and state and city elected officials from the neighborhood where the proposed casino would be located. If and when an applicant receives four or more votes from the CAC, they advanced to be evaluated by the Gaming Facility Location Board. ## Who are the leading contenders and where do they want to build? There were 11 publicly announced proposals to develop casinos, but only eight were submitted to the state and just four advanced past the local CAC round. Three won approval of the Gaming Facility Location Board: \-Metropolitan Park, a joint venture between Mets owner Steve Cohen and Hard Rock Entertainment, would convert a 50-acre Citi Field parking lot in Corona, Queens, into a $8 billion resort district with hotel, food hall, 3,000 parking spaces, and 25 acres of parkland. \-Bally's Bronx, owned by Bally's Corp, hopes to turn part of the city-owned golf course at Ferry Point Park in Throggs Neck, the Bronx, into a $4 billion entertainment complex with a 500-room hotel, a new event center, and 4,660 parking spaces. \-The Genting Group is seeking a $5 billion expansion of its Resorts World facility, which will include a new gaming floor, hotel and conference space, while also converting the now-defunct Aqueduct Race Track into a 50-acre park. These three likely casinos are within 15 miles of each other along the Van Wyck Expressway. ## Which sites have been ruled out? All five Manhattan-based proposals as well as bids in Brooklyn and Nassau County have already been scratched from contention. The most prominent Manhattan sites included SL Green's Caesars Palace Times Square, a $4 billion skyscraper at 1515 Broadway in Midtown, The Soloviev Group's Freedom Plaza in Murray Hill, and Related Companies's Hudson Yards West on the Far West Side. All were splashy, high-profile concepts, but they didn't pass muster. Both the Caesars Palace and Freedom Plaza proposals were rejected by their CACs this fall, while Hudson Yards West was pulled before the vote could occur. Thor Equities' The Coney in Coney Island was also voted down by its CAC this fall. Resistance hinged on [concerns](https://www.brooklynpaper.com/locals-largely-condemn-coney-casino-hearing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about increased traffic, rising rents and competition for neighborhood small businesses. ## How much tax revenue could the remaining bids raise for the state? Casino economics are famously dicey, with owners promising a boon but often failing to consider the very real downsides. Resorts World is promising [$4 billion](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2025/10/14/mgm-yonkers-withdraws-application-for-casino-license?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in gaming revenue annually after proposing a 56% tax rate for its slot machines and a 30% rate for its table games (each bidder must include their proposed tax rates in their application). Hard Rock estimates it would generate $3.9 billion in revenue each year while proposing the state's minimum 25% tax rate for its slots and 10% for its table games. Bally's believes it will raise $1 billion in tax revenue for the state. The company did not make its proposed tax rates public. ## What happens now that the bids have been submitted? On or around Dec. 31, the State Gaming Commission is likely to ratify the decision of the Gaming Facility Location Board by determining the criteria for earning a license are met. ## How quickly could these casinos potentially open? Resorts World promised to add 250 live table games and 4,000 slot machines into its existing gaming hall by the [middle of 2026](https://casinobeats.com/2025/07/22/resorts-world-queens-casino-expansion-cac-meeting/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Casino%20Could%20Open%20by%20Mid,slot%20machines%20and%20800%20tables.). Then it would embark on the second phase of its expansion, with 6,000 slot machines and 800 table games — which it says it would complete by 2030. Hard Rock anticipates starting construction on Metropolitan Park in January and expects to open in June 2030\. Bally's also hopes to open by 2030. ## What do the city's current and future leaders think of casinos? The governor and mayor don't have any direct say in the process at this point, but their opinions matter. Gov. Hochul has been strongly involved in the casino expansion effort; she pushed legislators to lift the moratorium a year early in 2022\. Her appointees on local CACs have [supported](https://gothamist.com/news/as-manhattan-casino-projects-fold-a-new-york-lawmaker-takes-credit?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) casino proposals. She also [vetoed](https://nypost.com/2024/11/25/us-news/kathy-hochul-vetoes-bill-to-force-nyc-casino-bidders-to-move-fast-or-lose-their-chance/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a bill last year that would have pushed up the deadline to submit proposals by a year. Mayor Adams, who [got caught up in a scandal to help bring gambling to Aqueduct Racetrack when he was in the state Senate](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/12/eric-adams-gambling-deal-487684?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), enthusiastically supported all of the casino bids and his appointees on the CACs have voted in favor of advancing them. His office released an [analysis](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/09/mayor-adams-issues-report-analyzing-billions-in-economic-impact-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the economic benefits of seven applications this fall. And he helped Bally's by [vetoing](https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/07/adams-vetoes-councils-rejection-of-ballys-casino-bid-00484957?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a City Council vote that had blocked zoning changes to the area, preventing the Bronx bid from moving forward. "Casinos can bring jobs. It can bring stability, tourism," Adams [said](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/mornings-on-1/2025/09/22/adams-touts-economic-benefits-of-casinos-ahead-of-freedom-plaza-vote?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in September after the Freedom Plaza bid was rejected. "So I was surprised at some of the negative votes. Let the final process make the decision. We should not be stopping them at this local level." Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani has been skeptical of the value that casinos bring to their communities — but he said he would not try to stop their expansion. "I've been open about my personal skepticism, and yet I also know this is the law," he [told](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/20/nyregion/mamdani-casinos-nyc-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the New York Times in August. "The siting and the choices of which casinos will open, that pertains to the state." ## Has there been any corruption in the bidding process? That's been harder to detect. Casinos are famously linked to ethical shenanigans — just look at the history of mafia involvement and other bad business practices in [Las Vegas](https://sports.yahoo.com/how-las-vegas-went-from-mobbed-up-town-to-the-center-of-the-entertainment-universe-135349918.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Atlantic City](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/casinos-bring-the-rot-why-gambling-is-fertile-ground-for-corruption). How about here and now? Yonkers officials called for a [state investigation](https://abc7ny.com/post/yonkers-mayor-mike-spano-calls-investigation-mgm-abruptly-withdraws-casino-bid/18014015/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into why MGM abruptly rescinded its casino expansion bid. But the company may have made its decision based on its evaluation of the [potential costs](https://seekingalpha.com/article/4832673-mgm-sudden-withdrawal-from-nyc-casino-race-saturation-fears-gripping-gaming-developers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the high level of competition. Bally's arrangement with the Trump Organization, brokered by Trump envoy Steve Witkoff, has certainly raised eyebrows. The president's company [sold](https://nypost.com/2023/09/08/donald-trump-unloads-bronx-golf-course-to-ballys-casino-chain-sources/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its contract to operate the Bronx golf course to Bally's in 2023 for $60 million. But the deal included a provision that the Trump Organization would collect another [$115 million](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/01/nyregion/trump-casino-ballys-bronx.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) if Bally's ultimately won a casino license. Several people close to Mayor Adams, whose Council veto this summer kept the proposal alive, including his former chief of staff Frank Carone and campaign attorney Vito Pitta, worked on the Bally's bid (Bally's [told](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/trump-ballys-casino-payday-eric-adams.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New York Magazine they did not influence the mayor's veto decision). Perhaps the lasting image of the casino process is from SL Green CEO Marc Holliday, who would have earned a [$10 million](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/real-estate/sl-green-ceo-marc-holliday-would-get-10m-bonus-times-square-casino?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) bonus if his Times Square casino opened. Instead, the Midtown CAC denied his bid in a 4-2 vote. "Go run and hide! Because what you did, the benefits you denied this community, and this city and state, you have to live with that history forever," he [said](https://x.com/nick%5Fgarber/status/1968317854169890954?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ### What Mamdani Gets Wrong About Severe Mental Illness & Crisis Response URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-mamdani-gets-wrong-about-severe-mental-illness-and-crisis-response/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:39.000Z In [his plan](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1a7ejjSZWWIAcxfcWnkYaqvnjihTb0LAOQkj8g10-npg/edit?tab=t.0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#heading=h.2gazcsgmxkub) to heal a public mental health system ravaged by decades of neglect, New York City Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani seeks worthy and achievable goals: shifting more of the burden of crisis response from police to mental health professionals, streamlining a hopelessly complex and often redundant array of community-based services, and removing the barriers that everyday New Yorkers face in accessing basic mental health care. It is immaterial whether these are precisely the goals I would prioritize in an alternate universe where Mayor Eric Adams won a second term. The voters chose a different vision, and we should all hope it succeeds. For that to happen, the mayor-elect will need to demonstrate adaptability. Informed by what I have learned over three-plus years in City Hall and two decades in mental health advocacy, I believe the shiny new vehicle Mamdani has designed to deliver on his ambitions — a $1.1 billion city agency to be known as the Department of Community Safety (DCS) — should not make it out of prototype. In support of creating DCS, the Mamdani platform promises to revolutionize crisis response and fill the gaps in community-based care, rightly bemoaning the "patchwork of programs" presently targeted to the city's severely mentally ill. But as details emerge, it becomes clear that DCS as envisioned would add *even more* illogic to our maze of community-based services, pull us *off* the path to progress on crisis response and *re-open* a pernicious service gap we have only just begun to fill. ## Piling on the patchwork From press coverage, one might have the impression that DCS would be laser-focused on crisis response — shouldering the burden of answering mental health-related 911 calls that now falls mainly on the city's police department. While that is certainly part of what Mamdani has in mind for the new agency (and more on that below), it represents just one of many major assignments to be stuffed into DCS' portfolio. DCS would also become the central command for efforts to conduct outreach to people who appear to be unsheltered and/or under the influence of substances in public areas. Unlike crisis response, outreach work is largely about building rapport and trust with familiar faces over time and learning as much as possible about what led each person to the street in hopes of eventually persuading them to accept shelter and services. These efforts are currently overseen primarily by the city's Department of Homeless Services (with the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene pitching in on substance use outreach), mostly through contracts with community-based nonprofits. DCS' authority would not end there. The Mamdani platform positions the new agency at the forefront of "preventative and ongoing care" for mental illness of all kinds, with oversight over a massive new ["Community Mental Health Navigator"](https://www.rethink.org/media/5473/mental-health-navigation-guide.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program, an expanded network of [peer-run "clubhouses,"](https://clubhouse-intl.org/what-we-do/what-clubhouses-do/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) an initiative to establish new ["crisis residences,"](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/crisis-emergency-services-respite-centers.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) various mental health services for youth and a plan to scale up important outpatient support programs like [Intensive Mobile Treatment (IMT)](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/program/intensive-mobile-treatment-imt?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Assertive Community Treatment (ACT)](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/act/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Regardless of the merits of each of these proposed new programs and expansions of existing ones, there is no question that they currently fall within the purview of the city's Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), which is tasked under state law with developing and managing the city's ["local services plan."](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/planning/docs/nyc-combined-lsp.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Far from streamlining all these functions and services, adding DCS to the mix would make the patchwork exponentially patchier. So long as we have a Department of Homeless Services, it remains the only logical agency to oversee street outreach. Many clients shuttle frequently between the shelters and [safe havens](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dhs/outreach/street-outreach.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=DICs%20can%20refer%20clients%20into,unsheltered%20individuals%20directly%20for%20placement.) overseen by DHS and the street. It makes no sense for the tracking of their cases to be passed back and forth constantly between two agencies. Similarly, unless the mayor-elect intends to pull oversight of *all* mental health services away from DOHMH (essentially, slicing it down to a mere "DOH"), it would add unprecedented layers of complexity and [probably flout state law](https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/planning/local-services-plans.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to splinter accountability for the city's local services plan, leaving some major mental health initiatives at DOHMH with others, such as clubhouses and crisis residences, overseen elsewhere. The interconnectedness of these programs runs deep. ## Answering crisis calls without police One program that *does* need an organizational shakeup is [B-HEARD](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), created by former Mayor Bill de Blasio in 2021 to provide a fully clinical alternative to police dispatch for lower-acuity 911 mental health crisis calls. But a DCS takeover of B-HEARD would achieve nothing, except to derail a much more sensible reorganization already underway. Here is what Mamdani gets right: He is correct to argue that sending cops to crisis calls presenting little or no public safety risk needlessly diverts them from fighting crime, and that many such calls would have better outcomes if we sent caregivers alone. He has good cause to be frustrated that after nearly five years, B-HEARD has not come close to fulfilling its promise, [failing](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-behavioral-health-emergency-assistance-response-divisions-effectiveness-in-responding-to-individuals-with-mental-health-crises-and-meeting-its-goals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) both to expand citywide and to respond to all appropriate calls within its current footprint. The question is how best to set B-HEARD on a course to succeed and grow. To date, the program has operated as a partnership between the City's public hospital network, Health + Hospitals (H+H), which provides mental health counselors and clinicians, and the Fire Department's EMS Division, which supplies emergency medical personnel and ambulances. Sometimes it proves to be a very good thing that the B-HEARD response includes EMS, but more often than not, the person they respond to does not need transport to a hospital or emergency medical services. In light of a [severe workforce shortage](https://nycremsco.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/workforcedocument.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and other challenges to EMS' capacity to respond to the full range of medical emergencies occurring every minute across the city, this partnership was destined from the outset to be uneasy. It is unreasonable to ask an EMS system already stretched thin and working under the kind of pressure few of us can imagine to contribute even more of its limited resources to support B-HEARD expansion. A better idea is to let EMS get back to its critical core mission and consolidate B-HEARD under one agency equipped to supply everything it needs. That agency is H+H, which already operates its own diverse vehicle fleet, including ambulettes, and employs medical professionals of all kinds. Indeed, earlier this month, Mayor Adams and H+H CEO Mitchell Katz [announced plans](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/11/mayor-adams-announces-new-model-to-have-new-york-city-s-911-ment?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to give H+H full responsibility for B-HEARD by next spring. This should be the breakthrough the program needs to start expanding its reach. The incoming administration would be ill-advised to scuttle those plans out of blind determination to make B-HEARD the centerpiece program of its new agency. Unless DCS were to establish its own ambulance fleet and emergency medical staff, potentially adding years of delay to its launch with additional political and regulatory hurdles, B-HEARD under DCS would be just as reliant on EMS as it is now. The Mamdani platform's pledge to expand B-HEARD "so that every neighborhood has a team and the 20 neighborhoods with the greatest need have two to three" is utter fantasy with a structure based on keeping EMS in a forced marriage. I must add a word of caution on B-HEARD: There are significant limits to how much of the total mental health crisis call volume can be handled without police. Before a 911 call can be diverted to B-HEARD, the dispatcher must determine that the person of concern presents no imminent risk of harm to self or others, is not clearly in urgent need of hospital transport, is not immediately suicidal or violent, does not have a weapon and does not require tactical expertise or resources (e.g., a person standing in traffic). These are all situations that require police to ensure safety, and they encompass at least half of all crisis calls. There is a world of difference between striving to maximize the use of a non-police response within the bounds of public safety and believing that police can be mostly erased from the picture. The mayor-elect's platform gives reason to worry that he sits in the latter camp. As an example of what is possible in New York City, the platform cites the highly misleading example of Eugene, Oregon's [now-shuttered](https://www.opb.org/article/2025/04/08/cahoots-service-ending-in-eugene-effective-immediately/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [CAHOOTS program](https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874339977/cahoots-how-social-workers-and-police-share-responsibilities-in-eugene-oregon?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a forerunner of B-HEARD. It notes that "CAHOOTS teams have resolved almost 20% of all calls coming through Eugene's police department," with 99% of calls resolved without a need for police backup. Reading that casually, one might have the impression that Eugene diverted 20% of its *911 calls* to CAHOOTS, which would be astonishing, since the great majority of 911 calls in any city have nothing to do with a mental health crisis. The implication is that nearly *all* mental health emergencies had been diverted successfully. But there is a key piece of information omitted from this widely reported claim. In Eugene at the time of this finding, "calls coming through the police department" did not only mean 911 calls. The Eugene Police Department had established a separate hotline for CAHOOTS and encouraged citizens to use it for *non-emergency* concerns about their own or another's mental health. This meant that the "calls coming through police" included a great many calls that no responsible citizen would ever have made to 911 in the absence of CAHOOTS. When I asked a Eugene PD data analyst about this a few years ago, he reported that the rate of 911 calls diverted to CAHOOTS, using diversion criteria essentially identical to B-HEARD's, was in the range of 3% to 8% each year. ## The vital role of "co-response" We must also beware here of a false choice between police-only and police-free crisis response. There is no question that even many crisis calls presenting a risk of violence would benefit from the inclusion of a clinician and/or peer counselor who is skilled in the art of calming a person down and gently steering them into treatment. There are many situations where police can secure a scene and safely pass the baton to a clinical partner to engage with the person in crisis. This model is known as ["co-response,"](https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/co-response-models-in-policing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and many experts consider it [the gold standard](https://www.williamjames.edu/news/doubling-down-on-education-co-response-model.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in responding to situations too dangerous to handle without police. We do not practice co-response nearly enough in New York City. And yet we may be on the verge of shutting it down entirely. The single most disturbing sentence in the Mamdani mental health platform is this bullet in a summary of DCS's goals: "*End co-response teams to hand calls off to crisis and outreach teams that are better positioned to address people's needs."* Let's consider what it really means to "end co-response." The NYPD will (as it must) always insist on sending police to a scene where a person is brandishing a weapon or screaming aggressively at passersby. If we "end co-response," we foreclose the possibility that police will have the benefit of clinical assistance in these situations. To keep this in perspective, the NYPD (lamentably) does not currently dispatch co-response teams in response to 911 calls. The department's small ["Co-response Unit"](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/program/co-response-teams?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is deployed only in response to certain calls received through 988 or 311 requesting a wellness check for a housed person. These calls are always answered by nurses dispatched by DOHMH. Co-response Unit officers will join the nurse if a record search on the person reveals a history of violence. Is this really what the mayor-elect hopes to end? I imagine the DOHMH nurses dispatched to these calls (and their union) might have thoughts on that. In the context of *outreach* — the practice of responding not to calls for help, but to unsheltered folks encountered in the course of canvassing public spaces — New York City under Mayor Adams has made major commitments to co-response. The state-funded [SCOUT](https://www.mta.info/document/135741?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program, launched as a pilot in the Fall of 2023, teams DHS nurses with officers from the MTA's internal police department. The subway system is also covered by the city's own [PATH](https://www.wnyc.org/story/the-adams-administration-is-marking-one-year-of-partnership-assistance-for-transit-homelessness-we-talk-to-the-man-behind-the-program/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program, launched in the Summer of 2024, teaming DHS' nurses and outreach specialists with NYPD officers. Together, SCOUT and PATH typically deploy 17 co-response teams in the subways over a 24-hour cycle. Their mission is to patrol stations and trains in search of people who appear to be unsheltered, engage those they encounter in conversation, assess their needs and endeavor to connect each person with the appropriate level of care. In most cases, it will ultimately be up to the person to accept what the team offers (usually a bed in one of DHS' low-barrier "safe havens" or a trip to the hospital to address a purely medical need). Sometimes, the SCOUT or PATH nurse comes across a person who exhibits symptoms of mental illness, presents a danger to themselves or others, and is unwilling to accept voluntary transport for a full psychiatric evaluation. When this happens, the nurses have [authority under state law](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/MHY/9.58?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to direct that the person be involuntarily transported by police and EMS to a hospital, which could lead to an involuntary admission for inpatient care if hospital doctors concur with the nurse's assessment. Under city policy, these individuals are always taken to hospitals operated by H+H and closely tracked to ensure quality of care and adequate discharge planning. If the person is not already connected to an intensive outpatient treatment team, every effort is made to enroll them with one. These co-response teams do [extraordinary work](https://wapo.st/49ltK4M?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They find people in the most appalling conditions and give them a fighting chance to gain a foothold on treatment, housing and stability. For a myriad of frustrating reasons, it doesn't usually turn out like a Hollywood redemption story, but the benefits of whatever medical and psychiatric treatment people receive are surely better than the old policy of benign neglect under the excuse of respecting their "rights" to self-direction. Over two years, the SCOUT and PATH teams have brought nearly 800 people for involuntary hospital evaluation, resulting in over 10,000 nights of hospital care. It bears repeating here that the troubling bullet point in the mayor-elect's platform resolves to "end co-response" not just in the crisis call context, but in outreach as well. This suggests that the subway-roaming teams of SCOUT and PATH are directly in the crosshairs. (As a state-funded program using a state-run police agency, SCOUT may be in less peril than PATH. But if the next administration truly wants no part of co-response, it could withdraw DHS and H+H from the collaboration.) Before doing anything so rash, the mayor-elect should spend some time on a shift with each of these two programs. He should see for himself their [compassion and professionalism](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkQBy9d6qec&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), take note of how bonded the clinical and law-enforcement members of the teams become through daily partnership, and hear directly from the nurses and outreach workers (most of whom have prior experience with police-free outreach) why officers are so essential to the work they do. It boils down to two irreplaceable police functions. First, police accompaniment enables the DHS staff to engage with every person in apparent need with a sense of safety, ensuring that no one gets passed by. Without police, it can be scary to start a conversation with someone who appears unstable and unpredictable. Not infrequently, the person whom the outreach worker would reluctantly allow to stumble past them in Penn Station at 3 a.m. is the person most in need of psychiatric assessment. The second function is logistical. A nurse with mobile crisis certification has authority under state law to direct an involuntary removal, but obviously, the nurse cannot be expected to keep the person on scene until an ambulance arrives, nor force the person onto the ambulance and into the hospital. For the nurse's authority to have any practical meaning, there must be a police officer on hand at the time the decision is made. Co-response not only ensures that; it ensures that the necessary police work will be handled by officers who have done this many times before and have developed expertise in completing the task with as little physical force and distress to the individual as possible. ## Involuntary removal as a form of care Perhaps the effect of making involuntary removal much more difficult to accomplish is a feature, not a bug, of the mayor-elect's plan to "end co-response." Understandably, involuntary removal makes many progressives uncomfortable. In the wrong hands, there is a potential for abuse. And even a perfectly appropriate involuntary removal can be upsetting to witness if the person becomes agitated, as often happens. Progressives are not wrong to prefer that people be brought into treatment voluntarily. *Everyone* prefers that, and [studies confirm](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK76143/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that psychiatric treatment is most effective when there is patient buy-in. Here's the problem: For many with untreated severe mental illness, the prospects for coming around to accept voluntary treatment are slim to none. The choice isn't between voluntary and involuntary treatment, but between involuntary treatment and no treatment at all. Their cruel disease renders them too disconnected from reality to understand their own plight. This is not "denial." As a corollary of their illness, many suffer from [anosognosia](https://www.nami.org/about-mental-illness/common-with-mental-illness/anosognosia/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a neurological deficit that makes it impossible for them to recognize that they *have* an illness. Once anosognosia is understood, the question of individual rights is flipped on its head. Is a person unable to perceive reality truly exercising "choice" when they refuse treatment? Are we really respecting that person's dignity when we leave them to suffer the horrific consequences of that refusal? Or are we letting ourselves off the hook for failing to do the hard stuff it takes to ensure sustained care? At [a recent Vital City forum](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-talks-public-safety), then-candidate Mamdani expressed a general skepticism of involuntary removal, conceding a willingness to use it only as "a last resort." While I doubt he had fully thought through the implications of that framing, it sounded to me like a retreat to the failed policy of past administrations. Among the ways we have tried under Mayor Adams to repair the culture of the city's mental health system is by making a sustained effort to broaden the understanding of what it means to be "dangerous to self" within the meaning of the state's involuntary removal and hospitalization laws. For decades, a pervasive myth had taken root among community-based providers, police and hospital doctors that a person had to appear *imminently* dangerous to meet this standard, despite the absence of any such language in the relevant statutes and [clear New York case law](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914c180add7b049347b9e31?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the contrary. This led to a wrong-headed consensus that finding danger-to-self required that the person be suicidal, or engaging in outrageously dangerous conduct like running into traffic, or neglecting a medical need that presented a true emergency. In [revised protocols](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2022/Mental-Health-Involuntary-Removals.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and training materials, we have stressed that "danger-to-self" also applies to those whose mental illness has led to [extreme self-neglect](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/25/nyregion/mentally-ill-homeless-nyc.html?unlocked%5Farticle%5Fcode=1.2E8.ZdrY.hEo8SXQDMIx-&smid=url-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) creating a risk of serious physical harm in the future, even if such harm is not yet imminent. (Mayor Adams also lobbied Albany over three years for a change in state law to make this explicit, which [was achieved in 2025](https://www.city-journal.org/article/new-york-budget-mental-health-reform-involuntary-commitment-law?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) thanks to Governor Hochul getting behind it.) This fuller understanding of danger-to-self has been baked into the culture of the SCOUT and PATH programs. In the training of the nurses serving on these teams, we have emphasized the need to look for signs of extreme self-neglect in assessing whether a person displaying mental illness presents a danger, and the nurses have taken it to heart. In most of the removals SCOUT and PATH have conducted, extreme self-neglect, rather than violence, suicidality or outrageous conduct, has been the basis for finding danger. Some of these individuals, who would have been left in the subway if SCOUT and PATH were sticking with the old narrow interpretation of the legal standard, are today in or on track for permanent supportive housing. And that is why I am so troubled by the mayor-elect setting the boundary at the point of "last resort." It justifies the old practice of declining a removal if the risk of harm is not imminent, because tomorrow just might be the day this person in acute psychosis agrees to voluntary care. That mindset, however well-intentioned, has been calamitous for New Yorkers with severe mental illness. It has led to needlessly prolonged periods of untreated psychosis, a condition which is toxic to the brain and [lowers prospects for recovery](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7801839/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It rests on hope that a clinician and police officers will be on scene at the moment *just before* disaster strikes. In the real world, that rarely happens. Much more often, the person or someone else is harmed, and/or the person commits a criminal act that lands them in the clutches of the criminal justice system, and we can all agree on the danger they presented in useless retrospect. It is my fervent hope that Mayor-elect Mamdani will not take us back to the days of involuntary removal only as a "last resort." I might even dare to hope that he will continue the work in progress to make the system more proactive in rescuing those in obvious psychiatric decline. I would argue that a progressive outlook requires nothing less. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/astbf2gnmrmgqoah_screenshot2025-11-24at3-33-06pm-png-auto-format-compress-1776259667621.jpg) Credit: Ray Raimundi / MTA No doubt the Mamdani team has some serious thinking ahead about how to translate their full slate of exuberant campaign pledges into viable policy. That should include a hard look at whether establishing a Department of Community Safety is truly essential to achieving their larger goals for mental health reform. Four years goes by fast. Do they really want to spend a big chunk of it seeking revision of the City Charter and working through all the heavy lifting of creating a major new agency, when they *could* just get straight to work on enhancing and augmenting mental health services within the existing infrastructure of city government? If they decide that creating DCS is just too important to abandon, they should at least tell us why — something their campaign platform never gets around to. They should also consider which mental health policy battles are worth fighting, and which are distractions. Does the administration want to spend its limited political capital on "ending co-response" and changing protocols to make involuntary removal a "last resort" — policy shifts likely to be highly unpopular with both [the public](https://abny.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/ABNY-Mental-Health-Policy-Polling-Memo.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [the mental health professionals](https://gothamist.com/news/mamdani-wants-transit-ambassadors-not-nypd-to-get-homeless-people-out-of-subways?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) already doing the work? If so, they should explain how they plan to convince those lacking awareness of their severe mental illness to volunteer for treatment, and how they plan to keep clinicians and outreach workers safe in their engagements. Whatever choices they make, the Mamdani team should see no shame in pivoting away from hastily hatched campaign promises as they come into power and learn more about a deeply complicated issue. I hope I can help them do that during this period of transition. *This is the first in an occasional series of Vital City reflections by current and former public officials on lessons they have learned from their time serving the city.* ### New Mexico: Surprising Proving Ground for Two Big Mamdani Ideas? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/department-of-community-safety-and-universal-childcare-albequerque-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:39.000Z Zohran Mamdani's imminent arrival in City Hall has been greeted, in conservative circles, with all the warmth owed an incoming asteroid. Many detractors say his policies are [alien and untested](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mamdanis-top-incoming-aide-chief-architect-radical-proposal-overhauling-nypd?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and will take New York City into uncharted territory. But two of his signature proposals — universal childcare and a new Department of Community Safety — are already being implemented in, of all places, New Mexico and its most populous city, Albuquerque. New Mexico is not typically considered a hotbed of policy innovation, but necessity is the mother of invention. For years, the state has [experienced among the highest rates of law-enforcement-involved killings](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6391295/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and Albuquerque's police department recently spent a decade under a federal consent decree for engaging in ["a pattern or practice of excessive force."](https://www.justice.gov/usao-nm/pr/summary-department-justices-findings-albuquerque-police-department-investigation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) So in June 2020, at the height of protests following the murder of George Floyd, Albuquerque Mayor Tim Keller launched what he described as the country's first cabinet-level community safety department. This third branch of emergency response would "deliver a civilian public health approach to public safety," said [the initial announcement](https://www.cabq.gov/mayor/news/mayor-tim-keller-to-refocus-millions-in-public-safety-resources-with-first-of-its-kind-civilian-response-department?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Similarly, New Mexico has [long ranked last in the country for child wellbeing](https://datacenter.aecf.org/data/tables/11617-kids-count-overall-rank?loc=1&loct=2&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#ranking/2/any/true/2545/any/22864), so upon taking office in 2019, Gov. Michelle Lujan-Grisham immediately set about expanding childcare. First she created an Early Childhood Education & Care Department (ECECD), and in 2022 expanded child care assistance to families earning up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level. [This month](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-first-new-mexico-launches-free-child-care-all-2025-11-01/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), she eliminated the income cap entirely, making it the first state to provide child care as a universal benefit. New York City's scale means no other locality's problems — or solutions — can entirely compare in scope. New Mexico's statewide population of 2.1 million is dwarfed by Brooklyn's (2.7 million), or Queens' (2.4 million). Albuquerque's Community Safety department has a budget of [$17 million](https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/expanding-first-response/program-highlights/albuquerque-nm/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com); Mamdani's proposal has a price tag of [over $1 billion](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1a7ejjSZWWIAcxfcWnkYaqvnjihTb0LAOQkj8g10-npg/edit?tab=t.0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#heading=h.2gazcsgmxkub). To make childcare universal, New Mexico is adding 12,000 children to its rolls; New York City would have to add hundreds of thousands. (The Mamdani transition did not respond to a request to comment.) Still, New Mexico's experiences implementing these policies highlight some challenges New York City and any other emulators should anticipate. As in the community safety department proposed by Mamdani, Albuquerque's took ownership of the city's violence prevention outreach workers and support services for victims, but the biggest lift was building out a new alternative first response system — or as its founding director Mariela Ruiz-Angel put it in an interview, "to not send cops to calls that they didn't really need to be at anymore." > New Mexico's experiments show how far bold ideas can go — and how quickly the hard limits of housing, staffing and services come into view. The department rapidly expanded its reach from [9,000 calls in the 2022 fiscal year to 45,000 in 2025](https://www.cabq.gov/acs/documents/quarterly-report-q4-2025fy-final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), far exceeding the number of calls receiving a non-police response from well-known programs in [Seattle](https://www.seattle.gov/care/research-and-data?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Denver](https://www.denvergov.org/files/assets/public/v/1/public-health-and-environment/documents/cbh/star/evaluating%5Falternative%5Fcrisis%5Fresponse%5Fin%5Fdenvers%5Fsupport%5Fteam%5Fassisted%5Fresponse%5Fprogram-interim%5Ffindings.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as well as New York City's B-HEARD pilot, which responded to [14,951 calls in 2024](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-behavioral-health-emergency-assistance-response-divisions-effectiveness-in-responding-to-individuals-with-mental-health-crises-and-meeting-its-goals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A non-police response is a needed service Mamdani [often spoke](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-talks-public-safety) about during the campaign, citing hundreds of thousands of mental health calls the New York Police Department responds to each year that other professionals would arguably be better equipped to handle. But it's one thing to show up for a call, and another to be able to provide the complex, often long-term services people in crisis require. Despite the growing reach of its crisis responders, Albuquerque still lacks sufficient detox facilities and housing to make those transitions successfully, said Ruiz-Angel. That has disillusioned some Albuquerque residents, who thought the new department was going to reduce the number of people living on the streets. Instead, [annual counts](https://www.nmceh.org/%5Ffiles/ugd/2e9419%5Fb4f165dd991a4b7aada59938d8488dbe.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) show the number of unsheltered people in Albuquerque rose to new heights in 2023 and 2024\. "We were never going to be able to fix homelessness," said Ruiz-Angel, but "we are being held accountable for it." Ruiz-Angel, who now directs a program on alternative first response at Georgetown Law School, said that the Mamdani campaign consulted with her in the run-up to the election. In those conversations, she emphasized the importance of thinking downstream and ensuring there was funding for building out those services. She also stressed the difficulty of staffing an entirely new agency. Mamdani's platform calls for peer-support workers in the transit system and a 150% increase in funding for the city's existing B-HEARD program, which deploys health professionals to 911 calls in some neighborhoods. "One of the pieces of advice I gave them was: Don't be so narrow on who you're hiring. Focus on your training," she said. Community health workers, nurses and EMTs might all be feeder professions. "What we care about is people who know people." As for New Mexico's expansion of childcare, the state expects [12,000 infants and toddlers](https://fiscalpolicy.org/how-new-mexico-will-pay-for-universal-childcare?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) to newly enroll, but there are only enough openings for [one in three babies under age 2](https://www.nmlegis.gov/handouts/LHHS%20091025%20Item%2010%20Accountability%20Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with the most serious shortage in rural counties. To grow the childcare workforce, the state has raised its wages. ECECD Secretary Elizabeth Groginsky said New Mexico is the first to use [a cost-estimation model](https://www.nmececd.org/new-mexico-child-care-cost-model/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), updated every three years, to ensure pay is sufficient to support stable child care businesses that provide quality care. She said that's driven [an uptick in the number of students in local training programs](https://www.pbs.org/video/elizabeth-groginsky-nykd3w/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). "Our workforce has grown 64% and we have the fastest-growing wages" in the country, she said. > The real lesson from Albuquerque isn't novelty but stamina: Transformative policy depends less on invention than on the grinding work of building institutions that can carry it. Mamdani's platform indicates he wants to raise wages of childcare workers, too, "to be at parity with public school teachers." That would add to the price-tag, however. And the average cost per enrolled child in New York City ($20,100) is already 68% higher than New Mexico's ($12,000), according to [the Fiscal Policy Institute](https://fiscalpolicy.org/how-new-mexico-will-pay-for-universal-childcare?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Another bottleneck is the number of facilities providing childcare in any given locality. "Access to capital is key for the sector," Groginsky said. New Mexico created [a $13 million fund](https://www.nmececd.org/childcareloan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to provide low-interest loans to build or renovate childcare centers, and is seeking an additional $20 million from the legislature. The state is also trying to recruit more people to run child care in their homes, since such providers are also [more likely to offer care at night or in a family's native language](https://sourcenm.com/2025/10/26/capacity-issues-may-limit-new-mexicos-universal-child-care-program/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Groginsky said this would be important in New York City, too, since families there would have a diversity of needs. "That families have choice is a key component of a good child care sector, because we can't pretend to know at the state-level what a family wants." During the rollout of former New York City mayor Bill de Blasio's universal pre-K program, home-based providers [said they were left out](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2025/11/06/mamdani-universal-child-care-plans-balance-speed-and-stability/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and lost students to public schools and institutional programs, which paid staff better. Mindful of how the sudden influx of kids newly enrolled could affect the most vulnerable residents, Groginsky said New Mexico is also holding 2,000 slots for families at the lower end of the income spectrum, "making sure they're not getting squeezed out of the market." For New Yorkers awaiting their new mayoral administration, New Mexico's experiences offer inspiration and caution. Its leaders have shown that bold ideas can be translated into real programs. They've also demonstrated that these programs aren't won and done: the challenges of implementation are real, and perpetual. Transformative policy is less about invention than persistence — the long, unglamorous work of building institutions that can bear the weight of vision. ### A Department of Community Safety: Theory Meets Practice URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-department-of-community-safety-where-theory-meets-practice/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:39.000Z Walking through Penn Station last year with my kids, I had an experience that captured exactly what Mamdani's proposed Department of Community Safety could address — and what it could easily miss. A disheveled man who had been sitting near a pile of dirty belongings and empty White Claw bottles stood and began weaving unsteadily down the concourse, then collapsed onto the floor. As fast as a school of fish, the commuters and tourists opened a wide circle around him. Many stopped to watch, uncertain of what to do, looking towards a nearby MTA employee in a vest who managed with admirable economy of gesture to convey the twin messages "I'll call someone" and "this is not my job." I felt that uneasy mix of recoil and concern that so often haunts you in New York, followed by a sense of relief, because I did have something I could do. We happened to be at Penn Station with Ben, a family member who is a psychiatrist with emergency medicine training who specializes in working with very high need patients at a mental health hospital. He was farther down the platform, so I called him and asked him to come back. He cut quickly through the circle of onlookers, knelt down at the man's side, and began gently asking him questions. Ben had helped him into a seated position by the time the police arrived. The moment I remember most clearly is when the police began questioning the man: Where had he been last? Had he had treatment somewhere? Stayed somewhere? Blurrily, the man began unclasping his pack. *Stop*, the officers snapped, voices hardening. *Put your hands up NOW. Don't touch your bag.* Confused, he mumbled and tugged at the clasp. The officers' hands went to their belts, and the circle of tourists tensed and shuffled back. Then Ben said very calmly, "Can I get it for him?" An officer nodded tersely. Ben leaned over, voice steady and warm. "Sir, can I get something from your bag for you? I'm going to open it, ok? I'm going to reach in — is it this piece of paper? Yes? Ok, I'm showing it to them. I'm putting your bag down over here." The crumpled paper had the name of a clinic scrawled on it — the answer to one of the officer's earlier questions. Then the encounter diffused into routine and the tourists drifted away. Ben stayed until the EMTs arrived with a stretcher, said goodbye to the man, and handed a brief synopsis of his observations over to the medical team. *(Heavily intoxicated. Notice the scars and wounds on the back of his head. He's fallen many times before. Possibly seizures that he's self-medicating for or that the alcohol use is triggering, a deadly cycle to be caught in.)* This type of interaction — where someone with training in mental health and substance use disorders resolves a situation where the traditional tools of policing are not the right fit — is the heart of the vision for alternative emergency response, which sends teams of unarmed civilian responders to a subset of 911 calls in lieu of police. Mamdani has [proposed](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-talks-public-safety) creating a new Department of Community Safety that would house a set of new and expanded services, including a citywide expansion of the city's alternative response B-HEARD program, mobile response teams and service provision in subways. He has argued that it would make it so that "no longer must police respond to every single failure of the social safety net." This will be better for the cops, he says, who are now burdened with problems far beyond their remit — and it'll be better for mentally unstable individuals, who need the help of clinicians and social workers, not people who carry guns. He's not wrong, but if these programs are going to be more than another add-on to an already fragmented service array, he'll need to design a department that provides something existing ones don't. My organization, the [Government Performance Lab](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at Harvard, works with dozens of cities across the U.S. that are [establishing or expanding alternative response programs](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/focus-area/alternative-911-emergency-response/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and runs a community of practice with over 400 government practitioners across the country, from 911 call center directors to fire chiefs, police chiefs and alternative response team leads. We have helped cities design and launch alternative response programs from Texas to Pennsylvania to Los Angeles. Mamdani is right that these programs can divert thousands of calls, that the calls can be [safely answered by community responder teams](https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/CRT-Landscape-Analysis.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and that the best evidence we currently have suggests that civilian response can [decrease criminal legal system contact](https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/sciadv.abm2106?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), possibly by [replacing arrests with pathways to mental health and substance use treatment](https://www.nber.org/papers/w33761?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But alternative response programs like the ones that the mayor-elect is describing are not a *stand-alone solution* to mental health and homelessness. They are simply a type of emergency response, one that ideally provides compassionate, trained care to help ensure that a moment of urgent need is less likely to escalate further. In Vital City's [public safety mayoral candidate event](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-talks-public-safety) and in his debates, Mamdani has focused his descriptions of a new Department of Community Safety "that tackles the mental health crisis and homelessness crises head on" on alternative response programs such as CAHOOTS (Eugene, Ore.) and B-HEARD (in New York). But community responder teams do not provide long-term treatment for mental health and homelessness any more than EMTs provide ongoing care for cardiac health after responding to a heart attack. To address deeper underlying concerns, crisis responders must be able to bridge folks in crisis through to intensive case management and ultimately to services — benefits, housing with supports for people with acute needs, inpatient or outpatient care, supports for obtaining and staying on medication. > A Department of Community Safety only works if it claims real ownership of the hardest cases — not just the easy wins at the front door. The "mental health" section of Mamdani's [Department of Community Safety proposal ](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1a7ejjSZWWIAcxfcWnkYaqvnjihTb0LAOQkj8g10-npg/edit?tab=t.0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#heading=h.2gazcsgmxkub)also name checks expanding the city's network of community mental health workers, mobile crisis units and some voluntary programs, including peer clubhouses and respite centers. But the City already spends billions of dollars a year on mental health and homelessness services that are administered by large, established agencies. In order to justify the monetary and bureaucratic costs of adding another agency, a newly formed Department of Community Safety would need to offer more than duplication of existing efforts under a new name. It would need to bridge three siloed domains — criminal justice, housing and homelessness, and mental health — and provide consistent cross-agency accountability for outcomes for individuals experiencing severe mental illness and homelessness. A Department of Community Safety would offer something new and needed only if it could take responsibility for the highest-need individuals in the city, create stronger accountability for outcomes using frontline data from 911 and other sources and create a unified pathway across currently disconnected systems. For one example of how a new community safety department could align its programs to address mental health and homelessness, look to Durham, N.C. Durham is, of course, much smaller than New York City, but is one of the few jurisdictions in the country that has established a Community Safety Department that functions as a peer to its law enforcement agency and is funded through general funds rather than short-term grants. What can New York City learn from its experience? In most jurisdictions, there are three types of emergency response: for fires, the fire department; for medical emergencies and transport to the hospital, EMS (and sometimes fire); and for all else, police. Alternative response takes the "for all else" category and breaks it down more granularly, saving police for calls that have a closer nexus to public safety, calls that involve violence or high risk of violence, weapons and so on. In July 2021, Durham created its Community Safety Department (DCSD) as a distinct municipal entity designed to rethink how the city responds to public safety and wellness needs that fall outside the traditional "police/fire/EMS" buckets. Structurally, DCSD sits alongside the city's police and fire departments as a co-equal part of the city's safety infrastructure that reports directly to city leadership. Its 911 response, stabilization programs and housing resources work in concert to provide both an immediate safety net and a feedback loop to inform broader system reform. Deep investment in data gathering and continuous learning enable DCSD to track patterns in emergency service utilization, recurring crises and unmet behavioral health needs. DCSD's core program is called Holistic Empathetic Assistance Response Teams (HEART). Launched in 2022, HEART comprises multiple units: a Crisis Call Diversion unit placing mental health clinicians in the 911 call center; unarmed Community Response Teams dispatched to nonviolent behavioral health and quality-of-life calls (similar to B-HEARD); and co-response teams pairing clinicians with specially trained police officers for higher-risk situations. These solutions are seen as different tools in the city's toolkit, allowing the city more nuanced and tailored responses to crises. 911 call dispatchers are trained to differentiate whether a call merits hand-off to a clinician over the phone, a co-response team (officer and behavioral health specialist) or the Community Responder Team. Critically, these crisis teams then hand off to in-house follow up teams that help connect residents to longer-term help. Over time, DCSD began to notice that a disproportionate number of 911 calls were about a small subset of especially acute individuals in the city. These are residents struggling with chronic homelessness and severe mental illness or substance use disorders. Ryan Smith, the founder and director of Durham's Community Safety Department, says that working with this group of residents in need has revealed how [fragmented traditional care systems](https://ssir.org/articles/entry/homelessness-services-redesign?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are and how the current system of services can fail the most vulnerable residents. "Because we take the 911 calls, we know what's actually happening on the street and we take responsibility. A lot of these systems of care and support — they have an out. If someone is too hard to work with, they kick them out of their program, discontinue them for being non-compliant. A community safety department is a structure that realizes that government shouldn't do that, can't do that. We're going to keep showing up. We're not going to give up on you." The hardest people to serve bounce in and out of city services, showing up in jails, shelters and emergency rooms. These are the individuals most likely to be dropped in the complex coordination and handoffs between existing city services, or to be discontinued by a provider for failing to show up or comply with program requirements. Mamdani shouldn't lose sight of this. A Department of Community Safety can reorient government to better address the problems of people who are struggling on the streets and subways only if it has a relentless ownership for the individuals it serves and has the mandate and ability to improve the way criminal justice interventions, homelessness and housing services and mental health resources are dispensed. > Compassionate crisis response is essential, but without relentless follow-up, people spiral right back into the same subway stations and emergency rooms. Rather than simply creating another layer of navigators whose job was to conduct hand-offs to other program, DCSD built Familiar Neighbors, a team responsible for seeing these high-needs individuals through their entire journey from street contact to placement in housing and care. With caseloads as low as three to four clients per caseworker, the Familiar Neighbors team takes a persistent, relational approach, meeting people daily or even multiple times per day, accompanying them to appointments, securing IDs or benefits, working to build the trust to move towards housing and treatment.They do not disconnect once they enroll them with a social services provider, ensuring continuity across multiple handoffs. This relentless (and time intensive) engagement, while still small in scope, has helped some of Durham's most troubled residents move from years of homelessness in the downtown business district into permanent supportive housing. But the persistent focus and ownership of the problem has also revealed structural gaps that prevent people from moving from the streets into housing and care — document processes that take over 50 days, missing referral pathways into housing or hospital services. Ryan notes that because DCSD is on the frontline of responding to 911 calls and then trying to move neighbors from crisis through stabilization and into treatment and housing, its work generates insights that can reshape how an entire city organizes care for its most vulnerable residents. This shows up in the way that DSCD designed a new involuntary committal team that can do involuntary committal assessments in the field. In North Carolina, any individual, including family members and clinicians, can petition a magistrate to initiate an involuntary commitment if someone appears to be at risk due to mental illness. Typically, the police are tasked with finding the individual and transporting them to the hospital, often in restraints, where they will be examined. However, these examinations often result in denials of involuntary committal, meaning that the transport was a waste of police officer and medical specialist time as well as traumatizing to the resident. To improve the process and experience with involuntary committals, DCSD created an in-house Involuntary Commitment Response Team. The DCSD involuntary committal team is staffed with certified first examiners who can conduct the initial steps of the assessment in the field. This approach has allowed the city to reduce the use of restraints and police transport when unnecessary and provide a more specialized, compassionate approach when a committal is merited. While Mamdani's goals to minimize the use of involuntary committals are laudable, he still needs a plan for how to support and integrate those types of intensive interventions alongside crisis response and long-term supports. Ryan told me, "One of the most touching things I've received in this role has been emails from parents who are in the heartbreaking position of having to make multiple involuntary commitment calls on their child. They've told me, 'This is always a devastating thing to do, but this was the best experience we've ever had. The way your team responded, their knowledge and compassion made a huge difference in an experience that is usually terrifying and traumatic. One mother wrote to us recently, saying, 'This is the seventh IVC experience for my son and myself and it was, by leaps and bounds, the best IVC experience I have had. This program has been so needed for so very long (my son and I have been navigating the system for 15 years) and I am so appreciative of your presence in our community! You all fill a vital need in this community.'" DCSD leaders saw this shift in perspectives not only from residents but also from officers. When I asked what he'd want a mayor building a new department to know, Ryan said, "People are going to talk about resistance and skepticism from law enforcement, But I'd want a mayor to know that can change, even faster than you think possible. We partnered with law enforcement from the beginning. There was a *lot* of skepticism. One of our sergeants described the feeling in the police department as 'darn close to 100% that this was a bad idea.' We did surveys of our law enforcement partners. Just 37% of officers thought HEART would be helpful on mental health calls initially. But that number had risen to 67% after one year. I thought that kind of mindset shift would have taken longer, but we saw significant shifts in just a year. We were on the radios together, they saw our teams going out, taking work off of them, being active in the community. Increasingly, officers are asking for us to go to more calls. They see it's something that's making their job better." Is the program perfect? Of course not. But when launching an ambitious new department, New York should learn from others who have done similar work. Much of Durham's success in establishing and expanding its Community Safety Department has come from creating a strong through-line between its crisis response teams, follow up care navigators and intensive case managers for its highest acuity individuals; working in close collaboration with its community, law enforcement and 911 call dispatchers; and building in real-time data-driven improvement. One vision for better crisis response could be what I experienced in Penn Station: a responder with training in mental and behavioral health averting a potentially disastrous encounter with law enforcement and enabling a smooth handoff to care. But unless that man we met in Penn Station was connected to intensive follow-up, he may have ended up right back in Penn Station the next day. Mamdani should invest not only in the front door of compassionate crisis response, but, more importantly, in the clear ownership and accountability to stick with someone after crisis through stabilization, treatment and housing placement. ### A Pipeline to Somewhere URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/kathy-hochul-nese-pipeline-empire-wind/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:39.000Z Only the timing was uncertain. Otherwise, it was plain as day that sometime this fall, Gov. Kathy Hochul would lift New York State's hold on a new 24-mile pipeline intended to augment natural gas supplies in New York City and Long Island. Sure enough, the [permits dropped on Nov. 7](https://dec.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/nesepermitcoverletter20251107.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), while city and state lawmakers were in Puerto Rico at their annual post-Election Day huddle, pondering Zohran Mamdani's mayoral win. The die was cast six months ago, in May, when President Trump [told Hochul](https://www.enr.com/articles/60774-trump-reverses-shutdown-of-5b-ny-empire-wind-construction?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) he would spare New York's first big offshore wind power array, the 54-turbine Empire Wind 1 project in the Atlantic Ocean off Long Beach. The price? Hochul would reverse earlier rulings blocking the new gas pipeline on account of potential harms to the seabed beneath Lower New York Bay and the Rockaways. Politics demanded the governor disclaim any quid pro quo. Despite knowing the tradeoff, New York climate activists torched her announcement. "Hochul hasn't kept her promises to fight against skyrocketing energy bills or the climate crisis," [declared Food & Water Watch](https://nysfocus.com/2025/11/07/nese-gas-pipeline-approval-hochul-trump-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). "Hochul just did Trump's bidding by approving the massive . . . fracked gas pipeline \[that\] will jack up our utility bills, pollute our air & water, and cook the climate," [thundered NY Communities for Change](https://bsky.app/profile/nychange.bsky.social/post/3m52lqphyrs22?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In more measured terms, the Jewish Climate Action Network [called](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#inbox/FMfcgzQcqlBMjbMSFgJrwqzLvrRnvlSF) the permitting "a major setback to our work on climate." But should a deal that recoups Empire Wind be deemed a setback? Those turbines will usher in a green energy hub on the Brooklyn waterfront and create well-paying jobs, while the extra gas provides a cushion against freezing winter weather. Just as importantly, the nascent offshore wind industry, unloosed from Trump's detention, will, before long, offset much and perhaps all of the gas pipeline's climate emissions. In short, for New York, Hochul's deal with Trump could be more of a save than a cave. ## **NESE Pipeline and Empire Wind: Dimensions** The Northeast Supply Enhancement project, orNESE,is the 24-mile final segment of a new 130-mile pipeline from Pennsylvania gas-fracking country to a gas distribution node at Floyd Bennett Field in southern Brooklyn. The pipeline company, Williams/Transco, and the local gas utility, National Grid, [maintain](https://dec.ny.gov/environmental-protection/facilities-in-your-neighborhood/northeast-supply-enhancement-project-nese?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that NESE will help households and businesses withstand prolonged freezes and ensure that gas-fired electricity-generating plants — the mainstay of downstate power supply — have ample fuel year-round. In the company's telling, NESE will also help New York City and Long Island retain and attract industry. Empire Wind is a wind turbine array designed by Equinor, a unit of Norway's state oil company, awaiting installation on the Atlantic Ocean seabed 15 to 30 miles south of the Nassau County city of Long Beach, just east of Far Rockaway. It has two stages. Empire Wind 1, the phase that Trump greenlit, comprises 54 turbines capable of generating 810 megawatts. Empire Wind 2, with an additional 84 turbines totaling 1,260 MW, will bring the entire venture to 138 turbines and 2,070 MW. Coincidentally, that megawatt total is roughly identical to that of Indian Point, the now-shuttered twin-unit 2,028-MW nuclear power plant tucked into Westchester County's northwest corner, although wind variability will limit Empire Wind's annual electricity output to around 45% of what Indian Point generated each year. That plant was closed in 2020-2021 in a [deal](https://www.gothamgazette.com/130-opinion/9430-drones-hacksaws-climate-consequences-of-shutting-indian-point-cant-brushed-aside?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) engineered by former Gov. Andrew Cuomo and the Hudson River advocacy organization Riverkeeper. Indian Point is germane because the premature retirement of this zero-emission power source [blew up](https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2025/04/30/5-years-on-the-indian-point-disaster-is-its-shutdown/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the effort to decarbonize the New York grid, especially downstate, where, as recently as last year, electricity produced by renewable solar and wind facilities was dwarfed 15 to 1 by gas-fired generating plants. There's an additional reason: Indian Point's carbon benefit *—* the carbon dioxide that the plant previously forestalled by letting the grid ease up on power plants burning natural gas — provides a benchmark for evaluating the relative climate impacts of NESE, which will increase gas burning, and Empire Wind, which will reduce it. ## **Quantifying key NY State carbon emissions and reductions** To fairly evaluate the trade Hochul made, we need to carefully think through not only the additional energy that'll be delivered (and the cost of that delivery), but the carbon emissions that NESE and Empire Wind will variously cause or prevent. Carbon emissions, of course, are the prime accelerant of global heating, and rapidly reducing them has long been the central objective of virtually every environmental actor in New York, from Gov. Hochul to the hundred or more NGOs that pushed through landmark state climate legislation in 2019. The respective sources' carbon implications are also easily compared thanks to their interchangeability with natural gas. (That commonality lets us set aside NESE permitting's impacts on emissions of methane, the number two greenhouse gas, since there's no clear-cut difference between NESE and Empire Wind on that score; permitting NESE will necessarily add methane to our atmosphere, but building Empire Wind will curb it by substituting for gas-fired power.) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26290374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Indian Point:**Over their final two decades, the two Indian Point reactors jointly generated nearly 16.5 billion kWh's a year, equivalent to a phenomenal 92% capacity factor. In Indian Point's absence, essentially every one of those kilowatt-hours must be generated by burning natural gas, mostly in relatively efficient but still carbon-emitting combined cycle power plants. Applying the customary emission factor (CO2 per kWh) for such plants, **Indian Point's closure is causing additional emissions of 6.2 million metric tons of carbon dioxide a year.** **Empire Wind:** I lump EW 2 together with EW 1, on the premise that the visible success of the project's first phase will enable the developer along with business and labor allies to fend off any attempt by the Trump administration to block the second. Assuming a 40% annual capacity factor — a figure reflecting seasonal and diurnal fluctuations in wind strength — the project is projected to generate 7.25 billion kWh's a year, which otherwise would have to be produced in combined cycle plants burning natural gas. Using the CO2/kWh factor I employed above, I calculate that **Empire Wind will avoid 2.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide a year** — a substantial amount, though not half as great as the carbon benefit Indian Point was providing. **NESE:** Assessing pipeline-caused emissions isn't as straightforward as calculating emissions avoided by offshore wind or Indian Point. The issue isn't the emission factor for each unit of gas conveyed by the pipeline, which is known, but getting a read on how much additional fuel NESE will cause to be burned. Two parameters are in play, and neither has been fully studied and reported. One is how the amount of gas NESE will deliver over the course of the year stacks up against its peak-day deliverability. The other is the extent to which NESE gas will constitute "new" (incremental) fuel resulting in additional emissions, rather than substituting for carbon fuels now being burned (for example, home heating oil, propane and gas from other sources), which would make seemingly new NESE emissions a "wash." Astoundingly, despite their numerical weight, neither parameter seems to have been quantified or even mentioned by state agencies. (An [evaluation](https://t.co/7R8aiStrPF?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) commissioned by the Department of Public Service addressed only trivial emission matters such as averted diesel truck trips delivering compressed natural gas.) Absent serious inquiry, I've had to draw on my utility economics background and intuition to make "guesstimates." *The first variable is* NESE's annual utilization rate. Virtually all gas pipelines are sized for the coldest winter days and weeks, when heating needs spike not just in homes and apartments but also in stores, offices, factories and institutional buildings such as schools and hospitals. Absent hard, contrary information, I've defaulted to a 50% annual utilization rate. *The second is NESE additivity vs. substitutability:* I've selected 40% for this parameter after digesting the definitive [scholarly article](https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/estimating-the-emissions-reductions-from-supply-side-fossil-fuel-interventions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on "supply-side fossil fuel interventions," by a team at Resources for the Future led by economist Brian Prest. That paper concluded that stopping a fossil-fuel expansion project such as NESE typically reduces fuel use and consequent emissions by only 40% to 50% of the theoretical, calculated amount. The remainder, they concluded, would have been extracted from somewhere else, delivered and burned anyway to satisfy ongoing demand. Conversely — or symmetrically — *permitting* an oil or gas expansion project will *increase* net usage by the same 40% to 50%. The percentage is greater than zero — meaning, some NESE gas will be additional — because the pipeline will tend to lower the price of natural gas by bolstering its availability. While that will aid household and business budgets, the economics get complicated — because lower prices also tend to deter some conservation steps (e.g., lower thermostats) and efficiency measures (e.g., heat pumps) and switches to renewable energy (e.g., solar) by making them less profitable. I settled on the lower end of the range, 40%, on account of the relatively mature nature of fuel use in Long Island and New York City. With these assumptions, the estimated CO2 emissions added by NESE pencil out to 1.6 million metric tons a year — more than will be reduced by Empire Wind 1 (1.1 million), roughly the same as will be reduced by Empire Wind 2 (1.7 million), and less than the two combined (2.7 million). (Not unimportantly, estimated NESE emissions are also a whopping 75% less than ongoing emissions each year from burning additional natural gas to make up for the lost output of Indian Point.) ## **Implications** This quantitative exercise validates Gov. Hochul's compact with President Trump on climate grounds. If that deal's only virtue were to guarantee Empire Wind 1 in return for NESE, its net climate cost would be an increase in CO2 emissions of half a million metric tons a year — not beanbag but not a backbreaker either. And on the strong likelihood that Empire Wind 1 does reel in Empire Wind 2 as well, then permitting NESE will have yielded a net CO2-avoidance *benefit* exceeding a million metric tons a year — a result equivalent to outfitting 200,000 houses with solar panels. Other, more palpable benefits will include enhanced gas-service and electricity reliability and the advent of a new, local green-energy sector. These findings should prompt questions about the strident state of New York climate activism. In pillorying Hochul for a deal she made with Trump — under duress — the state climate movement appears to be exaggerating its downsides ("major setback"; "cook the climate") and overlooking prospective upsides. Their sniping risks harming Hochul's re-election campaign next year, largely without cause. Hochul isn't immune to criticism over her climate record. But many of her actions merit praise for their climate value, among them a state-led program to expand nuclear power capacity, a halt to highway expansions in the Hudson Valley and the Bronx, and successfully defending congestion pricing from Trump. With the favorable outcomes from the NESE-Empire Wind deal in mind, her critics should calm down, step back and see the larger picture. *You can download the author's full calculations at* [*komanoff.net/fossil/NESE.xlsx*](http://komanoff.net/fossil/NESE.xlsx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Filling in the Blanks on Mamdani’s Education Agenda URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/filling-in-the-blanks-on-zohran-mamdanis-education-agenda/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:32.000Z Although education wasn't one of the hot topics in the mayoral race, it will soon become a topic of great interest to the thousands of parents, students, teachers and staff who depend on the city's public school system. If Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani seeks to retain control of the city's public schools (and I hope he revisits his ill-considered proposal to undo the accountability reform established in 2002), he can use his office to have an impact that will benefit 900,000 students and their families. I have been involved with New York's public schools for several decades as a researcher, an advisor to district leaders, and as a parent of two students who graduated. Although I now live in Los Angeles, I continue to follow what happens in the city and the district closely. I therefore offer these comments in the constructive spirit of one who hopes to be helpful. Like many others, I am excited by the prospect of Mamdani's mayoralty and the possibility that he will succeed in making New York a city that works better for all of its residents. His campaign was brilliant, but as many of us know, running the City will be harder than running a successful campaign. The challenges facing the school system are especially formidable. More than 100,000 students — more than a tenth of those enrolled — face chronic housing instability. Additionally, for a variety of reasons, enrollment is declining, and as it does, the system will lose funding that is tied to per-pupil attendance. Several schools are severely under-enrolled, and because so few children attend them, the Department of Education can no longer provide adequate educational opportunities and services to the children who remain. Several schools in the city's poorest communities face high teacher turnover, chronic absenteeism and poor academic performance. Several others are in high demand and unable to accommodate those who desperately want access. Finally, while test scores in reading and math have shown significant improvement in recent years (though they remain lower than pre-pandemic levels in 2019), the question remains: How will recent growth be sustained? Furthermore, how will New York's schools prepare students to have the skills needed in a labor market that is likely to be upended by the advent of artificial intelligence? It is widely known that the mayor is likely to encounter fierce opposition as he implements many aspects of his affordability agenda. For this reason, it would be wise if he can avoid allowing education to become a source of conflict and controversy. He should strive to ensure that education reform is not contentious. Here are 12 of the most important steps he can take to move the system forward while minimizing conflict: 1. **Retain mayoral control.** Although he may be tempted to shift control to elected school boards or other entities, I recommend that Mamdani seek to retain control in order to avoid the political conflict that has bogged down other large urban districts. Mayor Bloomberg used mayoral control to generate private-sector support for the public schools and promote innovation. Mamdani can go further while at the same time delegating more authority to local community boards and the PEP to ensure public accountability. 2. **Retain Melissa Aviles-Ramos as chancellor.** The current chancellor is just 43 years old — but as a former teacher, principal, superintendent and chief of staff to a previous chancellor, she has more experience than most of the individuals who have served in this role. She is well respected inside and outside the system. Mamdani would be wise to keep her in place; doing so would in no meaningful way impinge on his ability to execute his agenda. 3. **End the charter school wars.** In recent years, previous mayors have spent too much time on the question of precisely what role charter schools should play in the five boroughs. Mamdani should accept that 150,000 students are being educated in these schools because their parents have deemed them to be a good fit for their kids — and thousands more want the opportunity to attend.Some of the city's charters produce excellent results. They should be allowed to thrive and encouraged to collaborate with struggling public schools rather than being made into piñatas by the mayor. One way to demonstrate a new approach is to allow charter schools seeking to co-locate in public schools that have sufficient room to be welcomed to do so by City Hall and Tweed. 4. **Expand performance**\-**based assessments.** "Currently, only 38 public high schools are permitted to substitute long-form projects and other performance-based assessments for most of the Regents exams required for graduation. [Evidence shows](https://www.edutopia.org/blog/performance-based-assessment-reviewing-basics-patricia-hilliard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that these schools outperform schools with similar demographics on a number of measures, [including the SAT](https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/product/assessing-college-readiness-authentic-student-work-report?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Performance-based standards create an opportunity for innovative teaching and learning that is attractive to students and parents and teach higher-order thinking skills that will be even more important as artificial intelligence eliminates many of the current jobs. More schools should be granted these waivers from the state Regents exams when they demonstrate the ability to implement the standards effectively. 5. **Sustain Mayor Adams' reading initiative and expand it to higher grades**. NYC Reads, the phonics-based reading initiative that began under Eric Adams and Chancellor David Banks, has demonstrated progress in the form of [significant increases in fourth-grade reading and math scores](https://infohub.nyced.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/2025-math-ela---web-deck.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To sustain these gains and improve outcomes in the upper grades, Mamdani should avoid being drawn into curriculum wars over literacy, sustain efforts to train teachers in these strategies and ensure that literacy efforts for middle and high school focus on a broader range of skills, including writing, research and public speaking. To sustain these gains and improve outcomes in the upper grades, Mamdani should avoid being drawn into the curriculum wars that often pit phonics against other approaches — and he will need to navigate similar ideological battles in math. Recent controversies over tracking and algebra placement show how easily expectations can be lowered when curriculum debates overshadow student needs. Ensuring that middle school math instruction systematically builds the foundation required for success in ninth-grade algebra is essential. 6. **Engage other city departments in supporting schools in marginalized communities.** The Harlem Children's Zone has shown that when schools have the resources to mitigate the effects of poverty, academic outcomes can improve. The city's Parks and Recreation Department, Health Department, its Housing Authority and possibly other agencies should be required to work closely with schools to provide social support to children and families in need. 7. **Deepen partnerships.** The Children's Aid Society, Turn Around for Children, and Good Shepherd provide vital services to schools in high poverty neighborhoods. They could do more if they worked strategically with City departments. Similarly, Education Management Organizations (EMOs) such as New Vision for Public Schools, the Urban Assembly, the Internationals Network, the Young Women's Leadership Schools and others have demonstrated that they can help schools experience sustained success. Ultimately, the key to improving public schools in New York is to ensure that the vast resources of the city are enlisted to support them in the work they do — not for the government to try to micromanage the way to success. 8. **Significantly increase starting teacher salaries**. In order to retract and retain teachers, salaries must be increased substantially. Given that NY spends $42,000 per pupil, one of the highest expenditure rates in the nation, a major increase is possible if budgets are constructed from the classroom first. Auditors must ask how personnel outside of the classroom benefit the mission of the DOE which is to serve its 900,000 students. The current salary of $66K for teachers with a bachelor's degree and $75K for teachers with a master's degree, is barely enough to live on in NY. An affordability agenda must include the needs of teachers. 9. **Leave the exam schools alone.** Mamdani, who attended Bronx Science, has previously supported efforts to remake schools where entry is now determined solely by a student's score on the Specialized High School Admissions Test. Let those students who play by the rules of the game, many of whom study on weekends for years to prepare, attend those schools. Mandami has hundreds of others to focus on and he should work to ensure that high-quality schools, both traditional publics and charters, are available in every neighborhood. Previous chancellors have gotten sidetracked by efforts aimed at diversifying enrollment at the city's eight exam schools. It would be wise to avoid this trap and focus on expanding access to more rigorous, high-quality schools. 10. **Consolidate under-enrolled schools and create new ones**. Although school closures always generate controversy, even when those targeted for closure are underperforming, if consolidation is accompanied by the creation of new schools that are able to offer a variety of attractive programs and services (e.g. dual language immersion, STEM or arts focused instruction, etc.), the effects of closures will be offset by the excitement generated by the opening of new and better schools. It might also be possible to lease the land of closed schools to build affordable housing. 11. **Conduct an audit of the DOE, starting with central and district-level administration.** Although enrollment has declined, the size of central and district administration has remained the same. A careful examination of district operations should reveal areas where cuts can be made thoughtfully and strategically. Mamdani has said there's money currently being wasted in the central bureaucracy and associated contracts — but cutting is easier said than done. He needs to be systematic in finding savings, and then redirect saved funds to schools. That will help kids and teachers, increase confidence in the system and make it easier for the DOE to cope with lower levels of funding in the future. 12. **Take a strategic approach to implementing free childcare.** Although universal pre-k was a significant accomplishment, the [rollout was rushed in many areas](https://www.edsurge.com/news/2021-05-10-the-unintended-consequences-of-universal-preschool?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), resulting in uneven program quality, shortages of certified early-childhood teachers and gaps in coordination between community-based programs and DOE schools, which limited the initiative's effectiveness for some families. As Mamdani attempts to do something more complex — offer free childcare to all families with children between the ages of six months and five years old — he should target a few communities where the need is great first. That will enable Mamdani to avoid mishaps and increase the likelihood of effective implementation. The time for clever social media videos is over. Now it's time to demonstrate that he and his team can produce tangible results to improve lives. Mamdani knows he will come under attack from the Trump administration. The administration is likely to attempt to cut big portions of the $2.5 billion in federal funding the city's schools currently receive for special education, free lunch and breakfast and other needed programs. While he should fight to retain this funding, it represents just over 6% of the DOE's budget. The mayor will need to cultivate support from the private sector to make up for lost funding and to launch new initiatives that will make the system attractive to parents who currently choose private schools. He will be more likely to succeed in his efforts to raise these funds and get the city to rally around him if he is perceived as fair and reasonable, if he can avoid unnecessary conflicts, and if he demonstrates the ability to bring about steady improvement by working closely with Education Department leaders. The mayor has an opportunity to use his election to make New York City a model of educational innovation and success. He can do this by ensuring that his approach to educational leadership maintains a strong commitment to ensuring that children of all backgrounds have access to quality education. ### Trump vs. Civil Society URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-should-nonprofits-and-foundations-respond-to-trump/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:39.000Z The mood among American nonprofits these days is dark. Extremely dark. I have spent the past 40 years working in the nonprofit sector, and I've never seen anything like this. The second Trump administration has been engaged in a sustained assault on civil society, using its fiscal and regulatory powers, as well as the bully pulpit, to try to bring advocacy organizations, charities, universities and philanthropies in line. Thousands of federal grants have been cancelled. The cost to American nonprofits is difficult to calculate, but it almost certainly amounts to billions of dollars. The [threat of civil rights investigation](https://www.aaup.org/news/new-report-civil-rights-law-weaponized-chill-speech?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has been wielded aggressively, particularly against American universities. What institution wants to submit their internal correspondence to discovery in a court of law? Who knows what embarrassing or even self-incriminating things government lawyers might find when they sift through all those emails? In the wake of the killing of conservative activist Charlie Kirk, the Trump administration went into overdrive, promising to ["go after"](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/15/vance-white-house-promise-to-crack-down-on-radical-left-lunatics-00564766?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) organizations that it believes are guilty of fomenting violence, including a potential criminal investigation of the Open Society Foundations (founded by George Soros). The administration has even made noises about revoking [the tax-exempt status of disfavored charities](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/17/us/politics/harvard-trump-irs-liberals.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including Harvard University. In the face of this unprecedented assault, some nonprofits and foundations are taking the long view, effectively hoping that "this too shall pass." Sure, things look bad at the moment, but the courts will probably limit the administration's overreach, a corrective midterm election is likely in 2026 and the Democrats have a decent shot of winning the next presidential election. It may take a few years, but things will eventually return to normal, or close to it. Against this line of thinking are those who believe that civil society is facing what amounts to an [existential threat](https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/how-should-funders-respond-to-an-existential-threat?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). With the wolves baying at the door, some prominent philanthropic leaders are arguing that ["complacency is complicity."](https://nonprofitquarterly.org/unite-in-advance-philanthropy-coalition-launches-solidarity-campaign/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Instead of silence or, god forbid, ["appeasement,"](https://ncrp.org/2024/12/playing-it-safe-wont-save-us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) they believe that foundations need to show some guts and disperse even more money than they are currently granting. ## Taking stock Anyone who was around for the first Trump administration can be forgiven for thinking that we've already seen how this movie ends. Back in 2016, many foundations and nonprofits all but declared themselves part of the #Resistance to Trump. This was entirely appropriate for some organizations, given their preexisting missions. But the resistance to Trump also sucked in numerous agencies that had heretofore appeared apolitical or middle-of-the-road. Some minor skirmishes were won along the way, but the war was resoundingly lost: Despite a massive expenditure of time and resources by philanthropy and nonprofits, Trump returned to the presidency triumphantly in 2024\. Significantly, Trump's victory was fueled by non-college-educated voters and improved levels of support from Blacks and Hispanics, exactly the kind of "vulnerable communities" that philanthropy and nonprofits typically aim to serve. So if running back the Resistance isn't the answer, what is? A good first step would be to engage in some introspection. Nonprofits and foundations should look at the current state of politics in the United States and ask some hard questions about whether they have contributed to the hyper-partisanship and polarization that currently plagues us. The honest answer, for many, will be "yes." In recent years, many service delivery organizations have chosen to expand their remit and get involved in advocacy work. Many foundations have been responsible for underwriting ["intense policy demanders"](https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/TheoryofParty.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — activist organizations that have proven enormously influential, helping to move American political parties away from the center and toward more extreme policy positions. Some philanthropic insiders have come to recognize the downsides of this approach. For example, [Suzette Brooks Masters](https://www.philanthropy.com/article/philanthropy-needs-to-own-up-to-its-role-in-fueling-polarization?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) spent nearly a decade as a grant maker focused on immigration. With hindsight, she believes that she was so caught up in winning that she was blind to the possibility of backlash: "I didn't seek out enough evidence about the unintended negative effects immigration battles could have on a large portion of the public who might have reasonable or principled questions or concerns about demographic changes fueled by immigration." According to [Daniel Stid](https://thefulcrum.us/democracy/daniel-stid?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), formerly a program officer at the Hewlett Foundation, "You've got these networks of media, NGO activists, foundations, think tankers and policy wonks that are effectively pulling both parties out to the hyper-partisan poles … I think philanthropy is particularly implicated in this phenomenon … Philanthropy \[is\] bankrolling most of the elements of the so-called shadow parties." Even the [Ford Foundation](https://www.fordfoundation.org/learning/library/learning-reflections/closing-the-divide-inside-our-global-initiative-on-polarization/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a leading funder of social justice causes, has recognized this dynamic. In a 2024 missive highlighting a global initiative to combat polarization, the foundation acknowledged that "we must be diligent to ensure we do not make polarization worse through our own actions or rhetoric … in philanthropy, we must all be aware of funding solutions-oriented and transformative work, not just doubling down on one viewpoint." ## What is to be done Once they have fully taken stock of their own role in fueling polarization, the pillars of civil society should actively seek to shift gears. For foundations, this means recalibrating their giving so that they are funding more efforts to reduce the temperature of our politics and to build bridges across social divides. Nonprofits should actively rethink their communication strategies. Too many organizations have essentially given up on actually attempting to persuade the majority of Americans who do not vote for the Democratic Party. These types of changes will hopefully yield long-term dividends, but they will not halt the Trump assault in the here and now. For that, foundations and nonprofits should be engaging in collective action, both in the courts and in the public square. A recent [open letter](https://medium.com/@uniteinadvance/statement-on-the-fundamental-freedom-of-speech-b98c1c6db4e2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) signed by hundreds of foundations represents a first step. "Attempts to silence speech, criminalize opposing viewpoints, and misrepresent and limit charitable giving undermine our democracy and harm all Americans," the signatories affirmed. While that's a good message, its effectiveness is undercut by the composition of the foundations who agreed to sign on. The headline ["**Left-Leaning Nonprofits Push Back on Trump's Crackdown Threats"**](https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/left-nonprofits-trump-crackdown-threats-kirk-murder/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)was typical of the way that news outlets covered the open letter. The framing of the battle between the Trump administration and civil society as just another left-right dispute plays into Trump's hands. The more that the effort to defend philanthropy and the nonprofit sector can be portrayed as a nonpartisan issue, with significant support from conservatives, the more effective it will be. Given this reality, it was heartening to read a recent interview with [Lawson Bader](https://www.thefp.com/p/conservative-philanthropy-ceo-to?taid=68daaaebd54062000170e4fd&utm%5Fcampaign=trueanthem&utm%5Fmedium=social&utm%5Fsource=twitter), the president and CEO of DonorsTrust, a conservative philanthropic organization, in The Free Press. Bader called out the White House for engaging in "dangerous" rhetoric and creating a precedent that could be used against conservative organizations in the future."The whole conversation needs to tone down," Bader said. "I think it's going to come back to haunt us." What civil society needs now is a chorus of Lawson Baders. Nonprofits and foundations perform tasks that are vital to the health of American society. They deliver valuable services that businesses will never take on because there is no profit to reap. They spark innovation in a way that government cannot. Most important, they are part of the connective tissue that binds us together as Americans. If civil society hopes not just to survive the current crisis but to emerge stronger, it must embrace self-examination and cross-ideological partnership, not burrowing into partisan trenches. In the process, nonprofits and foundations can embody the kind of live-and-let-live pluralism and basic decency that are essential to a thriving multi-ethnic democracy. ### Tax Revenue is Destiny URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/tax-revenue-is-destiny/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:40.000Z I worked for Andrew Cuomo in New York State government for many years and was one of his principal policy advisors during his mayoral campaign. I thought Andrew Cuomo would be the better mayor, but I sincerely wish Zohran Mamdani well and hope he succeeds as mayor. There is no doubt in my mind that Mamdani won both the primary and the general election far more than Cuomo lost those races. Mamdani was a brilliant campaigner. Even so, I don't believe he would have come out of nowhere to win both the primary and the general election without his core agenda on affordability, which resonated so strongly with younger voters, in particular: Strikingly, according to exit polling by NBC News, Mamdani won 70% of the vote. Of New Yorkers age 18-44, while Cuomo won 50% of the vote among voters older than 45. But will Mamdani succeed in realizing his agenda? In state and local government, tax revenue is destiny. Whether Mamdani succeeds as mayor depends in large part on the fiscal condition of the city government. To understand this better, it helps to go back to 2013, when Bill de Blasio was first elected mayor. The consensus view among the establishment at that time was that his ambitious campaign policy agenda would be severely constrained by New York City's fiscal straits. For example, in [a profile of Mayor Michael Bloomberg](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/26/after-bloomberg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) published in The New Yorker in August 2013, the three-time mayor argued that "\[N\]one of the Democratic candidates have addressed the one issue vital to the city's future: the budget. Although the budget has been admirably balanced for the past decade, in the next few years New York may confront its most severe budget crisis since the nineteen-seventies." The profile added that the Citizens Budget Commission "described the predicament the \[next\] mayor will confront as 'the calm before the storm.'" The reality proved different. New York City's [Independent Budget Office](https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/2013fiscaloutlook.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) wrote in December 2013: > Through much of the summer and early fall, it was asserted with some frequency that New York's next Mayor and City Council would inherit a substantial budget shortfall for the upcoming fiscal year along with other fiscal challenges. Then in November Mayor Bloomberg released his quarterly update to the city's financial plan and a different story emerged: The Mayor projected a sizable surplus for the current year as well as a balanced budget for next year, fiscal year 2015. Indeed, total revenues in the New York City budget in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014, were $5.2 billion, or 7.5%, greater than had been forecast in the FY 14 Executive Budget introduced the year before. Shortly before leaving office, [Bloomberg](https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-nyc-budget/update-1-mayor-bloomberg-hands-off-balanced-new-york-budget-idUSL2N0J61MW20131121/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was able to announce, "For the first time in my memory, and perhaps for the first time in New York City's history, the budget for an incoming fiscal year has been balanced for an incoming mayor." As was the case in 2013, none of the candidates in the 2025 mayoral primary or general election sought to make New York City's current budget challenges a major issue. The press implicitly assumed that New York City would have a balanced budget and that Mamdani's success implementing his ambitious agenda would depend simply on the level of new taxes approved by the state legislature and governor in Albany. This willful ignorance of New York City's financial situation was also maintained by New York City Comptroller Brad Lander, a primary opponent who became arguably Mamdani's most important supporter. In mid-August, [Comptroller Lander](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/comments-on-new-york-citys-fiscal-year-2026-adopted-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), commenting in his official capacity on the recently adopted New York City Executive Budget, warned that: "\[T\]he Office estimates the City will end FY 2026 with a gap of $4.2 billion (3.6% of total revenues), growing to $8.8 billion in FY 2027." The Independent Budget Office, the Citizens Budget Commission, and Mayor Adams' Office of Management and Budget issued earlier estimates that are somewhat lower but still significant. If New York City is really facing a budget deficit of roughly $9 billion — before spending on any new programs — Mayor Mamdani's ability to implement his affordability agenda will be severely constrained. He will face a set of problems he was never asked to confront in the campaign. Unlike recent fiscal crises, such as the Great Recession in 2008 and the Covid pandemic in 2020, the federal government will not bail out New York City and New York State's ability to help will be limited (although Governor Kathy Hochul has signaled that she will support at least a phase-in of universal childcare — much as Governor Cuomo provided state funding for Universal Pre-K in lieu of allowing New York City to raise taxes to fund the program itself). The starting point of the fiscal hole that Mamdani finds himself in will be even more important than the willingness of state government to increase taxes to benefit New York City. Notwithstanding Hochul's stated opposition, I would not be surprised if the state ends up raising the corporate income tax along the lines proposed by Mamdani. But in contrast to Mamdani's proposal that all such revenue should go to New York City to fund universal childcare, both the State and the City may need to use that increased revenue to fund current budget demands rather than new programs. New York City's Office of Management and Budget has been criticized for routinely sandbagging its tax revenue estimates. The New York State Division of the Budget raised its estimate of tax revenue in its Mid-Year Budget Update on November 2, 2025 by approximately $1.6 billion from its estimate in the June 30, 2025 Quarterly Budget Update. New York City's tax revenues are affected by the same forces and can also be expected to be higher than the enacted budget forecasts. It is unlikely that Eric Adams will be the second mayor in New York City history to hand off a balanced incoming-year budget to a new mayor. But if Mamdani shares the good fortune of de Blasio and the fiscal deficit is much less than current expectations, he should be able to get off to a good start as mayor. If the FY 27 budget deficit is manageable and New York City is granted some new revenue from Albany, Mamdani will be able to begin at least the phased implementation of a number of his principal campaign promises. In this scenario, Mamdani's early momentum will put air in the sails of progressives across the country, proving the skeptics wrong by demonstrating that far-reaching proposals can in fact be implemented. On the other hand, if the forecasts from the city comptroller and other fiscal experts prove to be close to accurate, Mamdani will be hard-pressed to advance significant new initiatives. Mamdani has laid no track to prepare New Yorkers for challenging fiscal times. A program of fiscal austerity would only reinforce the narrative of traditional Democrats that the promises of Mamdani — and progressives more generally — sound good but are merely aspirational goals incapable of being implemented in difficult economic times. *This is an excerpt from a longer article called "The Mamdani Mayoralty" posted on the* [*Step Two Policy Project Substack*](https://steptwopolicyproject.substack.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *on November 10, 2025.* ### New York’s Civil Service System vs. Public Sector Progress URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-mamdani-ny-civil-service-system/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:40.000Z > To call the system "byzantine" would be an insult to Byzantium. Two days after his election, Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani smartly sought to seize his supporters' extraordinary enthusiasm by [opening up an application portal](https://www.transition2025.com/apply?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to "identify candidates for roles across City agencies and offices." It worked. Within 24 hours, [25,000 people had submitted their resumes](https://x.com/morganfmckay/status/1986829958467989646?s=20&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). There's plenty for them to do. Per Comptroller Brad Lander's excellent [dashboard](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/for-the-public/nyc-agency-staffing-dashboard/authorized-vs-actual-city-staffing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York city government's vacancy rate today is more than twice its level before the pandemic, with more than 13,000 positions vacant. Some of those jobs are empty because of efficient operations or budget constraints, but many should be filled. Some of the City's highest vacancy rates — and more than 1,000 openings — are in housing-related agencies. If the mayor is going to bring down rents and make the city more livable, he probably wants more people to grant housing permits, inspect buildings, help the homeless and repair public housing. And whether or not he succeeds in raising taxes on the wealthiest, he also ought to collect levies already due. That is hard with 265 openings and a 13% vacancy rate at the city's Department of Finance. "Money is being left on the table," [says](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2025/09/behind-all-time-high-job-growth-nyc-17k-government-positions-sit-vacant/407933/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) one city assessor. But if the new mayor wants to use the surge of interest in joining his mayoralty to get his administration up and running fast, he will face an ugly obstacle: the City's civil service system. To call the system "byzantine" would be an insult to Byzantium. First created by Governor Grover Cleveland in 1883, New York State's civil service system aspired to award jobs based on "merit" and "fitness" rather than connections or patronage. But the system has since become an obstructive barrier keeping many of the city's most civically engaged residents out of public service. Even in a country rife with bureaucratic government processes, New York State's system stands apart. Governing magazine once wrote: "For decades, the king of the calcified and recalcitrant beasts has been the New York state civil service system, a monster off whose chest comprehensive reports on reform bounded like Wiffle balls." And New York City operates under the state's rules, with a special sauce layered on. > To call the system "byzantine" would be an insult to Byzantium. In a reform agenda released during his own mayoral campaign, Lander [laid out](https://web.archive.org/web/20250623214704/https://static1.squarespace.com/static/67a2f550954e9c463f4a2ef6/t/6839d7ba133be44eb77db810/1748621242594/Investing+in+a+World+Class+City+Workforce.docx.pdf) the painful experience of applying for a city government job: *A noncity employee with appropriate qualifications must first wait for an exam period (which sometimes do not exist at all) to be advertised, qualify to take the exam, wait several weeks for their examination date and then again wait for a ranked list of test takers to be certified, which includes a time for a mandatory appeals process. Once the list is certified, only then can agencies begin assembling applicant pools, and they must start at the top of the list and call at least one in every three candidates, in order. The median time for releasing scores from an exam is 290 days. Including time for test development and hiring, city agencies must often wait well over a year to onboard qualified employees.* Lander only scratched the surface. Job postings in New York City must fit into official job titles. But existing job titles — and there are [more than](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/City-Government/NYC-Civil-Service-Titles/nzjr-3966/about%5Fdata?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 3,000 of them — often bear no relationship to existing jobs as normal people understand them. [Here](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/pdf/exam-schedules/dcas-annual-examination-schedule-fy2026-alphabetical-order.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is the list of civil service exams on offer in the next year. There are 16 "administrative jobs," including "administrative horticulturalist" (!), and 13 kinds of associates. Many of these classifications have no particular subject matter. If your life goal is to work on transportation or the environment, and you don't know exactly what job title you would need to hold, you're in trouble. For these types of "competitive" City jobs, you can't apply for a specific agency. You may need to apply for generic and often murky job descriptions ("administrative staff analyst," "associate job opportunity specialist," "legal coordinator," "special officer") that may (or may not) qualify you for the job where you want to work. Under the standard rules, hiring managers with vacant roles are only allowed to hire the top three scorers on the exam for the job they're hiring for. Under this "Rule of Three," managers must regularly call individuals about tests they took years ago, often for jobs they never wanted. And then hiring managers can take weeks continuing one by one down the list until they find an interested candidate. These problems are particularly bad for technology jobs. As [others have noted](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/10/26/digital-upgrade-for-city-hall-the-next-mayors-most-urgent-task/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), city government is in dire need of a digital upgrade, and a surge of tech talent will be critical to the Mamdani administration's ability to achieve its policy vision. But among 3,000-plus standard titles in city government today, not one is for a technology job recognizable to ordinary technologists —no "software engineer," no "web designer." > Among 3,000-plus standard titles in city government today, not one is for a technology job recognizable to ordinary technologists — no "software engineer," no "web designer." The city is, however, presently offering exams for three kinds of "computer associate," covering everything from allocating desktop computers to coding.To learn more about the "computer associate" role, "YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR READING [THIS ENTIRE NOTICE](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/pdf/noes/20266037000.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) BEFORE YOU SUBMIT YOUR APPLICATION." In that seven-page PDF, most of which is consumed with describing educational qualifications and relevant certifications, here is the entire description of what the job *is*: *Computer Associates (Operations), under general supervision, with very considerable latitude for independent initiative and judgment: supervise the activities of subordinates in one or more computer operations units of considerable size; or serve as a technical resource person in the performance of networked, multi-tiered, or mainframe computer operations; or perform as a technical resource person in the diagnosis of and, when feasible, the correction of telecommunications hardware problems in order to maintain efficient functioning of telecommunication operations and to minimize downtime in the case of system failure. All Computer Associates (Operations) perform related work.* That must have been written at least 10 years ago. Or so one hopes. Hiring strong talent for technology roles now requires all kinds of creative maneuvering and workarounds – like using a precious few positions exempt from this whole rigamarole. These constraints also incentivize agencies to outsource critical technology work to more costly contractors, a boon to vendors at public expense. What makes this especially painful is that so many talented technologists are eager to work in government. In recent years, a series of federal "Tech to Gov" virtual job fairs attracted thousands of experienced tech workers, prompting Wired Magazine to [label the U.S. government](https://www.wired.com/story/tech-jobs-government-layoffs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "the hottest tech employer in town." People will accept a pay cut for meaningful work, but forcing them to parse jargon-filled forms, sit for a written exam, and wait a year for a job offer is a surefire way to extinguish their enthusiasm. What's more, for many vacant mid-level and senior tech positions within the civil service system, preference is given to existing employees rather than outside applicants, who often get lower pay for the same work too. So if you're a senior software engineer at Google who is ready to jump ship, take a pay cut, and go help New Yorkers access their benefits… well, you're out of luck. The great irony of the status quo is that a system built to honor merit now favors insiders — those who either have city jobs or know those who can negotiate the alien job titles, erratic exam schedules, and vague interview calls needed to get those jobs. It is not the welcoming city that Zohran Mamdani campaigned on creating. Mamdani is nothing if not a man in a hurry, and he ought to bring change. The question is how. The traditional approach, even for effective leaders, is to look for workarounds. So Mamdani can max out on using existing exempt positions, and use more "non-competitive" titles exempted from testing requirements. But the trouble with workarounds is they only go so far. The number of exempt positions is capped, to name one example. Mamdani may be able to use exemptions to drive his affordability agenda, but what about hiring challenges in corrections? For 911 operators? Public health? A mayor can drive his priorities by exception, but he cannot govern an entire city that way. Mamdani should seek to reform the antiquated examination system codified in the state's Civil Service Law. A better system could replace old-school exams with adaptive ones that provide real-time, situational tests of skills. It could allow candidates to be recruited even when an exam isn't offered by the city's overmatched Department of Citywide Administrative Services (vacancy rate: 15%). And it could provide more flexibility than the Rule of Three. For far more jobs, New York could hire the way most employers do, flexibly assessing employees abilities based on job experience, references, and interviews. Many cities — Charlotte, Denver, Seattle, Dallas, Houston, Austin — limit exams to a few departments, mostly police and fire. There's little [evidence](https://pols.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/273/2023/11/Corruption-Rpt-15-Final.11.2.23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) these cities are more corrupt than New York. The best check on abuse is holding hiring managers accountable for their own delivery. You're less likely to hire a hack if the hack's incompetence will cost you your own job. Reforms to hiring should come with reforms to firing. These changes will be hard, requiring changes in both city and state law. Mamdani will need to use his political capital to create a broad statewide coalition — lobbying his former colleagues in the State Legislature and seeking strong support from Governor Kathy Hochul. To her credit, Hochul temporarily suspended exams for many of the state's hard-to-fill titles through the [recent NY HELPS program](https://www.cs.ny.gov/help/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which has cleared the path for over 30,000 state hires over the past two years. In this context, Mamdani will need to tussle with his allies in the public employee unions, which opposed the extension of HELPS and are already [rallying opposition against](https://www.pef.org/articles/news/highlighting-concerns-explaining-civil-service-plans-to-modernize-system/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) rumored state-level reforms that would reduce reliance on exams and extend the flexibility granted by the HELPS program beyond its June 2026 expiration date. In Lander's admirable campaign [white paper](https://web.archive.org/web/20250623214704/https://static1.squarespace.com/static/67a2f550954e9c463f4a2ef6/t/6839d7ba133be44eb77db810/1748621242594/Investing+in+a+World+Class+City+Workforce.docx.pdf) dedicated to hiring, his ultimate proposal was to "Convene a World Class City Workforce Blue-Ribbon Panel of Civil Service Experts," stacked with "experts from unions, academia, the private and public sectors, and key partners in Albany." That could be fine here. Listening is good, and Mamdani excels at it. But if unanimity among "experts" is what is required for change, civil service reform will fail. In her [recent interview with Vital City](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-york-city-deputy-mayors-on-how-things-really-get-done), Maria Torres-Springer, former first deputy mayor and now the Mamdani Transition's co-chair, acknowledged the problem directly: "The process for becoming a City employee is not for the faint of heart. At a time when a new mayor is coming in with a huge coalition of people who want to help and want to be public servants, the stumbling block cannot be that it takes too long to get hired. You commit to fixing it. That allows you to bring in the talent you need and retain them. Maybe government can finally be an employer of choice." We hope the new mayor will heed this advice and lay the groundwork for a New York City government that can attract the best talent the city has to offer. ### Mamdani’s Victory, and Memories of Dinkins’ URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdanis-victory-and-memories-of-dinkins/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:32.000Z When David Dinkins narrowly defeated Rudy Giuliani in 1989 to become New York City's first Black mayor, his victory was both historic and fragile. Thirty-six years later, Zohran Mamdani's triumph — the first by a democratic socialist, Muslim, and South Asian candidate — carries an entirely different tone: confident, youthful, and emblematic of a shifting political city. Yet both moments mark inflection points in how New Yorkers imagine leadership. I was a 17-year-old Cornell University freshman in the fall of 1989, too young to vote but old enough to feel the electric current of politics. Leaving the Bronx to study four hours north of New York seemed like a welcome respite from a city teetering between possibility and despair after a spate of racial incidents and a crime epidemic that seemed out of control. But the morning after the 1989 election my friend Andy and I walked to the student union to find a news ribbon scrolling: *David Dinkins elected the first Black mayor of New York City.* Andy looked at me, grinning, and said, *"Look what we did."* The "we" didn't make literal sense — neither of us was old enough to vote — but it was a proxy for a kind of joyful ownership of a new direction for the city. Dinkins' campaign was built on the idea of a "gorgeous mosaic," his phrase for the city's multiethnic, multigenerational population. After years of racial division punctuated by Howard Beach, the killing of Yusef Hawkins and the Central Park Five, Dinkins embodied the hope of racial healing. Just as important, his victory carried the feeling of arrival for the city's black population, which had previously been treated as invisible or dangerous The [Dinkins win, however, was razor-thin](https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/09/nyregion/the-1989-elections-the-new-york-vote-almost-lost-at-the-wire.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — revealing that many white Democrats were swayed by negative campaigning over Dinkins' personal finances and, more subtly, by discomfort with a Black candidate. Nearly 9 in 10 Black voters supported him, along with roughly 7 in 10 Hispanic voters. His appeal was sharply limited among white voters — only about 30% backed him, and he lost white Catholic and Jewish neighborhoods by wide margins. Dinkins may have gained as many votes from voters prioritizing racial harmony as he lost from those resistant to a Black mayor. Mamdani's 2025 win, by contrast, was decisive — though not a landslide. With roughly 50.4% of the vote and a nine-point margin over Andrew Cuomo, the mayor-elect built a coalition that expanded from the progressive base of his primary victory to include initially skeptical Democrats. Ignore the shallow caricatures of the Mamdani voter as a young overeducated white transplant who can't find a real job. According to the New York Times's precinct analysis, Mamdani performed strongly across most racial groups — [winning 57% of Black votes, 52 percent of Latino votes, and 62% of Asian votes.](https://www.cnn.com/election/2025/exit-polls/new-york-city/general/mayor/0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) His weakest showing was among majority-white precincts, where he yielded 45% of white voters compared to 46% for Cuomo. Unlike Dinkins, Mamdani's support was not defined primarily by race. Age, income and ideology were far more predictive: He dominated precincts where the median voter was under 45, and he won handily in low- and middle-income areas. In essence, Mamdani replaced Dinkins' racial coalition with a generational and class-based one. ## The price of victory So what happens now? From his first day in office, Dinkins faced relentless opposition, primarily from his defeated Republican opponent, Rudy Giuliani, who refused to fade into the background. Yet through all the noise, Dinkins governed. He worked with the federal government to add thousands of police officers to the force — a move that began to bend the city's violent crime downward. He launched the Beacon Schools program, turning public schools into community centers open at night and on weekends for tutoring, recreation and family support. Conservatives mocked the idea as "midnight basketball," but for the families who used those spaces, it was a lifeline. Still, his coalition frayed under pressure. Economic recession, racial unrest and the ever-present tabloid drumbeat about crime sapped his popularity. The infamous Crown Heights riots of 1991 became a symbolic rupture — the image of a Black mayor unable, in the eyes of many, to control racial violence. By the time he faced Giuliani again in 1993, the mood had turned. Giuliani won by nearly the same slim margin that he had lost four years earlier. Staten Island's secession vote that year brought out a surge of anti-Dinkins turnout, sealing his fate. Zohran Mamdani's election as New York's first Muslim and first South Asian mayor carries a different kind of historical resonance, but the underlying dynamics feel eerily familiar. Once again, the city is divided — not by the crime crisis of the early 90s, but by affordability, inequality and a growing generational chasm. The question this time isn't whether New York will survive violence, but whether it can remain livable for the many. The coalition that carried him to victory is as complex — and fragile — as Dinkins' once was. Mamdani's support skews younger and more diverse. He won big among voters under forty and among immigrant communities in Queens and Brooklyn. But in parts of Staten Island, southern Brooklyn and even among some older Black and Latino voters, his margins were thin. A record turnout — the highest since 9/11 — revealed not only enthusiasm for change but also deep resistance to it. The final days of the campaign made that clear. A super PAC supporting Cuomo ran ads showing Mamdani eating rice with his hands, followed by footage of a Black man robbing a store. Another spot featured a racially ambiguous man in a fur coat, sneering like a caricatured "pimp." The ads were so blatantly racist and Islamophobic that Cuomo's team eventually pulled them, though the damage was done. In his concession speech, Cuomo thanked his supporters not for serving the city, but for their loyalty to him personally, calling them "New York patriots" — a phrase that sounded lifted from a Trump rally. The implication was clear: Mamdani's supporters were somehow un-New York. It was a reminder that Dinkins, too, had faced a post-defeat antagonist in Giuliani. And just as Giuliani built a political career on defining himself against Dinkins' vision, Cuomo seems poised to play a similar role for Mamdani. The echoes are unmistakable. Mamdani's first task is to maintain the coalition that elected him. That means showing progress early, even symbolically: freezing rents as promised, piloting fare-free bus routes, launching visible community initiatives that make people feel their vote mattered. It also means keeping the lines open to the grassroots — to the young volunteers, immigrant groups and activists who powered his campaign. If they feel ignored or sidelined, their enthusiasm could turn to disillusionment faster than City Hall can draft a budget. The second task is to expand the coalition. Mamdani can't govern a city of 8.5 million people by leaning only on the left-most edge of his base. He'll need to reach out to moderate Democrats, to unions divided over his policies, to small-business owners wary of change. He doesn't need to win everyone over, but he does need to avoid governing against them. And then there's the hardest part: learning to use the machinery of government. Dinkins, for all his moral clarity, was often faulted for being a poor manager. Mamdani will have to be both visionary and technocrat. The policies he champions will test not just his ideals but his administrative skill. Can he navigate Albany's budget process, balance ambitious spending with fiscal realities and deliver concrete results without alienating the very bureaucracy he needs to make it happen? ## History's echo Dinkins left office with his moral compass intact but his coalition fractured. Yet his story didn't end there. Decades later, when Amadou Diallo was killed by police in 1999, Dinkins quietly reached out to Giuliani — the same man who had taunted him outside City Hall — urging him to meet with community leaders to ease the tension. Giuliani refused. Dinkins' offer of dialogue, rebuffed, stands as a small emblem of what real leadership looks like. Mamdani, too, will face moments when dialogue seems impossible — when opposition hardens, when headlines turn sour, when parts of his coalition feel betrayed. How he handles those moments will define his mayoralty more than any policy paper ever could. African-American voters represented some of Mamdani's biggest support. Ironically, his victory comes at the cost of [Eric Adams](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/percy-sutton-eric-adams-and-the-state-of-black-political-power-in-new-york), only the second Black mayor in the city's history. Some may reasonably worry that the importance of Black voices will be reduced in the city's political hierarchy once Adams leaves. But Mamdani's win symbolizes a different kind of revolution — not one of representation alone, but of ideology. If Dinkins' election was about breaking a color barrier, Mamdani's may mark the breaking of a political one. ### How Modern Mayors Meet the Moment URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-modern-new-york-city-mayors-meet-the-moment/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:40.000Z New Yorkers rarely cheer their mayors. It's a tradition. Moreover, we especially tire of those — even the sainted Fiorello La Guardia — who were unlucky enough to get elected to a third term in the era when they legally could. In May 1932, the city's beloved but discredited playboy mayor Jimmy Walker was improbably booed at Yankee Stadium before being rescued when the band struck up the National Anthem. (Walker won the crowd over by declaring that if a public figure "cannot withstand the boos — and I mean boo-s, and not b-o-o-z-e — then he also should not pay attention to praise.") This week's was the 17th municipal election I was assigned to decode as a reporter, columnist, editor or commentator for The New York Times, The Daily News, CUNY-TV, NY1 News and now City Limits. A single thread looped all those election results together. They suggest a commonsensical judgment, comparable to the way jurors reach a verdict: by sifting and often discounting much of the tangible evidence and conflicting expert testimony and going with their gut. New Yorkers have an uncanny knack of choosing the right candidate at the right time — often in robust and unambiguous reaction to his predecessor. That's a far cry from saying that the candidate they choose in any given election lives up to his promise or potential, or eventually makes a great mayor. But arguably, the voting public has consistently selected the candidate who made sense for the moment. In 1961, Robert F. Wagner won re-election by running against his own record in a beat-the-bosses campaign that empowered municipal labor unions and the Liberal Party. Twelve years of that deliberative mayor were more than enough, as it turned out. In 1965, Wagner was succeeded in an upset by a charismatic Manhattan congressman, John V. Lindsay, whom the columnist Murray Kempton sagely characterized as "fresh when everyone else is tired." Four years later, Lindsay lost the Republican nomination but was reelected in a record turnout by diverting attention from his own administration's mistakes and turning the campaign into a referendum on the war in Vietnam. Two terms of fiscal fakery, which kept the city cool and delivered services that even Lindsay's critics had sanctioned, left New Yorkers yearning for fiscal stability — and who knew the buck better than Comptroller Abe Beame? Except the voters — and the bankers from whom the city borrowed — discovered that he didn't. Beame had, indeed, warned of budget gimmickry under Lindsay. As mayor, he couldn't even certify how many municipal employees were on the payroll. So, he was more or less sidelined by Governor Hugh Carey and state overseers and defeated after one doleful term by the irrepressible Ed Koch, a legislator with little administrative experience, but who managed to differentiate himself from his rivals with the slogan, "After eight years of charisma \[Lindsay\] and four years of the clubhouse \[Beame\], why not try competence?" During his third term, though, Koch was doomed by a fourth "C" — corruption — and simultaneously became a symbol of racial division. He lost the Democratic primary in 1989 to David Dinkins, a balm-thrower who would become the city's first Black mayor (he won the primary and nearly lost the general election *because* he was Black) and tried fuzzily to encapsulate his persona in the mantra, "you don't have to be loud to be strong." It turned out you did, though. Which is how, after blaring bloody murder about rising crime and other self-inflicted failings of the Dinkins administration, anti-crime crusader Rudy Giuliani slipped in for two terms beginning in 1993\. Giuliani begatMike Bloomberg, who succeeded him in 2001 thanks to Giuliani's last-minute endorsement amid the lust for leadership after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Bill de Blasio naturally followed as New York looked to its liberal roots after billionaire Bloomberg had laid out the welcome mat for the fellow billionaires whose taxes disproportionately support city services. In 2021, as the pandemic compounded the impact (if you could call it that) of a lackadaisical mayoral administration — and with the city destabilized and suddenly feeling more dangerous — voters, in what seemed like a post-racial election, chose a borough president and former cop, Eric Adams. We all know how that turned out. "While the Presidency can elevate even average people," Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman wrote decades ago in "Governing New York City," their seminal study, "the mayoralty is the highly vulnerable symbol of all defects in the city and its government." Mayors are ultimately measured by the baggage they inherited (like the migrant influx), the challenges they faced and the legacy they left. Self-discipline aside, historians will probably judge Eric Adams more generously on what he accomplished than his contemporaries have. Now, Mamdani too arrives as a reaction to what came before. Like Lindsay in 1965 — and Donald Trump in 2016 and 2024 — Zohran Mamdani promises something different, if largely untested and ephemeral: an opportunity to repudiate an establishment weary of dreaming impossible dreams and afraid to fail and to validate the evolution of a metropolis founded on immigration and diversity. By voting for Mandani, a slim majority of New Yorkers invested a great deal of faith in wishful thinking. Skeptics hope that because he is a listener, he will mitigate his seeming intransigence. Supporters hope that he'll help make the city more affordable, and quick — but they will have to temper their expectations. The good news is that, having mounted a stunning campaign that overpowered the cynicism and polarization that pervades today's politics and government, he has single-handedly revived civic engagement. His recruitment of city government veterans to his transition team suggests some regard for what he and his idealistic acolytes know that they don't know. (Don't forget that the last New York mayor elected when he was 34 years old, [John Purroy Mitchel](https://www.boweryboyshistory.com/2025/11/the-boy-mayor-of-new-york-john-purroy.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), fell from the cockpit of an airplane because he neglected to buckle his seatbelt.) Whatever New Yorkers think of Mamdani, the fact that he won says a lot about them, too. Maybe someday, Mamdani — who's about to confront the challenges of leading a restive city — will achieve the impossible: to make *us* smile, too, and, ultimately, even to cheer for him. ### How About Energy Affordability? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-about-energy-affordability-for-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:42.000Z For a year dominated by talk of affordability, electricity costs have not featured prominently in New York's political debate — unlike elsewhere, [like Georgia](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/04/us/georgia-election-utility-board-results.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), where they upended elections this week. Events may soon change that. On the day Zohran Mamdani is sworn in as mayor, Con Edison's proposed [almost $400](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/08/new-york-con-edison-disconnections-climate-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) annual rate hike will take effect. Both [he](https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/brian-kavanagh/con-ed-customers-lawmakers-slam-new-rate-hikes-demand?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Gov. Kathy Hochul](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/keeping-money-your-pockets-governor-hochul-takes-sky-high-utility-costs-and-demands?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are opposed. With nearly [2 million city residents](https://a816-dohbesp.nyc.gov/IndicatorPublic/data-stories/energy-insecurity/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) struggling to pay utility bills, and approaching [a hundred thousand shutoffs](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/08/new-york-con-edison-disconnections-climate-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) this year alone, skyrocketing electric bills are fast becoming New York's next cost-of-living crisis. Our leaders should be treating them as such. If Mamdani and Hochul are serious about confronting a [crisis as sprawling as this](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/coming-electricity-crisis-data-brian-deese?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), they will need to join hands. They should start by shining a light onto the powerful institution that actually runs the state's electric grid — the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) — and, specifically, its lack of accountability to the communities it serves. Before rates spike again, the pair should demand reforms giving New Yorkers a real voice in its decisions, organized around a common-sense clarion call: No rate hikes without representation. So-called grid operators play an underappreciated, behind-the-scenes role, overseeing wholesale electricity markets that determine how resources are paid and managing the power grid. Likened to[ air traffic controllers](https://www.nmppenergy.org/energy-education/rtos-air-traffic-controllers-us-electric-grid?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), they [decide which plants](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nyc-peakers-planned-2025-retirement-remain-online-reliability-must-run-nyiso/700417/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are dispatched to meet demand and run the process for connecting new energy sources as supply. NYISO is a private, nonprofit corporation — a product of 1990s-era deregulation that [shifted grid control](https://www.ferc.gov/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from utilities to nonprofits intended to be neutral market actors. In actuality, entrenched interests [maintain an outsize role](https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/2024-08/01%5FMacey%5FART%5FFinal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in NYISO's governance, despite its formal independence. NYISO's [ultimate decision-making body](https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/1399438/By%5FLaws%5FNYISO%5F2017.pdf/ec19049e-f8f3-f72d-6460-699f8db53251?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is [its board](https://www.nyiso.com/about-us?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and it counts as directors several former executives of utility companies in New York and across the country, as well as from other energy industry incumbents. Directors are selected by the board itself or its external stakeholder committees. Those, too, are[ chock-full of incumbent industry members](https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/1408883/2025-Committee-Membership-Roster.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Public interest advocates on these committees are even given [less voting power](https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/1408883/NYISO-Governance-FAQ.pdf/471f13a1-5def-7358-b0a5-42221906ac0e?t=1546629718621&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than industry. That's despite [decade-old State proposals](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ny-gov-cuomo-orders-review-of-nyiso/359193/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to reform NYISO's governance, which failed to seriously change these dynamics. > No rate hikes without representation. Grid operators deeply influence electricity prices and, thus, our economic security. Nearly[ 50,000 megawatts](https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2223020/2025-Power-Trends.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of clean energy projects — enough to power millions of homes — are stuck in NYISO's process for connecting to the grid. Some have been [waiting](https://earthjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/2025.07.07-nyiso-letter-to-gov-agencies.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as long as six to seven years. [Experts have called](https://heatmap.news/podcast/shift-key-s2-e5-interconnection-queue?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) these interconnection queues "perhaps the biggest obstacle to deploying more renewables on the U.S. power grid." The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates most grid operators, but the Trump administration has made little secret of its disdain for robust oversight. The State's Public Service Commission has a [more limited](https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty%5Fscholarship/2848/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and[ nonvoting](https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/1399438/By%5FLaws%5FNYISO%5F2017.pdf/ec19049e-f8f3-f72d-6460-699f8db53251?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), role. No New Yorker facing rate hikes in the coming years should be comforted by the idea that their interests can or will be adequately protected by today's regulators or outvoted advocates. Instead, Mamdani and Hochul should demand reforms giving New Yorkers voting representation on NYISO's board. It behooves the next mayor to lead this cause, because the city accounts for [the majority of the state's residents](https://www.osc.ny.gov/reports/budget/fed-funding-ny/low-income-home-energy-assistance-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who are having difficulty paying utility bills and [a third of electric demand](https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Large-Scale-Renewables/Tier-Four?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Yet NYISO's governance does not reflect these stakes. The importance of representation in addressing rising electric bills was recently demonstrated just next door. This summer, in the wake of surging prices, NYISO's mid-Atlantic counterpart, PJM Interconnection, [came under heavy criticism](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/10/business/energy-environment/pjm-electrical-grid.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from elected officials. Citing an "unprecedented crisis of confidence," a bipartisan coalition of nine governors [wrote to PJM](https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/2025/20250717-nine-governors-letter-regarding-board-vacancies.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) demanding that two board seats be "proposed by the states" — a call they have [since reiterated](https://www.eenews.net/articles/governors-push-pjm-to-hold-down-power-costs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > Whether and how electric bills add to New York's affordability crisis will be decided, in part, in a nonprofit's boardroom. Other states have passed laws reforming grid operator governance. Following its massive electricity blackout in 2021, and after legislators blasted the board's ["good old boys,"](https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2021/02/26/whos-at-fault-texas-lawmakers-grill-regulators-energy-industry-over-power-crisis-but-get-few-answers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Texas[ granted its governor and top elected officials control](https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex.%5Futils.%5Fcode%5Fsection%5F39.1513?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over who selects its own grid operator's directors. New York's leaders should similarly insist on a say in how NYISO is run. Some may claim that such representation could inject politics into what should be technocratic decisions. Yet NYISO is already making value-laden choices — choices shaped by the incumbent interests privileged in its governance. Moreover, accountability [need not come](https://harvardlawreview.org/print/no-volume/presidential-administration/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the expense of qualifications and expertise. Many factors are driving electricity prices, including demand from AI, extreme weather and Trump's rollback of clean energy investments. Tackling this challenge will require a methodical, multipronged effort on the parts of Mamdani and Hochul, with both local and state-level reforms. But even the best policies will be [blunted by a bottlenecked grid](https://law.stanford.edu/2024/10/15/for-a-reliable-affordable-and-clean-energy-system-its-the-grid-stupid/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Accountability for our grid operator's decisions is a necessary step on any path that leads to an affordable energy future. Rather than wait for more hikes, or blackouts, to ignite the kind of accountability crises that plagued the mid-Atlantic region and Texas, the mayor and governor should demand immediately that New Yorkers' interests be represented on NYISO's board. New Yorkers have left little doubt about an affordability crisis that cannot wait. Whether and how electric bills add to it will be decided, in part, in this nonprofit's boardroom. Leaders who take that crisis seriously should insist that New Yorkers be at the table. ### Putting Tech To Work for All New Yorkers URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/putting-tech-to-work-for-all-new-yorkers/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:41.000Z As a candidate, Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani seemed pretty tech savvy. His [adept use of social media](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/29/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-campaign-videos.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) helped him reach a new generation of young voters. But the Democratic Socialist has [studiously avoided](https://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) any talk of technology's role in his government or the city's economic future. That's a mistake. Not only is tech [driving the city's post-pandemic recovery](https://nycfuture.org/pdf/CUF%5FTechNYC%5Ffinal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it will provide indispensable new capabilities the next mayor needs to achieve his goals. Some progressives view Big Tech and AI as threats to the working class. That's narrow-minded. New York City's government has a long history of introducing technological innovations that deliver widespread benefits. In 1968, John Lindsay [launched the 911 emergency response system](https://www.nytimes.com/1968/07/02/archives/police-emergency-center-dedicated-by-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) midway through his first term, an innovation that helped him win a tight reelection campaign. Michael Bloomberg expanded the idea in 2003, launching the 311 nonemergency hotline. The opportunity and the need are even greater today. To use tech aggressively and responsibly, however, the mayor-elect needs a strategy. I see three areas where he can deliver quick wins while also laying the foundations for future innovations that will empower his government to make tech work for working people. First, Mamdani should reboot promising tech programs that languished under the Adams administration. Second, he can reuse proven technology solutions pioneered in other cities. Third, he must reform how New York City's government builds, buys and uses technology. With this approach, Mamdani can turn the tension around tech into a tool for building the type of city he seems to envision. ## **Reboot: Deliver On Unfulfilled Promises** New York City was an early leader in using digital technology to improve government. But recent administrations have poorly managed vital programs and neglected essential technology modernization efforts. Mamdani seems to understand that government has to deliver on its promises. Failing to do so undermines its credibility — and the larger project of having a robust public sector that aims to do big things. He can't simply start over. Mayor Adams leaves behind an unusually long list of tech missteps. He touted cryptocurrency while shutting down City-led programs aimed at closing a persistent digital divide. The New York City Internet Master Plan, launched by the de Blasio administration in January 2020, made a commitment to universal connectivity and called for a City-owned open-access fiber network. That project [was canceled by Mayor Adams](https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-kills-internet-master-plan-for-universal-public-web-access?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2022 under pressure from telecommunications providers who didn't want their broadband duopoly challenged. At the time of this writing, a [City Council bill](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7029043&GUID=1796A95A-4157-4070-A45C-3281D9637135&Options=&Search=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) requiring the adoption of a new Internet Master Plan with mandatory five-year updates sits on the mayor's desk. The new mayor should work with Council leaders to reboot this essential campaign. Other flagship Adams tech projects overspent and underdelivered. The MyCity portal was intended to be a one-stop shop for City services and benefits. It was launched in March 2023 with just a single feature — a tool for working parents to find subsidized childcare. But after more than two years of mismanagement and [$100 million](https://nysfocus.com/2025/03/19/mycity-eric-adams-child-care?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in spending, some $70 million of it going to dozens of contractors, only a handful of new services have been added. And many are simply links to existing City websites that have been online for years. The new mayor must prioritize an accelerated timetable for MyCity and direct agency leads to make the business case for it by quickly identifying ways to use it to deliver better services for less money. What to do with MyCity's most derided app — its AI-powered chatbot? Meant to help the public quickly find answers to urgent questions, the tool instead repeatedly delivered false and misleading information, [dishing out advice to small businesses](https://themarkup.org/news/2024/03/29/nycs-ai-chatbot-tells-businesses-to-break-the-law?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on how to break the law, for instance. The mayor-elect's team might be tempted to step back here. Instead, it should double down and expand the use of chatbots for public engagement. AI technology has improved rapidly since the MyCity Chatbot's release, and AI systems are much less prone to hallucination. The City's own tech experts are also much better equipped to anticipate problems with AI systems through "red team" exercises that simulate attacks and malfunctions to identify risks before they're discovered by the public. But outside help will be essential to success. MyCity's struggles stem in no small part from the cancellation of a [master services contract for digital design, service design and communications design](https://www.nyc.gov/site/opportunity/news/022/doitt-releases-government-x-design-request-proposals?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/0) in 2019 by Jessica Tisch — then the City's tech lead, now police commissioner — which deprived the city of essential expertise in AI interaction. And drawing on intergovernmental municipal collaboratives like the [Government AI Coalition](https://www.sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments-offices/information-technology/ai-reviews-algorithm-register/govai-coalition?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) can help New York City avoid mistakes others have already made. ## **Reuse: Copy What's Already Working in Other Cities** Step two is to borrow technology solutions that are already working in other cities. While New York City often leads in municipal innovation, its size and complexity make it a tough place for startups and social entrepreneurs to test emerging technologies. Smaller cities and cities outside the U.S. are often able to experiment and learn what works more quickly. For instance, the New York City Civic Engagement Commission borrowed Barcelona's successful Decidim platform to [power the 2025-2027 participatory budgeting cycle](https://www.participate.nyc.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which invites New Yorkers to help decide how to spend part of the City's budget. That tool grew out of the citizen assemblies of the M15 and Occupy era, making it easy for local governments to run massive participatory deliberations online. Nowhere is the opportunity to learn from elsewhere clearer than 311, which itself was proven out in Baltimore in the late 1990s before Mike Bloomberg's administration imported it to the Big Apple in 2003\. The [mayor-elect criticized the aging service](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/07/17/mamdani-business-real-estate-meetings/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in a campaign stop with tech executives, "noting that he can track his DoorDash orders from the restaurant to his door but the public 311 service request system can't do anything similar." Here, New York might look to Beijing's 12345 service, launched in 2019\. While clearly a part of the CCP's evolving system of social control, the service [thoughtfully employs AI features](https://www.themandarin.com.au/287678-figuring-out-china-its-still-complicated/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that help operators find relevant information for callers, automate tracking and follow-ups about resolution actions and even help call center staff keep their cool by providing instant feedback on voice stress levels when interacting with angry residents. Expanding the telephone hotline system beyond government services is another innovation that's long overdue. As the city faces more frequent weather-related crises amid the dismantlement of FEMA, we still [lack a dedicated 211 social services hotline](https://www.gothamgazette.com/130-opinion/7230-disaster-preparedness-requires-a-211-system-new-york-city-still-doesn-t-have-one?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that can provide referrals to the network of NGOs that provide the vanguard and bulk of disaster relief. There are also quick wins that can be borrowed from elsewhere to address the quintessential New York City challenges the mayor is focused on. Consider housing, for instance. While New York City is the global center for proptech innovation — the application of information technology to the real estate industry, which uses AI to boost bottom lines — it has trailed other cities globally in using these tools to provide affordable homes. A major challenge will be expanding the reach of pro-housing zoning beyond the Adams administration's City of Yes program into lower-density parts of the five boroughs. In Los Angeles and more than a dozen other cities, the AI-powered [Housing Policy Simulator](https://www.ternerlabs.org/blog/new-housing-supply-los-angeles?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) developed at the University of California, Berkeley, is being used to explore how changes in land use regulations and financial incentives will impact the bottom line for real estate developers. This is giving policymakers and advocates the evidence to support reforms aimed at boosting the housing supply. AI will also be critical to helping expedite review and permitting of proposed development. Portland [built a chatbot](https://www.usdigitalresponse.org/resources/streamlining-building-permit-appointments-with-ai?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that makes it easier for contractors to schedule plan review appointments with construction officials. And [Honolulu](https://www.route-fifty.com/artificial-intelligence/2025/05/how-tech-sped-honolulus-housing-permits/405065/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Austin](https://www.constructionowners.com/news/cities-turn-to-ai-to-speed-up-permit-reviews?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have rolled out vendor-supplied AI tools that can scan submitted plans for code compliance and flag issues that need human review, reducing processing time from months to days. Finally, technology can also be a part of solutions to keep people in homes and end homelessness. The Times Square Alliance, for instance, partnered with startup Ginkgo to develop a case management system for unhoused people that helps district managers coordinate services among the vast network of government and nongovernmental outreach programs that serve them. Other cities are also using tech to deliver more equitable mobility, if not free buses. The [Southern California Mobility Wallet](https://www.metro.net/riding/mobilitywallet/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) provides up to $1,800 for low-income travelers that can be used to pay for transit, bike share or ridesharing services. What's more, unlike the Fair Fares discount program for New York City Transit riders, credits don't require a dedicated card but can be loaded to any qualifying payment device. Cities in Europe and Asia are starting to pilot automated buses, which have the potential to dramatically reduce the costs of operating and expanding bus services. While import restrictions bar U.S. transit systems from buying the same next-generation buses available overseas, the mayor's team can push the MTA to work with transit authorities in other U.S. cities to standardize the technology for automated buses. Led by New York, the largest buyer of buses in the nation, U.S. cities could collectively create a market big enough to entice domestic manufacturers to enter the market for autonomous buses. ## **Reform: Build the Foundations for Government Transformation** While the mayor should focus on using tech to deliver quick wins, he also needs a plan to rebuild many of the City's core tech systems and use that as a lever to advance [his vision of an efficient and innovative public sector](https://www.derekthompson.org/p/what-speaks-to-me-about-abundance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over the next four years. That starts by providing the City's [more than 300,000 employees](https://cbcny.org/research/nyc-employee-headcount?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the modern tools they need to be effective. Managing hardware and software for such a huge workforce, on a shoestring, is no small feat. But City workers face too many obstacles accessing cloud services and AI tools that could boost productivity and drive innovation, and there are too few training opportunities for them to develop skills to use them effectively. Here, the City could partner with CUNY to develop AI skills curricula that can expand the supply of AI-ready workers for the public and private sectors alike. New York City Economic Development Corporation's successful [Cyber NYC](https://edc.nyc/program/cyber-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which focused on cybersecurity training, is one model. Decoded Futures, TechNYC's AI boot camp for nonprofits, which immerses teams in problem-driven AI prototyping, is another. It could easily be adapted for City government teams. The City also needs to standardize the tech it provides to members of the public. That goes beyond the single point of access envisioned by MyCity to an entire "gov stack" of modern digital public goods like verifiable digital identities, encrypted personal data lockers and secure electronic payments. The public sector equivalent of Google or Apple's clouds, these services are the essential building blocks of 21st century government services. In the tiny, wired nation of Estonia, for instance, people can vote and pay taxes online and keep their personal information up to date instead of entering it anew every time they interact with the government. Other nations, like India and Singapore, use this approach to enable more equitable and effective distribution of public benefits, reduce costs for delivering government services and enable ongoing innovations. But no U.S. city has yet followed suit. New York City could be the first, and it would have the potential to make tech work for working people every day. Success at either of these efforts depends on getting the City's data house in order. Much of the City's vast trove of digital records is scattered, poorly documented or low in quality. Some agencies, like the Department of Correction, still run mostly on paper records. This increases costs, slows responses and reduces the effectiveness of City agencies while also inhibiting prospects for innovation. While the Mayor's team may be tempted to think big here, most comprehensive efforts to overhaul data practices in large government enterprises get bogged down. Costs balloon, and many such campaigns are abandoned. A better approach is to introduce modern data practices incrementally and consistently from the bottom up, across lots of small reforms to the City's business processes and governance. In Toronto, city officials have [worked with academics to analyze how data move through government](https://eil.mie.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/TCDM-Paper-v2.0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for different purposes, like tracking school crowding or coordinating human services. From there, they developed a starter set of data standards, the [Toronto Common Data Model](https://eil.mie.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/TCDM-Paper-v2.0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and a model interagency data-sharing agreement that together make it easy for others to copy best practices, organically expand the data modernization effort and feed back their own contributions. In the process, this work is also laying the foundations for future AI governance — as better data standards provide the precise documentation and controls City engineers need to define rules and restrictions for what data AI can scan, what the data mean and their permitted uses. The final reform is overhauling technology procurement — the rules and processes that determine how the City builds and buys technology. Failing to fix structural obstacles here can doom the best intentions elsewhere. Originally designed to reduce graft, New York City's procurement procedures aren't well suited for sourcing innovative technologies. Technical requirements must be spelled out by the City up front, even if officials aren't aware of all the possible solutions. Long delays in decisions disincentivize risk-taking — a technology may be obsolete by the time a contract is issued. And too much emphasis on past performance favors established contractors over startups with better solutions. One promising reform, [challenge-based procurement](https://www.route-fifty.com/finance/2024/05/challenge-based-procurement-just-makes-sense/396942/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), is being rolled out in New York City. This does away with specifying solutions to be delivered by focusing instead on describing a problem to be solved and how success will be measured. Boston is using procurement reform as an excuse to experiment with AI by deploying a chatbot trained on the city's dense stack of procurement rules and procedures, helping government employees expedite their own purchase approvals. ## **Think Big, Act Small** No New York City mayor can stake their entire agenda on technology. But Zohran Mamdani could be the first to acknowledge that his goals are unachievable, much less on time and on budget, without harnessing the power technology provides to expand government's capacity and agility. To do so, he will need to commit to the investments and reforms I've described. But he can start small and on point. Tech has immediate potential to advance two of his "big three" pledges — promises to eliminate bus fares and freeze rents for the city's million-plus regulated apartments. Mamdani may or may not get the $600 million to $800 million needed for the MTA to make all buses free, but he can use tech to speed them up — directing the Department of Transportation to fast-track the installation of priority signaling technology to speed buses through traffic and expanding the use of [fixed bus lane enforcement cameras](https://www.nyc.gov/site/finance/vehicles/bus-lane-camera-violations.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to complement the MTA's vehicle-mounted systems. On housing, judges may thwart his demand for the Rent Guidelines Board to freeze rents for four straight years — but there's lots that City Hall's data science teams can do to keep existing tenants in their homes by analyzing records scattered across agencies to target enforcement against deadbeat landlords and [intervene before vulnerable tenants face eviction](https://www.nlc.org/article/2022/04/05/using-open-data-to-prevent-evictions/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Looking further out, the mayor will need to move deliberately but thoughtfully into the AI-heavy future. Rapid advances in "agentic" AI — software bots that can observe the real world, reason and use tools to take action to achieve designed outcomes — hold great potential for redesigning government to do more with less. Hedge funds are already deploying "virtual employees," AI bots that help teams with routine administrative and research tasks. In government, such moves will require much more careful consideration. When do such powerful laborsaving tools become anti-labor weapons? And when and how do humans need to supervise the work done by computers? These questions must be answered, probably sooner than we expect. Failing to do so will mean New York City could miss out on opportunities to improve government. But unless the foundations outlined above are in place, we won't be ready to do so. ### Mamdani’s Charter School Dilemma URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdanis-charter-school-dilemma/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:41.000Z New York is living in a historic moment. After winning more votes in a primary contest than any Democratic candidate for New York City mayor in 30 years, Zohran Mamdani has just served a humiliating defeat to the once-powerful former Governor Andrew Cuomo by capturing more votes in the general election than any mayor since 1969\. The 34-year-old did so without the support of other major Democrats in his state, including Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, Sen. Kirstin Gillibrand and state party chair Jay Jacobs. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries demurred until the final weeks of the campaign, as he anticipated his own Brooklyn-based reelection campaign and sensed that something new was in the air. Mamdani has made mainstream Democrats uncomfortable by calling for an increase in the minimum wage, higher taxes on millionaires and corporations, four years of rent freezes, free childcare for all and free bus service. Having won the election pretty much on his own terms, Mamdani appears determined to chart his own way on the policy front — except, it seems, when it comes to charter schools. Charter schools are independently run public schools of choice that have been vehemently opposed by the teachers union and Democratic Party stalwarts who rely on the union for support. After their birth on the city scene in the late 1990s, they've seen dramatic growth: There are 286 of them in New York City, educating 150,000 students — 15% of the school population. Because of limits imposed by Democratic lawmakers on the number of charter schools permitted to open statewide, the demand for seats exceeds the supply. By the end of last year, [the waiting list grew to 173,000](http://newyorkcharters.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When Gov. Kathy Hochul encouraged her Democratic colleagues to raise the cap in 2023, they came back with a hard no. Opponents claim that charter schools are bad for public education because when students leave public schools, they take a portion of the funding with them. Lower enrollments could eventually force some public schools to close. When Zohran Mamdani was asked whether he agreed with his fellow Democrats' refusal to raise the cap on charters, he indicated that he did. Going along with mainstream Democrats wasn't much of a problem during the election campaign. Andrew Cuomo tried to challenge Mamdani on this issue, but it got lost amid more compelling differences. When campaigning gives way to governing, however, standing against charters could become a problem for a self-identified progressive mayor. Eighty percent of the students who attend charter schools in the city are from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. A disproportionate number are Black and brown. These children, whose families are a part of Mamdani's affordability constituency, [consistently outperform their peers in regular public schools](https://nyccharterschools.org/facts/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Sixty-six percent of the Black students at charter schools scored proficient in math on recent State tests compared to 38% of those in district schools. In reading, the difference was 58% vs. 39%. How can a progressive mayor —[ wh](https://www.derekthompson.org/p/what-speaks-to-me-about-abundance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)o claimed to be "very passionate about public goods" and said "we on the left have to be equally passionate about public excellence" — ignore such evidence and support a policy that curbs opportunities for students in need of better options? There is the obvious fact that Randi Weingarten, former president of New York's teachers union and current president of its national parent union, was among the first labor leaders to endorse Mamdani's candidacy. But in this case, the incoming mayor's reaction goes beyond the ordinary calculations of transactional politics. There are larger issues at stake. Weingarten was also one of the first public figures in the nation to protest the arrival of federal ICE agents at public schools, who were terrifying students and their parents with threats of being detained. In her new book, "Why Fascists Fear Teachers," she takes a forceful stand against Donald Trump's ongoing assault on democratic institutions. Soon, these will be Mamdani's battles. Beyond them, Weingarten and her fellow leaders in organized labor constitute the most significant source of support that Mamdani can rely on to advance his affordability agenda, while other Democrats succumb to pressure from deep-pocketed donors who want to keep taxes and spending down. That said, many members of these same unions have children in charter schools. The charter school debate, like other points of contention among key political actors, needs time to ripen. As mayoral candidates travel down the campaign trail and get closer to City Hall, ambitious ideas inevitably become tempered by political realities. You can see this dynamic at work with regard to public safety: Where once Mamdani sounded the call to "defund the police," he now embraces Eric Adams' police commissioner Jessica Tisch — much as Bill de Blasio, another avid progressive, appointed Rudy Giuliani's celebrity crime fighter, Bill Bratton, to head up the NYPD. Over the course of his campaign, Mamdani went from being an unknown assemblyman from Queens to a new voice within the national Democratic Party, which [has been losing registration](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/20/us/politics/democratic-party-voter-registration-crisis.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in formerly working-class strongholds throughout the country, including New York. His message of affordability obviously has resonated. Weeks before the November election, New York's avowed centrist Gov. Kathy Hochul began to preach the gospel of affordability after she broke with other top Democrats in the state to endorse the young upstart. Both Hochul and Mamdani can be expected to support regular public schools, as they should. Neither, however, will be able to evade the school choice issue. Black and brown parents will continue to plead for alternatives to failing public schools to which their children are routinely assigned, as 15,000 of them did last September when they marched across the Brooklyn Bridge to demand that State legislators increase their support and raise the cap on charter school enrollments. The governor and the incoming mayor's relationship will be an interesting one to watch as his inaugural year comes into focus. Mamdani has already demanded more national attention as an alternative to the status quo than any New York mayor since John Lindsay. Hochul's Republican opponent, Elise Stefanik, can be counted on to make charter school expansion a point of contention. A possible Democratic challenger, depending on who it is, could also join the chorus. Rethinking opposition to charters would not only be good policy — it could well prove to be savvy politics as well. A proud, Muslim, Mamdani showed surprising strength against Cuomo among working-class Black New Yorkers, who happen to be among the city's most pro-charter-school voices. If Mamdani wants to create a durable coalition, he needs to keep a hold on these voters. This is a general concern for Democrats. Recent national assessments revealed that performance in 12th-grade math is the lowest in recorded history (since 1992); [performance in reading is the lowest in 20 years](http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). One-third of the nation's high school seniors do not have basic reading skills. The evidence is more dramatic when you break it down by race and class. Democrats will find it increasingly difficult to ignore the perpetuation of educational inequality and claim to be the party of the marginalized and the disadvantaged. Charters also happen to be a compromise position when it comes to school choice, given how the movement is sweeping the country. Since 2022, some 30 states have [enacted new laws or expanded existing provisions](https://www.edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-ABCs-of-School-Choice.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that provide parents with tax support to send their children to private or religious schools. In 2027, a tax credit bill enacted by Republicans in Congress will offer states federal money to do the same for any family whose income is below 300% of their average area income, and governors will have discretion to either accept or refuse the funding. If blue-state governors and mayors insist on opposing programs that offer options for students to attend nonpublic schools at public expense, support for public charter schools may become the only choice for those who want to provide parents with alternatives. Might New Yorkers be so bold as to imagine that district schools and charter schools could partner in a shared public endeavor for excellence rather than fight it out as competitors in an education marketplace that sorts out winners and losers? New York's progressive mayor and pragmatic governor could stand together for high-quality educational outcomes for low-income families by supporting the expansion of charter schools. If this inevitably leads to the shuttering of underperforming district schools, the resources saved from the closures could be reinvested in remedial programs within those districts while charters assume a larger share of the burden for educating the most academically challenged students. Such a shift would give economically disadvantaged parents the real choices they deserve and enhance the future fortunes of district schools, charter schools and maybe even the Democratic Party. ### A Housing Roadmap for New York’s Next Mayor URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-housing-roadmap-for-new-yorks-next-mayor/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:41.000Z Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani ran on an affordability agenda. Creating more housing is the single most important way to make the city more affordable — lower rents, or at least rents that rise at a slower pace, would ease by far the largest item in every New Yorker's budget. At the start of the campaign, Mamdani's housing approach was narrowly focused on a rent freeze for the 1 in 3 New Yorkers' homes under rent regulation, plus building 200,000 units of union-built subsidized housing funded by [$70 billion in new borrowing by the City.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-17/mamdani-seeks-70-billion-of-nyc-debt-to-fund-affordable-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) As Mamdani's star rose in the primary, he soft‑launched a technocratic pivot, advocating for upzoning in high‑income neighborhoods and around high‑resource transit stations*.* By the time he spoke to the Association for a Better New York in October, he elaborated that his 200,000 City‑subsidized homes would be "additive" to continued private construction. Finally, after much hemming and hawing, on Election Day, Mamdani endorsed four pro-housing ballot measures meant to reduce the [City Council's post-1989 experiment](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/02/21/eric-adams-charter-commission-development-council/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Mayor%20Ed%20Koch%20had%20warned%20against%20the%20possibility%20of%20member%20deference) with "member deference" veto power over proposed rezonings. For housing policy nerds, the swell of pro-housing momentum throughout the campaign, one clarification or elaboration at a time, has been encouraging. But there are still pain points: - **Big bucks:** Mamdani's housing capital proposal is so large that it will require State permission to raise the City's debt cap, potentially starving other important uses of capital funds. - **Some rents are already too low to freeze:** Roughly 10% of the stabilized stock — an enormous portfolio of prewar outer-borough buildings — is [currently struggling](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-hangs-in-the-balance-sheets) with [costs above income](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-rent-is-too-damn-high-but-also-too-low). - **Tax foreclosure:** If a rent freeze pushes buildings into foreclosure, the City could be forced to buy out or acquire through tax seizure as many as 100,000 distressed stabilized units. This would consume half of Mamdani's proposed $100 billion housing construction proposal before building a single new home. - **Deep state words of warning:** Staff at the City's Housing Preservation & Development warn me anonymously that requiring city-funded housing to be built with all-union labor — which Mamdani has pledged to do — will raise housing production costs by 30% or more, [evaporating at least 23% of the city's new construction budget](https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/the-impact-of-prevailing-wage-requirement-on-affordable-housing-construction-in-new-york-city.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) overnight. - **The "99‑unit problem":** Under state rules for the new mixed-income affordable housing production program, called 485x, costly prevailing‑wage mandates now kick in at 99 units, creating a perverse incentive for developers to [shrink or split projects](https://www.skylineprp.com/post/opinion-new-york-s-99-unit-building-boom-is-a-symptom-smart-tax-lot-structuring-is-the-cure?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to stay below the line. These are real challenges. The good news is that, with the affordable housing ballot measures now approved by voters, there are three new fast tracks for all-affordable, mixed-income and modest market-rate projects. This should make a big difference on day one. Mamdani should not only support the Department of City Planning's existing pipeline; he should use his bully pulpit to go broader and faster. These new fast tracks also streamline opportunities to grow NYCHA's housing supply, [integrate incomes and entire neighborhoods](https://www.curbed.com/2024/01/our-radical-practical-nycha-makeover.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [build substantial volumes of mixed-income housing](https://www.bostonplans.org/projects/development-projects/bunker-hill-housing-redevelopment?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20proposed%20redevelopment%20of%20the%20BHA%20Bunker,%2A%20%2A%2AGross%20floor%20area%2A%2A%202%2C841%2C000%20sq%20ft) and [directly address NYCHA's daunting $80 billion capital backlog](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/1631404468309827586?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That said, the new ballot measures cannot fully[ substitute](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/1986077330201076172?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for wider ["by‑right" upzoning](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/zoning/zoning-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Most%20development%20in%20New%20York%20City%20happens%20%E2%80%9Cas%2Dof%2Dright%2C%E2%80%9D%20meaning%20it%20follows%20zoning%20rules%20and%20does%20not%20require%20significant%20approvals%20beyond%20NYC%20Buildings.). The faster approval process put in place thanks to the ballot measures — an expedited ULURP — while an improvement, is still slow and costly compared to zoning that just allows projects to be built by default. Projects that make sense, especially near subways, should not be presumptively illegal without special permission. So what would a genuinely robust pro-housing agenda look like under Mayor Mamdani? It begins with intelligent adjustments to his rent freeze proposal and expands to a more energetic, creative housing and transit production plan. ### 1\. "Pay for" a rent freeze without breaking the system Mamdani's signature promise — a four‑year rent freeze — tests whether his technocratic turn is real or Memorex. The critical [table 8 in the RGB's annual Income and Expense Report shows that in 2025](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-IE-Study.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), 10% of rent-regulated buildings already report operating costs equal to or greater than their rental income, meaning they're already near the edge of tax foreclosure. But this promise isn't going away; it's too central to Mamdani's agenda and even identity. So how to make it work? The Rent Guidelines Board (RGB) is a utility-style cost regulator — essentially a rate-setting public service commission for one million rent-stabilized apartments. Its mandate is to align rent adjustments with changes in building operating costs. That's how rent stabilization was designed to protect tenants and preserve the housing stock. Over the past decade, that link has been broken. Successive boards have approved 10 straight one-year rent increases below inflation — the [longest continuous real-dollar rent rollback in RGB history](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/1932544183803199920?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for one-year guidelines. The result is [visible in the data](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/1984367862560031143?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Table 8 in the annual [Income and Expense Report](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/research/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) reflecting the RGB's dichotomous coverage of the city's healthiest buildings and the least-healthy. We set annual increases on both new towers whose "market" units are under rent stabilization because of the former 421a tax exemption, and dilapidated tenements originally under the [WWII rent control regime that haven't seen significant rent increases since 1947](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/about/an-introduction-to-the-nyc-rent-guidelines-board-and-the-rent-stabilization-system/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=World%20War%20II%20Era%20Controls). The financially distressed 10% of regulated buildings are [overwhelmingly](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/18/nyregion/nyc-landlords-rent-stabilization.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Older%20buildings%20in%20Manhattan%20that%20were%20fully%20rent%2Dstabilized%20saw%20a%203.9%20percent%20increase%20in%20N.O.I.%2C%20while%20those%20in%20the%20Bronx%20saw%20the%20figure%20decline%20by%200.1%20percent.) fully rent-stabilized prewar buildings in the outer boroughs. That alarming figure excludes debt service entirely; it reflects only routine costs like fuel, insurance, labor and property taxes. When those outpace income, the maintenance cuts begin: deferred repairs, skipped painting cycles, late tax bills. Once properties fall behind on taxes, the city inherits the problem through what's called [*in rem*](https://nextcity.org/urbanist-news/a-closer-look-at-ed-kochs-affordable-housing-legacy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=in%20rem%20housing%2C%20or%20properties%20that%20the%20city%20had%20acquired%20because%20of%20property%20tax%20foreclosure.)[ foreclosure](https://nextcity.org/urbanist-news/a-closer-look-at-ed-kochs-affordable-housing-legacy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=in%20rem%20housing%2C%20or%20properties%20that%20the%20city%20had%20acquired%20because%20of%20property%20tax%20foreclosure.). Rehabilitating each building after years of neglect [costs $250,000–$500,000 per unit](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/how-nyc-can-better-track-condition-rent-stabilized-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (and usually takes it off the property tax rolls permanently through transfer to nonprofit ownership). Scale that to the 10% of the regulated stock now underwater, and the fiscal math becomes untenable. Without cost-flattening reforms, four consecutive rent freezes amid costs compounding at a typical 3% annual rate risk re-creating by regulatory fiat the [mass tax foreclosures of the 1980s naturally-occurring real estate bust](https://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Revitalizing%5FInner%5FCity%5FNeighborhoods.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). One of the most pernicious myths about the recent history of the Rent Guidelines Board is the claim that Mayor de Blasio ordered his board to do a rent freeze in contravention of the data, and without doing any harm. Everyone seems to forget to [actually check the RGB's historical cost data](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/mainfeaturesofrs.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): our [Price Index of Operating Costs would have justified a nominal rent *rollback*](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2016-PIOC.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), not just a freeze, in 2016 because operating costs (especially energy) fell an extraordinary 1.2% that year ([see Table IV](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/mainfeaturesofrs.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). No press or popular accounts have explained that de Blasio's freezes were within the ordinary cost-based behavior of the board, not a willful political hack job. Assuming Mamdani insists on ordering a freeze regardless of what the data show, he should at least take pains to ensure a freeze is *paid for* in a legitimate way that will eventually show up in RGB cost data*.* That means lowering operating costs rather than pretending they don't exist or ordering the RGB to ignore them. What would this look like in practice? - **Property taxes.** Class II multifamily properties — mostly rental buildings — face the most punitive effective tax rates in the city. Even nonprofit landlords, though tax-exempt, are struggling under the remaining operating burdens. Mamdani supports tax reform to relieve Tax Class 2 multifamily buildings of punitive rates in general, but so has every mayor in recent memory. - **Insurance and scaffolding costs.** New York's unique combination of [Local Law 11](https://sitecompli.com/blog/big-facade-changes-are-coming-to-nyc-heres-what-we-know/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [state's absolute-liability Scaffold Law](https://www.scaffoldlaw.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), together drive up both construction costs and insurance premiums. [Illinois was the only other state with such a rule](https://www.buildingcongress.com/uploads/research/scaffold/Scaffold%5FLaw%5FReport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); it repealed the law in 1995\. Studying how that change reduced costs in Chicago would provide an evidence-based path for reform here. It's essential to cut fundamental costs, not just transfer property tax dollars to pay for them, because struggling regulated nonprofits already don't pay property taxes. - **Rehabilitation incentives.** Targeted tax abatements like the former J-51 program, [now trimmed down and relaunched as the J51-R program](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/007-25/nyc-relaunches-j-51-new-tax-breaks-fix-aging-buildings-keep-rents-low?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), provide tax abatements for rehabilitating existing multiple dwellings. [Restoring a stronger version tied to Local Law 97 energy upgrades and code compliance](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/how-nyc-can-better-track-condition-rent-stabilized-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=J%2D51%20has%20since%20been%20renewed%20in%20a%20more%20limited%20form%2C%20and%20it%20is%20not%20yet%20clear%20how%20many%20owners%20will%20take%20up%20the%20new%20incentive.) would help rescue older rent-regulated buildings — at least the ones that will pay taxes ever again. J-51-R also requires rent-regulated landlords to forego the temporary 2% annual rent adjustments usually available when they make Major Capital Improvements (MCIs) if those improvements receive J-51 funding; applications for both J-51 and [MCI adjustments have both collapsed](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2025/01/08/hcr-reports-drop-in-mci-applications-post-2019-rent-law/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since these laws were tightened. A rent freeze won't be supported by economic data unless we get as lucky as the 2016 board, and may not hold up in court amid tax seizures potentially on the scale of NYCHA's portfolio. But if Mamdani insists, he can credibly "pay for" at least one year by fixing cost drivers that make the system unsustainable. ### 2\. Tie rent guidelines to building quality Another chronic flaw of rent stabilization is that RGB rent orders flow equally to responsible owners and to "slumlords." The RGB can change that through rulemaking, issuing differential guidelines based on building quality. The simplest way is to use the existing Alternative Enforcement Program (AEP) enforcement threshold as a quality filter. Buildings with AEP-tier violations — basically the worst 3% to 5% of the regulated housing stock, with conditions so bad that the factual merits of abuse are beyond question — would receive no rent increases. All others would receive adjustments aligned with operating costs. This approach needs no new data system, avoids subjectivity and directly ties revenue to performance. It would finally recreate a "customer-service" relationship in the regulated market: landlords who maintain their buildings would effectively be rewarded, while chronic violators face a financial penalty that stops short of expropriation. Politically, it also offers a useful bridge. If we can find a way to pay for a single rent freeze, but not all four years, then in later years, Mamdani can still meet the intent of his promise by freezing the rents of negligent landlords without wrecking 100,000 units or risking a Supreme Court "unconstitutional takings" loss. Mamdani arguably must deliver at least one year of rent freeze, but poll breakouts show his support is highest among market-rate tenants and below 50% among rent-regulated tenants: That means voters are interpreting his promises symbolically, not literally. If he can deliver on at least one true freeze and then functionally ban slumlording with partial freezes (while keeping rent growth reasonable and growing affordable housing citywide) he will have succeeded. The point is to stand up for working people, not to paint yourself into a dangerous corner and put hundreds of thousands of peoples' homes into financial trouble. ### 3\. Fix the hardship program There's one more step Mamdani should take to make his rent freeze more practical. State law nominally provides a hardship process for buildings whose operating costs exceed rent income. Roughly 10% of stabilized buildings should currently qualify, but approvals from the state Division of Housing and Community Renewal are nearly nonexistent. Mamdani has said he supports hardship relief for insolvent buildings. The next mayor should help Albany make that true — through what might be called the [Zohran Odd Lots Law](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/1984384954617512442?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Require the state to process applications promptly and set increases large enough to restore solvency. That could stop the bleeding for the first 100,000 units near tax distress. (The governor may also be able to share Zohran's podcast clip with DHCR leadership to inspire them to process at least some hardship applications under current law). Longer term, consider allowing modest rent resets when tenants voluntarily vacate, keeping total revenue aligned with costs and minimizing hardship increases during tenancies. ### 4\. Upzone the subways to boost affordable housing production without City capital funding This is the logical extension of Mamdani's late‑summer recognition that affordability also requires private construction. Upzoning transit corridors channels that realism into structural reform. Before COVID, opponents of housing growth claimed new residents would overload the subways. That was never strictly true — and it's definitively false now. The MTA carries about 80% of pre‑pandemic ridership, but hybrid work freed up vast peak‑hour capacity. The next mayor should use it. Treat the subway map as a capacity map. Work with the MTA to identify which stations and branches have room to grow and upzone accordingly in high‑opportunity areas. Where trains have space, relax growth controls to match available infrastructure. MIT researcher Vincent Rollet [estimates that if New York City allowed denser housing](https://vrollet.github.io/files/city%5Fstructure.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — about the level of an R8 zoning district — within a quarter mile of every subway or commuter rail stop, and slightly less dense (R7) zoning within a half mile, the city could increase its housing supply by about 15% and its population by 12%. That extra supply would likely lower rents by roughly 10%, even without cooperation from the suburbs. Allowing very high density (R12) on the parcels that directly touch subway entrances would do even more — opening up more land for construction, creating more housing and directing more people into the subway system. Every new apartment built near a half-full subway station brings riders, taxpayers and vitality back to the system. Each additional household pays into the tax base that funds the very services urban residents rely on. The MTA needs riders. The city needs residents. Workers need homes. Transit-oriented development delivers all three. Finally: Upzoning the transit system will allow mixed-income Mandatory Inclusionary Housing production all over the city, juicing subsidized affordable housing production without HPD assistance. These projects will still face the 485x 99-unit prevailing wage problem, but only Albany can change it. In the meantime, City Hall can at least track and publish where projects are being [downsized ](https://www.credaily.com/briefs/99-unit-building-trend-grows-as-nyc-developers-avoid-wage-rule/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Critics%20say%20the%20policy%20is,buildings%20with%20exactly%2099%20apartments.)or [segmented to avoid the rule](https://www.skylineprp.com/post/opinion-new-york-s-99-unit-building-boom-is-a-symptom-smart-tax-lot-structuring-is-the-cure?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), quantifying the lost units, and using that data to press for a legislative correction. ### 5\. Build new trains using the mayor's power of the purse We must develop more housing around transit — but also more transit to bring affordable housing within commutable range. The governor controls the MTA, but the mayor can still build subways by paying for them. Bloomberg's 7‑Train extension reached Hudson Yards without federal money, financed entirely through local value capture. Value capture fulfills Mamdani's instinct for redistribution and preventing private capture of public gains, but in an economically literate way. An [obscure state law passed in 2016 allows the mayor to capture the billions of dollars of land value that new MTA projects create](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/1483638031043149830?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through a never-before-used "split-rate land value tax" district mapped around MTA capital projects. Professor Arpit Gupta at NYU Stern, a colleague of mine on the Rent Guidelines Board, has shown that the first phase of the Second Avenue Subway, [despite its $4.5 billion cost for only three stations, created over $7 billion in private land value nearby](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working%5Fpapers/w26789/w26789.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In lower-density areas, we can't expect quite that high of an uplift ratio — but by controlling costs, value capture can still fund major expansions like the Utica Avenue Subway or the Interborough Express. The next mayor should fund new lines where city land value makes it feasible and use those projects to anchor the next generation of transit‑oriented housing. It can raise billions without a new Albany law—though the MTA must agree to accept the city's money. ## The Path Forward Experienced policy hands don't need to dampen Mamdani's boldness; we should channel it. He can be the mayor who brings New York back from COVID on every metric: MTA ridership, tax base, jobs, population — and leads the first major city-led subway building spree in a century. The housing shortage is so dire, and the resulting economic damage to the city so profound, that reform in this one area can pay for many sins. If Mamdani can pair his moral clarity with technocratic consistency, he can turn what began as a movement slogan for temporary rent freezes into the foundation of a durable affordability agenda. Let's help him get it done. ### Why Mayor-Elect Mamdani Should Embrace Mayoral Control of Our Schools URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-mamdani-should-embrace-mayoral-control-of-schools/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:41.000Z In 2014, Mayor Bill de Blasio entered office after promising to create Pre-K for All, the nation's largest free, full-day, high-quality universal prekindergarten program. There were 19,000 students in full-day pre-K when de Blasio took office. Eighteen months later, nearly 70,000 children were enrolled; every 4-year-old whose caregiver applied was offered a seat. The City hired and trained thousands of teachers, built outreach programs that reached every corner of the city, developed curricula and instructional standards, expanded bilingual programs and built systems for safety and quality. Pre-K for All is now hailed as one of the biggest wins for New York families in recent memory. And it was only possible because de Blasio had direct responsibility for the schools. Mayor-elect Mamdani has also made an ambitious promise to our youngest New Yorkers: to provide universal childcare for all children beginning at 6 weeks old. The proposal shows he understands the power of investing in our youngest New Yorkers and their families. Quality early education programs like childcare and Pre-K offer a powerful one-two punch. First, they help children become more prepared for school and have better long-term outcomes in education, health and employment. And second, in a city where childcare can cost thousands of dollars a month, they relieve financial pressure on working parents. Beyond universal childcare, Mamdani has not yet advanced a detailed children's agenda. But there is one exception: His [platform](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/nyregion/new-york-city-mayors-race-education-mamdani.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) calls for "an end to mayoral control." If he is going to deliver better outcomes for New York's children, he should reconsider and instead fight to retain this essential tool for educational opportunity. ## Life before mayoral control Before 2002, when then-new Mayor Mike Bloomberg successfully lobbied the State Legislature to grant the City's chief executive ultimate responsibility for the nation's largest public school system, a seven-member Board of Education was responsible for education policy, budget-setting and hiring the chancellor. The mayor appointed two members, with the other five appointed by borough presidents. In addition, 32 locally elected Community School Boards hired 32 local district superintendents accountable to the school boards, not the chancellor. These superintendents hired principals and oversaw local budgets and curriculum decisions. The system was designed to give agency to communities ill-served by the central bureaucracy — a goal consistent with Mamdani's today — but it did not serve children well. Instead, we saw decades of stagnant student achievement, low graduation rates, racially disparate outcomes and endemic, embarrassing corruption. Chancellors lacked the tools to drive change in failing local districts. And with seven bosses appointed by six different elected officials, it was difficult for chancellors to set clear priorities and a coherent vision. Worst of all, most New Yorkers took this dysfunction for granted. Mayoral control created a system with a clear chain of command. It rests on the idea that our children deserve the focus of an empowered leader chosen directly by voters in a relatively high-turnout election. The mayor manages the Health, Fire, Police and Sanitation Departments. Surely the same should be true of our schools. ## Mayoral control accelerates affordability and achievement I can speak to the value of this accountability firsthand. In March 2014, Mayor de Blasio appointed me to serve as deputy mayor for strategic policy initiatives and charged me with making Pre-K for All a reality. And I can tell you that it could never have happened if Mayor de Blasio had not directly managed the school system. To share one example of many: We needed to quickly open thousands of new Pre-K classrooms in every corner of the city. We expanded existing programs to serve more kids, converted underutilized rooms in schools, rented storefronts, constructed beautiful new buildings on parking lots and other City-owned spaces, took over closed parochial schools and brought charter and private schools into the fold. This required unprecedented coordination between an alphabet soup of agencies, including the Fire Department, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of Design and Construction, Department of Youth and Community Development, the School Construction Authority, Department of Buildings, the Administration for Children's Services — and, of course, the Department of Education. Our office built systems to facilitate coordination: to set collective goals, break down silos and hold agency commissioners and the chancellor accountable for results. It was not easy. But it worked, in large part, because all of those commissioners had the same boss. It is hard enough to make substantial and rapid changes in our schools. To do so when a chancellor is accountable to multiple elected stakeholders, and doesn't even directly supervise the principals of the schools where this work will take place, is just about impossible. The City's Community Schools Initiative offers another example. Community Schools [boost student achievement and well-being](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research%5Freports/RR3245.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by integrating social supports into schools, so that students can come to school ready to learn. In practice, that means connecting schools to community-based nonprofits that deliver services including school-based health clinics, mental health counseling, after-school and summer programs, English as a second language classes, food pantries and, in some cases, even laundry machines. The strategy is built on a simple notion: Students who come to school hungry, struggling with depression, lacking stable housing or facing similar challenges will struggle to succeed. Community Schools remove those barriers so teaching and learning can happen. Mayoral control allowed New York City to build the nation's most comprehensive Community Schools system. As deputy mayor, I helped create the Office of Community Schools in City Hall, a central hub that ensured every district operated under a unified vision. Starting with 45 schools in 2014, the initiative has grown to 419 Community Schools serving 173,000 students across every district. The mayor-elect has [committed to supporting these schools](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2025/10/20/zohran-mamdani-nyc-schools-special-education-homeless-students/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and for good reason. Graduation rates are 7.2% higher than in comparison schools. Chronic absenteeism has dropped significantly, especially for students in temporary housing, whose chronic absenteeism fell 9.3%. Disciplinary incidents dropped. And these gains were concentrated in the highest-need neighborhoods. Cross-agency choreography was essential to make these schools work, and that depended on mayoral control. For instance, the Department of Youth and Community Development ran the process to select the community-based organizations that coordinate services within each school. The Office of School Health ensured school-based health care. The Department of Homeless Services partnered with schools serving high concentrations of students in shelters. When COVID hit, Community Schools acted as neighborhood hubs for food, internet devices and health care, and as enrichment centers for the children of first responders. Companies stepped up as well. For example, Warby Parker provided free glasses to 65,000 students across all Community Schools, removing one of the most basic barriers to learning. The benefits of mayoral control continued under Mayor Eric Adams, who launched NYC Reads under the leadership of Chancellor David Banks. Previously, schools selected their own reading curricula, and quality varied widely. Too few schools embraced the essential role phonics plays in teaching early readers. NYC Reads requires all districts to choose from among a handful of centrally vetted, phonics-aligned curricula — an approach [that extensive research has proved](https://www.teachingbyscience.com/a-meta-analysis-of-language-programs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to help kids learn to read in the early grades — and works with unions to coach principals and teachers. NYC Reads represents a fundamental change in the relationship between the central administration and its districts — change that requires empowered mayoral leadership and concentrated execution. And we are seeing results. After decades of stagnant test scores followed by declines during the COVID-19 pandemic, New York City students posted a 7-point increase in reading scores [last year](https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2025/08/mayor-adams--chancellor-aviles-ramos-celebrate-grades-3-8-state-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with the largest gains occurring in the earliest schools to adopt NYC Reads. Pre-K for All, Community Schools and NYC Reads represent significant steps forward. But make no mistake, we have a long way to go. Literacy rates remain alarmingly low, with persistent achievement gaps between white and Asian students and Black and Latino students, and between students from high- and low-income families. Chronic absenteeism is rising, and the long-term effects of the pandemic are still playing out in our classrooms. The City faces substantial federal funding threats to its schools, as well as systems like health care, food and housing that students depend on. The mayoral-control era should give us confidence that we can manage these challenges: [Since 2002](https://infohub.nyced.org/reports/academics/graduation-results?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the graduation gap between Black and white students has decreased by 13.3 points, and the difference between Hispanic and white students dropped from 26.7 points to 12.6 points. Overall, the dropout rate has gone from 18.5% to 4.8%. Without mayoral authority, the urgent work of improving achievement and reducing gaps would be subject to the whims of local political interests and hampered by the complexity of working across bureaucracies led by multiple leaders with various priorities. ## It is about accountability Mayoral control's critics assert it locks out the voice of parents, a serious concern. After all, we cannot force change on communities. Durable reform requires deep engagement with the students, parents, teachers and administrators who are closest to the work. The [mayor-elect's platform](http://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) asserts that he would replace mayoral control with "a system instead in which parents, students, educators and administrators work together to create the school environments in which students and families will best thrive." But while community engagement must be strengthened, it is not incompatible with mayoral control. Today, the city has thousands of avenues for parents to engage directly with their children's education — from Parent-Teacher Associations to School Leadership Teams to Community Education Councils to the Panel for Educational Policy. These bodies have driven [increased funding for special education](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2022/12/1/23488843/nyc-banks-special-education-asd-nest-horizon-path/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), support for immigrant students and [critical facilities upgrades](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2024/01/18/community-groups-help-nyc-upgrade-neglected-school-buildings/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A smart mayor will listen to these voices not only because it is good politics, but because it makes for better policy. The mayor's authority to execute, combined with the power of parent voice, makes change possible. Ending mayoral control would diminish the mayor's authority and distribute it among other officials. To his credit, the mayor-elect has made clear that he [does not intend to return](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/nyregion/new-york-city-mayors-race-education-mamdani.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the system of 32 elected local school boards, though he has been less clear about what comes next. His platform speaks to ["co-governance,"](http://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but we have seen across the country that diffusing responsibility makes progress less likely. Indeed, elected school boards are in a very real sense less representative of community voice than the system we have today. Across the nation, school board elections are [plagued with low turnout](https://www.carnegie.org/our-work/article/visualizing-voter-turnout-local-school-board-elections/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), hovering around 5%-10%, and are increasingly attracting [massive amounts of special interest campaign spending](https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/chicago-school-board-election-money/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A few activists can take hold of these bodies and use them to force inequitable financing, patchwork policies and subpar achievement. And perhaps most importantly, weakening mayoral control weakens public accountability. Elections are, after all, the ultimate form of community engagement. If you are not satisfied, you can vote the mayor out. Under the prior system, few people knew their school board members. But everyone knows who the mayor is. In the old system, school board members would point their fingers at the mayor, who would point his fingers at the borough presidents and so on. And at the end of the day, everyone threw their hands up, lamenting that nothing could be done. Making authority more diffuse makes accountability more diffuse. ## There's time to reconsider, Mr. Mayor-elect The public's trust in government is [historically low](https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/24/public-trust-in-government-1958-2024/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with devastating results for our politics. One reason for that distrust is that, so often, our elected leaders make promises without delivering. De Blasio faced broad opposition to Pre-K for All. Why? Most critics weren't really opposed to Pre-K for All. They thought it would be a waste of money; they thought the mayor couldn't deliver. Critics exploited this cynicism, with [Reason Magazine intoning](https://reason.com/2014/08/30/nyc-mayor-bill-de-blasios-universal-pre/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "Mayor de Blasio looks out at this vast blighted terrain of waste and broken promises and thinks to himself: 'Time to expand.'" Instead, mayoral control gave Mayor de Blasio a powerful lever to do what many thought impossible, and by doing so, gave hope to many who discount the ability of communities to come together through their government to make positive change. Our new mayor-elect will face profound challenges; foremost among these is building systems worthy of our children. This is not the time to weaken his ability to do so. Mayoral control has proved an essential tool for change, not only for pre-K, community schools and reading instruction, but also for equitable school funding, recruiting diverse teachers and many other innovations. As Mamdani continues to develop his priorities, I am confident he will come to appreciate the benefits of the current system. Mayoral control is not a panacea. But meaningful change can't happen unless the mayor has the authority to drive it, and voters have the authority to hold him accountable for doing so. ### How Things Really Get Done URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-city-deputy-mayors-on-how-things-really-get-done/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:41.000Z *New York City mayors get the most glory and the biggest headaches, but they don't govern alone. Supporting every successful mayor (and every struggling one) are deputy mayors whose job is to translate vision into reality, manage crises, negotiate with Albany, wrangle the budget and ensure the massive machinery of City government is actually accomplishing the people's business.* *Though incredibly powerful, the job of deputy mayor is largely invisible to the public. Most New Yorkers couldn't name a single one from any administration. Yet these are the people who actually run the City, who generally decide which problems get attention and which get deferred, and who ultimately determine whether ambitious policy goals become operational realities or remain just aspirational rhetoric.* *With New York soon to be led by a 34-year-old legislator with no direct experience in the executive branch, we gathered four veterans of City government — Stan Brezenoff (deputy mayor under Ed Koch), Marc Shaw (budget director and first deputy mayor under Rudy Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg), Meera Joshi (deputy mayor for operations under Eric Adams) and Maria Torres-Springer (first deputy mayor under Adams) — to distill their hard-won lessons. Their advice is candid, practical and occasionally sobering.* *Here is what they told us about how to govern New York City — not in theory, but in practice. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.* **Vital City:** Imagine Zohran Mamdani comes to you. You have 10 minutes to give him your insight on the most important thing to understand about governing the city. What do you tell him? **Marc Shaw:** To me, the most important thing is to understand Albany. Running the City, you need to understand how Albany works because it's where policy and budget decisions get made. All the things he is fighting for require cooperation and working with Albany. Having an Albany strategy is probably the most important thing for implementing the specific agenda items he's run his campaign on. **Maria Torres-Springer:** I would remind him that personnel is policy — that an administration's success hinges not just on whether you hire and retain the right people, but whether they are in the right formation and empowered to advance an agenda. That's about agency heads and deputy commissioners. It's about relying not just on the heroics of a handful of people but on systems that allow those individuals to do their best work over a long stretch of time. **VC:** Can you talk about the last few mayors and how that worked well and where it didn't? **Torres-Springer:** For me, the ball game is all about reducing friction among people trying to advance the agenda. A structure, where the chain of command is clear. Everyone knows what they are accountable for because governing is not an episode of "The View." You can't just have 20 people chiming in. It all has to be about forward motion. The Bloomberg administration set a standard for hiring the best people and then empowering them to do their work, even if sometimes that means you fail. The de Blasio administration modeled a way of structuring so that priorities are clear. It was always exceedingly clear what Bill de Blasio wanted to get done, which allowed everyone to mobilize around it. **Meera Joshi:** The first thing is really about the money. Follow the money, because there's no policy or service that will come to fruition unless there's funding. Hiring your OMB (Office of Management and Budget) director is the most critical thing that has to happen. Second, hire subject matter experts. They can sometimes be hard to bear because the facts and the policy don't actually align with what you want, and they're giving you the sober truth. So it takes the fortitude to listen to the truth that experts are providing you, then the fortitude to follow through on those recommendations. ## Who decides — the mayor or his minions? **VC:** How does the mayor make clear what he wants final call on versus what he wants you to have final call on? **Torres-Springer:** One of the most important decisions a mayor needs to make at the beginning is what the decision-making protocols are, because the volume of decisions is legendary in New York. You have to set up a system. In my mind, it's the 51-49 types of decisions that go to the mayor. Over time, you want senior leaders who can make decisions that are aligned with your values, because if you have to be the daily arbiter of conflicts and decisions, that does not lead to forward motion of your agenda. **Stan Brezenoff:** This mayor is going to face a pretty unique world. He is entitled to a high degree of paranoia because they will be out to get him. The only thing that comes close to this is the often brutal attention that David Dinkins had on criminal justice. Secondly, this is a mayor who has no (preexisting) team. It's hard to imagine that his years in the legislature in a small political enclave have given him even the beginnings of a large collection of steady, knowledgeable, experienced people with whom he shares values and approaches. I think he has to strike first and early and go with his signature issues. Put together teams that will take on the mentally ill homeless, the criminal justice system, the expansion of pre-K and after-school. Hit the ground running, with clear evidence that you're pursuing these things in time frames that can demonstrate seriousness and effectiveness. Honestly, this is a mayor who may not have a honeymoon. ## Which priorities should take precedence? **VC:** Does Mamdani stage these priorities — rent, childcare, buses, Department of Community Safety — or fire on all cylinders at once? **Brezenoff:** On the issues you've raised, he should be firing on all cylinders at once. This is what has defined him in the campaign. They will give him no peace, and most of it will be nonrational, biased kinds of attacks. They are going to sensationalize and trivialize and divert the mayor and his key people from focusing on what's truly important. **Shaw:** Before you even get to priorities, the first issue he has to face is: What kind of mayor does he want to be? There's the issue of being an inside mayor and an outside mayor. He's a natural communicator — that's his skill set. That's going to help define what kind of people he brings into the administration. The most important thing is to have a structure for how you're going to run City Hall, who you're going to have in charge of that. You have to separate the issues of running the day-to-day of City government versus going out and being the mayor who runs around town. He's going to have one good thing going for him: There's right now a governor and two legislative leaders in Albany, and all three are very supportive of him. But the governor is going into an election year, and she's already made clear her positions on taxation. So you have to start thinking about the finances of the City and the State from a multiyear perspective. **VC:** What ought the next mayor's posture be with respect to the Trump administration? **Torres-Springer:** There's both the art and the science. New Yorkers want to feel, hear and see that they have a leader who is protecting New York City values. Then there are the real nuts and bolts of defense — who the corporation counsel is, how you look at all the levers of government to defend the city, how the budget is going to work. You need to be able to understand how those numbers work and determine what the response is going to be, hopefully in consultation with the State. Leave the possibility that there are areas for common cause. That might be heretical to some, but I think it's important to also operate in that gear. It's both about the defense and the offense, and they both have to be ready on Day One. **Joshi:** We are intertwined with the federal government on so many financial aspects, especially with infrastructure. So there are two things that are important. One, who are your surrogates? Who are the businesspeople in New York who have relationships in D.C. and can advocate for New York City without Zohran Mamdani's face on those conversations? And two, we have to partner with the red states that have the same problems as us. Texas has hotter summers. There's flooding in red states. All of these things can bring us together on existential threats to work on getting more resiliency funding. **VC:** Are there quick wins Mamdani could deliver to demonstrate that he gets the mechanics of governing? **Joshi:** Street order is always important. He can leverage the good work that happened under the Adams administration and bring home some wins on scaffolding. That's very visual. People see that, and everybody complains about it. **Shaw:** There are no easy wins for saving money. Saving money comes from the really hard work of figuring out efficiencies in government. That happens when you understand your labor issues and how to deal with your labor unions. Because at the end of the day, the vast majority of money spent is on people's salaries. **Torres-Springer:** I'd like to make a case not for the quick wins, but for the hard wins. And by that, I mean fixing the plumbing of government. So many great ideas, bold ideas, crash into the machinery of government. The fixing of the plumbing — how you hire, how you procure, how you leverage technology — is the unglamorous stuff that takes a long time and a lot of painstaking work. But in my mind, it's critical over time. For example, the process for becoming a City employee is not for the faint of heart. At a time when a new mayor is coming in with a huge coalition of people who want to help and want to be public servants, the stumbling block cannot be that it takes too long to get hired. You commit to fixing it. That allows you to bring in the talent you need and retain them. Maybe government can finally be an employer of choice. **VC:** How flexible should a mayor be on the how, not the what? We saw de Blasio wanting to do pre-K through a particular tax hike that the governor wasn't willing to do. **Shaw:** He needs to figure out how to move forward and show progress. But sometimes you need a multiyear mindset. I can't imagine him getting the taxes in his first year, but I can imagine structuring something so that the taxes remain on the table in his second year. I'll give you an example from the Bloomberg administration. It was right after Sept. 11\. Michael Bloomberg came into office, and in his State of the City speech said he wasn't going to raise taxes that year. Fast forward: We raised taxes 18.5% on Jan. 1 of the second year, and it turned out to be an enormous success. ## Organizing for accountability and results **VC:** What is good and bad about the current organizational chart at City Hall? Do we have the right number of deputy mayors? **Joshi:** I do think we have more deputy mayor positions than we need in the current administration. I think of the deputy mayor as the person who is driving the priorities at the agency level. Often, that manifests itself in weekly meetings with deputy commissioners, getting into the nuts and bolts and seeing where there are hiccups. Every role has to have a purpose, and nobody should have a role where they have no one reporting to them. So "senior advisors," those kinds of positions — if you can't answer what purpose that role has, then it probably doesn't need to exist. Mamdani's going to come in with an unprecedented amount of pressure, and he's following a one-term mayor. So anything that's kind of working already, my advice is to leave it alone. Keep moving. But I would certainly get rid of what I'd call accessory positions that have populated City Hall over recent years. **Brezenoff:** The history of deputy mayors tells you a lot about the way bureaucracies can grow. In the early days of the Koch administration, there were more deputy mayors than secretaries in City Hall, culminating in a kind of Kochian night of the long knives in which many were removed through no fault of their own. Nobody could quite figure out what each one of them was doing. It's important for Mamdani to show that he is in control and to be very careful about retention. Because he is running as a change agent, retaining people means he has to be absolutely sure that they're in accord with his vision and with his zeal to make change. But if he's careful in his most important selections — OMB, first deputy mayor, his economic development person — those people can help fill those gaps. Just a quick anecdote: When I went back to government to improve the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, I applied a model to each of the hospitals that looked at the numbers of vice presidents. I found across the system between 75 and 100 individuals. We couldn't figure out what they were doing. And ultimately, I'm the only person who convinced de Blasio there is such a thing as a good layoff. I think it's really important that in the transition, you press hard on the Adams people to be very restrained in hiring anyone on their way out the door and even employ a kind of hiring control board. It's a good message to send for a guy who's running on ideology to demonstrate some toughness here. ## Parting words **VC:** You gave a lot of affirmative advice. What negative advice do you have, if you had to crystallize one "Don't do this" for Mamdani? **Joshi:** Don't give away your power. This is a huge CEO job. The temptation to be pressured into saying yes becomes a floodgate. Whereas having the strength to say no allows you to retain that power, and at the end of the day that is your greatest tool. Externally, be prepared to disappoint. There are going to be elected officials and people who supported you on the campaign that you cannot please. And that's OK. Because if you start focusing on pleasing them, you're going to give away your power. **Shaw:** Don't try to run City Hall. First and foremost, because you'll spend your whole day there, and that's a mistake. You need to be an outside person. This guy is a natural outside person. He should do that. When I first came to New York from Albany, Stan Brezenoff and his relationship with Paul Dickstein were my role models. Ed Koch didn't make all those decisions every day. Stan Brezenoff did, and he did it with his budget director. New York City is an enormously complex place to run, and this guy's coming in with very little experience. He needs to find somebody he's comfortable with that he can delegate to and have a strong deputy mayor structure. **Torres-Springer:** Don't mistake activity for direction. Because the job can happen to you. If you don't have clarity of vision and you don't make sure your team has a maniacal execution of the things that are important to you, it's easy for the job to just swallow up your time, which is the most valuable currency of a mayor. And the second thing is, don't sleep on culture. A big part of a mayor's success will be whether he can actually create what I've described as a kind of low-drama City Hall where it's very clear from Day One that what is prized is quiet, effective execution and not political theater, not game-playing, not obsession with intrigue. Set a tone from Day One about what is valuable, what is prized and what won't be tolerated. ### Which Way Mamdani? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdani-michelle-wu-and-brandon-johnson/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:40.000Z There's one mayor that Zohran Mamdani doesn't want to be compared to: the last left-wing activist who took charge of a major American city. In 2023, Brandon Johnson ran for mayor of Chicago on an ambitious agenda that included increasing city spending, reducing the power of the Police Department and raising taxes on the wealthy. When he unexpectedly defeated his moderate opponent, his victory resonated nationally as a triumph for the urban left: A former teachers' union organizer, schooled by Chicago's activist class, had taken control of America's third-largest city. It's obvious why Johnson is compared to Mamdani. But to anyone who follows Chicago politics, it's clear why the people making the comparison tend to be Mamdani's critics rather than his allies. That's because Johnson's tenure has been, by nearly every measure, a disaster. The migrant crisis undermined his administration from the start, but his mismanagement of it fueled public distrust and helped sink [key spending priorities](https://www.axios.com/local/chicago/2024/03/27/bring-chicago-home-fails?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Chicago is not the dystopian city of President Donald Trump's imagination. By [many measures, crime is falling](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8jl969pg7o?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the population is [starting to rise](https://greatcities.uic.edu/2025/05/15/crains-chicago-business-chicagos-population-is-growing-again/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But Johnson's unwillingness to reform spending has led to the [most severe urban debt crisis in the country](https://www.thelastward.org/p/will-jb-pritzker-side-with-brandon?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It'd be one thing if current levels of government largesse produced top-notch city services. Unfortunately, few believe the city delivers competently on core responsibilities like transportation infrastructure or affordable housing, and half of city voters list taxes as a [top concern](https://www.illinoispolicy.org/poll-taxes-no-1-issue-for-over-half-of-illinois-voters-nearly-half-would-move/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The result is a Johnson approval rating that sits between 14% and 25%. If Johnson represents the future that critics fear Mamdani will bring to New York, Boston's Michelle Wu offers a more hopeful analogue. The former city councilor was elected in 2021 and is often grouped with Johnson as a part of the ["progressive takeover of big cities."](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/05/the-progressive-take-over-of-big-cities-is-nearly-complete.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) She ran on [a platform](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/us/michelle-wu-boston-progressives.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that will sound familiar to Mamdani fans: fare-free transit, rent control and climate action. Importantly, while Wu is more left-leaning than her predecessor, she has a more varied ideological history than Johnson. When she ran for City Council, one of her top priorities was cutting red tape for businesses, and her first vote in office was for a [moderate Council president](https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2013/12/11/michelle-wu-defends-her-decision-to-support-bill-linehan-for-boston-city-council-president/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). As mayor, Wu scaled back some ambitious proposals on transit and policing, prompting criticism from the left that she abandoned her campaign promise for transformative change. Wu can still point to victories on green infrastructure investment in schools and a major spending boost for [universal pre-K](https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/bostons-free-pre-k-program-gets-20m-boost/2765159/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but those left critics have a point. In polling and a [recent interview series](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/10/30/metro/boston-michelle-wu-first-term/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by The Boston Globe, most residents say they haven't seen much change in the city, aside from less crime and more expensive rent. The good news for Wu is that it isn't much of a problem; she just cruised to reelection, running unopposed after opponents [failed to galvanize sufficient support](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/boston-mayor-michelle-wu-will-now-run-unopposed-in-her-reelection-bid?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It turns out that pragmatically picking the right political fights and avoiding allegations of mismanagement was enough. The residents of Boston weren't clamoring for sweeping change. City-to-city comparisons are difficult. Chicago is well over three times the size of Boston, and New York City is nearly three times the size of Chicago. The powers of the mayoralties vary substantially. And all three cities perform differently on key issues like education, crime and economic growth. Still, New York's new mayor can take cues from Wu's successes and Johnson's governing failures. ## Promises and pragmatism Mamdani can start by avoiding Johnson's excessive deference to the demands made by certain unions and single-issue organizations that dominate the city's left-wing political coalition. Take education, for example. Chicago's [public schools face rapidly declining enrollment](https://www.propublica.org/article/chicago-public-schools-enrollment-costs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and rising per-student costs. Reform has been a decades-long challenge for leaders across the political spectrum, but Johnson worsened the situation by deferring to the deeply unpopular and overtly political Chicago Teachers' Union, where he once held membership. It may have been unsurprising, but was nevertheless disappointing when Johnson declined to push for the closure of severely [underenrolled schools](https://www.chalkbeat.org/chicago/2025/06/13/chicago-public-schools-declining-enrollment-causes-small-schools-high-costs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=At%20the%20next%20school%20board,70%2C000%20from%20a%20decade%20ago.) while supporting [additional funding](https://www.illinoispolicy.org/chicago-mayor-praises-school-with-just-2-adept-readers-as-example-of-his-values/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to expand the expensive and often underperforming "Sustainable Community Schools" program. The situation turned scandalous when the [school system's CEO refused](https://www.chalkbeat.org/chicago/2024/08/14/public-schools-teachers-union-labor-contract-talks-deficit-morgan-park/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a $300 million high-interest loan to cover the union's new contract demands. Johnson ordered the school board to fire him; he resigned in protest, and Johnson proceeded to appoint a board of union-friendly allies. Meanwhile, the structural problems in the school system remain unaddressed. Having steady working relationships with the public and private sector unions is foundational to any successful mayorship. But, as David Greising of Chicago's nonpartisan Better Government Association told me, Johnson never understood the "difference between standing one's ground based on principles and having a feel for the trades that need to be made in order to effectively make progress toward those goals." While that tension was clearest with the teachers' union, it extended to other realms — such as when Johnson [refused to lay off any municipal workers](https://news.wttw.com/2025/10/16/mayor-brandon-johnson-calls-617m-new-taxes-close-budget-gap-avoid-layoffs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) despite the city badly needing to cut back on its financially unsustainable staff levels. Wu handled [these trade-offs much more intelligently](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2024/04/23/metro/boston-mayor-michelle-wu-union-contracts-negotiations/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Tensions ran hot with Boston's teachers' union during contract negotiations, but she was able to deliver fair wage increases without yielding to less reasonable demands. Municipal workers pushed for increased pension payouts, but Wu wisely rejected them for being [financially untenable.](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/05/23/metro/boston-retired-city-employees-pensions-cost-of-living-increase/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The police union — a typically less friendly interest group for progressive mayors — [even agreed to major reforms](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2023/12/13/metro/boston-city-council-unanimously-approves-82-million-police-patrolmens-contract/?p1=Article%5FInline%5FText%5FLink&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in its disciplinary system. As [Wu put it herself](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2024/04/23/metro/boston-mayor-michelle-wu-union-contracts-negotiations/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "We may not always agree on the positions that are taken, or the outcomes that will come from certain changes that are being suggested, but we can all agree on wanting to do our best by the residents of Boston and by our workforce." That's a good reference point for Mamdani. Supporting working-class New Yorkers should mean siding with unions when they're right on policy or making certain pragmatic concessions to keep City services operating — but saying a firm "no" to demands that unnecessarily drive up costs and undermine [good governance](https://www.slowboring.com/p/the-stationary-bandits-of-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). For instance, Mamdani plans to build 200,000 units of affordable housing at the somewhat low cost of $500,000 per unit. But building with only union labor, as Mamdani plans to do, [yields a typical cost](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/10/28/zohran-mamdani-union-labor-affordable-housing-charter-proposals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of $800,000 per affordable housing unit. If affordability is truly his north star, will some demands from organized labor give way for the greater good? The economist Mancur Olson coined the term "stationary bandits" to describe how roving warriors settled in early farming communities, extracting goods while maintaining certain basic government services. The writer Matt Yglesias [applies the same logic](https://www.slowboring.com/p/the-stationary-bandits-of-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to some organizations in New York City, which serve important functions in the city but advocate for certain policies that extract costs from the City. While Mamdani has generally suggested that labor and the general public aren't in tension, in point of fact they are — in ways a smart progressive needs to address. For another example, think of the transit union's costly attempt to prohibit [one-person train](https://www.city-journal.org/article/new-york-mta-subway-transit-unions-train-operation?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) operation, a standard policy in metros around the world. The [onerous crane regulations](https://www.city-journal.org/article/deconstructing-new-yorks-building-costs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that increase construction costs while protecting entrenched construction interests. Or [the recent City Council plan](https://substack.com/home/post/p-174632604?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to make New York virtually the only city in the country to mandate gas-powered appliances installation by master plumbers — a policy that will increase costs for landlords, and consequently renters. Is this the kind of thing an affordability-obsessed mayor will bless or resist? Mamdani has the opportunity to stand against such banditry because, unlike politicians like Johnson or Cuomo, he doesn't owe his rise to these organizations' endorsements or fundraising. His support came authentically from New Yorkers who were sick of living in a city that feels so unaffordable. But time will tell which path he chooses. He'll need to show similar flexibility in other areas where his stated principles and pragmatism clash. The city's largest-in-the-nation public school system has middling test scores and the highest per-pupil spending just about anywhere. [Mamdani has said](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2025/09/05/zohran-mamdani-nyc-mayor-race-public-school-improvement-policy/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) he wants to better serve parents and students, especially low-income parents and students ill served by the current system. But if he sticks to some of his more rigid campaign pronouncements, that'll be difficult. He's positioned himself as a foe of many charter schools, which serve precisely this population. He's telegraphed resistance toward merging or closing poorly performing, underenrolled schools. And he's said he's against mayoral control of the schools in its current form, a stance that'll make it very hard to go "line by line at every single position" in the Education Department bureaucracy to ensure that they are "actually working towards the betterment of the system." It's not just unions he needs to be prepared to disappoint — it's his uber-progressive allies with the Democratic Socialists of America. The left political organization has been pragmatic during the campaign, [refusing to denounce](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/30/mamdani-dsa-relationship-nyc-mayor-00628704?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Mamdani when he backed the construction of new jails and apologized for his past criticisms of the NYPD. Their bet is that moderation will be worth it when Mamdani makes good on certain long-standing DSA priorities. But what happens when Mamdani isn't able to get the State approval he needs to fund the free bus program? Or, if his City-run grocery isn't able to expand and feed low-income residents at scale? Mamdani will need to think critically about which priorities can most cost-effectively improve life in the city, even if it means disappointing his long-standing ideological allies. ## Taxing and spending So much of this comes back to budgets. Like every other major city in the country, New York City is facing a looming budget deficit that's exacerbated by impending cuts in federal assistance from a hostile Trump administration. One of Mamdani's biggest responsibilities in the coming years will be navigating that situation responsibly. Michelle Wu has addressed Boston's [budgetary problems](https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/boston-fy-2026-budget-planning-wu/3673238/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with targeted cuts and emphasized, "We're holding steady and ensuring that we're doing things in a really disciplined and fiscally conservative way." She also dialed back some expensive campaign promises like free transit. Chicago, meanwhile, faces a far deeper budget crisis that began before Johnson even took office. The nonpartisan Civic Federation and other seasoned budget watchdogs [have urged](https://www.axios.com/local/chicago/2025/08/11/five-paths-to-shrinking-chicagos-deficit?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Johnson to rein in spending before turning to new taxes. But the mayor has largely brushed aside that advice, sticking to his refrain that wealthy Chicagoans need to "put more skin in the game." It's hard for Johnson to get beyond taxing and spending because he shares Mamdani's belief that the biggest challenge in municipal government is rampant fiscal austerity paired with a supposed tendency to let the rich get away without paying their fair share. The truth is that both Chicago and New York City are the capitals of states with some of the highest [combined state and local spending per capita](https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/state/state-local-tax-collections-per-capita/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and government expenditures have increased by [20% in New York City](https://cbcny.org/research/did-you-know?utm%5Fsource) and [58% in Chicago](https://www.illinoispolicy.org/chicago-budget-has-jumped-6b-since-before-covid-faces-1b-deficit-in-2025/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) since 2020\. Residents in New York City face among the [highest combined](https://cbcny.org/research/new-york-still-top-charts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) income tax rates in the nation. That doesn't mean Mamdani shouldn't seek to increase spending on certain vital services or pursue tax increases to fund that spending, but he should learn from Johnson's inability to rein in costs in the city. Johnson's affordable housing policy offers a useful example. While it's not the biggest cost in either city's budget, it is an area where Mamdani also wants to increase spending. Johnson recently pushed for a $1.25 billion loan to support new construction. But he's expressed no interest in reforming a system that spends almost $750,000 to build a unit of [affordable housing](https://citythatworks.substack.com/p/a-better-way-to-build-affordable?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — Houston, the next largest city in the country, spends $358,000\. His latest affordable housing policy is [loaded with more onerous design requirements](https://citythatworks.substack.com/p/how-to-make-social-housing-work-in-93b?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that will make it worse. Michelle Wu has increased affordable housing spending too, and Boston has seen its highest [affordable housing production](https://www.boston.gov/departments/housing/housing-initiatives-under-mayor-michelle-wu?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) since the 1990s. Still, construction costs remain high, and overall housing production in the city [has fallen](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/06/30/business/boston-housing-construction-policy-affordable-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). High interest rates and rising construction costs have undermined builders everywhere, but critics say Boston has been hit harder by new green energy codes and stricter inclusionary zoning rules. Both Wu and Johnson have implemented some other good supply-side reforms, like reforming parking mandates. Neither are models for unleashing a housing boom. Albany is almost certain to reject raising the debt limit to let New York City borrow the $70 billion Mamdani wants so that the public sector can build affordable housing. If he insists on this approach, he risks looking naive about fiscal constraints — the same political liability that has repeatedly undermined Brandon Johnson. Mamdani can still increase spending on affordable housing construction, but he should [reform the complex design requirements](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/why-it-costs-so-much-to-build-in-new-york-city) that are needed to build. Sean Campion, the director of housing and economic development studies at the Citizens Budget Commission, points to these regulations as a key reason why affordable housing construction is so expensive. Much has been written about the impracticality of Mamdani's rent-freeze plan. Less covered is Mamdani's misguided desire to enhance the current affordability standards under the 485-x tax credit and zoning for Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH). The tax credit functions as a carrot, cutting taxes for developers that include affordable housing, while MIH makes additional density contingent on providing a certain percentage of affordable units. Importantly, Alex Armlovich, a housing analyst at the Niskanen Center, told me both requirements "are already among the strictest in the country and that all the city needs is more upzoning to scale them." Mamdani has talked a big game when it comes to increasing housing supply. Now, he needs to change his policies to match his rhetoric. ## Nuts-and-bolts Regardless of whether Mamdani pursues the wisest housing policy or tackles extractive special interest groups, the biggest thing that will determine his fate in his first few years is competency. Will New Yorkers see their city getting and feeling safer? Will they sense the very basic mechanics of government working better? Listening to Mamdani's rhetoric, he seems to understand that this is how he'll be judged. But understanding the importance of good governance and actually governing well are two very different things. Some Bostonians criticize Michelle Wu's policy positions, while few argue that she has been incompetent. [Ford Cavallari](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/05/14/metro/michelle-wu-campaign-progressive-police-green-new-deal/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), chairman of Boston's Alliance of Downtown Civic Organizations, describes Wu as someone who "ran as an outsider-slash-reformer" and "ended up governing as an insider." This is the result of a few factors: Wu's long history of political pragmatism, background in business and private consulting and — arguably most importantly — good staff. On the other hand, even Johnson's progressive allies admit that he struggled to staff his administration with the kind of experienced managers the City requires. [As one put it](https://www.waleed-shahid.com/p/what-mamdani-can-learn-from-chicagos?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the mayor "involved so many people who wanted to feel like they had a seat at the table." That instinct to appease so many loyal factions left his government stretched thin on expertise — contributing to the administration's faltering response to the migrant crisis and to a series of avoidable political setbacks. More than any of his aforementioned policy failures, it was this sense of chaos and mismanagement inside the administration that drove Johnson's approval so low. To be fair, Johnson has still been able to achieve progressive victories like ending the subminimum wage for tipped workers and mandating 10 days of [paid leave](https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/press%5Froom/press%5Freleases/2023/november/paid-time-off-ordinance-passes.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across the city. The left-wing political strategist Waleed Shahid believes these achievements were undermined "by a sophisticated opposition network that dictated the political narrative." Perhaps, but actual results have mattered mightily too. Wu entered office with a far less entrenched political opposition and, in turn, faced much less negative media. Mamdani will face a more organized and better-funded opposition that is much more similar to Johnson. They will be searching for mistakes, and Mamdani needs to avoid them by not hiring too many of the ideological and inexperienced staffers he's carried on his campaign. Instead, he should follow the example of Bloomberg and even de Blasio by [appointing seasoned staff](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/mamdani-needs-a-staffing-plan) and deputy mayors who command broad respect in their fields. This could mean the administration narrows its ambition to issues like rent control or free buses. But it will result in a more competently run City. Mamdani's opponents have spent the past year fearmongering about the possible nightmare of a socialist-led city. Mamdani's political identity doesn't mean he'll manage the city poorly. In fact, as the 20th century ["sewer socialists"](https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/Records/Article/CS428?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Milwaukee and elsewhere show, socialist mayors can preside over a growing city and establish great public works. Mamdani's fate, and that of New York City, hinges less on ideology and more on effective governance that recognizes the need to make trade-offs. Brandon Johnson shows the danger of ignoring such governing complexities, and Michelle Wu is proof that progressives can narrow their governing agenda and remain broadly popular. Millions of New Yorkers voted for a better-functioning and more affordable city. If he's willing to make some tough choices, Mamdani can deliver on that promise. ### The Devil Is in the Details (of 911 Dispatch) URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-devil-is-in-the-details-of-911-dispatch/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:41.000Z On a sunny day in early June 2025, practitioners, policymakers and researchers from across the U.S. gathered at NYU's Kimmel Center to share insights in the growing movement to reassign low-acuity 911 calls from police to unarmed crisis response teams. In his [keynote address](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KzMa0%5F9GMQI&list=PLTzHm2AAUMu8QLA-H1mHoRoQkg6IZ4lda&index=2&ab%5Fchannel=ThePolicingProject&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City Public Advocate Jumaane Williams didn't mince words: New York City, he said, needs to expand its [B-HEARD](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program — which dispatches trained behavioral health teams instead of police officers to 911 calls involving people in crisis — ifit wants to better serve the 1 in 5 New Yorkers with psychiatric illness. His words were met with applause, reflecting the growing enthusiasm for alternative response programs across the country. Some cities have even created new [Departments of Community Safety](https://www.cabq.gov/acs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to coordinate these teams and other nonpolice responders under one roof. But that enthusiasm — and the enthusiasm for alternative response expressed by Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani, who wants [to create such a department](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/zohran-mamdani-social-workers-nypd-mayors-race-interview/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in New York City and send social workers to respond in cases of certain behavioral health crises — stands alongside mounting real-world evidence that cities are struggling to make these programs work. Those who believe in the promise of alternative response to reduce the scope of policing and offer a more suitable response to a range of social problems must grapple seriously with the practical challenges it introduces to underlying systems, most specifically 911 dispatch. Otherwise, good intentions will collide with messy realities, producing less-than-ideal results. [A recent audit](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/new-audit-comptroller-finds-over-a-third-of-eligible-mental-health-calls-did-not-get-a-b-heard-team-response-for-untracked-reasons/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the New York City comptroller found that even in the limited pilot phase, B-HEARD teams were unable to respond to more than a third of eligible calls. [In Louisville](https://www.justice.gov/crt/media/1365351/dl?inline&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the U.S. Department of Justice found that most 911 calls that could go to behavioral health teams still end up with police. And [in Phoenix](https://www.justice.gov/crt/media/1355866/dl?inline&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), DOJ investigators reported that the majority of behavioral health calls continue to be sent to patrol officers — even when clinical teams are available. In short, cities are building the programs — but struggling to deliver the response. Policymakers often point to funding gaps, staffing shortages or limited hours of operation as reasons why alternative response programs are underutilized. Those are real constraints, but they overlook something more fundamental: These programs only work if the right emergency calls reach the right responders. That decision largely falls to 911 dispatchers, who are the frontline workers judging which situations are appropriate for unarmed responders and which are not. And when there's any doubt, they often default to sending the police. Williams understands this challenge well. [In a public statement](https://advocate.nyc.gov/press/nyc-public-advocate-calls-for-expanding-nonpolice-response-to-mental-health-calls-at-hearing-on-bheard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), he acknowledged, "It can be difficult to discern over the phone what is happening at the scene, and whether there is a risk of harm to the caller or to the responders … It is imperative to ensure that 911 dispatchers are properly trained in how to effectively determine which calls can be sent to B-HEARD." As more jurisdictions roll out alternative response programs, they're grappling with the same concerns Williams raised. Many have turned to structured protocols — scripts, decision trees and checklists — to guide 911 dispatchers through call diversion decisions, much like physicians now go through [checklists](https://atulgawande.com/book/the-checklist-manifesto/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when assessing many medical conditions. Protocols can be useful for structuring and standardizing decision-making, but only when they're designed with care, tested against real-world practice and supported with additional forms of guidance and training — elements that largely have been missing from alternative response program implementation so far but urgently are needed. A structured, rule-bound approach to call-taking isn't a new idea. For decades, public officials and police reformers have treated dispatch as a clerical task that can be mastered through rigid adherence to procedure. In his 1950s textbook, ["Police Administration,"](https://search.worldcat.org/title/police-administration/oclc/1028285?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) influential police chief O.W. Wilson put it plainly: The dispatcher "makes no actual decisions regarding an operation but merely classifies it and applies the routine procedures established by department regulations for this classification in the deployment and assignment of men." That conception is far removed from the practical realities of the job — yet its legacy lives on in today's call-taking protocols that treat complex judgment calls as if they can be reduced to clerical tasks. To better understand how these protocols function in practice, [we conducted research](http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.70008?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in two cities at the forefront of alternative response: Denver and San Francisco. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork into Denver's Support Team Assisted Response (STAR) program and San Francisco's Street Crisis Response Team (SCRT) program, we found that their protocols can work reasonably well under ideal conditions: when callers provide clear, accurate information, are invested in the outcome of the call and share a mutual understanding of subjective terms like "violence" or "threat." Most crisis calls, however, don't unfold that way. They're messy, ambiguous and full of subjectivity. In those moments, today's protocols often fall short — and can even become obstacles to sending out alternative responders altogether. Take third-party calls. These are calls that come from passersby, business owners, neighbors — people who often lack the detailed knowledge that protocols demand. As a dispatcher in San Francisco explained: "You're asking a third-party caller, 'Is that guy who's ranting and raving and throwing stuff out of the gutter suicidal?' and they're like, 'I don't know.'" She noted that in her city, the protocol treated "I don't know" not as a neutral answer but as a risk — automatically escalating the response and ruling out a street crisis team, even when she believed it was appropriate. Or take calls about "violence." The term sounds clear, but its interpretation often depends on context. As another dispatcher in San Francisco explained, "If someone has a weapon and seems violent, we're not going to send Street Crisis (San Francisco's unarmed behavioral health response team). But that doesn't mean yelling and screaming. That doesn't mean having a stick. As long as they're not brandishing it. So, it can be really subtle." The problem is that today's protocols rarely accommodate that kind of nuance. Most rely on rigid yes/no prompts, and dispatch leaders have largely abdicated their responsibility for helping dispatchers make sense of the wide range of responses they actually hear from callers. In response to these protocol challenges, we observed a range of adaptations by dispatch staff. Some of the most sophisticated dispatchers developed creative workarounds — reframing questions, stretching definitions or entering responses after they'd decided who to send — to dispatch an alternative response despite the system's constraints. Others, facing similar pressures, defaulted to sending police, either by avoiding the protocol altogether or deviating from it. These varied practices point to a broader issue: The protocols, as currently designed, are not offering consistent or adequate support. So what is the better way? Our research, and that of others, points the way. As the police [rulemaking literature](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Police%5FDiscretion/dlgvAQAAIAAJ?hl=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) reminds us, well-crafted rules can play a critical role in guiding officials' discretion and promoting both appropriate and equitable treatment for those who call upon the government. For example, many policing agencies now use vehicle pursuit policies that [structure discretion](https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/the-new-world-of-police-accountability/book259214?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by instructing officers to consider environmental conditions and public safety risks before initiating a pursuit. Dispatch centers adopting alternative response can take a similar approach by redesigning their protocols to account for the messy realities of 911 calls and the nuanced judgments call-takers must make in real time. First, agencies should refine the questions dispatchers ask, drawing directly from the people doing the work. How do experienced dispatchers phrase their questions to surface need rather than threat? What conversational techniques help shift the trajectory of a call toward alternative response? One dispatcher we spoke with described rephrasing her protocol questions to focus on *what the subject of the call needs* — not just what they're doing. This call-taker believed a small change like this avoided unnecessary police dispatches. To capture and share this kind of insight, agencies need real feedback systems that help dispatchers learn from everyday calls. That means setting aside time for supervisors and peers to review calls together — not just when something goes wrong, but also when a call goes well — to talk through what worked, what didn't and why. One promising approach to achieve this, adapted from mediation and conflict resolution settings, is the [Conversation Analytic Role-Play Method](https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/journal%5Fcontribution/The%5FConversation%5FAnalytic%5FRole-play%5FMethod%5FCARM%5Fa%5Fmethod%5Ffor%5Ftraining%5Fcommunication%5Fskills%5Fas%5Fan%5Falternative%5Fto%5Fsimulated%5Frole-play/9472619?file=17097068&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (CARM). This method provides agencies with a framework to review recordings of real conversations in slow motion and build an evidence base for what conversational practices are most effective. A version of this technique could help 911 centers learn from their own calls and improve the wording of their protocols accordingly. Agencies could start by analyzing their call-for-service data to flag dispatchers who are especially skilled at diverting calls to alternative responders, then listen to how those calls unfold. These kinds of structured feedback loops could help improve protocols and strengthen alternative response programs nationwide. Second, cities should supplement protocols with more flexible forms of guidance. Rigid scripts alone won't cut it in complex situations. Dispatchers need a principled compass to follow in moments of ambiguity. Take Washington, D.C., where the police department's [use-of-force policy](https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/the-new-world-of-police-accountability/book259214?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) opens with a clear moral anchor: "to value and preserve the sanctity of human life." Dispatch centers similarly should adopt value statements — ones that pair a commitment to safety with a presumption in favor of nonpolice response. The balance between these values is delicate, but making the organization's preferences more explicit would help guide call-takers when the rules run out. Perhaps with such a value statement, the San Francisco dispatcher who struggled over how to handle the call about the man "ranting and raving and throwing stuff in the gutter" could have leaned on a departmental preference for a nonpolice response in that moment. This kind of framing matters. Instead of positioning diversion as a neutral sorting task ("send it to the right responder"), protocols could make clear that if a situation *can* be handled without police, *that's* the preferred outcome. Definitions matter too. Vague terms like "violence," "threat" or "weapon" leave too much room for guesswork. Agencies should clarify what these concepts mean in practice — and ensure they're informed by the real-world experiences of alternative responders. Clearer definitions act as value statements too, helping dispatchers interpret gray areas with confidence and care. And when a script truly falls short? Dispatchers shouldn't be left to figure it out alone. Agencies should invest in real-time support, like access to supervisors or embedded behavioral health specialists who can help dispatchers think through tough calls in the moment. There may even be a role for carefully designed [AI tools](https://www.policingproject.org/rethinking-response-articles/2025/5/8/part-two-body-worn-camera-analytics-e3zg9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to assist dispatchers here. Denver, for example, has begun testing software from Corti AI to analyze past 911 calls and better identify ones that could be eligible for diversion in the future. Integrating alternative response into the 911 system marks a major shift in how cities handle crisis calls — one that's still in its early stages. It's no surprise that initial forms of call diversion guidance have fallen short of what's needed to ensure alternative response reaches its full potential. For these programs to expand, they will require a more sophisticated approach to 911 rule design: one that is grounded in reflection, shaped by frontline insight and open to revision. ### Tough Budget Choices Ahead URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/tough-budget-choices-ahead-for-zohran-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:40.000Z Out of the campaign frying pan, into the budgeting fire. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani faces the immediate challenge of preparing a Preliminary Budget for the coming fiscal year (July 2026-June 2027) and a Financial Plan for the next four fiscal years by Feb. 1\. Although that deadline may be extended by a few weeks, the new mayor has little time to get his budget team in place and specify his fiscal policies. This is a complex and sprawling task involving more than $115 billion in annual operating expenses of more than two dozen agencies and over 350,000 employees. Mamdani has made the task even more daunting by making some pricey campaign promises — including making buses free ($600 million-$800 million a year) and providing universal childcare (around $6 billion a year). He wants to pay for these and other priorities by raising taxes on New York City's top earners and corporations, but that could well be a dead letter in Albany, which controls Gotham's taxes. So if he wants to advance his promises and keep the budget in balance, as required by law, then he's got his work cut out. Budgeting is where, to channel Mario Cuomo, the poetry of campaigning runs smack up against the prose of governing. Our new mayor should show all the people of the city, including the one million who did not vote for him, how he will finance his ambitious priorities while continuing to provide and enhance the basic services on which residents and businesses depend. In order to find the billions he wants to fund his priorities and to convince New Yorkers, including those with high incomes (who provide almost half of the City's personal income tax revenue), that their tax dollars are well spent, the new mayor's budget must show that he is serious about making City government more efficient and effective. Mamdani understands this, at least intellectually. He [told Derek Thompson](https://www.derekthompson.org/p/what-speaks-to-me-about-abundance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "As someone who is very passionate about public goods, I think that we on the left have to be equally passionate about public excellence … how we can make government more effective, how we can actually deliver on the very ideas that we are so passionate about. Any example of public inefficiency is an opportunity for the argument to be made against the very existence of the public sector. And so to truly make the case time and time again that local government has a role in providing that which is necessary to live a dignified life, you have to ensure that every example of government's attempt to do so is one that is actually successful." But theory and practice differ. Mayor Eric Adams' latest Financial Plan projects a deficit for the next fiscal year of $5 billion, accumulating over four years to $17 billion, which means even without a single new plan, something would have to give. Making matters more complicated, these projections do not sufficiently take into account the precarious condition of the State budget and the impact of potentially draconian federal funding reductions threatened by Congress and President Donald Trump. Which is to say, even if — and it's a big if — Mamdani is able to get the necessary State legislative and gubernatorial approval for the $10 billion in annual tax increases he seeks, City agency expenses must be revamped boldly and dramatically. Not only will this save money, but it will show that a mayor espousing a social democratic philosophy can provide practical as well as aspirational leadership. The imperative of such a revamp becomes even more pressing if Mamdani's preferred tax increases don't materialize. Mamdani has said that he would save money by cutting contracts and consultants at the Department of Education. But this is only a drop in the bucket. There are many additional and larger savings and service improvements to be had. It requires rigorously examining the budget, setting aside ideology and being willing to be a tough negotiator with public sector unions and other vested interests. What do they include? **Revamping New York City Housing Authority rules and practices**, including narrow job definitions, slow work order processing and generous overtime that delay repairs and boost operating costs above those of rent-stabilized units, as well as stronger enforcement of rent and fee collection and eligibility requirements. NYCHA collects less than 70% of the rent it is owed, loses approximately $100 million a year, has more than 6,000 vacant apartments and takes more than 400 days to complete repairs. **Changing the culture of the Department of Correction**, which, despite a daily cost of over $1,500 per inmate, leads to violence, mistreatment of inmates and the denial of medical care. The mayor should support the remediation manager, soon to be appointed by the federal court, in overhauling staff training, work practices and supervision. Civilianizing positions and cutting back on overtime could save hundreds of millions. The current plan for closing Rikers requires substantial capital investments but should lead to longer-term operational savings and more humane conditions. **Cutting the high cost — about $750 per ton — of collecting and disposing of recycling and residential trash.** Collection costs are high due to decades-old sanitation district boundaries that determine garbage truck routes, outdated "productivity bonuses" for staff on two-man trucks that were adopted 40 years ago and excess collection frequencies in neighborhoods that generate relatively little recycling material. Disposal costs are high due to expensive contracts, totaling more than half a billion dollars a year, for the export of waste to distant landfills in other states, necessitated by the premature, politically motivated closing of the Fresh Kills landfill. Exporting should be phased out in favor of reliance on waste-to-energy plants in the region. **Dealing with the vast bureaucracy of the Department of Education**, with more than 140,000 employees serving more than 900,000 students in more than 1,400 school buildings, plus 274 charter schools receiving public support. DOE's average cost per pupil is [about $40,000 a year](https://nypost.com/2025/08/30/us-news/nyc-doe-projected-to-spend-over-42k-per-student-this-school-year-the-most-in-the-country/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=NYC%20DOE%20projected%20to%20spend%20$42k%20per%20student%20this,year%2C%20according%20to%20DOE%20statistics.), well above national norms, but its scores on national performance tests are middling. Moreover, the schools suffer extensive de facto racial segregation. A [national academic study](https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/reports/nyc-school-segregation-report-card-still-last-action-needed-now?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found New York to have the most segregated schools in the country. To improve student performance and revive flagging public support for the system requires strategies opposed by the city's teachers union: (1) Shifting the basis of teacher compensation from rewarding seniority to a more flexible system that rewards performance and teaching in high-need schools and fields. (2) Deploying teachers more effectively so that fewer teachers have roles outside the classroom. (3) District lines and individual school zones should be revamped, reducing segregation and allowing the DOE to better allocate students to existing schools with excess capacity. Despite complaints about crowded schools and an unfunded State mandate to reduce class size, the DOE should already have enough space for its students. However, successive administrations have [spent billions of dollars building new schools rather than facing the political pressure associated with rezoning](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/public-comment-school-planning-and-siting-process?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mamdani can promote integration, reallocate substantial capital resources to other needs and become a national leader of school reform by pursuing new strategies. **Getting control over excessive overtime expenses in the uniformed agencies**, notably $1 billion or more at the NYPD alone. Protests, subway personnel surges, parades, United Nations annual meetings and many other events now covered with overtime are not unanticipated and could be built into officers' schedules. Unanticipated overtime often arises when an officer makes an arrest near the end of a shift and must spend unscheduled time processing the arrest at the station and in court. In this situation, overtime can be avoided with flexible weekly schedules that offset hours worked on one long day with fewer hours on other days to avoid exceeding 40 hours per week. Since [half of all City expenditures are for personnel](https://cbcny.org/research/5-year-pocket-summary?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Year%20Pocket%20Summary-,Fiscal%20Year%202024%2C%2076th%20Edition,%2C%2076th%20Edition%20%28430.54%20KB%29), and since 90% of those personnel are unionized, this and many other reforms will require collective bargaining. The police officers' contract has already expired, and the largest civilian union contract expires within Mamdani's first year in office. There is an opportunity to achieve significant savings early in the new administration. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/26030793?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Zj%5F-rj0kK15Y1FIaJ5OG9%5FcDQUT9jJuESsl2minZ%5FnY/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) There are also many savings to be achieved in areas that would not directly affect public employees but have their own strong constituencies. For example, ending business tax incentives like the ineffective Industrial and Commercial Abatement Program (approximately $600 million annually) and limiting property tax exemptions for universities and medical centers to exclude property such as housing that is not directly used for service delivery (approximately $150 million annually). These reforms have been resisted in the past, but perhaps, just as it took a strongly anti-communist President Nixon to recognize Communist China, the City needs a strongly pro-union and Democratic Socialist mayor to gain cooperation from the public employee union leadership as well as the City Council to make the government upon which all New Yorkers depend perform better and at less cost. ### No City for Old Monuments? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/no-city-for-old-monuments/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:40.000Z Zohran Mamdani has revealed little about where culture fits into his agenda. Monuments offer one test of the Democratic Socialist's willingness to listen to moderate voices, a trait for which he was praised on the campaign trail. Although it looms smaller in the public mind than the cost of living and public safety, art in the public realm matters in New York City. It gives our common spaces beauty and character and gives us as people a story to tell about ourselves. As such, murals and public sculpture have been priorities for mayors since Greater New York's establishment in 1898\. Mayor Robert Van Wyck oversaw their realization for new courthouses, libraries and museums. Seth Low and George B. McClellan Jr. commissioned them as symbols of honest, efficient municipal government. Fiorello La Guardia, Robert Wagner, Robert Lindsay, Ed Koch, David Dinkins and Michael Bloomberg all recognized art's role as a vehicle for community affirmation and economic development. Things went sour under Mamdani's progressive predecessor Bill de Blasio, whom Mamdani has called his favorite living mayor. In 2020, a Mayoral Advisory Commission on City Art, Monuments, and Markers put portrait statuary on trial for allegedly representing racial injustices. Statues of obstetrician and cancer surgeon J. Marion Sims (installed in 1894) and President Theodore Roosevelt (1940) were sacrificial lambs. The Sims was carted off from Central Park to Green-Wood Cemetery. The American Museum of Natural History, the Department of Parks and Recreation and the Public Design Commission oversaw the dismantling of the Roosevelt monument in 2022, at a cost of some $2 million. Both monuments are presently in storage. The gargantuan Christopher Columbus at Columbus Circle was also in the crosshairs, escaping removal partly because of opposition from Italian Americans de Blasio and Gov. Andrew Cuomo. Iconoclastic crusades under de Blasio focused narrowly on the perceived transgressions of the subjects and on how the sight of a public monument made people feel, even though they often came to the experience with little familiarity with the intricate backstories. A broader range of historical perspectives, supplied to the Mayoral Commission from the get-go, could have provided a more nuanced and educational platform for both internal discussions and ensuing hearings. Mamdani jumped on the negative bandwagon. [A 2020 photograph](https://nypost.com/2025/07/07/us-news/mamdani-stokes-italian-american-outrage-after-christopher-columbus-tweet-resurfaces/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of him flipping the bird at Angelo Racioppi's 1941 Columbus monument in Astoria hints at what could be in store — a return to the sanctimonious attempts to scour the city for statues that offend one constituency or another and take down those deemed out of step with current liberal mores. (Cuomo called out Mamdani for this gesture in both mayoral debates.) Mamdani might be tempted to take a "tear it down" route to controversial statues as mayor. This tack would surely rile up a president eager to do battle over progressive cultural causes. Would a renewed battle over statuary be worth it? Nobody is suggesting Mamdani should suddenly become the city's biggest Columbus fan, or not offer his opinions about the merits of his effigy. But disapproval need not lead naturally to erasure. A better approach would be to support the twinned ideals of education and preservation with the same fervor that some earlier mayors did. He should start by coming to appreciate how monuments are distinctive urban artifacts with a colorful life patina. Quite apart from the subjects portrayed, and the ways in which formal and spatial aspects augment those meanings, the stories of patronage and process surrounding their realization tell us volumes about the times in which they emerged. In this regard, the art objects are historical exemplars of how officials navigate obstacles daily to make government work. They embody principles like those at the heart of Mamdani's platform. Monuments represent successful outcomes of negotiations among patrons, residents and municipal bureaucracies. The statues have significance on that basis alone. Each and every monument represents purpose, planning and effort. Bygone New Yorkers invested emotion, time and money to honor a cause significant to them. Those motivations should be investigated dispassionately within the biographical, social and political contexts in which they unfolded. Regardless of whether a memorial meets today's standards of social acceptability, if it was officially accepted, it's part of the City's collection and heritage. The notion of removal should not be entertained lightly. In extreme cases, such as if a Confederate general is being exalted in the town square of a Southern city, a thumb in the eye of its current Black population, it might make sense to have a dialogue about relocating a statue. The vast majority of cases are not that clear-cut, however. What statues — even those that might rub some of today's New Yorkers the wrong way — can teach us overrides any harm they can do to us. With these facts in mind, the mayor should in good conscience promote actively the work of research and preservation that agencies like the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (specifically, its Department of Arts and Antiquities), the Public Design Commission and the Department of Cultural Affairs (Percent for Art Program) have done under the radar for years now, often in collaboration with private entities. These agencies have evolved strategies for outreach, edification, deflection and physical protection. They shepherd in new projects while keeping old ones intact. The 1892 Columbus at Columbus Circle is a case in point. A hub of ethnic and planning politics since inception, its meanings extend far beyond the symbolic reputation of its subject and the objectives of its sponsors. The Bloomberg administration understood that any assessment of the statue's vice or virtue had to address its multifaceted significance. In 2012, partnering with the nonprofit Public Art Fund, it mounted the economic development spectacle "Discovering Columbus," an elaborate installation with Columbus at its center. [The exhibition](https://www.publicartfund.org/exhibitions/view/discovering-columbus/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) explored both the checkered Columbus legacy and the New York City story of this monument. It also had a preservation component: conservation of the entire granite, bronze and marble art structure, underwritten by the Fund and implemented by the Parks Department. Long before the 2020 reckoning and removal movements, the Bloomberg people took a productive, mildly avant-garde course of action, then went back to business. The New York City way with public art is typically laissez-faire — except when it comes to upkeep, if Art and Antiquities and the Public Design Commission have anything to do with it. "Discovering Columbus" was atypical in its scale, if not in its ambition to protect and enlighten. More routinely, Arts and Antiquities cares for over 800 monuments and plaques, with the Public Design Commission as backup. Some of that burden is taken up by summer conservation apprentices, overseen by Parks staff. These same administrators help fundraise to pay for this work. They also fend off persistent hordes who seek to bestow statues upon parks of their choice. Central Park's typically preferred, with an assumption that the City will take on upkeep. Department gatekeepers also dispatch antigraffiti squads at the first sighting of red paint splashed a monument's way. On the side, Arts and Antiquities organizes temporary exhibitions in parks citywide and displays in its Arsenal Gallery. In summer 2025, Parks' in-house team conserved Henry Shrady's commanding [1906 equestrian George Washington at Valley Forge](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Continental%5FArmy%5FPlaza%5FBklyn%5Ftd%5F%282019-08-15%29%5F20%5F-%5FWashington%5Fat%5FValley%5FForge.jpg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the Brooklyn entrance to the Williamsburg Bridge. The agency's ongoing battle to preserve the monument in the face of repeated assaults from vandals and skateboarders is a heartening example of City government's refusal to surrender to entropy. New York City's public art cannot just fix itself. The Washington, along with Tony Smith's rotating Alamo in Astor Place and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Memorial in Riverside Park (its $60 million of repairs now finally underway), are merely three cases that show the deterioration that invariably sets in. Maintenance endowments and active support from City officials are crucial to deter it. Spawned by ignorance and neglect, the decay of City art is a palpable, demoralizing sign of municipal failure. Ask Bronx residents who witnessed [the decline of the LoreleiFountain (Heinrich Heine Memorial)](https://www.flickr.com/photos/masnyc/53359023232/in/album-72177720312579979?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the Bronx's Joyce Kilmer Park and celebrated its 1999 restoration by Parks and the "Adopt-A-Monument" program of the Municipal Art Society. Today, newlyweds pose for photos with the fountain as a backdrop. The revitalization of this and other monuments instills joy and pride in place citywide. Mamdani should follow this inspiring lead, one consistent with his vision of an administration that will deliver on its promise to provide basic services to all. He should actively back municipal agencies that have worked extensively to preserve, through public sculpture, the city's past and present-day vitality. Rather than giving the finger to monuments, he can learn from the complex urban lessons that they have to impart. He can affirm a commitment to an established bureaucratic process for creating and reviewing civic art — not lean into the idea that this ought to be a politician's job. By celebrating the City's vast collection of artworks, the mayor can quietly but pointedly undercut the misguided premises for the Trump administration's [National Garden of American Heroes concept](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National%5FGarden%5Fof%5FAmerican%5FHeroes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In affirming that the biographical, local, state and national dimensions of New York City monuments' histories are part and parcel of their significance, Mamdani can beat the president at his own game. He need only declare that the Big Apple's government has cultivated hero monuments for the American people over a prolonged period of time. He can boast, in fact, that the city of Trump's birthplace did it first, did it right and did it better, aesthetically and procedurally. It's a worthy cause for this mayor to consider. ### A New Era in New York City Political History? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-new-era-in-new-york-city-political-history/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:40.000Z > *Too often life in New York is merely a squalid succession of days; whereas in fact it can be a great, living, thrilling adventure. The reason, I think, is plain. The government of the City of New York, with unparalleled opportunities, simply has not seen its opportunities; and when it has seen them, has not been able to make use of them. We need imagination at City Hall—imagination for the other fellow….First and foremost, I want justice on the broadest scale. By this I do not mean the justice that is handed out in police courts. I mean the justice that gives to everyone some chance for the beauty and the better things of life.* During his culminating campaign rally at Forest Hills Stadium on October 26, now-mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani laid out his broad objectives as mayor. New Yorkers, he claimed, had been "encouraged…to imagine less." He promised a city of expanded imagination and expanded possibilities: "We deserve a city government as ambitious as the working New Yorkers who make it the greatest city in the world," he declared. Intentionally or not, Mamdani's evocation of social imagination and ambition echoed a mission statement once delivered by his favorite New York City mayor, the progressive Republican Fiorello La Guardia, who served three terms between 1934 and 1945\. Three weeks into his first administration, La Guardia wrote in the pages of the weekly magazine Liberty: This was as good an expression as any of the social vision that underpinned La Guardia's mayoralty. That vision shaped the city in the era of the New Deal and World War II and guided its politics in the postwar decades. It strained to encompass the broader claims to justice raised by the Black and Brown freedom movements in the 1960s and then collapsed entirely amid the economic turmoil of the 1970s, to be replaced by something very different in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Mamdani is now seeking to channel the spirit of La Guardia's New York in order to reinvigorate Gotham in the 21st century. Where exactly does he stand in the city's political history, and what does that history tell us about the obstacles he might encounter as he attempts to reshape New York politics? Fiorello La Guardia was a complex political figure, and there were aspects of his mayoralty that Mamdani's core supporters would not find cause to celebrate. He was a good-government reformer aligned with some of the city's leading financial interests, a moral traditionalist who sometimes impinged on civil liberties, a supporter of aggressive policing, a constructor of massive public works, many overseen by Robert Moses, and, during the Second World War, a rabid anti-Japanese racist. He, like practically all liberals of his era, had little grasp of the structural underpinnings of racial inequality and little appreciation for the hardships Black New Yorkers faced in the Jim Crow North. > New parks and playgrounds; theater and opera accessible to all; decent, affordable housing; monumental new swimming pools — these were not only goods and services, but gestures to working-class New Yorkers that the city cared about the quality of urban life in the broadest sense. But what made La Guardia so appealing to the working-class New Yorkers who resoundingly reelected him was his vision for how the government could be deployed where private markets had failed to make city life more tolerable and even more enjoyable — for what the city government, the agency of New Yorkers' collective aspirations, could do to make life in the city more than a squalid succession of days. With the help of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, La Guardia and his appointees put into practice a playbook drawn up by urban progressives and socialists over the previous few decades. New parks and playgrounds; theater and opera accessible to all; decent, affordable housing; monumental new swimming pools — these were not only goods and services, but gestures to working-class New Yorkers that the city cared about the quality of urban life in the broadest sense. In the 1960s and 1970s, this political vision ran aground on the twin shoals of inequality and insolvency. Public institutions could not work well in a city so deeply divided by race and class. And the coming of the fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s made it clear that the city could not count on the local growth that had sustained New Deal-era ambitions through the postwar era. What arose from the fiscal crisis was a sense among the city's political class that the municipal aspirations of the mid-20th century — augmented by the movements for freedom, equality and empowerment of the 1960s — had led to a political culture in which no one was willing to say no. Out of this passage came a new approach to city politics. The city thereafter "returned" to a focus on fundamentals — on responsible budgeting and core services, policing above all. Broadly, it turned away from the egalitarian visions of the mid-century — profoundly compromised though they were by inequalities of race, class and gender — and toward an emphasis on "making things work," which in practice meant attracting and retaining businesses and a middle-class/affluent tax-paying "public." This entailed, all sides agreed, a narrowing of horizons, evident in the shifting meaning of what became perhaps the most resonant phrase of the new era. > What arose from the fiscal crisis was a sense among the city's political class that the municipal aspirations of the mid-20th century — augmented by the movements for freedom, equality and empowerment of the 1960s — had led to a political culture in which no one was willing to say no. "Quality of life," a term that might otherwise have expressed something of the "great, living, thrilling adventure" of which La Guardia wrote, came to mean something quite different: not the presence of things that made urban life thrilling, but the absence of things that made it grinding and perhaps dangerous. This approach did not go unchallenged, and it is worth examining the successes and failures of those challenges, for they suggest some possibilities and dangers for the incoming Mamdani administration. In 1989, an appealing, nattily-suited man from an underrepresented background rose up to challenge a universally-known establishment pol in the Democratic primary, confronting accusations of antisemitism while promising to give voice to forgotten New Yorkers: This was David Dinkins, who became the city's first Black mayor after beating Ed Koch in the 1989 Democratic primary and Rudy Giuliani in the general election amid voter turnout not seen in decades. Almost a quarter-century later, a former Dinkins staffer, Bill de Blasio, emerged from a crowded Democratic field pledging to address inequality head-on — promising to end New York's "tale of two cities," a phrase he had gotten from Dinkins, who had gotten it from Gov. Mario Cuomo. Dinkins and de Blasio served at very different times, and their mayoralties defy tidy summary. Still, they illuminate some dilemmas the incoming administration will face. Both Dinkins and de Blasio faced challenges from independent power centers in the city: Both, for instance, had famously difficult relationships with the NYPD and the city press. But their insurgent candidacies also left lingering fissures within their parties. Dinkins' campaign, in particular, represented a challenge by the city's rising Black and Latino communities to the white-ethnic communities that had long been the Democratic party's center of gravity — and therefore to established leaders like Koch, Gov. Mario Cuomo and Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Dinkins never managed to repair those ruptures, nor to build a coalition powerful enough to surmount them. When he ran for reelection in 1993, Cuomo and Moynihan offered tepid support, Koch actively opposed him and a key slice of white-ethnic voters went over to Giuliani. De Blasio, of course, faced similar obstacles in winning Democratic support for his agenda, particularly in the form of opposition from Governor Andrew Cuomo. > Dinkins and de Blasio ultimately stand as cautionary examples to Mamdani and his supporters, not because they did not succeed as mayors — indeed, both performed better than is often remembered — but because they did not succeed on their own terms. Both Dinkins and de Blasio also struggled to make permanent changes in how the city government worked. For changes in governance, if they are to be durable, require not just enacting and implementing policies, but remaking entire administrative systems. Dinkins' "community policing" plan — an approach that envisioned police officers as neighborhood problem-solvers and ombudsmen — is an illustrative case in point as Mamdani considers a different reform, creating a Department of Community Safety to help address mental health problems without the presence of police. Dinkins and his police commissioners developed sophisticated policing strategy, but they never succeeded at changing the NYPD's organizational structure and culture. Dinkins' successor, Giuliani, and his Police Commissioner Bill Bratton, were much more successful at reorganizing the NYPD and shifting its culture, and their broken windows approach took hold. Dinkins and de Blasio ultimately stand as cautionary examples to Mamdani and his supporters, not because they did not succeed as mayors — indeed, both performed better than is often remembered — but because they did not succeed on their own terms: neither managed to turn the popular surges that had elevated them to office into durable, powerful movements. And that is what it ultimately takes to produce the kind of transformation to which Mamdani aspires. Much will be out of Mamdani's control. La Guardia succeeded in large measure because the New Deal enabled his vision for an ambitious, imaginative government, and because the ascendant labor movement provided the organizational heft to power a new kind of politics. Mamdani's mayoralty, at least in its early days, will be defined largely by the federal government's hostility toward the city. But much is within his control, too. Mamdani's ebullience, boundless energy and seeming ability to embody the city recall La Guardia and Koch, the men who set the template for what New Yorkers expect of their mayor. His election night remarks about governing in "prose that rhymes" suggest an appreciation of the workaday tasks in front of him, even if he has no firsthand administrative experience. He has created a genuinely new political force in the city, and while mayors always have their work cut out for them in Albany, the situation seems more favorable for Mamdani than it was for de Blasio in 2014. Even if he plays his cards well, Mamdani will not be La Guardia; the times are not so conducive. But unlike Dinkins and de Blasio, who were essentially reactive figures, responding to the developments of the Koch and Bloomberg years, Mamdani has a chance to point a way forward. That would be an achievement in its own right. ### Reality Check: How Safe are Manhattan (and Brooklyn)? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/reality-check-how-safe-are-manhattan-and-brooklyn/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:41.000Z Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg and Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez are both up for reelection next week. Bragg is running against Republican Maud Maron and Independent Diana Florence. Gonzalez is running unopposed. Both men, but Bragg especially, have faced criticism from critics throughout the city and even around the country for allegedly prioritizing progressive principles over urgent crime-fighting imperatives. But is that really the case? What are the Bragg and Gonzalez records in the streets and in the courts these past four years? Data help tell the story. And as with all data, they can also mask dynamics. For example, district attorneys do not have to charge every case that the police bring to them. Their job is to assess both the strength of the evidence and the likelihood of success at trial, and this assessment can vary across boroughs depending on the evidence the police present, the nature of the jury pool and the kinds of policies that any one district attorney may have put in place to govern the use of discretion across the office. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25925561?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## The city and the boroughs in national perspective Let's look at the big picture first. New York City continues to be one of the safest cities in the United States as measured by index crimes, a term that describes the seven most serious violent and property crimes: murder, robbery, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and grand larceny auto. Index crimes are the measure used by the FBI to compare crime across cities. Using this same measurement, if Manhattan — the city's third most populous borough, and its commercial and tourism center — were a city, it would be the 14th safest city in the nation. If Brooklyn — New York City's most populous borough — were a city, it would be the third-safest large city in the United States. Looking at violent crimes alone, Manhattan and Brooklyn are in the middle of the pack of the nation's 20 biggest cities. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25922287?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Measured by murder rate, Manhattan and Brooklyn are among the safest places in the United States. Manhattan's homicide rate is just 2.6 murders per 100,000, 38% lower than a year ago, and near the historic low of 2.0 in 2018\. Brooklyn suffered 3.6 murders per 100,000, 23% lower than a year ago, and the lowest rate in decades. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25922292?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) It's not only homicide that's down. The number of shootings has also gone down since 2021\. Both Manhattan and Brooklyn have reached new historic lows for shootings, as has the city as a whole. ## Borough trends since 2021 Those are wide-angle snapshots. What about trends since Bragg first won election and Gonzalez was reelected in 2021? There are many similarities among the boroughs, but some important differences between them as well. [Assaults are at a historically high level in New York City](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-state-of-crime-in-new-york-city-at-midyear-2025), registering totals not seen in two decades. Much of their increase happened right after the city hit prepandemic lows in 2019 — but the growth since 2021 has been significant as well. Manhattan's increase over that time period has been 16.4%, which is the smallest increase among the five boroughs. Brooklyn's increase over that period was 26.3%, the second-smallest. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25922090?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) While assaults are cause for serious worry, assaults involving firearms are on the decline. Since 2021, shootings in the city have dropped by 55%, with Manhattan well outpacing that reduction, showing a 68% drop. Brooklyn's shooting rate dropped by 51% since 2021. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/story/3412846?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Justice system performance beyond crime rates ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/aqt-yrprevya35nx_image3-png-auto-format-compress-1776259672026.jpg) As any viewer of "Law & Order" knows, district attorneys work with the police to control crime. The area over which they have direct influence is in prosecuting offenders. They make important judgment calls about which cases to pursue and how. Bragg was attacked for a ["Day One" memo](https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Day-One-Letter-Policies-1.03.2022.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (later [revised after a backlash](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/nyregion/manhattan-da-alvin-bragg-memo-prosecution.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) in which he called for greatly limiting pre-trial incarceration; suggested a shift in focus from the length of a sentence to restorative justice programs and other types of accountability; said his office would "not prosecute certain low-level misdemeanors that will not impact public safety," including trespass, fare evasion and resisting arrest for non-criminal offenses; and instructed prosecutors not to prosecute as felonies certain types of robberies. What is the record of Bragg's office, and Gonzalez's? **Arrest and declination** A case begins with an arrest. To arrest a person, a police officer must have probable cause that a crime has been committed. After arrest, the district attorney reviews the evidence to determine whether there is enough to charge — either in a complaint drawn up by the district attorney working with the arresting officer and reviewed by a judge, or, in a felony case, an indictment returned by a grand jury after the district attorney has presented evidence. A district attorney can "decline" a case because there isn't sufficient evidence to show probable cause that the person committed the crime (sometimes between arrest and presentation, for example, a witness may decide not to testify) or because of an assessment that the likelihood is low that a jury will convict on the higher standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. Declination rates are also affected by an office's policies to try to make discretion uniform, as in the effort by Bragg in the Day One memo. Manhattan has the city's second highest declination rate for both felonies and misdemeanors, after the Bronx, while Brooklyn has the second-lowest declination rate for felonies and third lowest for misdemeanors. Manhattan has the second-highest percentage of cases declined for both felonies and misdemeanors. The percentage of misdemeanor declinations in Manhattan has skyrocketed since 2021, from 5% to 31%, a trajectory shaped by the policies set out in the Day One memo and well above the citywide average of 21%. Brooklyn has a low felony declination rate of 6% and is in the middle of the pack for misdemeanor declinations at 13%. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25923282?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Arraignment** If a district attorney decides to bring a case, either by filing a complaint or presenting the case to a grand jury, the person charged appears before a judge. This is called arraignment: The judge formally informs the defendant of the charge and sets terms of release or detention, and the defendant pleads guilty or not guilty. Brooklyn and New York County account for approximately 56% of arraigned cases citywide. Declination rates and arraignment rates are related: as a district attorney declines more cases, fewer cases make it to the arraignment stage. This dynamic is reflected in the modest reduction of Manhattan's share of arraignments citywide since 2021, from 26% to 23%. Brooklyn's share modestly increased from 30% to 32%. The data also show that Brooklyn's share of the city's criminal justice workload has increased and Manhattan's has decreased. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25923175?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Bail, remand and re-arrest** When a defendant appears before a judge at first arraignment, part of the proceeding entails the judge setting conditions of release or detention. These included being released on recognizance (RoR) — that is, the person is released with no special conditions; supervised release, which means the person is released with some conditions related to participation in the citywide supervised release program; bail, in which the person is released upon paying a sum set by the court; or remand which means the person is detained. RoR is the most common form of release in the city, with 67% of arraigned defendants. Manhattan RoRs 59% of defendants and Brooklyn RoRs 69%. Both Manhattan and Brooklyn use supervised release at approximately the rate of the citywide average. Remand is extremely rarely used — in about 1% of the cases, while judges set bail on defendants about 18% of the time in Manhattan and 11% of the time in Brooklyn, compared to a citywide average of 15%. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25923581?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) In 2019, the state Legislature passed a series of laws that forbade the use of bail in almost all misdemeanor cases and further restricted its use in some other cases. Since then, there have been vigorous disputes as to whether the bail reforms affected crime rates. Comparing rearrest rates over time gives some indication of whether release conditions are affecting crime. In both Manhattan and Brooklyn, as well as in the city as a whole, the percentage of people rearrested for a misdemeanor after being released on another charge has remained steady. Between 2021 and 2024, the percentage of people rearrested for a felony has declined citywide (from 22.5% to 18.2%), in Manhattan (from 22.1% to 20.5%) and in Brooklyn (from 25.3% to 22.1%). [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25923653?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Dismissal rates** As part of the same set of reforms passed in 2019 related to bail, additional reforms were passed related to "discovery." Discovery refers to the obligation of prosecutors to provide a defendant with evidence material to their defense. The new law required that prosecutors produce these materials within a particular time frame: 90 days for a misdemeanor and 180 days for a felony (except murders). Failure to meet these deadlines would result in the dismissal of the case. Dismissal can happen for many reasons and at any time during the life of a case from arraignment on. Before the passage of the discovery laws, Manhattan dismissed 41% of cases and Brooklyn 54%. Following the passage of the new discovery rules, dismissals in all boroughs rose sharply as prosecutors struggled to meet the time deadlines. 75% of cases in Brooklyn result in dismissal, as do 68% of cases in Manhattan. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25923535?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Conviction rates** Conviction rates for felony and misdemeanor arrests have improved slightly in Brooklyn but have deteriorated in Manhattan. For Brooklyn, the conviction rate for felony arrests went up from 23% in 2021 to 31% in 2025\. In Manhattan, the conviction rate for felony arrests decreased from 47% to 40%. In New York City, only Staten Island has a conviction rate above 50%, while the conviction rate for felonies is above 80% in the rest of the state. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25923474?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### Bringing the Fun Back to Fun City: Mamdani, Mailer and Breslin URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-mailer-and-breslin-bringing-fun-to-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:32.000Z When American politics feel venomous and nearly hopeless, Zohran Mamdani's campaign and million-dollar smile are refreshing. With offbeat ads, clever videos and unconventional events, he is tapping into a lost local tradition and showing that politics, despite the best efforts of most politicians, can actually be fun. The idea might seem simple and frivolous, but it communicates something bigger: in the nation's biggest media market, a place renowned for its outsized characters and frenetic pace, politics should, like the city itself, never, ever be boring. A recent social media video featured Mamdani musing that if voters think 33 is too young an age for a potential mayor, he was, fortunately, about to turn 34\. His citywide scavenger hunt drew thousands of participants to neighborhoods they might have otherwise never visited. And supporters of the Democratic nominee threw a Mamdani look-alike contest in Prospect Park. The tone and tenor of Mamdani's effort lie in stark contrast to the lumbering sobriety and narrow vision of former Governor Andrew Cuomo. It's easy to dismiss events that don't look like the traditional rally or press release as "political stunts" — but they have a tried and true history in our politics. 56 years ago, two other colorful New Yorkers brought a zest and mischievousness to the campaign trail far beyond even Mamdani's. In 1969, author Norman Mailer and journalist Jimmy Breslin ran on a joint ticket in the Democratic primary for New York City mayor and City Council president. The duo made their bid at the tail end of Mayor John Lindsay's first term, after Lindsay's hope of making New York "fun city" collapsed amid political squabbling and rising crime. Many New Yorkers considered late-1960s city life anything but fun. Mailer and Breslin looked to change that. At the centerpiece of their half-in-jest campaign was an effort to amplify the city's political power by transforming Gotham into the nation's 51st state, with each of the five boroughs' neighborhoods becoming their own quasi-autonomous municipality. The "51st State" candidates barnstormed New York with wicked humor and relentless pugnacity, running a six-week campaign for the ages. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/aqjlarprevya3zl2_690611081-auto-format-compress-1776260480360.jpg) Credit: Harry Harris / AP Photo. Norman Mailer campaigning. Mamdani has, perhaps unwittingly, channeled the Mailer-Breslin campaign in both style and substance. The mayoral frontrunner recently hosted a soccer tournament in Coney Island. Mailer and Breslin, meanwhile, proposed a neighborhood World Series of stickball held every weekend on Broad Street more than half-a-century ago. The duo pledged to build zoos in every neighborhood, provide free bicycles in public parks and hold faux jousting matches for youth gang members.The 51st State campaign also suggested a "central-city farmer's markets offering ethnic foods of all varieties," an annual U.S. Grand Prix in Central Park and an attempt to "return national baseball teams to Brooklyn and Manhattan." Mamdani, like the 51st State candidates before him, brings charm and a sense of humor to the trail. Mailer and Breslin, though, were far less diplomatic than Mamdani, and derided their opponents with piercing, often hilarious, witticisms. "The reason we got into politics is that we knew the one thing we could do better than the other politicians is to lie," Breslin sardonically told reporters. "At least that's what we thought. But we found out we were hopeless amateurs." When asked about Democratic rival Herman Badillo, Breslin likened his opponent's tenure as housing commissioner under Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr. to "being the lookout on the Titanic." The candidates sported pins that declared "the other guys are the joke." And, if elected, Mailer promised to "plead with Mario Procaccino," the paunchy, gaffe-prone comptroller and Democratic frontrunner, "to serve as city greeter." Not to worry. If victorious, Breslin insisted that he would "demand a recount." The comparisons go beyond form to substance. More than five decades before Mamdani proposed a department of community safety to free the New York Police Department from being forced to address social issues, Mailer and Breslin bemoaned the fact that police were "asked to go out and…patch up holes made in forty years of history." "The police get all the mistakes of all the people who are supposed to be more important and smarter than us," Breslin told cadets during a speech at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Derelict politicians had "created the problems" but "turn to…the policemen of the City of New York and say, 'you go out and handle them.'" Instead, Mailer and Breslin recommended a system of community-based policing determined on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis. While Mamdani has made free and fast bus service a key campaign plank, the proposals of Mailer and Breslin around transportation would make today's Democratic candidate blush: banning all cars from Manhattan, a monorail ringing that central borough, and a monthly holiday known as Sweet Sunday, which Mailer described as "a day of rest" when "cars will have to stop, the trains will stop, the planes will stop." Mamdani's idea for free and accessible childcare? Mailer and Breslin promised public day care and nurseries in 1969. At the heart of the Mailer-Breslin campaign was the candidates' adoration of New York and what Mayor David Dinkins later termed its "beautiful mosaic." Mailer praised the "extraordinary toughness, and intelligence, and wit, and savvy, and brutal cynicism," of New Yorkers, contrasting "the best people" with the "worst administration" in the country. Joe Flaherty, the Mailer-Breslin campaign manager, wrote that at the core of their campaign was "a group of men who loved their city and thought they had a set of ideas that might save that city." Mamdani, too, is clearly enamored of his city and its people, and the grist of his campaign illuminates that passion. Mailer and Breslin, not unexpectedly, fared poorly in 1969\. Mailer finished fourth behind Procaccino, who went on to lose to Lindsay in November. Breslin also lost badly, though he earned more votes than Mailer and beat future Rep. Charlie Rangel. Despite the loss, or perhaps because of it, their candidacy remains one of the most remarkably eccentric forays into local politics in New York City history. Mamdani has resurrected the boisterous spirit of the 51st State campaign, but unlike Mailer and Breslin, he is the favorite to win the general election next week. If victorious, his mayoralty may mark the return of something to our civic spirit that, amidst corruption, cynicism and apathy, has been absent for too long: fun. All that's missing is a pledge to make Curtis Sliwa the official city greeter. ### What Came After ‘Drop Dead’ URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-came-after-1975-new-york-fiscal-crisis/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:42.000Z In 1975, New York was a city on the brink of collapse. [The city lost nearly 600,000 jobs from 1969 to 1976](https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/quarterly%5Freview/1977v2/v2n2article8.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Working class, middle and higher-income New Yorkers were voting with their feet — leaving for the Sunbelt or to the suburbs. By 1980, 800,000 fewer people lived in New York City than in 1970\. Population decline contributed to widespread property abandonment, resulting in increased costs for city government and lost property tax revenue. Federal transportation and housing policy encouraged the move away from urban centers like New York. Construction of the federal interstate highway system made it easier for city residents to move to Long Island, New Jersey and Westchester and commute to jobs in the city. [At the same time, many federally funded highway projects destroyed urban neighborhoods.](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/14/8605917/highways-interstate-cities-history?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) For example, the Cross Bronx Expressway divided and devastated a series of Bronx neighborhoods. [Redlining furthered segregation and disinvestment, with impacts lasting to this day.](https://a816-dohbesp.nyc.gov/IndicatorPublic/data-stories/redlining/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=In%20New%20York%20City%2C%20many,after%20the%20maps%20were%20created.) Between 1961 and 1973, federal aid had grown from 4.5% to 21.6% of City revenue. But the end of Great Society programs meant that the City was less able to rely on Washington for funding. Rather than acknowledging these dramatic shifts, New York continued on its unsustainable course. City government continued to fund a robust social safety net. New Yorkers depended on mass transit more than any other U.S. city, and the transit system was funded as a public good, with low fares and high subsidies. Free college was provided through the city's public university system. Strikes by teachers, transit workers, sanitation workers and even the police led to increased job protection, wages and benefits. New York City was living beyond its means. ## The myth of "Drop Dead" By 1975, when the City could no longer access short-term financing, default loomed. There were draconian budget cuts. Increased transit fares. An end to free tuition. Fewer police officers. Overcrowded public school classrooms. The recent documentary film ["Drop Dead City"](https://www.dropdeadcitythemovie.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) appropriately credits New York business and labor leaders and Gov. Hugh Carey for their roles in forcing through these austerity measures and saving New York City. But the film's title refers to the role of the federal government. As the fiscal crisis fades in memory, many New Yorkers have come to believe that the City made it back to financial health without any help from indifferent federal policymakers. The truth is more complicated. After the state created the Municipal Assistance Corporation as the mechanism for refinancing City debt, New York City and State sought federal assistance to back this debt. Initially, there was bipartisan opposition. And in late October 1975, President Gerald Ford announced that he would veto any bailout legislation for New York City saying that ["\[T\]he people of this country will not be stampeded. They will not panic when a few desperate New York officials and bankers try to scare New York's mortgage payments out of them."](https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/28/nyregion/28veto.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The speech prompted the infamous New York Daily News headline — "Ford to City: Drop Dead." But President Ford never actually said "drop dead," and less than two months after the speech, Congress passed — and [President Ford signed — the New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975](https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf%5Fdocuments/library/document/0055/1669138.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), authorizing the treasury secretary to provide up to $2.3 billion in seasonal loans to the City. In other words, the feds threw us a lifeline at a critical moment. The help didn't end there. In 1978, with financing authority coming to an end, the City sought long-term federal loan guarantees. President Jimmy Carter — whose electoral vote margin in 1976 came from his win in New York State — won Congressional passage of long-term federal loan guarantees for New York City and [signed the bill at City Hall in August 1978](https://www.nytimes.com/1978/08/09/archives/new-jersey-pages-carter-signs-aid-bill-for-new-york-at-a-gala.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). With continued federal intervention, the City could access the bond market. More importantly, the federal government had signaled its support for New York's comeback. A half-century later, New York's fiscal and management practices are often held up as examples for other large U.S. local governments. Many of the budget reforms adopted in response to the fiscal crisis — clearer and more accurate financial reporting, multi-year financial planning, multi-year capital plans and detailed collection and reporting and analysis of operational data — are now widely acknowledged best practices. In other words, Washington gave invaluable assistance with clear conditions to help New York nurse itself back to fiscal health. The stability of the City's finances was essential for New York's economic comeback. Population losses of the 1970s have been fully reversed and, before the pandemic, more people were living in New York than ever before. Neighborhoods that most New Yorkers had given up on in the 1970s have become desirable places to live; indeed, many of these neighborhoods are now unaffordable for middle-class New Yorkers. ## The exception, not the rule Unfortunately, instead of becoming a model for federal intervention in support of fiscally distressed cities, the New York case has been the exception. Carter called the 1978 loan guarantees a ["step forward toward the fulfillment of America's national urban policy. It's part of a much larger effort to strengthen the fiscal and the economic base of our communities."](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-bill-signing-ceremony-for-hr-12426-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Fifty years after the federal government helped to save New York, there is little sign of a national urban policy. [President Donald Trump's budget calls for "revitalizing federalism" by eliminating funding for Community Development Block Grants and cutting funding for the Economic Development Administration](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Fiscal-Year-2026-Discretionary-Budget-Request.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Even the [2024 Democratic platform](https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/FINAL-MASTER-PLATFORM.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) fails to lay out an urban agenda or a place-based strategy for economically challenged cities. More recent federal efforts to work with economically and fiscally challenged cities pale in comparison to what was done in New York. In 2013, Detroit became the largest U.S. municipality to ever go bankrupt. There was no New York-like response by the federal government. Instead, Detroit's state-appointed emergency manager told reporters that, ["\[W\]e have to solve these problems ourselves. The concept that someone else is going to come in and solve problems of our making isn't exactly productive."](https://money.cnn.com/2013/07/19/news/economy/detroit-bankruptcy-bailout/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The Obama administration did work to help Detroit better utilize existing federal resources and technical assistance and deployed an interdepartmental Community Solutions Team and ["an integrated federal government to align resources, cultivate working relationships, and streamline communications."](https://kresge.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/building-and-restoring-civic-capacity.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) But there was no increase in aid or loan guarantees or short-term financing. The Obama administration also deployed a team to work with Chester, Pennsylvania — a Philadelphia suburb where 70% of residents are Black and 30% of residents are living in poverty — on a series of initiatives, [including](https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/research-action-lab/projects/strong-cities-strong-communities/sc2-designated-cities-rounds-i-2013-15-and-ii-2014-16/chester-pennsylvania?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) development of a downtown revitalization plan, opening a local grocery store and the demolition of an abandoned hotel. [But Chester had spent nearly two decades under state fiscal oversight and had made little progress.](https://www.chesterreceivership.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [In 2021, President Joe Biden visited Chester — a half-hour drive from his Delaware home — in one of his first stops after proposing the American Rescue Plan.](https://6abc.com/president-biden-visiting-chester-pennsylvania-national-tour-stimulus-package-american-rescue-plan-act-of-2021/10422009/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Less than two years later, Chester's state-appointed receiver filed for bankruptcy. While many local governments have unfunded pension obligations, Chester simply had no money left to pay pension benefits, and the cost of retiree health care exceeded the cost of active employee health care. There was no special federal effort to support Chester. But American Rescue Plan funding for Chester was critical to avoid deep cuts to city services. With an annual operating budget of approximately $60 million, Chester received more than $30 million in one-time federal support. While American Rescue Plan funds went to all local governments, for fiscally distressed places like Chester, it became a critical lifeline. With the expiration of American Rescue Plan funding and the potential for an economic downturn, many cities like Chester are at risk. Yet 50 years after New York's successful fiscal recovery, there is no clear federal policy to assist fiscally challenged places. ## Feds to cities: you're on your own Conditions like those faced in New York, Detroit and Chester are almost always the product of failure at the local level. No amount of federal intervention can substitute for a lack of local leadership. But the experiences in New York, Detroit and Chester also highlight that the federal government has an important role to play in promoting the fiscal health of American cities. All cities — but especially economically and fiscally challenged cities — need to tap into the technical and financial support that the federal government brought to bear in Detroit. Federal intervention in New York and Detroit succeeded because state and local officials were already moving forward with the development and execution of effective fiscal plans. In New York, it was only because of tough fiscal planning that the federal government agreed to play its instrumental role. One-shot federal funding helped Chester, but the benefits might have been limited without a state-appointed receiver. Where states have not come forward to support fiscal planning, the federal government should support technical assistance. Finally, the federal government must provide aid. In the case of New York, it came through short-term financing and loan guarantees. In Detroit, it was through freeing up existing resources. And in Chester, it was American Rescue Plan funding. Ultimately, the lesson of the federal intervention in New York is that fiscal and economic comebacks are possible and that the federal government can play an important role. While New York may have been "too big to fail," cities that are collectively home to millions of people shouldn't be written off as too small to save. ### New York’s Next Mayor Must Put Heads Together URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-next-mayor-must-put-heads-together/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:42.000Z With early voting underway and election day around the corner, New York City is at a crossroads, faced with a chasmic choice between leaders who differ by generation, ideology and vision for the future. Missing from the discourse, and the candidate platforms, are the time-tested ingredients of New York's success: a capacity for compromise and collaboration in the service of common purpose. As we head to the polls, let's listen for and learn from the rhymes of history. This year marks the 50th anniversary of one of the city's finest moments of civic cooperation: the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), the public-private partnership that rescued New York from bankruptcy. The fiscal crisis of that era was severe; years of deficits and disinvestment eroded the tax base, drove residents and businesses out of the city and left New York teetering on default. In 1975, when the federal government largely refused to help — 50 years ago this week, the Daily News would memorialize the president's "[Ford to City: Drop Dead](https://www.nydailynews.com/2015/10/29/ford-to-city-drop-dead-in-1975/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" snub — Gov. Hugh Carey looked to an unlikely coalition of bankers, union heads and local leaders to negotiate New York's survival. Ultimately, the banks restructured the city's short-term obligations into longer-term debt, the unions froze wages and invested their pensions in the new MAC bonds and city officials agreed to budget cuts and state oversight. By staving off collapse and restoring investor and public confidence — over 20 years, the MAC would generate $10 billion in bond proceeds for New York — these agreements stabilized the city and paved the way for decades of growth. The spirit of '75 was about more than horse trading or financial engineering; it was a feat of civic imagination, rooted in the conviction that seemingly disparate interests — public and private, city and state — must work together towards a better future. 50 years later, New York needs that spirit — one guided by give and take, pragmatism over pieties and shared resolve in the face of shared challenges — again. Of course, New York today is on incomparably stronger ground than it was half a century ago. It is more diverse and dynamic in every sense, from the composition of our population to a diversified economy powered by a broad set of industries — finance, technology, health care, life sciences, media, hospitality, the arts and a multi-billion nonprofit sector that employs one in five New Yorkers. That dynamism is a source of strength; it has also outpaced investments in the physical and social infrastructure needed to sustain it, driving the cost of living, especially the cost of housing, beyond the reach of many. When the shocks of recent decades — 9/11, the financial crash, Superstorm Sandy, the pandemic — tested the city's resilience, New York rebounded. Today's exigencies recall those of the 1970s because they are simmering, stubborn and structural: Housing and childcare that are too scarce and expensive, strained infrastructure, public safety and quality-of-life concerns and looming budget gaps made worse by a hostile administration in Washington, D.C. So what does the spirit of '75 look like in 2025? We know what it is not: claims of singular management prowess to fix the city, vertical videos suggesting that public and private interests are at odds. Unfortunately, that's what we've often heard from the leading mayoral candidates. There are[ promising signs](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/14/magazine/zohran-mamdani-mayor-new-york.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in frontrunner Zohran Mamdani's quiet listening and learning tour. The Democratic Socialist has recently evidenced evolving enthusiasms: for some private sector resources for housing, for Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch to remain in the job. In these and other ways, he has signaled that he may just be collaboration, if not compromise, curious. Fortunately, when it comes to pragmatic partnerships, public officials need not look far for inspiration. New York is awash in creative constellations of every shape and size. To name a few: **Congestion pricing.** After years of delay, New York became the first U.S. city to adopt congestion pricing — an ambitious effort to reduce traffic, improve air quality and fund mass transit. The policy emerged from lengthy negotiations between state and city leaders, the MTA, business groups, environmental advocates and community representatives. It was an important act of joint problem-solving, and a success: traffic volume and delays are down, transit ridership is up, and the program is on track to generate $500 million in its first year for system repairs and improvements. Notably, the benefits are shared across New York *and* between the city and tristate suburbs. With New York at the center of a regional economy, many future initiatives, from the Gateway tunnel (now [under imminent threat from the Trump administration](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/23/nyregion/gateway-hudson-river-tunnels-trump-ciattarelli-sherrill.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) and Port Authority Bus Terminal developments to the 2026 World Cup, will require similar alliances. **The Empire Technology Prize,** launched by[ The Clean Fight](https://thecleanfight.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a nonprofit climate tech accelerator, and supported by the state's energy and research development authority department and corporate sponsors, represents another kind of partnership: one that harnesses public and private investment to catalyze outsized innovation. This relatively modest $10 million prize targets one of New York's greatest climate challenges: the tall and aging buildings that account for 70% of New York City's greenhouse gas emissions, often from inefficient heat systems using fossil fuels. Like many prizes, this one has stimulated far more value than the dollars awarded, including seven demonstration projects deploying breakthrough clean heating solutions. In 1975, "public-private" meant business and government putting their heads together. Today, New York's nonprofit sector is at the vital center. It is the backbone of the city's social safety net, arts sector, and, as the Clean Fight demonstrates, commercial innovation and climate change issues. **The Brooklyn Marine Terminal** offers a promising model for equitable, large-scale, mixed-use economic development. This 100+ acre industrial site, neglected since the MAC days, is being reimagined through a complex, ambitious and multi-stakeholder planning process involving the state, city the city's Economic Development Corporation, the Port Authority, local elected officials, unions, private developers and community stakeholders, including local nonprofit advocates and businesses. [The $3.5 billion project](https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2025-10/NYCEDC-Brooklyn-Marine-Terminal-Vision-Plan-09-30-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) seeks to revitalize this stretch of Brooklyn waterfront into a 21st century all-electric port and in the process create good jobs, light industrial and commercial businesses, new public open space, shoreline access and thousands of units of housing, much of them affordable. The lessons are many, among them: Community-led planning, while cacophonous and contentious, is essential. And the creation of expansive, imaginative infrastructure requires private-sector participation. **Housing, housing, housing.** With a vacancy rate stuck near 1%, [housing is the defining challenge of our time](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-14) — and the linchpin of affordability. Rising to the challenge will require partnerships of every stripe: better city and state alignment on zoning, public land and tax incentives; cooperation between developers, nonprofits and unions to speed production; and creative financing to build colossally more while ensuring it remains accessible. As the passage of City of Yes reminds us, this is an all-hands-on-deck moment to protect tenants, preserve and improve existing stock, and dramatically expand supply. Whether these new initiatives allow NYCHA to repair current units and construct new ones, incorporate housing into many more mixed-use developments or support[ significant rezoning](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/06/nyregion/amazon-rezoning-queens.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in places like Long Island City, this is the moment for a bold and inclusive consortium. These examples are different in scope but unified in ethos: the public, private and nonprofit sectors ought not be adversaries but allies — partners in the collective project that is New York City. We recall the MAC of 1975 not for nostalgia, but for renewal: a social compact that commits us to each other and to our common future. ### A True Mandate for New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/move-local-elections-to-even-years/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:42.000Z The first early voting numbers are in, and it is clear: New Yorkers are turning out in historic numbers to cast their votes in the mayoral election. In the first three days of the 2025 general election voting period, [223,268](https://www.vote.nyc/page/early-voting-check-ins?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) checked in — almost five times as many as the [45,009](https://x.com/BOENYC/status/1452745416852787203?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who showed up in the first three days of the 2021 general election early voting period. But even if the high turnout rate persists, the most bullish predictions anticipate just 30-40% of registered voters will cast a vote this fall. That means fewer than one in four New Yorkers will have inked in the oval next to the next mayor's name. As the victor inevitably claims a mandate to follow through on his agenda, those who disagree will be able to ask: Does he really have one? It need not be this way. Municipal election turnout in New York City has remained stubbornly [low](https://citizensunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Down-Ballot-Races-and-Even-Year-Local-Elections-Citizens-Union-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for decades, but this fall we will vote on a proposal that could double turnout rates in our city elections. Proposal 6 would move New York City elections to the same year as presidential elections once state law allows it — a change that would dramatically increase voter turnout in city elections. As a scholar of New York City elections, I've watched the turnout rates in our city remain stubbornly stagnant despite the valiant efforts of advocacy groups, like [Go Vote NYC](https://www.govotenyc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), on whose board I serve. Legislation enacting early voting and no-excuse absentee voting was [passed](https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/protecting-new-yorks-democracy-senate-passes-historic-election-reforms?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the hopes they would improve the numbers, but turnout hasn't budged. Ranked choice voting was meant to decrease the appeal of negative campaigning and increase voter turnout, but its effects are limited and it is only used in closed partisan city primary elections. The people who show up to vote are the ones elected officials pay the most attention to. In the 2025 primary election, people under the age of 35 voted in historic numbers, outperforming voters over the age of 65 by a [wide margin](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/29/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-voters-strategy.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But that was unusual; voters in off-year races tend to be [older and whiter](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/who-votes-city-election-timing-and-voter-composition/39CE6B9F0E906228F695248C874C0C36?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), making our local government less reflective of the city. Voters feel more connected to government officials whose names they have read on ballots, and those elected can govern with greater confidence when they have achieved "buy in" from a majority of residents. The more people who vote in city elections, the broader a mandate elected leaders can claim, and the more power they have to enact their agenda. Conversely, low turnout erodes trust. When only a sliver of voters participate, politicians are more likely to cater to that narrow group, instead of the whole city. That's not democracy — it's inside baseball. In the 2020 presidential election, [3 million New York City voters](https://vote.nyc/sites/default/files/pdf/election%5Fresults/2020/20201103General%20Election/00000100000Citywide%20President%20Vice%20President%20Citywide%20Recap.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showed up. One year later, just [1.1 million](https://vote.nyc/page/election-results-summary-2021?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) voters showed up at the polls. These years are not outliers — presidential contests routinely draw nearly *triple* the number of participants as our municipal elections. That's especially remarkable given that it's hardly ever in doubt which way New York State's electoral college votes will go, whereas mayoral elections can be genuinely competitive. Many cities across the country struggle with voter turnout for the same reason New York does. Elections held soon after another [depress turnout](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00104140231169020?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=An%20important%20exception%20in%20this,see%20Stockemer%2C%202017%2C%20p.) everywhere. But the comparison also provides hope. Other cities have solved this problem by moving local elections to even-numbered years. In other major cities that have made this change, turnout has [skyrocketed](https://yankelovichcenter.ucsd.edu/%5Ffiles/reports/Big-Cities-Tiny-Votes.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): Phoenix went from an average of 23% to as high as 77%, Baltimore turnout shot up from 13% to 60% and in Los Angeles, voter turnout doubled. The gains endure. Critics argue that the issues that matter in municipal races will get lost in the public conversation amidst the noise of presidential years. But the evidence says otherwise. Voters are motivated to pay more attention to down-ballot races when they share the stage with big contests, evidenced by the fact that Assembly races in even years in New York City draw [higher](https://citizensunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Down-Ballot-Races-and-Even-Year-Local-Elections-Citizens-Union-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) turnout than City Council races in odd years. Holding our city elections when New Yorkers are already engaged in election-related conversations encourages voters to learn more about candidates at the city level, rather than trying to bring them back into a conversation when the rest of the country has moved on. Others argue that adding municipal races to presidential ballots will make them too long and confusing for voters. Down ballot "roll off" is a challenge, but the turnout gains would more than offset inevitable roll off. Moreover, utilizing smart ballot design — like listing local offices first — would guard against voter fatigue and increase voter participation in local contests when they appear on presidential ballots. Opponents of Proposal 6 who contend that city races will get swept up in the national partisan politics which dominate presidential years, reflecting the partisan makeup of the electorate rather than those of voters who are truly engaged in local issues, should ask what they think democracy is really supposed to be about. The unavoidable implication of their argument is that our city should only want to hear from certain voters, those who are suitably informed, weighing in on the issues at stake in local elections. That logic once justified literacy tests and disenfranchisement. Nothing is ever easy or simple in New York City; passing Proposal 6 won't move our municipal elections immediately. It will require a state constitutional amendment — which hinges on two legislative approvals and a statewide referendum. But a strong "Yes" vote this year would send a message Albany won't be able to ignore: New Yorkers want to move our municipal elections to presidential years. Do we want more people to have a say in who becomes our mayor, or fewer? New Yorkers are known for their loud and feisty voices, motivated by national politics but shaped deeply by local issues. By moving municipal elections to presidential years, we will ensure that more of those voices are heard. ### Flip the Script, and the Ballot, for Housing URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/flip-the-script-and-the-ballot-for-housing/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:42.000Z At the final mayoral debate, the three leading candidates[ described different positions](https://gothamist.com/news/mamdani-attacked-for-refusing-to-take-position-on-housing-questions-in-nyc-mayor-debate?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the affordable housing ballot measures before voters this fall. Curtis Sliwa opposed them, Andrew Cuomo supported them and Zohran Mamdani said he's still considering them. Meanwhile, the City Council has drawn attention by actively campaigning against them. Ballot questions two through four have become a flashpoint among New York City politicians. How can voters make sense of these proposals? By looking past the political jockeying and focusing on what New Yorkers need most. The main characters in this story are not elected officials. They are the people of New York City whose housing is too expensive, who struggle to stay where they want to be or can't find housing near family and friends when they need to move because they're getting married or divorced or having a kid or lost a job or are struggling with personal circumstances. They are the people sleeping in shelters or on couches or are uncertain where they are going to sleep tonight. The vacancy rate for rental housing in New York City has [fallen to about 1.4%](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/007-24/new-york-city-s-vacancy-rate-reaches-historic-low-1-4-percent-demanding-urgent-action-new?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/0) — the lowest it's been in decades. Half of NYC renters pay more than 30% of their income toward rent, and [nearly 30% of renters pay at least half their income in rent](https://furmancenter.org/stateofthecity/view/state-of-renters-and-their-homes-2024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Meanwhile, on any given night, there are [over 100,000 people](https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/basic-facts-about-homelessness-new-york-city/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) sleeping in the city's shelter system, with thousands more living doubled-up or unsheltered. This conversation involves politics, but it's not for the sake of politics; it's for the sake of housing. We have dug ourselves an enormous hole by failing to allow the construction of enough housing for the people who need it, particularly those who can least afford it. These ballot proposals are part of the long-term effort needed to get us out of this hole. Well before these proposed changes were created, my organization — [Citizens Housing and Planning Council](https://chpcny.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a New York City-based nonprofit research and education organization focused on housing policy — researched how the current land-use process has been working. We found incentives embedded in it that [make it far easier to prevent housing than to allow it to be built](https://chpcny.org/publication/the-elephant-in-the-room/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We have had some elected officials make heroic efforts to help get affordable housing built. But as long as it takes a hero to do this, we'll never get all the housing we need. To make our way out of this affordability crisis, we need to make building housing an ordinary event, not an exceptional achievement. The original concept of ULURP — the City's land use review process, created in 1975 — was to begin with the airing of local priorities and perspectives, then to move to decisions from officials who represented borough-wide or citywide constituencies. This was intended to achieve a proper balancing of local and citywide perspectives — to value local views without empowering NIMBYism. In 1989, however, with the creation of the modern, 51-member City Council, the last vote in this process was assigned to the Council — a citywide governing body, but one with a natural tendency toward "member deference." This practice allows the local member effective authority over decisions in their district. It's worth noting that the only strictly neighborhood-specific laws the Council votes on are about land use. This change disrupted the logic of the process — and its outcomes. After 1989, the number of land-use applications approved for housing declined sharply. Residential rezonings today are approved at just 60% of the pace at which they were during the 1980s, when applications were typewritten, maps assembled by hand and applications took more than a week to transmit to Community Boards by mail. Member deference has effectively allowed a Council member to block new affordable housing in their district. "Don't bother spending your time and money on this; I'm not going to let it happen" has been the message to builders. And unsurprisingly, the map of where housing gets built — and doesn't — bears a strong resemblance to the map of where rezonings have been approved. This has made member deference a powerful tool for reinforcing segregation and exclusion. Even for the most pro-housing local electeds, ULURP actions in their district are a political hot potato, giving them an incentive to delay, dodge or defer the conflict that they stir up. Notably, the Council recently approved two affordable housing developments over the objections of local members, which is worth celebrating! But this doesn't disprove the logic of member deference; it's actually the exception that proves it. The only times in recent history that the Council has bucked member deference — in 2025, 2021 and 2009 — have all come in the waning months of the four-year electoral cycle, when the internal politics of the legislature are uniquely fluid. If we're going to make producing housing an ordinary rather than an extraordinary accomplishment, we need to be able to do this during the other 90% of the political calendar, too. So as much as election season draws our attention to politicians and who might be political winners or losers, let's keep our focus on New Yorkers' most pressing needs and the Charter reforms that can make us better, more affordable and more equitably housed. ### Two Mayoral Debates: Not Nearly Enough URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/two-mayoral-debates-are-not-nearly-enough/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:42.000Z I am ferociously proud of my colleagues who put together last week's 90-minute debate in the race for New York City mayor — the second and final general election faceoff in this campaign — and I am more convinced than ever that, going forward, we need to have many more debates, and to make them mandatory for all major candidates. Final numbers aren't in yet, but [YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/live/ot6zbhPLs4Y?si=8Dcx6WcPV8qWuoNd&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) alone has registered more than 883,000 viewers of the debate I co-hosted, a number that doesn't include the audience that connected via [WNYC radio](https://www.wnyc.org/story/listen-live-final-2025-mayoral-debate-wnyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [C-SPAN](https://www.c-span.org/program/campaign-2026/new-york-city-mayoral-debate/667477?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Spectrum News](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/politics/2025/10/22/full-debate--mamdani--cuomo-and-sliwa-face-off-in-final-mayoral-debate?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Spectrum Noticias](https://spectrumnoticias.com/us/noticias/politics/2025/10/22/full-debate--mamdani--cuomo-and-sliwa-face-off-in-final-mayoral-debate?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and other platforms. The first debate, hosted by WNBC and Univision, [drew 922,000 viewers on broadcast and nearly 1.5 million on streaming platforms](https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/politics/nyc-mayor-debate-wnbc-wnju-ratings/6408117/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Interest in the race reflects the magnitude of the choice voters will make on Nov. 4: New York's strong-mayor system concentrates an outsized amount of power in a single person, who will control a 37,000-member police force; a school system with nearly 1 million students and 75,000 teachers; and a $116 billion budget that is larger than the annual spend of all but four states. The first debate and the debate that my organization, Spectrum News, hosted along with a team that included WNYC/Gothamist and The City, were the only two question-and-answer sessions that candidates were [legally required](https://www.nyccfb.info/law/act/mandatory-debates/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to attend as a condition of receiving millions of dollars in public matching funds from the New York City Campaign Finance Board. We did our best to explore what I call the Big Five issues: housing, public safety, the economy, public schools and public transit. But 90 minutes left little or no time to dive into many crucial issues. Here are half a dozen questions that got left on the cutting room floor. - According to data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, nearly one out of every five children (18.6%) in New York City experiences food insecurity, which is especially true in the Bronx, where almost one-third of children are food insecure. But even though, on paper, New York gives every child free breakfast and lunch, New York allows principals the discretion to restrict breakfast to cafeteria-only, and to limit the time to first period or earlier. If elected, will you commit to making sure that all schoolchildren have a chance to eat free breakfast every day? - As of last year, there were 1,600 paraprofessional vacancies — affecting multiple areas across the public school system. Paraprofessionals perform a range of functions, among them helping students with special needs with instructional and behavioral support. The union representing these workers has called for a $10,000 pay boost to attract new hires. How would you address this shortage? - School bus delays in New York City reached a [seven-year high](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/nyc-public-school-bus-delays/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) this school year, affecting students with differing abilities the most. How would you fix this issue to make sure students don't miss class and their families don't end up paying for cabs to get them to school? - Property taxes alone constitute as much as 30% of the cost of a rent-stabilized apartment, with additional expense added by the highest property insurance premiums in America. Property taxes in particular fall under the control of local government — so exactly how will you attack that part of the affordability crisis? - Public health is an ever-present issue that deserves attention. Five years ago, COVID swept across the city, killing at least 46,000 New Yorkers and sickening hundreds of thousands of others. Except for criticism aimed at Andrew Cuomo for how he handled the pandemic during his time as governor, little or nothing was said during the campaign about COVID. What steps will you take to get New York City ready for its next major health crisis? - A decade after the launch of Vision Zero, New York has seen a drop in the number of fatalities and injuries, thanks in part to the widespread use of traffic-calming measures and infrastructure, such as protected bicycle lanes, speed cameras and pedestrian plazas. If elected, would you continue the city's commitment to Vision Zero — and if so, what measures do you think are especially promising when it comes to improving street safety? **More is more** We discussed most of these issues, and many others, at small, non-televised mayoral forums earlier this year, sponsored by civic, professional and academic institutions with subject-matter expertise in municipal matters. In April, I moderated a [panel on hunger and homelessness](https://sph.cuny.edu/event/2025-nyc-mayoral-candidates-forum-lets-talk-about-hunger-and-food-policy-in-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) co-sponsored by Hunger Free America and the CUNY School of Public Health and a [Vital City forum](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7nh3KBOrRrg&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on crime and quality of life. In May, the Furman Center and the New York Housing Conference hosted a [mayoral forum](https://nyunews.com/news/2025/05/05/democratic-mayoral-forum-nyu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with a focus on the city's housing crisis, and John Jay College held an in-depth discussion about [disorder in the streets](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBeC2LiVqe8&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In June, I co-moderated a candidate forum for the Jewish community at [B'nai Jeshrun](https://bj.org/event/mayoral-candidate-forum-for-the-jewish-community/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While my co-moderators and I got a fabulous multi-month crash-course on a wide range of topics, none of these forums had 100% attendance by candidates, and most had less than 50% even in the crowded pre-primary phase of the campaign. Ex-Gov. Andrew Cuomo made a point of never appearing on the same stage as his opponents, and Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani began telling forum sponsors that he wouldn't show up unless Cuomo did. That kind of gamesmanship cheated all of us — the public, the press and the candidates — out of a chance to focus attention and analysis on municipal problems that require more than slogans, quips and talking points. The law that makes debate attendance mandatory for recipients of matching funds should be updated to require more debates. The Campaign Finance Board has delivered matching funds on 13 different dates this election cycle; that should translate into at least five additional mandatory forums, awarded to media sponsors the same way the big debates are. Each could be dedicated to one of the Big Five subjects, so we could hold separate discussions about housing, public safety, schools, jobs and transit. So far this cycle, more than $48 million in public funds has been paid out to candidates for mayor, some of whom have barely shown their faces outside of controlled, limited appearances and paid advertisements. We can and should demand more for our money. ### How Zohran Mamdani Can Get Out of the ‘Gifted & Talented’ Trap URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-zohran-mamdani-can-get-out-of-the-gifted-and-talented-trap/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:42.000Z The debate over how New York City schools should implement gifted education — or whether it should exist at all — has resurfaced in the mayor's race. I have followed this debate for years, starting with the proposed Bloomberg-era reforms two decades ago, and the entire situation frustrates me to no end. We have known for a long time that there are better ways to do advanced education, most of them built on common sense. An important caveat is that [the current brouhaha](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/02/nyregion/mamdani-schools-gifted-and-talented-program.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was spurred by the mayoral candidates' brief responses to pre-election surveys and subsequent sound bites from campaign spokespeople. We have a general sense of what each candidate would do if elected, but details are few and far between. The big brushstrokes are that, frustrated that current programs disproportionately serve white and Asian-American students and are a source of *de facto* student segregation, Zohran Mamdani wants to do away with the gifted program's kindergarten entry point; what happens next in his vision is unclear. Andrew Cuomo and Curtis Sliwa, pushing back on this proposal as hostile to student excellence and contrary to the best interests of many New York families, say they would expand seats in the program. First, a quick primer on the system we have and how it came to be. For decades, the city used a test for four-year-olds to determine who would qualify for special gifted and talented classes. Although designed to level the playing field, in fact the test wound up reinforcing existing socioeconomic divides. Parents with money and others with a strong inclination to prepare their kids for the test got their kids to qualify and fill these accelerated classes; the vast majority of the city, predominantly black and Latino kids, wound up on the outside looking in. Mayor Bloomberg proposed changes to the entire system as early as 2005, but the most promising improvements [were rolled back](https://nymag.com/nymetro/news/politics/columns/citypolitic/11544/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in response to strong parent pushback. In part in reaction to ongoing criticisms and in part because COVID made the entry test difficult to administer, New York City scrapped the exam — and moved to a system built on pre-K teacher recommendations, followed by a lottery in cases where demand outstrips supply. Even with this change, profound inequities in access across the city remain. The current system isn't working optimally; to serve its purpose, either more kids need to be enrolled across a range of socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds, or it needs to be dialed back, so that general education classrooms do more to challenge kids at all levels. A major reason for the lack of improvement is that the current system is a hodge-podge of old thinking about academic excellence, back when one-size-fits-all, find-the-gifted-child programs predominated. Within these models, students were identified and labeled as gifted as early as possible, with an emphasis on finding students who were high achievers in most subjects, under the assumption that they were very rare. These students then attended special schools and programs segregated from "less gifted" peers. We now know better. Children may be highly talented in one area but not another, especially [twice-exceptional students](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00169862241302813?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that have significant talents while dealing with significant learning challenges. Student interests may also wax and wane regarding certain content and topics, appearing highly motivated to study math or history one year and completely uninterested the next. This is especially true for younger students. Some students may exhibit tremendous talents in preschool, while others are [late bloomers](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/001698628102500204?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) whose talents and interests develop years later. Researchers and educators have also developed a [range of interventions](https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/research/building-wider-more-diverse-pipeline-advanced-learners?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that don't require a "special schools" approach to advanced education. ## "Advanced learning" vs. "gifted and talented" If I could wave a magic wand to redesign the system, I'd start with this thought experiment: What if the term "gifted and talented" didn't exist in education, and we focused more on students capable of advanced learning? The key educational questions would become "How do we meet the academic needs of our advanced students?" and "How can we get more students to perform at advanced levels?" This isn't a semantic distinction. I often find myself in conversations where people rail about the evils of "gifted education." When they finish their speech, I ask if they have similar complaints about AP, high school honors courses, student artistic competitions and varsity sports. The response is almost always, "Um, no?" My follow-up question is, "Do you want to get rid of all advanced programs, or do you want your child to have greater opportunities to receive advanced services?" Or put differently, "Do you want your child to have no playing field, or a level one that has fewer barriers to entry?" The answer is always, "A level one." In other words, lots of people have problems with the g-word, but I rarely meet people who have a problem with advanced learning and academic excellence, especially if opportunities for advanced learning are widely available. This observation feels like the foundation of a new conversation, one focused less on ideology and more on meeting the needs of our children. A system focused on advanced education would include two practical sets of interventions: identifying students who "need more" and providing them with educational experiences that give them the opportunity for more. As described below, "more" is best defined by educators and parents in each school and community. For example, in one school the regular math curriculum may be rather advanced already, but instruction in advanced writing may be needed. Another school that has never offered such opportunities in any subject may need to offer more academic challenge and rigor across the board. But the focus should shift from "find the gifted child" to "figure out who needs more advanced opportunity." ## **Fresh thinking on interventions** Much ink has been spilled in recent weeks about what a research-informed talent development system would look like in New York City, and the suggestions are all worth considering. But I'll point to the change that strikes me as the foundation for everything else: Make advanced learning available *in every school*, because every school has students who need more or are capable of learning more if given the right opportunities. Having advanced services in all schools facilitates identification strategies such as [universal screening](https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1605043113?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (which helps identify overlooked low-income students) and [using local norms](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2332858419848446?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (looking at who needs more within each school and community, rather than citywide). Taking things a step further, the push to find students who need more [should occur every year](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=XG8IEQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=identification+gifted&ots=03MPDMG%5FLm&sig=IRKy-Zwjq2dFlmJiziDqkd8m13I&ref=vitalcitynyc.org#v=onepage&q=identification%20gifted&f=false) (and throughout each year!), not just at a handful of specific grade levels. And having advanced programs in every school would greatly facilitate a critically important change: Identifying students who need or want more [in specific subjects and not all subjects](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Lubinski/publication/249826186%5FRethinking%5FMultipotentiality%5FAmong%5Fthe%5FIntellectually%5FGifted%5FA%5FCritical%5FReview%5Fand%5FRecommendations/links/5cc1b5ad92851c8d220383db/Rethinking-Multipotentiality-Among-the-Intellectually-Gifted-A-Critical-Review-and-Recommendations.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These identification changes alone, though not sufficient, would radically change the city's approach to talent development. Once New York has improved its identification strategies and emphasized the need for advanced education in every school, several other, helpful interventions would flow quite naturally: A curriculum designed to help teachers work with students learning both below- and above-grade-level ([a "pre-differentiated" curriculum](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/0002831214549448?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)); a mix of [acceleration strategies](https://www.accelerationinstitute.org/Nation%5FEmpowered/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (allowing students to move at a faster pace) and enrichment activities (allowing students to dive deeper into select curriculum); afterschool, weekend and summer experiences that allow students to explore advanced topics with likeminded peers; partnerships with community colleges and universities to provide advanced experiences, perhaps as early as middle school. Perhaps most importantly, schools should implement an [automatic enrollment](https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/43bc8b47-7fd8-40d4-a75c-520f7ae53a4f/content?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), in which high-performing students are automatically placed in advanced coursework the following year. This policy is being successfully implemented across the country, at the school, district and state levels, and is another necessary condition for a modern advanced learning system. And here's the best part: This approach need not cost more money than the current system! We are talking about the same number of students and the same number of teachers. The change comes not from adding new services; it comes from replacing services and being creative in how they are administered. Initial investments may be required, but over the medium- and long-term, costs should remain the same. My response to well-intentioned people on both sides of the current debate is "yes." Yes, the current program has created huge inequities that especially disadvantage bright Black, Latino and lower-income students. Yes, advanced education is critically important for the economic and cultural well-being of our students and communities. Yes, advanced education in the city's public schools is artificially scarce by design and doesn't reach nearly all of the students who would benefit from it. And yes, we can replace the city's antiquated approach to academic excellence with pragmatic, research-based reforms that have the potential to transform the city. But will we have the leadership bold enough to make this happen? ### Done Right, Universal Child Care Would Be a Seismic Shift for New York’s Children URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/universal-child-care-could-be-a-seismic-shift-for-new-yorks-children/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:43.000Z Zohran Mamdani aims to make New York the first major American city to implement universal child care. Perhaps more than any leading U.S. candidate for city or statewide office this year, the mayoral frontrunner has made the cause a centerpiece of his campaign, proposing free care for all children aged six weeks to five years old. "The best way to keep families in New York City is to make it cheaper to raise one here," he states in a campaign video. The case for universal child care as an affordability measure is real. Free child care would put money back in parents' pockets and expand the city's workforce. The plan carries an estimated cost of $6 billion, a figure that underscores both its scale and ambition. But treating child care primarily as a pocketbook policy misses what matters most. When done well, it is an education reform with benefits that echo through high school and into adult life. The science is straightforward. From birth to three, the brain wires itself at a [breathtaking pace](https://www.zerotothree.org/why-0-3/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Experiences during those years set the architecture for language, reasoning and self-regulation. High-quality early education takes that natural surge and organizes it. [Research](https://www.naeyc.org/sites/default/files/globally-shared/downloads/PDFs/resources/position-statements/advancingequitypositionstatement.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) tells us that the best programs do not drill toddlers on letters or numbers. They are built on warm, responsive relationships — back-and-forth talk and consistent routines — paired with hands-on exploration in blocks, art, storytelling, music, science and outdoor play. Teachers notice what children are trying to do and gently extend it: the measured pour that becomes early math; the rhyming song that becomes early language; the turn-taking game that builds self-control. Families are woven into the work — engaged handoffs at drop-off, regular two-way conversations, shared goals for growth. And behind it all is leadership that treats classrooms as places of practice, with coaching that helps caregivers get better at their craft. This is not a luxury for a few neighborhoods. New York cannot wish away the stress many young children carry — housing instability, food insecurity, family crises. Over one-quarter of children in New York — nearly 420,000 youth — live below the poverty line, according to a recent [report](https://robinhood.org/reports/poverty-tracker-annual-report-vol-7/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by Columbia University and Robin Hood. Chronic stress frays the very capacities learning depends on. The countermeasure is not a worksheet; it is an engaged adult whom a child trusts and can count on. When children experience that kind of reliability, schools see the [downstream effects](https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/education/we-must-start-earlier-critical-importance-0-3?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): large public studies — from [Boston](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working%5Fpapers/w28756/w28756.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) and [Tulsa](https://mccourt.georgetown.edu/news/universal-pre-k-long-term-benefits-exceed-short-term-costs/?%5Fga=2.3977200.1702813498.1760734557-155199844.1760734557&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [New Jersey's Abbott districts ](https://nieer.org/sites/default/files/2023-07/apples205th20grade.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)— find that high-quality programs help students avoid being held back and put in special education placements, improve attendance and behavior, and raise the odds of graduating high school and enrolling in college. Access to this kind of care is grossly unequal. Typical annual costs run well into the tens of thousands of dollars. For many families — especially those with infants and toddlers — enrollment is simply out of reach. This means children are often left with friends or relatives who themselves are overstretched and unable to provide quality care, or parents are forced to stop working to care for children. The market isn't failing because parents don't want care. It's failing because the economics of quality are upside down. The adults who do the work — the largely female Black and Latina educators who diaper, comfort, plan lessons, assess progress and partner with families — are paid wages that would be scandalous in any other sector entrusted with children's development. Programs then churn staff and ask toddlers to form new attachments again and again, undermining the core relationships that support healthy development. Fixing this begins with pay. New York will not deliver quality at scale until early-childhood educators — many of whom are employed by community-based organizations or run daycare centers out of their homes — can afford to stay in the field. That means setting salary standards that move toward parity with public school teachers. Washington, D.C., offers a model: its early-childhood educator program supplements salaries to bring them in line with public school pay, strengthening retention and program quality. It also means creating real pathways — coaching and paid apprenticeships — for aides to grow into lead teachers without leaving the classroom. Stability in the workforce is stability for children. Space is the other bottleneck. The city depends on both nonprofit centers and smaller, home-based programs, especially in neighborhoods outside Manhattan. To ensure children's health and safety, the City licenses all centers and sets strict standards that all providers must meet. Centers need capital to retrofit infant-toddler rooms with sinks, ventilation, bathrooms and safe exits. Home-based providers — often anchors of care in their communities — need help meeting safety and licensing requirements without being buried in red tape or forced into debt. A universal plan must pair operating funds with grants and low-interest loans for facilities, along with technical assistance that helps providers open seats quickly and safely where families actually live. [Quality is not a mystery](https://educate.bankstreet.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=bsec&%5Fga=2.7587570.1367352059.1580740335-1524226221.1576784910&%5Fgl=1%2A1x68f0j%2A%5Fgcl%5Fau%2ANjgxNzgzNjIwLjE3NTg1Njg0MjI.%2A%5Fga%2AMTc3NjQzMTU1Ni4xNzU4NTY4NDIy%2A%5Fga%5F8BED3YJMC3%2AczE3NjA3MzM4MzQkbzYkZzAkdDE3NjA3MzM4MzQkajYwJGwwJGg1NzUyNzYxMTk.&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and it is not a luxury. It looks like low adult-child ratios that let teachers respond, not just supervise; play-rich curricula grounded in evidence; ongoing observation of children's growth; and regular, two-way communication with families. Most of all, it looks like instructional support with coaching, feedback and time for teachers to plan together. The City should set these expectations clearly and then support programs to meet them. The current approaches to ensuring quality, rooted in compliance checklists have minimal impact. Structured professional learning and steady staffing will. The conversation to date has too often treated "universal" as the finish line — as if a seat alone were the point. That is too small for New York. A universal system worthy of this city would guarantee not only a place for every child, but a level of teaching and care that closes the opportunity gaps that persist across our schools. It would pay the educators who make that possible, build out the infant-toddler rooms we lack, and knit together centers and home-based programs into a coherent, dignified system that families can trust. If a future Mayor Mamdani wants to lead boldly, he should aim to do more than provide affordable child care slots. Emphasizing universality without quality risks missing the chance to build a truly equitable birth-to-12 system in New York City. Promise parents relief, yes — but promise their children something far greater: the steady relationships and playful learning that turn toddlers into readers, problem solvers, artists and citizens who love to learn and contribute to their communities. New York can be the first city in the nation to guarantee universal quality child care from birth — quality that shows up not in the next political cycle, but in the commencement photos of the next generation. ### Why Isn’t Education at the Center of the New York City Mayoral Race? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-isnt-education-at-the-center-of-the-new-york-city-mayoral-race/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:43.000Z Over 90 minutes. That's how long it took in the first of two general-election mayoral debates before anyone mentioned education. We heard about foreign policy, 311 and personal shopping habits well before the word "schools" was even mentioned. There are more than 900,000 children in New York City public schools, and the next mayor will shape their future. If this city wants a new generation of New Yorkers who can thrive, education can't keep being treated like the-issue-that-must-not-be-named. Some will say education isn't polling as a top issue. But that's a symptom of a larger problem. Public conversation follows the questions debate moderators, reporters and everyday New Yorkers ask — and increasingly, the questions are about issues the mayor has no power over. Consider the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which dominated the first half of the debate. While New Yorkers may hold strong personal views on it, the mayor has no role in foreign policy. Contrast that with the delayed, muted whispers about the future of our schools, where the mayor has direct authority. Even worse, the only substantive education discussion so far has centered on the kindergarten gifted-and-talented program — an issue affecting about [2,500 children](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2025/10/10/mamdani-proposal-for-gifted-and-talented-comes-amid-admissions-shift/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20gifted%20programs%2C%20which%20enroll,or%20schools%20through%20fifth%20grade.). This alone cannot be the entirety of our discussion of education in a mayoral election where the winner will run the largest school system in the country. There are myriad issues that are complex, difficult and must be discussed — ranging from teacher quality to charter schools, truancy and more. One issue in particular is at the foundation of them all: literacy. And it's an issue where New York City is in a serious emergency. More than [70% of our fourth graders are struggling to read](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ToR6J6kgH3tGcvdEHb1pd2S3FNZAFaD%5F/view?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), according to the NAEP. For students with learning disabilities, this is especially perilous, and an estimated [one in 10 students has dyslexia](https://dyslexiaida.org/dyslexia-basics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But reading hasn't been discussed. Dyslexia hasn't been discussed. When questions on literacydon't get asked, serious plans to improve literacy don't get written. Education plans for our children's future become sparse. We should want every candidate competing to ensure that every child is a strong reader. But it's up to the media in particular to ask for that vision. If we don't, we risk a return to the status quo where reading is ignored in the midst of a literacy crisis. Teaching children to read is the baseline by which any school system should be judged. New York City has made real progress through NYC Reads — the initiative we advocated for, which was implemented by the Adams administration, to remove broken whole language reading curriculum and replace it with exclusively evidence-based literacy practices. But that was the beginning, not a victory lap. If the next mayor isn't committed to continuing this work, those gains can easily slip away. When schools adopt structured literacy rooted in the science of reading, students make gains. [When they don't, children fall behind](https://www.theargumentmag.com/p/illiteracy-is-a-policy-choice?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This isn't ideology. It's evidence. Other states like Connecticut, Mississippi and Wisconsin have deliberately chosen to prioritize replacing whole language with structured literacy and seen impressive results. Mississippi went [from second to last in the nation to seventh in reading proficiency](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/kids-reading-scores-have-soared-in-mississippi-miracle?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in just a few short years. Silence has consequences. When education isn't a campaign issue, it risks being overlooked as a governing priority. While education may not poll as high as affordability and crime, for many parents, the quality of their children's education — their chance to succeed — *is* the issue, and one deeply wrapped up with questions of affordability. Many families aren't just leaving New York because of housing costs. The effectiveness of their local schools is also part of their consideration. If you can live more affordably elsewhere and the schools there are a priority of state and local government, why wouldn't you move? Education is also one of the few issues in this race where candidates have genuinely different visions. Curtis Sliwa wants to rely more on trade schools. Andrew Cuomo wants to expand the gifted and talented program. Zohran Mamdani is focused on reducing class size by bringing more teachers into our schools. Understanding those differences matters. So does whether the next mayor will choose a chancellor with real literacy expertise and keep proven reforms in place, requiring evidence-based instruction in every classroom. This election will determine whether New York continues to move forward on literacy or slides back to the era when most kids were taught to guess at words rather than read them. It will determine whether we build on progress or squander it. Candidates, campaigns and the media should consider what's lost when education isn't given the platform it deserves. If it's an afterthought on the campaign trail, it will be an afterthought in City Hall. ### The One Debate Answer that Spoke Volumes about Zohran Mamdani URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-one-debate-answer-that-spoke-volumes-about-zohran-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:43.000Z In the first general election mayoral debate, one moment was especially revealing about how Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani ran his campaign and how he might lead the city. It came after 15 circular minutes about Israel that went nowhere, though it had become a defining issue in the race. The election's many skirmishes on Gaza, Hamas, Netanyahu, antisemitism and so on largely played out to Mamdani's advantage, but he avoided the key question of whether or not he's willing to break the city's own rules (about occupying buildings or blocking transit hubs, for instance) when he's in sympathy with the rulebreakers, instead fuzzing things up by talking broadly but selectively about the First Amendment. The big question about how much care the aspiring first-time executive will take to uphold the laws he is charged with executing as mayor crystallized in the exchange that caught my eye and ear — on a completely different topic. It started with a question from Politico's Sally Goldenberg, one of the city's sharpest and fairest political observers, as she pressed Mamdani on his signature rent-freeze promise. The exchange showed at once the potency of his pitch and the problem with his product. It's a minute worth going through in full, crosstalk and all. A New York Post piece from early October, worth reading in full, laid out the issue: Mamdani promised, in advance, to have his Rent Guidelines Board freeze rents every year he remains mayor. But while the mayor-elect will indeed appoint the board's members, different ones are required by law to represent tenants and landlords, and to take into account specific objective factors. That doesn't allow for a political prejudgement that the rent is too damn high, and landlords just have to eat the zeroes. Ignoring the law opens up an obvious space for the courts to get involved and, quite possibly, for this Supreme Court to get around to ultimately demolishing New York City's stabilization system that Mamdani's promise depends on. In September, the New York Editorial Board, on which I sit, put the question to Bill de Blasio (the last mayor to freeze the rent) when Vital City's Josh Greenman asked him, "Does Mamdani have unilateral authority to preemptively say four years of rent freezes \[on rent-stabilized apartments\]? And if he does, what if his posture was, we're going to have four years of 3% increase? Would that be OK?" De Blasio's answer, more or less, was that a mayor doesn't have that much power. "New York City is not a police state. The people named have the power to make their own — they have a term, they have the power to make their own decisions." Mamdani has insisted he can order up a four-year freeze, full stop, as part of some grand economic reparation for perceived past mistakes. Will that really pass muster in the political process? Will it really be a convincing position in court, when whatever decisions are made are inevitably challenged? Here's the full exchange from the debate: Goldenberg: The costs of maintaining a building change year to year for landlords. The Rent Guidelines Board is legally required to consider those costs when deciding whether to freeze rents. So how can you promise a rent freeze today before ever seeing that data next year? Mamdani: You know, we've seen the data time and again… Goldenberg: …But not next year's data… Mamdani: …It's been data that's been overruled by mayors again and again. The last Rent Guidelines Board study showed that profits were up 12% for landlords of those units, and what did they do? They raised the rent, adding to more than 12% under Eric Adams' administration. What I am speaking about is actually reflecting the needs of these New Yorkers and the state of the market today. These are New Yorkers who have a median household income of $60,000\. We do not need to be pushing them further out of the city. We need to keep them in their homes. Goldenberg: Aren't you saying in that answer that you're going to prejudge? You will not have seen the data for next year, and you're making a determination based on data you haven't seen. Mamdani: I've seen the data year after year of the fact that salaries are stagnating… Goldenberg: Based on the current data… Mamdani: …costs are up. New Yorkers can't actually afford their apartments, and I will also take action to actually ensure that the landlords of those bills can better handle their costs by taking on their insurance, their property taxes — Goldenberg: All right, we're at time. It is based on annual data and you have seen next year's data yet. What does it all add up to? Mamdani's central campaign promise is, in fact, a big maybe, and the question rises as to how much he'll be guided by evidence and the rules when the apparent imperatives of politics are pulling at his sleeve. That cuts right to the heart of what Mamdani can deliver, and how outside forces could stymie the biggest parts of his ambitious agenda. Among those outside forces: an economy that's likely to be cooling, a governor running for reelection, and President Donald Trump's well-established wrecking-ball approach to governance and blue cities, let alone a Muslim socialist mayor in his hometown. The job interview isn't the job, of course. But Mayor-elect Mamdani is now the manager as well as the messenger. He's going to be judged on how he delivers, not how well he can counter-punch wild swings from the right and the center. *This piece was originally published in October 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### Zohran Mamdani’s Year One: A Time for Testing URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdanis-year-one-a-time-for-testing/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:43.000Z Now that Zohran Mamdani has won the 2025 election for New York City mayor, it's worth thinking about what comes next. Before he's even sworn in, Mayor-elect Mamdani faces a series of very tough choices and challenges — decisions that will define both his approach to the mayoralty and how we see him as mayor. **Factors he will face:** **1.) A significant deficit.** Right now, the City's FY 2026 deficit is projected to be $4.2 billion (out of a total operating budget of $112 billion), and it's likely to get worse. The $4.2 billion gap does not factor in any of the pending federal cuts to Medicaid funding. The City Comptroller's office estimates the deficit will double to $8.83 billion in FY 27 and to $9.95 billion in FY 2028 (that's still pre-Medicaid cuts). Eliminating these deficits just gets the City's budget books back to zero; it does not factor in a single penny for new spending on anything Mamdani wants to do, let alone the $3-5 billion in estimated costs for his childcare program, so he will have to make hard choices in areas that are generally spared. **2.) An uncertain economy.** Inflation is rising, unemployment is rising and consumer spending is flatlining — and this is before the impact of Trump's tariffs is fully absorbed (assuming the Supreme Court upholds the president's authority to impose the tariffs). In the first seven months of this year, New York City added just 5,047 new private sector jobs — the lowest gain in 30 years. No city in the country fares worse during a recession than New York, because so much of our job base and revenue depends on the financial services sector. If we enter even a mild recession, the FY 2026 deficit grows by another $1.3 billion. If it's a severe recession, the deficit could double. Now do the same math for the subsequent years when the problem gets even worse. **3.) 2026 state elections.** Gov. Kathy Hochul is up for re-election next year. She has a clear path to the Democratic nomination, but the general election, likely against Republican Congresswoman Elise Stefanik, won't be easy. Hochul has already said she will not raise taxes, which both complicates Mamdani's budget and severely limits his plan to fund free childcare through a state income tax increase and a corporate tax increase. In the legislature, gerrymandering means that the vast majority of seats are safe no matter what, but the handful of swing seats could make the Assembly speaker and Senate majority leader wary of aggressively pushing Mamdani's agenda. With that said, the first year for any mayor is typically a honeymoon, and he will get something from Albany — likely either funding to pay for either a portion of his childcare plan or for free buses for one or two groups like senior citizens. He'll have to decide what half a loaf to ask for if the whole loaf isn't on the shelf. **4.) Donald Trump.** Mamdani will likely become the symbol that Trump uses everywhere as shorthand for the decay of the left. Whether it's sending in federal troops or cutting federal funding or just attacking New York City on a constant basis, Trump is going to play a bigger role in this mayoralty than any president has in a long time (if not ever). This could all easily work to Mamdani's advantage, but either way, it will take up a lot of his time and energy. **5.) The Wildcard.** In year one, something crazy or terrible will invariably happen. A natural disaster. An act of terrorism. A terrible fire or shooting or tragedy of some kind. A scandal involving City workers. And it will be an opportunity for Mamdani to either handle it well and shine or mishandle it and face accusations that he's not up to the job. **Choices he will have to make:** **1.) How should he pursue taxes in Albany?** Mamdani is committed to seeking an income tax increase on the wealthy in Albany and a higher corporate tax. (As with Bill de Blasio, it's a feature of his policy priorities, not a bug). Hochul is committed to blocking it, as then-Gov. Cuomo was with de Blasio's proposed tax increase, so it's very unlikely to happen. Mamdani can decide to make the pursuit of higher taxes on the rich his major issue and make Albany the villain — or he can decide not to waste political capital on something that can't happen and focus on getting something else instead. His allies in the Democratic Socialists of America will want the fight, but his budget and policy needs argue for cooperation and common ground. Given his firsthand knowledge of Albany, odds are he opts for comity, but who knows. Meanwhile, at the City level, the mayor and the Council can increase property taxes. However, this may be even more difficult politically. Unlike raising income taxes on the top 1%, who will never support him anyway, a lot of New Yorkers are house-rich and cash-poor. For someone whose home is valued in the low seven figures but with annual income in the low six figures, facing a $3,000 new tax bill is a very big deal and could easily spark a lot of new voters in the next Council primary to vote against the incumbent. Overall property tax reform may be warranted, but even if it does happen, it will likely take a few years. **2.) What can he do without meaningful new revenue?** By law, the City's deficit has to be eliminated — which makes free childcare very tough to offer even if Mamdani is truly willing to take on labor and find meaningful savings in the budget. He can order his appointees to the Rent Guidelines Board to vote to freeze rent increases, but the impact will be far less than people think. De Blasio did it three times. A freeze doesn't mean that everyone's rent is automatically frozen — it only applies to rent-stabilized apartments (of which there are a million). He can come up with creative ways to fund a City-owned grocery store in every borough, but that's small bore. And if he were willing to aggressively demand that the MTA and NYPD enforce fare evasion, that could free up the funds to make the buses free — but it would be directly at odds with the DSA platform of decriminalizing most misdemeanors. Tradeoffs are tricky indeed. 3.) How does he hire? There are two possible answers here: pragmatically or dogmatically. If he sees the role of mayor as mainly an operational job — making sure the trash is picked up, making sure the lights turn from green to red, making sure clean water comes through the taps — he will hire the most experienced and talented operators possible, regardless of their politics. (Mike Bloomberg used to say he wanted the best person for each job even if they were a communist; the same would apply here with an amended caveat: even if they're a capitalist.) Having a few unexpected, highly respected commissioners and deputy mayors lined up to announce on day one of the transition would send a strong signal and speed the recruiting process. But that requires being able to recruit top people with the assurance that an ideological agenda will not dominate every decision, which is not what Mamdani's base wants. If he feels like each major hire has to pass a progressive purity test, then the talent pool narrows dramatically and what he gains in likes on Bluesky, he loses in operational competence. **4.) Does he worry about the tax base?** Mayor-elect Mamdani can't implement most of his affordability agenda without new revenue, most of which comes from people with lots of money — as about 1% of residents pay 40% of the income taxes. Pursuing policies that risk losing more high-income taxpayers would satisfy the DSA agenda but cost his budget dearly. The Citizens Budget Commission just released a new report that showed that New York's failure to retain and attract millionaires at the rate of other states meant a $13 billion loss in tax revenue in just one year alone. Imagine that — enough money to cover any deficit, any loss of federal funding and all of Mamdani's affordability agenda. The more millionaires you lose, the more tax revenue you lose. Less revenue means less ability to help the poor, to fund social services, to combat homelessness, to fund NYCHA and to offer health care. Beyond the tax question, Mamdani may or may not realize that many DSA priorities — ending mayoral control of schools, essentially eliminating accountability for teachers, placing more restrictions on the NYPD, eliminating the gang database, ending enforcement of low-level crimes — result in exactly what drives away high-income residents: worse schools and worse quality of life. So pursuing his affordability agenda may require him to ignore the DSA's quality of life agenda. Even beyond the risk of losing more taxpayers, New Yorkers don't like it when the city feels dangerous, dirty and poorly run. That's why Eric Adams, fairly or not, has had such low approval ratings For Mayor-elect Mamdani to achieve one part of his agenda may require him to spurn another.. **5.) What does he do about housing, the homeless, Rikers and more?** Freezing the rent for some apartments doesn't increase the supply of affordable housing. Doing that will mean not just fighting with developers but saying no to groups that are usually sacred cows on the left: unions, community groups and environmentalists. Derek Thompson and Ezra Klein made the case well in their book "Abundance" that most of the blame for the failure to build affordable housing in blue cities and states lies with the left — and ironically, that failure may lead to even fewer electoral college votes for blue states and even more GOP presidents. Will Mamdani do what it takes to force through more affordable housing, or will he just blame landlords without actually making any progress? By keeping his campaign's focus on affordability, Mamdani has been able to avoid other, equally complicated issues that he will no longer be able to duck as mayor. The number of homeless New Yorkers is going down some right now because of the shrinking migrant inflow, but the shelter system is still bursting at the seams, and Adams hasn't really taken on street homelessness in the way that the public demands. Mamdani may try to thread the needle between compassion for people with problems that keep them from seeking help and the need to keep the streets safe. This will cost money in the short term but save over time; it will for sure mean pushing back on activist impulses. We will see how much appetite he has for that. Mismanagement has turned Rikers Island into an unmanaged prison camp. If the federal judge in charge of the case appoints a receiver, the mayor will still have to cooperate, and it will be at least in part on the City to execute the measures they impose. Will Mamdani be able to resist calls for more progressive solutions like large-scale early release, which would play into the narrative that he is against public safety? — No one has ever said that being mayor is easy. And few mayors have run for office both promising so many new programs that require so much new funding while facing large budget deficits, a shaky economy, an emotionally unstable president with real hangups about his hometown and an uncooperative Albany. If Mamdani can thread the needle and somehow manage to deliver on his big promises — free childcare, free buses, a lot more affordable housing — while still keeping the city clean, safe and well run, keeping the tax base stable and keeping his own allies from constantly attacking him for not fully pursuing their agenda, he will ascend to the ranks of the city's greats. It's not going to be easy. It would be hard for anyone, let alone a 34-year-old with no management experience. For the sake of all 8.5 million New Yorkers, let's hope he has what it takes. Note: Several employees of Tusk Strategies worked on Andrew Cuomo's 2025 mayoral primary campaign, separate from their work at Tusk. None of them are still involved. *This piece was originally published in September 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### Can Cities Withstand Trump’s Assault? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/can-cities-withstand-trumps-assault/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:43.000Z Donald Trump's double-barreled assault on cities — budget and administrative damage on the one hand, and attacks on immigration on the other — will severely hurt New York and other metropolitan areas. But although the actions of the Trump administration are exceptionally harsh in degree, they are sadly consistent with America's long anti-urban history. Trump's attacks are compounded by America's dysfunctional metropolitan form — core cities that drive the economy, surrounded by suburbs that benefit from urban economic strengths (scale, agglomeration, specialization, innovation) but at best only partially share the full costs of the city's problems, including high rates of crime, substandard schools and a housing crunch. The sad truth is that New York and other cities will struggle to deal with Trump's attacks because they are fighting with one hand behind their backs thanks to politically independent suburbs and the reality that state government effectively controls many city actions. ## A three-pronged attack The Trump administration's attack on cities has three principal components: cutting budgets, reducing immigration and advancing economic policies that will damage urban areas. Federal budget cuts will be very harmful to New York. Gov. Kathy Hochul's office estimates that the impact on health care will cost $13 billion annually statewide, including $8 billion in direct cuts to hospitals and the health care system. New York City is estimated to suffer $7.9 billion of those cuts annually. Cuts in food assistance, both in direct SNAP benefits and additional costs for state and local administration, could cost another $1.4 billion annually across the state. Overall, State Comptroller Tom Di Napoli now estimates the state faces budget gaps of more than $34 billion over the next three years, driven not only by the federal budget cuts but also by a weakening economy. Many of those budget gaps and fiscal pressures will flow down to the city. To be fair, New York City is not without fault here. To the extent it controls its budget, it has let it increase at a far faster rate than the rate of inflation in recent years. It is legitimate to criticize the City for failing to discipline spending, and for paying insufficient attention to government efficiency. But that having been said, the city is where it is — and the federal fiscal attack is going to do serious damage. Attacks on immigration are a second damaging blow. Immigration has long been a major driver of New York's growth and prosperity, especially in comparison to less immigrant-friendly cities like Philadelphia or Detroit. About 38% of New York's current population is foreign-born, and by some estimates, around 60% of New Yorkers are either immigrants or second-generation. (Even with the recent surge in undocumented migrants, the percentage of undocumented immigrants hovers steadily around 15%, and estimates for New York State are that most undocumented immigrants have been in the country for more than 10 years.) In 2023, foreign-born workers made up 44.3% of the city's labor force, with very high concentrations in construction (69.5%), transportation and utilities (65.3%) and manufacturing (54.7%). Other sectors, like health care, food delivery and hotels and restaurants, also have large concentrations of immigrant workers, many of them women. Undocumented workers are especially likely to work in construction, food services and home care. Many of these jobs are understandably categorized as "essential," and dramatically reducing the number of people available to occupy them could have a devastating impact on the health of the city. Finally, Trump's overall economic policies, especially his trade and tariff wars, could push up inflation and induce an economic slowdown or even a recession. Cities are especially exposed due to their greater integration into international trade, and unlike agricultural regions, the federal budget doesn't provide payments to offset the impact of retaliatory tariffs. The Center for New York City Affairs reports that the slowing of international trade in the wake of tariffs means "New York City's unemployment rate is likely to increase while its GDP growth may decrease in the short run." There has already been a sharp drop in foreign visitors and tourism, with the New York City Tourism and Conventions office foreseeing $4 billion less tourist spending this year. The city's economy is feeling the effects. The Office of Management and Budget estimates that only 5,079 private sector jobs were added in the first seven months of 2025, compared to over 68,000 by this time in 2024\. And health care, especially lower-wage home health aide jobs, is the principal source of net new jobs, not finance or higher-paying industries. The slowdown is driven in part by macroeconomic factors beyond anyone's individual control, but also by a toxic brew of uncertainty caused by erratic federal policy around taxes, regulation and investment, and increasing cost pressures from tariffs that serve to restrict hiring and job creation, especially for small businesses. ## American animus against cities Trump's hostility to cities is well documented. He's called American cities "rotting" and "cesspools of blood." Atlanta? "A killing field." San Francisco? "Worse than a slum." Los Angeles? "A trash heap" that has been "invaded and occupied by illegal aliens and criminals." Milwaukee (the site of the 2024 Republican convention)? "A horrible city." And in justifying his takeover of policing in Washington, D.C., Trump said the city suffers from "crime, bloodshed, bedlam, and squalor and worse" even while the city's violent crime rate is at a 30-year low. No one should deny that cities wrestle with real problems, but Trump's hyperbolic and racially coded attacks are worse than we've heard in recent decades. That said, his approach echoes a long-standing American animus against cities. Thomas Jefferson, in 1800, reflecting on a yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia, viewed the disease as "producing some good…(by) discouraging the growth of great cities in our nation… I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health, and the liberties of man." The Constitution disadvantaged cities, allocating two senators each to both urban and rural states. In 1956, the great historian Richard Hofstadter wrote "The United States was born in the country and has moved to the city," while clinging to a "sentimental attachment to the rural way of life" even as the economy and society urbanized. American cities were — and are — disadvantaged not only at the federal level but by state governments. In the late 1800s, disputes about whether cities could issue their own bonds and regulate railroads independently led to a series of legal battles, which culminated in states having virtually absolute sovereignty over their cities. This was formalized in 1868 by Iowa Judge John F. Dillon, in what has come to be known as "Dillon's Rule." Dillon wrote, "Municipal corporations (cities) owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the (state) legislature…As it creates, it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control." I don't here suggest that cities should be independent entities; as a matter of law, states are going to remain much more powerful. But the power imbalance is extreme, and unfortunate, and harmful to cities. ## Why New York will have a hard time fighting back After World War II, American cities experienced a paradox: A booming economy was driven by growing metropolitan areas, but urban cores themselves faced persistent declines as wealth and political power shifted to suburbs. As my 2023 book "Unequal Cities" documents, suburban growth was fueled by racially and economically exclusionary federal housing and transportation policy. So even though central cities typically remained the hubs of the metropolitan and national economies, they suffered from poverty, crime, housing and education problems that the suburbs generally didn't help pay for. Economists know cities drive economic prosperity; economist Edward Glaeser calls them "our greatest invention." They are the source of growth, innovation, jobs, tax revenues and population. America's metropolitan areas produce around 90% of GDP and the vast majority of patents and innovation. But most American cities are disadvantaged by our urban form: a core city surrounded by exclusionary and sometimes hostile suburbs, even though those suburbs' prosperity depends on being in thriving city-centered metropolitan areas. Government fragmentation in metropolitan areas has real costs in efficiency and policy coordination. The Houston region has more than 1,200 separate governments; the Chicago region has more than 1,300; and the New York City tri-state region has over 2,000\. This creates inefficiency and inequality, as suburbs that depend economically on their metropolitan location have higher tax bases and residential incomes, supporting better schools and housing that are not shared with the core city. That might be tolerable if suburbs could regularly be counted on to support urban priorities in the state legislature, but that is often not the case. In state government, suburbs often ally politically with rural areas against cities. Even with its powerful economy and large population, New York City has long grappled with this problem. The city's economy on its own produces close to 60% of state GDP, and if the suburban New York counties are included, the GDP share rises to around 80% of the state total (despite being home to only about 65% of the state's population). Metropolitan tax revenues fuel the state budget. In 1905, Tammany Hall's George Washington Plunkitt (the man who coined the phrase "honest graft") called the city "the milch (milk) cow of the state" with "the politicians up in Albany…after the last drops of milk in the udder." Today, roughly 70% of the state's tax revenues come from the New York metropolitan region. Yet New York City's ability to act on its own is constrained by the state. Among many other issues, Albany has mandated costly pension changes for city employees, imposed class size limits in public schools without funding them, authorized property tax abatements and exemptions that affect housing construction, regulated city borrowing, set bail laws and court procedures that have been controversial for some advocates, and even controlled whether the city can install red light and speed cameras for traffic control. To be sure, New York City has cost problems it has brought upon itself. Its government is no paragon of efficiency. I don't suggest that if left to its own devices, the nation's largest city and other cities would automatically be well managed. The point, rather, is that the ingrained structural constraints make it far harder for cities to get out of the box. ## What the future holds Given the fiscal and power imbalances baked into the political system, New York faces few good options under Trump's anti-urban regime. The severe budget cuts will likely force contentious political battles over how to spend limited resources. Should the state and city pay additional billions to cover the health insurance and hospital cuts being imposed by Trump? What about the gaps in food assistance, housing, transit and other services? Should taxes or borrowing be raised to cover these gaps, much less Mamdani's new and expensive proposed transit and social programs? Trump's policies hurt New York in other ways. His anti-immigrant hostility seems to be reducing the population, labor force, tuition-paying college and graduate students and tourism. Jobs and businesses in construction, health and elder care, hotels and restaurants are all being hit, and the lost paychecks from those employment declines will cut consumer spending and tax revenue. Without more authority over their metropolitan economies, New York and other cities will have a hard time crafting appropriate strategies in response to Trump's policies. Lost federal revenues might be replaced by increased local taxes, but Albany's control over city tax policy, especially with a gubernatorial election in 2026, make this unlikely. The city does have some levers under its control. We can (and should) keep making it easier for the private sector to build housing, through both new construction and converting offices. If enacted, the proposed City Charter amendments on housing will help, as will the changes made in zoning under the "City of Yes." Continuing to support immigrants, including undocumented ones, will help keep up the city's labor supply, and ongoing education and training for all the city's workforce should be a priority. Mobilizing new streams of investment capital also should be on the table. And streamlining regulatory policies to make decisions faster and less uncertain could also help growth. But if suburbs and states didn't hold as much structural power as they did, cities would have even more ability to adapt to the hostile new climate. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani will face enormous budgetary and economic pressures when he assumes office. The constraints on city autonomy in our fragmented metropolitan economies, grounded in America's anti-urban bias, will combine with the additional blows coming from Trump's anti-urban policies. A new mayor — and all of us — face a very tough challenge. *This piece was originally published in October 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### Zohran Mamdani’s Real-World Constraints URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdanis-real-world-constraints/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:43.000Z The mayor of the City of New York is the most powerful municipal official in the United States, and it isn't even close. But to say this isn't to say that Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani will have the ability to unilaterally do some of the things he promised on the campaign trail. There are very real structural, budgetary and legal limits on what the city's chief executive can accomplish without the cooperation and support of other branches of city or state government. New York's mayor is usually called a "strong mayor," and it's clear why. The mayor commands a workforce of approximately 300,000 — about the same number of people who live in Pittsburgh or Cincinnati. With a few exceptions — mainly his commissioner of investigations and the corporation counsel, who lead the city Law Department — he can appoint hundreds of commissioners, department heads, their deputies and other senior managers without the advice and consent of the City Council. One of the entities and employees under the mayor's control is the Department of Education, which operates the city's public high schools, middle schools and elementary schools — a function often overseen by semi-independent Boards of Education in other cities. (It is worth noting that Mamdani has said he wants to weaken this mayoral control in favor of a system that allows more community input, which might require City Council and/or state legislation.) Unlike most other mayors across America, he is not constrained by a county executive or county legislature. Indeed, he has five counties under his direct control with the ability to deploy city resources among them pretty much as he sees fit. And the resources he has to allocate are enormous — an annual operating budget of more than $115 billion (about the same as the entire state of Florida) and a 10-year capital budget of about $175 billion. But while these powers and his resources are vast, the mayor is far from omnipotent. So it is worth asking, especially with respect to Mamdani's ambitious proposals, what is it that he will be able to do on his own and what will require the cooperation and approval of others? Let's take a look at some of his most significant proposals: **Fast and free buses.** The mayor controls the streets; he does not control the bus network, which is run by the MTA, and which is mainly accountable to the governor. It is certainly within his power, through his appointed commissioner of transportation, to delineate bus lanes and, through a variety of physical designs — including physical barriers — assure that those lanes would be used exclusively for buses. While there would be consultations with local communities, ultimately most of the mayor's commitment to faster buses can be realized without the approval of others. Presumably, faster buses are also a goal of the MTA's, so there should be close cooperation between the mayor and the MTA on realizing much faster bus service. As to making buses free — which in Mamdani's vision would make them somewhat faster as well because loading wouldn't be slowed down by the process of passengers boarding through one door and paying fares — it is less likely that the mayor, on his own, will be able to get this done. It would cost more than $500 million annually to the MTA in lost fares to make all buses free to riders. To replace this lost revenue, the city would have to provide those funds annually to the MTA either through a reallocation of existing approved funding under the mayor's control or, more likely, a budget modification approved by the City Council. Alternatively, the State Legislature, with the governor's support, would have to allocate additional annual operating funding to the MTA. In either case, the MTA might have to be required through state law, or otherwise directed to make buses free, given the Authority's institutional resistance to free buses. That probably would require support from the governor and, possibly, majority support from the state Assembly and Senate — none of which is a sure thing. **City-run grocery stores.** It is not yet clear exactly what form Mamdani's promise to open a small network of publicly run grocery stores would take. What is clear, however, is that the mayor will have the unfettered ability to do this through the city's Economic Development Corporation, which is under his control. EDC already operates and controls several retail food operations, and the city has been in this business — in one way or another — for more than 80 years. The cost of establishing these new stores, assuming just one in each borough as Mamdani has suggested, is fairly minor in the context of the city's overall budget and EDC has the resources to undertake it. **Rent freezes.** The mayor derives his power to freeze the rent on rent-stabilized apartments from his authority to appoint members of the Rent Guidelines Board. The RGB cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously; it is supposed to be guided by a series of real economic indicators. Deviating from that would make it vulnerable to lawsuits. But it is most likely that the mayor's appointees would follow his policy guidance. Mayor de Blasio has already established the precedent that a mayor-appointed RGB can freeze rents — his appointees did so. But it's also important to note that Mamdani's authority would only apply to rent-stabilized units, which number about 1 million. The mayor does not have the power to freeze (or affect) rents on market-rate units or maintenance fees on unregulated condominiums and co-ops. Rents on thousands of more recently designated "affordable" housing units, which are governed by a myriad of federal, state and local laws and regulations, could not be subject to the mayor's unilateral action. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25499017?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Department of Community Safety.** Mamdani has proposed to take a chunk of activities out of the New York City Police Department and put them into a new Department of Community Safety. The premise is that such a department would be able to more efficiently and humanely address people struggling with serious mental illness and quality of life problems, while allowing the uniformed police force to focus more efficiently on serious crime. Creating such a department would require the approval of the City Council and a reallocation of funds, currently budgeted to the NYPD, to the new department. Of course, even if the Council resists, the mayor does have the power to simply reorganize the Police Department and create an "Office of Community Safety" within it. This might not accomplish all the goals of a new department — especially the cultural change to certain types of enforcement action — but it might be a unilateral first step. **Housing production.** Mamdani has proposed having government directly finance and build 200,000 units of affordable housing over the coming decade. That would cost $100 billion, which would hinge on the City getting permission to borrow $70 billion — or about 40% more per year added to its annual capital budget — which would exceed the city's debt limit. Without a very substantial increase in taxes or an infusion of funds from the State, the City would be unable to sustain the added debt service required, absent legislation. **Universal childcare.** Mamdani envisions providing universal free childcare to New York families, from six weeks to five years of age. Operationally, the mayor could probably do this on his own if he had the resources. However, the cost of childcare is considerable; estimates put the price tag around $5 billion annually. Depending on the scale, it would require either a substantial reallocation of existing city resources — or additional funding to the city from either direct funding from the state or an increase in taxes. This brings us to taxes. **Taxes.** To pay for many of his priorities, Mamdani has proposed raising income taxes on New Yorkers who earn more than $1 million a year by two percentage points to help fund some of his ambitious proposals. He also proposes raising the state's highest corporate tax rate from 7.25% to 11.5%. The mayor does not have the power to increase taxes unilaterally. Indeed, the City itself does not have the power to impose new taxes or increase existing ones without the approval of the State Legislature and the governor, with the notable exception of the local property tax, which requires only the approval of the mayor and City Council. Of course, much of Mayor-elect Mamdani's vision could be realized through additional funds flowing from the federal government, but — let's face it — that's not in the cards. *This piece was originally published in October 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### John Lindsay, Zohran Mamdani and How Ambitions Collide with Reality URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/john-lindsay-zohran-mamdani-and-how-ambitions-collide-with-reality/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:43.000Z Sixty years ago, a charismatic young politician took New York City by storm. His record in office offers some warnings to the current Democratic candidate for mayor. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani's road to victory in the mayoral election stunned many observers. The 33-year-old outsider defeated a flawed former governor, but one with huge name recognition and an established political reputation. A member of the Democratic Socialists of America, Mamdani presented a more radical vision for city government and has caused controversy with past statements on Israel and law enforcement. (Mamdani would not be the first democratic socialist to become mayor. Many forget that David Dinkins was a member of the DSA, but he was also a product of the Harlem Democratic machine, which exerted just as much influence on his politics as any left-wing affiliation.) Young and charismatic, Mamdani brought energy to the Democratic race and stood in stark contrast to the older Andrew Cuomo, who represented another era in Democratic politics. Yes, Mamdani was able to motivate large numbers of voters to the polls — a wide range of New Yorkers, but especially younger people, campaigning on the idea that the city is too expensive and there are too many people struggling to make ends meet. On the trail, Mamdani made "woke" cultural politics secondary to a left-wing populist economic message. Sixty years ago, New Yorkers elected another young, charismatic political voice who ran on a message that New York was a "city in crisis" and was becoming unlivable. John Lindsay condemned the city's "power brokers" whom he believed ran Gotham to their own benefit, not in the interests of the common good. He promised to bring a new energy to city government and was in sync with the idealistic, good-government movement of the early Great Society, when optimism about the ability of government to solve problems was high. Lindsay was not quite the outsider that Mamdani is. He was a Manhattan congressman with deep roots in the city's leadership class. Though Mamdani criticizes the wealthy, Lindsay was a Republican from the Silk Stocking district of the Upper East Side of Manhattan and had the support of much of the business community. While Mamdani is driven by left-wing ideology, Lindsay was a classic urban reformer determined to right the city from the damages of Democratic machine politics. Still, even though the old machine-reform dialectic in urban politics within which Lindsay operated is long dead, there are important historical lessons to learn from Lindsay's tumultuous eight years as mayor. > It is fine to be animated by larger moral and ideological concerns, but if people do not feel safe on the streets, snow is not plowed after snowstorms and schools fail to teach their students basic reading and math, then any mayor will lose popular support. First, New York has always been a cauldron of different racial, ethnic and religious groups. Tensions — and even on rare occasions, violence — are inevitable. In the late 1960s, racial tensions in the city and in the nation worsened. Lindsay found himself the target of a backlash from white ethnic voters who resented the elite liberalism of the mayor and his supporters. The fear of street crime, demands for racial justice, a fight between a mostly white, Jewish teachers union and an African American school district in Brooklyn, and changing demographics in some city neighborhoods all made for a combustible mix. Whatever the issue, many middle- and working-class whites found themselves pitted against Lindsay and his liberal supporters, who blamed white racism for many of these issues. It is no surprise that the term "limousine liberal" was coined in New York at this time by one of Lindsay's political opponents. Successful politicians are those who are able to navigate group tensions, not exacerbate them. Mamdani is a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and a strong critic of the Israeli government, both of which are fine, but he must take great pains to understand the trepidation that many Jewish New Yorkers feel over his past words and actions. Second, crime and disorder affect New Yorkers on a daily basis and can make or break a mayor. Under Lindsay, the city saw a dramatic increase in crime rates across the board, with murders more than doubling between the beginning and the end of his term. The bold reformer had a difficult relationship with the NYPD and was never able to adequately deal with the crime problem. In the past, Mamdani has made pointed criticisms of law enforcement and supported the "Defund the Police" movement. As mayor, will Mamdani further drive down police morale? Will his proposed "Department of Community Safety" — which comes with a hefty price tag — make the streets safer? Any sense that crime and disorder are increasing under Mamdani will quickly sink his approval ratings and make it hard for him to govern, just as it did with Lindsay. Third, Lindsay's eight years led to the city's infamous fiscal crisis of 1975\. Although Lindsay was not solely to blame, his administration greatly increased city spending. The many needs of city residents, Lindsay found, come with great costs that are difficult to cover by taxes and funding from the state and federal government. In the economic boom of the 1960s, New York could cover the new city spending (with help from the new city income tax). When the economy slowed down, it made city finances more unstable. Mamdani has made many promises that carry large price tags. City revenues are not infinite, and if his policies drive wealthy New Yorkers and employers out of the city, it will make the city's fiscal problems more precarious. Mayor-elect Mamdani will need to balance his promises to increase City spending and address social needs with a larger eye toward the city's fiscal health. Lastly, Lindsay possessed a deep moralistic strain. Mamdani is a deeply ideological politician. As elected mayor, will he govern as a kind of performative progressive, an inverse Donald Trump at the city level? In the end, running a large city is about providing basic public services to residents. It is fine to be animated by larger moral and ideological concerns, but if people do not feel safe on the streets, snow is not plowed after snowstorms and schools fail to teach their students basic reading and math, then any mayor will lose popular support. New Yorkers have taken a big risk with Mayor-elect Mamdani. It is unclear how much he understands about the city's history and its political past. As was said during the Lindsay years, New York is the "second toughest job in the country." In order to succeed as mayor, Mamdani will need to grapple with the city's history and hopefully find some helpful parallels. *This piece was originally published in July 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### Even Mamdani’s New York Needs Millionaires URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/even-mamdanis-new-york-needs-millionaires/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:44.000Z Zohran Mamdani's campaign galvanized people with its disciplined focus on affordability — promises of universal childcare, free buses and a plan to build 200,000 units of housing — paid for by increasing taxes on businesses and high-income New Yorkers. Underlying this narrative is the entirely correct assertion that lower- and middle-income residents are struggling to make it in New York. Left out of the conversation is the fact that those with higher incomes already pay a lion's share of the personal income taxes that fund the services so essential to the lives and livelihoods of working families. One question that emerges is whether, over time, increasing New Yorkers' already nation-leading taxes would play a part in decreasing the share of millionaires that call New York City home — and ultimately further squeeze the social safety net and basic services New Yorkers need to thrive. First, some context. Throughout its history, New York City has been a magnet, attracting ambitious people from all over the world who have thrived on its opportunities. It has strived to be a generous city, from the start of its settlement houses to its nation-leading social safety net. At its best, New York is a global powerhouse offering vast opportunities and a high quality of life to its diverse population, while providing robust services for its lower-income and higher-need residents. Supporting New York's expansive public services has long depended on a high-performing economy and high earners who pay a disproportionate share of the City's personal income taxes. In fact, filers with adjusted gross income over $1 million — less than 1% of filers — [paid 40% of New York's personal income taxes in 2022](https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/fiscal-history/pit-tables/2022-pit-data.xlsx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Personal income taxes will provide $18 billion in revenue in fiscal year 2026, and 22% of total City tax revenue. So the moment is ripe for this question: Do the mayor-elect's proposed tax increases risk adverse consequences? What would be the impact on top earners, who already pay the nation's top marginal tax rate, especially when [positive ratings for services and quality of life in the city](https://cbcny.org/research/straight-new-yorkers-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have declined? > To sustain its economy and government, New York City doesn't just need to keep the millionaires it has; it needs to keep growing and attracting new ones. The answers matter. A recent report by the Citizens Budget Commission, where I work, delved into these questions. ["The Hidden Cost of New York's Shrinking Millionaire Share"](https://cbcny.org/research/hidden-cost-new-yorks-shrinking-millionaire-share?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that while the number of high earners is growing all across the country, New York City and State — historic epicenters of economic opportunity — are losing ground. This is important, because the problem is sometimes framed as "millionaire flight," as though all of the city's millionaires might pick up and leave as Mayor-elect Mamdani starts to put his agenda in place. History shows this is unlikely to happen; indeed, [New Yorkers across the income spectrum have moved out](https://cbcny.org/competitive-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). People see that fact and conclude that if millionaires won't leave en masse, there's no problem to worry about. It's not that simple. To sustain its economy and government, New York City doesn't just need to keep the millionaires it has; it needs to keep growing and attracting new ones. Between 2010 and 2022, the share of U.S. millionaires living in New York City fell 35%, from 6.5% to 4.2%. Statewide, the share fell by nearly one-third, from 12.7% to 8.7%. Yes, the number of millionaire taxpayers in New York State nearly doubled over the same time period, from 35,800 to almost 70,000 — but that growth lagged far behind national trends. Nationwide, the number tripled, as it did in Texas and California. Florida in particular witnessed explosive growth, with its millionaire ranks quadrupling in the same period. This relative loss of the wealthiest to other parts of the country has real fiscal impacts: If the City had maintained its 2010 share, it would have collected $2.5 billion more in personal income tax revenue in 2022 alone. The State would have collected an additional $10.7 billion that year. To put that in perspective, Mayor-elect Mamdani's campaign projected the proposed tax increases could raise between $9 billion to $10 billion per year. Once the unmatched hub of finance and culture, New York City's 2.3 percentage-point drop in its share of millionaires shows how much ground and influence has been lost to rival metropolitan areas. Importantly, it's not only millionaires who are choosing other states to call home. Domestic outmigration has been sapping New York of [residents of all incomes, races and ages](https://cbcny.org/competitive-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In 2024, [91,000 more residents moved out of the city](https://cbcny.org/competitive-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to other parts of the U.S. than moved in. Why is that? Why is New York, New York, big city of dreams, of money-making, of finding whatever you seek, sending away more and attracting fewer*?* What's the problem? > Filers with incomes over $1 million make up less than 1% of taxpayers — yet pay 40% of the city's personal income taxes. High income taxes are one factor — New York State's and City's combined top marginal rate, [14.776% for the highest earners, tops the nation](https://cbcny.org/research/hidden-cost-new-yorks-shrinking-millionaire-share?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It exceeds California's 13.3%, New Jersey's 10.75% and Massachusetts' 9.0%. Nearly all of NYC's suburbs top out at 10.9%. Florida and Texas have no personal income tax at all. Mayor-elect Mamdani's proposed increase would take this tax to 16.776%. That may or may not prompt the wealthiest among us to up and leave; only time will tell. But taxes are not the only factor; California's share of millionaires grew while New York's shrank. The simple truth is more New Yorkers feel the City's value proposition is faltering. The city's cultural and economic magnetism is becoming harder to justify against its high cost of living, fraying infrastructure and declining quality of life. Housing costs are a huge factor. The severe housing shortage drives up rents and home prices, making it difficult not only for lower-income New Yorkers, but increasingly for [middle-class families.](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/newsletter/new-york-by-the-numbers-monthly-economic-and-fiscal-outlook-no-105-september-2025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Cleanliness, ease of travel, street noise and feeling safe in a park or on the subway also weigh heavily. CBC's [Straight from New Yorkers 2025](https://cbcny.org/straight-new-yorkers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) survey found only 34% of New Yorkers felt the quality of life was good or excellent. Just 27% rated public services the same. Notably, in 2023 and 2017, higher-income New Yorkers rated these categories better than other residents — but by 2025, the gap disappeared. Now they give the same general low marks as other New Yorkers. Lifestyle and economic factors play a role: the pandemic accelerated remote and hybrid work, enabling some to relocate to warmer climates, lower-cost states or even farther out of the city without sacrificing career prospects. [Office visits and subway ridership](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/newsletter/new-york-by-the-numbers-monthly-economic-and-fiscal-outlook-no-105-september-2025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) remain below pre-pandemic levels, demonstrating that the impact persists in 2025. New York will never be cheap. People, and perhaps especially people with disposable income, are willing to pay some premium for New York's unmatched amenities, but they are less willing to pay for subway delays, vacant office towers and storefronts or persistent street disorder. The issue is not merely high taxes, but low value — the erosion of the essential qualities that once justified the cost of being here. > If New York City had maintained its 2010 share of millionaires, it would have collected $2.5 billion more in personal income tax revenue in 2022 alone. Mayor-elect Mamdani has focused on eliminating some key affordability and quality of life challenges that drive New Yorkers away, and he's discussed the importance of improving basic city services. But paying for it all by increasing the City's already nation-leading marginal personal income tax rates risks accelerating New York's shrinking millionaire share and missing out on billions of dollars to fund services. What's a better answer? Imagine a city that offers stability for investors and affordability for tenants; that catalyzes innovation and growth while providing great services that improve everyone's well-being — from those in need, to school children, to working families. Such a balance would deliver for all New Yorkers while attracting high earners whose taxes provide substantial revenue. New York's bright future depends on including all these constituencies — the financiers and the front-line workers, the landlords and the tenants, the taxpayers and service recipients — in shared civic prosperity. Focusing on the fundamentals strengthens New York City's value proposition. Expanding housing production to improve affordability is paramount to ensuring that living in New York remains feasible and attractive for a broad range of residents. Clean and safe streets are equally vital, providing the order and quality of life that residents, businesses and visitors deserve. High-quality *and* efficient public services — from transit to education — support a prosperous city. New Yorkers should not pay top dollar for mediocrity; inefficiency rips off everyone. Stable public finances preserve services for all New Yorkers. Just like we learned from the city's 1975 fiscal crisis, expanding services without minding the store ultimately hurts those most in need. These investments will strengthen the foundation for long-term prosperity across all income levels, while helping retain, attract, and grow millionaires. Whether New York City is able to do this successfully will determine whether it continues to shrink in influence — or rediscovers its role as the city that makes prosperity possible for all. ### Bill de Blasio, Role Model? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/bill-de-blasio-role-model/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:44.000Z Ah, we remember … The bizarre morning rides across the city in a police-driven SUV to use the gym at the Park Slope YMCA, where he sometimes forgot to wipe down the exercise equipment. The quixotic and disastrous presidential campaign. The chronic lateness. The boomlet of fundraising corruption scandals involving some of the city's sleazier characters. The endless battles with the governor. But also … Universal pre-K for the city's children. An end to the racist scourge of stop-and-frisk police harassment without an increase in crime and with a decrease in incarceration (at least until COVID-19 hit). Contracts with unions that the previous administration had left behind like ticking financial time bombs. Midtown East rezoning. Ferry wakes crisscrossing our rivers. Vision Zero driving down pedestrian and traffic fatalities. It's been nearly four years since Bill de Blasio left office; at the time, much of the city said "good riddance." But Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani has called him his favorite living former mayor, pointing to progressive policy achievements, and prompting at least a few non-Mamdani voters to snarkily refer to him as "de Blasio 2.0." With four years of Eric Adams behind us, it's instructive to gaze back at the de Blasio years in light of Mamdani's praise. Have the de Blasio administration's successes and failures stood the test of a little time? While it's too soon to declare history's final verdict, patterns are emerging, as are lessons for the city's young new chief executive: Don't let your progressive ideals and hunger to be a star on the national stage get ahead of the mayoral work of nailing the basics. Don't micromanage your staff or the professionals you put in charge of agencies. Finally, don't let your annoying personality get in the way of your accomplishments — being sanctimonious or above it all will be a major liability when it comes to your legacy; that's what New Yorkers will remember most. De Blasio critics and fans agree that his single greatest achievement was the introduction of universal pre-K, a resource that had only been previously available in select corners of the city when he was elected in 2013\. Making good on a campaign promise, de Blasio and his team secured $300 million from the State for a program that has since accommodated roughly 73,000 young children a year. This early win showed flexibility that the mayor lost as his first and second terms wore on. While he'd initially wanted to fund the program with a new tax on the wealthy — essentially killing two progressive birds with one stone — he dropped that demand when then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo, pathologically opposed to tax increases, found the money elsewhere. Allocating the space and lining up the teachers for all those kids was no mean feat, either, but it got done. "I don't think he gets enough credit for universal pre-K," said Ken Fisher, a lawyer and former City councilman who deals often with City Hall. "Clearly this was a big accomplishment. Not that it was necessarily controversial, but logistically it was something that was difficult to do, to basically will a new part of the school system into being." This piece of de Blasio's legacy lives on every time a 4-year-old enters school for the first time. There is also little disagreement on de Blasio's extraordinary accomplishment of ensuring steady drops in crime as the City, initially under pressure from a lawsuit, moved away from the controversial police policy of unconstitutionally stopping and frisking minority men by the hundreds of thousands. Stop-and-frisk had run amok under his predecessor, Michael R. Bloomberg and his police commissioner, Raymond W. Kelly. In 2011, for example, [officers conducted 685,724 street stops with little or no justification](https://www.nyclu.org/data/stop-and-frisk-data?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It was a policy that helped sweep de Blasio into office (remember the [famous ad with his son Dante](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GgvXniTz7D8&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), as was Bloomberg's stated belief that New York was a "luxury product." The stop-and-frisk numbers had declined dramatically in Bloomberg's final years, but the question lingered: Could the new progressive mayor keep crime down, too? De Blasio set aside his ego — again, something he'd have trouble doing down the road — and brought in former police commissioner Bill Bratton. Picking a former commissioner and not his own new guy — one who'd worked for Rudolph Giuliani, of all people — was a bold move, according to Peter Madonia, a former staffer of Mayor Edward I. Koch and chief of staff to Bloomberg who helped advise de Blasio on his transition in 2013. "I told him, 'I think you should pick your own.' I believed that," Madonia said. "You have to have the loyalty of your police commissioner. But at the end of the day, he picked someone else's police commissioner, and it was a really smart thing to do." This decision may have already influenced Mamdani, who has said he wants to keep Adams' popular police commissioner, Jessica Tisch. Fisher, Madonia and others in and around the City Hall firmament point to other de Blasio successes. In 2017, his administration created the NYC Ferry program and extended ferry routes to all five boroughs with fares that were the same as the subway. His Vision Zero traffic safety program brought down pedestrian deaths across the city — to 101 in 2017 from 140 in 2014 — using a variety of enforcement measures and infrastructure improvements. More wonky but nonetheless crucial to a functioning City were his administration's successful negotiations with 13 powerful unions, which somewhat outrageously had been left without contracts by Bloomberg. The de Blasio administration made deals with the teachers union, District Council 37 and all of the uniformed services unions, among others, although not without some drama. Other high points cited by City Hall-watchers of those years include rezoning to the East side of Midtown Manhattan and moderate successes in building affordable housing. It's harder to pinpoint abject policy failures. New Yorkers recall a discernible increase in troubled homeless people, as well as increasingly frequent subway breakdowns, and were quick to blame de Blasio. But the causes of both are complex, with a great deal of the blame being laid at the feet of Cuomo, who [had cut funding for a program called Advantage](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/23/spike-in-homelessness-followed-cuomos-move-to-cut-off-voucher-funds-as-governor-00414646?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that subsidized housing, and whose administration had starved the State-run MTA of funds for years. The most glaring de Blasio policy miss in people's memory, perhaps, was the ThriveNYC program, which was created to address mental health issues. De Blasio assigned it to his wife, Chirlane McCray, despite her lack of experience and the inherent conflict of interest of appointing a family member to such a high-profile role. The program was generally seen as a $1 billion boondoggle, with at least one former official calling it "well-meaning but poorly thought-out." Entrusting ThriveNYC to McCray, who also sat in on job interviews at City Hall, underscores what many saw as de Blasio's most glaring flaw — a kind of goofy arrogance that propelled him to do things that almost any advisors would have begged him to avoid, and almost surely did. Famously, that involved using his security detail to drive him from Gracie Mansion to his favorite gym in his home Brooklyn neighborhood, where, by many accounts, he engaged in less-than-energetic workouts. These morning jaunts were constant fodder for the tabloids. He also was chronically late to events, including emotional memorials. "He had this arrogance about knowing how to fix all the problems," said Karen Hinton, de Blasio's press secretary for a year during his first term. "Once he got his head there, it was very hard to move it. I saw this happen with a lot of people who got very frustrated with him." On the other hand, she added, "What politician on the planet doesn't do that sometimes?" For his part, Madonia said de Blasio "was his own chief of staff, and that's not good." Forgotten by many in the wake of COVID-19 was the 2015 outbreak of Legionnaire's Disease in several Bronx apartment buildings that left 12 dead. At the time, in the view of many, de Blasio acted as the City's doctor-in-chief and took the lead in being the public face of the crisis, sidelining his Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and making the outbreak appear worse than it was. De Blasio's presidential campaign in 2018-2019 suggested to many that he'd lost interest in being the mayor of New York City. And it came with a cost — [he was eventually fined $475,000](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/15/nyregion/de-blasio-fine.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for using City resources (again, his security detail) during the campaign. For Mamdani, this would be more a question of optics than reality — having not been born in the United States, he can never be distracted by an overly optimistic run for president. Notwithstanding Bratton, the former mayor's relationship with rank-and-file police officers was terrible from day one. After officers Rafael Ramos and Wenjian Liu were assassinated in their car in Bedford-Stuyvesant in late 2014, grieving officers turned their backs on de Blasio and McCray in the blood-drenched hospital emergency room just feet from the slain men's corpses. "It was a world gone mad," de Blasio said soon after, clearly rattled. Seemingly intent on avoiding this conflict — after all, he'll be in charge of the cops — Mamdani has already apologized for previous comments he made calling officers racist; only time will tell if that and other gestures will avoid any schisms. De Blasio's relationship with the City Hall press corps was even worse than it was with the police, another example of his misplaced confidence in himself. Arriving late to events and dragging reporters to far corners of the city for modest policy announcements was the least of it. He consciously scorned and mocked journalists, refused to build relationships with them, and paid for it every time the presses rolled. De Blasio "failed to even try to allow the tabloids to get to know him or see him as human," Madonia said. "I begged him to go have a cup of coffee with Murdoch. He refused. Said he didn't need them. So they tortured and embarrassed him for eight years and severely damaged his legacy." Then there were the corruption scandals and investigations. The misdeeds, such as they were, appeared in the view of at least one former City Hall insider to be another example of misplaced confidence, in this case that the former mayor knew how to walk right up to the line of impropriety without crossing it. No one ever accused de Blasio of seeking to line his own pockets. Many of his headaches stemmed from the actions of two real estate developers, Jona Rechnitz and Jeremy Reichberg, who wound up convicted of bribing police and other officials. The mayor had solicited donations from them but was never charged with a crime. This was all especially jarring after three terms of billionaire Bloomberg, who had no reason to engage in fundraising, the realm where the scammers come out to play. In a sense, it was a return to the past. This would seem to be a minimal threat for Mamdani, who's powered his campaign with small donations and has consciously, and quite publicly, eschewed the big money-giving class. De Blasio gets passing marks for his handling of COVID-19, although there are quibbles as to whether he acted too slowly to push for school closures or to reopen restaurants. In any event, by pulling the rug out from under him when it came to most pandemic policies, especially schools, Cuomo at times left de Blasio practically powerless. Which brings us to de Blasio's relationship with the mercurial governor, his former boss at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, who toyed with him like a cat with a mouse throughout his two terms. Engineering a scant one-year extension of mayoral control of the schools and shooting down the 421 tax break for developers, a de Blasio priority, were two of many examples. These prompted de Blasio to publicly slam Cuomo. It's hard to fault de Blasio in this struggle because, as a certain president might say, he didn't have any cards, but observers think his penchant for fighting back wasn't always the best idea. Certainly, it invigorated the cat. "Sometimes when you are fighting with a superior political foe, it might make you feel good to fight with them, but it's not the most responsible thing to do," said one former official who did not want to be quoted by name. The lessons for Mamdani from the two terms of his favorite living former mayor will ultimately be up to the young Democratic Socialist to decide, but topping the list would surely include building bridges with the police and journalists, recruiting a strong team and listening to it, and putting good government ahead of politics. When fundraising, stick to the spirit of the law, not the letter of the law. And pick a gym near Gracie. To his credit, he has so far avoided several de Blasio missteps. His collegial relationship with Gov. Kathy Hochul and his previously mentioned police apology suggest he's paid close attention to the failings of his favorite mayor. And as for de Blasio's legacy? Most of those interviewed felt that his personal foibles would forever outweigh his policy successes in New Yorkers' memories. But Hinton, once deeply frustrated by the man, conceded that his stock has risen for her in recent years. "Looking back on it now, we can understand better the challenges he faced and the risks he took to try to do the right thing, especially for people who are lower-income residents of the city," she said. "Unlike in many ways what Michael Bloomberg had done, Bill took on a whole new class of people as his own and was courageous at times at helping them through really tough times. I think that's one reason Zohran Mamdani has embraced things about Bill, because he relates to that himself." ### Living in the City, Floating on the Hudson: A Conversation with Leslie Day URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/leslie-day-interview-hudson-river-houseboat/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:44.000Z *New York is a city defined, quite literally, by water. The Hudson River flows along Manhattan's western edge, the East River (actually a tidal strait) runs to the east and the Harlem River cuts across the top. These waterways have shaped the city from its earliest days as a Dutch trading post to its current status as a global metropolis.* *The Hudson in particular has been central to New York's identity and economy. For centuries, the river served as the city's highway — ferries carried commuters, barges hauled goods and ocean liners brought immigrants to Ellis Island. There was a downside: Shipyards, warehouses and factories dumped their waste directly into the water. By the mid-20th century, that industrial might had poisoned the river.* *Then came the Clean Water Act of 1972\. Over the following decades, the river came back to life. Fish and birds returned. Today, humpback whales feed in the New York Harbor. It's one of the great environmental success stories in American history — proof that even the most degraded urban ecosystem can recover.* *For 36 years, Leslie Day lived on a houseboat at the 79th Street Boat Basin, raising a son with her husband, teaching science and watching the river heal. Her forthcoming book,* [*"River,"*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501783883/river/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *is a story about finding nature in the heart of the city, about a floating community of people from around the world, and about what it means to have an intimate relationship with a river.* *We recently talked to Day, who now lives in the Bronx, about life on the water, how the Hudson has changed, and what New York loses when it pushes nature to the margins. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.* **Vital City:** Why does a person who loves nature want to live in New York City? **Leslie Day:** I was born in New York City, on West 73rd Street, so I always think of the city as home. However, the only place I truly felt happy as a kid was when I was in nature. When I was five we moved to Forest Hills, near Meadow Lake, which was ringed with weeping willows. Every fall until I was 8 or 9, I'd go down there with a shoebox and my little friends, and we'd collect colorful autumn leaves. Then we'd go under the largest weeping willow — whose hanging branches created a long green curtain — and we'd lay out our leaves, look at all the different colors and then lay down on them and hold hands. The beauty of nature and community still mean everything to me. At the same time, I genuinely love the city. I love being among people from all over the world. At the Boat Basin, we had our cake and ate it too because we were immersed in the natural world and were umbilically tied to the city. We had people from all over the world — from Holland, Italy, Guadalajara, France, Japan, Korea, Australia, Ireland, South Africa, Colombia and Switzerland. All these people came to New York for work, or school or to find themselves, and they wanted to be immersed in the city but close to nature, And then at the end of a long day or night of work we'd come home to the river. We'd walk through the marina gate and be surrounded by peace and beauty. And each night we were rocked to sleep. **VC:** Explain how a person winds up living on a boat in New York City, because it's not something that many people even know is possible. **LD:** I can't tell you how many times I'd get in a cab and say 79th Street Boat Basin, and they'd say, "What? Where?" Most people in New York have never heard of the 79th Street Boat Basin. During the 1960s, I went out to San Francisco during the great Hippie migration, and was introduced to the work of the writer Anaïs Nin. One of her books, "Collages," is a collection of short stories about women who live on houseboats around the world — on the Seine, on the Thames and in Sausalito. I found a boat to live on in Sausalito, and it was there that I found my element: the beauty of the natural world, a tight-knit community, close to a major city. When I came back to New York, I found a boat at the Boat Basin. The first boat I had was called the Mandala, about 375 square feet. I bought it for $4,000 in 1977 — which I had to borrow from friends. It was built by Sean Disney, an architect who built a ferrocement hull in Staten Island, then built the cabins — a tiny living room, a loft bed with a closet under it, a little bathroom and a small galley — the kitchen. There were windows all around and front and upper decks. It was 34 feet long and nine or 10 feet wide. Sean's fiancé hated being on the boat and so he had to get rid of it. When he sold it to me, he said, "Do you want to buy it with the engines or without? It would be $6,000 with the engines or $4,000 without." I didn't even have to think about it. I said, "I don't need the engines." It's such a magical way to live. The sky at dawn and sunset. The changing colors of the river. You're part of an interesting and caring community. We had to help each other through storms, sickness, and loneliness. Together we celebrated births, birthdays, weddings and holidays. It was an extended family. **VC:** Did people come and go? How many people were there for extended periods of time? **LD:** When our son was born in 1980, 110 boats were people's year-round homes. Very few would leave. Most of us stayed for 30, 40, 50 years. People left if they got married and their spouse didn't like to live on the water or if they had too many children to comfortably live on a boat, and of course as people died. One of my neighbors moved to the marina in 1963 and stayed until 2021 when everybody was forced to leave. **VC:** How do you raise a kid on a boat? **LD:** You think of the outside of the boat and the dock like you would the street in front of your building or house. You don't let them out by themselves and you're constantly holding their hand or strapping them into a stroller. When there were storms, like the nor'easter in December 1992, when it rained for three days and the river kept rising, we had our then 12-year-old son Jonah stay with a friend on West End Avenue. We put our dogs and cats in the car in the garage under the Rotunda and stayed up all night watching the river rise up the pilings that our boat was tied to until there was one inch left. Then it stopped raining and the tide went out. Several boats sank. It was a devastating storm. The winters were freezing, and boats aren't insulated. We had every kind of heater imaginable over the 36 years. If it was below freezing, the fresh water hose on the dock had to run 24/7 until there was a thaw. If anybody kinked the hose, the whole line would freeze up. We'd have to detach the hoses, bring them into our boats, put them by our heaters until they thawed out, then reattach them. But winter was beautiful and we had Riverside park to ourselves. **VC:** Everyone was kicked out in 2021, when the City vacated the marina. Who in New York City lives on the water these days, and where? **LD:** The majority of my neighbors moved their boats to Liberty Landing Marina in Jersey City, near the Statue of Liberty. They've maintained their community, but in Jersey. Many just gave up their boats. There's still the Rockaways — a marina there with few restrictions. There's a houseboat community on Westchester Creek in the Bronx. But leaving the Upper West Side, where our doctors, pharmacies, gyms, hospitals, all the stores, restaurants, houses of worship and friends are, and moving to Jersey City where, at least right near the marina, there's nothing, is tough. When you're going to live on a boat, you want to live near a thriving neighborhood. **Reflections on the city and water** **VC:** What do you think you learned about nature — and the city — living on the water? **LD:** Nature abounds in the city. We have over 30,000 acres of parkland, hundreds of thousands of street trees, gardens, a tremendous diversity of bird life and pollinating insects. Once you take the time to look, to stop and focus on the natural world, it is astounding how much is here. No matter what borough you live in, as long as there are trees, you're going to have all kinds of life. Just being able to identify everything that I see makes all my anxiety and worries fade away. I'm totally in the present, taking in the beauty. It's so therapeutic. If you get into birds, different leaf shapes, the different types of flowers that trees produce — there's so much to learn and see every single day. Living on the Hudson allows you to experience the diversity of fish, crabs, shrimp and shore birds. **VC:** Have you noticed changes in the waterways around New York City over the years? **LD:** When I moved to the Boat Basin in 1975, the only birds I saw were cormorants and some gulls. Before the Clean Water Act, every toilet from the southern tip of Manhattan to Inwood flushed directly into the Hudson. The river was a sewer. From the '40s to the '70s, there was a General Motors plant in Tarrytown, and at the end of every day they would dump all the leftover paint into the Hudson. You could look at the river and tell what color they were using to paint the cars that day. Then there was General Electric, which for 30 years dumped hundreds of tons of highly toxic PCBs into the river that still make certain fish and crabs inedible for children and pregnant women. The Hudson remains a superfund site from New York Harbor 200 miles north to Hudson Falls. But since the Clean Water Act and the building of the North River Sewage Treatment Plant, the native fish that left the river have returned. The bird life has come back. All the animals that feed on the fish have come back, including whales. There are hundreds of humpback whales now along the coast of New York City, and dolphins. It's just fantastic. The government did such a good thing by passing that act. **VC:** We've seen a significant increase in the active use of the water — we now have an active ferry network, as well as people who run and play along the water. **LD:** There used to be a tremendous number of ferries bringing people from the outer boroughs to Manhattan for work. It's wonderful that we have that again. When the river was still swimmable, there were bathing beaches along the Palisades. In the summers, two million people would take the ferry from Inwood to Englewood Cliffs to spend the day and swim. You can swim in the river now. I started swimming off my boat in 1998. I love watching the ferries and sailboats, especially the Clearwater, the sloop that Pete Seeger built to educate people about the Hudson. When we lived at the Boat Basin I'd kayak from April through November. From our building in Riverdale I'm able to see the river, though from a distance, and I love watching everything: the sightseeing boats, the tankers, the jet skis and recreational boats. **VC:** What is it that's so pleasurable about looking out at the water? **LD:** Water is mesmerizing — the way it moves and the way it reflects the light and shimmers. Right now, as we speak, the Hudson's going from blue to green to yellowish green to almost white. We respond to color. The color blue has a calming effect. I swim almost every day in our building's pool. Looking through my goggles at the blueness of the water makes me happy. Where do we go when we take vacations? We go to the water. It's nice to be near a lake or a pond or a beautiful stream. Then there are all the animals that use the water. It's so interesting to watch the birds diving and hunting. When we lived on the boat I would feed the swans, geese, ducks and gulls. The fish would follow the birds as I was feeding them. Some of the fish would goose the birds to make them drop the food, and then the fish would eat it. It was thrilling. My husband took a picture of me feeding the swans with our cat Woody on my shoulder. Woody loved it when I fed the birds. He would jump onto my shoulder and lean out the window with me to watch the swans reach up for the food. It was magical. The Boat Basin was what one of my neighbors called a magical village. Simone di Bagno, who had emigrated here from Rome and was a documentary filmmaker for the United Nations, said there were *pueblos magicos* — magical villages — in Mexico. Simone said that the Boat Basin was one of the few magical villages left in the world. ### Curtis Sliwa Talks Public Safety URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/curtis-sliwa-talks-public-safety/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:44.000Z *On Monday, Oct. 6, in the second of a series of sit-downs with New York City mayoral candidates, Republican mayoral nominee Curtis Sliwa took questions at a Vital City event co-sponsored by Columbia Journalism School. Sliwa was quizzed on his public safety philosophy and proposals by Errol Louis, Spectrum News NY1 political anchor and Vital City contributing writer. What follows is a complete, unedited transcript.* **Personal safety, security detail, campaign climate** **Errol Louis:** Thanks so much for being here, and in the interest of time, I want to jump right into some things. You made a little bit of news, I noticed, on the way up today: that you now have a full security detail that you did not have before. According to the reports, it said this was because of credible threats. What can you tell us about that? **Curtis Sliwa:** I’m the oldest candidate, 71, and Errol, you’ve seen me come and go. I’ve never had security. But both I and my wife were subject of direct threats, and so over the weekend I had armed security with me for the first time. Now you gotta understand I’m a guy who was targeted by the Gottis and Gambinos and shot five times with hollow point bullets, I never had armed security. But my wife is the most important thing in my life. Obviously, the rhetoric is way too high. Zohran Mamdani is getting all these threats. We need to lower it, let the people decide in the election. And in order to have a safe and secure election, I’ve agreed to have armed security with me, and my wife will have armed security with her. **Errol Louis:** When you say armed security, you mean the NYPD? **Curtis Sliwa:** No. These are former members of the NYPD. They’re part of a private security team who have liaison with the NYPD. **Errol Louis:** You’re entitled to a police detail the same way Zohran Mamdani as the democratic nominee has received. Did you specifically not want that? **Curtis Sliwa:** Yeah. In 2021, when I ran against Eric Adams, I felt that police were better served to be in the community. We didn’t have enough police. And at the start of this campaign, I made the same claim. And you know, I’m in the subways every day — the only candidate to actually campaign in the subways and the buses and the express buses. Never felt the need for security. But when you have credible threats, then you have to do what’s best for the campaign, and also try to bring all this craziness that exists. “You gotta get out of the race. You are responsible for Mamdani.” Guess what? Let the people decide who the next mayor is and not the billionaires. That’s my opinion. They’ve interfered too much in this race, the professional political class. I trust the people you know. I’ve always trusted the people. I’m well received by the people. But there are people out there with their agendas, and we’re gonna make sure that everything is safe and secure up until November 4th, and I’ll live with the decision that the people make as to who their next mayor is. **Errol Louis:** As far as you know, are the threats from within New York or from somewhere else? **Curtis Sliwa:** We’ll discuss that with police intel tomorrow when I go there. **Errol Louis:** Okay. One of your opponents around Momani joined us for a forum just like this, sat right in that chair last month. Another, Andrew Cuomo, has not yet agreed to attend. I’m wondering if you think you should and if you’re, well… **Curtis Sliwa:** Of course he should. Because I’ve said about Andrew Cuomo that he is not the law-and-order candidate that he pretends to be because he is the author of No Cash Bail, Raise the Age, closing Rikers Island. I know Zohran Mamdani shares that belief. I’m the only person outside of that, who was opposed to that. Obviously, when we debate, the two debates, we’ll have one with NY1, I’m gonna bring those subjects up. But I probably have more experience in the public safety field than both of them together. **Stats, strategy, tactics, staffing** **Errol Louis:** In general, I want to talk less about what is working as a political campaign position and more about what’s gonna happen in 88 days or so from now when the next mayor is sworn in. And what happens if that happens to be you. Let’s start out with, how safe is the city now and I don’t just mean a static quantity of safety, more or less this or that number, but the profile, the shape: How are things going as far as you’re concerned? **Curtis Sliwa:** Because I am in the streets and subways every day, I hear from a wide variety of people. The people who feel most stressed out? Women — and I don’t think in this election cycle, women’s voices are being heard. Because my wife, who made our first TV commercial — and Errol, I stayed quiet. Everybody who knows me, I’ve never stayed quiet in my life. She pointed out how, even in the subways and streets, men are sexually harassing women. They’re perving on women. They’re making life so threatening in what they call these “random attacks.” A random attack? They’re targeting women. And we don’t seem to be prioritizing them. Look, they’re the majority of the workers. Many of them are the single parent leaders in the household who pay all the bills and raise the kids. And if you consider nightlife, they not only own restaurants, bars and nightclubs, they manage ‘em. They work there. And one universal thing they say to me “I can’t keep affording to pay for yellow cabs, Lyfts and Ubers.” We’re not focused on their needs. And I think we do ourselves a disservice because a lot of them are just not coming out into the streets and going into the subways at different times. **Errol Louis:** So now, for the first quarter of this year, homicides are down 34%. Shootings are down 23%, assaults are near 25-year highs. So there’s these different numbers that are out there. What number do you want be judged by if you’re sworn in 88 days from now? **Curtis Sliwa:** I’ll give you an example, Errol. I heard the police commissioner Jessica Tisch say over July 4th, Wow. First time we never had any shootings. I’m a street guy. I heard a lot of bullets being fired. If the bullet does not hit the intended target, it doesn’t go on the stats in the precinct. It doesn’t go up to CompStat. So that means if we are gang members and I’m firing at you and I hit a tree, or I hit a bird, or I blow out the back window of a Toyota Corolla, that’s a crime. Doesn’t go on the books. So I truly believe that a lot of the statistics are suppressed. Just to give you a few: 90,000 packages a day are stolen in New York City. The mayor has admitted that publicly. So that’s FedEx, Amazon, USPS, UPS. You go to the precinct and say, “Hey, few of my packages were stolen.” They won’t take a report because if it’s over $1,000, it’s a felony. Then when you look at all the shoplifting that takes place. The men and women who do that, they have an E-ZPass to go in and out. A lot of that is not reported. And the last category is stolen mail, which definitely affects the outer boroughs that I represent. Towards the end of the month Social Security checks, debit cards, credit cards. They go right into the box. They don’t even wear a mask. They wave. Try to go to a local precinct and report that. They won’t even take a report on it. So that’s the way they cook the books. I’ve been into all 350 neighborhoods in this city. Some are friendly, some are not. I’ve yet to find one person, say, “Oh, Curtis, you’re really exaggerating this. I feel so much safer and more comfortable in New York City.” **Errol Louis:** You, you have an interesting proposal to create a long-term plan for crime reduction. Could you say more about that? Because I never really thought about it, but you point out on your website, New York City has no long-term plan to dramatically lower crime. How would you do that? **Curtis Sliwa:** First and foremost, it starts with the police. I don’t think people quite understand that not only do we not have enough police, but they are the only civil servants who have had the insurance that we all pay for stripped from them. It’s called qualified immunity. It’s a fancy name, but it’s really the insurance that guarantees that if something goes awry, we, the taxpayer cover it. Now, judges every day sentence, men unfairly. They get out 25 years later. We find out it was wrong. DAs. All of a sudden they don’t get sued. Cuomo himself, sexual harassment charges, 13\. \[State Comptroller\] Tom DiNapoli has said, we’ve paid out $60 million in settlement. He doesn’t pay a penny because of qualified immunity. I’ve got to fight to get that restored because not only do we need 7,000 new cops, we need them to feel comfortable in doing their work, which they don’t do now. So that’s step number one. Step number two, we need to bring back the homeless outreach unit. These were men and women police officers dedicated to dealing with homeless and emotionally disturbed. When Bill de Blasio and the City Council pulled $1 billion out of the budget for the police in the summer of 2020, they disbanded this great unit. They knew the clients. They would go into the homeless shelters, they’d speak with the directors, the security, they’d speak with community leaders. Once they disbanded that, they left it to the local precinct. And those are men and women who are not trained to deal with that. It takes a very strong skill level. And number two, they don’t have the connections to deal with that. And we’ve seen the rampant rise of homeless, emotionally disturbed, not only in the subways, but in the parks, in the streets. So I think long-term, that’s what we do. **Errol Louis:** Okay. I wanna come back to that in a couple of minutes, but let’s get into the staffing of the NYPD. The department currently has about 33,000 officers down from 37,000 in 2018\. You want to hire 7,000 more. Why is that necessary given we saw a steep decline in crime over the last 20 years, and the size of the force was declining along with it? **Curtis Sliwa:** We don’t see visibility now. Visibility is such a key to making people feel more comfortable. So whether you’re merchants, whether you’re residents of a community, the women, the elderly, the infirm, who are being targeted for attack. When you see the blue uniforms out there — and by the way, they better put their caps on. They know there’s the cops. They don’t put their caps on. Gotta put your caps on, that’s how you spot them in a crowd. So there are certain things I would do tactically. In the subways, they have the police assigned to what they call the transit police, but they never go up and down the trains as they used to. Now before they could patrol by one. Because of all the emotionally disturbed, they determine they’re safer if they patrol by two. I don’t care, but in uniform, they should start in the rear car, walk all the way up, all the way back. You’d be surprised how many people will tell, “You there’s a man in another car. He’s having a problem. He’s banging his head on the side of the door.” That’s not a crime, but they can then take him out and get him the help that he desperately needs. These are the kinds of things you’re never gonna know if you are assigned to a platform. And by the way, they get assigned near the turnstiles, they do nothing about fair evasion. Fair evasion has cost us $1 billion according to the Citizen Bureau \[Citizens Budget Commission\] that has determined that. **Errol Louis:** Did you pick this up from your years of patrolling with the Guardian Angels? **Curtis Sliwa:** Oh yeah. Remember 46 years and had pretty much seen what works in the subways, what doesn’t work. I cannot comprehend why they are not putting police officers on the moving trains. Now last year we had a subway crime crisis. Kathy Hochul, to her credit, assigned close to 1,000 National Guardspersons. The big time was when Debrina Kawam, who they all want to forget, that’s the woman who was set on fire like a torch on December 22nd of 2024 in the F train at Coney Island Stillwell by the migrant who watched it, the pyromaniac. The cops didn’t know how to handle it. The people who were all filming it live at five. And I see this on a repeated basis. That’s a stain on our soul, that we’re not resolving the emotionally disturbed and the homeless issue. These people live in the trains. It’s not good to live in the trains. **Errol Louis:** Does that, does any of this change because there are now cameras on apparently all of the cars? **Curtis Sliwa:** No they’re not in all the cars, but they’re in a lot of the cars. In fact, we had on the train down at Whitehall Street, this was the most bizarre thing I’ve ever experienced in the, since I was five years old, 1959, I’ve been riding the trains by myself. A man comes onto the train, it’s on camera. Unfortunately, a migrant has died on the train. He rapes the migrant on the train. It’s a dead person. You then watch the film, continuous people come on. I guess they thought it was filming a TV show. A woman comes on later, unattached to the guy, the rapist, and she then picks the dead man’s pockets. No police. Sure you have it on, but no response because we just don’t have enough cops. I’ve never seen anything so egregious in my life, all the years that we’ve focused on subway patrols. And it’s not getting better, it’s getting worse. **Errol Louis:** The department is struggling to fill the seats that are currently vacant. How would you hire 7,000 more, and are you worried about quality declining? **Curtis Sliwa:** Well, that’s always a problem because a lot of the potentially young and middle-aged men and women who might seek a career in law enforcement, sometimes they’re being lured away as soon as they get into the NYPD. I remember showing up at Jacob Javits Center, they were having a sergeant’s test, about 4,000 of the men and women, you know, the number 2 pencils, they were there. They had RVs outside from the Tidewater Peninsula in Virginia. Tempe, Arizona, come on in offering them, they would bring them to their community, pay the first year of housing them, improved opportunities and moving up the ranks, feeling better as a police officer in those communities. And that’s the problem. We end up recruiting a lot of men and women, and they end up leaving the department three years later because obviously they have the experience of the NYPD. We’re not offering anything to keep them, to maintain the police officers. The first five years are miserable for a police officer. They’re usually sleeping in the basement of their mom and dad’s house until they eventually have enough money to get their own apartment. Affordability is a crisis for everybody in New York City. The rent is too high to pay, as Jimmy McMillan said in 2010 when he debated Governor Cuomo. It’s now way too high to pay and include police officers and say, “I can’t find anything affordable on the five boroughs.” That’s why sometimes you see them going all the way up to Dutchess and Orange County in order to find something affordable. **Errol Louis:** You have called for increasing salaries and benefits on the front side. And you say that would reduce the need for overtime? **Curtis Sliwa:** Oh, absolutely. Look, overtime should exist because there are plenty of men and women who need the overtime. But there are plenty of men and women who don’t want the overtime because it’s affecting their family life, their domestic life. So if the overtime is available and there are those that need it, fine. But don’t force it. That’s what’s destroying the morale of the police department now. And by the way, after eight hours, you’re not as effective. If you’re on 12-hour tour, you’re not as effective. And speaking of that, the group that gets no attention, no recognition, the most dangerous job in the city — because I’ve been on the rock — Rikers Island, the Department of Correction. They’re on 12-hour shifts. It’s a perpetual, Errol, 911 call. They can’t do anything about the tiers. The gangs control the tiers. It’s predominantly women of color now who are the correctional officers, they’re getting sexually assaulted, sexually harassed. Where’s the #MeToo crowd? They’re not around for women of color in corrections. And you know what? They end up getting sent back to the same tier, there’s no discipline of the inmates who are harassing the female correctional officers. **Errol Louis:** We have a lot to talk about with the jails in a minute. Let’s talk about quality of life though. Generally speaking, do you think the broken windows theory is correct? Meaning, if you let small quality of life violations go unaddressed, it will actually lead to serious crime? **Curtis Sliwa:** I think there’s a variation of that. I’ll give you a perfect example. We know that the recreational use of marijuana is legal. You go into a state-licensed store, you buy it, you use it for your personal use, whatever you want to do. But when people are whipping out blunts and smoking it in public, and then I show up with an interview for you, Errol Louis, and you’re saying, “Oh, you’ve been doing puff pass, huh?” It’s like there’s a purple haze that hangs over the city. It’s not legal to smoke it in public. There’s no enforcement whatsoever. You go on a beach,: you see you can’t smoke cigarettes, cigars, tiparillos. What if I got a blunt on the beach? Nobody does anything about it. You have to enforce what is. It’s legal, it’s recreational, obviously medical marijuana. I’ve used that, medical marijuana, series of injuries I had. I had prostate cancer. I had Crohn’s Disease, shot five times. I know the benefits of that. But you can’t let people be smoking it out in public. Then you smell like, yourself, like you’ve been, like, you’ve been doobing up. **Errol Louis:** So do the idea or the question of having cops respond to relatively minor quality of life violations — shoplifting, fare evasion, public urination, public intoxication of whatever kind. What about the argument that it is wasteful to have one of these highly trained, highly paid officers that you want to recruit chasing after a guy for stealing a $20 bottle of shampoo? **Curtis Sliwa:** Yeah. Unless you happen to be in the store, and then it’s learned behavior. Isn’t it crazy that the number one question I get asked by people who come into New York City, whether they’re tourists or they work, or they live here, “Curtis, we live in a city where we lock up toothpaste and we don’t lock up criminals.” We lock up toothpaste. You know how many times you’ve been in a pharmacy and you have to wait 20 minutes for an attendant to come with the keys to open up something because it’s constantly being stolen. Men and women will come in with duffel bags and fill it up and then just walk out like they own the store. There’s no enforcement whatsoever. Part of that is the responsibility of the DAs. The DAs will cut ‘em loose under what premise? No cash bail. Thank you, Governor Andrew Cuomo, because you are not only the author, you inspired it. And in the primary against Zohran Mamdani and the other Democratic challengers, remember, he doubled down on no cash bail. **Errol Louis:** Let’s talk about the DAs. The district attorneys — and I moderated many of these debates, followed this, interviewed them many times. They have decided, and the voters ratified this decision, not to use prosecutorial resources to chase shoplifters, fare beaters and minor violations. They got elected on a promise not to do. If you are the mayor and you disagree with what they’re doing, where does that leave you? **Curtis Sliwa:** I’d put it up for charter revision. I believe, as you know, Errol, in initiative and referendum. I favored term limits, I favored ranked choice. I think it’s the people’s right to make those determinations. If the people make that determination — like sanctuary cities, I would’ve put it out there for a vote. If I’m the mayor, I’m opposed sanctuary cities. But if the people vote for sanctuary cities, then I have to do what is the will of the people. I don’t trust the politicians and the lobbyists and the professional class of people who try to control those things. I trust people to make the right decisions. I think they should. Now, I happen to know one of the DAs, Melinda Katz, who is the mother of my two youngest sons. So when I visit, we have conversations. “Would you let go of this, that guy who set the dog on fire after killing it. No cash bail.” “I had no, I was handcuffed because of the Cuomo law, no cash bail.” So whether it’s humans or animals — and as you know, I have the first independent line ever Protect Animals, which is no-kill shelters, animal abusers go to jail — but every time I ask, the blowback I get is “the Cuomo…No cash bail. No cash bail.” **Errol Louis:** But let’s put the responsibility where it belongs, which I think is with the voters. I mean, I moderated that debate with Melinda Katz. The same thing went down in the Manhattan District Attorney’s race. We’re gonna have another debate in a couple of weeks, and I don’t expect it to go any different. The voters have said to the district attorneys, “we do not want our highly paid six-figure cops chasing after $20 fare…you know, shoplifters. We don’t want that.” The district attorney then follows that guidance from the voters, stops prosecuting those cases and we end up where we are. **Curtis Sliwa:** Well, that was before we saw the complete catastrophe. As you know, with charter revision, you can come back two years later. Why not put it up for a review in simple language and let the people make the determination? I think people have had enough of this no cash bail. I think if you put it up for a vote, people would say, “I’m tired of the fact that I’m watching people go in and out of a store with an E-ZPass stealing products that I have to pay for. And obviously the prices go up. You don’t think the store owners are absorbing that loss. You just raise the prices. That’s part of the reason that prices are so high and it’s unaffordable. **Homelessness, mental illness and street disorder** **Errol Louis:** Let’s talk about disorder on the streets and in the subways and mental illness in particular. For people who are visibly unstable or in need of help, what would be the street-level triage you would favor? Like when do you send engagement teams? When do you call EMS? When do you send the cops? When do you mandate involuntary transport or even arrest? How do you do that? **Curtis Sliwa:** It’s always been the goal. We saw that with Bill de Blasio and his wife Chirlane, who ran a program called Thrive. In five years, they spent one and a half billion dollars. They were gonna have Thrive members, specially trained, go out there and deal with the emotionally disturbed, sometimes in tandem with police. What happened? Never happened. Eric Adams said the same thing. Never happened. I don’t have a problem with that, but it’s gotta happen at the precinct level. Your first responders are probably gonna be the police. This also goes for domestic abuse. Zohran Mamdani said, “I’ll send social workers.” Apparently, he hasn’t had the experience I’ve had with the Guardian Agnels. You go in, domestic abuse, it’s the most violent situation you can face. You are always wrong. You’re never right. The police sometimes would come later. It is the most dangerous situation for everybody involved in that room or that apartment. I don’t think social workers alone can deal with it. I’ve dealt with emotionally disturbed persons. As you know, I have really good feel for these men and women. Some that I know on a first-name basis. They need hospital care. Again, I have to go to Andrew Cuomo. When he came into office, 40,000 beds in the state mental health facilities. By the time he fled, fearing impeachment, to the Hamptons, 4,000 beds. He cut dramatically the number of state beds. **Errol Louis:** So if you’re mayor on January 1st, what do you do? **Curtis Sliwa:** Well, because the state may not respond — Hopefully Hochul would, or maybe the next governor — but you would have to increase… **Errol Louis:** She funded, I think, about 700 beds… **Curtis Sliwa:** Right. You would have to increase the number of municipal beds. Now, remember during the lockdown and pandemic, we were all frightened. Nobody knew what would happen. Friends of ours healthy one day would go into the ICU, ER, come out in a body bag the next. I knew of people, you probably knew of people. So they released all the mental healthcare patients in the private hospitals and the municipal. I get that. They had to do that. They needed the beds, but they never went back afterwards to find them. Some of them still walk around with the hospital tags. I read ‘em all the time. “Oh, you were in Bellevue. This is the medication you’re taking. Have you had your medication since?” “No.” “Have you gone for therapy?” “No.” All that does is exacerbate what ails them. Now, if we had a child crawling around — obviously, the thought process of a child, we would immediately rescue that child. We have elderly and we have adults who have the mind of a child who’ve lost control of their mental and physical faculties, wallowing in their own defecation and in their own urine, and we just go like this \[covers eyes\]. We Guardian Angels, we don’t. We care for them. We try to give them food, clothing, sustenance, try to get to know them on a first-name basis. I don’t know of anybody in the city who does that, and we supposedly spend millions of dollars in order to do outreach. **Errol Louis:** So talk about it though. If this person that you’ve encountered on the street, who should respond, should it be EMS? Should it be NYPD? Should it be somebody else? **Curtis Sliwa:** Could be a combination. Let’s take Jordan Neely. That’s the case that everybody remembers. He ended up being restrained by Daniel Penny. And everybody has a different point of view on that, but Jordan Neely was living in the subways for years. I knew Jordan Neely. He used to come entertain the…Guardian Angels during Christmas. He was a great imitator of Michael Jackson. He lived right in Washington House. Then he digressed. Imagine he was living in the subways. You had some outreach units who listed him as part of the 50 most dangerous individuals who were living in the subways. Well f they’re dangerous to themselves and everyone else, why do we then just let them live in the subways? **Errol Louis:** Okay, so January 1st or January 2nd, who do you give an order to? That same top 50 list. The names might change, but there will be a list. And it is a relatively small universe, which is what makes it so frustrating, right? There’s probably not more than 2,000 or 3,000 from what I’ve been told by… **Curtis Sliwa:** It’s a lot of people. **Errol Louis:** It’s a lot, but you have their names. What do you who do you call in as Mayor Sliwa? Who do you call in? And what order do you give them? **Curtis Sliwa:** You sit with your police commissioner. I would hope that Jessica Tisch would continue to serve, only to maintain stability, because Adams created chaos at One Police Plaza. And then you say, “I want to put back into effect the homeless outreach unit.” Trained professional police officers If we want assign them with healthcare workers, mental healthcare workers, so be it. But let’s do it, because we talked about it for eight years with De Blasio. We talked about it for four years with Eric Adams, and they haven’t done it. I’ll make sure it gets done. **Errol Louis:** There’s some findings from other jurisdictions, and I think this is what was behind the idea of a 988 instead of a 911 phone system for New York, that cops showing up with guns and handcuffs is a non-therapeutic approach that freaks people out. They don’t want the services, it’s not necessarily gonna stick. They might even regress rather than get help. Any thought to that? **Curtis Sliwa:** I’ve seen that sometimes. The psychosis of the individual is so strong that they have a negative reaction to almost anybody who approaches them. A combination of the two: specially trained police officers who can work with healthcare providers, mental healthcare providers. I think that’s the route to go. But sometimes, remember that 911 call comes in, it’s an emergency. Somebody has a knife to their throat. It’s a domestic situation. The cops are gonna be the first responders, you can’t wait. Zohran Mamdnai’s plan of just having social workers respond will lead to the deaths of women and children. I’ve been in too many of those situations to see mostly men…. **Errol Louis:** You’ve also seen cases going back to Eleanor Bumpurs, Gidone Busch, Deborah Danner, we could call out names all day. Saheed Vassell. **Curtis Sliwa:** Eleanor Bumpurs, I knew that situation personally. She was in the Sedgwick Housing Project. **Errol Louis:** Somebody emotionally disturbed, the cops show up first, and they kill the person. Usually within minutes. **Curtis Sliwa:** I remember at that time, \[Phil\] Caruso and the PBA \[police union\] was going at \[longtime Bronx DA\] Mario Merola who I knew personally, who was a friend of mine, and I stood with Mario Merola, got a lot of blowback from the PBA. **Errol Louis:** How do you prevent that from happening? It’s been going on for decades now. **Curtis Sliwa:** I understand. And that’s finally we’re gonna prioritize that. It wasn’t prioritized by de Blasio. It wasn’t prioritized by Eric Adams. You have the people train first. Remember, the one thing that the police department really does well. Training training training training. Obviously anti-terrorism unit, disaster, OEM, Office of Emergency Management. A lot of the time, it’s training, training. There’s no training involved in this. That’s why the homeless outreach unit is so important. There are men and women who are dedicated to helping these people, and then you team them up with mental healthcare workers. But it has to be rapid response. And I know, I’m the person who can do it, because they’re all…I do it all the time with the Guardian Angels. I’m very proficient at this. **Criminal justice reform** **Errol Louis:** Let me switch topics and talk a little bit about bail and court reform. You’ve mentioned even just this morning that you have some problems with the bail reform laws from 2019\. Let me just ask as a threshold question: Do you accept the basic premise that the only reason for bail is actually to ensure that a defendant shows up in court? I mean it’s not intended as a crime control measure. **Curtis Sliwa:** I don’t accept that premise because if a person has had a history of violent crimes being committed, crimes in which people’s lives are threatened, I think a judge should have to be able to consider that. That’s not part of no cash bail. So we see a turnstile. Now, I’ve been arrested, you know, Errol, 81 times the first 13 years. The police hated the Guardian Angels. I’ve been on Rikers Island in the dorm in what they call Punk City, protective custody. I’ve seen the system inside out. I’ve gotten wooden shampoos and concrete facials from cops who didn’t like us, and then eventually they learned: Wow, these are really good young men and young women who want to make a difference. So I know what it’s like to be abused, but I also know the differentiation between those who should be available for being released back into society and those who have proven themselves to be a danger to society again and again. **Errol Louis:** Why should cash be the tool? So like, if two people are arrested on suspicion of robbery, one happens to have money, they walk free waiting for their day in court, the other has to sit on Rikers Island ‘cause they don’t have a few hundred dollars. Is that fair? And how does that make the city… **Curtis Sliwa:** You want to change it to Venmo? One of those things? **Errol Louis:** The average person, at the time that they passed these, the average person was staying on Rikers Island for hundreds of days. And they were staying on average, I think it was like less than $500\. **Curtis Sliwa:** Understood. And that needs to be reformed. But I also know of many families who have the wherewithal to bail out their sons, their daughters mostly, and they won’t put up the bail. That tells you something right there, because they know this is a person who is a danger to the family and a danger to everybody else. Look, I’m open to working on it. It’s really more of a state issue because that was imposed by Governor Cuomo. It can be dealt with, but I think by experts in the field…remember, when Cuomo imposed no cash bail, he never contacted police. He never contacted prosecutors. He never contacted people in the field and put together a cross-section of people to come up with a plan that was fair. He basically just shoved it down our throats. And we’ve been suffering with this ever since. **Errol Louis:** I know he’s your opponent and he did sign the law, but my sense, my memory of it was that this really came from the legislature. **Curtis Sliwa:** Oh, who ever forced Andrew Cuomo to do anything, bully boy that he was? He threatened, he used intimidation.You remember Ron Kim, the assemblyman. “How dare he stand up and accuse me of having killed 15,000 elderly because of my executive order?” He tried to drive that guy outta the assembly. You know how Cuomo operated, like the head of an organized crime family. That’s why he was able to come back from being like Napoleon on the Island of Elba escaping, being impeached, because everybody was afraid of him. They all endorsed because they said, if you don’t endorse Cuomo, he’ll get retribution and revenge on you. That’s the only reason he came back. **Errol Louis:** So it sounds if elected, you’re going to put on your wishlist when you go up to Albany, the first session trying to change the bail reform laws. Does that include… **Curtis Sliwa:** Alter it, sit down and say, “Hey, I’m somebody who’s been on both sides of it.” The other thing is the gang issue. We have a gang roster. I’ve recruited gang members into the Guardian Angels. I know that there are some young men and young women, they haven’t had affiliation with a gang in five years. They’re still on the gang roster. You gotta take ‘em off. It’s like okay, you put ‘em on. If they’re active, you take ‘em off. If they’re not active, I always suggest to the young men and women, especially the older ones, you get laser, you get the tattoos off, ‘cause you are walking around, MS-13 on your neck like a giraffe, people are gonna think you’re MS-13\. You might no longer be involved with them for five years. But that should be reflected on the roster. And if you’re a gang member, I would suggest get rid of the gang tattoos because people are gonna think, you’ve got tattoos of a gang, you’re a gang member. **Errol Louis:** So when the City Council says we should get rid of the gang intelligence unit, it sounds like you’re on the same page. **Curtis Sliwa:** You can’t do that. We’ve had an uptick of gang violence, mostly juveniles, 16 to 18 because of the Raise the Age law that Zohran is in favor of that Cuomo did. I’m opposed to that because older gang members then use the younger ones to go out and do the drive-by shootings and commit the violent acts because they know there are almost no consequences for that, they end up going to family court. **Errol Louis:** When they changed the law, New York was an outlier. I think it was only New York and North Carolina that were treating 16-year-olds as adults. You Want go back to that? **Curtis Sliwa:** No. You alter it, but you also make special accommodations that you’re not gonna be sending hardened criminals who have been killers or people who have raped to juvie prisons. You’re just not gonna do that. You have to be able to bifurcate this. See, I’m open-minded. I don’t think I’m omnipotent, as much experience that I’ve had in public safety. I would say, let’s sit down. Let’s have town hall meetings, let’s have forums. Let’s try to work on something that’s viable. We’re not doing that. It’s basically “My way. That’s the way it is.” I don’t think many of the legislators are street smart. In fact, I know they’re not street smart ‘cause they never ride the subways. They never walk the streets. They’re not taking buses, they’re not dealing with the working-class people. That’s why I’ve dubbed myself the mayor of the working class people, who never, their considerations are never put up and prioritized. **Errol Louis:** Given the case backlogs, are there process reforms like digital discovery or remote arraignments that you would favor in order to speed up trial readiness. That’s partly why so many people are sitting in jail. **Curtis Sliwa:** Oh, yeah. I love the old fashioned newspapers, the Jersey Journal, which was over in Jersey City by Journal Square, they would show you all the arraignments that were done vis-a-vis television, teleprompter. The attorney is there for the accused, the judge, they’re able to give speedy justice to the accused and also make the system more malleable. The way it is now? No. It’s so slow that nobody benefits from this process. And in an age of technology, where we should be able to…Errol, I gotta tell you a story. ‘cause I know your whole family was involved with the police: In order to make overtime, when the cops busted me, they had to get three sheets of carbon paper and they would type it out. “How do you spell your name?” “S-L-I.” At the end of the report, they say, “Oh, Curtis. That last piece of carbon paper didn’t work. We’re gonna have to start the process all over again.” I said, “How many kids am I putting through college for you by doing this?” We have such great technology now. A lot of the old school ways just don’t work. **Corrections, immigration and civic management** **Errol Louis:** The next mayor is gonna have to deal with a federally appointed receiver over Rikers Island to address the violence and the poor management. The Adams administration resisted the appointment. Do you agree outside intervention was needed? And if you’re elected, would you be cooperating with the monitor? **Curtis Sliwa:** I would say to the feds, “How dare you assume that you could do a better job on Rikers Island?” We have one fed lockup in Sunset Park. It’s miserable, as you know Errol, it’s horrible the conditions there. So having a federal monitor, basically because Eric Adams and the Adams administration ignored communication back and forth… his correctional commissioners. I think had he been more forthcoming, had there been more transparency, we wouldn’t have gotten into this draconian situation. But remember recently his police commissioner who filed charges against him saying that Eric Adams ran the police department as if he was a head of organized crime. No transparency, not revealing what’s going on in an agency that we as citizens have a right to know what’s going on, I think is true to form. And that’s why you have a federal receivership: refusal to deal. Like with the Campaign Finance Board. How many times did the Campaign Finance Board ask Eric Adams, “How could you account for these contributions from Turkish American business people?” And they never responded and always acted like they were victims. That was part of the Eric Adams administration. Non-response. I would have a totally transparent administration. The good, but also the bad and the ugly. We like the good news bears, right? But you know, in government, a lot of bad news bears. And the other thing I would elevate are the civil servants, many of them who have served for Democrats and Republicans, they’re the silent number of people who keep the government going. Because elected officials, I don’t care if they’re Republicans or Democrats, are too busy dialing for dollars. The staff does all the work. As you know, Errol, they never get put on a pedestal. They’re never given an opportunity of exposing great ideas. There are correctional officers I deal with all the time. They have some great ideas. As mayor, I would sit back, I’d analyze, I’d have to sign off on it, I’d say, “But you, George, you are the one who was the architect of this. You’ve been a correctional officer for 32 years. You know the system inside out. I want you to give the press conference and explain how this works.” Wouldn’t that be a novel idea? **Errol Louis:** I mean, it’s reminiscent of how you know Jack Maple and some of the other lieutenants…. **Curtis Sliwa:** Wouldn’t that be a novel idea? The people who actually know what goes on, the people who do the heavy lifting, who are silent, who are never given their due, would actually introduce these concepts to the citizens, and all I would have to do is just sign off on it. **Errol Louis:** Let’s talk some more about Rikers. Under New York law, the island has to be closed by 2027, or no new people housed there. The four borough jails are behind schedule. They’re over budget. There are too many people in Rikers to fit in those borough jails. You’ve said you want to keep it open, but the law says otherwise. So what, how do you plan to address that? **Curtis Sliwa:** Okay. First we have the four borough jails. Staten Island somehow got exempted. How did that happen? **Errol Louis:** Well, they have a couple hundred people on… **Curtis Sliwa:** The point being is they got exempted, so we got four borough jails. The original assumption was it would cost $8 billion. Sounds like an MTA project, you know, when they’re building a new station. Now It’s $16 billion. It’s expected when they’re completed, $32 billion. What I would do is say, “No. Let’s slow down the process on Rikers. Look, I know I’m gonna get sued. We’re gonna get sued. Legal Aid, New York City Liberties Union. We have 1,000 Corporation Council members. We go into court, we battle, we win some, we lose some. “But I would say to the people who need affordable housing, “how about we convert what was built to be a jail into affordable housing?” Because the circumstances are, they’re brand new. You wouldn’t have bars, you wouldn’t have a prison. You make affordable housing. It’s not gonna work as a prison. As you said, we have more inmates than we have space in those new jails. What are we gonna do? Shut Rikers Island down? Since I’ve been on Rikers Island, I would have some of the sections for the mentally ill — who shouldn’t be in Rikers Island, because they have severe mental problems that we should be working on until the time of their release. We’re not doing that now. We mix everybody together. And we have to separate the gangs. When you go on to Rikers Island, everybody from MS-13 is all together with MS-13\. Everyone who’s a Trinitario. It’s like homecoming! Bloods with Bloods. Crips with Crips. That is a recipe for insanity. And who do we leave to deal with that? Predominantly women of color who are correctional officers, who are almost incapable of dealing with that as the male correctional officers are, because the system says keep the gang members of the same gang together. Anybody with common sense knows you gotta split ‘em up. **Errol Louis:** Let’s talk about immigration for a minute. Exactly how much do you want, and how much would your NYPD cooperate with ICE? Should they hand off people accused of serious crimes before they get their day in court? **Curtis Sliwa:** Everybody’s entitled to due process. Everybody. That’s the law. So even if you are, as Trump has called them, the bad hombres — okay? Drug dealers, gang bangers, narco terrorists, sex traffickers — you get charged here. You go to court here. Let’s say you plea out or you’re found guilty. You do your time here. Then the detainer gets issued and ICE comes and picks you up and deports you to your country of origin. You should not be sent to a gulag in El Salvador. I understand why the Trump administration did that. You don’t want people coming in, especially people who are narco terrorists, sex traffickers, which is a real problem that I’d have the FBI, Patel, deal with ‘cause we’re not handling it very well. In parts of Queens on both sides of the Grand Central Parkway, where open prostitution flourishes in Corona, Elmhurst, Jackson Heights and Flushing. And the sanctimonious hypocrite that Cuomo is, he says, you know, Zohran Mamdani is for legalizing prostitution. He is. You know who signed the law into effect? Governor Andrew Cuomo. He said it was okay. No more loitering, loitering laws go away. **Errol Louis:** I don’t wanna belabor the point, and you can talk to Melinda Katz about this, we did a story on NY1\. Prostitution is not being prosecuted. The district attorneys, I mean, you might get a couple of dozen cases in the course of an entire year… **Curtis Sliwa:** I would say, first of all, you have absentee landlords take the building. They’re allowing their facility to be used for prostitution. You have madams and you have pimps. Prosecute them. You have Johns. Expose who they are because they are the ones that keep this business alive. I would help the women — many of them who have been forced here from either Asia or from Central America and South America, who need help, a lot of ‘em want to go back. They can’t. I understand it from the street level. I would not hold the women responsible, but the pimps, the madams, the landlords who are making money, hand over fist and live in Delray, Florida because they’re absentee landlords. Absolutely, they gotta be prosecuted. **Errol Louis:** But you’re gonna have your cops make these arrests even if the DA has no interest in it and… **Curtis Sliwa:** Over and over and over and then shine the light on the DA and force the public, you say, “I’m trying to do our job. Look at what the DA is doing here. I want to protect the women in this trafficking.” I wanna go at the sex traffickers, some of whom are part of the narco terrorist organizations that exist in foreign countries that are imprisoning their own people. We gotta help them. Help them in. That’s what I’m saying. This whole discussion of being mayor never talks about the plight of women. Have you ever heard them talking about the plight of women, how they get abused, how they’re in sex trafficking, how we don’t do anything to rescue them, how they’re targets of random assaults, sexual harassment, perversions? I wanna prioritize women and take care of them. I was raised by my father and mother, you take care of the elderly, the infirm, the children, and especially the women. What kind of a man is not gonna take care of women who are in distress, especially if we know it? **Errol Louis:** Okay. This is a question from Zach Jaworski. He’s a Stabile student here at Columbia Journalism School. In 2021, you said that you don’t believe the mayor of New York City needs police protection specifically if they call for defunding the department. Do you stand by that statement today, even with the increased political violence in America? **Curtis Sliwa:** No. No. Like other things, I amend that. I see what Zohran Mamdani is going through. I’m aware of the threats. They’re serious. He has a different political philosophy than me. He’s got a wife, he’s got staff, he’s got people that are loyal to him that are under threat. We need to make sure we take care of everybody. Whether you’re running for office, elected office, the temperature is too high. And remember, 71 years, even though I was targeted by organized crime, I never had armed guards. Today the first time I officially am taking armed security and my wife, who’s also under threat, armed security. You know how bad that makes me feel, that I can’t walk the streets of the city that I love, ride the subways by myself, which I’ve been doing since I was five years old in 1959? And that’s because the rhetoric is too hot. **Errol Louis:** One of your opponents has called for — this is a First Amendment question. One of your opponents has called for reassigning the Strategic Response Group, which was designed and armed to repel terrorist attacks, but is also used to police constitutionally protected protests and demonstrations. Does it make sense to bring the department’s most lethal unit out when people want to hold a demonstration? **Curtis Sliwa:** I would be a little different when it comes to demonstrations. You should be able to get your permit for a demonstration in a day, which is normally the case, your sound permit in a day, but then you’re in a restricted area. Ever since Bill de Blasio was the mayor, all of a sudden there are no restrictions. A demonstration becomes a parade, and then you walk wherever you want to go. That’s why you need this strategic unit. Used to be, normally the police from the precinct, they would put up, you know, the wooden horses. You had an area you could demonstrate, certain time you could start, certain time you’d eliminate. When de Blasio became the mayor, he threw all that out the door. And so I’m gonna try to get everything back on track. Everyone is entitled to demonstrate. I believe that the way you deal with hate speech is more free speech. I don’t want to abridge anybody’s right of hate speech. I was a talk radio show host for 35 years, probably the longest here in New York City. We gotta keep free speech alive. That’s the greatest thing about the United States. If you’re bothered by hate speech, the remedy is more free speech. More free speech. **Errol Louis:** Last couple of questions. You call for the city to invest a few million dollars to support auxiliary cops and neighborhood watches, presumably like the Guardian Angels. To the extent that there’s a conflict of interest there, how would you handle it? **Curtis Sliwa:** Look, I’ve dealt with auxiliary police. They dress ‘em up in a police uniform and they move them around like pawns on a chess board to give you the impression that they have more police than they really do. These are dedicated men and women. They never get attention. They never get recognition. We should make sure, for the volunteer service they do, that some of their needs are met. And that would require us sitting down. Now there are a lot of different patrol groups that exist in the City of New York that have cooperation with the NYPD, but again, they rarely get attention and recognition because the attitude of One Police Plaza is, they really don’t like volunteers. I know how they treated me like a hemorrhoid in a red beret and they were looking for Preparation H to rub on me and the Guardian Angels and hope we dry up and… **Errol Louis:** Let me be more specific. You wanna put resources toward volunteers? Would you give money to the Guardian Angels? Cause that would be a conflict of interest. **Curtis Sliwa:** No. Because clearly that would be a big conflict of interest. **Errol Louis:** In that same section of your website, I noticed you don’t specifically talk about the violence interrupters who follow the Cure Violence model. I was wondering what you think of those groups and whether the city should keep or overhaul or defund them. **Curtis Sliwa:** I’ve dealt with violence interrupters where they started in Chicago, where we have Guardian Angels, in Washington, DC and here in New York City. There’s only one problem with the violence interrupters. They’ll tell you straight out, “we are not going to give information to the police.” Many of them will tell me straight up, “Curtis, snitches get stitches and end up in ditches. For us to maintain our relationship with gang members, guys and gals who are doing bad things, we can’t snitch ‘em out to the police.” Now, some of these are really serious criminals. There has to be an understanding. What are you gonna do with that information? If you know somebody was out on a warrant for murder or rape or really serious crimes, you’re not gonna convey that to the police? This is gonna ruin our effectiveness. I’d sit down with all the violence interrupters, ‘cause I’ve dealt with them for years. I agree with them in some instances, I disagree in others. We find out a way to accommodate one another. I don’t think this mayor has done that. The previous mayors haven’t. Andrew Cuomo talks about violence interrupters. What, in the Hamptons, violating people as they’re going out for their martinis and cocktails? What does he know about violence interrupters? He’s not a street guy. **Errol Louis:** Is what you’re describing there, is that done at the precinct level? Is that done at One Police Plaza? **Curtis Sliwa:** It’s the higher crime areas where you have the violence interrupters, where you can see there’s been a pattern of crime. Look, they do some really good work. Some of them were bad and wayward themselves and they’ve rectified their life and they have vans and they’ll go into intense areas, but there is that Maginot Line that many of them will not cross. And again, if they’re saying it, young people pick up on that. “Snitches get stitches and end up in ditches,” which has caused enormous numbers of problems in our city. **Errol Louis:** What’s the standard for Guardian Angels? If you come across information that would be of interest to police or prosecutors, you turn it over? **Curtis Sliwa:** Absolutely. Obviously, you go through the leadership, make sure that everything is tightened up, that you have your information correct. We work with the police, but again, we’re outliers. We’re not an auxiliary police department. And there were times initially in which they wouldn’t even give us the time of day. They looked at us as if we were the criminals, and then eventually that was resolved. **Errol Louis:** Okay. That brings us to the end of our time. Thanks so much. Great discussion. **Curtis Sliwa:** Thank you. Thank you very much. ### Designing Cities to Go the Distance URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/designing-cities-for-a-sustainable-climate-future/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:44.000Z Seated in Space Age plastic chairs, millions of visitors aboard the Ride to Tomorrow skimmed past stainless steel models of midtown airports, high-speed bus-trains, mile-high skyscrapers, moving sidewalks and underground conveyor belts. The popular General Motors exhibit at the 1964 World's Fair in Flushing Meadows Park forecast a gleaming fantasy future of prosperity and endless possibility, with "plazas of urban living rising over freeways." "What is to come, through the fair's eyes at least, is wonderful," marveled science fiction writer Isaac Asimov in an [August 1964 feature in the New York Times](https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/97/03/23/lifetimes/asi-v-fair.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* Looking back at the '60s vision for the future from the vantage point of today, it seems clear that we were hoodwinked by a big, beautiful, ingenious marketing ploy. The same people who were selling us Impalas, Sting Rays and Rivieras were imagining our cities not for us, but for cars. But what they didn't plan for was climate change, even though there were ample warnings of how the automobile-centric present and future would alter the planet irrevocably. It's not too late for a dramatic course correction. If there was one New Yorker responsible for moving those cars off the lots, it was Robert Moses. In 1953, as construction coordinator and parks commissioner of New York City, chairman of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority and president of the Long Island State Park Commission, [Moses won a $25,000 prize in the General Motors Better Highways Contest](https://www.nytimes.com/1953/06/19/archives/moses-wins-25000-for-highway-essay-gets-top-g-m-contest-award-urges.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=DETROIT%2C%20June%2018%2DRobert%20Moses,General%20Motors%20Better%20Highways%20Contest.) for his essay "How to Plan and Pay for the Safe and Adequate Highways We Need." That winning essay set him squarely on a path to remake New York City. While Moses spent the '60s successfully overseeing the construction of the Throgs Neck and the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge — a linchpin linking a network of highways including the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, the Staten Island Expressway and the Belt Parkway — he was ultimately thwarted in his attempt to make New York a car-centric capital. While Jane Jacobs and other critics who argued that the Power Broker's projects upended community cohesion, displaced people and demolished buildings, they skipped past one fundamental fact: climate change. By stopping Moses from slicing through Washington Square and the West Village to build a proposed expressway, Jacobs and her supporters not only saved the soul of New York City but, arguably, prepared it for a more climate-resilient future. Then as now, carbon dioxide gases were warming the Earth. The fossil fuel industry certainly knew it, and in 1965 — alerted by President Lyndon B. Johnson himself — even Congress knew it. As Harvard historian of science Naomi Oreskes recently concluded after conducting an exhaustive investigation to find out when concern about warming really heated up, "We discovered a universe of discussions by scientists, by members of Congress, by members of the executive branch. The more we looked, the more we found." Even Ruth Reck, a young physicist hired by GM Research Laboratories in 1965 to study physical chemistry, found strong evidence that CO2 gases were heating the planet and could trigger melting ice sheets and sea-level rise. But the warnings of Reck and others were dismissed as car-centric neighborhoods and cities grew — in New York, across the country and throughout the world. "Model" cities like the utopian Brazilian capital of Brasilia, which was designed to replicate the futuristic contours of an airplane and to project progress, power and efficiency, were built without even the most minimal sidewalks or mass transit system. > By stopping Moses from slicing through Washington Square and the West Village to build a proposed expressway, Jacobs and her supporters not only saved the soul of New York City but, arguably, prepared it for a more climate-resilient future. Today, as our world grows steamier, soggier and stormier, Brasilia represents all that's gone wrong with that monolithic concrete and steel model. Like cities across the globe, and particularly in the Global South, Brasilia today is chaotic, sprawling and scrambling to find enough water and other resources. Meanwhile, New York, Paris and London — cities that long pre-dated cars — are considered among the world's most sustainable. According to [the IESE Business School of the University of Navarra's Cities in Motion Index](https://citiesinmotion.iese.edu/indicecim/index.eng.html?lang=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which in 2025 evaluated 183 cities across 92 countries across factors including governance, mobility, sustainability and technology, New York City ranked second after London. It's walkable and has an efficient transportation system — key elements to urban climate resilience. Already, half the global population lives in cities. By 2050 — the year that world leaders at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris set as the target for "net zero," when all greenhouse gas emissions should be equal to the emissions removed from the atmosphere—an estimated seventy percent of some 9.8 billion people projected to inhabit the planet will be urban dwellers. To put those numbers into greater perspective, Yale geographer and leading climate scientist Karen Seto estimates that "urban expansion will result in building a city equivalent in size of New York City every eight days for the next 35 years." Not only is the number of cities soaring, but their size is exploding. In the next 25 years, the number of the world's megacities — those with populations of more than 10 million — is expected to shoot up from 44 to 67. Much of that growth is occurring, chaotically, in the sultry Global South — in cities like Dhaka, Bangladesh and Lagos, Nigeria, where glossy, costly high-rise centers stand surrounded by vast, sprawling, congested, polluted shantytowns that gobble up land and resources. These economically and ecologically marginal, often low-lying areas typically lack running water or sanitation and are particularly vulnerable to flooding and storms. Rather than piling *upward*, most of this growth — except in parts of China and South Korea, where high-rise construction predominates — sprawls inefficiently and unsustainably *outward*. Take Lagos, for example, which in 1960 had a population of 760,000\. Today, an estimated 16 to 20 million people inhabit an area that stretches uncontrollably across 450 square miles — mostly in informal settlements that lack running water and sanitation. By 2050, 30 million people are expected to live in Lagos, making it one of the fastest and least sustainably growing cities on Earth. Seto maintains that "one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce urban emissions is to have higher density housing located closer to amenities and needs, like shopping and jobs." Zoning and design that encourage co-location (also known as the "15-Minute City), where services and amenities are accessible within a short, shade-lined walk or bike ride from people's homes, are not only essential to a climate-resilient future but to the strengthening of communities' fragile social fabric. Five years ago, to address rush-hour gridlock and air pollution, and improve livability, Paris embraced the 15-Minute City. This design approach has, within just a few years, transformed the City of Light, which now has 746 miles of protected bike lanes and once-empty office spaces repurposed for housing, co-working, gyms and shops. From Cleveland to Melbourne to Ottawa, other sprawling cities are moving toward the 15-Minute model. At the same time, newly planned cities like The Line, a linear urban community currently under construction in Saudi Arabia, which will stretch 110 miles upon completion, are conforming to these 15-minute model principles. Indonesia, which is in the process of moving its capital from congested, polluted, rapidly sinking Jakarta — a city of 10 million squeezed into an area half the size of New York City — to Nusantara on the Island of Borneo, is upping the ante by aiming for a 10-minute city, where daily needs can be met within a short walk or bike ride away. > Yale geographer and leading climate scientist Karen Seto estimates that urban expansion will result in building a city equivalent in size to New York City every eight days for the next 35 years. In the early 17th century, when the Dutch first settled Manhattan, they developed streets based on existing paths and land contours before more systematically laying out roads. On Pearl, Beaver and Stone streets, for example, residential, commercial and even agricultural areas coexisted. Driven by a desire to divide populations based on class, ethnicity and race, zoning that segregated land-use became the norm across the country. Over time, schools, churches and stores began to be located farther away from where people lived. This trend accelerated a reliance on cars, and the intensification of carbon footprints. These days, across much of America, people think nothing of jumping into their cars and driving for fifteen minutes or more to pick up a quart of milk. It's a design flaw that squanders precious resources, increases carbon footprints and contributes to social isolation. The good news is that United States cities are rapidly moving toward adopting so-called "form-based" building and planning codes, which promote mixed uses, smaller setbacks, denser development, more varied housing types, and reduced parking requirements. A recent study conducted by Seto colleagues Arianna Salazar-Miranda of Yale and Emily Talen of the University of Chicago, found that communities in the car-dependent South — where urban sprawl is at its ugliest — are leading the adoption of such codes, most recently, Orange County, Florida, home to sprawling Orlando. Meanwhile in January, the New York City Council passed the City of Yes for Housing Opportunity, the most extensive zoning regulations in sixty years. While the Zoning Resolution of 1961 — largely the vision of Mayor Robert Wagner and Robert Moses — paved the way for more cars and high-rises rather than housing, the new rules roll back restrictions that encouraged the construction of glass towers in high-density neighborhoods. Instead, they are designed to facilitate the building of more modest structures and encourage the conversion of underutilized buildings and the development of new mixed-use spaces around transit hubs. Looking back at the '60s vision of progress, GM's promises seem preposterous. Were we really gullible enough to believe that "technology has found a way to control the wild profusion of \[jungles\]" by first applying searing laser lights to cut through trees before steamrolling toward progress on a "factory on wheels" that would grind up jungle growth and lay the foundation for multi-lane "forest highways bringing to the innermost tropic world the goods and materials of progress and prosperity?" By now, we should know better than to be distracted by implausible science fictions or duped by augmented future realities. While AI is enhancing data analysis of traffic patterns, energy use and zoning allocations, it's also apparent that lessons for the climate future of cities are found firmly rooted in the past: compact, vibrant, urban areas with good public transportation systems and a profusion of cool, green, leafy spaces. Cities employing these centuries-old common-sense approaches to urban design that enhance walkability and social cohesion will lead us toward a more vibrant, livable and climate-friendly future. ### Percy Sutton, Eric Adams and the State of Black Political Power in New York URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/percy-sutton-eric-adams-and-the-state-of-black-political-power-in-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:44.000Z The abrupt end of Eric Adams' mayoral campaign closed one of the most difficult chapters in recent New York politics. Voters had grown weary — embarrassed, even — by an administration marred by state and federal investigations, erratic messaging and a perceived alignment with Donald Trump that seemed antithetical to the interests of most New Yorkers. For Black voters in particular, the fallout carries a deeper sting: an uneasy recognition that the city may not see another Black mayor for a long time to come. This is about more than Adams heading to the exits to become New York's first one-term mayor since David Dinkins, the city's last Black mayor, left office more than 30 years ago. The demographic and political realities shaping New York today are vastly different from those that enabled the city to elect David Dinkins in 1989 or even Adams in 2021\. Outmigration of Black New Yorkers to southern states mirrors the transformation of other Rust Belt cities where once-robust Black communities have been hollowed out by economic and housing pressures. Those who remain in the city are more dispersed; Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant and other neighborhoods no longer hold the same density of Black voters who once anchored a powerful political base. At the same time, younger and wealthier Black residents who are gentrifying neighborhoods often lack deep ties to Democratic Party machinery. Their party registration may be as much a tool for access to the ballot box in the primary as an expression of ideological loyalty. The political ecosystem I grew up in feels far away. I am a member of Generation X, perched at the intersection of analog and digital. We were children of white flight, navigating a city in flux even then. We were raised on hip-hop. We played outside until the streetlights came on. My earliest exposure to politics came during the era of Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and David Dinkins' "gorgeous mosaic," which seemed to fit right into a modern and quickly changing city. Jackson's electrifying speeches at the 1984 and 1988 Democratic National Conventions invited me to imagine a bigger table. By the time I entered political work in the early 1990s, I had the rare chance to meet the so-called "Gang of Four" — David Dinkins, Charles Rangel, Percy Sutton and Basil Paterson — and work with them in various capacities throughout my career. Each was formidable, but Sutton left the deepest impression. Sutton's biography reads like a roll call of Black excellence in the 20th century. A Tuskegee Airman. Manhattan borough president. co-founder of Inner City Broadcasting. Attorney to Malcolm X and Betty Shabazz. He was tall, elegant and carried a commanding presence. He spoke with sharp eloquence, always certain of his point. Other leaders referred to him as "The Chairman," a recognition of his stewardship of Black politics rooted in Harlem but extending across the entire city. What made Sutton unique was his mastery of both inside and outside political strategies. Andrew Cuomo, for instance, excelled in maneuvering within government but often struggled to connect with people. Eric Adams, who built his reputation as a retail politician, couldn't really get his hands around the levers of public agencies and offices. Sutton could do both. As Manhattan borough president and a member of the powerful Board of Estimate, he wielded bureaucratic power to deliver for his constituents. Yet his closeness to Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael and grassroots activists grounded him in the politics of mobilization. He understood that true influence required aptitude at both levels. Later, he worked to leverage Black media to tell our stories and leverage Black wealth to widen economic opportunity. He also recognized the importance of political institutions within the Black community, such as the once-powerful Council of Black Elected Democrats (COBED). Though largely forgotten today, COBED was a regular gathering of Black elected officials in New York City, an effort to set policy priorities and coordinate electoral strategy. Its decisions were not binding, but the effort at consensus gave weight to the concerns of Black New Yorkers. Many, including the other members of the Gang of Four, trusted his counsel. Al Sharpton, as a convener through the National Action Network — a successor to Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Push Wall Street Project — is the closest equivalent. But it's unclear whether younger generations of political leaders and operatives will see that institution as part of the establishment politics it's campaigned against. Staffers were not admitted to COBED meetings, but young operatives like me found outlets through parallel gatherings. Journalist Jonathan Hicks of The New York Times, for example, hosted off-the-record conversations for young Black politicos to trade insights and test ideas. The rules were simple: Do no harm. You could work on opposing campaigns, but you supported each other's growth. These experiences mirrored the seriousness of the elders while also acknowledging the gaps in mentorship. In retrospect, those spaces were invaluable. We learned by watching, by absorbing the lessons of Sutton and his contemporaries. But as time passed, the "young guns" became veterans themselves. And without direct sanction from the old guard, our attempts to organize often met resistance. In a 2010 article, I reflected on how Harlem's political elite sometimes treated new leaders with suspicion, guarding the gates rather than opening them. Sutton was different. His grasp of the totality of civic and political engagement meant he understood the importance of preparing the next wave of leadership. Sutton's absence since he passed away in 2009 has been keenly felt. He lived long enough to see Dinkins ascend to City Hall and Barack Obama claim the presidency, but not long enough to witness Adams' brief and troubled tenure. Since his death, New York City has lost other towering figures — Rangel, Harlem Chamber of Commerce leader Lloyd Williams, NAACP President Hazel Dukes Dinkins and Basil Paterson. Today, House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, Attorney General Letitia James, Public Advocate Jumaane Williams, and Lieutenant Governor Antonio Delgado represent a lineage that can trace its roots back to Sutton's generation: believing that institutions were flawed and inherently discriminatory, but that they could be improved by leaning into inclusive decision-making and power sharing. Sutton sought those linkages throughout the public and private sectors. The entire Adams episode, however, reminds us that Sutton's absence left a vacuum not only of institutional history but of moral authority. From the outset, Adams sought to model himself on Dinkins' example and legacy, aspiring to be as beloved. But Adams' missteps were largely self-inflicted. His flirtation with Trump in his final months only deepened voters' disillusionment. The enduring lesson he didn't learn from Sutton, which Sharpton often conveys, is that Black politics is rooted in a sense of a shared fate — historical memory of political marginalization and collective understanding of the need for a strategic response. It is tempting to romanticize the past and fall into a kind of nostalgia tourism, but the impending exit of Eric Adams from the political scene still leaves a hole in the aspiration of Black political power. The lesson of "The Chairman" is not about longing for the past. It is about recognizing the need for leaders who can marry institutional savvy with grassroots connection, who can build consensus and enduring institutions while mentoring the next generation. Maybe Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani will work to build a new "gorgeous mosaic." Regardless, the next generation of Black political leadership in New York will not look like the last. The demographics are different, the neighborhoods transformed, the party less centralized. Percy Sutton showed us how to build cross-sector leadership that many across race and ethnicity benefited from. We would be wise to remember. *This piece was originally published in October 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### How NYCHA Can Serve More New Yorkers — Without Any New Buildings URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-nycha-can-serve-more-new-yorkers-without-any-new-buildings/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:44.000Z Affordable housing is a central issue in the New York mayoral campaign. Democratic nominee Zohran Mamdani has offered the most ambitious — and expensive — proposal: a bond-financed $100 billion initiative to build 200,000 new apartments, to add to what is already by far the nation's largest (177,000 units) public housing stock. There's a lot to question about it: NYCHA already faces massive capital repair needs and such large borrowing would require state permission that's unlikely to be forthcoming. But there's a way that the current public housing system could accommodate thousands more people, an approach that private developers are well familiar with: subdividing large units into smaller ones. It's a way to get more from housing that already exists — and, in the process, to give those on the NYCHA waiting lists what the Authority's records show they really want. To be clear, this is not an approach that has previously been tried, which is why it may require unusual arrangements to accommodate tenants. But creativity is in order given the city's huge housing challenges. To appreciate why it's worth considering, one must start with the little-known fact that a great many NYCHA tenants are what is technically called "over-housed." Specifically, [30% of tenants have empty bedrooms.](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) That reflects the fact that many tenants have aged in place and now live alone after their children have grown up and moved on. 10% of tenants have lived in their units for 40 years or more. Understanding that this is precious space, NYCHA has tried, with little success, to convince these older tenants to relocate to smaller units. But what if, as tenants vacate units voluntarily or pass away, modest construction projects could carve out smaller units from their 3-bedroom apartments? That would not make sense, of course, if large families were cued up on the waiting list. But NYCHA records show that's not the case. The largest group of tenants, per records not previously made public, want small apartments. Many more want studios and 1BR units than 3BR ones. Small unit turnover, as indicated below, is extremely slow. The units that most potential tenants want are occupied. NYCHA's current mix of apartments is a reflection of its original vision as a long-term home for large families. NYCHA's apartment stock has many more large units than small — even as tenant preferences have downsized. It's a mismatch for the needs of the city's current population. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25399134?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NoVk-64-aZnSVePM-9n3-6Drw2BDN28YZ%5Fm5GAgzE4I/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25399258?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18A-WE32LDXLgdeOplMoRb14K41WBVewC7JePMv70cGw/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) A quick comparison of the two above tables underscores the disconnect between what potential public housing tenants want and what NYCHA can currently offer. These figures show, for instance, that there are extremely few (4,903) studio apartments in the NYCHA system, but that 47% of those on the waiting lists (84,923) prefer such units. The math of subdivision could begin to align supply and demand. If 30% of units — those now characterized by "overhousing" — could be subdivided into additional units, that would mean, at minimum, 53,000 new units, if even only one new 1-bedroom was carved out of each unit. 2- and 3-bedroom units could be further subdivided, yielding more. It might not add up to 200,000 units — but it would be a big number. Subdividing is far easier said than done. More would be required, of course, than simply slapping up additional walls. Apartments need bathrooms and kitchens. And in most cases, it's probably folly to believe that people could stay in their units while they're being worked on. But it might get easier if paired with other creative ideas, such as dormitory-style shared common areas. A walk down the hall to shower is better than a homeless shelter. In at least some NYCHA units, one can imagine whole floors converted to SRO-type housing, though that would require working front door locks; the Housing Authority has often struggled to maintain these. Among the most serious drawbacks to public housing has been the fact that it is a kind of frozen city — its sites cannot be adapted for new purposes even as the city has changed. The Ingersoll Houses were first built, for instance, to house shipyard workers at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, long since closed. Subdividing units is at most an "unfreezing," but it could be a useful one. Financing such internal reconstruction may even be practical. As now planned, NYCHA will include 140 of its 335 developments in its [Permanent Affordability Commitment Together (PACT) renovation plans, through](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/PACT%5FDataset.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which private funds will be funneled into developments that remain publicly owned. (This is New York's version of the federal Rental Assistance Demonstration program initiated by the Obama Administration.) These extensive renovations could serve as vehicles for requests-for-proposal specifications that call for subdivision cost estimates and plans. No tenant should be involuntarily evicted. But it's worth considering using public funds to buy out long-time tenants — who might use the funds to help with relocation. It's also worth considering whether larger scale buyouts in order to free up whole buildings on high-value real estate — to produce revenue NYCHA so desperately needs, including to undertake subdivision. Subdivision could also help NYCHA in meeting a difficult challenge looming from a Trump Administration proposal: [to impose a two-year time limit on public and subsidized housing tenancies.](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/study-says-trumps-proposed-time-limit-for-low-income-housing-most-likely-to-affect-working-families-and-children?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) HUD Secretary Scott Turner has called this a way to ensure that subsidized housing is a "trampoline, not a hammock." Creating new units from existing ones would provide a means to relocate tenants—and comply with the time limit by starting the clock anew. It's worth saying that NYCHA should want its non-elderly, non-disabled tenants to do what Turner suggests: move out and up. It will help, however, if those in desperate need of housing have a chance to move in at all. Creating new, small units that align with the preferences of those on waiting lists could provide that opportunity. ### Is Eric Adams Our Last Tabloid Mayor? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/is-eric-adams-our-last-tabloid-mayor/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:32.000Z During April's annual Inner Circle dinner, a musical review in which the New York press corps lampoons the politicians they cover, Eric Adams capped the show with the traditional mayoral comic rebuttal. He stood on the stage, his backdrop a mock-up of a New York Post front page picturing the shirtless, buff mayor grinning below an all-caps headline: "SEXY IN THE CITY." After calling the event "my least favorite night of the year," Adams, [the Post noted](https://nypost.com/2025/04/05/us-news/mayor-eric-adams-numerous-ny-pols-lampooned-by-journalists-at-legendary-inner-circle-dinner/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), told the Ziegfeld Ballroom crowd: "I look forward to coming back to this for the next four years." We now know that the appearance would be his final Inner Circle gig, at least as a mayor of New York City. And with his exit Sunday from the race for City Hall, the bit, in retrospect, underscores that Adams may very well be our last made-for-the-tabloids mayor. It could spell the end of an era — or an error, depending on your view (and your tolerance for tabloid-friendly puns). Also, depending on how you see the world: The tabs either educate the public on who the politicians really are or caricature them beyond recognition — denigrating civic engagement, trust in the media and the papers' own relevance. Assemblyman and Democratic nominee Zohran Mamdani (D-Queens), who is leading in the polls, has built his insurgent mayoral run as a young Democratic Socialist largely on a mix of social media mastery (heavy on the [food videos](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/30/dining/zohran-mamdani-nyc-mayor-food.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), made-for-the-people message clarity and an army of door-knocking volunteers. It's a very different form of political celebrity than the brand long forged by his last-standing rivals, former Gov. Andrew Cuomo and Guardian Angels founder Curtis Sliwa. Cuomo's public life began as a teenager when he helped run his father's failed 1977 mayoral campaign. Sliwa, now 71, emerged during the same period as the city's self-appointed red-bereted crimefighter. The duo, like Adams — and the president who rescued the mayor from a corruption rap — knew how to play to the Post, the Daily News and, for a while, New York Newsday, as well as to local (and eventually national) TV news cameras. And they've largely stuck to their tried-and-true love-hate relationship with the press, even as the power of traditional media has waned. Many a reporter and editor have been on the receiving end of an angry Cuomo or Donald Trump rant. Adams may be less hands-on, but his career trajectory owes just as much to the tabs. He first gained widespread attention in the 1990s as an outspoken leader of 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care, crusading for racial equity. The activist cop morphed into the "swagger" mayor with his declarations of "my haters become my waiters" and "If you're going to hang out with the boys at night, you have to get up with the men in the morning" — even if it wasn't always clear where he was awakening, given confusion over his residency. The laws of tabloid physics mandate that rises come with inevitable falls, usually self-inflicted. The archetype fits Adams as well as the designer-tailored suits he favors. For perspective on how we got this point, check out journalist Jonathan Mahler's insight-filled, ["The Gods of New York,"](https://www.amazon.com/Gods-New-York-Idealists-Opportunists/dp/052551063X?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which tackles (among other things) the late 1980s plummet of Ed Koch, whose mayor-as-celebrity reign dwarfed that of John Lindsay and even Fiorello LaGuardia. Mahler also chronicles the tabloid-propelled elevation of characters still in the public realm, among them Al Sharpton, Rudy Giuliani and Trump. None are remotely god-like, but some have proven more resilient than others, as Andrew Cuomo has no doubt pondered. Mamdani, born in 1991 during David Dinkins' mayoralty, is busy writing his own TikTok-friendly script as he defies the laws of tabloid physics. Take his relative lack of experience, his past criticism of the "racist" NYPD (he says he [plans to apologize](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/11/nyregion/mamdani-police-apology-floyd.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but has yet to do so) and his [threat to arrest](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/12/nyregion/mamdani-arrest-netanyahu-nyc-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Benjamin Netanyahu should the Israeli prime minister step foot in New York during his mayoralty. All have landed Mamdani on screaming front pages (or "woods," as we old ink-stained wretches call them) — and all would have made his candidacy a nonstarter in times past. But he's brought to the polls [young voters](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-yorks-primary-and-the-power-of-better-election) unconcerned with Rupert Murdoch's Post deriding him as a virtual communist (one July front page [pictured Mamdani](https://nypost.com/2025/07/27/us-news/ny-republicans-tie-dem-opponents-to-zohran-mamdani-theyre-mamdani-democrats/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with the Soviet hammer-and-sickle). The Daily News, my former employer, hasn't been much friendlier. Even The New York Times' [vexing](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/our-advice-to-the-new-york-times-about-a-vexing-editorial-decision) Democratic primary non-endorsement editorial telling New Yorker not to vote for Mamdani also failed to sway his fans. The 33-year-old Democratic nominee's approach is working for him — so far. But the dynamic will almost certainly change should he become mayor of New York, a platform for aspiring larger-than-life figures with varying degrees of inflated egos screaming out to be punctured. The question is how much: Will the tabs set the tone, or will the media-savvy mayor? Mamdani's mayoral hero, Bill de Blasio, became defined in the press by his much-criticized chauffeured rides from Gracie Mansion to his beloved Prospect Park YMCA, perhaps speaking to a stubbornness that at times hampered his effectiveness. Mike Bloomberg, the nonplayboy billionaire, played an unnecessary cat-and-mouse game with reporters by trying to keep weekend jaunts to his homes in Vail, Bermuda and elsewhere a secret. Both could be prickly, but not as nearly as much as Koch and Giuliani, who relished verbal battles with the press and other perceived enemies. Both became the pugnacious face of the city of his time (before Giuliani's response to 9/11 would briefly earn him the honorary moniker of "America's Mayor"). Cuomo falls into the combative category, both cultivating and cudgeling generations of journalists, including some who later reported on the multiple sexual harassment allegations that drove him out of Albany in 2021 (he denies the accusations). He's been kicked around in recent months by the Post, though the paper is softening up a tad with Adams out of the race (the editorial board recently advised Cuomo to [show more warmth](https://nypost.com/2025/09/29/opinion/can-cold-andrew-cuomo-warm-up-and-get-out-of-his-comfort-zone-to-beat-mamdani/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the campaign trail). If he's elected mayor, how Mamdani will be pegged by the press — and how much it matters — will depend on how he rises to the challenges of leadership and how he engages with the media day-to-day. Much also will depend on whether Trump makes good on his vow to make Mayor Mamdani's life hell. Even as a frontrunner, Mamdani has generally engaged with reporters, showing some earned confidence. But he should keep in mind another tabloid maxim: Anything can happen between now and Election Day. The only certainty is whoever's standing on the stage at next year's Inner Circle will have the last laugh, at least for one night. ### A City of Winners and Losers: New York in the 1980s URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/jonathan-mahler-thomas-dyja-gods-of-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:45.000Z *If you want to understand Donald Trump, you need to understand New York at the end of the 1980s. This was the moment when the future president was transformed from a local real estate developer into a household name ("The Art of the Deal" was published in 1987.) Just as important, this was the time and place that shaped Trump politically.* [*"The Gods of New York,"*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/568081/the-gods-of-new-york-by-jonathan-mahler/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *the new book by Jonathan Mahler, powerfully conjures a particularly intense period in the life of New York. The gay community was furious at the failure of public health authorities to stop the spread of AIDS. The black community was up in arms over a series of incidents — including the deaths of Michael Stewart, Eleanor Bumpurs and Michael Griffith — that confirmed their suspicion that the criminal justice system was fundamentally racist. Activists watched with alarm as the homeless population grew to unprecedented heights. And everyone was set on edge by the violence and disorder that the crack epidemic brought with it.* *Presiding over this febrile environment was a mayor who was predisposed to combat (Ed Koch) and a collection of tabloid newspapers who were incentivized to throw gasoline on the fire. Is it any wonder that Donald Trump emerged from this toxic breeding ground with an instinct for how to command attention and a thirst for conflict?* *We asked Thomas Dyja, the author of* [*"New York, New York, New York,"*](https://thomasdyja.com/book/new-york-new-york-new-york/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to sit down with Jonathan Mahler to talk about what went wrong in the 1980s, how New York recovered, and what lessons present-day decisionmakers should take from the experience. The following transcript of their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.* **Thomas Dyja:** Let's start with the scene of your great new book, "Gods of New York." There's often a before-and-after mentality when people talk about New York City — the terrible "Drop Dead" New York of the 1970s, and then now. Your book covers 1986, which is not 1975, when your first book "Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bronx is Burning" was set. This is further along. Is this a different New York yet? What's changed in the city between your two books? **Jonathan Mahler:** New York died and was reborn. I would say that in 1977 New York is at its nadir. It's a couple years after the infamous "Ford to City: Drop Dead" headline, a couple years after the near bankruptcy. It's the year of the blackout, the year of Son of Sam. It's really when the city bottomed out. By 1986, when this book begins, the city has been reborn. But what happens in the four years I write about — 1986 to 1990 — is that New York begins to grapple with the wages of this rebirth. The city's new identity, its new economic structure largely built around Wall Street, finance and real estate — that city is a very different place. It's a city of winners and losers, a city of rich and poor, a city with a great deal of racial conflict. Add into the mix the AIDS crisis, the arrival of crack cocaine and the rise of the homelessness crisis, and it becomes an incredibly combustible period. These are the years when the reborn city began to really grapple with what its new identity meant and how many people were going to be left out of it. **TD:** A book like this is a benchmark. You and I have both written about the same period — I did 40 years, you did four. So between us we have a long haul and a core sample. What's great about your core sample is that it lets us make comparisons between then and now, to see what we've learned, if anything. Since we're in election season, let's start with talking about mayors — in this case, Ed Koch. My introduction to Ed Koch was moving here in 1980 from Chicago during the drought and watching him on TV with a bunch of kids singing about toilet flushing. I thought, "This is a very different place from Chicago. This man is not Mayor Daley." Give us a quick sketch of Koch and where he was at this point. **JM:** By 1986, he's just been reelected yet again. He is really the most popular mayor that New York has had, probably since LaGuardia. He's swept into office with a huge victory, basically uncontested. But what we see over the course of his third and final term is that the whole city unravels. He goes from being this enormously popular, beloved figure — not just a mayor but the symbol of the city's rebirth, like the city's mascot — to someone whose shtick gets old. He was always out there, a proud New York booster when New York was down in the late seventies, always engaging with voters on the street with his famous "How am I doing?" He was shticky in that Catskills way, and people loved it. But it all starts to get a little tired and old in these final years. The city and this great rebirth that he presided over really begins to unravel, and he's ultimately driven out. **TD:** When you look at Bloomberg's last term, which wasn't his best term either, how much of this do you think was Koch specifically and how much is just the perils of a third term? **JM:** I think Koch, like Bloomberg, overstayed his welcome. People were tired of him. People started to feel there was a callousness to him, a narcissism. That's what happens when you have a politician who refuses to leave office — they begin to look like a narcissist. That happened with Bloomberg and certainly happened beforehand with Koch. Then combine that with a series of events, many of which were out of his control, that he reacted poorly to. That didn't help matters. In some ways it was the chickens coming home to roost from decisions he'd made, and in some ways it was just bad luck. **TD:** I also think by the third term, you have trouble getting the same level of talent that you had coming in. During the primary this year, we kept hearing people complaining about the talent pool. "Why are all the candidates so bad? Why can't we ever have a good mayor?" Do you think our talent pool is significantly different now, or is this just something we always say? **JM:** I was talking the other day with [Bradley Tusk](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/bradley-tusk), and he was making the point that basically the moderates in New York, the centrists, the Bloomberg types — they have no political machine in New York. There's no organization producing candidates. All the energy is out on the edges. Looking at the mayoral race I wrote about in "The Bronx is Burning" — we had Bella Abzug, Mario Cuomo, Percy Sutton, who was a very successful Harlem businessperson and Manhattan borough president. It does seem like we're far from that now. New York local politics are not drawing the most talented people. **TD:** The one tragic flaw that I think we probably all agree on with Koch is race. At the end of the day, whenever I'm asked questions about Koch, it always comes around to that. One of the other big figures in your book is Al Sharpton. So let's talk about the racial situation then and now. In your book, Koch is freezing out Black New York and the only forms of resistance, really, are two things you talk about: Al Sharpton and hip-hop. **JM:** That's right. And I guess film — "Do the Right Thing." So protest and culture, or culture as protest. One of the wages of the rebirth was that Koch did not bring Black New Yorkers into his administration to start. He also really actively alienated the Black community and Black leaders during his first campaign. There were his infamous comments about "poverty pimps." Another thing that really cost him support in the Black community was that he promised he would not close Sydenham Hospital in Harlem — a campaign promise to the Black community. Sure enough, he turned around and closed it down. He had no goodwill, really, in the Black community. By 1986, he had some Black votes — it wasn't that he was completely wiped out — but among the city's Black leadership, they wanted to run a candidate against him. There was already a sense in the Black community that their interests weren't represented by Koch. What really struck me in my research was Benjamin Ward, the city's first Black police commissioner during these years. In his unpublished memoir, Ward says that he admired Koch, but Koch just didn't understand Black people. He didn't understand what the world looked like from the perspective of a Black New Yorker, and he didn't really seem to care to. That really became clear during these years. It's not quite right to say Koch was racist — I think Koch had a problem with empathy more broadly. He wasn't successful at seeing the world from anyone else's point of view except Ed Koch's. **TD:** So Sharpton — is he different now? Is he someone who has really changed, or is this just him adapting over time? **JM:** I think the same fundamental forces are in tension in Sharpton that have always been — his desire to be famous and important and powerful, and his desire to make the world into a more equal place. Those two forces that make him such an interesting, complicated person have always been there. What changed is he realized over time that he was accruing power and influence, that he didn't need to always be the bomb thrower. He already was the person people were turning to, the person white politicians couldn't ignore. As he began to accrue power and confidence in his ability to draw crowds, he didn't need to be as outrageous because he had the power he was looking for. In some ways, it's not so different from Donald Trump — he learned how to capture the public's attention and then recognized all the power that came with that ability. **TD:** Your book touches on the Central Park Five, Howard Beach, all these incidents. Where are we now compared to then with race relations? **JM:** I think we're far from that. When people ask me what's better about the city now, I do think racial relations are unquestionably better. Black New Yorkers feel like they have much more of a voice in the politics of the city. There was so much mistrust between Black and white New Yorkers during these years. White people didn't go into Black neighborhoods, Black people didn't go into white neighborhoods. The city is hardly a model of integration now — the schools are still largely segregated — but it just feels like a very different place. The idea that movie critics were up in arms that Spike Lee had made "Do the Right Thing," which ends with a riot in Bed-Stuy after cops kill a Black New Yorker — critics and political pundits were writing that it was irresponsible to release it. Can you imagine what the social conditions in the city must have felt like for a critic to feel justified in writing something like that? It's almost beyond imagination. **TD:** Yes, and George Floyd in many ways brought together Black and white people. In the 1980s, when Al Sharpton took several hundred Black New Yorkers into white neighborhoods to protest after Howard Beach or when Yusuf Hawkins was murdered, they had epithets screamed at them and watermelons held up. **JM:** Exactly. The civil rights movement was primarily a southern movement. In New York, it was more of a militant Black power movement — Malcolm X and his acolytes. Those were people who had a very different understanding of the civil rights struggle, much more separatist. **TD:** Another thing that's hard to explain from then to now is crime. This book is a great reminder of how insanely dangerous New York was in this period, especially 1986 to 1990. **JM:** This is when crime peaked in New York. I think it was 1990 when murder peaked. Obviously crack was a big part of that. You had a police department that had been shrunk during the fiscal crisis and was also overwhelmingly white. We are so far statistically from where we were then in terms of crime. In some ways, Trump's idea of how dangerous American cities are is because his brain still lives in that era. Going out in the street — everyone got mugged in the 1980s in New York if you lived here. That's just what happened. The city is really a very safe place now, even though much of the country sees New York through a distorted lens. But it wasn't just street crime. There was also endemic political corruption — one Koch administration official after another in scandals. You had these high-profile white collar criminals — not just the insider traders like Boesky and Milken that Giuliani prosecuted, but Leona Helmsley the tax cheat, Imelda Marcos. The police corruption was endemic and ingrained. The whole city felt foul. **TD:** And the mob, the Gotti lionization... **JM:** Yeah, Trump — this is the world, the crucible for Donald Trump. There was almost a sense of immorality that had descended on the city during these years. Everyone, whether civil servants, politicians or the already rich, everyone was just trying to grab what they could. They were all looting the city in a way. **TD:** Do we feel the city is still criminal in that way? **JM:** No, though Eric Adams... that's a pretty corrupt administration. But it doesn't feel as endemic and widespread. It also doesn't feel like everyone's just taking what they can. **TD:** I wonder if 9/11 was a kind of reset in how New Yorkers viewed each other. The concept of crime seemed so odd after that. We had all had this thing inflicted on us. Even if you weren't standing downtown when it happened, it was emotionally so immense and it became clear we don't like to do this to each other in some basic ways. **JM:** Yeah, there's just a different mood now, a different atmosphere. **TD:** Another big factor is media and the role of tabloids. How do you see that then versus now? **JM:** The tabloids played a huge role because they played a huge role in the city. There were really three or four of them if you include Newsday. Everyone read the tabloids. Everyone read Jimmy Breslin, Pete Hamill, Murray Kempton. These columnists were important, influential people — influencers long before the internet. This had a paradoxical effect. On one hand, tabloids by their nature are very polarizing — they divide the world into heroes and villains, good guys and bad guys. They're comic books for adults. On the other hand, the fact that everyone was reading the same newspapers made everyone concerned about the same stories and issues. There was much more of a sense of New York as a single city. It was a single city whose identity was up for grabs and being fought over intensely, but it was still a place. If you were a New Yorker, you read the tabloids. I think we've lost something with the fragmentation of media. People don't care about the city in the same way. People care more about their neighborhood, their street, their life in the city, their kids' school. We've lost a larger sense of civic identity — what Mario Cuomo once called "the New York idea." What is the New York idea now? **TD:** What would that era have looked like with social media? **JM:** What's funny is, you had influencers then too. This was the attention economy. Donald Trump and Al Sharpton were in command of New York's attention economy. Page Six and the gossip columns made celebrities out of people in the same way TikTok makes celebrities out of people who aren't doing something necessarily worthy of notice. The tabloids were the precursors to social media. **TD:** Homelessness is another issue that really begins to come together as a concept and policy problem at this point. **JM:** The term "homeless" didn't really arrive until the '80s. There had always been homelessness — during the Depression, for instance — but it was always seen as a temporary condition. When it returned in the early 1980s, aside from the winos and bums around the Bowery, the thinking was this was just a temporary social crisis. Then it became clear that if someone didn't do something, it would go on. No one was able to figure out what to do, and this temporary social crisis became a permanent one we're still living with today. It was shocking to see people sleeping on the streets in the 1980s. Now we routinely step over them on our way to the subway. We have for decades now. It shocks the conscience when you think about it that we still don't have a solution, to say nothing of the mentally ill homeless, who are a whole other and much more urgent population. **TD:** This was because of policy choices — we got rid of SROs, decided we wanted a family-oriented city starting in the '60s. We got rid of housing for singles, including the elderly. We also changed how we dealt with the mentally ill and deinstitutionalization. These were reversible policy choices. **JM:** Absolutely right. One thing that becomes clear during these years is that the economic policy of incentivizing real estate development, which led to the demolition of so much affordable housing and SROs, might have been great for getting the economy moving again and spurring construction. But it also kicked tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers out of their homes. Many didn't have the means to find or afford new ones. These were economic policy decisions. **TD:** Tell me some good things that happened from 1986 to 1990. **JM:** If you're a fan of hip-hop, these were amazing years — Beastie Boys, Public Enemy. Fort Greene during these years was an incredible neighborhood, filled with Black artists. I would also go back to my earlier point — there was an investment in New York. There was a sense of "we care about this city" that I don't always feel now. I have a pretty limited circle of friends who are into New York politics the way I'm into New York politics. But then, in the '80s, you lived in New York and you were a New Yorker. I feel like a lot of people just live here now. They live here because they have money and can afford the great restaurants and theater. This is just where they happen to plunk themselves. **TD:** I've always had problems with Jane Jacobs' street ballet metaphor because watching ballet is a spectator thing. A lot of what happened was people coming in and living on top of the city and watching — "this place is adorable, it's got the coffee shop" — but they don't go to the PTA meeting or community board meeting. They don't do the day-to-day things that are part of why that street ballet happens. You've got to jump in and folk dance, not watch the street ballet. **JM:** Yes, for sure. One nice thing about this mayoral race has been seeing people, young people in particular, galvanized by a local politician. That's something we really haven't seen in a long time. I was in college during these years, but working on the book made me nostalgic for a New York that existed then. I was in Chicago reading the Village Voice every week and feeling like, "Oh my god, New York!" Even though lots of horrible stuff was going on, it was alive and people were fighting for something. The other thing that was good about those years was the characters were just amazing. I don't know if that's "good," but it was fun to observe them. They were larger than life. "Gods of New York" is rightly titled — and many of them still march among us. ### Crime Victims Can Help Point the Way Forward URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crime-victims-can-help-point-the-way-forward/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:45.000Z New Yorkers have access to mountains of statistics, updated weekly, about crimes committed in New York City and what happens to the people accused of committing them. Policymakers and the general public, however, lack the data necessary to track what happens to crime victims. It's time that changed. An important national statistic mostly unknown outside criminal justice circles is that [more than half of all crimes are not reported to the police.](https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/cv23.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) This critical finding has been consistent since 1973, when the federal government first launched the [National Crime Victimization Survey](https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection/ncvs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (NCVS). This household survey asks whether individuals were victims of crime and if so, whether they reported the crime to the police. It also asks what support victims received following their victimization, whether they accessed victim services and, for those who did not report the crime, why they chose not to. But the NCVS is for the nation as a whole; there's no corresponding way to track what happens to crime victims in the nation's largest city. There should be. We encourage the next mayoral administration to invest in an annual victimization survey that builds upon the NCVS platform, but with additional statistical power and enhanced questions. This robust survey would allow for a granular understanding of the reasons city residents do not report crimes and the steps they take, if any, to seek assistance following the crime. It would also shed light on variations across neighborhoods and within different demographic groups. In light of the Trump administration's enforcement and deportation policies, this would be particularly important to document shifts in trust in the police in neighborhoods with a high percentage of immigrants. The overarching policy goal of this initiative would be to help all victims of crime across the city, including victims who did not file a complaint, rebuild their lives. **New York City: A decline in victimization and a decline in reporting** The potential of such a local study is illustrated by a recent analysis of NCVS data from New York City. [Research](https://datacollaborativeforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Crossroads%5FNCVS%5FReport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) published earlier this year by Dr. Min Xie, a criminology professor at the University of Maryland, documents changes over the years in crimes reported by victims in New York City, the reasons given for not reporting and the use of victim services. Xie's study analyzed data from 1996 to 2022\. Consistent with crime trends based on police reports, she found that both violent and property crime victimization decreased significantly over this time period. Violent crimes declined from 38 to 15 per 1,000 residents, while property crimes declined from 161 to 100 per 1,000\. Her analysis also supports the finding from police statistics that New York City remains one of the safest cities in the country. More importantly, however, Xie found that over time, fewer victims were choosing to report the crimes committed against them to the police. In the late 1990s, 49% of violent crimes werereported to the police. By the early 2020s, this decreased to 35%. In the late 1990s, 31% of property crimes were reported to the police. This decreased to 21% by the early 2020s. Another cause for concern is that, in recent years, other large cities had higher reporting rates than New York City for both violent crimes (42% vs. 35%) and property crimes (29% vs. 21%). New Yorkers should be concerned that fewer crimes are being brought to official attention. Reversing this trend requires a deeper understanding of the reasons victims do not report. Fortunately, the NCVS provides a good place to start because it asks why the crime was not reported. Was the crime dealt with another way? Was it not considered important enough to report? Was the crime covered by insurance? Did the victims fear retaliation if they were to report the crime? Victims can also respond that they thought the police couldn't help or wouldn't help. Xie looked in particular at the number of victims who said that "police wouldn't help." Here again, the trends are concerning. In the late 1990s, 7% of New York City victims of violent crime gave this as their reason for not reporting. By the early 2020s, this number had risen to 16%. A similar trend has been reported in other large cities across the country, underscoring the national challenges of enhancing public trust in the police. Xie's study also highlights some good news. Among New Yorkers who experienced serious violence (including rape, sexual assault, robbery and aggravated assault), the use of victim services *increased*sharply over the study period. From 1997 to 2021, the percent of victims of these crimes who reported using services doubled, from 15% to 30%, rising to a level seven times higher than in other large cities. This is a testament to the city's rich array of nonprofit and government services for crime victims. For decades, nonprofit and government agencies in every borough have provided services for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. Safe Horizon, the nation's largest victim services organization, has offered advocacy and assistance to victims of any crime. In 2016, Safe Horizon began expanding its services by placing two victim advocates in all 78 police precincts — one for victims of domestic violence, the other for victims of all other kinds of crime. These advocates offer assistance to every victim who reports the crime they were a victim of to the police. This is the largest partnership between a victim assistance agency and a police department in the country. The NCVS data indicate that as more services became readily available, more victims of crime accessed them. **Where we go from here** The advent of a new mayoral administration provides an opportunity to leverage these findings into policy reforms. At a minimum, the City should focus on improving victims' trust in the police and building a stronger network of victim services. To track improvements in these metrics, the City should commit to its own annual victimization survey based on the NCVS. If conducted with a larger sample size, this would allow for important analyses by subpopulation (race/ethnicity, age) and neighborhoods (between and within boroughs). With this information, the City could target resources to those communities with the highest levels of non-reporting and lowest levels of confidence in the police. We propose expanding the survey to ask more questions about crime victims' experiences in order to shed light on how to best address victims' physical, emotional and financial needs in the aftermath of crime. [Research](https://www.amazon.com/Parallel-Justice-Victims-Crime-Herman/dp/0615326102/ref=monarch%5Fsidesheet%5Ftitle?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that victims of crime, compared to the general population, experience higher rates of depression, PTSD, drug and alcohol abuse, suicide and poor performance at school and at work. An expanded survey could reveal what services and supports are most helpful, and what more public and non-profit institutions could do to support victims. Do our social services contribute to victims' healing? Is our victim compensation system designed to maximize support? Answers to these questions could enhance both crisis response and long-term care. By asking victims where they turn for support, we would also value and strengthen the community and familial bonds that help victims heal. This new survey would also document the complex relationships between crime victims and the individuals who caused them harm. This information could lead to the design of better interventions to keep victims safe and, wherever possible, support reparative work such as restitution or mediation. In addition, by expanding the frame from recent experiences to the ongoing impact of crime, we could address the long-term ripple effects that are not always observable in the immediate aftermath. And, by understanding patterns of repeat victimization, a phenomenon that occurs across crime categories, we could target services such as safety planning to interrupt cycles of ongoing harm. Ultimately, addressing the trauma many victims experience can keep victims engaged in community life. Indeed, if the survey's framing shifted from system-centric to victim-centric, the results would lead to a deeper understanding of the multidimensional experience of crime victims. It would shift the emphasis from framing the victim as someone who does or doesn't trigger a law enforcement response to a person who needs and deserves our support. When it was first launched, the NCVS was revolutionary. It opened the door to an understanding of crime that went beyond police reports. Today, it stands as a tool that hasn't met its potential. Under the next mayoral administration, New York City should lead the way and encourage a new wave of surveys that put victims' needs and experiences front and center. Then, New Yorkers can embrace a policy goal to support all parties to a crime — those responsible for the crime and those who are harmed by it — as they both rebuild their lives. That is the highest aspiration of justice. ### Newark and the Limits of Criminal Justice Reform URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/newark-and-the-limits-of-criminal-justice-reform/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:45.000Z By the time the car began to slow, the officer already had his gun drawn. On August 31, 2017, 20-year-old Raheem Bryant saw a convertible idling near a gas station in Newark, New Jersey. He jumped in and drove off. The car was quickly reported stolen, and the police began a pursuit. Most of the responding officers followed department protocol: keep a safe distance, avoid escalation and wait for the vehicle to stop. Bryant wasn’t armed, and he wasn’t posing an immediate threat. The plan was to wait him out. But as the car came to a stop near a residential block, off-duty officer Xavier Pimentel ran up to the vehicle. He wasn’t assigned to the call. He approached the driver’s side and fired a single shot into the car, striking Bryant in the neck. The bullet severed Bryant’s spine and left him permanently paralyzed. A grand jury later declined to file charges against Pimentel. Bryant has since filed a civil lawsuit against the city and the police department. The shooting occurred during a turning point for Newark. Three years earlier, [a U.S. Department of Justice investigation](https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark%5Ffindings%5F7-22-14.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that the Newark Police Department routinely engaged in unconstitutional stops, searches and use of force, all of which disproportionately impacted Black Newark residents. At the same time, the city was still one of the most dangerous in the country. A [federal consent decree](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-agreement-city-newark-new-jersey-reform-police-department-s?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) followed in 2016\. It was designed to overhaul the department’s policies and practices to restore public trust and ensure constitutional, accountable policing. Today, Newark is often held up as a [national model](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/25/camden-newark-new-jersey-police-reform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for [police reform](https://giffords.org/analysis/lessons-on-police-reform-from-newark/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Since entering the federal consent decree, the city has shifted its policing strategies toward more community-based approaches, strengthened oversight and seen a steady (though [not uninterrupted](https://patch.com/new-jersey/newarknj/violent-crime-rises-newark-still-lower-past-decades?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) decline in violent crime. By the summer of 2020 — when protests over unlawful police violence turned chaotic in cities across the country — Newark stood out for its restraint. Demonstrations remained peaceful, and the city recorded [zero police shootings](https://www.ksby.com/national/newsy/with-no-police-shootings-in-2020-newark-makes-case-for-consent-decrees?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that year. But during that same period, Raheem Bryant’s case remained unresolved. “\[The city has\] been trying to get the case dismissed on qualified immunity,” said Jarrett Adams, a civil rights attorney representing Bryant. “The consent decree specifically said officers should be trained not to shoot at fleeing suspects who pose no danger.” According to Adams, Pimentel was never given that training. The case is still tied up in appeals, while Bryant continues to battle serious medical complications stemming from the shooting. “The city of Newark is waiting on this man to die,” Adams said. Bryant’s case didn’t make many headlines, but it lingers in Newark as a quiet reminder of how difficult lasting reform can be. Nearly a decade after the city launched sweeping changes aimed at building trust, many residents and organizers say the same frustrations continue. Traffic stops still spark tension. Complaints still go unanswered. For those who lived through the department’s worst years, the distance between policy and practice doesn’t feel nearly as wide as it looks on paper. > By the summer of 2020, Newark stood out for its restraint: Demonstrations remained peaceful, and the city recorded zero police shootings that year. “Law enforcement has to be accountable to the communities they serve, and that still hasn’t happened,” said Aqeela Sherrils, founder of the Newark Community Street Team, a grassroots violence intervention program he led from 2014 to 2019\. “They still believe they have more authority than the people who pay them to provide a service. It’s a cultural shift that still needs to take place.” The mayor’s office and the police department did not respond to multiple requests for comment, but activists and residents point to persistent signs of mistreatment. There are stories of officers unjustly stopping Black residents, behaving aggressively during routine interactions, and using unnecessary force during arrests. [Department data](https://www.newarkpublicsafety.org/npd/transparency-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) support some of those concerns. In 2024, Black residents in Newark were stopped by police at more than twice the rate of white residents. And of all recorded use-of-force incidents last year, 76% involved Black individuals. While officials often argue that these numbers reflect where crime is concentrated, critics say those explanations overlook longstanding issues of over-policing. A [2023 Fairleigh Dickinson University poll](https://www.fdu.edu/news/category/fdu-poll/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that public confidence remains fragile. Just 10% of residents rated police performance in their neighborhoods as “excellent,” and fewer than half said they’d likely report a crime to the police. Trust in the police also varied sharply by race and geography, according to the poll. Black and Hispanic residents were far less likely than white or Asian residents to say they felt safe or that officers treated people equally. And while many agreed that Newark had improved as a place to live, a majority, particularly in the South and West wards, believed that crime victims often have to seek justice of their own. “We know our communities have been overpoliced. We understand that the war on drugs disproportionately impacted our spaces, and the residuals of that will take a while to overcome,” said Will Simpson, a Newark native and former director of Community Safety & Justice at Equal Justice USA. Part of Newark’s response to that history has been the creation of more collaborative, data-informed strategies for public safety. Alejandro Santana leads one of those efforts as the executive director of the Newark Public Safety Collaborative, an initiative housed within the Rutgers-Newark School of Criminal Justice. His group collaborates with the Mayor’s Office, the Department of Public Safety and a network of community partners to reduce harm and violence through data sharing, trust-building and strategic intervention. > The shooting of Bryant and the broader mistrust it represents is a reminder that reform is not a fixed destination. Santana says Newark has made meaningful progress in recent years, especially when it comes to building trust through community feedback sessions, expanding the role of social workers and supporting community-led approaches to public safety like the city’s Office of Violence Prevention. “From my point of view, we’ve never had an issue with the police not being at the table or being collaborative,” he said, noting that more than 50 organizations now work in concert on public safety strategies across the city. Still, he acknowledges that many residents continue to raise concerns about how officers interact with the public, adding that those voices need to be part of the conversation. “There are people who still have legitimate concerns that have to do with policing, and they need to be heard,” he said. The shooting of Bryant and the broader mistrust it represents is a reminder that reform is not a fixed destination. It’s an ongoing process, one that requires constant attention from city leaders, law enforcement and the communities they serve, even after progress has been made. There’s another reason progress is especially fragile. Earlier this year, federal funding cuts to community violence intervention programs threatened the very partnerships that helped reshape the city’s public safety model. Many of the impacted organizations have played key roles in bridging the gap between police and residents. “I think the biggest hurdle we’re facing is the federal cuts,” Santana said. “This will continue to impact the system over the next few years, and it’s really going to put the system itself to the test.” As Newark pushes forward with its reform agenda, Adams is still hoping for some justice for Bryant, even if there’s no sign it’s coming. “They’ve changed the culture and deserve credit for that,” Adams said, but he wonders what the lack of accountability in this case says “about their progress.” ### What Happens If Adams Resigns URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-happens-if-adams-resigns/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:45.000Z *For the past few weeks, rumors have surrounded Mayor Eric Adams and his potential resignation. Is he going to leave office early? Will he work for the Trump administration? Can his voter base really keep Mamdani from becoming the mayor of New York? Jamie and award-winning journalist and Executive Director of Citizens Union Grace Rauh pick apart these rumors and examine what this race says about the state of democracy in NYC.* *You can listen to this podcast on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/what-happens-if-adams-resigns/id1794619189?i=1000727137101&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/0m2h8tk1oRQgHM9DdWohBz?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Editors' Note: Brick by Brick, Rule by Rule URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/brick-by-brick-rule-by-rule/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:45.000Z Sometimes with editors' notes, the goal is to convince readers that a given topic is worthy of their attention. Many issues of Vital City have focused on fairly niche (but important!) subjects, such as the role of [the nonprofit sector](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-11) in running cities, the use of [social science evidence](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-7) in crafting public policy or the size of [the jail population](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/how-many-people-should-new-york-citys-jails-hold) on Rikers Island. Vital City editors have spent thousands of words explaining why you should care about these topics. This issue is different. Almost no one needs to be convinced that housing is important. Indeed, housing has been the topic of preeminent concern in New York City for months. In the mayor's race, upstart Zohran Mamdani has leaped to the front of the polls, driven in no small part by his campaign's relentless focus on affordability, including his pledge to freeze the rent for the hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers living in rent-stabilized apartments. Meanwhile, the national policy discourse of late, at least on the left side of the spectrum, has been dominated by the debate over [the abundance movement](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/why-abundance-matters). Sparked by the publication of "Abundance" by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, YIMBY advocates have been aggressive in extolling the virtues of loosening government rules and regulations as a means of sparking more building. (Their exuberance has been matched by their progressive critics, who have been equally vocal in attacking the idea that fewer rules and regulations will produce more housing, or more affordable housing, as opposed to more profits for wealthy interests.) There was even [a crossover moment](https://www.derekthompson.org/p/what-speaks-to-me-about-abundance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when, in [an interview with Thompson](https://www.derekthompson.org/p/what-speaks-to-me-about-abundance?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Mamdani embraced some of the language of abundance as part of a concerted effort to convince moderate voters that he is not a crazed ideologue. Whatever the merits of Mamdani's campaign and the abundance movement, much of the public discussion of these topics has tended to focus on political questions: Who is going to win the mayor's race, Mamdani or his rivals? Who will control the future of the Democratic Party, abundance advocates or their opponents? As a result, these conversations have also tended to shed more heat than light. (If you want to encounter unhinged vitriol, try searching for @ZohranKMamdani's mentions on X. It ain't pretty.) At Vital City, we acknowledge the importance of the current political debate between left, right and center. But politics is most meaningful when it is connected to policy and practice on the ground. And that's where we focus our attention with this issue. While there are, of course, references to the mayor's race and President Trump and the future of the Democratic Party here, we want to wrestle with the thorny challenges of how to actually improve housing in New York and other cities — making (and preserving) more of it, making it more affordable and making it more beautiful, too. We are joined in this effort by an A-list collection of writers, including activists and architects, planners and developers. Our contributors don't all agree with each other, but they do share a desire to do something more than curse the darkness — each in his or her own way attempts to offer concrete proposals for solving the housing problems that are currently roiling New York. Generally, these solutions fall into five categories (we hope the mayoral candidates are taking notes): **Zoning and land-use reform**. The City's approval process for development projects — the Uniform Land Use Review Process, or ULURP — is rigorous and thorough, requiring approvals by several different levels of government. It works better in theory than in practice, however. With staggeringly few exceptions, the whole process hinges on the judgment of the council member in whose district a project happens to be located. A development project can win the endorsement of everyone else in the chain, including the mayor and the City Council speaker, and still fail thanks to the Council's tradition of deferring to the local member. Several of our contributors call for reform of this process, as well as expanding City of Yes for Housing and pushing for legislative changes in Albany to ensure that suburban counties contribute to solving New York City's housing challenges. **Transit, transit, transit.** Public transit is the lifeblood of New York, so it comes as little surprise that several of our contributors choose to underline the need for more development around transit hubs and to better coordinate transit planning with housing production. Other places (think Tokyo) have done this to far greater effect than New York City. **Reducing the cost of construction**. In New York, it is a fact of life — and a call to political action — that the rent is too damn high. Our contributors highlight a not-unrelated phenomenon: The cost of building is also too damn high. Attacking this problem will not be easy. Among the ideas floated in this issue: Repealing New York's unique Scaffold Law, which inflates insurance premiums by imposing strict liability on contractors; modernizing building codes to allow for innovations like single-stair buildings and new forms of piping; and using bulk procurement to scale modular housing, something Sweden has pioneered. **Addressing neighborhood concerns.** The specter of displacement has haunted many efforts at economic development in recent years. In New York and other cities with strong progressive traditions, the accusation of gentrification is a powerful political weapon that has been used to derail numerous projects. Even as they call for a massive effort to build more housing, our contributors understand the need to be responsive to community worries. They offer a number of ideas to ensure that development benefits local residents, including the use of new vehicles like Mixed-Income Neighborhood Trusts that are designed to empower local voices and reduce the chances of displacement. **Making Cities Beautiful Again.** One major impediment to winning public support for a massive expansion of housing constructionis the reality that many new developments are, in a word, fugly. They don't look good in the first place, and they look even worse after five or 10 years. If we are to build, let's build beautifully, this issue suggests. This includes investing in attractive design and taking seriously the idea of integrating new buildings into the existing character of their neighborhoods. **\*\*\*** Few things evoke more powerful emotions than the idea of home. Home, at its best, means safety, love and a sense of belonging. Those without housing, or struggling with substandard housing, find themselves in a uniquely vulnerable position: It is hard to make progress in any aspect of your life if you do not have a stable roof over your head. That's why the current focus on building more housing, and making it accessible to every New Yorker, is such a welcome development. We hope this issue of Vital City will make a small contribution as policymakers wrestle with how to translate the interest in this topic into tangible progress on the ground. This issue would not have been possible without the contribution of Kaley Pillinger, a J.D. candidate at Yale Law School with considerable expertise in affordable housing. Kaley was a crucial thought partner and coconspirator as we put the issue together. We thank her for her insight, hard work and good humor. ### New York’s Housing Crisis: Self-Inflicted and Solvable URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-housing-crisis-self-inflicted-and-solvable/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:45.000Z New York City is living through its worst housing affordability crisis in a century. While the City and State distribute billions of dollars in housing subsidies each year, maintain the most robust rent-stabilization program in the nation and sustain a public housing system that is home to a population larger than many cities, almost all of the personal outcomes associated with housing here are terrible. Around 86,000 New Yorkers stayed in a City-run shelter on a typical night in October 2025\. The median New York renter spent 31% of their income on rent last year. Only 1.4% of rental apartments are available for rent — including an infinitesimal 0.4% of apartments that cost less than $1,100 per month. In 2023, only 53% of NYCHA Housing Choice (Section 8) voucher holders — already a small subset of those eligible by income — were able to secure an apartment before their voucher expired. All of these devastating statistics are rooted in the fact that we have not built nearly enough homes to accommodate all those who want or need to live in New York City. Some of the most centrally located neighborhoods in Manhattan and Brooklyn are actually losing homes as people with means combine multiple apartments, and their neighborhoods do not add enough new homes to make up the difference. ## How did we get here? Our crisis is in part a product of New York City's success. Since the high-crime, high-dysfunction late 1980s, we have increasingly become a city in high demand. Between 2011 and 2023, the city added almost 900,000 new jobs but only 350,000 new homes — a difference of almost three new jobs for every home built. Removing the pandemic-related job losses of 2020 from the average, that ratio leaps to almost 6-to-1\. That shortfall shows up in everyday life: Rents climb faster than paychecks, people in their 40s live with roommates, and many workers must commute from far-flung suburbs. Scarcity also tilts the playing field against housing voucher holders and renters with lower credit scores; with dozens of strong applications, landlords pick the safest prospect, and vulnerable populations fall further behind. Other big cities prove that scarcity is a choice. Tokyo adds roughly 80,000 homes a year — two to three times New York's pace — and rents there stay moderate even as its population rockets past 14 million. Houston allows townhomes and small apartment buildings on most blocks, keeping supply high and virtually ending chronic homelessness. Austin expanded its housing stock by 14% in two years — New York managed 2% — and saw rents fall 22%. Auckland upzoned transit corridors, which sparked a construction boom that flattened rents within three years. The lesson is consistent: Sensible zoning to allow more homes of all kinds, along with streamlined approvals, can unlock the construction needed to curb rent spikes. New York has produced lots of housing at a rapid clip before. In the 1920s, the city added nearly 730,000 new homes, nearly four times what was added in the 2010s. As recently as the 1960s, we built twice as many homes per year as we build today. In the intervening decades, a combination of new restrictive zoning rules, layers of paperwork and changes to public review processes has resulted in a city where it is impossible to add enough homes to meet need. Now and again, you'll hear antidevelopment voices suggesting that the city is "full," and that adding lots more people will stress infrastructure and services. Any such argument defies the very essence of New York City as a place where openness, diversity and entrepreneurial energy are its engine — meant to be fueled, not stalled. It also defies the dynamic history of New York City development, which has been defined by the renewal and regeneration of buildings (think East Midtown, where 19th century brownstones made way for the Chrysler Building in the 1930s), the creation of new neighborhoods via land reclamation (think Battery Park City) and the organic growth of apartment buildings of different sizes and forms (think Astoria to Jackson Heights, where single-family houses along Broadway and Steinway Street evolved into the three- to six-story walk-ups above storefronts that still anchor commercial corridors). The story of why New York City slammed the brakes on housing production is complex, mixed with both good and bad intentions, and outdated policies linger on the books even as the challenges we face have changed dramatically. Guardrails that were initially necessary to protect working-class and nonwhite New Yorkers from poor labor standards, industrial pollution and urban renewal overreach have been co-opted over the decades by well-resourced homeowners and other moneyed interests to freeze many neighborhoods in place. Many rules that were created to prevent displacement and protect residents have come to drive up rents citywide and push the very working- and middle-class New Yorkers those rules were meant to protect out of their homes. The evolution of zoning rules tells the tale. The first half of the 20th century saw rapid growth under (mostly) reasonable zoning laws that attempted to promote resident health and safety. But in 1961, an overhaul of the City's zoning framework introduced more prescriptive zoning that significantly restricted housing density across the city. Charter revision commissions in 1975 and 1989 established the contours of the current Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), meant to counter the overreach of years of top-down master planning with a more decentralized decision-making process. The resulting process incorporated advisory opinions from community boards and borough presidents and binding votes from the appointed City Planning Commission and City Council. While the process has many strengths — a predictable seven-month "clock" to ensure projects don't stall forever, as well as clear, uniform steps aimed at transparency and accountability — our housing shortage today is far more severe than it was in 1989, and ULURP's built-in political incentives skew against approving housing in the places we most need it. In theory, ULURP gives every project an objective review. In practice, the local Council member's unwritten veto — "member deference," whereby the Council rarely, if ever, bucks the judgment of the member in whose district a given project sits — means no major plan lacking their support has passed since 2009\. Well-funded developers can slog through, but small builders rarely bother. Layers of environmental paperwork invite delays and lawsuits, so even modest projects can take years or collapse under the weight of waiting. Ironically, public-sector-led affordable housing projects, which should have widespread support, face even greater barriers. Since 2022, the city has lost more than 3,500 proposed apartments — nearly 1,000 of them income-restricted — when they have been downsized or withdrawn through the public review process. What began as efforts to protect neighborhoods and give residents a voice has hardened into a system that freezes much of the city, favoring wealthy enclaves and worsening the housing crunch. ## How to fix it Fortunately, an emerging coalition of advocates and political leaders has, since the late 2010s, paved the way for new opportunities to build more homes more equitably. In response to the Bloomberg administration's zoning changes — which significantly limited housing growth in predominantly white and wealthy neighborhoods, paired with upzonings lacking required affordability — the de Blasio administration initiated efforts to build more, and more inclusively. De Blasio's policy agenda began with mandated affordability in new upzonings, but even then, it did not initially focus on the wealthiest neighborhoods where the tool would be most effective. Yet by the end of de Blasio's mayoralty, new grassroots activism and political leadership helped refocus the priority on mandating affordability in neighborhoods that needed it most. Proposals in this policy legacy in neighborhoods like SoHo/NoHo (2021), Gowanus (2021) and Windsor Terrace (2025) — neighborhoods that previously would have been assumed politically off-limits to growth — have since been successful. Under Mayor Eric Adams, the big wheel has turned faster still. Last winter, the City passed City of Yes for Housing Opportunity, the most significant set of major citywide changes to restrictive and exclusionary zoning rules in a generation, along with a $5 billion package of complementary investments known as City for All. City of Yes pared back parking mandates, legalized backyard accessory units, granted height bonuses for buildings that lock in permanent affordability and more. Spread across every neighborhood, these changes could yield more than 80,000 new homes over the next 15 years and, just as crucially, have forged an even broader prohousing coalition with a necessary citywide approach. While a major step, ultimately these gains cover only a fraction of the roughly 800,000 homes experts say we need in the next decade. Closing the gap requires bold action on multiple fronts. The New York City Charter Revision Commission approved reforms that would help curb the influence of the well-housed minority from vetoing new homes in the districts where they are most needed. In four ballot measures this November, voters realigned the rules toward fairer, more abundant housing citywide. Mayor-elect Mamdani and City Council must build even further on this momentum with ambitious neighborhood and citywide reforms. The 2025 elections yielded promising results. Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani's campaign succeeded after centering affordability and energizing many young New Yorkers fed up with the status quo. Mamdani, a proponent of City of Yes, has notably evolved his thinking about the need for both private- and public-sector housing and a broader agenda of effective governance. And pro-housing City Council members won reelection handily, including those who had taken hard votes for more homes. However, no mayor or City Council can solve the city's housing shortage on their own. For better or worse, New York State government holds many crucial levers that contribute to the shortage, including decision-making over the City's regressive property tax system and the overly litigious environmental review processes that are often weaponized to delay or kill proposals for new homes, especially in well-resourced neighborhoods. New York State has also failed to update its basic zoning framework to curtail the many restrictive and exclusionary rules that its municipalities have created over the past 80 years. Unlike counterparts across the country, New York lawmakers have chosen not to enact a statewide legislative mechanism to push forward home construction in areas that continually block new homes. Westchester and Long Island have some of the most restrictive and exclusionary zoning in the nation; their lack of growth also exacerbates the severe housing pressures within New York City's bounds when it can't spill over into neighboring suburbs. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24669062?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1XpBPB40A7UAlEyy0vkdvGcn9taHZiViltE67hQSIX7U/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The outcome is unsurprising: few affordable options, particularly in areas with high-performing schools, and a perpetuation of the patterns of segregation under the guise of "local control." Legalizing modest apartment buildings near regional transit stations, allowing homeowners to build backyard cottages or granny flats and setting enforceable targets for affordable housing growth are all critical solutions that other states have embraced. In 2023, Gov. Kathy Hochul laid out a promising blueprint including solutions to many of these problems, but it ran aground. And since then, she has shied away from pressing ahead on many of the most impactful ideas. The Legislature has shown interest in a smart first step with the Faith-Based Affordable Housing Act, which streamlines the ability to build affordable housing on land owned by faith-based organizations across the state, but did not pass the bill this past legislative session. Without an assertive Albany, even the boldest mayor will be stuck playing whack‑a‑mole with rising rents. ## The bedrock beneath every issue Housing is the foundation of civic life. When homes are scarce and expensive, teachers leave, storefronts go dark and neighborhood ties fray. New York spends more per capita on affordable housing than any other state in the nation — almost $1,000 per person per year. California, the closest second, doesn't clear $750 per person. Yet dollars alone cannot solve shortages created by outdated rules. Fix the housing-production bottleneck — make it easier to build more homes of all types in the neighborhoods people most want to live in — and the rest gets easier: Rents stabilize, voucher holders can find homes, families stay and grow, and overcrowding eases. Ignore production, and displacement, homelessness and fiscal stress all worsen. New York City missed keeping one of its congressional seats in the 2020 reapportionment by just 89 residents. Since then, more than half a million people have left the state. If the trend holds, we will likely lose yet another two seats — or three — after the 2030 Census, shrinking our voice over transit funds, disaster aid and every federal program the city relies on, and eroding New York's importance in the Electoral College. Time is short. Act boldly, and we can keep the promise that anyone who wants to build a life here can find a place to live. Shrink from the task, and we will see rents climb, the tax base erode and New York's seat at the national table grow smaller. The choice — build or bust — is ours, and the clock is ticking. *This piece was originally published in September 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### Jane Jacobs and the Quest for Goldilocks Density URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/jane-jacobs-and-the-quest-for-goldilocks-density/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:46.000Z This year, the “abundance” message has been heard loud and clear. Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s “Abundance,” Yoni Appelbaum’s “Stuck” and Mark Dunkelman’s “Why Nothing Works” all make the case that America has been way too fussy about the built environment, putting up barriers to all kinds of development, particularly housing. And with the accompanying call to loosen up and build more stuff — more multifamily housing, more density, more mixed-use, more infrastructure — one woman long considered a saint of urban living has been blamed, somewhat counterintuitively, for contributing to the problem:[ Jane Jacobs](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2025/03/american-geographic-social-mobility/681439/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The argument goes that while she stopped many bad things from happening — slum clearance to make way for soulless towers in the park and neighborhood-destroying urban freeways — her legacy has left places like her beloved Greenwich Village essentially frozen in amber. The people who live there are quite content to be in four-story brownstones with high-class boutiques on the ground floor. No added density is tolerated. True to the laws of supply and demand, not just enclaves but long stretches of city blocks have become staggeringly expensive. There might as well be a velvet rope at 14th Street. What started as earnest protest against top-down planning has morphed into a framework for defending these neighborhoods from any incursion. The local community board is fully in control, and what they invariably do is say no. **The real Jane Jacobs** I first noticed the co-opting of the Jane Jacobs legacy soon after publishing[ “Wrestling with Moses,”](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/50509/wrestling-with-moses-by-anthony-flint/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the story of her battles with Robert Moses in New York City in the ’50s and ’60s. It was 2009, the book had just come out, and James Gandolfini was considering playing Robert Moses in a movie adaptation. I was all in on the fight-the-power narrative and was struck by how many current city residents were channeling Jane Jacobs and her power-to-the-people energy from 50 years ago. One such instance was out at Coney Island, where several women had donned white wigs and black-rim glasses reminiscent of Jacobs’s classic look to protest against redevelopment plans. Perfect, I thought: Davids against the Goliath of greedy developers and a Moses-nostalgic City Hall. On further review, however, I saw that the new development they derided wasn’t really much of a monstrosity at all. In fact, it was a badly needed increase in the supply of multifamily housing, on underutilized urban land. It was clear these folks just didn’t want anything to change in their backyard. They were energetic in their Jacobs-caliber activism but had strayed from her guiding principles for how cities grow. While some of what Jacobs wrote can indeed seem antidevelopment, only a narrow reading of her work would classify her as a NIMBY given the current challenges cities face. It’s important to remember what she actually said about urban development, which, in large part, was that cities must change and evolve. Yes, she was against Le Corbusier-inspired high-rise apartment buildings; she favored what she believed was more human-scaled development, like the[ West Village Houses](https://villageview.nyc/2023/06/05/the-west-village-houses/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Yes, she was all for historic preservation, another trend that is at odds with the abundance agenda, yet Jacobs urged new uses for old buildings in an approach in line with today’s widely accepted ethos of [retrofit and adaptive reuse](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-12/at-boston-architecture-convention-retrofits-and-rehabs-are-the-rage?srnd=undefined&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At the same time, she was increasingly aghast at how expensive the Village had become, what she called “oversuccess.” Her answer was to make it so these gentrifying urban neighborhoods weren’t so rare, but rather ubiquitous. Her solution was more supply — ideally, mostly low-rise attached town houses, but just lots and lots of them. She is best known for all the ingredients to make new development successful, like shorter blocks, a mix of uses and a variety of building types. But the inherent value of more housing options was a given. Jacobs, understood in full, wasn’t antidevelopment, nor was she exactly a YIMBY. What she was really seeking was Goldilocks density — not too much, not hulking and inhospitable, but also not too little, so as to be a drop in the bucket in terms of supply. That kind of development is the key, most experts now say, to affordability. Though contrarians like[ Patrick Condon](https://thetyee.ca/Culture/2024/07/19/Patrick-Condon-Why-Housing-Costs-So-High/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the University of British Columbia say prices don’t actually come down when cities let developers build, baby, build, breaking down regulatory barriers and increasing the total number of housing units in a metropolitan region is seen as an optimal market-based solution. **How to get there** Of course, along the way to this balanced density, there’s room for further conversation about the concern about redevelopment and any [unearned profits](https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/conference-papers/unearned-increment/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that builders make. Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic nominee for mayor of New York City, has espoused more direct subsidies for affordable housing, aligned with the European concept of[ social housing](https://www.wsj.com/real-estate/nyc-mayor-primary-rent-housing-affordability-78e26691?gaa%5Fat=eafs&gaa%5Fn=ASWzDAhsA5w2I%5Fn7AR9f4TllMS9roBVuczUFf8cgodyx9JbvbGkfN1Z-d1DGPVYwW14%3D&gaa%5Fts=685cb885&gaa%5Fsig=yg5dnY949PGAvnu6upt-rVW9XhhPFFhE9v-XotUKzqcwtZR1CB0VNxX0qfQpr%5Fyz2gxRhs3HthHDHUgoWe3wzA%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But either way — whether market-based or government-funded — new housing is going to be more dense, and everyone, whether established residents or first-time homebuyers or renters seeking reasonably affordable shelter, would do well to share that reality. How density plays out on the ground has been a central occupation of architects, builders, planners and policymakers for a long while now. Stantec’s[ David Dixon](https://www.stantec.com/en/people/d/dixon-david?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), an elder statesman of the topic of density, says it’s not that complicated: About 30 units per acre is what it takes to support mixed-use retail, workplaces and transit. Put another way, he recommends envisioning a 200-unit condo building, perhaps six or seven stories high, integrated into a well-designed public realm. Speaking at the Congress for the New Urbanism in Providence, Rhode Island, in June, Dixon referred to [demographic trends](https://www.prb.org/resources/u-s-household-composition-shifts-as-the-population-grows-older-more-young-adults-live-with-parents/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=This%20increase%20in%20the%20share,groups%20in%20the%20coming%20decades.) anticipating that a net 80% of new households will be singles and childless couples, at odds with 62% of current housing options being single-family homes designed for traditional larger families of two parents, three kids and a dog. Accordingly, multifamily development will be very much in demand, Dixon said, to accommodate the surging demand from these smaller households. Indeed, it’s a matter of economic development for cities, he said, as they compete for higher-income[ knowledge economy workers](https://www.wsj.com/articles/DJFVW00020120903e893h14fs?gaa%5Fat=eafs&gaa%5Fn=ASWzDAga%5Fyv-fN62Z-P0tEo5MY98pn5Jb%5Fphde-0rlvEzWoncqNH7fg-enxRKaCg6KE%3D&gaa%5Fts=684c3a6d&gaa%5Fsig=Do8LZ%5F7%5FBOj2HWl6B4oTR1wSX4B0xIdgL00GI60fYGsgbHAjjaQYRij-8x0Muk3U3Ju%5Fct%5FS8rTMRRp7r7jtOg%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in amenity-rich urban settings — ergo, density. In Massachusetts, the MBTA Communities Act tells cities and towns to allow 15 units per acre by right in catchment areas near T stations. This level of density is seen as scary and onerous by [some communities](https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/milton-mbta-communities-law-housing/3636991/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that have balked at the program, though[ 15 units per acre](https://www.lincolninst.edu/data/what-does-15-units-per-acre-look-like/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a relatively unobtrusive threshold, especially for land that now stands as vacant parcels or parking lots. It’s just plain old infill. **Neighborhood character and the way forward** Many of those who purport to channel Jacobs mourn how development threatens the “character” of neighborhoods. Again, the idea is misappropriated. Jacobs understood that the character of a neighborhood is partly about the way it looks and feels and partly about the people who inhabit it and otherwise make use of it. When a lack of development drives prices through the roof and makes a swath of the city a playground for the wealthy, that creates conditions for a monoculture, which she opposed. Economic homogeneity can take hold even if the cosmetic character of blocks and buildings hasn’t changed. Faithfully following through on her ideas means understanding that the key to making density acceptable requires making new development fit in with the surrounding fabric. Which is to say, preserving neighborhood character is a design challenge above all else. It’s a bit of a gauntlet. Guides like Northeastern University’s[ Equitable Zoning by Design](https://impactengines.northeastern.edu/ie/equitable-zoning-by-design/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) help government officials and public stakeholders understand the physical and spatial implications of zoning regulations in transit-oriented and walkable mixed-use hubs. The idea is to make infill density more acceptable to wary established residents, with the goal of illustrating how the new building fits in with the fabric of a neighborhood. The now-ubiquitous facades of 5-over-1 developments, five stories of wood-frame residential on top of a concrete foundation, have triggered complaints that all new multifamily housing[ looks the same](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-02-13/why-america-s-new-apartment-buildings-all-look-the-same?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a legitimate critique, though the reaction was much the same 100 years ago when now-beloved brick and brownstone streetscapes were conjured in Boston or Philadelphia. Another important factor in terms of public understanding is making it clear what different levels of density actually look and feel like. Over the past few months, I’ve been helping curate an online tool kit called [Visualizing Density](https://go.lincolninst.edu/l/153411/2025-09-04/prrhb7?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the[ Lincoln Institute](https://www.lincolninst.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which debuted this month. The resource offers image galleries of different densities via compelling aerial photographs by Alex MacLean. Users are able to see what San Francisco density looks like compared to transit-oriented development outside Dallas. The spoiler alert is that they’re both pretty pleasant. Ultimately, attitudes toward density may require a shift in mindset similar to the corollary narrative of ’70s-era environmentalists who pushed for laws that stopped bad things from happening, similar to the legendary crusades of Jane Jacobs. That dynamic has been equally excruciating: Advocates were virtuous in seeking to stop damaging projects, but now those rules are being used as a cudgel blocking things the planet desperately needs, like solar farms and wind turbines and[ transmission lines](https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/2023-06-how-land-use-battles-are-hindering-clean-energy-transition/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to facilitate the clean energy transition. The irony is searing. A movement that started out well justified has now become mindlessly obstructionist — preventing progress on the ultimate environmental objective, combating climate change. In the same way, zoning, codes and land-use regulations, as well as grassroots community control over planning and development, served a purpose that is no longer quite so relevant. Like climate change, housing affordability is a 21st century crisis that warrants thoughtful new approaches that aren’t tied so literally to the battles of 50 years ago. “A living culture is forever changing, without losing itself as a framework and context of change. The reconstruction of a culture is not the same as its restoration,” she wrote in her last book, “Dark Age Ahead.” Being nimble and not so black-and-white in our understanding of density will be critical in accommodating the new housing cities need. It’s a mindset she would applaud. ### My First Adult Apartment URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/my-first-adult-apartment/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z *New York’s current housing crisis matters not only for economic reasons, but for personal ones — because home is the most intimate terrain in the city. The city might afford us less personal space than we’d like, but scarcity means that when we do find a home, we typically hold onto it with all our might (even as we endlessly complain about it).* *Finding a place in New York isn’t easy, even for native New Yorkers. Recognizing this, we asked a handful of New Yorkers to tell us about the first place they called home as an adult. For those who settled here from elsewhere, that meant their first foothold in this often intimidating metropolis. For those who grew up in the city and already knew how to navigate its streets and subways, it meant the first place they lived under their own roof and paid their own rent.* *Stories run the gamut, but this is the common thread: Regardless of how often the roof leaked or the paint peeled or the neighbor kept them awake, it is hard to overstate the importance of having a room of one’s own in the greatest city in the world.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **I Found It in the Voice** By Dan Smith In 1992, New York City was a different world — pre-9/11, pre-internet, pre-smartphones. Having grown up in Newton, Massachusetts, I was 21 and fresh out of NYU. No job, no credit history, no tax returns — but I knew it was time to leap into adulthood. I had been living with a couple of friends in a two-bedroom railroad apartment on East 1st and Avenue A, across from Katz’s Deli. Nice guys, but they had one crucial flaw: They lived with me. I needed my own place. So when I spotted a studio listed in the Village Voice for $425, I hopped on the 1 train to the Upper West Side, a neighborhood I barely knew. When I arrived, the rent had magically jumped to $575\. The landlady didn’t ask for any financials — just my parents’ phone number. I’m pretty sure she never called them. Questionable business practices? Yup. Could I afford it? Nope. But once I signed the lease, it was mine. West 75th Street, between West End and Riverside. A short walk to Riverside Park and Fairway, which, back then, was a quaint corner grocery compared to the two-level gastronomic mecca it grew into. A far cry from the grit of the Lower East Side. I felt like I was movin’ on up — even if the Jeffersons technically lived across the park. The studio was tiny — definitely under 100 square feet — and four creaky flights up. There were some rusty pipes and cracks in the walls. I did my dishes in the bathroom sink. The “kitchen” was a two-burner gas stove and a mini fridge underneath the loft bed. Air conditioners were forbidden. This point was driven home when I turned on the TV and toaster at the same time and blew a fuse. It was perfect. This was more than a place to live. It was a transformational chamber. I paid a lot of dues and shed a lot of skin there. I got the kind of education NYU could never offer. I wrote my first songs there, taught my first guitar students and designed some of the first flyers that would become a New York City staple. It was the first tangible manifestation of my New York independence, and I’ll never forget it. Since then, I’ve watched the “Starbucksification” of New York: mom-and-pop shops replaced by sterile corporate chains, the urban jungle systematically morphing into the suburban mall I came here to escape. But will all that “progress” erase the danger, romance and humanity that drew me here? Has all the grit been scrubbed away? Have all the cracks been sealed up? I hope not. I firmly believe that New York shouldn’t be easy. It’s good that it challenges you, tests your resolve and weeds out the wimps and the whiners. But I wonder about the next generation of artists and adventurers trying to make their mark here. No question they’re navigating a very different landscape. I hope they can still find a few cracks to sneak through the way I did. *Dan Smith will teach you guitar.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Where I Lay My Head and Stomach** By Ayo Balogun Before the boy was born, before the restaurants, before the move to Bed-Stuy with hipsters, I lived in a little mustard seed at the corner of Jay Street and Willoughby Avenue in Downtown Brooklyn. It was a very noisy fourth-floor walk-up that was full of fashion designers who designed clothing for the apocalypse and filmmakers who made high-concept movies that were almost porn. We called it the Jay Willy. My tenure at the Jay Willy began with lots of ambitions. I wanted to become a documentary filmmaker or a war photographer, whichever was more dangerous. These ambitions were muted immediately when my first rent was due. My newfound aspiration became avoiding homelessness during winter. Nothing sharpens young senses quicker than the anticipation of rent. If you make $300 a week and your rent is $900 a month, there needs to be a bit of Tetris in planning to survive. Luckily, breakfast was a given. From the bodega downstairs, the waft of the 99-cent breakfast trumpeted like reveille — in different tunes each morning based on who was on the grill and how they decided to spice it — and was the reason to wake up before 9 a.m. Now, what was a 99-cent breakfast? What did it consist of? Where was it served? And what did it do to you? These are very good questions. The Soprano who sang the 99-cent breakfast hit a range that the sirens of the Odyssey have nothing on. This meal was supposed to consist of two eggs, bacon, toast and coffee. As you can guess, whatever that substance was, it was not eggs; I’m equally sure that rubbery matter was not bacon. The toast was toasted bread, and the coffee was bad. What did this do to you? I will leave that to your imagination. Yet that smell in the morning was like a symphony, and that — and the price — kept me coming back. For lunch, we developed a cheat sheet at Popeyes. If you place your order by saying “May I have half a dozen biscuits?” they push a different button than when you ordered a batch of six biscuits instead of one at a time. This is very important for young survival. I still think the most delicious biscuits in the world might be found at Popeyes. For dinner, my exotic roommates dined in whatever fancy restaurant was a hit that week. Looking back, this usually contributed to my inability to make rent. But still, it felt like there was no kind of calculation, no kind of adjustment to my lifestyle, that would make it possible for me to afford rent. I was poor. But being poor at the Jay Willy was quite exciting. We made movies, discussed philosophy that we didn’t understand and, of course, hated everything mainstream, only because we were jealous of it. Most apartments can be described by their fancy finishes or amenities or pictures on the wall. I can’t quite remember any picture or decoration. I remember the smells from the illegal barbecue downstairs, the noise of constant fighting and harassment on the streets, the songs of 99-cent breakfast and, most especially, the very colorful creatures who resided in my little mustard seed at the Jay Willy. *Ayo Balogun is a chef based in Bed-Stuy and the proprietor of Nigerian restaurants Dept. of Culture and Radio Kwara, and The Bureau BK.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Such a Great Place** By Megan McArdle The apartment was 435 square feet and half-underground. The kitchen was a tiny stove, an even smaller fridge, and a jury-rigged island that used to rock alarmingly when I chopped vegetables too aggressively. The hot water was at best erratic and often absent altogether. I had to keep the windows covered at all times unless I wanted to watch my neighbors staring at me. And yet, when people visited, they would gush that it was *such a great place*. It was a block from Central Park and two blocks from the C train! Had prewar charm, of a decidedly tattered vintage, and offered ground-floor access for convenient grocery hauling! Contained a separate, postage-stamp-sized bedroom with a *full-size closet!* And all this bounty for only $1,100 a month (about $2,000 in today’s dollars)? Who had I murdered to score such an incredible deal? Welcome to New York, where rental prices are themselves a form of murder. But I loved that apartment with my whole heart and soul. My bullmastiff and I moved in on June 1, 2003, and I immediately set about improving it. With my extremely limited funds — working as an entry-level journalist, I had a couple of hundred bucks left over each month after student loans, rent and taxes — I customized every inch of that apartment to make the most of its tiny attractions. I scoured the Paramus furniture stores for a love seat that would fit into the unforgiving 49-inch clearance between the apartment’s outer wall and the island, and spent hours hanging and rehanging cheap prints I’d picked up on Craigslist, or from the garbage. I went all over the city in pursuit of furniture deals, which I hauled back on the subway, assaulting my shins and my fellow passengers at every stop. I covered the kitchen window glass in pretty privacy film and got a friend to build me custom shelves that fit over the window to provide storage for my dishes. I splurged on honeycomb shades for the bedroom. They lowered from the top as well as rising from the bottom, so I could get a little light into that great place without watching the steady parade of shoes on the sidewalk. A couple of years into my tenure, after I was burglarized by a juvenile who jimmied the bedroom window and simply reached in from the sidewalk to swipe the contents of my top two dresser drawers, a police officer escorted me to the promenade of the housing project across the street, from which, it turned out, the interior of my apartment was fully visible. “I’d guess you’ve had every 13-year-old boy in the neighborhood watching you change for two years,” he said, not unkindly. “Please close those shades.” This bothered me less than you might think, because I was born and raised in New York City, breeding a certain indifference to the gaze of strangers. But I closed the shades and continued loving my apartment. After all, there is *nothing* a true New Yorker loves more than a real estate bargain. At parties — you can cram 30 or 40 people into 435 square feet, if they are not fussy — I could often be heard passionately declaring that I never intended to leave. Then I got evicted. My apartment was a sponsor unit in an elderly co-op with an incompetent manager. Eventually, that manager died. The new manager briskly set about fixing the building’s finances, a project that included renovating my unit and selling it off. I looked at my options and moved to Washington, D.C., where you could enjoy space and light without selling a kidney. I was stunned when I walked into a 750-square-foot second-floor unit and realized it would cost just $50 a month more than I’d been paying for my semicustom cave. Yet it never gave me the thrill of that first apartment. It was not, for one thing, in New York. It was just the place I happened to live. *Megan McArdle is a columnist for the Washington Post.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A Bit Insane** By Majora Carter In 1988, I earned an MFA in Cinema Studies from Wesleyan University, and the image of my diploma freshly calligraphed with my full government name danced happily in my head. My parents and I had a running joke about me giving them my diploma on a silver platter, and I fulfilled the promise, delivering it with a curtsy on an aluminum serving tray, the closest we had to a silver platter. Despite their wish for a more sensible degree, my parents, who came from the South during the Great Migration and raised seven children in Hunts Point, South Bronx, were incredibly proud and celebrated their baby daughter graduating from an elite university. However, when I announced I’d found an apartment in Brooklyn, they didn’t understand why I would want to move out of their loving and comfortable home at all, and they *especially* did not consider the move from one distressed neighborhood to another, to “Do-or-Die Bed-Stuy,” a step in the right direction. But I reminded them I was from the South Bronx. There wasn’t much I couldn’t handle. It was a gray and rainy afternoon when I first emerged from the Nostrand Avenue A train station to view what would be my first apartment. Hardly anyone was on the street; it seemed very quiet, sleepy almost. There was a KFC on the corner, a pharmacy, a fruit stand and some discount stores. I walked to a block with antique row houses, most in good condition. The apartment building near the corner, next to a former warehouse building that had seen better days and now housed a low-grade candy store, would soon be my home. It was a four-story limestone apartment building. The top three floors each had two very large, ornate windows with an oculus in the top center and curved sills underneath, giving the building the appearance that it had six crystal butterflies affixed to it. Once inside, it was easy to see the building had not been well loved. The butterfly windows had some serious draft action going on — *Nothing a good caulking couldn’t fix!* I had always wanted wooden floors, but these hadn’t been finished and were even splintered in places — *Sandpaper and polyurethane to the rescue!* And there were cracks along some baseboards — *Stock up on steel wool and metal plates, and mouse traps for good measure!* The last one really did give me pause, but the $417-a-month stabilized rent was almost too good to be true — and I thought, in 1988, that it would have been insane to turn that down. Turns out it was a bit insane to rent it. After months of DIY renovations, the place looked and felt great, with walls painted in rich tones of copper, sapphire and emerald; wood floors restored by hand; repaired cracks; and well-caulked windows. The candy store next door was an informal hangout for low-level drug dealers, but they made sure I knew that they would always look out for me — which was helpful because I didn’t always feel safe. I could not believe how loud the neighborhood was, often well into the wee hours of the morning on work days, for crying out loud. Once, I actually called the police precinct to report it; the officer apologized profusely and said there was no one to send because they were out taking care of more serious crimes. The dilapidated former warehouse building next door that housed the friendly drug dealers was eventually condemned and torn down, leaving a shallow pile of rubble. Eventually, I moved back home to Hunts Point. About 10 years later, after dedicating myself to urban revitalization, both living and mostly working in the South Bronx, an old friend invited me to a housewarming party near the Nostrand Avenue A train. I was shocked to see white ladies pushing top-of-the-line Maclaren strollers, and there were designer dogs too — this wasn’t the Bed-Stuy I knew. It was my first experience seeing how a neighborhood could transition into a “better” area that was not inclusive of local residents. This laid the foundation for what would become my approach to community revitalization projects — designing systems to benefit neighborhoods without displacing residents and encouraging residents to believe they do not have to move out of their neighborhood to live in a better one. *Majora Carter is a real estate developer, urban revitalization strategy consultant, lecturer at Princeton University, MacArthur Fellow and lifelong resident.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A Classroom of Sorts** By Arthur Goldstein My first apartment was in Middle Village, Queens. I was starting work as a teacher at Lehman High School in the Bronx in the fall of 1984\. I had no training, no experience and no idea what I was doing. I brought that same total lack of sophistication to apartment hunting and took the very first one I was shown, above a real estate office on Metropolitan Avenue. It was a pretty crude one-bedroom. Having no plates or pots, I filled the kitchen cabinets with books. The woman who’d vacated the place was kind enough to leave me all her dead or dying flowers. It gave the place that festive touch. I’m pretty sure I was making about $13,000 as a teacher. That was not quite enough money to pay rent, so I spent weekends playing guitar and fiddle with an Irish singer. He’d discovered me playing in a country band in Suffolk County. He asked me how much I was making. I lied and said a hundred bucks. He said, “I happen to know you’re only making $50, but if you play with me, I’ll pay you $100 a night.” I was sold. One St. Patrick’s Day weekend in 1985, I made over $500 at an Irish bar. Upon hearing about my gig over a lunchroom conversation, a teacher I worked with, who spent nights and weekends dispatching taxis, never spoke to me again. The singer brought his young son by my place once, looked around in disbelief and told the boy, “Son, *this* is a *bachelor pad*.” I was not quite cognizant of his sarcasm at the time. For me, it was just a place to sleep. I had standards nonetheless. I determined the green walls were a turnoff, perhaps. I decided to paint them. I bought some blue paint, not realizing it was too dark or that it was enamel. I painted the whole apartment and managed to make it look even worse than before. One weekend, playing at Action Park with the Irish singer, I met a young woman I really liked. This was a lucky break for me. I’d noticed, to my deep disappointment, that women tended not to be attracted to band members uniformed in Kelly green sport jackets. Nonetheless, she came all the way from Darkest New Jersey to visit me. She took one look around the apartment, walked out, and I never saw her again. This was not good. Worse, though, was when the movie theater two doors down closed. Evidently, it had been infested with mice. With no buttery popcorn to draw them to the movie theater any longer, they sought greener (or bluer) pastures. I’d gotten the apartment because I was tired of roommates, and these particular roommates were not only no more desirable than the ones I left, but further, paid no rent. I bid farewell to Middle Village. My next apartment was sunny, clean and free of uninvited guests. Experience is a tough teacher, but if you’re careful, you only need to learn hard lessons once. *Arthur Goldstein is vice chair of the UFT Retired Teacher Chapter. He writes*[ *Union Matters*](https://arthurgoldstein.substack.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *on Substack.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A Different Place and Time** By Suketu Mehta My wife and I moved back to New York, where I had grown up, from Iowa City, where I’d gone to study writing, in 1993\. Browsing through the apartment ads in the Village Voice, which I ran to collect from the Voice building on Tuesdays when the weekly came out, I found a place in a small condominium building right by Tompkins Square Park. Our landlady was an Australian communist gynecologist who had left for Asheville to be with her lover, who was a jockey. She rented us a nicely furnished one-bedroom with a study for $950 a month. When I went to meet her the first time, I found a large picture of a naked woman with her legs spread apart hung up on the wall of the living room. She told us, with some pride, that it was a portrait of her. My mother came from New Jersey to check out the area before I signed the lease. We sat at a sidewalk table outside a cafe on Avenue A, and my mother regarded the drug dealers, the pierced and tattooed polysexuals, the teens with boom boxes walking by. Then she called my father, who asked her what kind of neighborhood it was. “It’s full of …” she said, and paused, thinking carefully, “… artists.” On one of our first nights in the apartment, my wife’s cousin, a young hothead who had come by to visit, got into an argument with a group of young men when he went downstairs for a smoke. “I’m going to come back here with an army,” the cousin threatened them. A few minutes later, a stocky man named Hector came up to our door and introduced himself. “Melanie must have told you about me?” The landlady had. Hector, an ex-Green Beret (or so it was rumored), was the leader of a drug gang that had been on the block for 15 years. His Puerto Rican father was our janitor and raised roosters for cockfights; his Irish mother did our laundry in the laundromat on the first floor. Hector taught karate to the kids on the block, whom he then recruited into his gang. “Now you live on the block. Any of my guys,” he promised, thumping a fist on his heart, “We’ll take a bullet for you.” When I drove home late at night, his boys would guide me into a parking space. Some 30 years later, I was at a steakhouse in the Bronx with a couple of detectives, shooting the shit. I told them I lived on East 7th Street in the ’90s. One of the detectives said, “I put away a heroin dealer there for 25 years. He sold it out of a laundromat.” And the single most violent incident I’ve ever been witness to in my life replayed before me. One night in the ’90s, my wife and our 2-year-old son and I awoke to the sound of a helicopter low overhead; it sounded like Vietnam in the war movies. Soon, it was followed by an army of 50, 100 cops, some of them in a kind of armored vehicle, four of them with submachine guns. When I opened the door, heavily armed men in black armor yelled at me to “STAY INSIDE!” and ran up the stairs toward the roof. The block had been, literally, invaded. All these years later, the detective at the steakhouse would fill me in on the details about the raid on 7th Street. The NYPD used a “Trojan Horse.” For a month before the raid, two cops dressed shabbily, “like hippies,” and would drive down the block in a beat-up truck. The first couple of times, Hector’s lookouts chased them away. Then they got used to them, and waved at them as they passed by, and directed them to a parking place like anybody else. The day of the raid, the truck was stuffed with cops hiding as it drove into the block. Then they burst out of the back of the truck, with guns. This I remember: As the cops led the last of the gang away in handcuffs, an eerie sound floated out over the East Village in the dead of night — one of the cops, singing some sort of operatic song of triumph in a high tenor, like a victory song sung by a castrato. The week after, my car got broken into on the block, for the first time in five years. The watchers were all gone. Years later, the parking lot next door got turned into a luxury condominium. Its lobby features large black-and-white photographs of the anarchists and junkies that the bankers and lawyers moving into the building had replaced in the area. Young white and Asian women strode determinedly out of the building early in the mornings, wearing business suits and sneakers, holding handbags to carry the heels they would change into when they got to the office. *Suketu Mehta is the author of “This Land is Our Land: An Immigrant’s Manifesto” and “Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found.”* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Love Shack, Baby** By Chris Policano This all happened in the late 1970s. I don’t remember how I did the math, but while attending City College and working part-time hawking TV Guide subscriptions and Montgomery Ward Auto Club memberships for a telemarketing firm, I determined that the rent would be too damn high if it exceeded $200 a month. (That’s less than half of what it now costs to park my car in a Queens garage, by the way.) The options were limited and unappealing: - Live alone under squalid conditions that would certainly appall my hardworking parents, who took pride in raising their three kids in a 4-bedroom house built in 1940 on a 6,000 square foot lot in southeast Queens; - Live with one or more of the plethora of strangers — emphasis on strange — who sought roommates through the classified section of The Village Voice; or - Continue to live with the aforementioned parents. And then love played a hand. More specifically, very young love — because you have to be very young to believe you can actually pull off living with a significant other in a Manhattan studio apartment. Tina and I were 19 years old, maybe 20, and we’d only been together 18 months or so. The city was falling apart; all the papers said so. But as far as we were concerned, its streets were paved with roses and ice cream. So I am here to report that we *almost* pulled it off. Back then — and even now, I suppose — 92nd Street between First and Second Avenues was not considered the “fashionable” Upper East Side. It was too far east and too high up. For $275 a month, doable with pooled resources, we could live on the second floor of a five-story walk-up, in a unit approximately 10 feet wide and 20 feet long, kitchen included. The apartment’s best features were an exposed brick wall and a fire escape that we lovingly referred to as “the terrace.” From that “terrace,” we observed the routinely chaotic life of the block. One of the buildings across from us warehoused Sabrett hot dog carts that vendors would pick up early in the morning while navigating around the loud, high drama often being played out at the closing time of the dive bar up the street. As a kid from Queens, residing in Manhattan was like living in a movie. Sometimes literally. On the way to the subway one morning, we passed a group of what appeared to be well-heeled revelers standing outside a restaurant on Second Avenue, looking profoundly out of place in broad daylight. This odd tableau repeated itself over the next few days. Turned out the restaurant was Elaine’s, the partiers were extras, and the film being shot was Woody Allen’s “Manhattan.” In the weeks and months that followed, we started taking friends to the bar of the world-famous restaurant on Friday nights, ordering Michelobs because they were 25 cents cheaper than Heinekens, and delighted to be bystanders at the best ongoing cocktail party in the city. Eventually, alas, the walls of that tiny studio closed in on us, the mattress of the pullout couch lost its shape, the “terrace” lost its charm — and the relationship failed to survive the growing pains of its participants. But you never forget your first love, or how it played out in your first apartment. *Christopher Policano is the director of external relations at the CUNY School of Labor and Urban Studies.* ### A Housing Agenda for the Next Mayor URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-housing-agenda-for-the-next-mayor/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z The New York City mayoral primary was a rebuke to those who think Democrats have lost touch with voters. Nearly every serious survey found that affordability — specifically the cost of housing — was the issue most important to New Yorkers. After some early focus on public safety, the candidates fought principally for the title "Most Likely To Solve the Housing Crisis." And the runaway winner was Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani, who stuck to affordability with martial discipline. On substance, nobody truly rose above the field. For the most part, the plans offered by candidates Mamdani, Andrew Cuomo, Brad Lander, Scott Stringer, Zellnor Myrie and others committed to producing ambitious numbers of new and mostly affordable apartments. Details of timing, cost, location and approach were scarce and mostly irrelevant. After all, primary election commitments are promises made with budgets that don't exist, dependent on an economy nobody can predict. Packed around the production goals were other proposals intended to signal a broader approach, and it is here that the candidates perhaps diverged. Cuomo threw up a blizzard of indiscriminate initiatives that tried to satisfy everyone and failed to build on the expertise he could have claimed as a former U.S. secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Lander showed a mastery of detail and offered perhaps the only creative — if unrealistic —[ new idea](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DKxPCrwufUH/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), converting some city golf courses into housing. Only Mamdani broke through to voters, though, with piercingly clear rhetoric that communicated that he understood the urgency and scale of the crisis and that he wasn't willing to accept half-measures. Wise or unwise, "Freeze the rent!" was a resonant battle cry. While the candidates debated, the real action took place elsewhere. The Congress used its otherwise catastrophic One Big Beautiful Bill to [expand the capacity](https://www.novoco.com/podcast/aug-5-2025-a-closer-look-at-lihtc-details-in-reconciliation-bill?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the Low Income Housing Tax Credits important to building multifamily housing at the local level. Soon after, the City's Charter Review Commission [advanced to the public](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a set of procedural reforms that, if supported by a majority of voters, would give the next mayor a flying start by streamlining cumbersome and time-consuming land-use reviews and weakening the power of local council members to veto rezoning proposals. All of this built on the passage earlier in the year of Mayor Adams' City of Yes zoning reform and the ongoing neighborhood rezonings that aimed to ease the path to development in Midtown Manhattan, Long Island City and elsewhere. Between now and Election Day, the public has another chance to assess which of the general-election candidates is best equipped to reverse the trend of more than two decades of insufficient housing construction and make the city a place where people of all income levels can reasonably hope to find an affordable home. Like any chief executive, the mayor is a decision-maker. If they're disciplined — think Bloomberg, not de Blasio — the city's next leader will make a few critical calls every day and leave the execution to key players in the administration, holding them accountable for the results. So in the brief window between now and Nov. 4, it would be immensely useful for the major candidates to skip parading around "unit counts," which are misleading, wishful thinking, and instead explain the principles that will govern their key decisions on the issue that matters most to New Yorkers. **Five key principles** What follows is one approach to New York City housing policy for the next mayor — a framework for policymaking, written not to help any particular candidate but to enable sensible policy choices that also have broad political appeal. One caveat: Much of what follows concerns housing *supply*. The project of housing all 8 million-plus New Yorkers goes far beyond construction alone, encompassing the enforcement of tenant protections and the maintenance of existing units as well as other areas far beyond the scope of traditional "housing policy," including the treatment of the mentally ill, the role of law enforcement in monitoring and oversight of landlords, and more. But supply is a big part of the picture, and it is as good a place as any to start. This is what the next mayor should say: *The unwavering goal of housing policy should be to provide an affordable place to live for every New Yorker. There are five cornerstone principles that will guide the work of my administration's housing agencies and that the public can use to hold government accountable:* 1. **All-of-government approach:* Every agency will play a role in solving the housing crisis, and they will work together with the urgency a crisis demands.* 2. **A new relationship with landlords and real estate developers:* City government and the real estate industry should be partners as much as possible, not combatants. City government will be fair, transparent, responsive and decisive with developers and landlords. Anyone seeking government assistance will be held to high standards, and housing agencies will have the resources to negotiate and enforce fair deals as well as to protect tenants from predatory behavior.* 3. **Fairness:* The housing crisis affects all five boroughs; every neighborhood will play its part in solving it.* 4. **Public development:* City government should aggressively look for ways to use its rich and diverse asset base to take a more direct role in developing truly affordable housing.* 5. ***Accountability:*** On Dec. 31 of every year, the Mayor's Office will put out a clear and concise report of what was accomplished in the housing sector over the prior 12 months. This report will go much deeper than the production numbers have in the past. It will tell New Yorkers how their government is doing on issues that matter to them: Is it getting cheaper to rent a home? How long does it take people of all income levels to find an apartment? How have key housing statistics changed over the past year? The annual report will answer these kinds of questions, and the mayor will hold a press conference to explain every single number. **The fine print: Some examples of the principles in practice** All-of-government approach: Every agency that touches housing should meet monthly with the mayor to report on its progress, in a meeting dubbed "HousingStat." Today, agencies are siloed, which means the simple act of renting up a fully built government-regulated apartment building can take months or years, while the Department of Buildings, the Fire Department and other agencies schedule multiple visits to measure compliance with outdated standards. Under an updated policy, the City should set a benchmark time period from completion to rent-up, and officials from the Mayor's Office should use HousingStat to monitor compliance and promote accountability across the agencies. A new relationship with landlords and real estate developers: The relationship between city government and the real estate industry is in many ways out of balance. Developers are supplicants when they need funding and are made to jump through bureaucratic hoops while understaffed agencies hack their way through years-long pipelines. But developers often try to make back profit margins by stacking subsidy upon subsidy, shutting out other worthy projects. Affordability commitments made to secure political support are [sometimes treated as optional](https://gothamist.com/news/ny-lets-brooklyns-atlantic-yards-owner-skirt-huge-penalties-for-affordable-housing-failure?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). No more. The City should treat developers and landlords as equal partners, and demand they reciprocate. For example, the refusal by two consecutive mayors to hold the owners of Atlantic Yards to their contractual obligations is a disgrace and will never be repeated. The City should always take steps to enforce contractual obligations to protect taxpayer dollars and the rights of tenants. The other side of the bargain is that the City must acknowledge that bureaucracy is a big part of the crisis and will take concrete steps to do better. Within 90 days of taking office, the mayor should have a plan to streamline archaic and unnecessary codes and rules, including establishing hard and fast timelines for City review, with the goal of speeding time to action. Furthermore, the new administration should finally address the looming catastrophe in the rent-stabilized universe. There are reportedly many tens of thousands of vacancies in buildings whose landlords won't rent apartments, because doing so would not yield enough revenue to cover their costs. By the end of March 2026, the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) will have a plan to get these units fixed and filled. To be clear, some government money can get many units of housing back online, but this should *not* be a bailout. Many landlords will have to take tough terms or relinquish ownership as a condition of avoiding financial disaster. Rent-stabilized buildings were universally profitable until very recently, in part because landlords stinted on making repairs while rents went up and apartments eventually went market-rate. Again, this is part of rebalancing the relationship between government and the private sector. Fairness: The City needs at least 1 million new apartments, and they must be built in every corner of New York. The mayor should direct the chair of the City Planning Commission to assess the city's housing stock and set a timetable for a citywide housing plan. The goal: to support building where public dollars can go the farthest and make the most impact. To achieve this goal, the city needs to build housing that is affordable but also near transit and other critical amenities. Without question, there will be communities that will seek to reject these plans, but no neighborhood will get special treatment or be singled out. The plan should be available online and constantly updated — a living document. Public development: Housing development is not the sole province of the private sector. New York City can use a wide variety of emerging and well-established models to build its own housing, which will have economic and social benefits. This is hardly the first time in its history that the City has built housing. The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) is the city's largest landlord. Restoring livable quality to this critical source of low-income housing for at least 520,000 New Yorkers will be a priority. With the federal government taking another big step back from its housing commitments, the City should make multiyear funding available for public housing and will pressure the state to do the same. NYCHA also has an untapped opportunity to capture value for itself while helping solve the crisis: Its developments sit on an enormous amount of attractive land in every borough, and the administration should help NYCHA turn this incredibly valuable asset into thousands of new affordable units. The Economic Development Corporation (EDC) should make the creation of new housing a priority. Lack of housing is the choke point for New York's economic growth, so many of EDC's noncore programs will be paused in favor of a focus on housing: no more "job retention" tax breaks for companies that were never going to leave. EDC should work alongside the primary housing agencies to ensure that housing goals are included in all of its development work and will look for places to use its land-use powers aggressively. Accountability. Every mayor since Bloomberg has finished each year by congratulating themselves for "creating" so much new housing — meanwhile, the deficit has only grown worse. Something doesn't add up. Going forward, at the end of every year, City Hall should issue a clear report that tells the public what got done and what New Yorkers can expect for the next year. This report should include how many apartments were restored to affordability, how many new apartments will be built thanks to City action and at what rent levels, how much government funding from all sources was committed and spent and who received it, and how much progress has been made toward closing the housing gap by 2035\. It should report on progress toward reducing the bureaucratic barriers to development and will lay out every commitment made by every developer. Each year, the work will start over again. **A reality check** There is no unitary solution to New York's housing crisis. This city is land-constrained and has demographic and political currents that make the abundance movement's sole reliance on increasing supply a partial solution at best. But without more supply, we have no way to get all New Yorkers housed. The next mayor will have to start with an approach to governing that balances evidence-based policy goals with political reality — and let the details flow from there. If he tells the City *how* he'll govern — and lets the voters hold him accountable for the results — he'll not only make meaningful progress toward solving our housing problem, he'll also take huge strides toward ensuring his place in the pantheon of great New York mayors. ### The Rent Is Too Damn High (But Also Too Low) URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-rent-is-too-damn-high-but-also-too-low/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z Many people look at rent-stabilized housing and see the embodiment of their particular fears — either landlords squeezing cash-strapped tenants or wealthy renters scoring a bargain by mooching off regulated rents. Both these problems do exist, to varying degrees, but the biggest issue policymakers need to confront today is that recent changes to rent stabilization and the economy are threatening one of the most important sources of housing for low-income New Yorkers. Some people say that sky-high rents are enabling New York City landlords to rake in profits on rent-stabilized buildings, while others say that it's becoming impossible for landlords to operate rent-stabilized housing because rising expenses are outpacing revenues. Both statements are true — but they're referring to different buildings. Unfortunately, the way rent laws are administered has blurred distinctions among the heterogenous set of rent-stabilized buildings in New York. As a result, some buildings are doing fine financially while many are in severe distress. If we fail to heed the increasingly clear warning signals, we can expect dire consequences for the city's ability to house lower-income residents stably and affordably. **The threshold of disinvestment** It is now widely understood that New York City's high housing costs are fueled by a persistent shortage of housing, which drives up rents. Yet in the roughly half of[ the city's rental housing ](https://chpcny.org/visualization/housing-stock-visualization/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)units that are rent-stabilized, rents are subject to a ceiling on annual increases, enhancing stability for the tenants who live there. But as stabilization sets a ceiling on rents, we also have to pay attention to the floor — the cost of paying utility bills, taxes and insurance; making repairs and filing required paperwork; repaying lenders; and paying the workers who do everything from processing leases to [taking out the trash](https://gothamist.com/news/adams-to-push-nyc-trash-placement-to-night-time-hours?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). If the rent — plus any other revenues, like charges for using laundry machines — doesn't cover all these costs, something must be cut back. The first casualty of belt-tightening is almost always nonemergency repairs. This doesn't bring about immediate disaster, but tenants feel it, and the longer it keeps up, the more serious its consequences are, and the more expensive it is to fix later. The Community Preservation Corporation's[ Rent-Regulated Portfolio Data Brief](https://communityp.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/CPC-NYC-Portfolio-Data-Brief-2020-2024-v2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that, as insurance, compliance and other operating costs grew from 2020 to 2024 — insurance and administrative costs each rose by more than 50% during this period — the amount spent on actual repairs and maintenance decreased. This is what it looks like when disinvestment creeps across the threshold. When the quality of resident services declines, residents with the means to find a different apartment may do so. But those who can't afford housing elsewhere become trapped in deteriorating conditions. New York City has a long and dark record of allowing affordable housing to degenerate into what my colleague Sarah Watson and I have called ["antisocial housing"](https://citylimits.org/opinion-nycs-antisocial-housing-problem/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — where rents are required to stay low, but no one has provided enough revenue to maintain decent conditions. This degrades residents' quality of life and[ drags down their economic prospects](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/103472/why-housing-matters-for-upward-mobility-evidence-and-indicators-for-practitioners-and-policymakers.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), hurting the very people that housing policy otherwise aims to help. **Distress hiding in plain sight** Wait, you might say — didn't I read that[ rent-stabilized buildings were showing increased profitability](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/politics/2025/03/28/revenue-profits-for-landlords-increase-across-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? Yes and no. When rent stabilization was established in New York City, it mostly applied to entire buildings. But in the past several decades, many units within these buildings were removed from rent stabilization under since-repealed provisions that allowed decontrol of high-rent units, and tax incentive programs such as 421-a required rent-stabilized units in new, mixed-income buildings with predominantly market-rate rents. As a result, the phrase "rent-stabilized building" lumps together highly dissimilar buildings — ranging from old, 100% rent-stabilized buildings with low rent rolls to recently built buildings at mostly market rents — and produces a misunderstanding with grave implications. [Data published by the Rent Guidelines Board](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-IE-Study.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that, on average*,* from 2022 to 2023, revenues increased faster than costs in buildings that contained at least one rent-stabilized unit. But looking beyond averages, it quickly becomes evident that the balance between costs and revenues depends heavily on the mix of market-rate and rent-stabilized units. In core Manhattan — south of 110th Street on the West Side and 96th Street on the East Side — two-thirds of buildings containing at least one rent-stabilized unit are actually made up primarily of market-rate units. Only 16% of core Manhattan buildings are 100% rent-stabilized. Outside of core Manhattan, 61% of rent-stabilized units are in 100% stabilized buildings, and in the Bronx, it's as high as 75%. Why does this matter? The income of a fully rent-stabilized building is limited entirely by the ceiling for annual rent stabilization increases. But in a building with market-rate units, income can be (and is) driven mostly by rising market-rate rents. As a result, Rent Guidelines Board decisions — which impose the same cap on rent increases on every rent-stabilized apartment in the city — have a modest overall effect on building revenues in those majority market-rate buildings in core Manhattan, and a much larger effect in the rest of the city, where buildings lack revenue sources other than rent-stabilized units. In other words, rent-stabilized buildings are doing well financially, as long as you're talking about buildings that mostly aren't rent-stabilized. Much as overall crime rates might mask chronic problems in many neighborhoods, the relative financial success of buildings with market-rate units masks pervasive financial trouble in rent-stabilized housing. In core Manhattan, median building income for buildings with at least one rent-stabilized unit [increased](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-IE-Study.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 12.2% from 2022 to 2023, while costs increased just 3.4% — hardly the picture of distress. In the Bronx, however, where 100% rent-stabilized buildings predominate, the median building's costs increased faster (4.6%) than income (3.8%). The same pattern holds true for the entirety of the city outside core Manhattan: Median costs increased faster than income. In other words, costs outpaced revenues for most rent-stabilized buildings. One year of data like this isn't a serious concern. But this is a sustained trend. Rent Guidelines Board data running from 2013 to 2023 show that, over this decade, expenses for the median building outside core Manhattan have increased 26% faster than income. This predictably shows up as deferred maintenance, physical distress and owners unable to access lending for capital improvements. [The financial failure](https://nyassembly.gov/write/upload/publichearing/001452/005966.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of organizations operating affordable housing would pose dire risks for their tenants and the communities they serve. Flirting with mortgage defaults threatens community-based organizations that provide not only housing but a range of important services in their neighborhoods. **Solving the problem** Multiple factors have conspired to create distress in lower-priced, rent-stabilized housing, and no single action is going to fix the problem or avoid replicating it in the future. We must explore a range of solutions that address both renters' needs and the business challenges of maintaining and operating housing, either by reducing the costs of providing housing or by finding a way to pay for them. We can begin with these three strategies: **1\. Pay the cost of freezing rents for the people who can least afford a hike.** Low-income New Yorkers are already overburdened by rents, but their housing problems aren't solved if we allow their homes to crumble. Tenant- and project-based vouchers provided by the federal government are an irreplaceable resource for enabling people with very low incomes to afford housing while also ensuring the upkeep of their buildings. An obvious step would be to expand these programs — but this simply isn't on the menu in today's federal government. The State and City have taken steps to expand rental assistance, but their limited fiscal capacity constrains the scale of these efforts. We can also look to expand existing programs that freeze rents without stiffing the building. The housing community knows these as the SCRIE (Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption) and DRIE (Disability Rent Increase Exemption) programs, but they have also been branded ["The NYC Rent Freeze Program."](https://www.nyc.gov/site/rentfreeze/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Low-income seniors and people with disabilities living in rent-stabilized apartments can have their rents held flat while the building owner receives a tax abatement credit to backfill the missing rent increase. These programs have a more limited benefit but also a lower budget impact than rental voucher programs, because they offset only the rent increase rather than the full gap between the tenant's share of rent and market rent. Expanding the NYC Rent Freeze Program to cover other rent-burdened, low-income residents would essentially be a way to means-test a rent freeze and to pay for it, rather than pretend that revenues can be frozen without adverse effects on buildings and their occupants. With the most vulnerable renters insulated from rent increases, the Rent Guidelines Board's decisions could better address the financial circumstances of fully rent-stabilized buildings. This might even enable legislation to, as some have proposed, support the long-term viability of housing by[ pegging rent increases to the Consumer Price Index](https://furmancenter.org/thestoop/entry/the-economic-challenge-for-the-rent-guidelines-board-balancing-long-term-affordability-in-rent-stabilized-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). **2\. Give subsidized housing some flexibility for the sake of preserving affordability.** Roughly 300,000 units of the rent-stabilized stock are subsidized affordable housing — buildings for which the City or State has provided capital or operating subsidies specifically to provide quality, long-term affordable homes for low-income New Yorkers. These buildings are governed by regulatory agreements that require landlords to, among other things, keep rents below specified levels. They are financed on terms that don't generate surplus revenues, which means properties — already running on thin margins — can be thrown into financial crisis when costs or income deviate from expectations, such as [when rent collections plunged](https://thenyhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Arrears-Update-Dec-2023-Policy-Brief-Final.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) during the pandemic. Prior to 2019, when a tenant moved out of a subsidized, rent-stabilized apartment, that unit's rent could be increased if necessary as long as it remained affordable at the income level specified under the building's regulatory agreement. This ensured long-term affordability while allowing affordable housing operators to recoup some of the expense of renovations and other costs. In 2019, though, as part of a package to prevent owners from hiking rents to unaffordable levels, State legislation prohibited these rent increases at vacancy — even for subsidized buildings with regulatory agreements guaranteeing that units would remain affordable! There was never a risk of massive rent increases for these apartments. This policy change has compounded the financial squeeze on subsidized low-income housing, constraining the resources available for maintaining these homes for low-income New Yorkers. If the State legislature were to amend rent laws to allow subsidized affordable housing operators additional latitude to adjust rents at vacancy — under the oversight of housing agencies and consistent with their regulatory agreements — this would enable these buildings to better meet the needs of the low-income residents they were created to serve, and for longer, without further increasing any existing tenant's rent. **3\. Get serious about costs.** Households that are just scraping by can't afford unnecessary expenses. Neither can public policy turn a blind eye to the costs of operating their housing. As rent stabilization has further limited rent increases, the costs of operating housing in New York have ballooned. The well-documented upheaval in insurance markets is one driver of recent cost escalation. The Community Preservation Corporation's [rent-stabilization portfolio report](https://communityp.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/CPC-NYC-Portfolio-Data-Brief-2020-2024-v2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that, in 2023, these buildings spent more on insurance than on actual maintenance and repairs. A steady drip-drip of regulatory mandates, from façade maintenance to carbon reduction, has also increased administrative costs and capital demands. Even something as seemingly simple as requiring trash to go to the curb after 8 p.m. increased staffing costs. These cost increases affect co-ops, condos and market-rate rentals, but the most serious effects are felt in the buildings that have neither a financial cushion nor an ability to generate additional revenue. If we are going to be able to ensure the adequacy of rental revenues while limiting rent increases, further reforms will be necessary to bring these and other costs under control. We need to actively pursue policies that bring down unnecessarily high costs and[ require disclosure and transparency](https://chpcny.org/policy-and-testimony/accounting-for-costs-imposed-on-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when regulations would increase the cost of building or operating housing. We can no longer afford to treat other policy objectives as if they're freeloading guests at a resort who can sign their bar tab and charge it to housing. Sadly, this is not the first time New York City has seen the maintenance of affordable housing underfunded to the point of crisis. Today, the government is in the midst of a long-term project to reinvest in other types of housing that have been victims of deferred maintenance — over 150,000 units of public housing and roughly 50,000 Mitchell-Lama apartments in affordable complexes built with City and State support from the 1950s through the 1970s. There is no public funding source waiting out there to tackle the new mountain of outstanding capital needs for rent-stabilized apartments. We need to find ways to help people pay rent that sustains our housing stock. We cannot afford to pretend any longer that this is unnecessary. ### What Hangs in the Balance Sheets URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-hangs-in-the-balance-sheets/ Last updated: 2026-04-16T19:02:02.000Z In order to help readers better understand how landlords keep their rental buildings in the black — or why they fall into the red — Vital City asked real estate companies to share income and expenses for two buildings for calendar year 2024\. We agreed not to identify the exact addresses of the two buildings so that companies could share private accounting and loan information. We chose two buildings, one wholly market-rate and one entirely rent-stabilized, because the regulations, costs and income associated with rent-stabilized and market-rent apartments can differ significantly. However, neither building is intended to be a representative example of a typical market-rate or rent-stabilized building. Each income statement simply represents an overview of one year in the financial life of a real building. These two buildings also have different ages, sizes and locations: The nearly-100-year-old rent-stabilized building in Inwood is smaller, while the larger market-rate building in Midtown, built in 1962, includes a retail component and amenities. In general, under the [Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974](https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2024/11/fact-sheet-08-11-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), rent-stabilized buildings are mostly older pre-war or post-war buildings built before 1974, which makes maintenance and heating more costly. Market rent buildings tend to be either smaller buildings (such as a Brooklyn brownstone) or larger but newer buildings with amenities (such as a high-rise in Long Island City or Hudson Yards). Within and among regulation types, the cost of running a building will vary. The income statements of brand new market-rate buildings would look different, as would buildings with a significant number of affordable units, as would very small buildings, as would coops and condos. Public housing presents its own economic complexities. To reiterate, these are just two snapshots. Whenever possible, similar account approaches were used to categorize income and expenses for each building. (In one income statement, we have rounded numbers to the nearest dollar; the other includes revenue and expenditures to the cent.) Cassidy Jensen did the reporting for this project. ## A 1962 market-rent building in Murray Hill This 198-unit Manhattan elevator building, built in 1962, is made up of market-rent apartments along with a parking garage and a small retail space. It was originally used as a hospital dormitory. A large New York City-based family-owned real estate development company purchased the building in 1994 and has owned it since. The building was most likely exempt from rent regulation despite its age because it was built as a dorm, not apartments. The building has been free-market since the company purchased it. The company's portfolio includes other older buildings like this one that are fully market-rent along with newer buildings that have a mix of market-rent units and stabilized units. For newer buildings constructed in the last 15 years, developers commonly include 20% to 30% affordable units to qualify for tax breaks. Unit Mix 198 42 (stu), 151 (1br), 5 (2br) Highest Rent $6,700/month 2-Bedroom Lowest Rent $3,200/month Studio Income Residential Rent Rent that would have been collected if all units had been filled with paying tenants. Includes $137,210 in concessions made to renters (for example a month of free rent), and the super's apartment ($72,694). $9,489,807.00 Vacancies There were 66 vacant apartments in this building in 2024\. Portfolio average is 35%-40% turnover each year. \-$339,490.00 Uncollected Rent This represents one tenant who was 45 days late on rent as of December 31, 2024\. This company doesn't write off bad debt, and this particular building does well at collecting rent on time compared to others in the company's portfolio. \-$3,054.00 Other Income Income from a retail space and a parking garage. $260,032.00 Other Revenue Mostly amenity fees, including gym fees. $72,652.00 Total Revenue $9,479,947.00 Expenses Real Estate Tax This older building doesn't have any tax abatements. Most newer buildings qualify for tax abatements that lower this cost. New buildings in this company's portfolio tend to include about 25% affordable units to qualify for tax programs. \-$2,275,565.00 Payroll This represents pay for nine full-time employees, including door staff, cleaners and repair people. Includes benefits and payroll taxes. \-$903,076.00 Repairs and Maintenance Does not include large capital projects (like the new roof, broken out below) \-$544,390.00 Utilities Water, sewer, gas and electric. Tenants pay their own electric bills, apart from cooling in the common areas. In 2023, this was $242,071 and in 2022 it was $270,546. \-$249,333.00 Insurance Increased from $178,024 in 2023 and $162,237 in 2022\. Property insurance costs have risen nationwide in recent years. \-$193,695.00 Administrative/Professional Includes legal fees to take tenants to housing court and accounting services, plus computer software for the leasing office. \-$53,419.00 Property Management Property management fee is 3% of total revenues. This company manages their own properties instead of paying an outside company. \-$286,120.00 Owner Paid Broker Fees \-$99,018.00 Leasing & Advertising \-$81,221.00 Total Operating Expenses \-$3,885,837.00 Capital Expenses This is the cost of a 2024 roof replacement. One-time expenses like these are not included in yearly operating cost numbers. Another example: In 2017, a facade replacement cost $6 million. Lenders typically require money for large capital repairs like this to be held in reserve. A new building might require about $300 per unit per year to be set aside. \-$800,000.00 Net Operating Income $4,794,110.00 Interest Payment \-$2,650,000.00 Net Cash Flow After Debt Service $2,144,110.00 ### Per Unit Total Revenue $46,565 Total Expenses \-$23,666 Net Operating Income $22,899 ### Loan Details Loan Amount $50,000,000 Interest Rate Between 3.0-3.5% Debt Service Coverage Ratio 1.81x Owners took out a 15-year mortgage in 2015, benefitting from low interest rates at the time. This ratio is the net operating income divided by debt service. A minimum ratio is usually 1.20 or 1.25, although some lenders might go as low as 1.1 with a high interest rate or where units are subsidized by government programs. A ratio greater than 1 means the property can generate enough income to cover its debt obligations. # ## A pre-war rent-stabilized building in Inwood This 75-unit elevator building, built in 1926, is located in Inwood in Manhattan between the Met Cloisters and Inwood Hill Park. It was built as moderate middle-income housing, shortly before the A train was completed. The owner, a 3rd generation family company, purchased the building in 2010\. Because it was built before 1974, all its units were rent-stabilized, meaning the New York City Rent Guidelines Board determines how much the rent can be increased each year, or rent-controlled, meaning the rent for tenants or their successors who have lived in a particular unit since 1971 can't exceed a certain maximum amount. New York City has about one million rent stabilized units, generally in buildings of at least six units constructed before 1974 or in newer buildings that receive tax breaks. About 16,000 units are rent controlled. In this building, tenants in rent-controlled apartments either died or left those apartments and those units moved into rent stabilization. Today, all its units are rent-stabilized. Unit Mix 75 6 (stu), 59 (1br), 10 (2br) Highest Rent $2,648/month 2-Bedroom Lowest Rent $881/month 1-Bedroom Income Residential Rent All the rent the owners expected to collect, not what was actually collected in cash. $5,199 in rental income came a combination of Section 8 (a voucher program in which the New York City Housing Authority pays a portion of a tenant's rent) and the Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption program (a city program for seniors that freezes the tenant's rent and gives the owner a property tax credit to make up the difference). $1,536,240.12 Vacancies At the beginning of 2025, there were 10 vacant apartments in this building as owners tried to decide whether to lease the open units. Now two are vacant. Usually, the vacancy rate is closer to 2-4%, depending on the season. Across the company's portfolio, the turnover rate for longer-term rent stabilized units is 5-10% annually. \-$91,703.00 Other Income Includes interest and other fees. $13,923.07 Bad Debt Bad debt is uncollected rent that the owner doesn't expect to collect. This company writes typically writes this debt off about 3 months after those tenants leave (either move out or are evicted). This debt includes one tenant who stopped paying rent in 2019 and moved out in 2023, but the debt was written off in 2024. \-$232,450.98 Total Revenue $1,226,009.21 Expenses Real Estate Tax Taxes have gone down in recent years after the owner successfully challenged tax assessments. Expected taxes were $350,414.48 in 2023 and $355,414.70 in 2022\. This building doesn't qualify for abatements. \-$318,406.38 Payroll \-$59,775.64 Repairs and Maintenance The cost of getting vacant apartments ready to rent again make up $34,261.55 of this number. Last year included a one-time expense of $18,300 for lead testing. \-$244,167.13 Utilities Includes water and sewer, electric for common spaces, and natural gas for building heating. Tenants separately pay electricity for their units. Decreased from $160,654.39 in 2023, but has increased 27% since 2019. \-$148,161.94 Insurance Insurance increased from $69,570.47 in 2023 and $63,869.62 in 2022\. This real estate company has used the same insurer for years across most of their buildings. Property insurance costs have risen nationwide in recent years. \-$80,575.56 Administrative/Professional Includes legal fees to take tenants to housing court and accounting services. Also covers permits. \-$32,571.00 Property Management Property management fee is 6% of collected revenue. A 5-7% management fee is standard for rent stabilized properties. Because rent stabilized buildings have lower revenue, property managers sometimes demand a higher share of it to make projects worthwhile. Property managers may also pursue other strategies to reduce costs on rent stabilized portfolios, such as centralizing property management in one office across a portfolio of multiple buildings, like this company does. This company manages their own properties instead of paying an outside company. \-$90,407.19 Total Operating Expenses \-$974,064.84 Capital Expenses No major capital expenses were incurred in 2024. $0.00 Net Operating Income This number for 2024 should be slightly higher, closer to $300,000 or $400,000, because some 2023 unpaid rents were assigned to 2024 rather than the previous year. In 2023, NOI was $525,006.90. $251,944.37 Interest Payment \-$456,468.00 Net Cash Flow After Debt Service \-$204,523.63 ### Per Unit Total Revenue $16,347 Total Expenses \-$12,988 Net Operating Income $3,359 ### Loan Details Loan Amount $11,650,000 Interest Rate 3.84% Debt Service Coverage Ratio 0.55x Owners refinanced in 2020, when income still exceeded interest payments. Net operating income was $696,796.17 in December 2020\. Vacancies and expenses increased during the pandemic while rents remained more or less the same. The loan was extended in January 2025 and is now up in 2030. This ratio is the net operating income divided by debt service. A minimum ratio is usually 1.2 or 1.25, although some lenders might go as low as 1.1 with a high interest rate or where units are subsidized by government programs. A ratio less than 1 means the property isn't generating enough income to cover its debt obligations. ### ### The Property Tax Cannot Stand URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-property-tax-cannot-stand/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:46.000Z Most policy conversations about producing more housing focus on creating financial incentives for more development, streamlining the zoning code and rationalizing the elaborate web of rules that drive up the cost of construction. All of that matters, but the way we tax property in New York City is as big an impediment to housing production as any other factor. It's time we focus on that broken piece of the status quo. Let's start with a quick primer: The property tax people pay varies depending on the tax class to which the property is assigned and then four key numbers about the property itself. New York City has four tax classes. One-, two- and three-family homes are assigned to Class 1\. All other residential property, including apartment buildings, co-ops and condos, is assigned to Class 2\. (Other classes of property, 3 and 4, are nonresidential.) Which numbers determine the size of the bill? First is the market value, which the City estimates using three appraisal methods. For small homes in Class 1, it mostly assesses market value by looking at sales of comparable buildings. For apartment buildings, co-ops and condos in Class 2, and for office buildings, factories and stores in Class 4, it generally looks at the building's income or the income of comparable buildings (this is called the "income approach"). For unique properties like utility equipment, churches and museums, it uses the cost to replace the property. Second, there's the assessed value of a property, which is a percentage of the market value, that the City chooses to ensure that all properties within a tax class are, putatively, taxed equivalently (uniformly) across that tax class. Third, the City Council determines the share of taxes that will be paid by each tax class based on a not-easy-to-explain formula. Once the amount of money to be raised — the levy — is determined, the City Council sets a tax rate for each tax class so that it can raise the target levy. In simple terms, the math works like this: Tax Class Rate = Class Levy / Total Tax Class Assessed Value. But it's anything but simple. New York City's property tax system is known for its complexity. That complexity adds significant inequities, unfairness and confusion. A few examples: - Assessment caps for small homeowners (Class 1) limit assessment increases to 6% per year and 20% over five years. This, along with the City's failure to adopt a uniform assessment ratio (assessment divided by market value) within Class 1, means that in neighborhoods with fast-rising property values, assessments are kept low, resulting in lower tax bills than would have otherwise been the case. - In multifamily buildings, rentals pay a disproportionate share of the property tax levy compared to very expensive cooperatives and condominiums. This is a huge problem in a city where the vast majority of residents rent rather than own. [Decades of research](https://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter%5FShiftingtheBurden.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [by the Furman Center](https://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Distribution%5Fof%5Fthe%5FBurden%5Fof%5FNew%5FYork%5FCitys%5FProperty%5FTax%5F11.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the New York City Independent Budget Office shows that the effective tax rates paid by rentals are higher than co-ops and condos. For the rent-stabilized stock, the Rent Guidelines Board reports that taxes [constitute a whopping 29%](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-PIOC.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of operating costs — the largest single line item. - Co-ops and condos, regardless of how fancy they are, are valued by comparing them to rental income from regulated, rather than from market-rate, rental buildings. As a result, some of the most expensive co-op and condo buildings are undervalued, which shifts a greater responsibility for the classwide tax levy to modest co-ops, condos and rental buildings. These are just a few examples; there are more. Add them up and they place a greater financial burden on rental apartments, drive up rents and discourage the production of high-density housing New York desperately needs. In addition, homeowners in modestly priced homes are paying substantially more taxes. After decades of hearing elected officials talk about the problems with the property tax but not seeing sufficient solutions, Tax Equity Now New York (TENNY) [sued New York State and City](https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aaid:sc:US:f38d9905-d956-47e1-999d-154d8e9d8e10?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in April 2017\. (Disclosure: I am the policy director for TENNY.) The suit sought a declaration from the court that the City's property tax system violated the New York State Constitution and several provisions of State law. In its review, the Court of Appeals, the State's highest court, clarified the law in two important respects. First, the Court debunked the City's excuse for not adopting a uniform assessment ratio for small homeowners: In response to the City's argument that the 6% and 20% caps were the reason why assessments were not uniform, the court held that the City could both adopt a uniform assessment ratio and comply with the required caps. In other words, contrary to the City's belief, the assessment caps did not trump the requirement for uniformity. Second, the Court clarified that the City was not required to use regulated rental income when valuing co-ops and condos that would *not* have been subject to rent regulation. In 1997, [the New York State legislature allowed](http://www.housingnyc.com/html/resources/reform.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) apartments with rents of more than $2,000 and household incomes of more than $175,000 to be deregulated. The laws were [amended in 2011](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/resources/rent-regulation-laws/rent-act-of-2011/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [again in 2015](https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/resources/rent-regulation-laws/rent-act-of-2015/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to allow apartments to be deregulated if rents were more than $2,700 and the household income was greater than $200,000\. For expensive co-ops and condos that the City had been valuing using regulated rents, the deregulation that was allowed between 1997 and 2019 almost certainly would have led to the deregulation of almost all of those co-ops and condo units. Therefore, the City could start to use market-rate rents to value those co-ops and condos. The use of market-rate rents from comparable buildings could increase the unfairly low assessments on these higher-end buildings. The Court also held that the City is on the hook to make these changes: It doesn't need to surrender its power to Albany to get a more equitable tax policy done. The next mayor can take a series of steps now to begin to make the property tax more fair and legal and to loosen the cinder block tied to the legs of New York's housing market. **Advance fairness for small homeowners in middle-income and predominantly minority neighborhoods** For the more than 700,000 small homeowners in the five boroughs, equity principles are clear: Homes that have the same value should have the same tax assessment. Yet this is not the case under current City tax policy; homeowners in the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island bear the brunt of the inequities. If you look at the median assessment ratio for all small homes by borough, Staten Island has the highest at 4.41%. That means, for example, that a home that the New York City Department of Finance — the agency responsible for determining property taxes — values at $100,000 would have an assessment of just $2,800 in Manhattan but would be 57% higher ($4,410) in Staten Island. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25164159?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/16mzMTp0jhG9G7FZQ4Ic-Utxf%5FJqXiisqI7%5FXhYhb-6k/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Even within boroughs, there are wide disparities. For example, in the Bronx this year, the Department of Finance estimated the value for 200 properties at $802,000 each. Yet the assessment for these properties — which, based on their valuations, should be the same — range from a low of $6,300 to more than $42,000. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25163804?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1QP2suWS3kWmOrk9MKpZWFyQZPwWME5333vZtEqhklxU/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The City once had a much more equitable policy, and it could again. Between 1982 and 2006, it [continuously lowered the uniform assessment ratio](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/fiscal-note-implications-of-lowering-the-class-1-assessment-ratio/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for small homeowners of Class 1 properties to comply with the law. But the City has not complied with the law requiring uniformity for almost two decades. It is important to note that Nassau County and the City have the same assessment rules for Class 1 properties. To comply with the law, Nassau County has lowered its assessment ratio almost every year. For the City, that means homeowners in every borough — and especially Staten Island, the Bronx and Queens — are overassessed. Under an equitable tax policy where the burden is shared more evenly between homeowners, the overall assessment for homeowners on Staten Island, in the Bronx and in Queens could be reduced by 33%, 28% and 26% respectively. **Doing right by tenants** Today, the market value and resulting assessed value for rental units, cooperatives and condominiums is determined using a system that significantly understates the value of the most expensive cooperatives and condominiums in the city. Under New York City law, the Department of Finance cannot value Class 2 apartments based on sales prices, but instead must estimate the value of multifamily units based on the building's rental income (or likely rental income, if a co-op or condo). The question for the City is how to estimate co-op and condo rental income. The City believes the law requires benchmarking against regulated rental income. However, regulated rents are significantly lower than market-rate rents, which means that co-ops and condos valued with those rents would be low. For example, imagine a co-op or condo that, based on sales price, is worth $1 million. If the City used the median rent for a regulated apartment in 2023 of approximately $1,300, the Department of Finance would estimate the property value at around $156,000\. However, if the City used the median rent for a Manhattan unregulated apartment (almost $4,500), the resulting value would increase to $540,000. The use of regulated rents to measure property value means some of the most expensive co-ops and condos in the city are compared to buildings that include rent-regulated units, regardless of whether the cooperatives and condominiums were regulated in the past. It doesn't have to be this way. The Court of Appeals agrees that the City could use market-rate rents when estimating the market value for high-value cooperatives and condos. Such an approach would result in property taxes for the most expensive cooperatives and condominiums that are as much as 40% to 50% higher than they currently are, taking the burden off of tenants in low- and medium-cost rental buildings who are shouldering more than their fair share. Implementing this change for high-valued cooperatives and condominiums could help reduce the tax burden for rental buildings and lower-valued cooperatives in Manhattan and the boroughs. For example, the current 12.5% Class 2 tax rate could be reduced. Currently, Class 2 property owners pay $15 billion in property taxes. Proper assessments of higher-valued co-ops and condos would allow Finance to lower the rate across the board. A fairer system could lower the rate to approximately 10.5%, under which the average taxes per rental apartment could go from $5,600 to $4,700\. It is one very concrete way to mitigate the skyrocketing rents. **Stop penalizing owners who renovate and improve their properties** For renovated properties, the City uses a hybrid method to estimate market value. The City values apartment buildings based on the income from the property. Typically, when valuing a property by the income approach, the value would not increase unless rents go up or expenses go down. However, rather than base the new value for renovated properties on those factors, the City typically *adds* the cost of the renovation to its preexisting value. This approach overassesses owners who invest in renovating and upgrading their properties and can discourage needed renovation and improvements. **Move toward truth in taxation** While we fix the most egregious flaws in the tax system, we must also hold elected officials accountable when they decide to raise taxes. Right now, elected officials and policymakers play hot potato when it comes to accepting responsibility for increases in New York City property taxes. While the authority for deciding the amount of taxes each year is vested in the City Council, they blame the Department of Finance for the tax increases. A principle called "truth in taxation" seeks to elucidate the relationship between City revenue growth and assessment changes, requiring elected officials to explain to the public their decision-making by showing the public what the tax levy would be if frozen (and tax rates are reduced) and what the levy would be if it were increased based on assessment (and tax rates remained the same). While it is a simple requirement, it forces elected officials to remember that they are accountable for decisions about the levy. **Adopt the statewide 2% property tax levy cap** Another policy related to "truth in taxation" is a levy cap. In 2011, New York State adopted a property tax levy cap, under which the [amount of revenue raised](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/local-government/property-tax-cap/pdf/inflation-and-allowable-levy-growth-factors.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from property taxes cannot increase by more than the lesser of 2% or inflation each year, unless the legislative body overrides the cap with a 60% supermajority vote (with some variation for different jurisdictions). Unfortunately, the law does not apply to New York City. Since adopted, the property tax levy for New York State local governments and school districts, not including New York City, has grown by just 25.5%. New York City's property tax levy, by contrast, grew by 71.3% — from $24.1 billion to almost $38 billion per year. If the City adopted the State property tax cap in 2011, the property tax levy would be just $23.6 billion this year, $15 billion less than it is currently. Would that mean a smaller City budget? Yes. But it would also mean lower rents — and not only for stabilized units. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/25163941?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jBIhy3spaCU6Q82SddBw%5FWTJG1cTH6dOdVMx6zYNTEc/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Stop violating the constitutional operating expense limit** New York City and other local governments rely heavily on the property tax because it is the one tax primarily within local government control. However, there is a constitutional limit on the amount that can be raised for operating expenses. The City can raise the levy as much as it needs to pay for the debt it has borrowed. The City should seek clarification and a ruling from the State attorney general to make sure they are not violating the constitutional provision. In short, there are several steps the City can take to increase fairness and clarity and genuinely incentivize production and maintenance of the types of housing New Yorkers most need. Now is the time. As the Court of Appeals has said, the City has the power. ### The High Price of Fine Print URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-high-price-of-fine-print/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:46.000Z In the parable of the blind men and the elephant, a group of men who cannot see try to piece together the true nature of the pachyderm, each touching a different part of the animal's body and confidently extrapolating from there. One man touches the tusk and says the elephant is a pole; another touches the tail and says an elephant is a rope; a third touches the leg and says the elephant is a column. Something similar is happening with the nation's ever-expanding affordable housing crisis, which has become a top political issue even in traditionally affordable Sun Belt sprawl towns like Charlotte and Houston. To say nothing of New York City, where the [vacancy rate is 1.4%](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/08/nyregion/apartment-vacancy-rate-housing-crisis.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and apartment hunting is a blood sport. The median age of the first-time American homebuyer [has shot up](https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024-profile-of-home-buyers-and-sellers-highlights-11-04-2024%5F2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to 38 — from 31 a decade ago. What's to blame? The YIMBYs say it's the zoning; the Wall Streeters say it's the financing; the leftists say it's the landlords. Others focus on the high cost of land or permitting delays or insurance rates or the ["everything bagel problem"](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/02/opinion/democrats-liberalism.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of political priorities like wage requirements and low-carbon design layered on every new project. Indeed, all those features contribute to housing's cost and scarcity. But there's another significant, underappreciated driver of costs that deserves scrutiny, especially in a heavily regulated city like New York: building codes. New York City has its own special Building Code, and while it contains some improvements over national norms, it adds other provisions that make it even more expensive to build here. Building codes are the complex set of documents and standards that govern how workers can put a structure together, from the strength of the concrete to the shape of the pipe beneath a toilet. There are codes for single-family homes, ventilation systems, swimming pool installation and construction in fire-prone areas. Local officials examine drawings and construction projects for compliance. Most U.S. cities place multistory buildings under a version of the International Building Code (IBC), which, notwithstanding the name, is a mostly American institution. There's value in standardizing the rules rather than having every jurisdiction across America craft its own elaborate requirements. But a growing chorus of critics says the International Building Code, a so-called "model" document that is revised every three years at stakeholder conferences and then adopted by local jurisdictions, is antiurban and insensitive to cost. As I[ wrote in Slate in February](https://slate.com/business/2025/02/housing-crisis-apartments-development-single-stair-reform-codes.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), pressure is mounting from all sides to overhaul these design guidelines. Some downtown boosters would like to change local rules to ease the way for office-to-residential conversions, where large floor plates are often incompatible with residential light and air requirements. Staring down the rebuilding challenge after the Los Angeles fires, California has frozen [new energy-efficiency updates](https://calmatters.org/housing/2025/05/building-code-california-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the IBC until 2031 (these updates are also a routine gripe in red states). And companies building modular construction, heralded by some as the future of cost-effective housing development, are having trouble adapting their innovations for patchwork inspection standards. > A growing chorus of critics says the International Building Code is antiurban and insensitive to cost. These advocates may be on to something. A building industry study claims that 11% of total development costs since 2012 [can be attributed](https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/research--insight/research-reports/cost-of-regulations/2022-nahb-nmhc-cost-of-regulations-report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to increasingly restrictive code changes. Mike Eriksen, a professor of economics at Purdue University who is studying the Code's effect on safety and cost, explained that codemakers rarely undertake cost-benefit analyses of their impacts on construction: "I'm worried we're building a world that's too expensive to live in." Reformers have seized on an observation by the Seattle architect Michael Eliason, who, over the past five years, has drawn attention to the problem of the International Building Code's two-stair rule. In plain English, every apartment in a building of four stories or more is required to be accessible from two separate stairways, ostensibly for fire safety reasons. The resulting layouts, with long rows of apartments branched off windowless hallways (think Danny riding his tricycle in "The Shining"), create apartments that have only one exposure and no cross ventilation. Large areas of interior space are wasted on hallways. On small lots where there's no room for two stairways and a corridor, three stories becomes a hard limit. More than 10 states (and a few cities) have passed their own "single-stair" legislation over the past three years, hoping to enable the kind of design-efficient, low-cost, small-lot apartments that flourish in places like Switzerland, where building codes are more friendly to urban growth. The reforms are too recent to have generated a meaningful sample size, but the [results](https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/seattle-special-us-citys-unique-approach-small-infill-lots?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in cities that *do* permit single-stair buildings are promising. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24669523?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Bl%5FGkf0l80%5FQgG5y7fM%5FcHotlMOoK7uLojrJXex21Rg/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Here, New York City is an American outlier in a good way. Since New York has long allowed buildings of six stories with one staircase, it made a good place to study the risks of having only one way out of a burning apartment. According to [a Pew Charitable Trusts study](https://www.pew.org/-/media/assets/2025/05/single-stair%5Freport%5Fsummary.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) released earlier this year, there was no correlation between fire deaths and single-stair buildings over a 12-year period in New York. "There has been so much interest from policymakers," Alex Horowitz, the director of Pew's Housing Policy Initiative, told me. "The one question holding back authorizing single-stair construction to help make a dent in the housing shortage has been about fire safety. That's why we wanted to do empirical work here, and we found that there's no trade-off with safety." The City's single-stair carveout is both a feature and a bug, the result of a strain of New York exceptionalism that led the City to resist the ongoing march of model codes, whose standardization otherwise appeals to manufacturers, architects and engineers. For decades, the City and State led the way on mandating their own design standards. The first City building code was adopted in 1850; the State followed with the famous Tenement House reforms that required basic amenities like fire escapes, courtyards, windows and toilets. The competition between safety and cost was often explicit: Early building code reformers hoped their requirements would crowd slum housing out of the market. For the latter third of the 20th century, New York City built under its own 1968 code, even as most other cities adopted one of the other model codes gaining in popularity. By the turn of the millennium, the vast majority of cities outside of New York had adopted the IBC; meanwhile, the bespoke [700-page rule book](https://www.nyc.gov/site/buildings/codes/nyc-code.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) dictating the rules for construction in the five boroughs was causing problems. Not only did New York have different rules from the rest of the country, but the code on its own terms was described by a mayoral reform commission as "cumbersome" and "convoluted." "It has also become increasingly difficult for design professionals to accurately and consistently interpret code provisions," [the commission's report](https://www.mzarchitects.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/ibc.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) read. "Ultimately, these difficulties have led to confusion, inconsistent interpretations and delays." The flourishing business of "expediters" to help architects and developers navigate this labyrinthine process, combined with a series of Department of Buildings [corruption scandals](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/nyregion/23buildings.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), helped make the case for the City to switch to the IBC, which it ultimately did — kind of — in 2007. Why "kind of"? The City still wasn't willing to live by the same rules as the rest of the country, deeming itself too dense and too different to use a model code straight off the rack. The result is that today, the City uses a heavily modified version of the IBC, different from the national model in two ways: It is more geared toward urban density, and it has more union-backed provisions. That leaves us with rules that are simpler than before, but still with their fair share of complexity. Relatedly, we still have those expediters. Some of the City's departures from the IBC are good, some are bad, and many are in the eye of the beholder. The good? In addition to permitting six-story buildings with one staircase, the New York Building Code also allows "scissor stairs" — an interlocking double staircase that takes up less room than two separate staircases. Because New York has so many high-rise buildings, the City also has special rules for standpipes and diesel generators in case of fires or blackouts. These don't make building cheaper but do promote safety in a city with a skyline like this one. Other provisions are more complicated to evaluate. Recognizing the potential for an urban conflagration, the State prohibits New York City from building the wood-framed "five-over-ones" that have become the dominant typology in many American cities. This anti-wood policy also discourages the use of mass timber — wood is prohibited on a building's exterior, which means that any mass-timber construction[ would have to be dressed up](https://www.curbed.com/article/mass-timber-nyc-construction-projects.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to disguise its structural ingenuity. > New York's restrictive plumbing rules force the use of more expensive materials like cast iron and copper, driving up housing costs without clear evidence of improved performance or safety. And some are simply concessions to interest groups, especially building trades unions. New York requires a quarter-inch metal-bar lattice for office drop-ceilings, where the IBC allows thin wires. These only-in-New-York systems are robust and pricey, and it's not clear whether the rest of the country's office drones have a problem with ceilings collapsing on their cubicles. New York's Code (along with those of several other big cities) still has restrictive rules limiting the use of plastic PVC and PEX pipes in plumbing, which are easier to install than the metal pipes favored by plumbers' unions. (When Philadelphia decided to permit plastic pipes in high-rise construction, a building industry consultant[ told](https://whyy.org/articles/changes-to-plumbing-code-expected-to-sharply-reduce-philly-construction-costs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) PlanPhilly, "A common saying in the industry is that it takes 10 men to carry one length of cast iron pipe, but only one man to carry 10 lengths of PVC pipe.") "The result," Brian McDonough, a mechanical, electrical and plumbing consultant, told me, "is a reliance on more expensive materials like cast iron and copper, which significantly increases installation costs and ultimately contributes to higher housing costs, without clear evidence of improved system performance or safety." While these larger, more expensive pipes once made some sense, they are bigger than strictly necessary for today's buildings — the Code has not rightsized dimension requirements to accommodate modern low-flow fixtures. Builders indulge New York's eccentricities because the market is so large: It can support a whole ecosystem of architects and engineers who understand its special requirements. "It would be grand if the whole country had the same building code," said the architect and real estate lawyer James P. Colgate, a former assistant commissioner at the Department of Buildings, "But New York City can have its own code — it's bigger than some countries — and have thriving industries within it." While the City has sometimes influenced national building practices — glow-in-the-dark stairway markings became IBC policy following a post-9/11 task force — the City mostly lets the IBC do its business, knowing it can make changes later. "As a result, New Yorkers don't really participate in the national process as much as I'd like," argued Stephen Smith, founder of the code advocacy think tank the Center for Building in North America. Not all building practices are rooted in the Building Code per se. In New York City, for example, the Code is supplemented by a number of code-adjacent local laws. One law requires those little floor plan maps to be placed by all elevators; another mandates much of the scaffolding that supplies the city with its very own sidewalk arcade. The City has[ banned](https://citylimits.org/nyc-votes-to-ban-gas-in-new-construction-as-plastic-utensils-bill-stalls/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) gas hookups in new construction. Most controversially, the New York City Council passed [Local Law 97](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-new-york-citys-building-emission-law-may-harm-the-environment-and-economy) in 2019, which requires dramatic reductions in carbon emissions for all (existing) buildings over 50,000 square feet. It's a massive expense for the city's aging housing stock — there's currently no efficient way to electrify a steam heating system. But those big-ticket policies are not typical of the inefficiencies and outdated rules that pervade the codes in New York City and elsewhere. In most cases, it is much harder to tease out both the logic behind the rule (which may have been established decades ago, with no documentation) and the cost of implementing it (often less than 1% of total construction cost). It's only in the aggregate that these requirements create a meaningful divergence from our low-cost, high-design neighbors abroad. "There is no silver bullet," said Smith. "The problem needs to be constantly hacked away at." ### Teachings from Tokyo URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/teachings-from-tokyo/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:46.000Z New York City faces a well-documented housing crisis: Rents have soared, supply lags far behind demand, and an acute unit shortage looms. A 2022 report from the urban economics consulting firm AKRF found that the city would need roughly [560,000 additional housing units by 2030](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/only-way-build-what-we-need-nycs-construction-imperative?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) just to keep up with population and job growth; the city is [nowhere near on pace](https://www.citysignal.com/how-the-nyc-planning-commission-plans-to-address-the-citys-housing-shortage/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to meet that goal. For tenants, this shortfall translates into sky-high costs and low vacancy rates. Every major candidate to be the next mayor of New York this cycle has run a campaign focused on promises to fix the runaway cost of housing, and whoever is ultimately elected will face the daunting task of transforming those campaign promises into workable, concrete policies. New York City's housing shortfall stands in stark contrast to the housing situation in Tokyo, a global metropolis that is comparable in many respects — a coastal national center of culture and industry with a robust public transportation network and a metropolitan area that is home to tens of millions — but has overwhelmingly avoided any housing affordability crisis, with [modest rent increases](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/11/opinion/editorials/tokyo-housing.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over the past decade and an incredible variety of livable neighborhoods on offer. All this while Tokyo's population, now at 14 million in the city proper and 37 million in the broader metro area, [continues to grow](https://pdf.savills.asia/asia-pacific-research/japan-research/japan-investment/jp-tokyo-demo-spotlight-06-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — the result of Japan's younger generations moving to cities — despite the nation's population falling overall. Tokyo and New York are two of the world's largest and most dynamic cities, but Tokyo offers its residents housing and livability at a fraction of New York's cost. What is Tokyo doing differently, and what can New York's next mayor learn from its example? Thankfully, the short answer is simple enough: Japan has long embraced housing abundance through prodevelopment policies (both intentional and unintentional) and as a result continuously builds a large quantity of urban housing — [130,000 new units began construction](https://www.toukei.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/tnenkan/2023/tn23q3e003.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the most recent recorded year and averaged [roughly 150,000 new units per year](https://jamesjgleeson.wordpress.com/2018/02/19/how-tokyo-built-its-way-to-abundant-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the two decades from 1995 to 2015 (and that's before counting the railway commuter suburbs that house the majority of the Tokyo metro area's population, which would bring those numbers even higher). This strong development pipeline allows Tokyo to maintain a degree of "slack" in the market, where buyers and renters alike have options and prices remain relatively stable. And even though New York can't simply copy-and-paste Tokyo's policies, there are indeed ways to reach the same result in New York's context. A better, more Tokyo-esque future for New York is possible. Tokyo's housing abundance is a credit to policies in three key categories — zoning laws, building regulations and land division patterns — that all interlock with one another. In each case, there is a path for the next mayor of New York to follow Tokyo's lead, but New York City will need to recreate the preconditions for Tokyo's abundance in a way that reflects its own unique history and context. Tokyo accomplishes this impressive amount of construction despite providing tenants with [fairly strong rent stabilization protections](https://housekey.jp/when-can-you-raise-tenant-rent-in-japan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which have less of a distortional effect on the market in an environment where housing is abundant. The most obvious lessons for New York from Tokyo relate to how land use and development are governed by zoning. Tokyo's zoning system is fundamentally *additive* and *housing-permissive*. Land uses are divided into roughly a dozen tiers of land-use intensity, with the lowest tier mainly limited to residences, small shops and restaurants and schools, all the way up to heavy industrial zones. But unlike in the United States, land that is zoned for a given "tier" can also be used by right for any use covered by lower tiers as well. This means that, with the exception of heavy industrial zones, residential housing can be built on nearly any parcel in the city entirely by right, even in more heavily commercial areas. > It is not enough for an area to be zoned for housing in theory; the devil is in the details, and the City's zoning must actually allow ample housing to be built in practice. In today's New York, by contrast, opportunities for as-of-right residential construction are relatively scarce. At first glance, much of New York City is [already residentially zoned](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/zoning/zoning-districts-guide/residence-districts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and [80% of the housing units](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/planning-level/housing-economy/how-much-housing-is-built%20as-of-right.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) constructed in the city since 2010 have been built as of right, which sounds positive. Upon deeper inspection, however, these numbers paint a darker picture due to the City zoning code's layers of restrictions on how these residential zones can be used in practice. Tightened floor-area ratio requirements (zoning regulations that determine the maximum size of a building relative to the size of its plot of land) and other building restrictions mean that only [20% of the residentially zoned lots in New York](https://cbcny.org/research/strategies-boost-housing-production-new-york-city-metropolitan-area?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are actually suitable to have additional by-right housing units built on them; they are functionally "full" under the zoning code. Mayor Adams' signature City of Yes initiative has marginally improved that outlook, but is only expected to produce roughly [5,500 additional housing units](https://citylimits.org/the-blocks-strips-and-neighborhoods-carved-out-of-city-of-yes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) per year, or a total of 82,000 units over 15 years. As for that promising-looking ratio of 80% of new housing being built by right? Looking at the anemic amount of overall new construction, the real origin becomes clear: The process for obtaining a site-specific discretionary rezoning (done through New York's Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, or ULURP) is generally so onerous that developers usually abandon any plan that would require one. It is not enough for an area to be zoned for housing in theory; the devil is in the details, and the City's zoning must actually allow ample housing to be built in practice. In the past, there have been [numerous proposals](https://cbcny.org/research/improving-new-york-citys-land-use-decision-making-process?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to reform New York's byzantine process for granting discretionary rezonings, but since the process reflects the entrenched power of key city interest groups, major changes are unlikely even in the present crisis. The practice of ["member deference,"](https://edc.nyc/housing-crisis-and-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for example, which grants City Council members incredible power to block discretionary rezonings in their district according to their personal whims, has been discussed repeatedly for years but is unlikely to end — those with power are loath to surrender it. Given the steep political barriers to reforming the site-specific discretionary rezoning process, the best path forward for the next mayor will be instead to push early and hard for the council to adopt a dramatic shift of the residential zoning code, allowing significantly more housing to be built on residentially zoned lots, thus limiting the need for one-off discretionary rezonings in the first place. The new mayor will enter office with considerable political momentum, and in the past, the council has shown a degree of willingness to work with each new mayor on their signature initiatives. Allowing for more housing construction is politically popular; while nothing is certain in municipal politics, rezoning stands a decent shot at becoming law if the next mayor makes it an early priority. It's worth noting that, in certain contexts, Tokyo faces a similar situation to New York's discretionary approval stagnation. Projects that require the buy-in of local stakeholders to proceed, such as the [Roppongi Hills megadevelopment](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/worldbusiness/27mori.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) completed in the 2000s, have often taken decades to move forward as change-averse neighbors fight to maintain the status quo. The fundamental difference between the two cities is that Tokyo's zoning (which in Japan is largely controlled at the national level) allows for such a high number of as-of-right projects that seeking a project-specific variance is a rare exception rather than the rule, so the onerousness of the process is not a major drag on housing construction. > If the next mayor can push a zoning code update that dramatically expands as-of-right residential construction, New York City can achieve results akin to Tokyo-style housing abundance. Relaxed zoning isn't the only lesson from Tokyo for boosting New York's housing production; New York could also ease the burdensome restrictions it places on both the smallest- and largest-scale new housing construction. On the one hand, regulatory compliance in New York creates major disincentives to microunit developments. Across the United States, minimum unit sizes were[ widely adopted a century ago](https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/urban-minimum-lot-sizes-their-background-effects-and-avenues-reform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over largely unsubstantiated health and safety concerns. Whatever their merits at the time, in today's New York City, they represent a costly anachronism that prevents building affordable units for young urbanites. Although the law notionally allows microunits as small as 150 square feet, compliance with various accessibility regulations[ in practice means that 270 square feet is the minimum possible](https://manhattan.institute/article/small-is-beautiful-micro-units-can-help-make-nyc-housing-affordable?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the City's structural bias against single-room occupancy (SRO) buildings (where sleeping quarters are private but common amenities such as kitchens are shared) generally prevents developers from reducing housing costs by moving shared resources out of personal quarters and into communal areas. Making matters worse, large housing developments of over 100 units are also now disfavored by statute. In April 2024, the City enacted a new version of the Real Property Tax Law under Section 485-x, which replaced the previous tax exemption 421-a for new construction projects. 485-x features a number of well-meaning provisions, such as an affordable unit mandate and a "prevailing wage" requirement for labor, that both kick in for projects that involve building 100 units or more. The logic here was that bigger projects were making enough money to shoulder additional, socially valuable costs. While well-intended, these requirements are onerous even for developers benefiting from economies of scale. As a result, new developments seeking 485-x tax abatements now artificially restrict themselves to 99 units to avoid triggering these provisions, and the city loses out on housing as a result. This particular case of regulatory malpractice is new, but at the same time emblematic of a pattern of well-intentioned City regulations that, by misaligning developer incentives, ultimately backfire and fail to produce the housing New Yorkers need. In Tokyo, by contrast, there is generally no minimum unit quantity or lot size for housing, nor are large by-right developments saddled with the same onerous requirements as found in New York. A range of historical factors from [informal postwar rebuilding processes](https://nextcity.org/informalcity/entry/when-tokyo-was-a-slum?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to strict inheritance tax laws, [which have at times required up to a 50% tax on inherited estates](https://www.cao.go.jp/zei-cho/history/1996-2009/gijiroku/kiso/2002/pdf/kiso22a.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), payable immediately upon the owner's death (and thus required division of any inherited land, as part of it could then be sold off to pay the tax), have all contributed to the subdivision of what were once larger plots into smaller parcels, which in turn play host to smaller housing. The proliferation of smaller housing not only adds density and unit quantity to areas of Tokyo where buildings have comparable floor-area ratios to New York City by fitting more residents into the same space but also allows for a greater diversity of housing options and richer neighborhood fabrics. U.S. urbanists[ increasingly recognize](https://buildingoptimism.substack.com/p/the-undeniable-financial-supremacy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the benefits of smaller-scale, fine-grained urban design even within our megacities, based on a body of evidence now demonstrating that smaller, unconsolidated lots can promote vibrant neighborhood life while maintaining the same development profitability and number of units found in consolidated, formulaic podium-style developments. A walk through Tokyo's backstreets into its wonderfully alive,[ dense low-rise neighborhoods](https://marketurbanism.com/2022/05/25/unpacking-emergent-tokyo-with-author-jorge-almazan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), many of which feature small living quarters even by Tokyo standards, will ease any apprehensions that the scale of microunits inevitably leads to unlivable urban squalor. And in Tokyo, large-scale housing developments by right are not hampered by the [excessive step functions](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-09/nyc-apartment-construction-wage-requirement-leads-to-99-unit-buildings?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — like the 485-x obligations imposed on 100+ unit projects — that sometimes disincentivize scale in New York City. Instead, most projects are governed by [consistent formulas](https://www.realestate-tokyo.com/news/floor-area-ratio-and-building-coverage-ratio/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) linking building size to road width. Unlike the step functions in the New York code, they scale smoothly and easily allow for large-scale developments around commuter transit hubs, particularly in the suburban districts that house the majority of metropolitan Tokyo's actual population. If New York's next mayor wants to take bold action to restore the city's housing affordability, Tokyo offers meaningful lessons, all of which are variations on a single theme: Make housing easy to build by right in as much of the city as possible. If the next mayor can [push a zoning code update](https://www.niskanencenter.org/zoning-reform-in-gotham/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through the City Council that dramatically expands as-of-right residential construction, removes onerous provisions against microunits and SROs, and rethinks poorly designed regulatory step functions, New York City can indeed achieve results akin to Tokyo-style housing abundance. The alternative — continued stagnation and tinkering around the edges of the ULURP process as the city becomes ever more unaffordable to working New Yorkers — is no alternative at all. Subsequent mayors, no matter their politics, will be faced with the same housing crisis until bold action is taken to fix it. ### New York City Needs a Two-Track Mind URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-city-needs-a-two-track-mind/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:46.000Z New York City has, by some measures, the most expensive housing in the nation.[ Renting a typical apartment](https://www.zillow.com/research/data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) costs almost $4,000 a month, according to Zillow. That's more than in any other U.S. city with more than 100,000 residents. (In terms of home values adjusted for apartment size, New York also dominates the list, at fourth place.) New York's rental rate is more than two times what average renters pay in cities like Charlotte, Houston and Phoenix. The city's high housing costs impose a considerable burden, but New Yorkers have something residents of those other cities don't: access to an extensive and (despite grumblings, mostly) effective transit system. New York City's subway and bus network isn't just a nice thing to have. It's also a money saver that enables residents to avoid the[ costs of car ownership and operation](https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/what-rising-gas-and-rent-prices-mean-families-low-incomes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which amount to thousands of dollars a year per household. While[ 56% of New York City households live without a car](https://censusreporter.org/data/table/?table=B08201&geo%5Fids=16000US3651000,16000US0455000,16000US4835000,16000US3712000&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), that's true of less than 10% of households in any of those other cities. As a result, the *combined* costs of housing and transportation in New York and Phoenix[ wind up being the same](https://htaindex.cnt.org/map/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the typical U.S. household. Building more housing and creating guaranteed affordable units are unquestionably necessary steps to reduce the cost of living. But equally key to achieving that goal is ensuring that the city grows its housing supply in close connection with its transit system. That requires deliberate, coordinated planning — in some cases, adding more housing near transit, and in others, adding more transit to areas with a lot of housing. **The location of New Yorkers' homes helps determine whether they use transit** New York City has the nation's most extensive transit network, and most of its residents have good access to it. About 44% of denizens live within a quarter-mile — about a five-minute walk — of the closest station on the subway map (including the Staten Island Railway); an additional 28% live within a half-mile. (I'll refer to the subway and the Staten Island Railway collectively as the "subway" for this article.) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24748721?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13dtF4b6HchNih4hIhkpXVG2lWzDAsXpXVjVRFD18nKU/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Nevertheless, some people are left out: About a quarter of the population — in areas like Mill Basin in Brooklyn, Fresh Meadows in Queens or the North Shore on Staten Island, among many other neighborhoods — resides too far from a subway station to make it an easy part of their daily routine. About 1.2 million New Yorkers live more than a mile from the nearest such station. Though almost all New Yorkers live within easy distance of a bus route — including express bus routes, which are especially important on the edges of the five boroughs — and others live close to the Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North commuter rail systems, distance to the subway, which has a flat fare, great coverage and frequent service, plays a huge role in influencing peoples' likelihood of using transit. Citywide, a majority of workers who live within a quarter-mile of a subway station commute by transit, but fewer than 30% of those who live more than a mile from a station do. Residents near subway stations are also much less likely to own a car. Among households within a quarter-mile of a subway stop, 66% have no vehicle — compared to just 21% among those living further away. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24748824?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17WA08mSMv66b9vKSmsxxI19y2R0aCCV953Laef5o0xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) If everyone in the city lived within a quarter-mile of a subway station and had the traveling patterns of residents in those locations today, 200,000 additional commuters would take transit to work citywide — a 12% increase. And the city would have 400,000 more zero-car households. That kind of citywide subway access could save New Yorkers thousands of dollars each year by allowing them to get rid of their cars. Evidence suggests that fewer people driving and more people riding transit would also mean[ less congestion](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?%20id=10.1257/aer.104.9.2763&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ less air pollution](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150414&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Transit use also means[ less need for parking](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3141/2245-07?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which can reduce the cost of new housing construction and free up space for homebuilding. Opening up more corridors to car-free households could also spread housing demand more evenly across the city, lowering costs. Coupled with City of Yes zoning reforms that increased buildability in low-density neighborhoods and dramatically scaled back parking requirements in new construction, more transit could unlock tens of thousands of new units. Achieving those cost savings for households can be accomplished by both increasing density near existing lines and expanding the transit network. Together, those changes can produce a more transit-oriented city with a greater supply of affordable housing. **Accelerating transit-oriented development** New York City has always been oriented toward its subway system, and natural demand and wise city planning continue to make it even more so. Over the past 15 years, almost 60% of newly occupied housing units were located within a quarter-mile of stations; an additional 27% were within a half-mile of stations. In 2015, the[ extension of the 7 Train to Hudson Yards](https://www.hydc.org/no-7-subway-extension?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was funded by a[ tax-increment financing system](https://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/insights-blog/the-cost-of-hudson-yards-redevelopment-project?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a value-capture tool that collects increased property taxes paid to fund infrastructure — that leveraged a massive upzoning designed to enable the construction of the approximately [4,000-unit](https://www.hudsonyardsnewyork.com/sites/default/files/2020-09/HY%5FPressKit%5F092420%5Flores.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) development there. In Brooklyn, the City engaged in a[ series of upzonings](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/realestate/brooklyns-fourth-avenue-gets-in-gear.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) along the Fourth Avenue corridor, changes that transformed a previously[ low-slung, automobile-dominated](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Brooklyn,+NY/@40.6782065,-73.9825944,3a,75y,37.1h,92.59t/data=!3m8!1e1!3m6!1sWEarUlMAZTk2eG5weCZ3ng!2e0!5s20090601T000000!6shttps:%2F%2Fstreetviewpixels-pa.googleapis.com%2Fv1%2Fthumbnail%3Fcb%5Fclient%3Dmaps%5Fsv.tactile%26w%3D900%26h%3D600%26pitch%3D-2.5869669084726183%26panoid%3DWEarUlMAZTk2eG5weCZ3ng%26yaw%3D37.0955998731216!7i13312!8i6656!4m6!3m5!1s0x89c24416947c2109:0x82765c7404007886!8m2!3d40.6781784!4d-73.9441579!16zL20vMGNyM2Q?entry=ttu&g%5Fep=EgoyMDI1MDgxMy4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) space well served by the R train into a[ hub of apartments](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Brooklyn,+NY/@40.6781825,-73.9825777,3a,75y,37.1h,92.59t/data=!3m8!1e1!3m6!1sR6C2JtgEkaejIc-8m%5FcUww!2e0!5s20241101T000000!6shttps:%2F%2Fstreetviewpixels-pa.googleapis.com%2Fv1%2Fthumbnail%3Fcb%5Fclient%3Dmaps%5Fsv.tactile%26w%3D900%26h%3D600%26pitch%3D-2.5900000000000034%26panoid%3DR6C2JtgEkaejIc-8m%5FcUww%26yaw%3D37.1!7i16384!8i8192!4m7!3m6!1s0x89c24416947c2109:0x82765c7404007886!8m2!3d40.6781784!4d-73.9441579!10e5!16zL20vMGNyM2Q?entry=ttu&g%5Fep=EgoyMDI1MDgxMy4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Those[ City of Yes zoning reforms](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/citywide/city-of-yes-housing-opportunity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) passed by the City Council late last year legalized middle-scale apartment buildings[ on large streets](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/downloads/pdf/our-work/plans/citywide/city-of-yes-housing-opportunity/housing-opportunity%20guide-transit-oriented-development.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in[ districts near rail transit](https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/5ea895beb7154042a694371502ab9480/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These parts of the city had previously only allowed low-density homes. This change will likely have major impacts; [more than 90% of buildings](https://buildingtheskyline.org/tod-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) near the subway are now three stories or less. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24748892?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1QonFc2EhYcH4IwkEDL7CfjJtwNu4Z19acinzYc1dML0/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Blind spots** Not every development change has fully incorporated the need to link transit and housing. The Gowanus redevelopment zone in Brooklyn, expected to add about 8,500 housing units, is[ largely located](https://www.esd.ny.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/Item-VA-Exhibit%203-Gowanus-ESD-Technical-Memorandum.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) further than a quarter-mile from subway stations. While residents won't have to walk too much further than that to jump on a train, based on existing evidence, several hundred new residents will end up driving instead of taking transit because of that distance. In Queens' College Point neighborhood, the City is readying a plan to[ add 3,000 housing units](https://newyorkyimby.com/2025/08/3000-unit-complex-revealed-for-former-flushing-airport-site-in-college-point-queens.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the site of the former Flushing Airport — more than a mile from a subway station. Based on experience, that site will attract almost 1,000 fewer daily transit commuters, and require parking for more than 1,000 more cars, than it would if it were within a quarter-mile of a subway station — only possible if new transit facilities were constructed there or if the development were located near an existing station. And coordinating transit and housing requires more than just adjacency. Despite its new apartment buildings, for example, Brooklyn's Fourth Avenue remains relatively inhospitable to pedestrians; it is dominated by five lanes of car traffic, has few trees and lacks the comfortable mix of public spaces and retail that make nearby Fifth and Seventh Avenues so appealing. Creating a neighborhood that's more walkable[ boosts transit ridership](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1077291X22002429?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), especially for[ people with disabilities](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0966692322000424?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). **The road (and track) ahead** One key need is continuing to implement major zoning reforms designed to increase housing availability near transit. The planned[ Interborough Express](https://www.mta.info/project/interborough-express?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which is proposed to link outer Brooklyn and Queens and which will be completed after 2030 — is expected to carry[ 160,000 daily riders](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-interborough-express-advancing-planning-active-phase?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A potential rezoning along its route could[ accommodate 70,000 additional homes](https://www.6sqft.com/70000-new-homes-could-be-built-along-interborough-express-with-zoning-changes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), leveraging the new transit line as a mechanism to absorb the city's growth while ensuring it occurs in a way that limits the overall cost of living to future residents. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority, similarly, should accelerate the redevelopment of land it and other governmental entities own in areas near transit stations. Public agencies can take advantage of[ federal policies and funding opportunities](https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/leveraging-underused-transit-properties-could-produce-more-affordable-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and lead the development of these neighborhoods, including funneling affordable housing subsidies toward those projects, ensuring that every subway station is surrounded by at least medium-density homes and providing transit access to New Yorkers who may need it most. Simultaneously, the City should make sure that the neighborhoods near transit are walkable, landscaped and offer access to public services like libraries. These investments can ensure that housing near transit is located in communities people find appealing and livable. Finally, New York City should further[ expand](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/expand-the-reach-of-the-subway-system-a-2125-map) and[ improve](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-new-yorks-subway-system-can-learn-from-cities-around-the-world) its transit network to better serve the housing that's not accessible enough. This could mean, for example, a[ new subway line](https://bsky.app/profile/yonahfreemark.com/post/3lahechedns2a?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) connecting College Point, Flushing, Queens College and Jamaica. It might mean reactivating once pie-in-the-sky plans to extend the 1 line to Red Hook, Brooklyn, a rare transit desert in the city's most populous borough. Or it could mean creating [express subway links](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-new-yorks-subway-system-can-learn-from-cities-around-the-world) that dramatically improve the transit system's speed. These transit improvements should focus on the subway — but also improve bus service and commuter rail lines enough to make them as attractive to potential riders as the subway currently is. Better transit could help reduce the cost of living for thousands of residents and maximize the impact of reforms that make the city's housing more affordable. ### Why It Costs So Much To Build in New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-it-costs-so-much-to-build-in-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:46.000Z New York City has a massive undersupply of housing, which drives up prices and exacerbates the affordability crisis. That is not news to anyone searching for an apartment. The [citywide vacancy rate](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — at 1.4% — is the lowest it's been since 1968, and the asking rent for vacant apartments, as measured by[ Streeteasy's Rent Index](https://streeteasy.com/blog/data-dashboard/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), soared to a record-high $3,730 in July. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24699204?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1PpPkxQYex1-KGisd0zEqmVZypbHdiC5NYMQDbTIAk9U/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Even previous ["supply skeptics"](https://furmancenter.org/research/publication/supply-skepticismnbsp-housing-supply-and-affordability?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) now generally agree that a massive increase in housing supply is needed to bend the curve on housing costs in New York City. At a minimum, that means doubling the anemic housing production level — which has [averaged](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 25,000 units annually in recent years — to at least 50,000 units per year. With so much demand for housing, why hasn't New York City's supply kept pace? Part of it is a scarcity of land — there's nowhere to build but up. But even when there is an available site to build on, New York's construction costs are higher than in almost any other city. The cost of labor, materials, services and land are all higher here than elsewhere, and onerous regulations further increase the price tag. Higher construction costs generally mean lower profit margins, which constrain the number of projects that developers are willing to build. High costs restrict growth because developers typically only build housing in neighborhoods where rents are high enough to make at least some profit on new construction. Absent public subsidies, developers must find projects with reasonable costs to make lower-rent apartments worthwhile to build. Lower costs would boost production by making more market-rate and affordable buildings economically viable. Let's take a closer look at what inflates each of the three types of costs that developers incur: hard costs (labor and materials), soft costs (financing and professional services like lawyers and architects) and land. **Hard costs** The cost of labor and materials — what real estate professionals call "hard costs" — typically account for [around 60%](https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/making-apartments-more-affordable-starts-with-understanding-the-costs-of-building-them?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the cost of constructing a building in the United States. New York City's hard costs consistently rank as the most expensive in the world, according to an[ annual survey](https://www.turnerandtownsend.com/insights/global-construction-market-intelligence-2025/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the construction management company Turner & Townsend. After losing the top spot between 2019 and 2022, New York reclaimed its position as the world's costliest city to build in for each of the past three surveys. And it's not just because in New York City, more people want to build vertically. Building the same building costs more in New York than elsewhere, including both high-rise and low-rise buildings. In the [2024 Turner & Townsend survey](https://publications.turnerandtownsend.com/international-construction-market-survey-2024/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York had the highest high-rise residential hard construction costs in the world: just above San Francisco, 30% higher than London, 40% higher than Los Angeles and more than double Houston, Toronto, Amsterdam and Paris. For low-rise town house construction, New York was tied with other costly cities like London, Los Angeles and San Francisco, but 75% to 100% more expensive than Houston, Toronto and continental Europe. New York is also the costliest city for commercial projects, including offices, hotels and industrial properties. Why? New York City's high labor costs are the primary reason. Turner & Townsend found that New York's labor costs across all types of development, including commercial and residential and union and nonunion projects, are 10% higher than San Francisco's, at least 40% higher than in Chicago's or Los Angeles' and double Houston's. Residential development is extremely sensitive to wage costs. Just look at what is happening with the recently approved 485-x property tax incentive. 485-x offers tax breaks to projects that offer a certain share of restricted affordable housing units, but it also imposes wage floor requirements that kick in when 485-x buildings have 100 or more units. Unsurprisingly, developers have responded by [building 99-unit buildings](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/real-estate/new-york-city-builders-continue-favor-projects-under-100-units-amid-485-x-requirements?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to avoid triggering the wage floors, even when they could have built more units. Residential developers in New York also increasingly use [nonunion labor, or a mix of union and nonunion labor](https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/RPA-CUI-Construction-Costs.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to reduce the cost of building. Union labor is generally more expensive than nonunion labor due to negotiated wages, benefits and work rules. The Regional Plan Association estimated in 2011 that projects that use at least some nonunion labor (often referred to as "open shop" projects) are 20% to 30% less expensive than union-built projects. Some developers, however, don't have a choice about wages. Affordable housing programs often require developers to pay workers prevailing wages, which are based on union wage and benefit rates. In New York City, affordable projects with prevailing wage requirements [cost 23% more to build](https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/the-impact-of-prevailing-wage-requirement-on-affordable-housing-construction-in-new-york-city.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), according to the City's Independent Budget Office. Productivity also explains some of the cost differences between New York and other cities. Nationally, construction industry productivity — the amount of construction work produced per worker — has [declined since the 1970s](https://www.nber.org/papers/w33188?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but factors unique to New York make construction still less productive here. Collectively bargained union work rules can raise costs for union projects, typically by increasing the number or skill of workers required to complete tasks. Infamously, overstaffing is a major reason why New York has the world's highest subway construction costs: The New York Times reported that subway work in New York requires [four times as many laborers](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/nyregion/new-york-subway-construction-costs.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as underground construction in other cities. This overstaffing affects residential and commercial construction as well. [For example](https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/RPA-CUI-Construction-Costs.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), steamfitters are required to work in pairs, and additional workers must be available to monitor site conditions, operate elevators, or repair equipment. Licensing rules and regulations also affect productivity. For example, New York City's[ licensing rules for tower crane operators,](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20160515/REAL%5FESTATE/160519910/dan-mooney-s-skypicker-crane-could-save-millions-in-construction-costs-here-s-why-it-s-gathering-dust-in-a-war?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which go beyond the[ requirements in other cities](https://www.city-journal.org/article/deconstructing-new-yorks-building-costs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), effectively limit the number of operators who can work in the city. That drives up costs and dissuades the use of tower cranes, even when they would save time or improve safety. Materials are the other main component of hard costs. It is not that raw construction materials are that much more expensive in New York City; they are, but not nearly to the extent of labor costs. Rather, laws and regulations dictating the use of specific materials and methods drive up the overall hard costs by requiring the use of more expensive materials that take longer or require more skilled labor to install. Sometimes these requirements are about safety. The building code requires concrete-and-steel construction to mitigate fire risk, largely barring the wood frame construction commonly used elsewhere. But in other cases, requirements are motivated by factors, such as job preservation, that also drive up costs. For example, the [plumbing code](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCadmin/0-0-0-163374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) requires metal rather than plastic piping, commonly used in other cities, in buildings of six or more stories. Similarly, the electrical code requires specific metal conduits for wiring. While many of these requirements were enacted in the name of safety, few have been evaluated to see if their benefits outweigh the higher costs — or if the difference in safety exists at all. For example, a study on the [safety of single-stair buildings](https://www.pew.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2025/02/small-single-stairway-apartment-buildings-have-strong-safety-record?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found no difference in fire safety between buildings with one or two means of egress, even though many cities require developers to build two exit stairs. A final factor unique to New York is the cost of liability and workers' compensation insurance, which is bundled into construction contracts. Construction insurance is substantially more expensive here than in other states. Part of this is because New York State uniquely assigns strict liability to contractors and building owners for on-the-job injuries involving falls under its [Scaffold Law](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/LAB/240?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), meaning that if an injury occurs, the contractor is automatically on the hook — no matter what reasonable precautions they had put in place, and even if the injured party was at fault. Every other state uses a comparative liability standard that balances responsibility between owners and workers. The Scaffold Law increases total development costs[ by at least 7%](https://verticalaccessllc.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/2014-02-study-the-costs-of-labor-law-240-on-new-york-economy-and-public-infrastructure.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), according to analysis by the Rockefeller Institute of Government. **Soft costs** Soft costs, which are typically another 20% of a project's construction budget, include the "behind-the-scenes" work that makes building possible: The architects, engineers, lawyers, consultants, lobbyists, expediters and bankers who shepherd a project from inception to closing to ribbon cutting. The longer it takes to build a project, and the more complex the planning requirements, the higher the soft costs will be. The cities with the highest construction costs — New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and London — also have complex and restrictive building rules. By contrast, the cheapest cities make building fast and easy. Project approvals take[ 30 days](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research%5Freports/RRA3743-1.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Houston, compared to 15 months in San Francisco, according to a RAND study. In New York City, it takes [an average of 2.5 years](https://cbcny.org/research/improving-new-york-citys-land-use-decision-making-process?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to secure zoning changes, which is one reason why most developers choose to build housing on land that is[ already zoned for development](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/planning-level/housing-economy/how-much-housing-is-built%20as-of-right.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This is in addition to the months it takes to get a permit for as-of-right work, a process so complex that many contractors[ hire expediters](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/realestate/renovating-dont-forget-the-expediter.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to navigate the Department of Buildings; it's often cheaper to pay someone to avoid delays that could wind up costing even more. Perhaps most significantly, affordable housing projects specifically have complex design requirements imposed by City and State agencies and[ take years](https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/research-and-policy/reducing-the-complexity-in-californias-affordable-housing-finance-system/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to secure financing and approvals, with firms all charging billable hours along the way. Each step drags out project timelines, and time equals money: The Citizens Budget Commission, where I work, estimated that a two-year discretionary review increases hard and soft costs by as much as $82,000 per unit due to inflation, as input costs creep ever higher, and additional professional services fees. Lengthy reviews disproportionately increase soft costs on small- to midsize buildings. Because soft costs are more fixed than hard costs, larger projects are better able to take on the risks of development by spreading soft costs over a larger number of units. **Land** The last piece of the puzzle is the price of land. Land costs (the remaining 20% of a total construction budget in most places, but often higher in more desirable or zoning-constrained neighborhoods) are a function of supply and demand. Some supply constraints can't change: Even though some people have proposed [making Manhattan bigger,](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/expand-manhattan-for-housing) the amount of terra firma probably isn't changing anytime soon. But other aspects are within government control: Zoning dictates (and often restricts) what and how much you can build; tax policy can make building more (or less) profitable; mass transit or highways make properties accessible to more of the region; and school quality makes homes more or less attractive to families. That is why land costs [vary greatly](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/mih/bae%5Freport%5F092015.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across the city: A condo developer will outbid a rental developer for a prime site near the High Line, but an affordable housing developer might be sole bidder on a parcel in an outer-borough neighborhood. Similarly, land near transit zoned to allow office or residential uses is worth more than land that is inaccessible or zoned exclusively for manufacturing. That said, the average land cost in New York City remains among the[ highest in the country](https://www.fhfa.gov/research/papers/wp1901?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To some degree, that's a feature, not a bug, of being the country's densest and most populous metropolis. Barring economic changes, land will always be more expensive here. But it need not be *this* expensive*.* In cities like New York, restrictive land-use policies — like those recently loosened by a trio of City of Yes laws — [drive up land costs](https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.32.1.3?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), creating a vicious cycle: High land costs increase the cost of new development, which reduces development and increases housing scarcity, thereby driving housing and land costs even higher. **What to do about it?** New York will never be a cheap place to build, but the City and State can take specific actions to make New York a little more like Houston and a little less like San Francisco. Government cannot change the price of steel or land-use lawyers, but it can make building more efficient. Reducing hard costs will require the City and State to improve productivity and modernize building codes. The City could align construction codes and regulations, which are often now bespoke to New York, with best practices from other global cities. Other cities allow the use of less costly materials that require fewer labor hours to install, encourage efficient and innovative technologies like off-site production and [modular housing](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/is-modular-part-of-new-yorks-housing-solution), and boost productivity by making it easier to use tower cranes on job sites. And all without sacrificing safety. It can also better balance the trade-off between prevailing wage requirements and production. While workers deserve to be paid fair wages, onerous wage requirements can render new residential development financially infeasible or increase the subsidy needed to build. Imposing these requirements on affordable housing in particular can disincentivize more construction of some of the housing we need the most. The State should repeal New York's exceptional Scaffold Law and adopt the liability standards used in every other state in the country. For soft costs, the City and State should focus on predictability and simplicity over site-by-site approval processes and complexity, with speedy permitting, as-of-right approvals and simple financing and design requirements for affordable housing. The State should also reform environmental review laws to exempt beneficial projects. The easiest way to address the high cost of land is rezoning to increase opportunities for development and chip away at the scarcity that drives up prices. Increasing density allows more sites to be developed, which ultimately reduces the per-unit cost of building housing. The Adams administration is making it faster and cheaper to build housing in some of these areas, and the New York City Charter Revision Commission has [proposed ideas to streamline the lengthy land-use review process](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/four-ballot-items-to-unlock-more-new-york-city-housing) to allow more housing to be built. Yet much more can be done. Take a wrecking ball to higher costs — and watch more housing rise up. ### Learning from Jersey City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/learning-from-jersey-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:46.000Z When New York City politicians invoke New Jersey, they don't usually offer words of praise. But recently, one small slice of the state has been feeling the love from across the Hudson. Jersey City has become a source of housing inspiration for its much larger neighbor. Mark Levine, the Manhattan borough president and New York City's all-but-certain next comptroller, has tweeted [enviously](https://x.com/MarkLevineNYC/status/1688976991507087383??ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of Jersey City's home building boom. So has state senator and former mayoral candidate [Zellnor Myrie](https://www.brickunderground.com/live/zellnor-myrie-build-one-million-housing-units-in-decade-fund-right-to-counsel-housing-court-lawyers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), along with the Democratic nominee for mayor, Zohran Mamdani. "We need to interrogate why Tokyo is building 10 homes for every thousand people, Jersey City is at seven, and New York is barely at four," [Mamdani said](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2025-05-23/zohran-mamdani-the-socialist-running-in-the-democratic-primary-for-nyc-mayor?sref=ndQeXqOs&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on Bloomberg's "Odd Lots" podcast in May. In fact, Mamdani understated the discrepancy. In 2024 — New York's [biggest year](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/about-us/newsroom/pr-20250310?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for housing production since 1965, as developers scrambled to take advantage of expiring property tax abatements — the city did in fact produce about four new homes per 1,000 residents. But Jersey City actually produced 13 homes per 1,000 residents. Last year, this city of 300,000 added [twice as many](https://jerseydigs.com/jersey-city-rental-construction-2024/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) apartments as all of Queens, whose population is 2.3 million. The discrepancy is even greater compared to more suburban parts of the region. Last year, Hudson County, the county of 700,000 where Jersey City is located, issued permits to about 5,000 new housing units, [Census data show](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BPPRIV036059??ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Nassau County, with its 1.4 million residents sprawled across Long Island, issued permits to about [800 projects](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BPPRIV036059??ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It's worth interrogating: How does Jersey City build so much housing? And beyond that, how has the building boom affected city life, particularly the central concern of housing policy: affordability? While an undeniable good for the region, Jersey City's growth spurt has come with some growing pains. And affordability remains a huge challenge despite all of the new development, though the situation on the ground is complex. What Jersey City does show, unequivocally, is that when municipalities clear the way for building massive apartment buildings right next to transit stations in the New York City area, developers will do so. Jersey City also shows that a building boom can coexist with rent control and inclusionary zoning. It's a model that, if repeated across the region, could someday go a long way toward addressing the housing crisis. \*\*\*\*\*\*\* Jersey City is, [by some measures](https://jerseydigs.com/downtown-jersey-city-growth-study/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=StorageCafe%2C%20a%20self%2Dstorage%20marketplace,Image%20courtesy%20of%20StorageCafe), the fastest-growing city in the Northeast. Its population increase of more than 20% between 2010 and 2024 puts it in a class with Sun Belt cities like Phoenix and San Antonio. However, compared to its high-growth peers, Jersey City is tiny. Its 15 square miles of land (not including the watery surrounds of Ellis Island, most, but not all, of which is technically within city limits), were completely built out long ago. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24669302?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Sn1TKOmKM7vMwXzqL3AmtDjv17sWmwnR7NZn6b24KH0/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Jersey City leaders knew that to accommodate more people, the city had to grow up rather than out, especially near the PATH train stations that whisk commuters directly to Manhattan's business districts. The groundwork for this vertical growth was laid in the 1970s, when downtown and adjacent industrial areas [were rezoned](https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/22/archives/jersey-city-planning-waterfront-housing-new-park-planned-kinney-is.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to accommodate as many as 60,000 additional residents. The Exchange Place [redevelopment plan](https://data.jerseycitynj.gov/explore/dataset/exchange-place-redevelopment-plan/information/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), passed in 1974 and amended in the 1980s, allowed projects to reach a floor area ratio (FAR) — a measure of building size and density — of 15 or even greater in certain cases. Subsequent rezonings around PATH stations were even more permissive. The [Journal Square](https://data.jerseycitynj.gov/explore/dataset/journal-square-2060-redevelopment-plan/information/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) plan, initially adopted in 2010, has a maximum FAR of 25 on lots closest to the station. These zoning regulations meant that for the past half-century, the highest allowable densities in the region were not in Manhattan, but across the river in Jersey City. New York City's 1961 zoning ordinance capped FAR at 12, requiring developers to assemble complex air rights packages or build large plazas to reach greater densities. (The state legislature lifted the cap last year.) Jersey City is "a rare example of a city that has, of its own accord, without state mandate, pursued real transit-oriented development," said Alex Armlovich, a housing policy analyst at the Niskanen Center. "These are big buildings going up on top of the train stations." Armlovich describes Jersey City's development pattern as "missing massive," in contrast to the "missing middle housing" idealized by many urban planners. It's a pattern that's commensurate with housing need in a region with an extreme shortage, and complementary to a high-frequency-rail rapid-transit system like PATH, he said. Much of Jersey City's zoned capacity went unused until the region's economy hit its stride around the turn of the millennium, when employment growth in Manhattan resulted in housing demand overflowing outside the five boroughs. Not only could developers build larger buildings than they could in New York, but they were also greeted with handsome tax breaks and a streamlined approval process. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24669166?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YkSg3ZTd1Hj43FpL9ghux%5FZBX0sU257lNZ2kphCi-IQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "I​n the '90s and early 2000s, the development community here got pretty much whatever they asked for," said Annisia Cialone, director of housing, economic development and commerce for Jersey City. Typically that meant generous [property tax abatements](https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/09/nyregion/residential-real-estate-140-million-complex-for-jersey-city-riverfront.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or payments in lieu of taxes, called "PILOTs," that effectively reduce a project's tax bill and increase its value. By 2010, a [state report](https://www.nj.gov/comptroller/news/docs/tax%5Fabatement%5Freport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that $2 billion worth of real estate in Jersey City — owned by big names like LeFrak, Kushner and Trump — was exempted from the property tax rolls. Since then, Jersey City has steadily demanded more from developers. In 2013, when Mayor Steven Fulop took office, he created a tiered system of PILOTs, making them less generous in the most desirable parts of the city. The city also began asking for community benefits agreements, through which developers paid for improvements to parks, schools and other infrastructure. Then, in 2021, the city adopted an inclusionary zoning ordinance that required projects seeking zoning variances to dedicate 10% to 15% of units to affordable housing, depending on the neighborhood. Nonetheless, the building boom continued. Between 2010 and 2022, nearly 26,000 new homes were constructed in Jersey City, growing its housing stock by 24%, according to [an analysis](https://rpa.org/work/reports/jersey-city-housing-needs-assessment?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the Regional Plan Association. And the development applications keep on coming, with 68,000 units approved since 2015, many of which have not yet broken ground. "Our planning board agendas are full," Cialone said. "We're backed up." Even as it has asked for more from developers, Jersey City has maintained a broadly prodevelopment posture, with permissive zoning and a planning process geared toward efficiency and speed. Many developers that work in Jersey City are New York-based firms attracted to the more favorable development climate. "We meet with them, we talk with them, we work together," Cialone said of the city's relationship with developers. "We're not impossible." City staff independently review project financials to see how much they can extract from a developer without pushing them away. The city is also helped by state-level policies that require less environmental review; there's nothing resembling the cumbersome New York City Uniform Land Use Review Process, or ULURP, here. And when it comes time for developers to seek approvals, projects tend to sail through in a single planning commission meeting because everything's been negotiated in advance. So the Jersey City growth machine grinds on. "It has been producing housing at an incredible rate, but in spite of that, the affordability conditions kind of have remained stagnant," said Marcel Negret, author of the RPA report. "Jersey City cannot resolve the housing problems for the metro area on its own." > Last year, this city of 300,000 added twice as many apartments as all of Queens, whose population is 2.3 million. For most of Jersey City's building boom, its housing costs have risen along with the skyline. Median market-rate rents increased 50% between 2015 and 2024, roughly matching increases in the metro area overall, according to the RPA report. Jersey City has taken on the region's housing burden, but it hasn't always felt the benefits. For many locals, it's a frustrating dynamic. "We hear the concerns of the residents," Cialone said. "It's hard to see how much we build and still see the prices where they are." However, median rents may not describe the average tenant's experience, since, in Jersey City's case, that figure is pulled upward by a large proportion of recently constructed higher-end homes. Meanwhile, most older units in Jersey City are under a rent-control ordinance that limits annual rent increases. It's possible the new buildings are acting as ["yuppie fish tanks,"](https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/yuppie-fishtanks-yimbyism-explained?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) absorbing demand from high earners and preventing them from competing for the older homes of more working-class residents. Census reported "transaction rents" that existing leaseholders pay have grown much more slowly than median asking rents for newly available apartments in recent years, [according to a study](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b996f553917ee5e584ba742/t/67ebf71fd6f1664558bb46b8/1743517472774/The+Other+Cities+Report%5FApril+2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the Rutgers Center on Law, Inequality and Metropolitan Equity. The study also found that the number of rent-burdened households in Jersey City declined slightly between 2015 and 2023. That could be evidence that longtime residents are not being hit as hard by higher housing costs; on the flip side, it could be a reflection of the fact that the average resident is now wealthier and in a better position to afford the high rents. Jersey City's demographic change during its development boom is also a complex story. While the city's Black population has declined in recent years, its Asian, Hispanic and foreign-born populations have continued to grow. It remains one of, if not [the most](https://www.nj.com/hudson/2022/09/this-new-jersey-city-is-still-the-most-ethnically-diverse-in-the-entire-country.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), racially diverse cities in the country, with white, Black, Hispanic and Asian residents each making up about a quarter of the population. The sidewalks and storefronts of Little India are overflowing with shoppers, while 50-story towers rise up a stone's throw away. It's also possible that supply is finally catching up with demand and providing tenants some relief. Vacancy rates are up slightly, Census data show, and some builders have begun grumbling about an oversupply in the market. The latest data from real estate platform Zumper show [Jersey City rents](https://www.zumper.com/rent-research/jersey-city-nj?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have declined 9% over the past year, with one-bedroom rents declining by 17%. [New York City rents](https://www.zumper.com/rent-research/new-york-ny?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have decreased by 2% overall and 6% for one-bedrooms over that same period, according to Zumper data. (Rental price data are notoriously fickle: [Other](https://www.apartmentlist.com/nj/jersey-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#rent-report) real estate [sites](https://www.apartmentlist.com/ny/new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#rent-report) show rents in both cities being relatively flat.) There have also been other growing pains. As Jersey City prospered, state aid for schools declined, shrinking by nearly [$300 million](https://hudsoncountyview.com/op-ed-heres-why-your-property-taxes-are-soaring-while-jersey-city-schools-struggle/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since 2018\. New Jersey calculates its subsidies based on property values and median incomes, a formula intended to favor poorer districts. But as with housing affordability, median incomes and property values do not convey the full picture. Jersey City remains socioeconomically diverse, with many high-need students from underprivileged backgrounds. > Jersey City is a rare example of a city that has, of its own accord, without state mandate, pursued real transit-oriented development. The city's ability to absorb state funding cuts is exacerbated by the many high-value properties that remain off the tax rolls, as well as PILOT windfalls that were spent immediately, instead of being saved for the long term. To close the gap, the city [raised property taxes](https://newjerseyglobe.com/local/mcgreevey-overspending-a-way-of-life-in-jersey-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by 50% between 2021 and 2023. Katie Brennan, the Democratic nominee for the state Assembly seat representing Jersey City in the November election, has [campaigned on](https://hudsoncountyview.com/op-ed-heres-why-your-property-taxes-are-soaring-while-jersey-city-schools-struggle/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) rejiggering the school funding formula by weighting median income and property values less, and weighting the number of students in poverty and students for whom English is a second language more. "The state is punishing us for growing," said James Solomon, a Jersey City councilmember and a candidate for mayor in the November election. Solomon, a frequent critic of Fulop, the three-term mayor he hopes to replace, also feels that for much of the building boom, the city did a "poor job maximizing the public benefit of that development, leveraging that development for infrastructure, for affordable housing, for the types of public goods that can come through the development process." He's one of several mayoral candidates calling on the city to do more to specifically promote affordable housing construction. Solomon, along with other candidates like former New Jersey governor [Jim McGreevey](https://hudsoncountyview.com/mcgreevey-elaborates-on-affordable-housing-plans-for-jersey-city-if-elected-mayor/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), councilmember [Bill O'Dea](https://www.billodeajc.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and former school board president [Mussab Ali,](https://www.ali2025.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is calling for increasing the inclusionary zoning rate to 20% or more in certain cases. (All are running as Democrats in the nonpartisan general election. Despite being eligible to run for a fourth term, Fulop declined to enter the race in order to mount an unsuccessful bid for governor.) Solomon also spearheaded a recently passed development fee that will fund ultra-low-income housing and the city's right to counsel program for tenants facing eviction. Notably, none of the major candidates are calling for reducing new development in the city. Even Solomon, the progressive standard-bearer, concedes that "rents would be higher if a lot of those (new buildings) hadn't been built." But there's a risk that Jersey City is pushing the limits of what it can demand from developers to the point where they stop building. The city's inclusionary zoning ordinance has yielded about 500 below-market-rate homes as of the end of 2024\. However, no project has yet broken ground at the 15% inclusionary rate, Cialone said. She believes a few are poised to do so soon. To keep housing production going through tough economic times, you have to "err on the side of generosity" toward developers when it comes to inclusionary zoning, Armlovich said. That's "not always politically attractive," he added. In recent years, Jersey City has walked a fine line. It has rolled out the red carpet for developers with high-density zoning and an easy planning process. Simultaneously, it has steadily increased public benefits developers are required to contribute. And it has done all this while maintaining a strong rent-control program for older units. Perhaps the city could have asked for more from developers. Perhaps it's already asking for too much. Either way, "It would make our lives so much easier," Solomon said, "if New York City got its shit together and started adding supply commensurate with demand." ### Local Democracy is Land-Use Policy URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/local-democracy-is-land-use-policy/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z If you've ever been to a community board meeting or other public hearing about a contentious rezoning to produce more housing, it really seems like *everyone* is up in arms. There's a lot of yelling and people claiming that "the neighborhood" has clearly defined views, usually against anything new getting built. But if you pan out a bit, it's clear that the people yelling at these meetings — which, let's remember, [take free time, civic know-how and commitment to attend](https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2018/8/27/who-is-the-public-at-public-meetings?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — represent a tiny fraction of "the neighborhood" and an even smaller percentage of the people who will be affected by the construction of a new apartment building or office. Not in that room are the huge number of people who work long hours and can't make it to a meeting, people who don't think the specific project is that big a deal, people who would like to move to the neighborhood but can't because there isn't enough housing and people representing citywide interests like employers and unions who benefit from more construction and lower housing costs but don't care much about any specific project. To some extent, that's the way democracy always works — with only the people who are motivated to vote actually choosing our leaders, and a tiny fraction of them lobbying for specific changes. But local governments, and New York City particularly, have built institutions and practices that enhance and protect the voices of the residents near proposed new developments, to the exclusion of all others, with predictable effects on policy. Members of the City Council rely on neighborhood recommendations, and as it currently stands, council members have effective veto power over rezonings in their neighborhood. There's long been a culture of deference whereby the entire 51-member Council follows the lead of the member in whose district a given rezoning is happening. You can understand this as a theory of how democracy should work: that the people closest to a particular decision and with the highest intensity of preferences should have the most — and even the only relevant — say. Call it hyperlocalism, and it describes how land-use policy in New York City — and many other places — generally operates. It's not *crazy*. People near new projects do have both specific knowledge about the likely effects of new development and strong beliefs about how their neighborhoods should look and feel. America has always had a soft spot for raucous political participation by small groups, from its earliest town meeting-based governments to utopian communities on the prairies. But hyperlocalism is also not the only type of democracy about land use that is possible, nor is it the best way to look at these questions. While existing neighborhood residents care about development, so too do many others. Practices that privilege the views of existing neighborhood residents, like council-member deference or community board meetings, are built on an assumption that outsider voices, larger in number if lower in intensity about a particular decision, shouldn't matter. This is a particularly strange belief in New York City, which, as [E. B. White famously noted,](https://langurbansociology.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/white-on-nyc.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has always been defined by its newcomers and transplants — and, for that matter, in cities generally, which rely on dynamism and churn to thrive. Perhaps more pressingly, hyperlocalism imports a deep conservatism into public policy, putting almost exclusive power in the hands of those who would rather not see change. Local homeowners who like how their neighborhoods look and feel clearly do not care if failures to build housing lead to ever-increasing rents, prices and homelessness (and indeed can benefit from the increases to their home values that scarcity brings). We can use [procedures that encourage other voices](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1162%5Fm41e7ifa.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to participate, including potential residents in new housing, ordinary citizens seeking economic growth, employers and unions. Doing so generally entails that power must be put in the hands of high-profile citywide officials — mayors, most notably, but also heads of citywide agencies, borough presidents and city council speakers — who are known by and represent this broader range of voices. Cities that do this with citywide rezonings and plans have seen the greatest land-use policy successes in recent years, from [Minneapolis' 2040 plan](https://minneapolis2040.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to citywide rezonings in places like Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Austin, Texas, to our own City of Yes. Land-use policy is downstream from the type of democracy we have. Citywide elections and hyperlocal politics are both democratic, but they are fundamentally different kinds of democracy and lead to different outcomes. A hyperlocal system will be skeptical of change, protecting neighborhoods while rents rise and the homeless population surges. Relying more on citywide officials and decisions will encourage participation by a wider range of voices and, as a result, do more to embrace growth and change, but will reduce the ability of the loudest neighborhood voices to decide the fate of their communities. New York must choose what kind of democracy it wants to be. **Our development problems are democracy problems** Having public meetings about changes to individual spending lines in local budgets would be considered ridiculous, a huge imposition on an already complex process. But we have public meetings about individual rezonings. What purpose do they serve? In New York, any substantial land-use change must go through the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), an early step of which is a public meeting before a community board. [Community board recommendations are technically advisory](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/planning/public-review?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#process); opposition from neighborhood activists, in theory, can be overcome. But in practice, this is a serious hurdle and is usually only surmounted by making very serious compromises, reducing the amount of housing and commercial space that gets built. And then there are all of the projects that never get proposed because developers know neighborhood opposition is likely and will be fatal. There is an asymmetry of process here that gives more power to those who want to stand in the way of new development. The very fact that there is even[ ](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1162%5Fm41e7ifa.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)a debate over a rezoning that [only covers a single project or neighborhood](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1162%5Fm41e7ifa.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) creates dynamics that limit new building. Potential consumers of new housing may not be from the neighborhood yet and thus don't care that much about this or that specific rezoning. Important interests — employers, unions — want more housing supply generally, because it drives down housing costs and increases population, creating greater demand for services and jobs. But they don't care that much about specific projects either. In contrast, opposition clusters around individual projects. Public meetings help organize this opposition. Organizing people in politics is notoriously difficult. But a big public meeting about a specific project provides local activists with a focal point to organize around and a way to monitor who shows up (or even — gasp — supports a rezoning). The public meeting requirement is effectively a subsidy to opponents of projects, a chance for all those who are against it to gather and marshal their arguments. Further, public meetings are particularly influential because of the way elections work in New York.[ ](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=1122422&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)Members of the City Council are functionally elected in [low-turnout, low-information primary elections](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=1122422&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), in which the same voices you hear at community board meetings — local homeowners most notably — dominate. The absence of strong party organizations in local legislatures usually leads to ["member deference,"](https://openyls.law.yale.edu/handle/20.500.13051/4488?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Abstract,housing%20as%2Dof%2Dright.) or a strong norm that City Council members get veto power over rezonings in their district. This is roughly how it came to be that former Council Member Carlos Menchaca [killed the redevelopment of Industry City](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2020/08/why-industry-city-rezoning-is-failing/175744/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Sunset Park; that Council Member Raphael Salamanca [stopped the rezoning of Southern Boulevard](https://www.welcome2thebronx.com/2020/01/southern-boulevard-rezoning-is-rejected-by-councilmember-effectively-killing-it/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the Bronx and that then-Council Members Antonio Reynoso and Raphael Espinal [blocked dense new housing in Bushwick](https://citylimits.org/downzoning-differences-clash-over-housing-projections-led-to-bushwick-stalemate/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The result is hyperlocalism. The loudest neighborhood voices have the ability to veto or change new projects, meaning far too little gets built. **The better way** We can't easily change the way people think, but we can retool the procedural dynamics to stop putting a thumb on the scale to effectively advantage antidevelopment forces at nearly every turn. Big cities can pass citywide text amendments that change land-use policy for all similar neighborhoods, as New York City did with its[ City of Yes](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/city-of-yes/housing-opportunity/housing-opportunity-guide-illustrated.pdf?r=1001&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ Zoning for Quality and Affordability](https://council.nyc.gov/land-use/plans/mih-zqa/zqa/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) amendments. Cities can adopt citywide plans, which require them to zone in accordance with the plan's commitments, [as Minneapolis did](https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/comprehensive-zoning-reform-in-minneapolis-mn/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in its widely hailed[ Minneapolis 2040](https://minneapolis2040.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) plan.[ ](https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SchleicherHills.printer.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)Cities can leave [more power in the hands of Mayors](https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SchleicherHills.printer.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and their appointees, who are well known by and thus accountable to the public. [The recommendations by the Charter Revision Commission ](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)that will be on the ballot in November are designed to encourage a more citywide perspective on land-use policy. States can either directly preempt local zoning, as we've seen on different issues in[ California](https://cayimby.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CAY-ADU%5FReport-2024-v4.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ Montana](https://www.sightline.org/2025/04/25/montanas-housing-miracle-strikes-twice/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ Texas](https://www.texastribune.org/2025/06/16/texas-legislature-housing-bills/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), or set targets for new housing supply for jurisdictions, as we've seen in[ Massachusetts](https://spectrumlocalnews.com/charlotte/supreme-court/news/2025/06/04/mbta-communities-law-augustus-compliance-massachusetts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ California](https://reason.com/2021/02/09/california-massively-increased-the-amount-of-housing-the-bay-area-has-to-allow-yimby-lawsuit-says-eh-could-be-more/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Each of these strategies has its own challenges. But the reason to pursue them is that they force a broader group of people and groups to get involved in deciding how much housing and commercial space should be allowed to be built. They usually lead to more liberal outcomes — i.e., allowing more building — than does hyperlocalism, because they consider the voices of those harmed by excessive zoning. Hyperlocalism isn't inevitable or necessary. It has done great harm to our economy. We should try something different. ### The Misunderstood Urban NIMBY URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-misunderstood-urban-nimby/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z One of the most consequential political battles of the 21st century does not cleanly map onto our ordinary ideological lines. But it does lean heavily on easy cultural stereotypes — ones we need to get past if we're going to build the housing we need to build and to understand the limits of ["just building."](https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/2022/11/a-yimby-and-a-left-nimby-duke-it-out?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Here's a cursory sketch of the two ideological camps, purposely oversimplified. Spurred by ever-escalating housing prices in desirable urban spaces, the YIMBY ("yes in my backyard") movement — now seemingly absorbed into the prodevelopment, regulation-critical abundance movement incited by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson's [book of the same title](https://bookshop.org/p/books/abundance-what-progress-takes-derek-thompson/20165403?ean=9781668023488&utm%5Fsource=google&utm%5Fmedium=cpc&utm%5Fcampaign=coop%5Fs&s&utm%5Fcontent=s&s%5Fdsa&utm%5Fsource=google&utm%5Fmedium=paid%5Fsearch&utm%5Fcampaign=bookshop%5Fdsa%5Fsands&utm%5Fterm=&utm%5Fcontent=176349376953&utm%5Fpage=%7Blpurlpath%7D&gclid=Cj0KCQjwzaXFBhDlARIsAFPv-u9l66oJAgJc-IssLkk-nnTkZAXShe7dNCwjxFDqzvHyffBrn42GqxoaAqmcEALw%5FwcB&gad%5Fsource=1&gad%5Fcampaignid=22224636854&gbraid=0AAAAACfld40HyUpzFlkNlPMazoL1CGoQX) from this March — calls for a dramatic reduction in regulatory barriers to building, including an overhaul of our country's Byzantine zoning systems and an elimination of rules that prevent development, such as mandatory parking minimums and height maximums for residential buildings. The YIMBY movement has taken fire from both conservative forces that seek to protect incumbent advantages and leftists who deeply distrust both deregulation and the corporate interests that build and own residential real estate. YIMBYs' foil are NIMBYs, those who might theoretically support new development somewhere, but, worried about neighborhood character and the spirit of the community and other vague things, supposedly say "not in my backyard" to essentially anything in their own neighborhood. NIMBYs have sometimes been caricatured as BANANAs ("build absolutely nothing anywhere near anyone"). Sometimes that shoe fits. In our current political imagination, the NIMBY is an all-too-familiar figure: a relatively wealthy, white, boomer-aged homeowner living in a leafy single-family neighborhood, jealously guarding property values and suburban tranquility by opposing any and all new housing development. YIMBY rhetoric, driven by a mix of economic analysis and moral urgency, has leaned heavily on this archetype. In this telling, the NIMBY is the villain of the housing affordability crisis, an avatar of privilege defending a grotesquely exclusionary status quo. There is certainly some truth to this image, especially in affluent suburbs and exclusionary neighborhoods that are most often the site of NIMBY conflict. But this reductive view of who fights against development is also a simplification, one that fails to capture the full range of actors resisting new construction, especially in the dense urban cores of American cities. In the neighborhoods experiencing the strongest NIMBY pushback, the politics of housing are not shaped primarily by rich white homeowners but by working-class renters, often people of color, who are mobilizing against development not to protect wealth but to defend themselves from displacement and gentrification. These are not reactionary property owners clinging to racial segregation but marginalized communities trying to hold on to the tenuous roots they've established in cities that have long underserved them. The YIMBY movement, for all its valuable contributions to housing policy, has too often flattened this distinction. The image of the NIMBY perpetuated on social media, on podcasts and at conferences is of the wealthy white landowner who agitates against new building as a way to pull up the ladder, to protect and consolidate their own advantage. In conflating antigentrification resistance with suburban exclusion, YIMBYs risk alienating natural allies and obscuring the complexities of urban housing politics. The case they make for zoning reform and increased housing supply becomes less persuasive when we fail to account for the very real fears that underlie much urban NIMBYism. If we are to have a real hope of building the housing we so desperately need, we must begin by understanding who NIMBYs really are and why some of them have good reasons to say no. The YIMBY critique of NIMBYism emerged in response to undeniable realities: In wealthy coastal cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles and New York, restrictive zoning, discretionary permitting and endless community veto points have made it virtually impossible to build enough housing. This shortage, coupled with the inelastic demand created by job-rich urban economies, has sent rents soaring and home prices into the stratosphere. The result is what scholars have called a ["housing trilemma"](https://0xjim.medium.com/the-housing-trilemma-7974769bdbfd?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): Cities are forced to choose between affordability, economic growth and the vague but potent factor of "neighborhood character" that many voters push for. > Urban NIMBYs are not reactionary property owners clinging to racial segregation but marginalized communities trying to hold on to the tenuous roots they've established in cities that have long underserved them. YIMBYs — who pick the first two options of the trilemma — rightly argue that breaking this impasse requires more housing, including dense, transit-oriented and market-rate housing, to absorb demand and stabilize prices. To advance their case, YIMBYs often deployed a rhetorical foil: the suburban NIMBY who opposes development out of selfishness, nostalgia or racial animus. This figure is politically potent and often real. In places like [Palo Alto](https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/06/23/fierce-7-year-nimby-battle-in-palo-alto-reaches-a-luxury-conclusion/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Marin County](https://sfist.com/2022/11/10/power-nimby-move-marin-residents-give-selves-hefty-tax-hike-to-block-housing-development/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Westchester County](https://howprop.com/nimbys-banana-and-cave-people-what-they-mean-to-development-in-westchester/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Beverly Hills](https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2024-09-04/beverly-hills-is-dragging-its-heels-on-a-new-building-the-governor-says-build-it?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), organized homeowner groups have indeed spent decades fighting off apartment buildings, subsidized housing and even modest infill projects (that is, attempts to build more housing through greater density in already-developed spaces). The pushback to these projects tends to fall under the guise of "neighborhood character" and "quality of life." These rich neighborhoods and municipalities are the true bastions of exclusion, and the YIMBY critique has done well to puncture their pieties. But when this critique migrates wholesale to cities and neighborhoods like Oakland, Boyle Heights, Crown Heights or the Mission District, it begins to lose coherence. In these places, NIMBY resistance often comes from people in low-income communities who do not own homes and who are acutely worried about, if not always vulnerable to, displacement. Their opposition to development is not rooted in greed or parochialism but in survival. To treat them as ideological equivalents of suburban homeowners is not just analytically wrong but politically self-defeating. Making the oversimplification even worse is this fact: In the urban core, many development proposals wind up concentrated in neighborhoods where land is cheapest, zoning is more permissive and political resistance is weaker. Mayor Bill de Blasio's first big rezoning was in [East New York](https://gothamist.com/news/grading-de-blasio-in-east-new-york-mayors-first-rezoned-neighborhood-promises-fall-short?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These happen to be low-income, often majority-Black or Latino neighborhoods that have long borne the brunt of disinvestment, environmental degradation and underpolicing. When capital begins to flow back into these areas (often in the form of luxury condos, new restaurants or boutique retail), longtime residents fear they won't be financially able to enjoy the benefits. And they recognize the signs. Gentrification is not an abstract concept to them; it is a lived experience of rising rents, no-fault evictions, loss of cultural institutions and the sudden appearance of outsiders who reshape the social fabric. The very existence of gentrification as a widespread phenomenon is controversial, and its effects are far less obvious or certain than many fear. But there are undoubtedly neighborhoods that underwent a classic gentrification process, such as Williamsburg in Brooklyn, which went from being a working-class neighborhood to a wealthy enclave in less than a decade and a half, and it's natural for local residents to fear the same result in their community. You can't change their minds by calling them white and rich, especially when they're neither. In a context of ever-spiraling housing costs, opposing new development can be a rational political act even if its fundamental logic confuses YIMBYs. It's a way of asserting community control over space, resisting economic forces that have never acted in the favor of these communities and attempting to slow down or mitigate displacement. These NIMBYs are not against "housing" in the abstract. They're against the kind of housing that they believe is not for them — units that are too expensive, too unwelcoming to residents who look the way they do, too indicative of a city slipping out of their grasp. This is not to say that every antidevelopment fight in the urban core is justified or constructive. But it is to say that the motivations are fundamentally different from those animating the homeowners of Atherton or Scarsdale. And when YIMBYs collapse this distinction, they invite understandable backlash. In six years in tenant activism in New York City, I saw conflict after conflict between local communities of color and the whims of absurdly well-moneyed corporate interests that sought to helicopter in and start buying up land for luxury development. Prominent examples of neighborhoods that saw antigentrification fights that some would deride as NIBMYism include Inwood and Washington Heights, where the [Northern Manhattan is Not For Sale](https://www.metcouncilonhousing.org/campaign/northern-manhattan-is-not-for-sale/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) movement fought tooth and nail against planned construction that they feared would displace incumbent populations; the ["Fight for Sunlight"](https://www.bbg.org/support/save%5Fthe%5Fsunlight%5Foppose%5Frezoning?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and similar conflicts in Crown Heights and Prospect Lefferts Gardens; and the successful [opposition](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/nyregion/industry-city-rezoning-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to an expansion of the Industry City megacomplex in Sunset Park. > Gentrification is not an abstract concept to some urban NIMBYs; it is a lived experience of rising rents, no-fault evictions, loss of cultural institutions, and the sudden appearance of outsiders who reshape the social fabric. The first campaign was dominantly led by Hispanic renters; the second by Black residential groups like Alicia Boyd's Movement to Protect the People; and the latter by a coalition of Asian, Hispanic and white residents. None of these groups were made up primarily of rich people — in fact, they're almost all working- and middle-class — and very few of those involved in them were homeowners. They had no property values to protect. Instead, they had legitimate fears of being displaced and seeing the neighborhoods they love taken out from under them by the kind of rootless white elites who have casually conquered so many other places in New York. For an example from a different city, consider Boyle Heights in Los Angeles, a historically Mexican American neighborhood with deep roots and fierce community pride. In recent years, [residents have opposed](https://field-journal.com/issue-14/desarmando-desarrollismo/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) several art galleries, coffee shops and apartment projects, seeing them as beachheads of gentrification. I assure you, the Boyle Heights activists were not all wealthy white landowners of the NIMBY stereotype. Yet YIMBY critics were quick to denounce these campaigns as irrational or selfish. They failed to honestly reckon with the questions: What is it that people fear losing? And how might policy address those fears without dismissing them outright? The more the YIMBY movement has grown into an online social club, the less patience it seems to have for engaging in even basic political empathy for its foes. The mischaracterization of urban NIMBYism as the same phenomenon as suburban exclusionism has real political consequences. It creates unnecessary antagonism, fuels distrust and makes coalitional politics around housing more fraught. Worse, it allows policymakers to dodge the hard work of designing development that actually protects vulnerable residents. Yes, building is good. But the YIMBY mantra of "just build" is exactly the kind of slogan you come up with when you're fighting for an abstraction; the antigentrification activists, meanwhile, are fighting for their homes. If all opposition to development is treated as reactionary, then the only acceptable response is to override it. That may be politically satisfying, but it is rarely sustainable. In places like Minneapolis or Oregon, where prohousing reforms have had some success, those wins have required building alliances, not dismissing local concerns. That means acknowledging that development can have both positive and negative consequences and that mitigation (through stronger tenant protections, community land trusts, inclusionary zoning and other measures) is essential to any serious prohousing agenda. Moreover, painting all NIMBYs with the same brush obscures one of the central dynamics of urban development: Supply follows demand. Developers do not build housing where it is needed most; they build where it is profitable. That often means luxury housing in gentrifying neighborhoods, not affordable housing in underserved ones. Without aggressive public investment and planning, simply "unleashing" the market can reproduce inequality even as it adds units. Yes, luxury development can drive down the cost of housing overall over time. But that process is slow, diffuse and necessarily hard to observe for long-term residents. Indeed, long-term residents will very likely see statistics point to average rent going up in their neighborhoods: After all, a brand-new building of any kind in a developing neighborhood with aging housing stock will almost certainly charge more in rent than the median existing apartment; charging more than the existing average raises the average, definitionally. Gentrification fears do not spring from nowhere. Smarter YIMBYs have begun to acknowledge some of this nuance, and the movement is not monolithic. But the dominant narrative that all opposition to housing is bad, and all support is good, remains powerful. It simplifies the public debate and hardens opposition among precisely the communities most in need of affordable housing. If a prohousing movement wants to succeed — not just on X, but in actual policy — it must broaden its moral and political vocabulary. That means moving beyond economic modeling and embracing a politics of solidarity. It means listening to communities that resist development and understanding their fears as legitimate, not pathological. And it means distinguishing between those who fight development to protect the asset price of their third vacation house and those who fight it to protect their homes. This does not require surrendering to every neighborhood demand or allowing the status quo to persist, but it does require humility. The housing crisis is not just a story of bad zoning and selfish boomers; it would be convenient if it were, but it isn't. It's also a story of decades of disinvestment, racism and top-down planning imposed on communities with little voice. If we are to build more housing (and by God, we must), we need to build it in a way that earns trust. ### What Can We Learn from Social Housing? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/when-government-built-homes-for-people/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z Home is formative, and the particularities of home especially so. In her memoir “Just City: Growing Up on the Upper West Side When Housing Was a Human Right,” Jennifer Baum narrates the ways she and her family were shaped by their unique home: a [Mitchell-Lama](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/mitchell-lama-program.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) cooperative she was raised in as a child, that served her as a backstop and crash pad when a young adult, that provided a foundation when she became a mother and that still plays the role of touchstone. [RNA House](https://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/RNA-House/history/50Ann-history-booklet.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which stretches its honey-combed facade for nearly half a block of West 96th Street between Amsterdam and Columbus, is a creature of a singular moment in New York City history. It was built as social housing in 1967 within an urban renewal area that, unlike many of its predecessors, sought a gentler, if still disruptive, approach to upgrading a neighborhood, sidelining full-on urban clearance for a mix of rehabs, more contextual public housing and new middle-income buildings. Everyone involved in today’s conversation about how to produce new and more affordable housing in New York City — organizers of community land trusts, advocates and foes of Mayor Eric Adams’ City of Yes rezoning, the YIMBYs, [those who point out that even “affordable” housing is affordable to far too few families](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/12/nyregion/housing-crunch-affordable-housing.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — needs to understand how such housing came to be, how to preserve it and how to build on its legacy. **What Mitchell-Lama meant, and still means** Back in 1955, a coalition of state and city politicians, unions and developers (particularly large not-for-profit outfits like the United Housing Federation) met a dire need for more affordable units accessible to New Yorkers by pushing through the Limited Profit Housing Companies Law. Mitchell-Lama, as it’s better known, was designed as the gap-filler between public housing owned and operated by government-run housing authorities and market-rate homes. Offering new builds at affordable prices, the program [aimed to keep mostly white, middle-income families in the city](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0096144209339558?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a counterweight to the lure of a new suburban dream. By offering developers low-interest-rate mortgages that covered up to 95% of project costs, generous property tax breaks that reduced operating costs over time, and, sometimes, a ready-made site to build on, New York City and State funded the creation of permanent units, kept so by limiting developers’ profits and, initially, placing perpetual restrictions on how much a co-op share could be sold for and how much a rental apartment could be rented for. A permanently affordable home outside the market under community control: This is the promise of social housing, and that of Mitchell-Lama co-ops. And it remains the promise, for all those that remain in the program. A legislative change in 1959 meant to spur the construction of more Mitchell-Lama rentals, then erroneously applied to the very different context of co-ops, means that the rental owners (mainly large real estate firms) and co-op owners (the residents themselves) can opt to exit the program if they pay off the state or city mortgage and vote to leave. Many co-ops have stayed true to the program — only 10% of the roughly 69,000 cooperative apartments built between 1955 and 1974 through Mitchell-Lama have privatized, but more than 50% of the rental units, some 36,000, have flown the coop. > A permanently affordable home outside the market under community control: This is the promise of social housing, and that of Mitchell-Lama co-ops. And it remains the promise, for all those that remain in the program. Despite Mitchell-Lama’s success in building social housing on a large scale, this loss to the speculative market of apartments once meant to be permanently affordable — and with them the public subsidy that made them possible — makes the program as much a cautionary tale for our current moment as it is a pinnacle of a brighter past. Today, we are engaged in a perpetual scramble to build enough affordable homes to replace what we lose as affordability restrictions on publicly subsidized homes sunset. Mitchell-Lama was in some ways a harbinger of this present, an example of how government shifted from building upon its own investments through the maintenance of public goods to a recurring crisis of letting those investments wither, necessitating additional, more expensive ones anew. **More than a morality tale** This aerial view — an understanding of the scale of the challenge or analysis of how we got here — gets inconsistent attention in Baum’s memoir-cum-argument for replicating the likes of RNA House. But her reminiscences of that building, and the many kinds of structure it provided, are both useful and necessary. They serve as a kind of oral history of the lived experience of a housing program, injecting the less quantifiable components into a policy conversation so stuck on numbers that we too often talk about housing as units — even widgets — and not as homes. Baum’s view of her home, be that RNA House or the wider neighborhood, is unquestionably nostalgic. Her memories, and those she sources from former neighbors through Facebook reconnections, are imbued with an “everything was better then” gloss that allows her to look back at her beloved city and claim that “nowhere had the unified effort to provide a decent home for all been as comprehensive or successful as in New York City.” As the title states, she considers the era that gave rise to her home as one “when the idea that housing is a human right was a guiding principle of politics, urban design and planning.” These sweeping statements are historically questionable — not the least summing up the multifaceted, watershed Housing Act of 1949 as “inspired yet flawed” — but Baum the memoirist can be forgiven for extrapolating from the often inspiring snapshots of her co-op and her neighborhood. There’s the uncannily heartwarming image of the group of neighborhood kids of many colors tipping a departed pet into the building incinerator in a makeshift funeral. Down the hall, a group of mothers distribute food among themselves after a pre-dawn trip to buy from wholesalers at Hunts Point, a co-op operating within the co-op. Upstairs, Baum’s mother studies, taking advantage of the low maintenance to go back to school after Baum’s father tragically dies on a visit to her fifth-grade classroom. This death understandably reverberates through Baum’s life, and its echoes reveal the contours of her home’s significance. RNA House “provided a ballast” when her father passed, though at the time “she had no sense how important Mitchell-Lama’s social justice values were to our mother or that our father's spirit lived on in the building.” This link between Baum’s father and her co-op is made first by his involvement on its board. With his death, it’s cemented in the way that RNA House can be said to care for her. The loss of his income doesn’t lead to an eviction; rather, it results in a reduction in her family’s housing costs. When she’s yearning to return to New York with her future husband and their child, RNA House provides a leg up: Her name rises to the top of the waitlist, and she’s able to buy into the co-op herself. For Baum, the state, in the form of this publicly subsidized opportunity at middle-income homeownership, isn’t a nanny. It’s a dad. The way the Mitchell-Lama model adapts to the changing circumstances of Baum’s family should be instructive for any housing policy. But what does Baum have to say about how we get there, and then, how we maintain such decommodified housing in an era of runaway housing costs? In her telling, the answer is ethical, inspired individuals. She largely gives credit for the success of Mitchell-Lama, and the vitality of her neighborhood, to “enlightened politicians, urban planners and architects,” and frequently ascribes normative value to the formal aspects of the spaces they shaped, referring to her parents’ pursuit of the “morality of modernism” — so much so that modern architecture “was her \[mother’s\] god.” > For Baum, the state, in the form of this publicly subsidized opportunity at middle-income homeownership, isn’t a nanny. It’s a dad. As for maintaining this housing, little attention is paid to the ongoing acts of governance of the co-op, by its resident-owners or the city’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development. Instead, she emphasizes the background and morals of RNA’s cooperators, with particular reverence given to Jewish families like hers schooled by labor unions. For Baum’s family and city alike, the halcyon days of social housing’s arrival on the Upper West Side are presented as the progressive summit of a family *and* of a city. Everything that follows — Baum’s moves to Vancouver, Paris and Arizona, and New York’s turn towards luxury and unaffordability — is a downward spiral. This lament is both warranted and damaging. Her focus on individuals is similarly both helpful, in documenting the way good housing policy shapes lives, and harmful, in attributing the success of that policy almost solely to personal initiative. The utopian rendering of RNA House and the Upper West Side obscures the contentious, impure politics that brought it into being. Baum does acknowledge the role of community organizations like Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council and her building’s sponsor, the Riverside Neighborhood Assembly, in realizing, for a time, a racially and economically integrated Upper West Side. But that acknowledgment pales in comparison to her lionization of bureaucrats, who, without the agitation of the likes of Strycker’s Bay, would have planned for the kind of luxury-tinged Upper West Side she now rails against. Her depiction of the 60s and 70s as an era in which housing justice was broadly accepted and enshrined in policy like Mitchell-Lama transforms what was, in truth, political pragmatism within a substantially different economic landscape into a too-tidy narrative of moral uplift. It is true that a different idea of what housing is for is embodied by the social housing that came from the program. But in this retelling, the less straightforwardly progressive aspects of the program aren’t given the necessary attention. For instance, [the integration that occurred under the program ran counter to the policy’s original intent of keeping the white middle-class in city limits](https://www.academia.edu/43531790/Housing%5Fthe%5FCo%5Fop%5FA%5FMicro%5Fpolitical%5FManifesto%5FClaims%5Ffor%5FAction?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [Mitchell-Lama’s incentives were also so generous that it made for low-risk, if “limited,” profits for the developers](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501716430/freedomland/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that employed the modernist architects Baum’s mother deifies. In so doing, Baum, like others who exclusively lament the state of the city, pays too little attention to the workaday governance and strategic organizing that has allowed elements of the era she reveres to endure, just as new policies and politics that could usher in a renaissance of social housing in New York begin to take root. **A gift of honesty** In the course of the book, Baum does, however, deliver key information to aid the cause of preserving the social housing we already have. In recent decades, the question of privatization has raised its head at RNA House, presenting the possibility that cooperators could vote to leave the Mitchell-Lama program and remove the resale restrictions that have kept their homes affordable for generations. These homeowners could then sell their shares for any sum they’d like, and future generations would lose out on the opportunity that served, and shaped, her family so significantly. This variety of privatization is meaningfully distinct from the kinds of real estate transactions among large corporations that led to the erosion of other key sources of housing built for the public like [Stuyvesant Town](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/oct/29/stuyvesant-town-corporate-greed-affordable-housing-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), or the growing role of private operators in the renovation and management of public housing through programs like [NYCHA’s Permanent Affordability Commitment Together (PACT)](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycha/about/pact.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In the case of Mitchell-Lama co-ops, the greatest beneficiaries of this already privately owned and managed social housing are the possible agents behind their elimination, and with them, the public purpose enshrined in their construction. In this context, Baum’s greatest gift is her honesty about her changing relationship to her co-op, from embarrassment in youth, to reverence during her political awakening, to the more complicated ambivalence of adulthood. Late in the book, she sits on the floor of her childhood home waiting to turn it back over to the co-op. The inevitability of her mother’s passing means her apartment at RNA will now be passed to the next family on the waitlist. She shares, “As my mother aged, the reality that we'd lose the apartment became more pronounced, and I'd found myself partially holding out hope for privatization, not due to the attraction of a real estate sale windfall, but to keep the apartment in the family.” She adds: “Morally, philosophically, intellectually, I understood the building should stay public; privately, though, I was already mourning the loss of my childhood home.” Years later, with no RNA shares to her name and thus no skin in the game, Baum “learned the family who moved into our apartment were in favor of \[privatizing\], leaving me gasping, as though I’d lose #14E all over again. If RNA remained public, my mother’s common good values and spirit would live on, and apartments would continue to go to families in need. If it were to privatize, all that my mother stood for would vanish.” In telling her family history as the housing history that it is, and owning up to how her personal attachments to home collide with the prerogatives of the housing policy she desires, Baum in fact demonstrates the need for more than just enlightened individuals to realize her vision. The same ethical individuals who once built a co-op can also, in other circumstances, destroy it. Which is why collective action, state regulation and an ecosystem of support are needed to sustain housing that properly serves its role as a public good. Which is also why housing policymakers must also talk about more than units. In crafting good policy, they must reconnect with the fact that such units are in fact homes, imbued with emotions and meaning that deeply affect the success of the programs that aim to build and maintain them. ### California Dreaming URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/california-dreaming/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z After decades of climbing rents, City Hall is finally treating New York City's housing shortage with the urgency it deserves. That was the message of City of Yes, the sweeping 2024 rezoning that represents [the biggest transformation](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/19/nyregion/city-of-yes-nyc-housing-crisis.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the local land-use system since the City's 1961 downzoning. That misbegotten overhaul helped precipitate the current crisis by constricting the city's ability to build more housing when its population once again began to grow. But for all its ambition, City of Yes is still only a first step. The package is [expected to yield 80,000 new housing units](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-mayor-adams-and-council-speaker-adams-celebrate-passage-most-pro-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over 15 years; credible estimates of the city's actual housing needs suggest a deficit of [closer to half a million homes](https://cbcny.org/building-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Many are the plans to produce more housing. Mayor Eric Adams has what he considers an aggressive agenda, as does Democratic mayoral nominee Zohran Mamdani and former Gov. Andrew Cuomo, running for mayor as an independent. But the five boroughs' housing supply problem can't be solved by the five boroughs alone. Metro areas function as ecosystems, and New York City has long been surrounded by suburbs with [terribly restrictive housing production rules](https://furmancenter.org/research/publication/ending-exclusionary-zoning-in-new-york-city8217s-suburbs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (along with a few decidedly pro-growth places like [Jersey City](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/learning-from-jersey-city)). That exclusionary zoning only increases pressure on New York City itself to generate all the new units New Yorkers need. Not even Albany can touch exclusionary suburbs in Connecticut and New Jersey, but New York lawmakers can certainly upzone Westchester County and Nassau County, which together send [thousands of commuters](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/planning-level/housing-economy/nyc-ins-and-out-of-commuting.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the city each day, and which could serve as release valves for the five boroughs' growing population. Only the governor and State Legislature can overcome the collective action problem that throws the burden of solving a regional housing crisis on a handful of individual municipalities — while white, affluent, single-family-only communities free ride off the metropolitan area's booming economy. **A problem of collective action** How to tackle this problem? Political leaders in Albany can take inspiration from California. California's major cities are grappling with profound housing shortages and epidemics of homelessness, just as New York City is. And, like New York City, all of California's high-cost cities are surrounded by suburbs whose exclusionary land-use regimes have only fueled downtown crises. Yet Sacramento, unlike Albany, has now spent the better part of a decade preempting local zoning and permitting rules in an attempt to open those suburbs up to housing. New York needs to follow this lead. Albany has already taken the first fitful steps in this direction. Gov. Kathy Hochul has at least talked a good game on housing production. In 2023, before abundance became a hot brand, she proposed a housing compact that would have loosened rules to allow more accessory dwelling units (ADUs or "granny flats"), allowed higher-density construction near train stations and incentivized housing production through tax exemptions. It foundered in the face of legislative opposition from both sides of the aisle. In 2024, her second, less ambitious attempt at statewide housing reform yielded [real but woefully insufficient](https://www.thecity.nyc/2024/04/23/kathy-hochul-budget-housing-good-cause-421a/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) results. California, in contrast, has now taken dozens of bites at the apple — and has the results to show for it. Sacramento's pro-housing run began in earnest in the mid-to-late 2010s, when a handful of legislators embraced housing as a top priority. Around the same time, in 2017, a new advocacy organization called California YIMBY (Yes in My Backyard) became the main voice for YIMBYs in state-level politics. (Disclosure: I was California YIMBY's policy director from mid-2022 until early 2025.) With the help of California YIMBY and other pro-housing advocacy groups, a herd of housing bills was shepherded to the governor's desk. Within the span of a few years, California enacted [a series of ADU reforms](https://cayimby.org/reports/california-adu-reform-a-retrospective/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (discussed below) that produced tens of thousands of new units of housing, [legalized multifamily housing](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill%5Fid=202120220AB2011&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) along commercial corridors, [eliminated parking requirements](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill%5Fid=202120220AB2097&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for housing located near transit stops and [added serious teeth](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill%5Fid=201720180SB167&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the state's long-neglected oversight powers over local zoning. Most recently, the legislature passed a [transit-oriented development bill](https://cayimby.org/news-events/press-releases/historic-housing-legislation-passes-in-california/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that automatically upzones parcels near some transit stops. (As I write this, the bill is awaiting the governor's signature.) That list of examples doesn't even begin to cover the full breadth of California's recent pro-housing reforms. A mix of inside-game and outside-game strategies was key to these successes. Thousands of local YIMBY volunteers across the state contacted their legislators and even flew to Sacramento in order to support specific bills. They also organized their communities, spoke out in favor of individual projects in their towns and rallied to the support of local pro-housing candidates. Many of them even ran for office themselves. The volunteers gave crucial leverage to the professional YIMBY advocates tasked with rounding up votes for pro-housing legislation. And crucially, pro-housing heroes in the legislature heard them and acted. It was these representatives and their staff who bore primary responsibility for carrying their bills from the first committee hearing to final approval in the second chamber. It was they who had to take most of the heat from both skeptical colleagues and NIMBY constituents. **Sacramento on the Hudson?** There's no time for victory laps. The long fight to end the Golden State's housing shortage continues, both inside and outside the legislature. According to the state's Department of Housing and Community Development, California has a deficit of [approximately 2.5 million homes](https://www.hcd.ca.gov/planning-and-community-development/housing-element-implementation-and-apr-dashboard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Homelessness remains at historic levels, and [more than half of all renter households](https://chpc.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/California-Affordable-Housing-Needs-Report-2024-1.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are moderately or severely cost-burdened. Still, we've made enough progress for New York to take a hard look at what's gone right in California, and why. Lesson one is that the legislature needs its own housing standard-bearers who know how to navigate both the halls of power and the public discourse and who have a certain appetite for political risk. Second, work must proceed on multiple tracks at once. Consider the California YIMBY legislative package of 2019\. That year, YIMBYs pursued a dual-pronged strategy: They attempted to pass a massive bill that might have single-handedly ended the housing shortage ([SB 50](https://cayimby.org/legislation/sb-50-the-more-homes-act/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a hypertrophied predecessor of the transit-oriented development bill that passed this year), but they also pursued a set of apparently mundane technical fixes to ADU regulations, which were putatively aimed at adjusting inefficiencies in the process to approve these smaller housing units on the lots of larger, usually single-family, properties. California, just beginning to grapple with its housing crisis, saw in SB 50 the value in starting out strong: The bill's ambition matched the scale of the crisis. And while it ultimately died on the Senate floor, the bill helped push housing to the top of the legislature's agenda and elevate the perceived strength of the YIMBY movement. It also drew fire away from those minor ADU tweaks. Those relatively modest ADU reforms passed — and showed the power of fine print. In 2016, cities and counties [issued 1,336 ADU permits](https://www.hcd.ca.gov/planning-and-community-development/housing-element-implementation-and-apr-dashboard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); in 2017, they issued 5,153; in 2023, they issued more than 28,000\. That's thousands of new homes. YIMBYs in both the legislature and at the local level have been building on ADU law since 2016\. Part of the secret to this approach has been that housing advocates approach ADU policy as a single coherent package: they have fought for tweaks related not just to zoning and permitting, but also to utility hookups, parking requirements, owner-occupancy rules and so on. The sheer comprehensiveness of ADU reform is an important takeaway in itself; exclusionary jurisdictions will use every tool at their disposal to block new housing, so any attempt to legalize a particular housing typology must be watertight. **A cautionary note** Not every lesson from California is a positive one, however. Take the story of [SB 9, a bill from 2021](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill%5Fid=202120220SB9&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That bill, which was hyped as [the effective end of single-family zoning](https://www.sfchronicle.com/realestate/article/california-sb9-housing-duplexes-20175585.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in California, was supposed to allow for the construction of duplexes on most single-family lots; further, it would allow homeowners to split those lots in two, effectively legalizing the creation of up to four units of housing where previously only one had been permissible. It was a great idea in concept, but the results have been disappointing: In the first year since implementation, California's largest cities [approved just a handful](https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/research-and-policy/sb-9-turns-one-applications/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of SB 9 permits. SB 9 hasn't worked for a few reasons. First, the bill is far from watertight: Some jurisdictions have succeeded in keeping out SB 9 projects through tricks like [imposing unworkable design standards](https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/California-cities-rush-to-limit-new-law-16647764.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and making tactical use of [historic preservation rules](https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/nimbys-ceqa-housing-historic-preservation-19761668.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Second, just because it is legally feasible to build something, that doesn't mean it is economical: Converting a single-family home into two duplexes tends to cost more money than it is worth. And third, many people who own single-family lots already had an option for adding one or two additional units: It is likely that SB 9 is, to an extent, a victim of ADU reform's success. In 2024, a new piece of legislation fixed some of the flaws in SB 9, but most of the underlying problems remain. Cleaning up the legislation has proved challenging, as there appears to be little appetite in the legislature for revisiting the original, fairly bruising fight to pass it. (Another cleanup attempt, this year's [SB 677](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill%5Fid=202520260SB677&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), didn't make it out of committee.) One lesson here is that it is better to underpromise and only ask your allies to take hard votes if there will be a substantial policy or political payoff. Overpromise today; engender cynicism tomorrow. Another important takeaway is that economic feasibility is everything when it comes to pro-housing legislation: If you want units to get built, you need to make sure that it is worth someone's while to build them. That means the process needs to be as smooth and efficient as possible, and the rules need to be flexible enough that projects will reliably yield sufficient returns to compensate developers' shouldered risk. ADU reform satisfied these requirements; SB 9 did not. If future attempts at state-level housing reform are going to succeed, New York's pro-housing advocates will likely need to engage in deeper grassroots organizing, especially outside of the five boroughs; they will need to cultivate charismatic and highly sophisticated legislative champions, ideally on both sides of the aisle; and they'll need to pay close attention to the legislative politics of reform. ### How Housing Supply and Design Intersect URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-housing-supply-and-design-intersect/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:47.000Z *Almost everyone agrees that New York City needs more housing — and that building housing here takes too long and costs too much. New York Magazine architecture critic Justin Davidson wants to remind us that one thing we shouldn't cut corners on is good design. Jamie and Justin talk about what architects really mean when they say "design," and how good design and abundant housing are closely related.* *You can listen to this episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/how-housing-supply-and-design-intersect/id1794619189?i=1000719740964&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/0bYTvKAjKaIfH70zB3Y6gU?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### The Promise of Floating Zoning URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-promise-of-floating-zoning/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:32.000Z On the banks of Lake Erie in 1922, a small village abutting Cleveland, Ohio, passed a controversial law. Under the new ordinance, the village drew lines across its jurisdiction and, within the polygons those lines created, set requirements for the type of buildings that could be built in each. One landowner, Ambler Realty, sued the village, claiming an infringement of its property rights. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled against Ambler, allowing a new form of urban policy: zoning. New York City, as it often is, was already ahead of the curve. The City had [established](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/downloads/pdf/zoning/zoning-nyc/1916%5Fzoning%5Fresolution.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the United States’ first zoning code in 1916, and New York State courts [had signed off on its legality](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a89aadd7b049347005c6?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Now, such rules would be permissible nationwide. The type of zoning that Ohio village instituted — setting fixed spatial boundaries for building types, dividing up residential, industrial, commercial and other uses — came to be called Euclidean zoning; not for the Greek mathematician, but after the defendant in the suit, the Village of Euclid. Today, Euclidean zoning is the most [common](https://northamericancommunityhub.com/euclidean-zoning-explained/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) form of regulating land use across the country. Euclidean zoning makes intuitive sense. Separating hazardous factories from places where people live is uncontroversial, as is relegating Times Square to only one tourist-crowded zone. But the top-down urban planning scheme, under which neighborhoods could be categorized and divided, created opportunities for discrimination. New York’s original 1916 zoning code pushed garment factories and their working-class employees [out of the tony Fifth Avenue shopping corridor](https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/items/f137a8fa-5e52-4c55-8952-3ffa768c5b97?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Districts zoned for only single-family houses made those areas [too expensive for low-income residents](https://citylimits.org/opinion-how-exclusionary-zoning-perpetuates-segregation-in-new-york/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), dividing wealthier households on larger lots from low-income neighborhoods. The Godlike planning power of Euclidean zoning also made it easy to treat poor neighborhoods differently. In her book [“Noxious New York,”](https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/2798/Noxious-New-YorkThe-Racial-Politics-of-Urban?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Julie Szeargued that Euclidean zoning tools allowed planners to spare whiter, wealthier communities from the brunt of environmental hazards — shunting high-polluting industrial zones to locate next to already disadvantaged residential neighborhoods. Even the most well-intentioned Euclidean system has elements that are too rigid for modern urban development. Cities change, and so do patterns of demand for land. There is no clearer example than the past several decades in New York City, where many people want to live (Yay! [Urban density is good!](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/upshot/coronavirus-urban-density-risks.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), but limited supply is [pushing up rents](https://www.newsweek.com/new-york-rent-hits-all-time-high-1945346?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [pushing out our neighbors](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/31/nyregion/black-residents-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Euclidean zoning makes it hard to transition neighborhood-use type when needs have shifted. (On this front, New York’s current zoning is actually *stricter* than the kind in Euclid, Ohio: Early Euclidean zones were “cumulative,” which meant that putatively higher-value uses, like single-family housing, could locate in lower-value districts like industrial lots. Today, New York’s housing cannot be built in industrial zones without a rezoning.) Transitioning is what New York neighborhoods do best, but under our current land-use system, it takes time for the built environment to catch up. Wall Street hosts [more apartments and fewer Wall Street firms](https://nyublueprint.substack.com/p/transforming-the-financial-district?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — but that took long years of[ clever regulatory rethinking](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/office-to-residential-conversions-in-nyc-economics-and-fiscal-estimates/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When a coalition of elected and planning officials sought to rezone the Garment District — no longer home to many garment factories, and in a top-tier transit zone — for housing, it took nine months to get from [rezoning application](https://zap.planning.nyc.gov/projects/2024M0142?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in late 2024 to [City Council approval](https://www.6sqft.com/city-council-approves-midtown-south-rezoning-unlocking-9500-new-homes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) this summer. Not to mention historic preservation restrictions under the Landmarks Preservation Commission, which subject zones covering 3.4% of the city (and 27% of Manhattan) to additional review prior to construction, and which research from the Furman Center found [reduce development](https://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter%5FHistoricDistrictsBrief%5F7MAR2016.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in affected neighborhoods. > Cities change, and so do patterns of demand for land. Euclidean zoning makes it hard to transition neighborhood-use type when needs have shifted. Planners, urbanists and academics have argued that it’s time to [move](https://sites.bu.edu/dome/2018/07/19/the-problems-with-euclidean-zoning/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [on](https://northamericancommunityhub.com/euclidean-zoning-explained/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [from](https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2009/1/21/whats-wrong-with-zoning.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [Euclidean zoning](https://www.governing.com/community/our-cities-get-zoning-all-wrong-heres-a-way-to-do-it-better.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and its use is softening. (Some have gone so far as to champion the no-zoning model exemplified by Houston, which planner and native Houstonian Sara Bronin describes as [“the poster child of urban anarchy.”](https://thewaroncars.org/episode-136-key-to-the-city-with-sara-bronin-final-web-transcript/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) That no-zoning model is, in part, why Houston has such a strong track record of [adapting to the housing needs](https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/detached-townhomes-gentrifying-gentrifiers-and-housing-regulation-uniquely-houston?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of its residents and [keeping prices down](https://benjaminschneider.substack.com/p/learning-from-houston?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Yet even in the most land-use-anarchic city, Bronin points out that [residents can lose flexibility](https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/shows/houston-matters/2024/10/01/501502/want-some-control-over-houstons-future-growth-maybe-try-zoning/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in a different way: Homeowners, seeking more stability, have created de facto zoning through an [above-national-average number](https://www.axios.com/local/houston/2025/04/17/homeowner-association-houston-rates?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of homeowner association covenants — which, among other effects, can foster residential inequality.) Once more, New York is ahead of the curve — this time in moving away from rigid Euclidean boundaries in favor of programs that allow neighborhoods to adapt to changing use needs. The City has a track record of seeing a need for more or different types of housing and finding ways to build it. Where a trek out to the industrial meatpacking district once felt like fulfilling manifest destiny, the City began to encourage housing and commercial activity, developing the [affordable artists’ complex, Westbeth](https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/16/realestate/once-gritty-neighborhood-comes-alive.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), in 1969\. In 1982, as artists took over underused, formerly industrial buildings in SoHo, the State Legislature [amended the Multiple Dwelling Law](https://www.nyc.gov/site/loftboard/about/about.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to formally recognize the lofts as residential. A 1968 rule change allowed property owners to [transfer unused development rights](http://mildredwarner.org/www.mildredwarner.org/gov-restructuring/privatization/tdr.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20new%20zoning%20ordinance%20set,Department%20of%20Planning%2C%202002%29.&text=The%20idea%20of%20transferring%20development,proved%20to%20be%20no%20exception.) to lots elsewhere in the city, a mechanism that helped pay for [ambitious development projects](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/citywide/transferable-development-rights?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) like the High Line and South Street Seaport. In the past decade, the City has passed a series of rezonings that increase residential buildability in formerly industrial areas like [Gowanus](https://www.brownstoner.com/development/gowanus-rezoning-impact-new-construction-affordable-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=He%20said%20while%20he%20understands%20the%20need,industrial%20space%2C%20too%2C%20and%20said%20the%20rezoning), Brooklyn, and a swath of [Jerome Avenue](https://ny.curbed.com/2018/3/29/17174676/bronx-new-york-jerome-avenue-rezoning-photo-essay?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the Bronx. This year, the City upzoned part of Brooklyn’s [Atlantic Avenue](https://council.nyc.gov/crystal-hudson/aamup/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), paving the way for 4,600 [new apartments](https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/05/12/2865/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We still live under a Euclidean system, but New York has made large strides toward developing more adaptive zoning processes. Can we push the rigid boundaries of Euclidean zoning even further and make it easier for development to follow demand? One New York urban planner said yes. Peter Marcuse (1928-2022) was a lawyer and Chair of the Division of Urban Planning at Columbia University. In 1985, he published an article in the [NYU Review of Law and Social Change](https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PETER-MARCUSE%5FRLSC%5F13.4.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) proposing that New York adopt neighborhood-wide “floating zones.” Floating zones are predrafted sections of zoning code that describe regulations like size or use requirements, but are not placed in a specific location on the map. They only come into play when the planning department decides they should be used in a certain area and then applies them there (which is called “drawing down” the zone to that area, as though pulling down clouds from the sky and placing them on earth). Where Euclidean zones assign specific uses to neighborhoods in the zoning ordinance, floating zones leave the location of certain district types to future decisions by planning officials. > Floating zones could allow for streamlined, targeted upzonings in neighborhoods that most need additional housing, releasing the demand pressure valve where it is easiest or most essential to do so. In contrast to our current zoning amendment process, in which changes to neighborhood zoning are written on a case-by-case basis and must be approved by the City Council each time, the floating zones would be preapproved by the Council and not require legislative sign-off to apply to a given neighborhood. And floating zones can also be designed to restrict too-dramatic change, where appropriate: For example, New Rochelle’s [zoning ordinance](https://ecode360.com/6731220?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#6731285) contains a floating zone that encourages affordable housing development, but that floating zone can only be drawn down in already residential neighborhoods. Once the floating zones pass through the Council once, the City Planning Commission would be empowered to draw down the zones to neighborhoods that need them. With floating zones, theoretically, planners could move faster to accommodate market or social demand than they can under our current process. As in Japan, [which has only 12 simple zoning categories](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?params=/context/crpsp/article/1173/&path%5Finfo=2017%5FPetrillo%5F%5FAnthony%5FJapanese%5FZoning%5Fand%5FIts%5FApplicability%5Fin%5FAmerican%5FCities.pdf&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) nationwide, Marcuse suggested a limited set of floating zones to meet different types of neighborhood needs. There’s suddenly more demand for housing in a previously unpopular neighborhood? City Planning could draw down a higher-density floating zone. Need to encourage commercial activity along a subway corridor? It could draw down a mixed-use district. Neighborhood-wide floating zones were Marcuse’s idea, but traditional floating zones — which apply only to one property at a time and are drawn down based on the request of the property owner — had already been around for several decades. (New York, conveniently for the drumbeat of this article, had been at the forefront of floating zones, too: In 1951, the State was the first to [declare them legal](https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/property/property-law-keyed-to-smith/zoning-property-law-keyed-to-smith/rodgers-v-village-of-tarrytown/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).) The original idea for floating zones came about during the growing-pain years of zoning. Within a few short decades of Euclid v. Ambler, cities realized that Euclidean zoning wasn’t flexible enough. In the postwar suburban boom, planners had to rethink the division of residential and commercial. The [growing popularity](https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/6/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of residential subdivisions whetted Americans’ appetite for grocery stores and small retail in previously monolithic single-family zones. Floating zones could allow property owners to apply to use their lot in a suburban residential district for retail. During the Cold War, the federal government wanted to build defense manufacturing plants close enough to cities to be easily accessible but far enough to mitigate wartime risks to major centers of commerce. In Maryland, a light-industrial floating zone was designed. In each of these cases, Euclidean zoning would not have allowed for such an interspersion — a full rezoning of the neighborhood to allow these uses everywhere would have been too politically unpopular to pass and could have resulted in oversaturation of certain facilities needed only in moderation. Rather than make guesses about where future demand would fall, floating zones were intended to let planners wait and see — and then adjust zoning accordingly. > It’s New York’s adaptability and appetite for change, more than anything else, that has allowed it to grow from a cramped seaport 200 years ago to the five-boroughed metropolis it is today — and will let us thrive for the next two centuries. Marcuse wanted to use floating zones to mitigate the residential displacement he was witnessing. The 1980s were a period of growing economic divides in New York City. Coming off a decade of urban crisis — in the 1970s, the lights went out (1977), the Bronx burned (1977), and the city was told to drop dead (1975) — New Yorkers’ incomes diverged dramatically. The top fifth of earners brought home [32 times as much income](https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/25/nyregion/gap-between-rich-and-poor-in-new-york-city-grows-wider.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=By%20the%20end%20of%20the,it%20was%20$94%2C264%20versus%20$6%2C810) as did the bottom. Estimates clocked that New York was [losing 140,000 households a year](https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PETER-MARCUSE%5FRLSC%5F13.4.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Following the crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic, [we see these trends accelerated](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/28/nyregion/nyc-income-gap-wages.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Traditional, one-parcel-at-a-time floating zones worked well for a landowner who wanted to apply for a commercial zone to build a shopping plaza, or for a defense contractor to apply for an industrial zone to build a factory. But to adjust zoning to meet residential demand, Marcuse looked to the neighborhood level. While his plan was, by his own admission, only a first sketch, it offers a model for neighborhood groups (such as nonprofits, community boards or local legislators) to raise their hand and ask for more buildable area for housing in their communities. And it offers a regulatory strategy for city planning to provide that area efficiently, meet market demand quickly and stave off the risk of cost-induced displacement. New York’s recent rezonings have brought great wins to increase buildability, but citywide upzonings likely won’t get us there alone. City of Yes, the lauded 2024 zoning initiative to expand housing stock, is estimated to enable the construction of an incredible [80,000 additional units](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/882-24/mayor-adams-governor-hochul-speaker-adams-celebrates-passage-most-pro-housing-proposal-in?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Yet still, estimates of demand are [closer to 500,000](https://www.centernyc.org/urban-matters-2/a-big-deal-thats-not-nearly-big-enough-what-the-city-of-yes-will-and-wont-do?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Richard%20McGahey:%20With%20its%20sights,similarly%20bite%2Dsized%20reforms%20available?.). Floating zones could allow for streamlined, targeted upzonings in neighborhoods that most need additional housing or in neighborhoods where building more is [politically salient](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/about-us/newsroom/pr-20240425?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — releasing the demand pressure valve where it is easiest or most essential to do so. Marcuse’s idea isn’t the only supra-Euclidean one floating around. In his 2025 mayoral campaign, Zellnor Myrie proposed [“sandwich rezonings,”](https://thenyhc.org/mayoral-candidates/zellnor-myrie/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) under which new housing could be built in industrial zones squeezed between residential areas. Legal academics [Roderick Hills](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/roderick-hills) and [David Schleicher](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/david-schleicher) (both Vital City contributors) [have proposed](https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/77-1-NoncumulativeZoning-Hills%20-%20Schleicher.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) allowing housing development along Brooklyn’s in-demand industrial waterfront, providing flexibility more akin to the very early cumulative Euclidean zones. Since the publication of their article, New York City’s Economic Development Corporation has started making [strides in that direction](https://edc.nyc/project/brooklyn-marine-terminal?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Fast changes don’t always move in the right direction. Some New York [zoning overlays](https://zola.planninglabs.nyc/about?layer-groups=%5B%22building-footprints%22%2C%22street-centerlines%22%2C%22subway%22%2C%22zoning-districts%22%5D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which are a schema to allow planners to design bespoke edits to certain zones without displacing the underlying requirements, actually reduce the amount that can be built — so an ideal floating zone system may be designed to allow only zone drawdowns that *increase* buildability. Other built-in safeguards may protect Marcusian zones from abuse: By streamlining legislative review, a Marcusian system would organically shift power from individual council members to the mayor — an approach that has gained momentum with this year’s [Charter Revision Commission report](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in response to a system that overaccords power to the politically cautious and sometimes development-phobic local council member for a given rezoning. (Disclosure: I served as a policy advisor to the Commission.) It’s New York’s adaptability and appetite for change, more than anything else, that has allowed it to grow from a cramped seaport 200 years ago, where [pigs roamed](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674979758?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) downtown’s streets, to the five-boroughed metropolis it is today — and will let us thrive for the next two centuries. As [Jerry Seinfeld argued](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/opinion/jerry-seinfeld-new-york-coronavirus.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the beginning of COVID, New York isn’t and will never be dead, because all good cities facing a crisis change. “They mutate. They re-form.” New York moves fast. As we move toward more flexible land-use regulation, our zoning should be able to keep up. ### Building Better, Piece by Piece URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/building-better-piece-by-piece/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:48.000Z Over the last 50 years, the United States has[ experienced a steep decline](https://www.nber.org/digest/202502/stagnation-us-construction-productivity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in construction productivity. While manufacturing has seen productivity growth aided by new technology, amazingly, we are somehow *worse* at building homes today than we were during the post-World War II era, when developers like Levitt & Sons adopted assembly-line techniques to mass produce affordable communities. In the last decade, software-trained investors in Silicon Valley — the country's most expensive housing market — have poured millions into startups aiming to fix how the U.S. builds, by upgrading Levitt's approach for the digital age. Insiders now prefer the term ["off-site"](https://offsiteconstructionnetwork.com/what-is-offsite/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or ["industrialized"](https://www.autodesk.com/design-make/emerging-tech/industrialized-construction?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) construction to describe the brimming field, to dodge the stigma of "modular," a word that, for many Americans, conjures images ranging from Soviet-era housing blocks to the flimsy trailer homes of the 1970s. (I will continue to use the term "modular" here for simplicity.) Whatever the label, the sector now encompasses a[ wide range of building types and techniques](https://www.karmod.com/en/blog/volumetric-vs-panelized-modular-construction/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), spanning skilled tradesmen assembling a building from Ikea-like 2D panels, to the delivery of full 3D rooms, which are then "stacked" like Lego bricks. The common thread that unites and defines modular development approaches is that most of their construction work is done in a factory. Yet for all the buzz about modular's potential, few startups in the U.S. have[ made it past their first building](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/18/modular-housing-a-century-old-sustainable-housing-idea-is-struggling.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Infamously, Softbank-backed Katerra[ went bankrupt](https://www.constructiondive.com/news/what-does-katerras-demise-mean-for-the-contech-and-modular-industries/608037/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=In%20March%202021%2C%20Greensill%20Capital,of%20the%20COVID%2D19%20pandemic.) shortly after achieving a $4 billion valuation, leaving projects abandoned across the country. The companies that survived the latest hype cycle have been sold for pennies or [shifted to the Middle East](https://www.archdaily.com/1016213/building-the-future-the-rise-of-modular-construction-in-the-middle-east?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), chasing demand from new-city projects like [NEOM](https://www.neom.com/en-us/our-business/sectors/design-and-construction?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as a temporary reprieve. I lived this hype cycle as an employee at several U.S.-based modular companies. I also began my career in Scandinavia, where a more mature, economically rational modular sector is thriving. In the United States, approximately [4% of new construction is manufactured ](https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/making-modular-construction-fit?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)off-site — mostly single-story buildings. In Scandinavia, by contrast, that number sits at 45% and includes mid- and high-rise apartments, of the type the U.S. desperately needs to confront its worst housing crisis in a century. There is a range of theories about why the U.S. has failed to keep pace with other developed countries. Economists have posited that increasingly[ restrictive land-use regulations](https://www.nber.org/papers/w33188?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) fragmented the construction market into small companies, which underspend on R & D. In my experience, the United States' decision to[ federate the development of building code](https://www.construction-physics.com/p/how-building-codes-work-in-the-us?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to 20,000+ local jurisdictions, each with its own byzantine requirements, made it impossible to develop a standard product that can be sold at scale across state lines. (The exception is single-family homes delivered on a steel chassis, for which the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development does [have a national building code](https://www.construction-physics.com/p/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-mobile-home?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); in this piece, I am focused on mid- and high-rise buildings.) Add NIMBY-coded land-use policies and antiquated permitting regimes, and the government can look like a head-banging obstacle to growth rather than an ally. An obvious solution is [to relax land-use regulations](https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/zoning-reforms-to-support-factory-built-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But I also think that — perhaps counterintuitively — the government should get a lot *more* involved in the modular industry. Specifically, it should follow the lead of countries with robust public housing programs, where the government has played a catalytic role for the sector by placing up-front bulk orders — the type of[ advanced market commitment](https://worksinprogress.co/issue/how-to-start-an-advance-market-commitment/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that provides builders with the scale and predictability they need to invest in their factories. The stabilizing presence of a big and patient buyer, like the government, helps overcome the[ "valley of death"](https://www.owensdesign.com/custom-automation-design-engineering-manufacturing-blog/how-to-get-your-technology-manufacturing-startup-across-the-valley-of-death/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that tends to afflict early-stage manufacturers. Ford didn't get his car right on the first try, and the same is true for most modular builders. In fact, first projects often go quite wrong. That was the story with [461 Dean Street](https://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2018/03/forest-city-sells-461-dean-troubled.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City's first off-site high-rise development. A closely watched part of Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn, it ended up taking twice as long as initially projected. Even under the best circumstances, first modular builds are rarely cheaper than traditional construction, given the extra up-front costs of design and engineering. Economies of scale and associated cost savings typically emerge only after the third or fourth building. To make modular economics work, you need a buyer willing to order multiple, similar-enough buildings. Those buyers do exist in the private sector, but they are rare: For example, Marriott, which has a[ 263,000-room pipeline](https://marriott.gcs-web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/marriott-international-celebrates-outstanding-development-year?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=United%20States%20and%20Canada,the%20Luxury%20Collection%20Midtown%20Manhattan.) in North America, has invested in modularizing some of its hotel brands. Greystar, the largest U.S. apartment owner,[ purchased a modular factory in Pennsylvania](https://www.greystar.com/business/about-greystar/newsroom/greystar-nears-debut-of-its-first-modular-us-apartment-project?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to act as a supplier for its development pipeline. But some of the strongest examples come from national governments in other countries. A program run by Sveriges Allmännytta — which roughly translates to Public Housing Sweden (PHS) — offers a clear road map for the United States. PHS represents 310 municipally owned housing companies managing over one million rentals. In 2011, Sweden saw an acute need for more affordable rental housing — in part a reflection of its relatively friendly immigration policies — but most of PHS' members had limited experience constructing new buildings. PHS, which had historically played a role more akin to advisor and auditor of its subsidiaries, jumped into development. PHS launched an open call, asking regional builders to put forth a Kombohus — or "concept" housing design — that they would be willing to deliver at a fixed price per unit. It selected three vendors, each with distinct designs and with factories that provided coverage across the length of the country. (While Sweden's population is only slightly larger than New York City's, its land mass spans the distance from New York City to Jacksonville.) Member housing companies were given the opportunity to purchase a "Kombohus" off PHS' master agreement at the prenegotiated price. The response was immediate, and PHS quickly expanded into a full catalog of options: a basic mid-rise apartment building ("bas"), an urban tower ("plus"), a small-unit model for students and seniors ("mini") and row houses for peri-urban areas ("småhus"). Every six years, PHS runs a new public procurement to add developers to its master contract. During its first six-year term, PHS delivered over 10,000 units. Houses ordered on contract were delivered five months faster and 18% cheaper than houses off contract. A similar, cross-jurisdiction procurement strategy is possible in the U.S. — and it could simultaneously lower costs and bolster domestic industry. The most obvious place to start is the military, which has a nearly $20 billion annual construction budget and a robust housing pipeline. Hundreds of thousands of people live in barracks or other military housing, [much of which has fallen into disrepair](https://www.thecentersquare.com/national/article%5Fd383f16c-2114-47f2-887a-2d5ffb0f6ef5.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At a congressional hearing earlier this year, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle pressed leadership to [incorporate industrialized construction techniques](https://appropriations.house.gov/schedule/hearings/innovative-techniques-military-construction?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as it creates its next capital plan. Perhaps unsurprisingly, people across the spectrum can all get behind the goal of better, cheaper housing for the enlisted and their families. (Disclosure: I have advised the Department of Defense on its modular efforts.) The next step, though more contentious, is for HUD to lead its own initiative. Like Public Housing Sweden, HUD could establish master contracts that local housing authorities tap through cooperative purchasing. The U.S. tried a watered-down version of this approach before: In the late 1960s, HUD ran a national modular program known[ ](https://www.construction-physics.com/p/operation-breakthrough-americas-failed?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)as [Operation Breakthrough](https://www.construction-physics.com/p/operation-breakthrough-americas-failed?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which lost momentum in the 1970s as private market housing starts shot up. In 2023, HUD commissioned research [on a possible Operation Breakthrough revamp](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/08/headway/how-an-american-dream-of-housing-became-a-reality-in-sweden.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Seemingly not much has happened since the administration changed in January. But a Breakthrough-esque program could be a way for the Trump administration to give new direction to the beleaguered agency while providing a much-needed lift to a struggling domestic industry. Call it the Made in America Homes program or the National Industrialized Construction Strategy. Other countries are already moving. In June, Canada's new prime minister, Mark Carney, launched [Build Canada Homes](https://www.mpamag.com/ca/mortgage-industry/industry-trends/can-carneys-26bn-prefab-housing-solution-solve-canadas-housing-crisis/535123?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a government agency with $25 billion in debt financing and $1 billion in equity dedicated to modular-home builders. Crucially, the agency has authority to place bulk orders. It plans to encourage the use of Canadian materials like timber, a [staple](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2352710222014917?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=modular%20CLT%20construction.-,Abstract,emergency%20and%20rapidly%20constructable%20housing.) of the modular industry. Rather than wait for federal action, some state and local agencies in high-cost areas of the U.S. are taking matters into their own hands. Cal Poly, for example — part of the California State University system, the largest public university system in the country — has set up[ a factory to deliver 4,200 units of off-site student housing](https://www.fullstackmodular.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Fast-Company-FullStack-Modular-2.24.25.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) over the next decade. Sitting in San Luis Obispo, a small town located in the middle of California, its factory will be positioned to provide dorms across the state. Meanwhile, in New York, the governor's 2025 budget includes[ $50 million for a modular "starter home" initiative](https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default%5Ffld=&leg%5Fvideo=&bn=A03004&term=2025&Summary=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), though few details have been released. And one could imagine the New York City Housing Authority's [surprisingly sophisticated procurement department](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/opinion/elon-musk-government-spending-reform.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) playing a similar role to Public Housing Sweden, using its market power to set a modular room rate scheme accessible to housing authorities across the state. The key is to structure procurement around a comprehensive program and pipeline — not just one building — using the State's market power to get better pricing. Venture capital won't inaugurate the next great era of modular building. But government demand might. If Washington is serious about solving the housing crisis, it should stop passively waiting for the next Katerra and start acting like the customer the industry needs. ### Predictability Begets Productivity: A Conversation with Alicia Glen URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/predictability-begets-productivity/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:48.000Z ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/znmyfzbwfbowez9n_vitalcity_glen1-auto-format-compress-1776259681467.png) Credit: Arthur Mount. Portrait of Alicia Glen. *After serving as assistant commissioner for housing finance at the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) — and building a successful career in municipal finance on Wall Street — Alicia Glen served from 2014 to 2019 as deputy mayor for housing and economic development under Mayor Bill de Blasio. She is now the founder and managing principal of MSquared, an affordable housing development firm she launched in 2020.* *As deputy mayor, Glen oversaw a housing plan that by the end of her tenure had built or preserved more than 135,000 affordable units across New York City. She also led the creation of the Permanent Affordability Commitment Together (PACT) initiative, which brings private ownership and management into partnership with the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) to rehabilitate deteriorating buildings. The agencies under her leadership were responsible for a series of neighborhood upzonings, including the administration's two signature zoning reforms: Mandatory Inclusionary Housing and Zoning for Quality and Affordability.* *At MSquared, Glen and her team focus on mixed-income, mixed-use development projects in urban areas. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.* **Vital City**: You've had a remarkable career in both the private and public sectors. What did your time in New York City government teach you about how to get housing produced? **Alicia Glen**: The most important thing I learned is that you need to know what the rules of the road are. There needs to be certainty in the system. For investors, construction companies, developers and nonprofits, and all the players in housing, it's not helpful when people are trying to put together a deal to have too many pieces of the puzzle that are uncertain. City government can't control global interest rates or federal policy, but the things they can control need to be as knowable, with as little discretion, as possible. This is why what's going on now is very worrisome. Some people say each deal should be underwritten separately, and to make sure we don't oversubsidize this one or that one. All of which sounds like great policy, but if you really want to build housing, you need clear rules. In 2017, we changed the rules pretty dramatically from the old 421-a to the new 421-a, rebalancing the program more in the public's interest. Then the market responded. They react, they adjust. But everybody knew what the rules were. Same with zoning — if you want to rezone your site, this is how much affordable housing you have to do. It's not bespoke, not subject to political whim. It is what it is. Advocating and fighting for more units is where legitimate dealmaking comes in. Administrations can and should have discretion over how they use their discretionary resources. But at the end of the day, jurisdictions that don't take seriously their obligation to establish clear rules of the road cannot produce housing at scale. **VC**: Do you think New York City is one of those jurisdictions now? **AG**: New York has historically been the poster child for having very clear rules about how you get it done. It's had very little corruption in the housing space and has been a very knowable system for capital markets and developers. Every five years or so, the game is up for grabs, and it's chaos, but then at least you know what's going on. There are two things that worry me. First, there are people who argue that every deal should be individually underwritten and then the City should figure out what it can get from the developer. That's completely unscalable and impractical — you'll never get a deal done that way. It sets you up for corruption, because it becomes all transactional. Second, the City has increasingly stopped obeying its own program rules. I think only one deal this year is being done at "term sheet." That's outrageous. What's the point of having term sheets if you're not following them? > Jurisdictions that don't take seriously their obligation to establish clear rules of the road cannot produce housing at scale. **VC**: Walk me through how a project goes from concept to reality. **AG**: There's a great [kids' book about this](https://akidsco.com/products/a-kids-book-about-real-estate-development?srsltid=AfmBOorgnSp3s9EPfaJdZUuAnfWKsPx9jXJoWRHxroAYGd3vKsNAMACb&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Let me break it down simply. For as-of-right market-rate housing: You see a piece of land and buy it for $1 million. In New York, each piece of land is zoned; let's say this land permits a 10-story building with 100 units. You hire an architect to design the building and get a contractor to say they can build it for $10 million. You go to a bank and get a $5 million loan, then find an equity investor for the remaining $4 million. The architect files plans with the Department of Buildings, they self-certify compliance with all codes, and boom — they get a building permit. No review, nothing. Your contractor builds the building. No fuss, no muss. Virtually unheard of anywhere else in the country. When you need or want a rezoning: You want to build 200 units instead of 100, or your site is in a mixed-use neighborhood, and you can't do that as-of-right. Now you spend two years convincing everyone you should be able to double the size and allow residential. Under New York law, you now need affordable housing in it. It's harder to get financing, and you have to talk to the council member and deal with people who don't want a 20-story building. Two years of politics and predevelopment financing costs. When you want to build affordable housing: You call the City, and they say, "Fantastic, we'll give you $200,000 per apartment." You fill out forms, take it to the bank, then sit in line for five years while the property costs you money. Every time you call your contractor, costs have gone up. You go back to the City asking for $250,000 per unit, then $500,000\. Seven-and-a-half years later, you have 200 units of housing. **VC**: How much of the high cost of affordable housing is due to the wait versus other requirements? **AG**: The biggest driver is the wait. The actual requirements aren't that complicated — New York's Housing Department has pretty much standard plans and specs. They've been doing this since the Koch Housing Plan, which was the first comprehensive plan laying out how the City would finance, fund and regulate construction and preservation of housing through a series of programs. These all-affordable building requirements are generally straightforward. Yes, the City sometimes requires passive house standards or other expensive features on public sites, but that's a political choice. New York City's code is already very progressive on environmental issues. **VC**: What about labor costs and prevailing wage requirements? **AG**: Historically, we had a bifurcated labor market with detente. The affordable housing pipeline was left alone, and labor wasn't much of an issue. Very large rental or condo projects have almost always been built with all-union labor. More recent tax policy has caught affordable housing in union politics, which is challenging. The wage premium is real — I just got bids both ways, and it was about 26% to 27% more for union labor. That's enormous, especially in this environment with tariff uncertainty driving up raw materials costs. The way they've implemented it is also dumb — if the wage premium triggers at 100 units, people just build 98 units. > The wait is the biggest driver of cost in affordable housing — not the requirements, not the standards. It's the years lost to bureaucracy. **VC**: If you were queen for a day, how would you attack the wait problem? **AG**: The wait is a function of decisions about which projects to do. If you do projects that are very expensive and you have the same number of dollars, there's a longer wait for other projects. You need to think about bang for your buck. Take Site 5 at the World Trade Center. We decided bids should comply with Mandatory Inclusionary Housing — 25% affordable housing in this luxury high-rise that costs at least a million dollars per unit. Then politicians and advocates screamed that we needed more affordable housing. Everyone caved and magically came up with another $65 million to go from 25% to 31% affordable. That $65 million could have funded three deals in the pipeline that had been waiting for years. The debate is: What's more important — building more units or having equitable distribution of affordable housing throughout the city? We've increasingly leaned toward using scarce public resources to build housing in expensive neighborhoods or expensive building typologies. I find the building typologies particularly upsetting. Why use City dollars for people in an elevator going to the 80th floor when you could fund good mixed-income projects in great lower-density neighborhoods where most families want to live? **VC**: Is there a policy fix? **AG**: The fix is having more money, or doing what we did in the de Blasio administration — using Mandatory Inclusionary Housing and tax policy to get affordable housing in neighborhoods without costing the City anything. We attacked the economic segregation problem through Mandatory Inclusionary Housing and by requiring that rental buildings in New York built with a tax exemption require affordable housing. And almost every single rental building has a tax exemption. If 30% affordable isn't good enough for the Upper West Side, people are living in la-la land. Not everybody can live in every neighborhood. Land costs more. Period. I'd rather have a moderate-income family live in Queens or Brooklyn and have a place to live than have no place to live. The answer isn't to put everybody in expensive neighborhoods — it's to make investments in physical and social infrastructure in other neighborhoods and make them better. **VC**: What about City of Yes and other zoning reforms? **AG**: City of Yes is great — it's an extension of Zoning for Quality and Affordability, which we did in the de Blasio administration. It fixes stupid stuff in the zoning resolution. Its projected impact is maybe 80,000 units over 12 years, which is part of the solution. By comparison, the first de Blasio housing plan was 400,000 to 500,000 units of market and affordable housing over 10 years. The bigger win was lifting the floor-area ratio cap on residential. That's potentially enormous. There used to be a State law limiting how much of a building could be residential — even if you could build a 100-story building, you couldn't make it all residential. Removing that cap means that where I could build 700 units before and use the rest of the site for office or retail, I can now build 1,000 units. We also need to keep doing larger-scale neighborhood-wide rezonings like the Atlantic Avenue one that was recently certified, as opposed to one-offs. Once you're done with a neighborhood rezoning, that property is as-of-right, and you just go. No discretionary review needed. **VC**: What about downzoned neighborhoods and historic districts? **AG**: Pitting landmarks people against housing advocates is a fake narrative. There are buildings and neighborhoods that should be landmarked and respected — we're not Phoenix. We have bones, terroir, neighborhoods. But the Bloomberg downzonings did result in significant loss of potential production in neighborhoods that weren't really about preservation. With good leadership, you could reopen some of those conversations. Life is different now from 20 years ago. But I think we should finish the more obvious ones first — neighborhoods that historically had more density or have existing infrastructure for more density. **VC**: How do you get developers to build more family-size housing instead of just studios and one-bedrooms? **AG**: The market won't do it on its own, because it's all driven by per-square-foot economics. Developers only build family housing if it's either required or lucrative, and in New York's rental market, it's generally not lucrative except for very high-end condos. You'd have to force it through regulation — then the market would react by adjusting land prices and financing. And there are some fixes that don't need legislation — the City currently provides the same amount of subsidy for a studio or a three-bedroom, which is insane. But that means announcing 7,000 units instead of 10,000 units. So it's a political choice. In the next round in Albany, you could also require that, if you get a tax exemption, you have to provide family-size housing. Regulation is a toolbox, and you have to think about things from a variety of perspectives. **VC**: Why can't the housing market respond to demand faster, like other industries? **AG**: The residential cycle is just different from something like making jeans. There are some examples of overbuilding — for example, Austin might have zombie buildings soon because the market overresponded. New York is weird because we don't build nearly enough, and we've generally avoided boom-bust cycles — except in luxury condos. We should get better at shaving time off construction through technology, but in a dense, old city with old infrastructure, you're never going to cut off that much time. The real problem is that the time before construction — the pipeline — is getting longer, not shorter. The City officially says the average time to get an HPD-financed building in the ground is at least five years. Every year they're not moving forward, costs go up. I think there's no sense of urgency from some public-sector actors, because if they miss this cycle, they'll get the next one. But there's a real cost to waiting. ### A New Construction Lender in Town URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-new-construction-lender-in-town/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:48.000Z In rental housing markets, a vacancy rate of 5% or lower is typically considered an emergency level — because it means there is so little housing available for new households. New York City's vacancy rates are now 1.4%, according to the [housing census conducted in 2023](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/007-24/new-york-city-s-vacancy-rate-reaches-historic-low-1-4-percent-demanding-urgent-action-new?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/0). Unsurprisingly, [market rents here have risen](https://streeteasy.com/blog/data-dashboard/?agg=Median&metric=Asking%20Rent&type=Rentals&bedrooms=Any%20Bedrooms&property=Any%20Property%20Type&minDate=2010-01-01&maxDate=2025-08-01&area=Flatiron,Brooklyn%20Heights&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) sharply over the last five years, from $3,400 to $4,400 for a Manhattan one-bedroom and from $4,400 to $5,400 for a Manhattan two-bedroom. Those rents are the main thing that makes the city increasingly unaffordable for many individuals and families, and the only sustainable way to drive them down is to produce more supply so that the city's vacancy rate is in a reasonable range. Think of this like musical chairs (a [common](https://archive.strongtowns.org/journal/2024/1/3/the-best-evidence-yet-for-the-housing-musical-chairs-theory?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) analogy to help explain the importance of housing supply): Say you have 100 homes; when people or families are looking for a new apartment, like when their lease ends or when they move out from an apartment with roommates, there is only one empty chair. It's no wonder our housing market has such fierce competition and sky-high prices. Producing more units requires a clear-eyed look at the current development process in New York City to determine which pieces of that process are creating barriers. So let's do that. What does a developer need? Three things: land, permission to build and capital. Land is limited and therefore expensive in New York, and that's unlikely to change anytime soon. But the other two ingredients are within our collective control. We can do something about them, and we should. The barrier that is permission to build is having a moment these days: Pro-housing groups like Open New York have been advocating for changes to the permitting and zoning processes in the city and successfully advocated for a major reform last year, the [City of Yes](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/citywide/city-of-yes-housing-opportunity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Nationally, the pro-housing agenda, driven to prominence by the bestselling book ["Abundance,"](https://www.amazon.com/Abundance-Progress-Takes-Ezra-Klein/dp/1668023482?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has taken corners of the Democratic Party by storm. And New York City voters have the chance this November to make significant further progress on this issue with four important [ballot measures](https://www.yesonaffordablehousing.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that would make affordable housing development much easier and faster. But this piece will discuss a less talked-about ingredient: investment, or how people who want to build housing go about getting the money to build. Let's start with the basics of understanding how a multifamily construction development is financed. On the face of it, it seems like the economic math should be simple: There's a lot of demand for housing. People will pay for it. So there ought to be market forces for people to build it, knowing that they'll get paid handsomely once it's built. That's the way it works with most products. But housing is different for a few reasons. First, housing is simply capital-intensive to build, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars per home. Second, housing takes a long time to build, even with permissive zoning and building codes: It takes months, and often years, to turn a piece of land into even a small apartment building. These two things combined make investing in building housing more risky than, say, buying stocks and bonds, and as such, investors want to be compensated handsomely, too. ## Let's build an apartment Say we are a developer who wants to build a 200-unit apartment building in Long Island City that is going to cost $100 million. We've got our land, but before we go get our permits and start building, we need to go out and get that $100 million to cover our costs. There are essentially two ways to go about this: We can get that money from government affordable housing programs, or we can get that money from private investors. First, let's explore the conventional, subsidized affordable channel. These subsidies take a few different shapes: "tax-credit equity," which acts kind of like a grant; low-cost debt; or ongoing operational supports like housing vouchers. When we cover a chunk of the project's cost with tax-credit equity, the loan covering the rest of the costs can be smaller. Think of the tax-credit equity like a large down payment: With a big down payment, you get a smaller loan, which means smaller monthly mortgage payments, which means the rents needed can be lower — i.e., "affordable." This sounds great — and *is* great — but there's one challenge: Cities and states only have so many housing tax credits (and tax-exempt bonds, and additional city and state subsidies) to go around each year — and every year, New York spends every last dollar. In fact, New York's housing subsidies are heavily oversubscribed: At any given point, there are five to 10 projects waiting for each slot in the subsidized pipeline. That means that at any given time, there are scores of projects waiting in the wings, often otherwise "shovel-ready." But for our project, we don't want to wait years in line to get started, so let's see what our other options are. The second channel is private investment. We'll try for market-rate apartments instead, because private capital is more expensive and we need higher income potential to make that project work. The first stop is the bank to get a construction mortgage. Just as with affordable projects, banks want to ensure that there's a "down payment," and won't give a loan to cover the entire cost. Depending on interest rates, where we are in the business cycle and our project's modeling, we could get anywhere from 50% to 65% loan-to-cost. Optimistically, in today's market, let's say we get 60%, or $60 million, from the bank as a construction loan. Finding the other $40 million, the "down payment," is harder — we have to find investors willing to take a risk. We send out a pitch email to a bunch of limited-partner equity investors explaining to them why our "beautiful project" is projected to generate "20% returns." They won't believe us, so we'll send them our financial models. They'll say our rent growth model is overly optimistic, and the project will actually only generate 13% returns — so they're not interested. We'll do this about 14 or 15 times and often still not get an investment. Sometimes, neither our affordable nor our market-rate channels for multifamily investment pan out. One might say that if the projects aren't generating high enough returns, then they aren't economically efficient and shouldn't be built. But that's hard to square with New York City's 1.4% vacancy rate. With housing in such short supply, shouldn't more projects be viable? Why wouldn't they be built? The U.S. Census Bureau, which, among many other statistics, measures construction activity, keeps track of when buildings get permitted, when they start construction and when they finish. As such, one of their measures looks at the number of units that have received permits but have not yet started construction — often because the project is facing a financial constraint. In recent years, [that number has skyrocketed](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AUTHNOT5MUSA?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) nationwide, more than doubling, up to 140,000 units per year, above the average last decade of around 60,000\. And despite their preeminence, even superstar cities like New York, Boston, San Francisco and Los Angeles are not immune to these challenges. ## A third channel Several states and some cities have put in place solutions to these financial barriers, and New York City could learn from these ideas to boost our own housing production. The gist is simple. If we've spent all of our housing tax credits for the year, and sufficient investor equity isn't forthcoming, New York can offer a third approach to investment: Make revolving construction loans to cover costs during construction, and, when construction is over, use the repaid debt to fund another set of projects. This type of funding is called a "revolving loan fund," because, like a person walking through a revolving door, the capital cycles into a project, back out to the fund and so on. Without typical subsidies, buildings financed this way won't be 100% affordable, because the rents would not cover the costs. But if cities or states offer revolving capital at a cheaper rate than the private markets, the resulting buildings can support a mix of incomes. In many states, projects with publicly supported construction loans like this can support rents for people across the income spectrum. Several states have recently set up programs to do this, including [Massachusetts](https://www.masshousing.com/en/developers/bild?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Michigan](https://www.michigan.gov/mshda/about/press-releases/2025/08/22/mshda-to-launch-michigan-housing-accelerator-fund?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and even New York at the state level, with our new [Housing Acceleration Fund](https://hcr.ny.gov/new-york-state-housing-acceleration-fund?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But how do these programs scale up, and how can we really make the most of them here in New York City? As noted above, on the affordable side, New York City has far more project proposals than projects that actually get built. A revolving credit fund could help push almost-there projects — those that just need a little more funding to fill the gap — into reality. In Michigan, for example, the state has started with providing revolving fund money to projects that applied for federal or state subsidies but were not selected. The state program targets projects that can generate the revenue to pay back the revolving loan, allowing the funds to be redeployed elsewhere after construction is completed. For an enterprising housing agency with a backlog of applications, a revolving construction fund that can process stalled projects as mixed-income can be a monster tool, churning out units even when interest rates make it challenging. Here in New York, one could imagine this type of tool being used to finance New York City Housing Authority redevelopment projects, both for its [Housing Preservation Trust](https://www.preservationtrust.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and its [Preserving Affordable Communities Together](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nycha/about/pact.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program. One could also imagine revolving credit that prioritizes Mandatory Inclusionary Housing projects using the State's property-tax incentive programs that, by virtue of having a municipal construction fund as a coinvestor, could provide additional affordability above and beyond what is required to qualify for the incentive programs. The opportunities for the City to support housing abundance through public construction investment are plentiful, and the need for [hundreds of thousands](https://edc.nyc/housing-crisis-and-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=While%20calculating%20just%20how%20much,and%20its%20economy%20have%20room) — maybe millions — of new units is getting deeper every day. We can implement a uniquely New York City structure for supercharging multifamily investment if we put our minds to it. ### The Quality of Quantity URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-quality-of-quantity/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:48.000Z A welcome consensus is starting to emerge in New York City: If we are ever to make our city more affordable, we have to build more apartments to address our severe housing shortage. In a win for housers, virtually every mayoral candidate has proposed to increase housing production, but the devil will be in the details — what kind of housing, where, built by whom and for whom? Reasonable minds agree that we need to ramp up housing supply to address the city's success of increased demand, but what will we demand of this supply? With all this talk of quantity, shouldn't we, in this, the greatest city on earth, equally insist upon quality? Fran Lebowitz, Gotham's famed raconteur, once observed that "No one can afford to live in New York. Yet, eight million people do. How do we do this? We don't know!"I often wonder when it was that people considered New York affordable: during the time of our Indigenous predecessors, the Lenape? There was of course the 1970s, when the city lost hundreds of thousands of jobs and communities of color were ravaged by crime — is that the era for which people pine? Put differently, our current struggles with affordability are due to decades of magnetic success most places would envy: Millions of residents want to stay, while newcomers of all stripes and means want in. The statue in the harbor is doing her thing. Our Democratic nominee for mayor, Zohran Mamdani, has understandably focused on the struggles of everyday New Yorkers to make ends meet with his populist oratory, a luminous smile, impactful social media and head-scratching policy prescriptions. (I visited the Soviet Union before its collapse. Government-run grocery stores? No, thank you.) One of Mamdani's central campaign promises — freezing the rent in rent-stabilized housing — was [enacted](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/09/02/rent-freeze-mamdani-affordable-housing-stabilized-apartments/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) before by Mayor Bill de Blasio. Yet little evidence points to increased affordability during de Blasio's eight years as mayor, particularly for low-income New Yorkers, despite that administration's laudable achievements in other key policy arenas such as building working-class housing and establishing universal pre-K. As[ ](https://cssny.org/news/entry/de-blasio-housing-legacy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20American%20Community%20Survey%20suggests,than%20those%20of%20previous%20administrations.)cited by the Community Service Society, the [2017 Housing and Vacancy Survey](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2017-hvs-initial-findings.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that the city's affordability crisis did not subside under Mr. De Blasio, but to be fair, the City has been in an official state of "housing emergency" [since the 1960s](https://edc.nyc/housing-crisis-and-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): There are no quick fixes here. With over 100,000 homeless people [in our shelters tonight](https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/basic-facts-about-homelessness-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including countless children, it should be painstakingly clear that our entire housing system is broken in terms of both process and product. The Adams team deserves immense credit for its City of Yes zoning amendments to produce more housing; recent[ recommendations](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/7-21-2025-charter-revision-commission-adopted-final-report-digital.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the New York City Charter Revision Commission, which will be voted upon this November, bring additional hope for achievable reform. But much more must be done. > Perspiration without inspiration is just sweat, so how beyond sweating over our inability to produce sufficient housing do we inspire people to actually want more housing in their neighborhoods? No matter who wins the mayoralty this year, they must adopt an all-of-the-above approach. For [the nearly half of New York City apartments](https://www.nytimes.com/article/rent-stabilized-apartments-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that are rent-stabilized, the incoming administration should of course advocate for a fair balance between struggling renters and their landlords, who must maintain their buildings in the face of rising costs. But the new mayor must also deal with the crisis in the remaining half of our housing stock — apartments that are market rate rather than rent-stabilized — by significantly advancing housing construction for both renters and those who aspire to own. The Koch, Bloomberg, de Blasio and Adams administrations all enabled new housing, albeit in different ways for different eras, but construction takes time while we continually fall behind the curve of extraordinary ongoing demand overwhelming this limited new supply, which in turn causes ordinary people to doubt the supply-demand analysis as their rents continue to rise. But perhaps the political challenge isn't the veracity of the analysis but the appeal of its aesthetic. Technocrats speak of facts; populists — who are all the bipartisan rage today — speak of emotion. The first is a rhetoric of light, the second of heat. Perspiration without inspiration is just sweat, so how beyond sweating over our inability to produce sufficient housing do we inspire people to actually *want* more housing in their neighborhoods? It is abundantly fashionable today to blame community groups for our inability to build, but perhaps the greater fault lies with the policy wonks who must learn to not only be impatient for new housing, but to be inclusive and inspirational as well. As an architect, my first impulse is to focus on homes, not housing. Little is more intimate than the space of one's dwelling, where one makes love and dinner, where one raises children while praying for a raise. Eighteen months ago, in The New York Times, my team and I [proposed a plan](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/30/opinion/new-york-housing-solution.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for building homes for 1 million New Yorkers. In our plan, we visualized the spaces and places where people across the city can be housed near transit and out of flood zones, with images that helped readers understand new buildings in relation to the scale of their neighborhoods. Much to my pleasure, the article inspired many everyday New Yorkers, from whom I heard in droves. A number of the random emails I received spoke to the aesthetics — "if only new housing in our neighborhood could *feel* like that," people would suggest, often employing language not about how the imagined architecture looked, but what it meant for them as an experience. The green-eye-shades among us will immediately jump to the conclusion that I am advocating spending more money on design, and they would largely be right, but with fewer dollar signs than they often fear and more intelligence than they typically summon. How is this for math: If your building cost 5% more in order to be attractive, and this shaved precious time off your approvals process while helping you sleep better at night as a good citizen, isn't that worth the trade-off? > As the richest city in the richest nation on earth, these are false choices we must reject, lest we end up with nothing but rejection of all construction by a beleaguered public. Efficiency and experience don't have to be at odds. My firm has been working on a deeply affordable development in East New York called the Innovative Urban Village, and while the construction budget is tight, our aspirations are not. We are designing more than 2,200 homes, including some homeownership opportunities, in handsome brick apartment buildings for individuals and families over a range of low to middle incomes, all organized around social infrastructure, public space and a performing arts center. So far, the community acceptance level has been extraordinarily high and the dialogue respectful, with an atmosphere of mutual trust that I do attribute, in part, to their embrace of the design as their own. As the winds of change blow through our politics this autumn, I can only hope some leaves will settle on this side of beauty, which will only happen if we embrace it as egalitarian rather than elitist. Otherwise, we have descended so far down the political rabbit hole that the aspiration of high quality for the public — so commonplace from socialist Europe to capitalist Japan to our own exquisite Grand Central Station — has become elitist in the eyes of today's political elite. The quality of mercy is not strained, and neither is the quality of our lives. We no more have to choose between neighborhood character and inviting new neighbors than we do, for instance, between additional train capacity and beautiful architecture at Penn Station. Such attempts to pit need against desire, efficiency against experience, are the constant challenge my profession confronts in this still Puritanical society. As the richest city in the richest nation on earth, these are false choices we must reject, lest we end up with nothing but rejection of all construction by a beleaguered public. We do not have to tell communities that we need to churn out ugly modules of housing — a notion they will rightfully spurn — in order to achieve expeditious delivery of quality homes. As we propose much-needed new construction in people's neighborhoods, we must learn to be inclusive, impatient and inspirational, trusting that creating spaces and places of both affordability and beauty fulfills our most basic human desires. When I look out my apartment window, I not only want to see a city that current and future New Yorkers can afford, but will cherish. That isn't elitist or profligate or technocratic. It's human. ### Building Neighborhoods on Trust URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/call-it-gentlefication/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:48.000Z As a young staffer in New York City government under the de Blasio administration, my role often took me to community engagement meetings. One sticks with me. It was a Saturday morning in East New York in January 2015; the City was laying out its ideas for the "East New York Plan," an upzoning that would increase the amount developers could build in the neighborhood and, hopefully, spur neighborhood investment. A man approached the microphone with a sentence that struck me: "I am a refugee of Williamsburg." He spoke of his former neighborhood, where his kids lived down the street from their grandparents and where rising rents ultimately forced him to leave. He said he felt powerless as he "lost" his community in the wake of the Williamsburg upzoning of 2005\. City officials had celebrated the housing supply the upzoning generated and cut ribbons at new affordable housing developments, but no one he knew had gotten those celebrated units. His rent started to rise, and he ultimately moved his family to East New York, where they could live affordably. Now he was scared the same thing would happen again. That resident's story captures what I believe is a broken social contract in America: Making your community better can sometimes lead to the displacement of the very residents who made those improvements in the first place. When this happens, it is rational for local residents to become skeptical of change — including changes that could actually benefit them over the long haul, like increasing housing supply. This paradox persists because displacement — the process where residents involuntarily move away from a place due to the rising cost of living — is too often treated as an unfortunate and inevitable byproduct of housing development rather than a harm that is avoidable with careful planning and action. We need to flip this. Fixing this paradox and preventing displacement requires, in large part, more affordable housing. But alongside more construction, New York also needs targeted antidisplacement strategies. As Vicki Been, head of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development during my time there,[ wrote](https://wagner.nyu.edu/impact/research/publications/supply-skepticism-housing-supply-and-affordability-0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) along with Ingrid Gould Ellen and Katherine O'Regan, "New market-rate housing is necessary but not sufficient. Government intervention is critical to ensure that supply is added at prices affordable to a range of incomes." Neighborhoods where rapid development is taking place offer a unique window of opportunity. The political will to invest in these communities emerges precisely as market forces threaten them — opening up a narrow path where it might be possible to harness investment to build lasting community wealth and decision-making power. **The MINT model** I was part of a small team that founded [Trust Neighborhoods](https://trustneighborhoods.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a nonprofit focused on empowering neighborhood-based organizations to stem displacement by building and preserving mixed-income housing, in 2020\. The motivation behind Trust Neighborhoods was simple: In cases where residents are truly at risk of displacement, can we protect their ability to stay in their neighborhoods? How can we help original residents benefit from a greater share of economic opportunity even as their neighborhoods change? And is it possible to make neighborhood change less scary? In short, we wanted to develop a tool kit to help ensure that increasing neighborhood opportunity generates positive opportunities for all, including those at risk of displacement. The tool we developed is the [Mixed-Income Neighborhood Trust, or MINT](https://trustneighborhoods.com/whats-a-mint?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). MINTs use community-governed ownership of mixed-income real estate to help ensure that neighborhood improvements benefit existing residents rather than displacing them. Since Trust Neighborhoods' incorporation in 2020, we have created five MINTs: in Fresno, California; Denver and Aurora, Colorado; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Kansas City, Missouri; and Boston, Massachusetts. The MINT is a vehicle to buy, develop and hold property in perpetuity. Community governance of the MINT happens in several ways. For each MINT, a group of community stakeholders defines the purpose to which the organization will be held responsible. This structure exists in other industries as well and is known as a "perpetual purpose trust." (Well-known examples include [Patagonia](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/14/climate/patagonia-climate-philanthropy-chouinard.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com/news/the-long-term-benefit-trust?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).) Each MINT is overseen by a Trust Stewardship Committee — composed of a neighborhood-based organization, renting residents and other stakeholders — who are responsible for governing the trust in accordance with the Purpose Agreement. This crucially includes preserving affordability, preventing displacement and building community power alongside financial sustainability. The Stewardship Committee elects the board of the Operating Company, which, in addition to the neighborhood partner, renting residents and other stakeholders, often includes housing experts as well as a representative from Trust Neighborhoods. Finally, each MINT has a general manager, which is the neighborhood partner; for example, in East Boston, this is the [East Boston Community Development Corporation](https://www.ebcdc.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), or in Tulsa, [Growing Together](https://gttulsa.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Each MINT seeks out investors, who will receive returns from rents in the portfolio of properties owned by the MINT. For example, the MINT in East Boston raised approximately $54 million from the City of Boston, [foundation program-related investments](https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/program-related-investments?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and private investors. In short, with this structure, the MINT aligns the interests of a diverse set of capital partners (federal, state and municipal subsidies; philanthropic investments; grants) with social and economic returns for incumbent residents — who benefit when quality, community-controlled housing that preserves affordability is built in their neighborhood. **Could it work in New York?** The East Boston Neighborhood Trust provides a good case study for how New York City could implement a MINT. In 2022, Trust Neighborhoods partnered with the East Boston Community Development Corporation and City Life / Vida Urbana to acquire 114 units in East Boston. The goal was to preserve these apartments at a mix of income levels. As Andres del Castillo, an organizer with City Life / Vida Urbana, explained, "We didn't want our membership to just organize, fight for a new lease and in a year, be caught in the same situation. And that was what was actively happening to many, many, many of our members." New York City — where displacement and affordability have been reshaping[ the city's identity and politics](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/23/nyregion/nyc-mayor-black-voters.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — is a particularly meaningful place to test the MINT model. New York has the tools to do this: The Department of City Planning collects an impressive wealth of data, including the ability to proactively track building permits and certificates of occupancy, which show the path of neighborhood growth even before rent data can. This data can serve as a trigger to implement antidisplacement mechanisms like the MINT. Beyond direct renter protections, the City should also look for opportunities to shift power to residents in neighborhoods undergoing significant development. For example, the City could expand the[ Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program](https://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/neighborhood-entrepreneurs-program?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which started in 1996 and matches tax-in-rem properties with residents from underrepresented backgrounds to rehabilitate and own them. The housing challenges of gentrifying neighborhoods are complex. The MINT model, by itself, is not going to solve the problem of displacement or neighborhood disempowerment. However, the early returns from five communities suggest that MINTs can be an important piece of the puzzle. Healthy neighborhoods tend to incorporate many different forms of housing, from homeownership to cooperatives to market rentals. By helping to preserve affordability and creating a mechanism for local renters to exercise a measure of power over their neighborhoods, the MINT model has the potential to help drive a better kind of neighborhood growth in the days to come. ### The Form Density Takes URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-form-density-takes/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:48.000Z New York already knows how to build housing that works. The question is why we stopped. In the midst of a [housing crisis](https://edc.nyc/housing-crisis-and-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it's important to build more and to build better. All we need to do is look at the buildings that have been lived in for decades — even centuries — and continue to function at a high level. Why are typologies we admire from past eras or see in other countries not getting built in New York City today? The city's housing has shifted with each era, from 19th century [grid blocks](https://thegreatestgrid.mcny.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to postwar [towers in the park](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Towers%5Fin%5Fthe%5Fpark?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Housing has always followed design formulas, but the formulas keep changing with the whims of design or concrete demand changes. Density is critical. When different housing formulas can lead to the same density — whether in a tower or a mid-rise block — we must consider which designs most improve the quality of life for New Yorkers and how to ensure those designs are possible. Rules and policies have tried to fix the quality of housing or incentivize better design through guidelines. The result, historically, has often been the opposite. Rigid financing for subsidized and regulated affordable housing has led to repetitive layouts with little space for community life. Zoning adds more limits, especially in low- and mid-density districts. We are now in a moment of great housing need, but also a moment of opportunity. The [City of Yes for Housing Opportunity](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/our-work/plans/citywide/city-of-yes-housing-opportunity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) initiative, one of the most significant updates to New York's zoning code since 1961, passed last December. It aims to allow more and diverse types of housing in every neighborhood and represents a step toward new possibilities. At this critical juncture, we should look back at what has proved to work and forward to what could. To identify possibilities for the future of housing in New York City, we studied legacy buildings in New York and recent models abroad, then tested them against models that illustrate how different housing configurations can reshape the standard [city block](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City%5Fblock?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). (In our assessment of each housing model, we report the residential density — number of people per acre — exhibited by that design. For New York City examples, we leveraged census data and publicly available data from [PLUTO](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/resources/datasets/mappluto-pluto-change?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which yield a close-to-precise estimate of density. For non-New York examples, we estimate density based on the number of units, which yields a directionally correct but more approximate figure.) While the models we reviewed are each geared at increasing housing availability — desperately needed to accommodate the estimated [500,000-home shortage](https://edc.nyc/housing-crisis-and-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=While%20calculating%20just%20how%20much,and%20its%20economy%20have%20room) in the city — we also aimed to propose density increases in ways that add to the block, the street and the neighborhood. New York's policymakers, planners, designers and developers have a choice. Keep repeating the forms we already know, with double-loaded corridors (floor plans that boast apartments on two sides of a long hallway), flat facades and hotel-like boxes — or design differently. Use the full depth of lots. Bring in light and airflow, and build thresholds that invite connection. The places where people feel at home aren't at the utilitarian, uniform facades of cookie-cutter buildings; they are the stoops, courtyards, benches and edges where life spills into the street. These spaces aren't luxuries. They're what hold the city together. ### Housing models worthy of reconsideration ### **1\. Garden blocks** In 1928, [Sunnyside Gardens](https://sunnysidegardenapts.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Queens introduced one of New York's first garden-block developments. Each apartment had windows front and back, with direct access to both street-facing gardens and shared courtyards tucked inside the block. The idea was simple: Combine density with green space so daily life could seamlessly incorporate the outdoors. Variations of this model are still being built across Europe and elsewhere. Why not here? **What:** Garden Blocks frame pockets of open space that are easy to reach from the street and that connect to a shared garden at the center of the block. While some Garden Block courtyards are designed as semiprivate green spaces for residents only, others are configured to be publicly accessible, meaning the model can flex between private, shared and public uses depending on context and ownership. **Why not here:** Zoning rules make it difficult. In many [medium-density](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medium-density%5Fhousing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) districts in New York City, regulations require a continuous ["street wall"](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/street-wall?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) where buildings line the sidewalk without breaks, originally intended to create a consistent urban edge and prevent gaps that could feel underdeveloped or unsafe. On the flip side, mandated distances between distinct buildings are too large to accommodate an aesthetic entrance portal to a backyard garden. Yard minimums and other distance mandates — especially prevalent in the medium-density residential zones (known in zoning code as R5-R7) common in Queens, Brooklyn and the Bronx — can push neighboring buildings 40 feet apart or more. That spacing creates leftover gaps rather than intentional courtyards, making it much harder to design compact, efficient gardens that support shared communal space and a sense of neighborhood life. While commercial districts sometimes allow and even provide incentives for developers that create open space, residential zoning does not. In practice, the very garden space that defines this model is treated by zoning code as a "yard," which counts against what can be built, disincentivizing developers from adding green space. **How to enable:** Rethinking the incentives in New York's zoning ordinance could change the equation. A code that allows, or even encourages, greater building height for residential projects in exchange for including shared open space would incentivize developers to build them. Unlike commercial zoning, where developers sometimes gain floor area in exchange for public plazas, residential districts currently offer no comparable incentive. Counting openings such as archways and passageways as part of the public realm, instead of against what can be built, could help close that gap. Relaxing minimum yard requirements would also make these layouts feasible. Full-block sites, often assembled through City or State initiatives, could open the door for a mix of housing types alongside active ground-floor uses. **Examples to build on:** a. [Sunnyside Gardens](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunnyside%5FGardens,%5FQueens?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Queens, 1928, Clarence Stein and Henry Wright (75 people per acre): An early low-rise example that paired private front gardens with shared courtyards inside the block. Houses had through-lot access, meaning residents could pass directly from the street side of the building to the rear garden, with communal green spaces located behind the rows of homes and connected by internal walkways. b. [Möckernkiez](https://www.buildingsocialecology.org/projects/mockernkiez-berlin/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Berlin, Germany, 2018, Baumschlager Eberle (150 people per acre): Six-story cooperative housing project that frames the street with a single-loaded street wall, meaning all apartments face outward toward light and air rather than lining both sides of a hallway — a layout that improves natural ventilation, daylight and views for every unit. Behind the building perimeter, a network of courtyards, terraces and common paths creates layers of open space inside the block, away from the street edge. **Future New York Garden Block**, a test fit of a standard 200' x 800', the [common Manhattan block](https://thegreatestgrid.mcny.org/greatest-grid/making-the-plan/12?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) size (150-350 people per acre): A study of a typical full-size block using a mix of building types and open spaces. At four stories, the block can support about 150 people per acre. If some parts of the block rise to six stories and others to 10, the density can increase to around 350 people per acre. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/ammv7ggnhvftpsfx_vc1-hr-auto-format-compress-1776259683418.jpg) Credit: WXY Studio. Sunnyside Gardens' low-scale model can be amplified with additional height similar to Möckernkiez. The Future New York Garden Block can achieve a similar density or greater with mid-rise towers. ### **2\. Courtyard buildings** At the turn of the 20th century, courtyard buildings — made famous by the [Dakota](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The%5FDakota?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (1884) and the [Apthorp ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The%5FApthorp?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)(1908) on the Upper West Side and by the [Belnord](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The%5FBelnord?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (1909) on Broadway — were the standard for high-end apartment living in New York. They brought light, air and a sense of shared green space into the middle of dense blocks. By the mid-20th century, this typology was pushed aside in favor of towers in the park, which offered more height but often resulted in narrower apartments with limited natural light and undefined outdoor space. Recently, courtyard buildings have been reinvented in cities around the world. It is a design worth reexploring. **What:** A courtyard building frames a central, parklike space with housing on all sides, giving residents a quiet shared garden with direct, easy access to the street. Unlike a garden block, where buildings are typically lower in scale and the interior space may be semipublic, courtyard buildings are often taller, and their gardens are usually reserved for residents. **Why not here:** Several factors have made it hard to build new courtyard buildings in New York. Over the 20th century, zoning and market forces favored towers on larger sites, and fire codes encouraged shorter building wings to limit the number of stairs. More recently, [standard affordable housing layouts](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/hpd-design-guidelines-for-new-construction.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) set by City agencies like the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) are designed for simple, rectangular floor plates, which are difficult to adapt to courtyard buildings that require many corner units with windows facing both the street and the garden. **How to enable:** We could allow more flexibility on midsize sites by relaxing the circulation and layout requirements by HPD in New York City. With modest changes, courtyard configurations could fit different unit orientations and sizes, offering New Yorkers denser housing that also comes with real shared green space. **Examples to build on:** a. [Apthorp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The%5FApthorp?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York City, 1908, Clinton & Russell (275 people per acre; had the Apthorp been built with 1,000 square foot apartments, as is the typical size today, it would have exhibited even higher density): A 12-story courtyard apartment building on the Upper West Side. It frames a large central courtyard about 90 by 140 feet. Apartments are arranged on both sides of internal corridors, which means many units face either the street or the courtyard. Even though the building is tall, it offers ample green space, light and air to lower floors and larger unit sizes. b. [Camden Courtyards](https://www.sheppardrobson.com/projects/camden-courtyards?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), London, U.K., 2018, Sheppard Robson (350 people per acre): A seven- to eight-story mixed-income housing development with 164 units. The project uses a compact set of courtyards easily accessible from the lobby, combining high density with shared outdoor space. **Future New York Courtyard Block**, a test fit of a half-block lot at 200' x 300' lot (225-550 people per acre): A test-fit study of how much density different heights can deliver on a standard block size. At four stories, the block can reach about 225 units per acre. At up to 12 stories, the same site could support up to 550 units per acre. Varying building heights would produce densities within that range. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/ammwcmgnhvftpsga_vc2-hr-auto-format-compress-1776259683357.jpg) Credit: WXY Studio. The Apthorp is a solid courtyard block with exceptionally large units, which lowers the density per acre. In contrast, Camden Courtyards, a more contemporary model, provides higher density. A hybrid of these with varying heights is proposed in the Future New York Courtyard Block. ### **3\. Pocket courtyards and laneways** Smaller courtyards, also known as pocket courtyards, and narrow laneways — narrow, pedestrian pathways — were once a common way to bring light, air and shared space into dense housing blocks. In the early 20th century, however, new codes required much larger minimum distances between buildings, which effectively outlawed these intimate spaces in New York. The idea behind the new codes was to guarantee light and air, but they are unnecessarily rigid and reduce capacity for other environmental amenities like compact courtyards. Many cities abroad still use this model successfully. Performance-based rules, like measuring actual daylight and ventilation, instead of our current form-based rules, which set fixed minimum distances between buildings regardless of their spatial context, could reopen this possibility. **What:** Pocket courtyards and laneways allow smaller internal gardens and passages. They create a range of shared spaces that families can use without sacrificing density. **Why not here:** New York City's Zoning Resolution and New York State's Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL) both set strict minimum distances between buildings. For example, if a window faces another window, the law requires at least 40 feet of separation. These distances make small courtyard and laneway configurations difficult to build in most new housing. **How to enable:** Other cities already take a different approach. [London](https://democracy.cityoflondon.gov.uk/documents/s151823/Appendix%202%20-%20Daylight%20and%20Sunlight%20Guidance%2012%20May%202021%20-%20adopted%20Daylight%5Fand%5FSunlight%5FPolicies.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) uses performance-based daylight standards that consider whether rooms receive enough natural light rather than assessing how far apart buildings are. [Berlin and other German cities](https://bpie.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/BPIE%5F%5FIndoorAirQuality2015.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=16) rely on similar measures, requiring habitable rooms to meet daylight and ventilation targets without prescribing fixed separations. [Copenhagen](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14771535241306970?int.sj-full-text.similar-articles.6&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) also uses daylight factor standards in its building regulations. By shifting toward performance-based rules, New York could give architects more freedom to shape housing around courtyards and laneways, threading new paths through blocks while still guaranteeing healthy light and air for residents. **Examples to build on:** a. Cobble Hill Towers / Warren Place Mews, Brooklyn, 1876, Alfred Tredway White (280 people per acre): A 19th century development that combined six-story apartment blocks with narrow two-story mews houses, a term that originally referred to small dwellings converted from stables and is now used to describe compact houses lining a lane or courtyard. Tight 15-foot passages and 24-foot-wide laneways run between the buildings, creating a connected block with both density and shared outdoor space. b. Zelterstraße 5, Berlin, Germany, 2010, Zanderroth Architekten (150 people per acre): A contemporary Berlin housing project that mixes four-story town houses with five-story apartments. The buildings face each other across a 40-foot-wide courtyard that runs the length of the block, giving every unit access to shared open space. **Future New York Laneways**, test fit on 200' x 300' lot (225-325 people per acre): Our example shows how smaller distances between buildings could increase density. With four- to six-story buildings, a block this size could support 225 to 325 people per acre. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/ammwzmgnhvftpsgh_vc3-hr-auto-format-compress-1776259684396.jpg) Credit: WXY Studio. Cobble Hill Towers and Warren Mews are early examples with small courtyards and laneways, where Zelterstraße 5 in Berlin comprises a long courtyard along a series of town houses. Future New York Laneways are possible with reduced window-to-window distances. ### **4\. More buildings, fewer staircases** In much of Europe and elsewhere, small apartment buildings rely on a single stair to serve multiple units. In the United States, codes are far more restrictive, requiring two stairs even in buildings of modest height. This rule adds cost and limits the kinds of housing we can build. This was not always the case in New York. Walk-up apartments built in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries relied on a single stair. Over time, fire safety concerns led to tighter codes, making two stairs mandatory almost everywhere. Yet international examples show that well-designed ["point access"](https://www.housingaffordabilityinstitute.org/policy-center/single-stair-dwellings/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) buildings can safely support high-density housing. **What:** Point access buildings use one stair to connect several apartments, often with balconies, terraces, or open corridors providing light, air and an additional means of escape in case of emergency. Clustering apartments around a single stair enables more compact and flexible layouts because less floor area is consumed by circulation — and [does not sacrifice safety](https://www.pew.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2025/02/small-single-stairway-apartment-buildings-have-strong-safety-record?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in case of fire, because all apartments are situated near the interior egress, and, since the original instatement of single-stair requirements, building designs have added additional fire protections like sprinklers that reduce the risk of fire overall. With only one stair, apartments can be arranged more efficiently around shared open space, which makes courtyard buildings possible at scales where two full-stair towers would take up too much room. **Why not here:** [National fire codes](https://www.nfpa.org/news-blogs-and-articles/blogs/2024/12/05/single-exit-stairs-and-the-fire-and-life-safety-ecosystem?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) limit single-stair buildings to only three stories. [New York City](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCadmin/0-0-0-49628?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) allows a single stair in buildings up to six stories, but only if there are two units per floor and a maximum of 2,000 square feet per level. These restrictions make the single-stair model impractical for most new projects. **How to enable:** Updating the code to allow a modest increase in floor area and units per level could make single-stair buildings viable again. A feasible limit would be six to eight stories, which aligns with international practice and maintains safety. Pairing the stair requirement relaxation with more affordable elevator systems would ensure accessibility. At present, [codes](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCadmin/0-0-0-183610?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) often trigger oversize and costly elevator requirements once a building passes certain thresholds, adding expenses that small projects cannot absorb. Adjusting these rules could reintroduce a building type that combines density with affordability and livability. **Examples to build on:** a. Towers, Jackson Heights, 1925, Andrew Thomas (200 people per acre): A set of six-story U-shaped apartment buildings organized around a central garden that runs through the block. Each building used a single stair and elevator to reach multiple units — an early example of efficient, high-density housing with shared open space. b. 182 Rue Gallieni, Boulogne-Billancourt, France, 2023, Jean-Christophe Quinton Architecte (400 people per acre): A contemporary corner-lot project made up of two connected volumes, meaning distinct building forms that are joined together as part of a single development. Apartments are reached through open-air circulation, where corridors and walkways are outdoors rather than enclosed, and a single stair at the rear of the building provides access. This design creates an efficient plan that maximizes usable living space while reducing the need for interior common areas. **Future New York Point Access Block**, test fit on 100' x 150' lot (300-400 people per acre): A hypothetical six-story building with minimal setbacks and a single stair. This layout reduces the amount of hallway and circulation space, allowing more of the building to be used for housing while still maintaining direct access to the street. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/ammxrwgnhvftpsgq_vc4-hr-auto-format-compress-1776259683656.jpg) Credit: WXY Studio. The Towers in Jackson Heights is a common example of the time with a single stair and elevator, where 182 Rue Gallieni tucks the core and circulation between two volumes. The Future New York Point Access Block improves circulation efficiency with multiple cores and short hallways. ### **5\. Hybrid buildings** In many cities, architects are experimenting with hybrid models that combine town houses at the street with apartments stacked above. These buildings bring life to the sidewalk by giving each unit its own front door, fostering activity and opportunities for everyday interaction, while delivering the density that neighborhoods need. **What:** Hybrid buildings mix street-level town house entrances with elevator-served apartments above. At the sidewalk, they look and feel like traditional row houses, with multiple front doors that keep the street active. Above, the apartments add height and density in a way that bridges low-rise houses and larger buildings. The result is a building that aligns with neighborhood character, offers a mix of unit sizes and provides accessibility for people of all ages and abilities through the inclusion of elevators and barrier-free design. **Why not here:** It is rare to find middle-scale housing — approximately five to eight story buildings — in New York City today. Most housing is either low-rise, like a three-story walk-up, or much taller at eight to thirteen stories. The gap leaves little room for types in between. Part of the challenge is cost. Once a building passes certain height thresholds, construction materials and systems must shift to more expensive methods, which makes midscale projects less viable. Hybrid buildings offer a way forward by pairing ground-floor units offering individual entrances that can be sold as discrete homes with apartments above that provide added density. This creates a model that blends the familiarity of town houses with the efficiency of multifamily housing while opening a path to ownership. **How to enable:** Updating zoning to allow greater lot coverage on midblock sites and waiving rear-yard requirements in certain cases would make these hybrids more feasible. Currently, in many medium-density residential areas of New York City, interior and through lots are limited to about [65% to 70%](https://zr.planning.nyc.gov/article-ii/chapter-3/23-361?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) lot coverage, while corner lots may go up to [80% to 100%](https://zr.planning.nyc.gov/article-ii/chapter-3/23-361?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)**.**With those changes, developers could produce buildings that deliver density and variety while staying in tune with neighborhood character. **Examples to build on:** a. Cadman Towers, Brooklyn Heights, 1971, Glass & Glass, Whittlesey & Conklin (490 people per acre): A heavily debated transformation on the edge of Brooklyn Heights in the 1960s to 1970s, this redevelopment looked to mix townhomes and towers, but, instead of integrating both typologies on one block as more modern counterparts do, it was constructed as separate blocks. It sought to bring the two typologies together within the same neighborhood context, marking an early attempt at hybridization. b. 35 Wabash Ave, Toronto, Canada, 2018, RAW Design (200 people per acre): A four-story residential building arranged in a T shape on a deep lot. The design keeps the street frontage modest, matching the scale of nearby houses, while extending back into the lot to create additional shared yards. This layout balances density with outdoor space in a neighborhood context. **Future New York Hybrid Block**, test fit on 100' x 200' lot (200-500 people per acre): Our model version, on a similarly deep lot to the examples shown above, offers three to four stories at the base and heights in the center of the block up to eight stories, allowing it to blend into a low-rise neighborhood while achieving a comparable density and providing communal open space. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/ammxwmgnhvftpsgk_vc5-hr-auto-format-compress-1776259683866.jpg) Credit: WXY Studio. Cadman Towers uses both town houses and elevators in the same development, where 35 Wabash Avenue integrates within the same building. The Future New York Hybrid Block can work similarly at multiple densities. ### Bringing density and livability into balance The form density takes will decide how New York grows. It can follow the path of repetition, with rigid corridors and blank facades, or it can take shape in ways that open onto courtyards, gardens and shared thresholds that hold neighborhoods together. Revisiting mid-rise housing is one way to get there. It offers a scale that adds homes while keeping the city walkable, connected and livable. If policy can catch up to what design has already proved, density can be more than a number. It can be the foundation of a city where people want to live. ### The Real Story of Co-op City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-real-story-of-co-op-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z In late July, Andrew Cuomo posted a video documenting a campaign visit to Co-op City. There are several reasons why he may have taken the trip out to the far reaches of the Northeast Bronx, the most likely being that Co-op City, a working- and middle-class, majority-Black outer-borough community consisting of over 40,000 residents living in over 15,000 apartments, represents one of his strongholds during the recent Democratic primary, which he lost to Zohran Mamdani. Indeed, on their first round ballots, Co-op City residents [voted by a two-to-one margin for Cuomo](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/24/us/elections/nyc-mayor-primary-results-precinct-map.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But Cuomo's ostensible reason for visiting Co-op City was not his electoral strength in the neighborhood, but rather its place in the history of affordable housing in New York. In [a video his campaign released commemorating the visit](https://www.facebook.com/andrewcuomo/videos/great-day-in-the-bronx-talking-to-new-yorkers-about-the-housing-crisis-and-how-w/2568432606836933/), Cuomo noted incredulously that it had been built "in 1970" and "if we can do it then, we can do it now." His incredulity is warranted — since Co-op City's construction, no affordable housing project has come anywhere close to the project's size. Meanwhile, New York City remains mired in an affordable housing crisis even more severe than the one that led to Co-op City's construction over a half-century ago. The real history of Co-op City's construction is more ambiguous than Cuomo was willing to admit on this brief visit. For those who wish to construct affordable housing in the 21st century, Co-op City can serve as both a cautionary tale and the source of important lessons, revealing to government officials and voters alike the necessity of ongoing investment in order for affordable housing to flourish over the long term. Affordable housing is an important plank in both Cuomo and Mamdani's platforms. Cuomo [claims](https://www.andrewcuomo.com/issues?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that he will "build more housing across all income levels," while "leverage\[ing\] public land for housing development." After a recent flare-up over Mamdani's own rent-stabilized apartment, Cuomo has proposed [means-testing this housing for new tenants](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/08/zohrans-law-cuomos-very-political-housing-proposal-would-not-apply-zohran/407373/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). For his part, [Mamdani promises](https://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to freeze rent increases in rent-stabilized apartments and [borrow $70 billion](https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/04/business/zohran-mamdani-nyc-mayor-housing-affordability?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to directly fund affordable housing construction, with the goal of 200,000 new units over 10 years. They are not the first New York City mayoral candidates to promise to solve the affordability crisis, but the number of affordable apartments built since Co-op City's construction has clearly been insufficient. [As New York City's Charter Revision Commission states](https://edc.nyc/housing-crisis-and-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "the housing crisis shapes what kind of city New York will be. It damages the local economy. It hurts the city's standing on the national and international stage. And it undermines New York's promise as a city of strivers, creatives, and entrepreneurs. It is sapping the vitality that has made the city a world center of business, arts and culture." Since 1980, half a million apartments have been built in New York. While this number sounds high, New York's high rents and low vacancy rates show that it is clearly insufficient. Indeed, New York City constructed more housing in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s alone than in the last half-century. > Keeping housing affordable requires ongoing investment. Over 100,000 of those postwar apartments were financed by the New York State Mitchell-Lama Program, which became law in 1955\. Expanding and building upon interwar initiatives, Mitchell-Lama sought to spur the growth of affordable housing by providing subsidies to both cooperative and rental developers. Developers could take advantage of mortgages at lower rates than the open market, along with tax subsidies and a guaranteed rate of return, while in return, they would have to keep rental or cooperative prices low for qualified renters. The largest developer to take advantage of Mitchell-Lama funding was the United Housing Foundation (UHF), a cooperative housing nonprofit with deep ties to labor unions and Robert Moses alike. The UHF was responsible for such projects as Penn South in Chelsea, Rochdale Village in Jamaica and their largest and final project, Co-op City in the Bronx. Co-op City alone makes up approximately 15% of the total number of apartments constructed in New York City over Mitchell-Lama's 20-year lifespan (1955-1974). Especially compared to the snail's pace that has marked affordable housing construction since, Co-op City was built at lightning speed. The development was approved by New York City in 1965 and ground was broken later that year, starting with a massive landfill to allow housing towers to be built on Co-op City's marshy soil. By 1972, construction had concluded and the development's 15,372 apartments were fully occupied by working- and middle-class New Yorkers living in modern apartments, mostly situated in Tower, Triple-core and Chevron high-rises, featuring panoramic views, large closets and central A/C. Initial residents paid an equity deposit of $450 per room and were promised monthly carrying charges of $22/room. There were complaints about Co-op City from the very outset. Some officials complained that Co-op City's attraction of Jewish residents from the West Bronx, prompted white flight and destabilization of the neighborhoods around the Grand Concourse. Others complained that Co-op City was too boring and had poor transit connections to the rest of the city. Still others complained that the development's high-rise towers and slabs were soulless and antithetical to any sense of authentic community. But from the outset, the biggest complaints about Co-op City were financial. > Co-op City residents organized the largest rent strike in American history. And though it's sometimes celebrated today as an unalloyed success, Co-op City had massive cost overruns. Its initial $235 million mortgage had ballooned to $390 million by the time that Co-op City's construction concluded in 1972\. While corruption and a poor understanding of the engineering required to build a massive housing development on top of a landfill on top of a swamp played an important role in Co-op City's ballooning construction costs, much of the problem was due to rising interest rates and inflation during Co-op City's construction period. Co-op City was not the only Mitchell-Lama project in financial trouble in the early 1970s. In fact, Mitchell-Lama's financing woes [played a not-insignificant role in New York City's near bankruptcy in 1975](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250160072/fearcity/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To pay off Co-op City's massive debt, the state demanded a series of carrying charge increases in 1970, 1971, 1973 and 1974\. Co-op City residents had initially been promised carrying charges of $22/room. By 1975, the state was calling for yet another increase that would have resulted in carrying charges of $53.50/room, or an increase of 250% over this initial figure. Co-op City residents balked at the seemingly endless series of carrying charge increases, and organized the largest rent strike in American history. Approximately 80% of Co-op City's residents withheld their carrying charges for thirteen months, from June 1975 to July 1976\. UHF's leadership immediately resigned from the board that governed Co-op City, and management was taken over by New York State. The sheer size of Co-op City meant that the rent strike nearly bankrupted the New York State Housing Finance Agency. Ultimately, the rent strike ended with a deal that gave control of the development to its residents. The deal that ended Co-op City's rent strike prompted dire warnings about the consequences of bowing to the demands of rent strikers. One editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* warned that the deal to end the rent strike could serve as "the coup de grace to New York City's plans for recovery." Financial concerns led the Mitchell-Lama program to stop construction in 1974\. New York entered a period of financial recovery after the depths of the mid-1970s crisis, leading once again to a dearth of affordable apartments. The austerity that followed from New York City's near bankruptcy of the mid-1970s, combined with fears of resident activism inspired by Co-op City, meant that neither New York City nor New York State would again embark on an ambitious affordable housing program such as Mitchell-Lama. The construction of affordable housing slowed to a trickle. The end of the rent strike did not solve all of Co-op City's problems. Its new resident managers would still struggle to contain costs and mismanagement, and corruption remained an endemic issue. However, it would be the first slow step to normalization. Today, Co-op City is an increasingly rare haven of affordability in an increasingly unaffordable city. Co-op City residents pay rates that other New Yorkers could only envy. A resident of the largest 6.5 room apartment [pays a maximum of $1,875 per month](https://www.coopcity.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), an amount which includes utilities. In a recent *New York Times* op-ed, Co-op City's congressional representative, [Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez heralded Co-op City](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/18/opinion/aoc-tina-smith-housing.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as "a testament to…financial and social sustainability." > The story of Co-op City shows that constructing affordable housing at scale and keeping it affordable for the long term is both difficult and possible. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see why Co-op City is no longer seen as a lodestone but as a symbol of bygone ambition and achievement. But due to its tumultuous early history, it offers lessons for any new mayor interested in constructing affordable housing during their tenure. Cuomo does not specify any numerical targets in his housing plan, but if Mamdani were to realize his plan of 200,000 affordable apartments in 10 years, that would mean an annual construction of 20,000 apartments per year, or a level of approximately 125% of Co-op City's entire size each year. This would be a monumental task on almost every level and a welcome return to the ambitious public works projects of pre-austerity era New York; but Mamdani and his supporters should be clear-eyed about the fact that fulfilling something even close to this plan would require ongoing funding and commitment on the part of the government. The Mitchell-Lama program rested on the presumption that while it was important to fund construction, affordable housing would not require ongoing subsidies. This was likely a pipe dream regardless of circumstances, but proved to be especially misguided in the 1970s when Co-op City and most other Mitchell-Lama developments faced financial challenges. Keeping housing affordable requires ongoing investment. In Co-op City's case, that investment has always been begrudging, pushed first by the rent strike itself and later by the fear of renewed resident activism. Since its initial construction, the state has been forced to pay hundreds of millions of dollars on maintenance and the repair of construction defects. Despite this investment, Co-op City's mortgage is now even larger than it was at the conclusion of construction. There is no quick or conclusive solution that will fix the affordable housing crisis once and for all, and recognizing the need for ongoing investment — especially if and when there are inflationary pressures — is vital. The story of Co-op City shows that constructing affordable housing at scale and keeping it affordable for the long term is both difficult and possible. This is a story that Cuomo, at least, should know well. After all, it was his father, Mario Cuomo, who negotiated the deal with Co-op City's resident leader to end the rent strike nearly a half-century ago. ### Crossing Delancey: One Project’s Story URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/crossing-delancey-one-projects-story/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z During eight years as a New York City Council member, I saw heated sagas involving housing development ignite, erupt and burn out. Some communities have rightfully demanded more affordable housing, some not so much. Local history, particularly redlining and gentrification, factors prominently as residents' fears of being priced out bubble to the surface. I have heard people say downtown Manhattan is too expensive and already overdeveloped as reasons to keep any new construction from happening. But while New York City is undoubtedly one of the most complex and expensive places to build, my experience tells me that anything is possible if we approach it the right way. For every unsuccessful project, there are equally compelling examples of ventures that moved forward to preserve and strengthen their communities. The ongoing development of [Essex Crossing](https://edc.nyc/project/essex-crossing-development-seward-park?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a nearly 2-million-square-foot mixed-use development on former vacant land on the Lower East Side, offers critical lessons that can inform future affordable housing developments and the negotiations that come along with them. When it was originally razed in 1967 as part of Robert Moses' "slum-clearing" initiative, the Seward Park Urban Renewal Area (SPURA) displaced [roughly 1,800 mostly Puerto Rican families](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/nyregion/city-plans-redevelopment-for-vacant-area-in-lower-manhattan.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from a multiblock section of the Lower East Side straddling Delancey Street. Due to political gridlock and a lack of community empowerment, the site remained vacant for nearly 50 years, finally breaking ground for development in 2015. Collaborating on Essex Crossing, as SPURA would be renamed, was my first experience with the affordable housing and development industry, my first community campaign as a volunteer with Good Old Lower East Side (GOLES) and a project that would span into my time as Council member for the East Side. One of our most meaningful victories was securing the right of return for families who had lost their homes decades earlier, including [my father and Aunt Elsie](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/realestate/better-than-the-powerball.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Today, Essex Crossing spans nine city blocks and includes more than 1,000 residential units, [more than half of which](https://essexcrossingnyc.com/community/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Affordable%20Housing,aside%20specifically%20for%20senior%20housing.) are designated as affordable housing — including senior housing and the units reserved for former SPURA residents. Knowing the neighborhood's history and listening to the needs of the existing residents were critical to making this project possible. Essex Crossing also highlights the importance of having a developer who meets the community eye to eye and uses shared visioning to shape its plan based on local needs. The Essex Crossing developer, Delancey Street Associates, was at the table every step of the way and was a reliable partner for City officials, local stakeholders and the community. > While New York City is undoubtedly one of the most complex and expensive places to build, my experience tells me that anything is possible if we approach it the right way. Delancey Street Associates, a joint venture partnership with L+M Development Partners, BFC Partners and Taconic Investment Partners, collaborated with the local community board, housing advocacy nonprofits and tenant leaders to focus on the project's design, which now stands as a model of inclusive urban renewal — blending affordability, community services and economic development in one of the city's most iconic neighborhoods. Additionally, strong political leadership was and remains key to its success. Essex Crossing would not have been possible without strong leaders like City Council Member Margaret Chin, who championed the development during its approval phase, ensuring a proper blend of commercial development and affordable units for residents. Through meetings, town halls and a task force set up by Manhattan Community Board 3, she encountered valid concerns, impassioned debate and aggressive protesters every step of the way. This intense and robust engagement eventually led to more senior and low-income units, park space, square feet reserved for a potential school and a commitment to local hiring through a network facilitated by the nonprofit Henry Street Settlement. In the end, without her advocacy, Essex Crossing might still be stuck in bureaucratic limbo. It also shows why Council involvement is paramount in land-use negotiations. While one size never fits all across the neighborhoods of New York, the development of Essex Crossing serves as a blueprint for those who are focused on developing more housing equitably and with appreciation for the unique needs of each community. Lessons to take from this important development are reflected in the community benefits that were ultimately included in the plan, including a public market for fresh, low-cost groceries; reserved space for multiple nonprofits that offer affordable childcare and services for our seniors; the provision of affordable retail space to support long-standing local businesses; open space; local hiring; and rents for low-, moderate- and middle-income families that are memorialized in perpetuity. Neighborhoods recently rezoned in desirable and rapidly changing areas like SoHo, NoHo, Astoria, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Crown Heights and the Garment District can all take note. Essex Crossing is an example of the seemingly implausible becoming possible because developers and community leaders met consistently, negotiated based on local needs and were brave in the face of opposition. It shows that we can — and must — learn from history to build a more equitable future for all New Yorkers, especially when it comes to affordable housing. ### Build Big Without Delay URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/build-big-without-delay/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z When the topic turns to producing new housing in New York, we often hear that there are no more big sites to build on, hence no chance to create new critical masses of apartments for the city. We exhausted those opportunities back in the Koch administration when [swaths of vacant land turned into scads of homes](https://www.gothamgazette.com/624-creating-affordable-housing-how-koch-did-?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the argument goes, and can't do that again. So our only hope is to gently rezone, neighborhood by neighborhood — settling for single after single, and no home runs. The theory is false. Even a cursory look around the city reveals a number of currently uninhabited places where we can take big swings at producing housing, generating many thousands of units at a time. Any housing strategy should take direct aim at these sites. Some history: Before East Brooklyn Congregations [began rebuilding East Brooklyn in 1983](https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/citizen-power-rebuilds-east-brooklyn-the-nehemiah-housing-plan-in-the-1980s?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the experts of that day had decided that East Brooklyn, the South Bronx and other deteriorated areas could never be rebuilt. Investing in those areas would only throw good money after bad. It took two affiliates of Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), an organizing network that preaches and practices a process of deep listening to the longtime residents of a community, led by community and clergy leaders who never gave up on their neighborhoods, to prove those experts wrong. The IAF, founded by Saul Alinsky, knits those leaders and their institutions together into a power base capable of both protecting communities from those who seek to exploit them and of designing and implementing strategies that benefit local residents. That base, led by those leaders, then pushes public- and private-sector power players to react and respond to those priorities. Around the same time, the naysayers looked at the approximately 100,000 vacant apartments citywide, many along the Cross Bronx Expressway, and asserted that those buildings would never be returned to useful life. But thanks to the [pioneering approach of the Community Preservation Corporation](https://www.mcny.org/exhibition/south-bronx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), led by Michael Lappin and imaginative City housing and preservation leaders like Felice Michetti, Paul Crotty and Mark Willis, almost every single abandoned building was renovated and almost every abandoned unit fully occupied. We have seen big swings happen in the last decade, too. In the 1980s, few thought the vacant acres of East Brooklyn and the South Bronx would ever be rebuilt. In the 1990s, few thought the site in Spring Creek, then filled with weeds and discarded tires and debris, would ever support a new and vibrant community. Just as it has in the past, the City can prove naysayers wrong and produce many thousands of units over the course of the next decade. It just requires focus, funding and political will. So let's talk about those big sites — and then about the staff and subsidies necessary to turn them from fallow or otherwise underutilized tracts into vibrant communities. ### First, sites Some of the locations we and others have identified are controlled by the State, some by the City, some by the feds, some by others. Depending on which is the case, what it'll take to turn them into homes can be more or less complicated. But in every case, there is a pathway. **First, Creedmoor Psychiatric Center in Queens.** Creedmoor is a State-owned site that's dramatically underutilized. Until our affiliate, Queens Power, went into action, the mostly abandoned Creedmoor site was not considered a promising place for new housing. Various plans had been proposed, one of the more recent by then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo, only to generate local civic hostility and then simply fade away. Meanwhile, its 50 acres of tragically underutilized property, one of the best sites in Queens, stood mostly vacant. In 2023, we commissioned a [new plan designed by the architecture firm of Alexander Gorlin](https://www.gorlinarchitects.com/projects/creedmor-psychiatric-center-master-plan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to show the public and the State how a development of mixed densities could transform that site into a vibrant and attractive new neighborhood. After a year of pressure and negotiation, Queens Power leaders persuaded [Gov. Kathy Hochul to start the process](https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-unveils-vibrant-community-strengthening-vision-underutilized-creedmoor-campus?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that will lead to the construction of more than 2,000 new affordable homes and apartments there. That effort, now moving through the early stages of environmental and other reviews, will rival the construction at Spring Creek in its impact. **Second, Mott Haven.** In the South Bronx, just south of 149th Street, there is an area above Metro-North tracks that could be platformed, enabling the construction of 1,000 or more affordable homes and apartments. This area lends itself to a new development because of the narrowness of the gap between adjacent streets. Architects Alexander Gorlin and Quncie Williams still have the scale model they prepared at our request years ago. We've dusted it off and are ready to show it to the next mayor's housing team. It's the kind of bold effort that a fresh, new administration would be much more likely to implement. **Third, Sunnyside Yards in Queens.**The Sunnyside Yards area in Queens is another location that, once platformed, [could hold many more homes and apartments](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/instead-of-a-stadium-sunnyside-yard-to-host-homes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Both [the Bloomberg and de Blasio administrations](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/instead-of-a-stadium-sunnyside-yard-to-host-homes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) had ambitious plans to reimagine the site, but neither they nor any alternative vision has happened yet. It is indeed an expensive, complicated undertaking — but this is a 180-acre rail yard. The opportunities are boundless. **Fourth, Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn.** This is vacant federal land in Marine Park, once used as the city's first airfield, that's more recently been employed as a site for an emergency migrant shelter. It's aching to become something more. A plan cooked up by a Brooklyn law student would [redevelop the site](https://www.archpaper.com/2025/05/hero-village-housing-plan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into a medium-density community with as many as 15,000 to 20,000 units. He wants to call it Hero Village and set aside housing for members of the NYPD, FDNY and National Guard. That should be negotiable, but the idea of converting underutilized open space into places for people to live should not be. **Fifth, Aqueduct Raceway in Queens.** The racetrack and its flagging operations, which could easily be folded into nearby Belmont, are a whopping 210 acres of underutilized land, 50 of which are parking lots. Those and other sections could be easily [transformed into new housing](https://gothamist.com/news/housing-at-nyc-libraries-and-aqueduct-racetrack-proposed-by-city-council-speaker?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as City Council Speaker Adrienne Adams has proposed. **Sixth, a dozen City-owned golf courses.** [Brad Lander](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/nyregion/brad-lander-housing-plan.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) made this idea — identifying a few courses for redevelopment to produce 50,000 units — a major theme in his mayoral campaign, which could carry into a high-level position in the next administration. Here, we would have to balance the open space and recreational values that the most heavily used courses provide with the housing needs of those paying exorbitant rents. But it's surely worth aggressive exploration. **Beyond.** Megasites aside, packages of somewhat smaller sites could generate scores of new units. Our leaders and organizers have already identified and even commissioned plans for 69 sites at New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) developments. NYCHA is not opposed to this strategy, at least in theory. In fact, NYCHA has developed eight infill sites, including Redwood Senior Living in East New York, spearheaded by East Brooklyn Congregations. But it has taken eight years to complete the development. That is a glacial pace, and it fails to take the fullest advantage of the 69 other NYCHA sites that we have identified. There is an added value when building on NYCHA sites and accommodating NYCHA seniors now living in oversize NYCHA units: Those units are freed up for the scores of families and individuals on the endless NYCHA waiting list. And working with NYU's Furman Center, our research teams have also identified [1,009 vacant City-owned sites](https://furmancenter.org/thestoop/entry/institutional-owned-land-and-new-york-citys-housing-crisis-the-extent-of-faith-based-owned-land-ownership?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that could be built as of right now if the City focused on them. None of this includes the hundreds of sites owned by closed or shrinking religious institutions, which we estimate could house at least 10,000 units. **But sites alone aren't enough; we need subsidies.** While freeing up sites is generally the critical first step in the process, sites go nowhere without public funding to kick-start development. While today there are billions in housing subsidies available, they're almost all spoken for; more sources are desperately needed. When the Community Preservation Corporation (CPC) pioneered the critical mass renovation of thousands of apartments, it tapped into union pension funds, backed by essential insurance support from the State of New York Mortgage Agency (SONYMA). Mike Lappin, the former CEO of CPC, described this dynamic in detail in [City Limits](https://citylimits.org/opinion-use-nycs-public-pension-funds-to-supercharge-affordable-housing-production-and-preservation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): "How did the CPC investments measure up to the comptroller's 'triple bottom line?' First, the investments were secure. From 1983 through the end of 2011, over $1.5 billion of CPC loans was invested by the City and State funds without a loss of either interest or principal. The losses that did occur, about $6 million, were fully covered by the SONYMA insurance. This record of no losses has continued to the present day." Since the big swings that occurred from the 1980s through the early 2000s, later generations of bankers, union bureaucrats and others decided to be more "prudent." In the name of prudence, this flow of capital dried up. It should be made to flow again. In the current crisis, the State of New York, already a significant player in the field, would need to increase its financial commitments to the range of housing opportunities mentioned here, as well as reasonable proposals from other groups. **Producing far more housing requires more staff.** The severely [understaffed and undersupported](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/understaffed-underserved/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) program officers at the City's Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) would welcome a rapid expansion of their teams so that developments languishing in the current pipeline could be reviewed and processed in a timely manner. Speeding up development by adding agency staff would dramatically reduce the cost to builders, who now expect a multiyear gap between submitting proposals and approval. The meter keeps running during this period, with the costs ballooning and driving up the price of each new or renovated unit. If a builder can get from concept to groundbreaking in two years, instead of five or six, that represents years during which staff, consultants, lenders, and lobbyists no longer need to be paid. The city is home to scores of top legal and underwriting professionals who once worked for HPD and the New York City Housing Development Corporation. Outsourcing some of this work to them while the next generation of in-house staff members is being recruited and brought up to speed would both make good sense and would expedite the review process. The development staff at NYCHA would also need to be beefed up. Or it would be worth exploring if the professionals at the School Construction Authority — in our minds, the most productive public agency delivering new buildings — could take over the delivery of projects that would entail City construction, such as building senior residences on NYCHA sites. The next mayor has an enormous opportunity to set the pieces in place to stimulate the next great wave of affordable housing work in the city. It's not as hard as it looks. The land is waiting to be turned into real places for real people to live. ### Zohran Mamdani Talks Public Safety URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdani-talks-public-safety/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z *On Monday, Sept. 8, in the first of a series of sit-downs with New York City mayoral candidates, Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani took questions at a Vital City event co-sponsored by Columbia Journalism School. Mamdani was quizzed on his public safety philosophy and proposals by Errol Louis, Spectrum News NY1 political anchor and Vital City contributing writer. What follows is a complete, unedited transcript.* **Transition planning and timeline** **Errol Louis:** I’m Errol Louis, the political anchor at Spectrum News NY1\. I’m also a contributor to Vital City, and if you haven’t already subscribed, you should look at everything they’ve got going on on that website at [vitalcitynyc.org](http://vitalcitynyc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We have only a short amount of time, so I’d like to jump right into it by inviting today’s conversation partner, Assemblymember Zohran Mamdani, to have a seat. Let’s hop right into it. Good to see you. **Zohran Mamdani:** Good to see you, sir. **Errol Louis:** There are only 57 days between now and the election. I’m sure that might have occurred to you today. But then there are only 58 days after that between November 4 and January 1, so we’ve got 115 days. You won’t, if you are successful, won’t even have two months to organize a government if you should win. Even understanding that you’re still in the middle of a campaign and that’s your primary focus, I’d like to ask you about some of these questions about how you would plan to govern. Have you formed a transition committee? **Zohran Mamdani:** No, we have not formed a transition committee as yet. That’ll be the first order of business after winning the general election. **Errol Louis:** Okay. You’ve said publicly that no jobs have been promised to anyone. And does that include everybody? That includes your inner circle, all your close advisors? **Zohran Mamdani:** Yes. I can tell you that the experience I have every day is reading an article about people that I’ve apparently promised a job to. And sometimes I learn their names just as soon as you do. **Errol Louis:** Ha ha ha ha. But, no talk about who might be your chief of staff, your first deputy, your police commissioner, and so forth? **Zohran Mamdani:** No. **Errol Louis:** Okay. What kind of transition process do you intend to have, then? **Zohran Mamdani:** One that is rigorous and one that is actually focused on outcomes. The reason I say “actually” is that oftentimes, the transition is a period of performance, of ensuring that every specific person reflects every specific commitment. But are you actually preparing yourself for January 1st? And one of the things that I’ve spoken about is my desire and the necessity of having a team that I surround myself that is characterized by a track record of excellence. And that means ensuring that you are not just surrounded by the people that are quickest to say yes, but rather people who will push you and be able to deliver on this agenda that we’ve laid forward. **What caused violence to spike in New York?** **Errol Louis:** Okay. Speaking of people who are willing to push you, there’s a bit of news that happened just as you were arriving. The NYPD commissioner, Jessica Tisch, spoke at the Citizens Budget Commission breakfast this morning, and apparently began by saying, and I’m quoting now, “in my opinion, crime went up as a result of the drastic changes being made in our criminal justice laws in New York State, not as a result of the pandemic.” So, a lot of journalists here, wanted to give you a chance to respond. **Zohran Mamdani:** I have a different opinion. My opinion is, one, that looks at the spike in crime across the country, over the course of the pandemic and sees similar spikes regardless of what any of those one states pursued with regards to criminal legal reform. And I think we’ve even seen with Raise the Age that we, there are fewer arrests of younger New Yorkers than there were prior to the implementation of that legislation. However, there continue to be issues with that implementation. I think chief among them is that about two-thirds of the amount of money that was allotted still remains unspent in Albany. And that is money that was critical to ensuring that these reforms are not just ones that are changed in the legal code, but they also felt and experienced in the investments that were intended to accompany them. **Errol Louis:** Now you were elected to the assembly for the first time at the height of the pandemic in 2020\. What’s your sense of kind of where society was and how that might have affected public safety? **Zohran Mamdani:** It was a deeply unsettling time for many people. So much of what we had come to…I apologize, I should have poured you water…I thought it would take too long. It was a time when so much of what New Yorkers had come to rely on as the facts of their life were thrown into debate. And we even saw this with the larger conversation about shutting down schools. It wasn’t just that they were schools, it’s also that they were, for many New Yorkers, the primary place where they interacted with city government, almost a site of social services. And I think that I heard briefly in, in some of the introductory remarks about an allusion to the sense of unease that people felt at that moment and continue to feel to some degree now. And when I ask New Yorkers where they feel that the most, or their heightened anxiety, they often speak about the subway system. And much of that unease is not actually captured in any statistic. It’s not captured in CompStat, and yet it is something that is present on the minds of New Yorkers. And I can just tell you myself, as someone who grew up in this city, not too many blocks from where we are right now, that I have a few speeds when I take the train. One is my headphones are in and the music is on. The other is the headphones are in and there’s no music playing. And the other is I’m taking the headphones out of my ears. And all of this is in relation to what I am seeing there on that subway car. And I know that for many New Yorkers, it is the same. It is the possibility that what could be banal could turn into something else. **Errol Louis:** Have you ever been a victim of crime or faced a sort of a near encounter, a frightening encounter? **Zohran Mamdani:** I have been held up at gunpoint once in my life. It was actually in Atlanta, not here in New York City. **What would be Mamdani’s enforcement priorities?** **Errol Louis:** What objective indicators — I mean, you know, whenever we talk about this, and Vital City has been great with a lot of the numbers, I’ve certainly seen a lot of this in some of our reporting at Spectrum News… There are objective indicators. There’s, you know, the crime rate, there’s arrest rates, there’s shooting clearances, there’s emergency room assault visits and so forth. Then there’s, you know, vibes, there’s how people feel, some of which can actually be objectively captured, but much of which is not. What objective indicators do you think New Yorkers should be paying attention to? And if you’re the mayor, which ones would you be looking at? **Zohran Mamdani:** I often hear from New Yorkers their greatest concerns have to do with murders and shootings. And we can see that murders and shootings are down since 2019, and they are down even further since 2024\. And yet we know that, as was said earlier, major crimes are up 30% since 2019\. So my answer to you is, this is what I often hear of as the first thing, and yet, as we know, for most New Yorkers, it is not the most frequent version of crime that they interact with or they hear about. And so CompStat gives you a sense of crime as it is. And then there is also all of that which is not categorized. So to me, one of the most important things is, in our vision for public safety, is our plan to deploy teams of dedicated mental health outreach workers to the hundred subway stations with the highest levels of mental health crises and homelessness. I say this in relation to your question because a lot of times for New Yorkers, what is experienced or understood as an example of social disorder is then tasked to the police as if it is their responsibility. And what we have ended up with is police officers responding to 200,000 mental health calls a year, and that cannot be separated from the fact that response times have increased by 20% over the last few years, where now the average time is closer to 16 minutes. **Errol Louis:** Well, I want to come back to that in a minute, but I’m struck by, well, let’s talk for a minute about disorder or the perception of this disorder, its relationship to crime, that does not involve, say, the mentally ill. I saw you at the breakfast that preceded the West Indian American Day parade, about a week ago. It was a great morning, we had a great time. By the time the sun went down, six people had been shot, one had been slashed, and it was a reminder that frankly, last year at the 2024 parade, five people were shot, one fatally, in broad daylight on Eastern Parkway. They still don’t even have a suspect in that case. What I did see at the parade this year was tons of unlicensed vendors selling booze, beer, mixed drinks, all kinds of stuff. Totally illegal, so blatant that, in my opinion, it had to have been noticed or condoned frankly. What do you do about that? Because that’s something that doesn’t involve complicated new systems like what we’re gonna talk about when it comes to say seriously mentally ill people or people who are unhoused. But what do you do about that, your run-of-the-mill disorder? **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, I think first of all, I appreciated your hosting of that breakfast, and I tried to keep it to no politicking on that stage. I think the city has to showcase its own competence in trying to create that social order. And what I mean by that is, you bring up vending — and one thing that I’ve been struck by is how the city under Mayor Adams’ leadership has simply refused to issue the permits that are now required by law, to the extent that we have a 4,000- or 5,000-person waiting lists, where a vendor will pay an intermediary who just happens to be a vendor who got lucky 20, 30 years ago, $20,000 for the right to sell chicken and rice. And I tell you this because if you want to tell someone that they cannot vend because they do not have a permit, and then in the same breath you’re uninterested in providing them with any avenue to actually procure a legal permit, then where do you leave people? You leave people with a diminishing faith in civil society and the ability for city government to actually deliver on any of this. So I do think there is a, there’s a necessity of competence and execution in so much of this. And from there, we ask New Yorkers to trust. **Errol Louis:** So if you’re a mayor on January 1, 115 days from now, what will you do in that case? **Zohran Mamdani:** The first thing is that I would stop the practice of what the Adams administration just did with the vetoing one of the bills that would help to actually cohere the system. And the second is that I would actually start to procure those licenses to eliminate that black market to, in the words of a number of vendors, actually reduce the price of chicken and rice from 10 bucks to 8 bucks, um, because they have told me that if they weren’t paying $20K for a vending fee, they would be able to charge a little less for their food. And it’s getting to the nuts and bolts of the competency that’s been missing some of this execution. **Mental health challenges and the Department of Community Safety** **Errol Louis:** Over the last 30 years, we’ve learned a lot about what reduces crime. We have not been great in New York and ensuring that we always follow the evidence. When push comes to shove, whether we have to decide whether to put it into a program or just assess what’s going on and maybe try and think it through, we kind of always defer or default to running the program. Do you see an opportunity to maybe change the way that goes? To what extent are you going to be led by evidence as opposed to sort of looking at it and then making a different decision? **Zohran Mamdani:** Evidence and outcomes, they have to be the north star of our administration and frankly, of any administration. And I think what’s frustrating is that we have evidence of approaches that work, but they are not operating at the scale that they could be. You know, B-HEARD, for example, it’s a program that could respond to mental health crises in New York City. There were 35% of calls that B-HEARD was eligible for they did not respond to, and the police responded to. And part of that is because it has been underfunded. Part of that is because it has been completely deprioritized. And our vision is not just to bring that which works elsewhere here, but also to scale that which works here. And to me, the vision of B-HEARD has to be one where we have it present in every single neighborhood, and in the 20 neighborhoods of the highest need, that we have two or three teams, and that we increase funding for it by about 150%. That, coupled with looking at the models of, let’s say, CAHOOTS in Oregon, a program that diverted 20% of calls that were coming into a police department and was able to resolve 24,000 calls save for 311 without police assistance. It shows what could be possible. And what I’ve found is that oftentimes when you speak about this, it’s seen as if it is a critique of police officers. And yet what has struck me is that it is often police officers, like the police chief in Olympia who described their Familiar Faces program, and the language of the need “to hug the cactus,” to embrace that which is uncomfortable actually makes the job easier. And I think that that would transform what policing looks like in New York City, if we say that no longer must police respond to every single failure of the social safety net. **Errol Louis:** Well, when it comes to programs like B-HEARD, do you think it was, I mean, you know, it had limited hours, it had limited funding. As you said, they, they sort of passed on a lot of calls or insisted on sending cops on certain calls, where arguably, according to the model, they weren’t necessarily needed. Is this something that you would assign to the Police Department or is this for your new Department of Community Safety? **Zohran Mamdani:** This would, this is currently not in the Police Department and, but part of the issue here is that like so many programs, it operates in a silo separated out from so much similar work. This would be an example of something that would come into the Department of Community Safety. And I think just, you know, it’s…When you are in the legislature, you have an idea for legislation, you work with a coalition, and let’s say that a bill is signed into law. We all know that it is then up to the executive’s interest in actually implementing that bill what determines its success or its failure. And what has been so frustrating is that we’ve seen the complete lack of will from this executive mean that so many of these kinds of programs have been prejudged to failure from the very beginning because they’ve never been given what they needed. **Errol Louis:** Well, to a certain extent you could argue that many of the reforms that came out of the legislature, some of the analogous or even follow-up actions by the local prosecutors represent the will of the people. Right? You guys didn’t wander in off the street, you all got elected, implemented bail, some other reforms, Raise the Age and so forth, discovery reform. The district attorneys in particular ran on a promise to stop charging criminally certain low-level offenses and so forth, and they followed through on that. Is this a case of the populace, the voting public, maybe changing their minds? That like, “Hey, we didn’t expect this. This is what we thought we wanted, we are glad that you did this. Now we need a course correction.” **Zohran Mamdani:** I think…This goes back to the earlier conversation around Raise the Age. There was…the criminal legal reform package that was passed prior to my time in Albany. And yet my understanding since getting to Albany has been that the intent of it was to also be accompanied by significant investment and education as to what this legislation was. Because I can tell you that the way in which people have also understood these pieces of legislation has not always been tied to what the legislation itself actually does. And part of that is a larger story around the void that Democrats often leave in the debate around any of these issues, we sometimes are almost embarrassed about our own ideals and our own convictions and our own legislation. And I think that this is a real moment to make clear what those convictions are, and explain why we actually have them. And, you know, I’ve been pushed on this question of the Department of Community Safety, and I’ve said time and time again, to your point about the evidence and the outcomes: When I started running this race for mayor, on average, about 200 officers were leaving the department each month. That number has now climbed above 300\. And in writing around that development, there has been a real focus on this question of forced overtime. Now, there’s no question, there are a number of officers who want overtime. They willingly take overtime, and then there is another conversation around forced overtime. The question of officers who have three days off and then they’re told at the last minute that the second day, they have to be back. Do whatever they want for the first and the third. But that means the entire trip, the plan, whatever they’ve made, it’s gone, it’s done. And how this really reduces a sense of quality of life for many of these same officers. Now, that is often separated out from the conversation that we have around policing, where so many other candidates will just say, the only answer no matter what the question, is police. And that is actually even to the detriment of those officers themselves. **Errol Louis:** You know, there’s a question I want to read to you. This is from Katlyn Ma, who’s a Columbia Journalism student. In your plans to fund a new Department of Community Safety, you say you’ll transfer $605 million from existing programs into this new department. What would you cut from is the question. **Zohran Mamdani:** There would be no cuts to create this department, right. This is a department that would have a budget of about $1 billion. $605 million is existing programs, like B-HEARD, for example. Um, the other $400 million would be from New revenue. So if you look at our policy proposal, we put forward over the course of the primary a belief that the two most productive ways in which to raise that revenue would be: One, by raising the state’s top corporate tax rate to match that of New Jersey. And two, by raising New York City’s personal income tax rate on the top 1% by 2%. Those two things together raise $9 billion. There are a number of approaches we could take in city government that would raise an additional billion dollars. That $10 billion covers the cost of our major policy programs and starts to Trump-proof this city. **Errol Louis:** So a billion dollars for the Department of Community Safety. What’s the personnel size, roughly? **Zohran Mamdani:** The personnel size, a lot of that is still to be determined in terms of the scale. Much of this is to ensure that this is what it would take to start to put it together. And you know, about two-thirds of it is already existing, right? But it’s about cohering it. One third is, to be created, most especially in the dedicated teams of mental health outreach workers in the subway station. **Errol Louis:** Yeah, walk us through that, a mental health crisis on a train platform. We’ve all seen it. You know, it might be acute or it might be, you know, kind of a passive in a way where someone is just falling apart in front of the rest of us. Walk us through the response. What would that look like? **Zohran Mamdani:** So you would have teams of three, and in those teams you would have an EMT, you would have a peer, because we’ve also seen time and time again that having a peer present in these interactions is critically important. And I’ll give you an example of how this could work. In Denver, they had a STAR program \[Support Team Assisted Response\]. This is a program that focuses on low-level crime. And in the neighborhoods where they focused, that crime went down by 34%. Over the period of a number of years, they had 12,000 clinical interactions. Of those, only 3% required a medical hold. I say this because oftentimes in this conversation around subway safety and the conversation around mental health, there also comes a question of involuntary commitment. And what I have said, time and again is: It’s outcomes, it’s evidence. And in reading some of the research around involuntary commitment, not being fully convinced that this actually has the outcomes that we hope that it would in terms of remedying this, but saying that this would be a last resort. However, the first resort has to be actually engaging and interacting. And the goal here is not just to respond to someone in a crisis or in need. The goal is also to bring them out of the subway system. You know, in Philadelphia, they have a Hub for Hope program where they transformed some vacant spaces within the SEPTA system, and they were able to connect more than 300 previously homeless individuals to housing. My goal here is: How do we ensure that our approach to this, these crises, is not just one of shifting people out of view, but actually connecting them with services? And I remember, I think it was in THE CITY, there was an article that came out that showed this absurdity that we had nearly the same number of vacant supportive housing units as we did homeless New Yorkers. And how through this mix of bureaucracy, incompetence, and a lack of interest, there was a complete inability to match anywhere near half of those same New Yorkers with those services to the extent that I think three of them died waiting to hear back on their application. **Errol Louis:** Sure. Would you agree with me that while it might seem simple and it’s certainly frustrating and you know, sort of morally unacceptable, it’s also hard, right? I mean, you’ve got all these different agencies involved. There’s the MTA and there’s the Department of Homeless Services. There might be this new Department of Community safety, all involved. Making it work is, is kind of the whole trick, right? **Zohran Mamdani:** Absolutely. This is not, none of this is simple. None of it is going to be easy. But what has been so frustrating is, it has seemed for many years as if there are many who are not even trying. They are simply at peace with a status quo that we know is broken for so many. And I am confident in our ability to actually deliver a new chapter. And, you know, I am running, once again, against Andrew Cuomo. And in this conversation around homelessness, we also can’t forget, this is a man who, in his cutting of the Advantage plan, that was a decision that led to a skyrocketing of homelessness here in New York City. So some of this is difficult, it’s bureaucracy, it’s, you know, it’s managing these multiple agencies. Some of this is also the result of funding decisions that have been made that cut state funding. And then by doing so, cut matching federal funding and left us in a position where we have come to accept homelessness as a fact of life in New York City. **Service hubs for the homeless in the subways?** **Errol Louis:** You’ve talked about using vacant subway retail space, I guess modeled on what they’re doing in Philadelphia as a place for drop-in hubs, crisis centers, and so forth. Would you be concerned that that might draw more of that population into the system when making the system primarily or almost exclusively about transit is considered one of the paths to just making it livable and usable? **Zohran Mamdani:** Absolutely. The intent of those, of the repurposing of the 75% of commercial units that are vacant within the subway system, is, one, to connect people to outside the subway system. And I think of it, it’s not, it’s geared to each and every New Yorker who may have a medical emergency, a place that they can actually just go and be connected with services out of the subway system. The system itself is a system to get people around New York City. And what we have to ensure, however, is that we are prepared and ready for the questions, the interactions, the experiences that New Yorkers have, because too often we pretend, we are still surprised when we have the only person that a tourist can ask about which exit to use is a police officer stationed in that same subway system. And that’s why I think that we should have transit ambassadors scaled up throughout our subway system so that those same officers can actually focus on serious crimes. And these are the individuals who can answer the questions of which elevator is broken, which line is delayed, which exit to take. **Errol Louis:** Are you opposed to coercive medical treatment? I mean, this has reached the point where it’s been talked about both as policy and as legislation that in some of the encounters that we’re discussing — involuntary commitment, treatment or removal. **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, I’m skeptical about its efficacy, as I was saying, with some of the research that I’ve read. But I do think it is, it is a last resort. It is something that if nothing else can work, then it’s there. **Errol Louis:** The 911 system, which is really the front door for most emergency services, that often gets the cops involved, was supposed to be, at least supplemented and in some cases displaced by a 988 system, where you call if it’s not necessarily appropriate to bring in the cops. How has that worked in your opinion, and would that be folded into your Department of Community Safety? **Zohran Mamdani:** It’s, I don’t think it has worked all that well. I think that there’s an issue of inoperability between the two numbers. I think also there are still too many New Yorkers who do not know about 988\. And today, if you call 911, you cannot actually order a, you cannot ask for a, emergency response that is not the police to, to any crisis that you call them with for a mental health crisis. And we need to ensure that there’s mass education, of which I know there’s some. You know, at Steinway Street, my subway station, there is a faded 988 poster right there on the platform. But still, many New Yorkers do not know. And the second is we actually have to ensure that we are providing guidance as to what can be diverted where. You know, this example of B-HEARD of the 35% of calls that even after all of that were still determined eligible, and still not taken up, I think it speaks to this question of execution. You know, I think often about, I was saying, it’s the executive’s will oftentimes. You know, in the end of 2021, we had passed significant amount of rent relief that was to be distributed. And when Governor Cuomo was the governor, that relief was, it was stuck. It was not moving. And one of the most impressive things that Governor Hochul has done is how quickly she transformed that program that, you know, moving at the speed of molasses, into one that was actually releasing the funds. And I just view that as, do you actually want these things to succeed? Because if you do, we can see that what is often described as an ocean liner can go as quickly as a speedboat. **NYPD resistance and morale** **Errol Louis:** Well, one of the things you’d be up against, of course, is the big blue machine, the NYPD itself, right? The unions, the leadership, frankly, even the rank-and-file are often resistant to change. You know, it’s gonna be tricky to navigate. If you run into the kind of resistance that led in a prior administration, say, the cops to turn their backs on the mayor in a public sign of disrespect or lack of confidence, what do you do about that? **Zohran Mamdani:** I think the first thing you do is you take every opportunity you can to build a relationship such that the disagreements that are inevitable, ones that already exist, ones that may come in the future, are understood to still be accompanied with a respect for the work that is being done. And I say that because behind every headline, behind every caricature, I found is a New Yorker just trying to do their best. And when Detective Islam was killed and I met his family, I got to understand the man that he was when he put that uniform on and when he took it off. And I know those same stories are the stories of so many across the department. And I’ve actually found support for this vision of the DCS, of this idea of the removal of mental health crisis from the NYPD’s set of responsibilities. I was recently endorsed by a number of police officers in Jamaica, Queens. And at that event, as the chair of the organization was walking up, he dropped a one-pager on the table I was seated at, and it was a delineation of 911 calls and all of the different kinds of calls that they received. And his point was, look at how many calls we have to deal with that actually have nothing to do with us. And I think that this comes back to the heart of, how do we make sure this is a job that is possible to do? Part of it is by ensuring that we give a set of responsibilities that are actually the ones that people signed up for. **Errol Louis:** On the campaign trail, you’ve acknowledged that contrary to your earlier position, you no longer embrace the phrase “defund the police.” Do you support reducing the budget today? You put out some numbers a minute ago while we were talking, but are there specific areas where you think there’s room to cut or to change the budget? **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, I have spoken about, as it pertains to headcount, sustaining the number of officers that we have on the NYPD, and trying to fight this crisis of retention that we’re seeing. And I appreciated, I think it was [John Hall in Vital City](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-new-yorkers-should-know-about-nypd-staffing) who wrote a piece around interrogating this question of headcount and the relationship to crime from like 2001, 2011, and actually said that our proposal was one that was sound. And I’ve seen, you know, one of the things that I’ve admired about Commissioner Tisch is not just the uprooting of corruption at the highest levels of the NYPD, but also some of the decisions that were being made from a place of: Does this deliver public safety? Does the NYPD having a more than 80-person communications team deliver public safety? No. That relationship is minimal. And she made the decision of cutting it down to about 40 or so. That’s something that I was calling for early in this campaign, and I think that it always has to come back to, is this actually delivering that? **Errol Louis:** Let me ask you about a bunch of different policies just to kind of get your thinking out there. If City Council legislation to abolish the NYPD gang database were to pass, would you support and sign that? **Zohran Mamdani:** I have supported that proposal, it’s one that I’ve supported because of, the vast dragnet has meant the inclusion of New Yorkers on the basis of whether they go out late, photos they put on social media, so much of the facts of life of being a young New Yorker. And yet it then becomes a mark of suspicion. And it is concern of mine that we do not live up to, of all people, Eric Adams’ words in 2021, who said that New Yorkers need not choose between safety and justice. There’s no question that we have to take gangs extremely seriously. And yet I find that a database that includes New Yorkers on such bases is one that that doesn’t actually do exactly that. **Violence interrupters** **Errol Louis:** In the past decade, the city has invested in violence interrupter programs, the Cure Violence model. By the way, a lot of their vans were out there at the parade the other day. And I remember thinking, that’s not the model I remember researching and reporting on over the years. That it was much more subtle. It was personal, it was one-on-one. It wasn’t like big sprinter vans spray-painted on the side with logos and stuff. But putting that aside, have the Cure Violence efforts been effective, and how would you, support, change or even abolish them? **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, Baltimore has been in the news quite a bit, with President Trump especially, and one thing I’ve admired about the mayor of Baltimore is that when he came into office, he did a full investigation and they found that 2% of Baltimore residents were responsible for more than…up to 75% of homicides and shootings. And there had been attempts in Baltimore of a Cure Violence approach of violence interruption, but it had never been done at a systemic scale in the manner that you had alluded to of being able to work across agencies having buy-in. And he created this. And we have seen that they are now on track for the lowest number of homicides in recorded history, and I think more than a 20% decline in shootings. And we’ve seen here in New York City, we have the crisis management system, CMS. It’s been proven to be effective at reducing shootings by up to 40%. Yet it’s only in operation in, I think, 28 of the more than 70 police precincts. And oftentimes where it is in operation, it’s not being fully funded. And this past week, I was in the Bronx at Lincoln Hospital. I met the head of Guns Down, Life Up, this incredible organization that does this exact kind of work. And as he was explaining what the work is, he was telling me, unlike many, they’re embedded in the hospital. They’re immediately notified when a victim of gun violence comes into the hospital. They go immediately to the bedside. And there was actually a young man next to me when he was telling me the story. That young man, this was his story. He had been attacked, he had gone to the hospital. And as he was starting to think about retaliation and how he would respond, he was instead met by this program. And he happened to be homeless at the time. He was living in a shelter. They got him out of the shelter, they got him housing, they got him a job. He now works at that organization. And so to me, it shows the multifaceted approach that’s necessary in tackling the scourge of gun violence. And so what I would do is, is support a Cure Violence approach. The CMS system, we’ve talked about increasing funding by 275% as one part of the way in which we deliver public safety. **Errol Louis:** And that, would that too be under your Department of Community Safety? **Zohran Mamdani:** Yes. **Surveillance of political or religious groups** **Errol Louis:** Under what circumstances, if any, should the NYPD be allowed to conduct surveillance of political or religious organizations? **Zohran Mamdani:** I have many concerns about the history of surveillance we’ve seen in this city. You know, I represent Steinway Street in Astoria, and the NYPD had a unit, the Demographics Unit, which was tasked with surveilling Muslim New Yorkers doing the most banal things: the barbershop, the travel agent, hookah bar. There were even reports of when Muslims would play soccer at Astoria Park — and they could have asked me, I would’ve said, “every day.” And I think it has shown that there have too often been instances where just identity in and of itself is the basis of suspicion and the basis of surveillance. And I went to high school with someone who was pressured into becoming an informant. So these kinds of approaches to surveillance have been ones that have truly torn at the fabrics of civic society. You know, part of the reason I’m sitting before you as the Democratic nominee is because of an increase in Muslim voter turnout, unlike anything we’ve ever seen in the history of this city. And the reason that was so difficult, the reason it’s taken so long, one of those reasons is that there are many whose experiences in the post-9/11 era, whose experiences of a Demographics Unit, whose experiences of the N-SEERS \[National Security Entry-Exit Registration System\] program have been experiences that have taught them that the safest place to be is in the shadows, and that the best thing you can do is to engage as little as possible with government around you. And I have deep concerns about the possibility of extending that era. **Errol Louis:** At the same time, would you acknowledge that it’s an issue, and it’s a challenge, that if there are people who mean to do harm and they are hiding in the shadows, somebody’s gotta go and find them? **Zohran Mamdani:** If there is actual intent, right? If there is actual, if there are those who mean to do harm, that is absolutely, to me, a different conversation. What I am concerned about is the many ways in which it was, the stories of entrapment, and the desire to surveil not on the basis of suspicion of that meaning, but rather that identity itself is a pretext for that. **Errol Louis:** I wanna give you a hypothetical. Imagine an otherwise peaceful protest, supporting, say a Gaza ceasefire, and they’re blocking a thoroughfare. They’re doing things that would possibly make them eligible or subject to arrest. What are the limits of acceptable protest in your mind, and at what point should the police intervene? **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, I think we have a proud history of exercising the First Amendment in the city, and it’s one that should be protected. And much of this conversation around protest has also been a question of which police would respond to that protest. You know, I’ve been critical of the Strategic Response Group, a group that was founded in the mid 2010s with the intent of being a counterterrorism force that has now become the primary response to acts of protest. And I think that to say that we must separate the police presence at an act of, you know, the First Amendment versus, um, countering terrorism, is not to say that we should not have any presence. It is to say that we should learn from the models of cities around the country, around the world. I think one that’s been of interest to me is in Columbus and the way in which they’ve approached some of these questions of how to have a police presence at these larger kinds of demonstrations. **Errol Louis:** Your platform calls for increasing resources for hate crimes enforcement. Does that mean more police involvement, or are you talking about other agencies? **Zohran Mamdani:** My platform within the Department of Community Safety is focused on hate crime prevention programs. And that is, we are talking about programs that have to do with education, that have to do with training, that have to also do with questions of, larger questions of curricula as well. And that is critically important because we’ve seen hate crimes continue across New York City, and we know that these are hate crimes where it’s not just the impact it has on one person’s life, but also the impact it has on entire communities, of the lesson that it leaves them with about whether they have a place in public life. And I’ve heard from, from many Jewish New Yorkers and many Muslim New Yorkers about the fears that they’re left with whenever an incident like this takes place. And this program is in tandem with ensuring that you have police that are actually able to respond to that. **School safety** **Errol Louis:** What’s your stance on school policing and the presence of armed officers in or around the public schools? **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, I think it is an indication of this broken status quo that we have many schools where they will have a school safety agent, but they will not have a nurse, they will not have a social worker in that same school. And we find that time and time and time and time again. And I’ve been critical of that kind of an approach to our education system, and also the ways in which we view discipline, the only ways that we can actually impart and enforce discipline versus us learning from many models that we’ve seen even be more effective at promoting, getting people back in compliance with those rules as opposed to just punishing them for violating. **Errol Louis:** Do you support the use of metal detectors and I guess more to the point ,who should make the call on whether or not to use them? **Zohran Mamdani:** I think there has to be a real role for the schools chancellor in being a part of that conversation. You know, I have heard from a number of New Yorkers whose children have to go through those metal detectors of the feeling it leaves them with of being less than a student at another school. And I also know that this is not an easy and simple conversation and that there are real questions of safety, but I have a skepticism about whether this is the way in which we can actually create that safety. Is it through the application of metal detectors at a few schools across an entire system? **Rikers Island and the four borough-based jails** **Errol Louis:** Let’s talk for a minute about Rikers Island, and reform of the jails. Under the Adams administration, I believe the number’s up to 42 people who have died while in custody or shortly after being released. What would be your strategy, including sort of timeline changes, alternative sentencing, diversion programs? How do you turn that place around? **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, I’ve visited Rikers a few times, and one of the last times I went there was an incarcerated New Yorker that tried to take their own life in front of one of my colleagues in that cell. The despair on Rikers Island has been well known to many of us for quite some time, and yet it is despair that has only been heightened under this current mayoral administration. You know, you mentioned more than 40 New Yorkers have been killed on Rikers Island, five in the last two weeks. And the jail population of Rikers has increased since Eric Adams has come into office, by more than a thousand additional incarcerated New Yorkers. And what is quite staggering to me is that we know that we can reduce that jail population to less than 4,000\. I mean, Vital City had an article about a number of different proposals that could reduce it to 3,700\. And some of this also just has to look at: The average stay on Rikers in the 1990s was 50 days. Now it’s more than a hundred. There are more than 1,500 people on Rikers who have been held there for more than a year. So I do think many of the reforms that have to be made are also reforms around the court system and ensuring that people are actually having speedy trials. But I also think other reforms. You know, we often talk about the revolving door and how do we actually address and deal with the revolving door, and a big part of it is that we ensure that we are in actually equipping people with what they need to not just come straight back to Rikers Island. But this administration has cut funding for much of those very services on Rikers Island. And so I think that this is part of my frustration, where, you know, we have had a mayor who has made it effectively impossible to follow the law of closing Rikers by 2027. My commitment will be to do everything in my power from the very beginning to follow that law and to ensure that we are reducing the jail population and following the example we’ve seen in the past where you can do so while also reducing crime and understanding that no longer can we just be at ease with Rikers Island being the largest mental health facility in New York City, second largest in the country, where 40% of all the population is, is diagnosed as having SMI, serious mental illness. **Errol Louis:** Um, Jack Jaworski, who’s a journalism student here at Columbia, picks up on that, saying that the mayor of the current administration has made it “functionally impossible,” those are your words, to close Rikers by 2027 as required by law. And his question is, what would you do to get the closure and the required borough jails back on track? **Zohran Mamdani:** Is Jack here? Zack. Zack. I feel like we have seen each other at a number of events. You’ve finally got me. You’ve finally got me. Thank you for your question. And I hope, I hope the other person who asked is also here. Um, you know, I think there’s a question of will. Do you actually want to do this? Do you actually want to take this on? Are you just pushing the can down the road? And to me it’s also how you approach not just Rikers but also the relationship with the state. Right now, for New Yorkers who were released out of state jails, 40% immediately enter into New York City shelters. There’s not much thought as to what will they do next? What is their pathway beyond that? And you had brought this up of a few different proposals of alternatives to incarceration that have been proven to be effective, and these are also alternatives that actually reduce the likelihood of recidivism. Because as soon as you step foot in a jail, your likelihood of recidivism increases. And we need to be guided by these outcomes, by this evidence, because so often as it pertains to jails and prisons and crime, we are only willing to speak about this in the discourse that we’ve had politically for the last few years, as opposed to what works, what doesn’t work, and how can we ensure that…These statistics, they are both horrifying, and these were the statistics, you know, these have been, the statistics we have become inured to over the last few years. I mean, going to Rikers…the peak of the crisis, you know, when I first came in, it was in my first year in 2021, and going there and having to fight to even visit and trying to be convinced by anyone who had any power that I shouldn’t go, that we shouldn’t organize this. And then going and knowing that whatever we were seeing was a sanitized version of what actually existed because everyone knew that we were coming. And yet even amidst that sanitized version, seeing the despair amongst so many, and the fact that, I mean, you have people who have waited two years for a trial. How does that make any sense? And it’s not a question of fiscal imperatives because it costs the city more than $500,000 a year to keep someone on Rikers Island. And if you have such a large population of New Yorkers with SMI on Rikers Island, you then have to ask what’s the best way of actually engaging in dealing with SMI. And I have been quite taken by the clubhouse model by Fountain House that we have here in New York City, I think there are about 16 clubhouses. They are centers, peer-led rehabilitative centers for New Yorkers with SMI. They have been proven to reduce hospitalization by up to 45%, increase employment rates by 50%, decrease loneliness by 56%, and actually reduce the cost of Medicaid, when used for those members by more than 20%. And the cost of an entire year’s worth of service is $4,000\. That is three days on Rikers Island. How does it make sense? In that we are willing to invest in this, but we are not willing to invest in this. And some of this is a question of funding, but even in the bureaucracy, you know, Mayor Adams put forward restrictions in an RFP that made it difficult for a smaller-size clubhouse to even be possible. It’s a lack of interest and a lack of will at both the bureaucratic, the technical, and also the questions of funding. **Errol Louis:** Well, also at the political level, right? I mean, when a Fountain House or a similar proposal comes up in a neighborhood and folks want to march in the streets, go to court, call the mayor names, say, you’re destroying our quality of life, what are you gonna say to those people? **Zohran Mamdani:** Well, I will tell them that I have been called many names in this campaign, and some of them are by my opponents who just can’t seem to say my real name. But you know, part of this is you have to be willing to have, you have to be willing to fight for these policies. You know, it is not going to be easy to build the number of protected bike lanes, bus lanes, busways that I’ve spoken about. It means you have to be able to actually stand up and understand that there will be opposition, and yet that oftentimes that is a magnified opposition. That in terms of sound and impact, it dwarfs the sentiments of the more than million New Yorkers who ride that bus traveling at an average speed of eight miles an hour. I mean, look at the Fordham bus lane, you know that you would have the mayor taking phone calls from the Botanical Garden to say that we don’t want this, but not thinking about the thousands of New Yorkers who sit in, on those buses that are suffocated by traffic. I think that these are the kinds of fights. They are different topics, they’re different policies. But they do require a common thing, which is political will. **Errol Louis:** How willing are you to say no or to disappoint even some of your strongest political supporters? **Zohran Mamdani:** That has been a part of this campaign is putting forward our agenda and knowing that there will be disagreement with those that I share much agreement, those that I share little agreement, but the disagreement will be a part of being in a coalition, that tension. You have to be able and willing to say no, as long as what it is in service of is saying yes to the agenda that you actually ran on. **What if Trump sends the National Guard?** **Errol Louis:** Some of what you just described requires a lot of coordination with other government agencies, like you mentioned basically the State Department of Corrections, DOCCS, they’re sending people here after they’re incarcerated. You’ve got all kinds of federal funding streams. You’ve got the district attorneys and the court system, which frankly will determine how fast people get processed and maybe get out of Rikers Island, that sort of thing. But let me ask you about the extreme example that is on everybody’s minds, which is a federal government that has talked openly about sending troops here or nationalizing the National Guard and placing them on the streets of New York. **Zohran Mamdani:** You know, I agree with Commissioner Tisch’s response to this, which is that we do not need the National Guard here in New York City, and we know that no matter the context within which it is described, this has nothing to do with questions of crime and safety. If it was questions of crime and safety, then you would see the deployment of the National Guard in the eight of the 10 states that have the highest levels of crime in the country, which are Republican-led. It is not about that. It is an attempt to insert Donald Trump, his agenda, his vision into the hearts of municipalities that showcase an alternative style of politics that is actually for people, that has an affirmative vision of what’s possible for them. And I think of a few things. One is the necessity of partnership working alongside elected officials at every level. You look at California, it was the mayor of L.A., it was the governor of the state, it was the attorney general together. That they worked together, they filed a lawsuit. A federal judge recently found in their favor that the deployment was illegal. And through the attorney general of California, the steps that they have taken for every dollar they’ve spent on a lawsuit, they’ve won more than $33,000 in federal funding that they’ve, that that has been returned to them. I can’t quite imagine Andrew Cuomo working with Tish James and Kathy Hochul to fight back against the deployment of the National Guard. And I have appreciated here that we have an incredible attorney general whose support I’m so proud to have who has been on the front lines of this. And in Governor Hochul, someone who has shown that it is possible to actually fight back against Trump. You think about this, you think about the battle around congestion pricing. You don’t hear about it much anymore. And part of that is because it’s been successful, but for it to be successful, it needed to be defended. And the governor’s forceful pushback of that is part of what allowed the time, the space, the oxygen for it to become an issue such that the federal administration wouldn’t even want to tackle it anymore. **Errol Louis:** Okay. That brings us to the end of our time. Thank you so much. I learned a lot. Great talking with you. **Zohran Mamdani:** Thank you. Jelani, if I could, if I could just add one thing, we just jumped straight into the conversation, but I just really want to say thank you for having us here, for having this conversation. Errol, thank you for the moderation and thank you for the questions from all of you. It’s really been a joy to be here, and thank you for finally cornering me for that question. I knew you’d get me. I thought I could outrun you. ### The Growth of the Firearm Industry URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-growth-of-the-firearm-industry/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z > The country's gun problem was a problem of plenty, driven by postwar prosperity mingling with anxieties about crime and social upheaval. It took Americans about a century and a half to accumulate the roughly 45 million guns in civilian hands at the end of the Second World War. Over the subsequent 80 years, they would add 400 million more. The most important thing to know about the consumer market for guns in the postwar United States, then, is that, like so many other aspects of American life in the era, it emphasized quantity over quality. By the 1960s, the country's gun problem — and, even more so than today, there was a growing consensus that guns were *a problem* — was a problem of plenty, driven by the unprecedented prosperity of postwar U.S. society mingling with increasing anxieties about crime and social upheaval. "Plenty" not only described the availability of guns after 1945; it also described the preponderance of myths about guns in contemporaneous American life. Out of kernels of truth — guns as essential tools in a white settler-colonial society at war with Indigenous people and dependent on hunting wildlife — grew simplistic narratives of white people marching westward, building a nation from scratch through little more than the power of the gun. The first generation of gun capitalists [both shaped and reinforced this facile story](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The%5FGunning%5Fof%5FAmerica/ue%5FlCgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through marketing — consider Winchester's Model 1873, the "gun that won the West," or the clever pitch: ["God created men equal. Colonel Colt made them equal."](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/day-1847-texas-ranger-walked-samuel-colts-shop-and-said-make-me-six-shooter-180961621/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The pioneering marketing techniques of industrialists like Colt and Winchester spurred demand, or attempted to, but it was only with U.S. victory in the Second World War and the country's ascendance to global predominance that the United States could become materially the gun country of entrepreneurs' — not to mention consumers' — dreams. The United States claimed half of all global economic production in 1945\. Despite the challenges of conversion from wartime to peace, the consumer economy was humming by the 1950s, giving Americans access to an abundance and variety of consumer goods unprecedented in world history, making their middle-class consumer society the envy of the world, even of the rival Soviet Union by 1959, when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev toured the United States and openly admired the bounty of its consumer offerings. > The country's gun problem was a problem of plenty, driven by postwar prosperity mingling with anxieties about crime and social upheaval. Gun myths started to meet material reality, then, as gun sales grew steadily in the 1950s and 1960s. Raised on legends of the Minutemen and the frontier, many of them having lived through the tempering violence of the Second World War, American men — and it was overwhelmingly men, and they were overwhelmingly white — had money and leisure time like never before in the 1950s. The fields and the forests surrounding growing suburbs beckoned, offering new or expanded recreational opportunities that promised to connect men both to nature and an imagined past in which pioneers had manfully conquered it. Advertisers connected traditional themes of manliness in the consumer gun market with the new bounty of the postwar era. American men won the war, vanquishing fascism and empire, and among the spoils were the world's guns, imported by wily entrepreneurs who stalked defense ministries around the world in search of war-used weapons to buy for pennies on the dollar. "From all corners of the globe these superb firearms are brought to your very doorstep," boasted a 1961 ad from Hunters Lodge, a large national mail-order distributor. Indeed, imports of war surplus weapons, millions of rifles and handguns wielded by the war's European and Asian powers, helped power the rapid expansion of the consumer gun market in the 1950s and 1960s. For a fraction of the price of a brand-new rifle from a traditional manufacturer like Remington or Winchester, gun-curious men could take home a firearm designed to meet the exacting demands of combat. By [one estimate](https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/firearms-and-violence-american-life?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the United States had imported about 70,000 rifles total between 1918 and 1945; in 1960 alone, private importers brought in more than 400,000. Chief among this new generation of gun capitalists was Samuel Cummings, the era's most infamous and prodigious international arms merchant and also Americans' chief domestic gun dealer. Better than anyone else, Cummings managed to connect the supply of cheap guns around the world to U.S. consumer demand. Cummings ran a company called Interarms out of a series of warehouses on the Alexandria, Virginia, waterfront, building it into the country's largest importer and distributor, supplying thousands of retail outlets, from small mom-and-pop shops to department stores like Sears, with inexpensive war surplus rifles. For the weekend hunter and the target shooter, a sophisticated logistics network "sporterized" the millions of guns Cummings acquired, softening the scars of wartime use. In a peak year, Cummings could import upward of a half-million firearms for the U.S. consumer market, and by the time the Gun Control Act of 1968 cut off his most lucrative activities by restricting war surplus imports, he had sold U.S. consumers some five million weapons of war. ([Recent revelations from the JFK assassination files](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2025/05/jfk-files-assassination-release-date-declassified.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) point to Interarms' origins as a CIA front company, raising all sorts of titillating questions about the role of U.S. intelligence in helping to kick-start Americans' postwar addiction to guns.) > The postwar consumer market had shown Americans that a world of cheap, widely accessible guns was at their fingertips. The impact of imports on the domestic industry and the consumer market should not be underestimated. While they were never more than one-third of guns sold in the United States in any given year during this period, traditional gun manufacturers saw Cummings' guns as an existential threat both to the industry and to national security, or at least portrayed them as such to Congress, which investigated in 1958\. National security considerations of a different nature won out, however. In[ hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee](https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/101710769?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), officials with the State Department told members that, despite protests from the gun industry, it was indeed good for U.S. foreign policy to encourage the world's cheap guns to flood into the United States, rather than allowing them to fall into the hands of communist insurgents elsewhere. Cold War imperatives forced binary thinking on the world's guns. Cummings, too, wrote to the committee, arguing that his cheap guns weren't competing for the same dollar as the high-end rifles from the traditional manufacturers. If anything, he was bringing in new buyers who might prefer to dip their toe into the waters of gun ownership before diving in headfirst. An astute observer of consumer trends, Cummings was on the mark. The gun consumer market was expanding into a truly mass market, widely accessible for the first time to even the working classes, thanks to the imports pushing prices down and drawing in new buyers. Cummings chastised the traditional gunmakers in 1958 for their failure to grasp the opportunities of this expanding market, but they would do so enthusiastically in the 1960s. Data on gun sales backed up Cummings' claims. While the sale of long guns for hunting and sport shooting jumped dramatically in the 1950s — rifle sales, for instance, almost doubled from 1954 to 1960 — it would be during the 1960s when the gun industry would take advantage of rocketing demand for handguns. Sales of handguns in the decade leading up to the Gun Control Act of 1968 were 250% higher than in the previous decade, and handgun sales quadrupled from 1962 to 1968 alone. Here, too, imports proved the main catalyst for market growth. In 1958, the United States imported roughly 79,000 handguns; in 1968, it brought in more than 1.2 million, accounting for half of all handgun sales that year. While some of these imported handguns were war surplus, most were newly manufactured in Western Europe, cheap guns made quickly to take advantage of the booming U.S. market. Made from inferior metals, they could be dangerous to fire, and it was not uncommon for the barrels to warp slightly after each round fired. > It is difficult to conjure a time when the vast majority of Americans believed that something had gone wrong in the mechanisms of the consumer gun market. What Americans knew about the consumer market for guns, even those in the nascent field of gun studies, was mostly a mystery until 1968\. In the wake of the spring slayings of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Milton Eisenhower to head the U.S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence in an investigation of the origins and nature of violence in American life. The Eisenhower Commission in turn appointed a Firearms Task Force (FTF) to investigate the impact of guns on violence specifically. The Eisenhower Commission's esteemed research directors included two scholars who had conducted some of the earliest social science research on firearms violence, Marvin Wolfgang and Franklin Zimring, the latter of whom supervised the FTF's research agenda. (In 1969, the FTF published an[ essential report](https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/firearms-and-violence-american-life?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for making sense of the postwar gun market, where all of the above data can be found.) Among the discoveries that surprised the FTF was that no federal commission or agency had ever before set about trying to collect data on guns in America and to make sense of all that data. Drawing data from federal departments like Commerce and Treasury, along with, remarkably, sales data from gun manufacturers — figures the manufacturers shared only after the commission agreed to anonymize them — researchers concluded that the number of guns in civilian hands had doubled since the end of the Second World War. Roughly 90 million firearms sat in Americans' gun cabinets and closets and night table drawers and glove compartments in 1968, some 45 million more than in 1945\. Of those, roughly 25 million were handguns, which the FTF concluded were the most dangerous weapons of interpersonal violence, accounting for three-quarters or more of gun deaths annually. For many Americans, including the president and those members of the U.S. House and Senate who would pass the Gun Control Act of 1968 in a bipartisan vote, this accumulation itself was a kind of tragedy. How had this happened? How had the country let this happen? Congressional champions of gun control, like Sen. Thomas Dodd, identified cheapness and the problem of plenty as a culprit. The GCA therefore attempted to dam the flood of both war surplus firearms and cheaply manufactured handguns. But there would be no turning back: The postwar consumer market had shown Americans that a world of cheap, widely accessible guns was at their fingertips. Watered down by conservatives and gun rights organizations like the National Rifle Association intent on preserving access to that market, the GCA proved inadequate to the task of limiting accumulation, and it contained too many loopholes to prevent determined gun entrepreneurs from finding a way through the weak barriers it erected. Over the next quarter-century, the civilian gun stockpile would double again, just as it had after the Second World War. And then it would double once more 25 years later. In the 21st century United States, in our contemporary guns-everywhere society, in a country now with 10 times as many firearms as 1945, it is difficult to conjure a time when the vast majority of Americans believed that something had gone wrong in the mechanisms of the consumer gun market. There were too many of them and they were too easy to buy — an observation that, since then, has seemingly become an American virtue rather than a vice. ### Gun Culture Then and Now URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/gun-culture-then-and-now/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:51.000Z > What preoccupied white gun owners in early America was not self-defense so much as collective offense. I've been researching and writing about the history of the international arms trade for about 15 years. Until 2022, I'd never been contacted by any party to a Second Amendment court case. But things changed that summer, after the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark gun rights decision in [New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc., v. Bruen](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843%5F7j80.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The majority decision put history, text and tradition at the center of Second Amendment jurisprudence. Faced with a consequent wave of new challenges attempting to invalidate gun safety laws as unconstitutional, state attorneys general have [sought out](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/14/us/gun-law-1791-supreme-court.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) professional [historians](https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2024/07/07/gun-laws-supreme-court-bruen-rahimi/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with relevant expertise to help them mount an effective defense. In more than two dozen cases over the past few years, I've been asked by attorneys general to respond to historical arguments put forward by plaintiffs and their expert witnesses in the gun-rights movement. The basic claim I've seen them making over and over again is one about continuity. They argue (a) that guns and gun problems in the founding era were analogous to guns and gun problems in our own times, (b) that the founders didn't regulate guns, and therefore (c) that we can't, either. My response as a historian has been to explain that guns and gun problems were in fact [very different in the founding era](https://www.californialawreview.org/print/gun-continuity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Those differences are key to understanding what the founders did or didn't do about the problem of guns in society. Before considering the most important differences between firearms then and now, though, there is one very important similarity to consider. Like residents of the United States today, (white) British North Americans owned a lot of guns relative to their contemporaries around the world. To the best of our knowledge, by 1774, on average [about half of all white households](https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol43/iss5/2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) possessed a firearm. That meant [guns were more abundant than bibles](https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol43/iss5/2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in early America. All told, the 13 Colonies probably had enough privately held guns to arm around a third of adult white men. That's paltry compared to the contemporary United States, where there are far more guns than there are all the men, women and children in the country combined. But British North America was indisputably one of the best-armed societies in the world during the founding era. Why? British North America was a well-armed society because it was a war-making society. It was preoccupied with three kinds of conflicts: settler colonialism, slavery and warfare with imperial rivals France and Spain. The first two were foundational to the whole enterprise of Colonial America, and they were both perpetual. Without the Europeans' monopoly on producing firearms, they would not have been able to dispossess Native people of their land or keep [a fifth of the population enslaved](https://www.amrevmuseum.org/finding-freedom-big-ideas/finding-freedom-big-idea-5-slavery-and-revolutionary-ideals?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Wars against France and Spain periodically convulsed the Colonies as well. Such wars diverted men and weapons from the projects of settler colonialism and slavery, imperiling both. With no significant permanent standing army in British North America, most fighting against Indigenous nations, the enslaved and rival empires fell to white men who either volunteered or were drafted into service, usually with their own weapons. That basic fact — that early America was a wartime project requiring an armed white male populace — helps explain three of the biggest differences between gun culture today and gun culture in the founding era. First, while our gun culture is consumerist, theirs was utilitarian. Today, guns are heavily marketed consumer goods. They come in an astonishing variety, with gunmakers aggressively catering to ever more specialized segments of the market. Browse the magazine rack at your local supermarket; chances are it will feature several different publications devoted to the pastime of consuming firearms. A landmark [2015 survey](https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/3/5/38.abstract?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from researchers at Harvard and Northeastern Universities found that the 3% of Americans who own the most guns — for reasons of collecting or prepping for disaster or both — possess roughly half of all privately held firearms in the country. That astonishing fact is even more remarkable when put into a global context. Americans own [nearly half of all the world's privately held firearms](https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/estimating-global-civilian-held-firearms-numbers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That means around the world, nearly one out every four privately held guns belongs to an American ["super-owner"](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/09/20/gun-ownership-america-firearms-super-owners?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a group comprising 0.13% of the global population. Nothing remotely like this existed in the 18th century. [Careful surveys of probate records](https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2023/09/an-eighteenth-century-gun-culture-shaped-by-constraints?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the time reveal that few households possessed more than one firearm. Vanishingly few possessed more than five. Those that did were almost exclusively large southern slaveholders, who had brutally utilitarian reasons for being heavily armed. Most Colonists saw guns as tools and would have found today's hypercommercialized and ideologically charged culture of consuming, collecting and stockpiling guns deeply alien. Second, where our gun culture is individualist, theirs was collective. Since 2008, the Supreme Court's position has been that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to armed self-defense. Of course, this is something many Americans feel very strongly about today. Gun-rights groups have put the armed individual at the center of their rhetoric for more than a generation. The firearms industry has been [phenomenally successful](https://www.thetrace.org/newsletter/coronavirus-gun-surge-marketing-triumph/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at [marketing fear](https://www.vpc.org/studies/militarization.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the prospect of the armed individual [protecting themselves](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340654183%5FTargeted%5FAdvertisingDocumenting%5Fthe%5Femergence%5Fof%5FGun%5FCulture%5F20%5Fin%5FGuns%5Fmagazine%5F1955-2019?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and their families. Things were different in the founding era. Prior to the widespread availability of breech-loading weapons and metallic cartridges in the mid-19th century, firearms were awkward tools either for perpetrating or resisting crimes of passion. They were notoriously inaccurate at range, liable to misfire and had to be laboriously muzzle-loaded with gunpowder and ball before every shot. Moreover, such guns were seldom kept loaded and at the ready for any extended period because black powder corroded iron barrels so quickly. Partly for these reasons, firearms usually played a relatively small role in murders in North America before the era of the Civil War. What preoccupied white gun owners in early America was not self-defense so much as collective offense — the three kinds of collective war-making that made guns so indispensable and abundant in the 18th century. Third and finally, while our gun culture is [government-phobic](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0349-z?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), theirs was government-led. [Fear of government](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383344542%5FA%5FBulwark%5Fagainst%5FTyranny%5FFear%5Fof%5Fthe%5FGovernment%5Fand%5FFear-based%5FGun%5FPurchasing%5Fin%5FRecent%5FYears?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has been almost as useful for the gun-rights movement and the firearms industry as fear of crime and the promise of self-defense. Every election is framed as an existential contest for the future of gun rights in this country and every proposed regulation, no matter how mild or popular, is a treacherous step down the slippery slope of mass confiscation. The gun-buying public responds to these claims. Sales of certain kinds of guns and accessories [surge after mass shootings](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2729806?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), in anticipation of regulation (that almost never comes). [Presidential elections](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272715000857?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) now have [major effects](https://www.wsj.com/us-news/gun-sales-drop-trump-slump-4cad49ee?gaa%5Fat=eafs&gaa%5Fn=ASWzDAiK6i4%5Fj4j2-97mpk9rarp1O8AyRO7r8C7jKxFSv9shrz5JzQUxcD-CtmkWrUQ%3D&gaa%5Fts=68544202&gaa%5Fsig=335wLhRWZhTtLccE6eFNl7ya73ehQBsDbVGTYGgGoqi7PtCX%5FeKUseTck9krjEREgcH1HHPZxjxh5UaMhwqjpw%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the civilian firearms market, even though the prospect of serious gun control is tiny regardless of which party is in power. > The founders lived in a different world from ours. They weren't worried about government regulation of privately owned firearms so much as the balance of power between federal and state governments. Here again, things were fundamentally different in early America. British Colonists remained unusually well armed because they remained perpetually at war. They fought those wars collectively, usually in militias. These militias were organized, disciplined, directed and, when necessary, armed by the state. There were in fact hundreds of firearm regulations passed in early America. Most took the form of militia laws, requiring adult male military service and firearm ownership. When militiamen couldn't afford or acquire their own arms, the state tried to provide them. In fact, the state was so important to arming early America that historians can mostly predict where gun ownership rates were high or low depending on a Colony's militia laws. In other words, early American gun culture was government-led, rather than government-phobic. The historian in me thinks these differences are fascinating and worthy of study. As a citizen concerned about gun violence in our communities, though, I think it's a tragedy that the 18th century has come to have so much power over the present, over whether elected officials are permitted to regulate firearms here and now. But this state of affairs may not outlast the Supreme Court's conservative majority. In the 2008 case [District of Columbia v. Heller](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/554/570/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Supreme Court declared for the first time that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms. That fateful decision ignored the gun-culture chasm separating us from the founders. As previous decisions had maintained, and as several of the nation's most distinguished scholars reminded the court in an [amicus brief](https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/07-290%5Famicus%5Fhistorians.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Second Amendment was not drafted to protect armed self-defense. The founders lived in a different world from ours. They weren't worried about government regulation of privately owned firearms so much as the balance of power between federal and state governments. The newly ratified Constitution had just given the federal government sweeping authority over state militias, provoking significant anxiety within the states. The Second Amendment was the answer to those anxieties. Americans will have to keep living and dying with the consequences of the court's misreading of history for the foreseeable future. But by incentivizing states to sponsor new research into firearms history, Bruen will have the ironic effect of bringing the folly of modern Second Amendment jurisprudence into sharper and sharper focus. It isn't difficult to imagine future justices, as skeptical of precedent as the conservative majority is today, reconsidering the landmark Second Amendment decisions of the Roberts era. Thanks to Bruen, they'll have a lot of history to work with. ### The Case Against Futility URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-case-against-futility-in-gun-regulation/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:51.000Z There are more firearms than people in the United States, and guns are far more likely to be used in violent crime than in other wealthy nations. Annual sales in recent years range from 20 million to 40 million. But does that mean that guns are readily available to every American who wants one? Or that it is futile to attempt to regulate them? The short answer to both questions is no. The campaign to do away with long-standing regulations is a threat to public safety. Federal regulation for the purpose of curtailing gun violence dates back over 90 years. In 1934, the National Firearms Act imposed a $200 tax (confiscatory at the time) on sales of Tommy guns, sawed-off shotguns and other weapons favored by gangsters in the Roaring '20s, and required that owners register these weapons. The modern regulatory framework was detailed by the Gun Control Act, enacted in 1968\. It sought to prevent certain high-risk groups of people (those with a serious criminal record, a history of involuntary commitment and other things) from obtaining or possessing firearms. The law restricts commercial manufacture, shipment and sale to those who have a federal license. Retail dealers are required to conduct background checks on would-be buyers and keep records to assist law enforcement in tracing guns used in crime. A number of states [supplement federal regulations](https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/law-navigator.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example by requiring a government-issued permit or license to purchase handguns, and the Gun Control Act's restrictions on interstate commerce are intended to prevent state regulations from being undercut. This regulatory effort has failed in the sense that there is a great deal of gun crime, to a large extent committed by individuals who are legally barred from possessing guns. But it is a mistake to conclude that these regulations on commerce are worthless just because they are widely violated. Things could be worse. That truth is all too clearly illustrated by the U.S. experience in deregulating other problematic commodities. The campaign to legalize cannabis was supported in part by the argument that "everyone is doing it anyway." But states that have legalized cannabis have experienced large increases in the number of frequent users, as well as the rapid proliferation of novel, [high-potency products with yet-unknown health risks](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/25/us/marijuana-thc-health-claims-potency.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). There is a similar dynamic with online sports betting, a common practice made much more common now that it has been legalized in a majority of states. The "futility" argument asserts that crime-involved individuals are highly motivated to go armed, since they need a gun to intimidate rivals, commit robbery or protect their drug stash. In this view, they will do whatever is necessary to obtain a gun. In economic lingo, their demand is inelastic. And in any case, so it is claimed, not that much effort is required when guns are pervasive. The argument was propounded by prominent scholars of the 1980s like Peter Rossi, James Wright and James Jacobs. But the argument is called into question by the behavioral revolution in social science. While there surely are some dangerous people who are enterprising enough to overcome any barriers to obtaining a gun, that is not likely to be the norm. Seemingly weak regulations can often have leverage on even life-and-death outcomes, as illustrated by the well-documented power of minimum drinking age laws to reduce traffic fatalities and violent crime. The fact that [only a small minority of individuals](https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/suficspi16.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) incarcerated for gun crimes sourced their weapons from licensed dealers suggests that even weakly enforced supply regulations influence the supply channels available to dangerous individuals. Of course, supply regulation is not the only potentially effective strategy for gun violence prevention. Gun violence represents the intersection of violence (most of which does not involve guns) and gun availability. There are numerous effective approaches to reducing violence rates — in Vital City, [John Roman listed 20 evidence-based options](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/twenty-strategies-for-reducing-crime-in-cities). An effective program to reduce violence (such as hot-spot policing or dropout prevention) will typically reduce both gun violence and violence perpetrated with knives and clubs and fists. As we write this (in June 2025), it appears we are in the midst of a historic decline in violence of all sorts, beginning in 2022\. Gun violence is to a large extent embedded in overall violence. > Seemingly weak regulations can often have leverage on even life-and-death outcomes. Successful gun control programs, on the other hand, reduce the portion of violent crimes that involve a gun without necessarily affecting the overall amount of violence. Reducing gun use makes violence less deadly. Even a one-for-one replacement of shootings with knife attacks reduces the number of deaths, simply because guns are so much more lethal than other commonly available weapons. In looking at international comparisons with Canada and other wealthy nations, the U.S. homicide rate is a far greater outlier than our overall rates of serious criminal violence — simply because violence here is much more likely to involve guns. One analogy is highway safety. Traffic fatalities are reduced by regulations that require air bags and other measures that make crashes less deadly — even if the overall accident rate is unchanged. Similarly, effective gun control makes violence less deadly. It can also reduce the threat of certain types of violent crime for which firearms are central to the perpetrators' success. Think of political assassination or mass attacks in schools and other public places. While relatively rare, such events have an outsized impact on quality of life. So, given the importance of curtailing gun use in criminal violence, the case for regulating gun commerce must still overcome the "futility" claim. That case rests on an understanding of the distribution and supply of firearms. First, even though there are more than enough guns in circulation for everyone to have one, the fact is that most do not. Only about [one-third of adults, and 40% of households, own a gun](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/07/24/key-facts-about-americans-and-guns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In that sense, a majority of adults do not have ready access. The stockpile of guns tends to be concentrated, [with the most heavily armed 10% of owners owning an average of 25 guns each](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00027162231164855?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), nearly half the total. Furthermore, guns are far sparser in some jurisdictions than others. The national household prevalence of 40% is an average concealing [considerable geographic variation](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2815585?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In particular, it is lower in metropolitan areas than rural areas, and lower in the Northeast and West Coast than elsewhere. Comparing large cities, more than one-third of the households in St. Louis, New Orleans and Nashville own guns, while ownership is only about 10% in New York and Boston. The prevalence of gun ownership in a jurisdiction is correlated with the likelihood that robberies and assaults will be committed with a gun. The likely explanation relates to what economists call "transactions costs" — the effort, delay and risk (as well as the money price) entailed in acquiring a gun. The guns used in crime are typically acquired [a few weeks or months](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-019-00358-0?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) before the crime, and usually from an acquaintance, fellow gang member or other individual in the social network. In cities where guns are relatively sparse, one's social network is generally less likely to include gun owners, especially those who are willing to sell or loan one of their guns. Surveys of individuals who are underage or who have criminal records help document this sort of differentiation. Some respondents indicate that they would like a gun but don't know how to obtain one, or that it would take them a week or more to obtain one. Others, particularly those more embedded in criminal networks, report ready access. Indeed, one "benefit" from joining a gang is that fellow gang members may serve as connections for obtaining a gun. > The problem in regulating gun commerce to reduce gun violence is not some intrinsic futility of this approach, but rather the lack of political will. While it is relatively rare for the guns used in crime to have been acquired directly from a federally licensed dealer (FFL), those dealers play an important role in the diversion of guns from the legal supply stream. FFLs, who collectively sold about 25 million guns annually during the COVID years, are required to conduct background checks on would-be buyers and enforce state and local regulations, if any. To evade these requirements, a proscribed person can possibly find a corrupt dealer or present false identification to a careless dealer, although this practice does not appear particularly widespread. More important is that proscribed individuals can prevail on some entitled person to serve as a "straw purchaser," buying from a dealer on their behalf. There is an analogy here to the beer market; underage individuals can access this market with the help of a false ID or an adult willing to buy for them. Illicit transactions are embedded in the much larger flow of licit commerce. Unlike in the case of underage beer, the supply chain of illicit gun commerce includes some professional straw purchasers who acquire guns from dealers with the intention of trafficking them. It appears that the hundreds of thousands of firearms that flow from the U.S. to Mexico each year are largely sourced from FFLs by straw purchasers. The same is true for interstate trafficking to New York, Chicago and other jurisdictions that have relatively stringent regulations. Recent changes in federal law dating to 2022 have made it easier to prosecute such straw purchasers and traffickers. There are a variety of approaches to make it more difficult for those more likely to misuse firearms — including youths, those with serious criminal records and domestic batterers — to obtain them, even within a gun-rich environment in which most adult citizens are allowed to acquire as many guns as they want. While not an exhaustive list, here are a handful that would likely pass muster with the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Second Amendment: **State permit or license requirements.** As of 2024, 10 states require handgun buyers to have a permit or license issued by a law enforcement authority — although such laws have been a prime target for the deregulation movement. In practice, they are enforced primarily by retail dealers, who are required to deny sale to a customer who lacks a permit. One prominent case study is of Missouri's decision to repeal their requirement in 2007\. That repeal increased gun violence rates, in part because it accelerated the connection between dealer sale and criminal use, likely by making it easier for proscribed people to obtain guns from dealers directly (known as "lie and buy") or indirectly (through straw purchasers). More generally, even accounting for their other laws, states with permit requirements are less likely to be principal sources of illegal cross-border gun flows within the U.S. and across the U.S.-Mexico border. **Federal law enforcement.** The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is charged with issuing licenses for firearms commerce, regulating dealers and conducting criminal investigations of trafficking. Its firearms division has long been understaffed, and the Trump administration's plans to further cut investigator staff are [estimated to reduce ATF's already meager capacity to regulate the industry by about 40%](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/18/us/politics/justice-dept-guns-atf-trump.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). If licensed dealers have little to fear from the regulators, and traffickers are confident they will not be prosecuted despite the new legal tools created by the 2022 act, the results are predictable. While most of the country's nearly 80,000 FFLs are undoubtedly compliant, a few corrupt or negligent actors can play an outsize role in the illegal supply of firearms. Increasing the likelihood of random audits with direct sanctions for noncompliance, while using better data to target scofflaw dealers, has been shown to improve compliance in other industries. It has the potential to reduce the flow of guns to illegal trafficking, but it will require resources. Effective regulation does require some level of enforcement. **Sustaining the new regulations on "ghost guns."** While the primary sources of guns used in crime remain various types of diversion from legal commerce, a new supply channel has become prominent over the last decade: privately made firearms (PMFs). The initial concern was that individuals would take advantage of advances in machine tools and additive manufacturing to produce high-quality guns in their garages — and some do. But [the surge in PMFs' involvement in gun crimes](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-iv-part-v-%E2%80%93-pmf-updates-and-new-analysis/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) between 2015 and 2022 was primarily the result of the marketing of easy-to-assemble gun kits by commercial companies, most notably Polymer80\. These kits were not initially regulated as firearms, so Polymer80 could and did ship them directly to customers, across state lines and with no questions asked. In 2022, ATF changed its ruling and required that these kits, like other firearms, be shipped to licensed dealers, who would in turn require background checks of buyers. The effectiveness of this regulation is suggested by charting the steep increase in PMF prevalence among "crime guns" confiscated in California, the state that led the way in PMFs and that also happens to have relatively stringent regulations on firearm sales and transfers. That rapid growth ended abruptly in California in 2022, with subsequent declines in 2023 shown in some Northeastern cities (New York City, Philadelphia and Baltimore). While the Supreme Court has upheld the 2022 ATF rule, [the question now](https://www.npr.org/2025/07/03/g-s1-75792/ghost-guns-may-make-a-comeback-despite-a-supreme-court-ruling?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is whether the Trump administration will push to rescind those recent regulations. **Local** **buyback programs**. While it is commonplace for local agencies and nonprofits to run short-duration gun buyback programs, there is [no indication that they are effective in reducing gun misuse](https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/essays/gun-buyback-programs.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). New York City has what seems a better idea. For many years, the NYPD has offered to buy operable guns from all comers at $200 apiece, no questions asked. One logical consequence is to set a floor on gun prices, since why sell a junker gun to the teen next door for anything less than you can get in a legal transaction with the police? There will of course be individuals who take advantage of the program to make a profit, and the NYPD has modified its program to limit the number of compensated trade-ins per person or offer higher prices for handguns or certain types of semiautomatic rifles. A program that establishes a long-standing price floor may be enough to discourage some cash-strapped teens and adults living on the margins, and will at least reduce the fraction of the time that they can afford to be armed. The regulatory framework created by the Gun Control Act of 1968 is weak by international standards, but it is far from nothing. Compared with laissez-faire, it serves to reduce gun availability and use by crime-involved people. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of some firearm regulations has only been clearly revealed when they are repealed. The problem in regulating gun commerce to reduce gun violence is not some intrinsic futility of this approach, but rather the lack of political will. ### Licensed to Kill URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/licensed-to-kill-concealed-carry-training-course/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:51.000Z I'm going to tell you a story about gun training — what it's like in America today, and what it could be. It was September 2023 in Austin, Texas. We'd been sitting in a classroom in the back of a gun shop for six hours, poring over the letter of the law and watching news clips about civilians defending their homes against masked invaders. It was a bit performative for my group. There were two dozen of us, and most of us were combat veterans. But we were curious to experience what it was like for a civilian to earn a license to carry a concealed firearm in the Lone Star State. The state of Texas doesn't require any training prior to carrying a concealed firearm, but they still offer a state-sanctioned curriculum. The idea of allowing people to carry hidden guns in public without copious amounts of training, quite frankly, flies in the face of everything we learned in the military about guns. So for me and my veteran friends, this was less about the training or the certification and more of an experiment to see if civilian gun safety training was as bad as we'd been told. The instructor was named Steve (name changed) — a barrel-chested Black man in a polo shirt embroidered with his company logo — and he was carrying a holstered SIG Sauer 1911 Spartan, a large pistol with the image of a Spartan mask clearly visible on the grip. The way the gun protruded 6 inches above his belt line seemed like an odd flex, but this was Texas, where the hubris associated with firearms knows few bounds. "How can he quickly draw that pistol when the grip is as high as his elbow?" I whispered to my fellow classmate. We ultimately decided that functionality didn't matter. He thought it looked cool and that was enough. After the classroom portion of the course, we emerged from the gun dealer's back room into the bright Central Texas sun and sauntered across the strip-mall parking lot to our vehicles, ready to head to the range. I drove separately, so I was not in the van with the instructor when the question of the day was asked. "Hey Steve," my friend later told me he inquired, "You said you were in the Army. What was your MOS?" One veteran asking the military occupational specialty of another is the equivalent of meeting someone from your hometown and asking what neighborhood they lived in. It's standard and benign but can also tell you a lot about the person. Steve was teaching us — and countless others over the years — how to have a loaded firearm in public. What do you need to know to be armed at the mall and not risk harming children? How seriously must we take the responsibility that comes with possession of a tool that can instantaneously take human life? These lessons should be the basic tenets of any license to carry course. And because the stakes are so high, the quality and experience of our instructor matters. I had chosen Steve for two reasons. First, he was located in Austin, where my group was already gathering for other meetings. Second, he was also a veteran; thus, I assumed the gun skills he would teach us would be commensurate with what we had learned in the military. It also didn't hurt that Steve was Black, because one of the biggest criticisms of these types of classes — especially those sponsored by the gun lobby — is the use of coded racial language to stoke fear and incentivize the desire for more people to carry guns in public at all times. Back in the van, Steve told the passengers that his MOS was "42 Romeo." Veterans like us typically recognize a few MOSs. Eleven Bravo is infantry, 19 Delta is a cavalry scout, 31 Bravo is military police, and perhaps a handful of others can be deciphered from the alphanumeric nomenclature; 42R is not one of those. > The most important skill was not how to get away with shooting, but rather how not to shoot. At this point, most veterans would've nodded their heads and politely inquired, "What's a 42R, again?" as if we definitely knew once, but just couldn't recall at the moment. Steve volunteered that he had played the trombone in the Army band. Did we snicker at the concept of being taught how to carry a loaded gun down the public street by a dude who spent most of his Army career providing the live soundtrack to parades and award ceremonies — the literal pomp for the circumstance? Maybe. Though, when I heard, I just rolled my eyes because I appreciate irony. But that's the norm for those of us who served in the military. Give me a veteran, and I'll give you five ways to poke fun at them. The Air Force has cushy offices and nice golf courses. The Navy "deploys" to "hot spots" like Sydney and Bangkok. The Marine Corps — to their chagrin — is part of the Navy. And the Army has trombone players. It's all in good fun. We also respect each other immensely. And I respect every moment Steve served in the Army. At home or abroad, whether he was performing a march by Sousa or qualifying at the range with his service weapon. There is no doubt in my mind that his service is every bit as valuable as mine and that of every other veteran I was with that day. The truth is, most of us had lost confidence in Steve well before we knew his MOS. He lost us by teaching a concealed-carry class that focused not on the awesome responsibility of carrying a weapon that can kill others in an instant, but on fear, paranoia and how to get away with discharging a firearm in public. His training consisted of PowerPoint slide after slide with screenshots of state statutes accompanied by a discussion about how not to get arrested. Examples of times when a license holder can shoot another human being and not worry about getting convicted of a crime. Frightening elaborations of scenarios where there is some legal gray area. And a reminder to buy insurance from the U.S. Concealed Carry Association, and then, if you discharge your weapon, to call them before the gun stops smoking. Steve taught us that in Texas, if someone steals "tangible, movable property" from you before sunset, you can't legally shoot them, but 30 minutes after the sun goes down, it's legal. Steve, apparently, advocates for checking celestial tables before killing another human. With pride, Steve recounted the story of his stepfather shooting and killing a man attempting to enter the second floor of his home through an unlocked window using a ladder taken from an unlocked shed. This happened in Georgia, but Steve must have pitched it to local news in Texas. There was no thought that if the property had been locked up, the gun wouldn't have been necessary. There was no mention of what the invader was after or whether the deceased had children or not. To be fair, Steve did share some of what I assume were required slides on the secure storage of firearms — a key tenet to military gun safety. Each slide was shown for about three seconds, enough to check the box but not absorb the information. > I carry the card and remember how easily I obtained it. Perhaps the most egregious and offensive example was the "self-defense" insurance salesman that Steve peddled into the room in the early afternoon. According to him, the world was full of shadowy armed men intent on doing harm to you and your little lady. But for a low, low monthly payment, you can be shielded from litigation, protected from the law, and feel free to shoot before you see the whites of their eyes. Some people call this coverage "murder insurance," and it's quite commonplace to be pitched on this coverage in gun safety courses that are affiliated with the gun lobby or gun dealers. Strangely, through the entire course, we only shot 50 rounds — most of us using .22-caliber Glocks that we picked up on the firing line fully loaded. This was the only contact we had with a gun in the entire course. It was a stark contrast to the hours upon hours I spent in military training learning every part of an M16; taking it apart, cleaning it and reassembling it, with no ammunition in sight. By the end, my group completed the concealed-carry license requirements. Mine is in my wallet. A piece of plastic that empowers me to carry a hidden gun in public in 37 states. I've never done it, and I don't intend to. I prefer to express my machismo in ways less likely to harm others. But I carry the card and remember how easily I obtained it. **Beyond that back room** This was just one training session administered to one group. Thousands of similar courses happen every year in Texas, and all over the country — courses that are facilitated by gun shop owners and insurance brokers who stand to make a profit when the students buy, carry and even use a firearm. Even though Texas and 28 other states don't actually require training or a permit to carry a concealed gun in public, the courses still exist. Most people take them because they want the knowledge; they want to be responsible. Additionally, states can offer legal advantages to holding a license to carry, meaning that the law might be more permissive of your use of a gun in public. The states that allow for permitless carry are, by definition, dangerous. People who have never held a gun before can purchase one, load it and walk into a grocery store with it in their pocket, all on the same day. The gun lovers call this permissive policy "constitutional carry" because they believe it's covered by the Bill of Rights. But, to me, that's a bastardized reading of the Second Amendment from a group of people who hide behind our nation's founding document, because they love guns — as a hobby, a sign of strength or cosplay. I was recently inside a state capitol building during a contentious hearing about gun legislation. I was advocating in favor of banning military-style assault rifles. One of the gun bros was dressed in 18th century Colonial attire, complete with powdered wig. He bore a resemblance to James Madison, perhaps because he was short. Madison was, famously, 5 feet, 4 inches tall. "Hey James," I hollered, "What's the Sixth Amendment?" Surely, I caught him off guard, but I'd bet my Adidas sneakers against his knickers that he didn't know. Maybe he doesn't even know how many amendments are in the Bill of Rights. But he's sure as hell memorized the Second. (The Sixth Amendment provides the right to a speedy trial. An important one to know if you didn't buy the insurance from Steve's guy.) I have spoken up against gun violence for various organizations and efforts throughout the years, and it's a strange thing to be a combat veteran immersed in the national gun debate. It feels like half the country is hoping to prevent gun violence and death, while the other half has no problem with nearly 50,000 Americans dying by guns each year. Every time I think about our nation's gun culture, I simply can't square it with my military firearms training. > They are learning, quite literally, how to get away with murder. I qualified as an expert on the M9 pistol and M4 carbine. I took both weapons to Afghanistan and carried the M9 as a sidearm at all times. Until I got to a combat zone, I never, ever carried a loaded weapon outside of a weapons range. I was not military police, so I had no need to be armed in public. It would be ridiculous to walk into the post exchange with a gun in tow. Moreover, when it came to firearm use, even in combat — especially in combat — the most important skill was not how to get away with shooting, but rather how *not* to shoot. A close friend who served as an Army special operator once explained to me that if we wanted to kill the enemy indiscriminately, we'd use bombs, rockets and grenades. We put small arms into human hands because humans can exercise judgment. We can teach soldiers when not to shoot. And spoiler alert, we almost always choose not to shoot. Yet, that's not what people across the country are learning in firearms training courses — whether they are required by the state they live in or not. In way too many of these courses, new gun owners are being taught to fear the world and everything in it. They are told that danger lurks around every corner, and all too often the person who represents the danger happens to come from a different background. They are learning, quite literally, how to get away with murder. To be honest, Steve's course was probably in the top 20% of gun safety training courses out there, and that frightens me. We need something different. We need a new formula for firearms training taught not by those who stand to make money from gun sales and shootings, but by those who respect firearms the way we do in the military and understand their use against another human should only be a last resort. We need to teach people to exercise judgment. We need to counter fear with knowledge. The experience the other veterans and I had with Steve so dismayed us that we're doing something about it and building courses that focus on safety and accountability by emulating the respect for firearms we learned in the military. We are now working with Everytown for Gun Safety to advise on [Train SMART](http://trainsmartgunsafety.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), their new firearms training program. We hope Train SMART provides smart answers to many of the questions we had in Steve's course. The questions that you must ask before you shoot. And believe me, there were a lot of questions floating around that day, and most had little to do with the trombone. ### How Modern Bullets Maximize Lethality URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-modern-bullets-maximize-lethality/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:50.000Z *"Many of the varieties between one gun-shot wound and another, arise from the difference in the velocity of the body projected; and they are principally the following. If the velocity of the ball is small, then the mischief is less."* *\-Sir John Hunter, "A Treatise on the Blood, Inflammation, and Gun-Shot Wounds," 1794* Writers and commentators in the media often refer to guns as a single type of product. In fact, there are a wide range of firearms and ammunition sold in the United States today, representing a wide spectrum of lethality. Moreover, the[ design, construction and performance](https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/archives/55/5/common-use-lineage-and-lethality?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of firearms and ammunition today[ is dramatically different](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=4546050&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from in the past. Understanding the distinctions and[ historical evolution](https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/20/opinions/supreme-court-gun-rights-case-lethality-tucker?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of arms and ammunition is essential to informing policy and program efforts to address and[ prevent firearm-related harm](https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/reducing-firearm-injury-and-death/9780813524214/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The damage that gun violence does all comes down to how bullets harm human tissue, a science known as *wound ballistics*. It's a crucial specialty, but one that needs more attention. We have embarked on a systematic, multidisciplinary study combining expertise from specialists who normally have not worked together — trauma surgeons, emergency physicians, military historians, historians of technology, firearm/toolmark examiners and biomechanical engineers — to investigate, develop and evaluate wound ballistics of small arms and bullet combinations that are in circulation in the United States today as well as a selection of firearms and bullet combinations from earlier periods. > A Colonial soldier with a flintlock musket could kill 43 people an hour; by World War I, that number had risen to nearly 500. **Context** Historically, efforts to study the changing characteristics of firearms and ammunition have been conducted primarily by military researchers. In the 1930s and 1940s, for example, the U.S. Army conducted[ experiments](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25092035?seq=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to explore the lethality of different calibers of bullets. In the 1960s, the Army [commissioned a study](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD0458760?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of weapon effectiveness that sought to quantify the lethality of firearms throughout history. The designer of the study,[ Trevor Dupuy](https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/09/obituaries/trevor-n-dupuy-79-prolific-military-historian.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), was a decorated U.S. Army colonel, a noted military historian and a founding faculty member of Harvard University's Defense Studies Program. In 1964, Dupuy developed the "Theoretical Lethality Index" (TLI), which calculated the lethal capacity of weapons across time. He [defined lethality](https://dupuyinstitute.org/publications/books/numbers-predictions-and-war/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as "the destructive power of weapons": "the ability to injure and if possible to kill people." The[ original purpose](https://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/potomac-books/9781612348865/war-by-numbers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the construct was to compare weapons to one another. A table Dupuy developed showed how many persons a soldier with a particular weapon could theoretically kill in one hour. The study demonstrated a significant increase in firearm lethality from the mid-19th century due to improvements in range, rate of fire, accuracy, reliability and the velocity of the bullets. According to the analysis, a Colonial soldier with an 18th century flintlock musket could kill 43 people in an hour, while a soldier in the Civil War era using a rifle with the Minié ball could kill 102 people. The introduction of breech loading rifles, metal cartridges and magazines meant that a soldier with a Springfield Model 1903 rifle theoretically could kill 495 people per hour, representing more than a tenfold increase over the 18th century musket. Studies like this one didn't just try to explain which weapons were deadliest; they sought to understand what individual variables made some weapons more lethal than others. Some of this is about firearm design — some guns can fire bullets at a higher velocity, or more bullets per minute, than others — but much of it comes down to the ammunition itself. These are interrelated. Bullets damage the intended target by transferring kinetic energy to tissues and organs upon penetration. Damage and disruption to those tissues and organs is caused by the direct impact of the bullet (known as the permanent cavity) and the indirect impact of the temporary cavity, which expands radially from the permanent cavity. One can think of the permanent cavity as being the bullet "hole" and the energy outward ripple forms the temporary cavity. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/amgigggnhvfto_ny_bontecou_2_095-png-auto-format-compress-1776259686048.jpg) Credit: Medical Historical Library, Harvey Cushing/John Hay Whitney Medical Library, Yale University. Photograph of a gunshot wound received by a 19-year old soldier from New York on the battlefield during the Civil War in North Carolina in April 1865, during the last days of the war. Plate 95 in Reed Brockway, Gunshot Wounds Illustrated, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Harewood U.S.A. General Hospital, 1865). The pasted-in caption provided the detail that the wound "was caused by the conoidal ball," a type of hollow-based bullet designed by Claude-Étienne Minié for muzzle-loaded, rifled muskets. Bullet speed is a crucial component of its wounding potential. Following a basic formula from physics: Kinetic Energy (KE) equals 1/2 mass times velocity squared, this means that as the mass of the bullet changes, the effect is proportional, but as velocity changes, its effects are exponential. Today some bullets exceed a speed of 2,600 feet per second — making them among the fastest objects propelled in modern society with their resulting KE and wounding potential. The structure of bullets is a significant variable too. Over time, bullets have changed in shape and other characteristics that changed the speed at which they can travel and the way that they behave in the body on impact and penetration. The original lead spheres that were used in 18th century muskets were replaced in the 19th century by new forms of bullets and cartridges. The Minié ball, a bullet designed in the mid-1840s by Claude-Étienne Minié for muzzle-loaded, rifled muskets, could be loaded into the muzzle of a rifled barrel, significantly increasing the range, velocity and lethality of the musket. Compared to the 1700s and lead spheres to modern day bullets (such as the 5.56 NATO), we see a greater than ninefold increase in the kinetic energy delivered by the projectile and the rifle it carries. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/amgijggnhvfto_nv_tuckerhargartensupportingimage1-png-auto-format-compress-1776259687621.jpg) Credit: Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives (James Henry Burton Papers, MS 117, box 3). Varieties of Minié bullets. Pen and ink sketches and diagrams. "Illustrations from Report on experiments with small arms, carried on at The Royal Manufactory at Enfield \[England\] in 1852." Finally, lethality is influenced by the way bullets are carried in firearms. From the late 19th into the early 20th century, cartridges (typically a brass casing that includes a primer, gunpowder and a bullet) were advanced to their present-day configuration, not only resulting in greater velocities but also permitting the cartridge to be loaded in the breech of the barrel, allowing more bullets to be released per minute. **Our project** We are currently involved in a state-of-the-art investigation to describe and quantify the permanent and temporary cavity formations in human tissue and the kinetic energy release in order to categorize a cross-section of current and historical firearms and ammunition by their wounding and lethality potential. One aim is to establish a common vocabulary and a shared metric for quantifying the lethality of firearms and bullets. To do this, we are applying cutting-edge technology to measure the wound ballistics of several different bullets from a range of historical and contemporary handguns and rifles. Our project uses high-resolution video to show the wounding potential of a range of bullets by measuring velocity and energy once the bullet has been fired. High-speed photography and advanced techniques such as laser visualization have been developed to study bullet trajectories in greater detail, including analysis of ricochet and other impacts. Using new visualization technologies, we are examining wound ballistics across a spectrum of bullets and firearms and calculating kinetic energy metrics with the high-resolution video technology, further characterizing and quantifying the wounding potential of bullets. There have been few scientific studies that have systematically and prospectively examined the clinical effects of a bullet on the human body using rigorous, state-of-the-art laboratory methods. We are not aware of studies that describe the different outcomes of the bullet's ballistics trauma on the bodies of, for example, young children versus mature adults.[ One study by Anthony Braga and Philip Cook](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2688536?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggested that if homicide events were conducted with lower-caliber handguns, there would be a nearly 40% reduction in homicides. Our preliminary investigations demonstrate a fivefold difference in the KE delivered by a .25-caliber handgun bullet (low caliber) versus a .40-caliber handgun bullet. Clinicians who care for patients injured by bullets should understand the relationship of bullet mass and velocity to wound severity and outcomes and surgical care. This information is also valuable for policymakers, who can take this science-driven information into account when categorizing the technological changes in firearms and the bullets they carry. Bullet and firearm designs and technologies have changed considerably since the 1700s, and the changes have been followed closely by those in the military, hunting and sporting communities. The implications for civil society have been largely underresearched and are not fully understood. We should begin to have public policy discussions informed by what science is beginning to tell us about these changes. ### Guns, My Family and Me URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/guns-my-family-and-me/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:51.000Z Today, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, I see the extraordinary opportunity I had growing up on a farm in what then was rural Pennsylvania. My parents and many of our neighbors hunted for the table as much as for the sport. At an early age, I learned how much better tasting a wild duck is compared to a fatty domestic duck. Because my parents were skilled wing shots, we often ate pheasants, doves, ducks and geese. Often, I tease many of my friends who grew up in big cities that they are deprived of the best food this country has by having never eaten wild game. The farm provided endless opportunities to observe wildlife and see nature firsthand. I enjoyed catching frogs, snakes, turtles, salamanders and crawfish, and learning where birds made their nests and hatched their young. My parents generally tolerated my enthusiasm for exploring the outdoors. Once, early in the morning, I caught a box turtle and proudly put it on the dining room table where my mother was having breakfast. She was a Victorian and said, "How nice, but we don't dine with turtles." As a result of this deep and early exposure to nature, it was an easy jump to understanding the importance of conservation and protecting our environment. My mother grew up in Kentucky, in a family that was highly competitive when it came to bird shooting. She had to compete with her numerous brothers, who were amazing shots, and she could occasionally outshoot them. Despite their mastery with a shotgun, neither she nor my father were good rifle shots. I remember showing her a large snapping turtle sunning itself on the edge of our pond. We selectively shot snapping turtles because they ate baby ducks that hatched on the pond. At a range of 10-15 yards, she took aim at the turtle with a rifle and missed. She never missed with a shotgun. To impress me with how lethal a shotgun was, when I was 8 or 9 years old she had me catch a spotted turtle from our pond and put it in the field and shot it. It tore the turtle apart and made an indelible impression on me. A shotgun, like any gun, was dangerous, and it had to be respected. At the age of 10, I was allowed to shoot clay pigeons. One of my parents' friends had a cement bunker which held a clay-pigeon launcher. Standing behind it, one would say "pull," and a clay pigeon would soar into the air. At first, using a 12-gauge shotgun to shoot at clays was painful, but with time and some patient coaching one became proficient. When I turned 16, my mother gave me a 16-gauge shotgun, which I found to be much more fun to shoot with. When I was a teenager, we had a plague of groundhogs on the farm. My father said that he would pay me 25 cents for each groundhog I shot. I eagerly accepted his offer. I learned how to stalk groundhogs so they could not see me and scurry into their holes. I also learned that in order to kill them cleanly, it was important to hit them in the head, which required better marksmanship. This was great practice and served me well later in life. At the end of the summer, I told him I had killed 48 groundhogs and was proud to collect $12. The shooting skills and gun safety habits I developed during those formative years on the farm would serve me well beyond our Pennsylvania countryside. When I decided to serve my country and enlisted in the Navy, I discovered that my early education in marksmanship had given me a solid foundation for military training. During BUD/S training for the SEAL I teams, I once dozed off during a lecture on shooting the AR-15 and was roundly dressed down by the instructor. When we went to the rifle range, I got the highest score in our training class and managed to partially redeem myself in the eyes of the instructors. In Vietnam, as an assistant platoon commander, I always went ashore with one other person to check out the beach before bringing the rest of the platoon ashore. At night, two people could quietly and discreetly check out the beach faster and more effectively than more individuals. We didn't want the platoon to land where hostiles might be waiting. I used a .45-caliber M3A1 submachine gun. It was an amazingly reliable weapon and would fire after swimming through the surf zone. After I left active duty in the Navy, I joined the U.S. Department of State as a foreign service officer and was assigned to Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso. Before long, I enjoyed hunting big game in West Africa. Fifteen years later, I had the privilege of hunting elk, mule deer and Antelope in Montana. Given my experience with machine guns in Vietnam, I was totally surprised by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision that a bump gun was not a machine gun. To reach this conclusion, the conservative justices had to conclude that the court would no longer defer to the government entity that regulated firearms and had the expertise to do so, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"). In some ways, a bump gun works in a similar way to the M3A1 or grease guns we used in Vietnam. Both the M3A1 submachine gun and bump stocks use the gun's recoil as the key mechanism to achieve rapid fire. The grease gun uses recoil to automatically cycle cartridges, while the bump stock uses recoil to create rapid trigger activations, enabling near-machine-gun rates of fire. Originally, the ATF classified bump stocks as legal accessories rather than machine guns. But after the horrific 2017 Las Vegas shooting — where a gunman used bump stocks to kill 58 people and wound over 500 — the ATF reversed course and banned the devices as machine guns under existing law. The conservative Supreme Court majority overturned this ban, ruling that the ATF exceeded its authority and that bump stocks don't meet the 1934 National Firearms Act's technical definition of a machine gun, which requires multiple shots "by a single function of the trigger." By prioritizing narrow legal technicalities over the practical reality that bump stocks enable mass casualties at machine-gun-like rates, the conservative majority chose ideological rigidity over commonsense public safety. My experience with guns and the numbers of people killed by them in our large urban areas has led me to believe in sensible gun regulations. I use the word "sensible," as sometimes politicians who are unfamiliar with guns and eager to score political points hurriedly draft legislation that is nonsense. One example is when a politician drafted legislation that meant a bolt-action rifle with a thumbhole would be deemed an assault weapon and needed to be registered as one. A bolt-action gun can only fire when first another round is loaded into the chamber using the gun's bolt to remove the empty cartridge and replace it with a new one. As with the bump guns, the conservatives who determined the Supreme Court's rulings on guns do not appear to understand American history, or choose not to understand it, as they interpret the Second Amendment. The state militias at the time of the American Revolution were a bulwark against a standing army that could be used by a tyrant to subvert our emerging democracy. Under English common law, weapons such as swords could not be owned by the masses. This common law carried into the English Colonies in North America and is totally ignored by the "originalist" justices who dislike government regulation, including allowing cities to regulate pistol ownership. The NRA, originally founded to teach young Americans how to shoot, has sadly evolved into a lobbying agent for the gun manufacturers. The NRA seems to oppose any form of gun regulation. That is not a responsible position to take for an organization that has such influence on gun safety laws. ### Breaking Through With the Next Generation URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/breaking-through-with-the-next-generation-on-firearms/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:51.000Z For cities to thrive, families and kids need to feel safe. Today, in too many American cities with high rates of gun violence, young people don't feel safe, and some are choosing to possess and carry guns as a way to protect themselves. But the evidence is clear: That choice puts them at greater risk and makes gun violence more likely, not less — a textbook example of a vicious cycle. These findings about young people and their relationship to guns and gun violence come from a 2023 [research report](https://projectunloaded.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2023%5FStayInsideAhzul.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) released by Project Unloaded, the nonprofit I founded to disrupt the cycle that leads so many young people to believe that a gun is the key to safety. We do that by leveraging the power of social media and the creativity of Gen Z to shift the narratives and norms driving gun use. Our work is a direct outgrowth of this research. During the summer of 2023, our research partners from the firm [Ahzul](https://ahzul.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) interviewed teens of color in Chicago, Philadelphia, Sacramento and other cities with high rates of gun violence, and surveyed 500 similar teens nationwide. We learned that many teens are spending nearly all of their time indoors because of the threat of gun violence. Fewer than 1 in 10 teens feel "very safe" spending time at a local park, and just one-third feel "very safe" in their schools or neighborhoods. More than half reported a personal experience with gun violence. Despite the impact of gun violence, the teens in our survey hold some conflicting views about guns: Among teens who are undecided about having a gun in the future, two-thirds believe having a gun will make them safer. At the same time, most teens we surveyed said their neighborhoods would be safer if fewer people had guns, a belief that aligns with the scientific consensus that access to guns is a risk factor for homicide and suicide, though nearly 90% say they have done little to no research on the risks that come with having a gun. In these complex and sometimes conflicting views, Project Unloaded sees opportunity. [The majority of young people](https://projectunloaded.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/InfluenceSG%5FKeyFindingsDoc%5F2022%5FRev3.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) may believe a gun will keep them safe, but unlike their parents and grandparents, our research shows that they're open to learning more and changing their minds. We reach young people with facts about how guns make life riskier — including that [homicides are twice as likely](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35377715/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in homes with guns, and suicides are [three times more likely](https://www.acpjournals.org/doi/10.7326/m13-1301?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for everyone in the home, and [even higher](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/article-abstract/516891?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for children and teens. Once teens learn the facts, they are more likely to believe that guns make people less safe, and they are less likely to say they would have a gun in the future. In our research, just 13% of the urban teens of color we surveyed (including Black, Hispanic and AAPI teens) said that guns made them less safe before being exposed to facts related to firearm risks. After reading those facts, 31% of respondents said guns would make them less safe. Youth-focused firearm risk education has the power to reduce interest in gun ownership and use and, as a result, can save lives. > Reducing gun violence depends upon future generations deciding, on their own terms, against owning and using guns. With that goal in mind, Project Unloaded focuses on reaching 13- to 17-year-olds with information about gun risks through platforms like Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube. We run peer-to-peer campaigns that can efficiently and frequently reach millions of teens online with the facts on why they're safer without guns. While gun violence is sometimes treated by adults as a political football, our teen-facing campaigns are strictly nonpartisan and apolitical. [According to 2019 research](https://projectunloaded.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/InfluenceSG%5FKeyFindingsDoc%5F2022%5FRev3.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from SocialSphere and Cause and Social Influence, young people's awareness of the social movements related to guns is low and many are turned off by the polarized nature of the discourse around guns. With those findings in mind, we give teens the facts on gun risks and ask them to make decisions about guns with those facts in mind. We don't tell them what to do; rather, we empower them to make fact-based decisions on their own terms. We tailor our campaigns to the audience we want to engage. Using the findings in our 2023 research, we built a campaign designed to engage Black and Latino teens in communities deeply harmed by gun violence. The campaign, [Guns Change the Story](http://gunschangethestory.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), uses videos featuring Chicago teens and MadLibs-style storytelling to challenge teens to consider how guns add risk to everyday situations. Our campaigns consistently see a strong response from our teen audience. In 2024, Guns Change the Story reached 1.3 million teens in five cities in neighborhoods with elevated gun violence rates. Ads were watched to completion over 345,000 times, indicating strong engagement with the message. Nearly 100,000 teens clicked through to the website to learn more. This year we launched a campaign, [Leave Guns in the Game](https://projectunloaded.org/gaming/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), geared at teen gamers that earned engagement six times above industry norms. [Our research](https://projectunloaded.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Project-Unloaded-External-Memo-F092822.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showed that many teen boys learn about guns through gaming, making this an important entryway into a conversation about the risks that come with having guns in real life. Similarly, knowing that mental health is top of mind for young people, we've also launched a campaign that joins an existing Gen Z-led conversation with a message about gun risks. The campaign, called [Working On It](http://weareworkingonit.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*,* amplifies the voices and words of Gen Z content creators and everyday teens sharing a simple message: We're all working on our mental health. And while we're Working On It, we're safer without guns around. The secret to our success comes from the teens and young adults who fuel our peer-to-peer campaigns. Our Youth Council is made up of high-school- and college-age young people who write and film content and weigh in on every campaign we release to help shift gun culture. Teens in our [community partner program](https://news.wttw.com/2024/04/23/how-teens-are-using-social-media-try-change-cultural-narrative-around-guns?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) learn social media marketing skills alongside firearm risk education. They create their own campaigns and contribute to our existing ones. Teens know what will work with other teens better than adults ever will. Young people tell us in exit surveys that they're leaving our program with a deeper understanding of the risks that come with using guns as well as feeling more comfortable and prepared to talk to their peers about the risks of owning and using guns. Reducing gun use leads to reducing gun violence. Put differently, reducing gun violence depends upon future generations deciding, on their own terms, against owning and using guns. It may sound outlandish, but it's not: Youth-focused culture change is a proven public health solution. In the early 2000s, [nearly a quarter of teens smoked cigarettes](https://truthinitiative.org/who-we-are/our-history?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Thanks to decades of messaging and marketing from Big Tobacco, misinformation was rampant. But this proved to be a fixable problem: The Truth Initiative and other organizations worked to reach teens with the facts on smoking cigarettes, to catch people before they get hooked. As a result of these efforts, teens effectively turned smoking cigarettes from cool to uncool in a single generation. Today, less than 3% of U.S. teens smoke cigarettes. > Just like tobacco two decades ago, myths about guns are rampant today — and those myths are driving more young people to want to own guns. Project Unloaded is applying a similar strategy to reducing gun violence among young people in the United States, for whom [firearm injuries are the leading cause of death](https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2024/guns-remain-leading-cause-of-death-for-children-and-teens?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for ages 1 to 17. Just like tobacco two decades ago, myths about guns are rampant today — and those myths are driving more young people to want to own guns. [On average](https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2017/06/22/the-demographics-of-gun-ownership/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), men who choose to get a gun acquire their first one at 19\. That's why reaching young people while they're still in their teen years — before they've made up their minds about guns — is essential. Thanks to the power of social media, reaching young people is easier than it's ever been. Most young people have a smartphone and [consume social media content](https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2024/12/12/teens-social-media-and-technology-2024/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) every day. The evidence that extensive social media consumption can harm teens' mental health is [well known](https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/social-media-teen-mental-health-a-parents-guide?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but social media can also be used as a tool for good, amplifying the voices of young people who are fed up with how gun violence is affecting their generation and hungry to mobilize their peers for change. Through our [social media campaigns and content](https://www.youtube.com/@projectunloaded/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we're empowering teenage participants in our community partner program as well as young people in our [youth leadership program](https://projectunloaded.org/young-leaders/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to make their voices heard to millions of their peers. In addition to our youth-led campaigns, we also partner with Gen Z influencers who typically produce lifestyle, comedy or college-life content. We're intentional about reaching teens through content creators they already trust, in nonactivist spaces. We want to give young people unbiased facts and empower them to choose on their own terms. Connecting with teenagers before they've solidified opinions on gun ownership allows us to enter the conversation in a critical window of their development and make sure they know the facts before making a high-risk decision about gun use. And throughout our cultural campaigns, content creator engagements and community partnerships, we pay close attention to the data. We survey, optimize based on what's working and have landed on an effective approach. Every time Project Unloaded has tested our campaigns and partnerships, we've seen teens shift [15 to 20 points away](https://projectunloaded.org/research/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from interest in gun use. By engaging young people before their opinions on guns are fully formed, we hope to inspire the next generation to make their communities safer. We believe the narrative of guns in America can be rewritten, with young people as the central figures driving change. ### My Seven Guns: A Personal Inventory URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/my-seven-guns-a-personal-inventory/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:50.000Z > These handmade guns kept some of us alive. If we were caught out of our neighborhood unarmed, we could be robbed, beaten or possibly shot and killed. I grew up in Chicago in the 1970s. My first gun was a zip gun I made myself at the age of 14\. Zip guns were made out of a piece of wood fashioned as a gun with rubber bands holding the chamber in place down upon the wood. A hanger cut off into thirds made up the firing pin. In rural America, young people are usually gifted their first gun and may be taught to shoot a gun at an early age. Urban youth from my community and many others similar to mine start our love affair with guns by way of a truly different route. Making our first guns was what teenagers like us did in the 1970s. These handmade guns kept some of us alive. If we were caught out of our neighborhood unarmed, we could be robbed, beaten or possibly shot and killed. My second gun was my first manufactured gun, a .25-caliber Browning semiautomatic pistol. I purchased it from one of my neighbors when I was 16\. I named it Blackie, in honor of my first dog that had recently passed. My love affair with guns started at this time in my life. My friend's mother beat his butt because he had the gun in their house. He offered it to me for $75\. Blackie was a semiautomatic, and having one when revolvers were the most-used guns at the time made me a mover and a shaker. After I purchased Blackie, me and a couple of the guys started going around testing it out in the alley a couple of blocks away from my house. One of the neighbors called my mother. Mom came walking through the alley and asked us what the hell we were doing? We lied, saying that we had a BB gun and were shooting at rats. When she asked to see the gun, my homie Ryan took off running with it in his hand. Ryan and I both got grounded. Blackie kept me and the guys safe for the next year. When I was 17, the Chicago Police Department seized the gun from one of my friends. He got two years' probation. I was also 17 when I got my third gun. I found him during a burglary, so that meant that I owned him. I named him Skipperdale. This gun was a .38 long, with a faulty firing pin. This gun would shoot a bullet and then skip, skip, pow, skip skip, pow pow, skip, pow pow — something like that. I had that gun when gangbanging was resurfacing in Chicago in the late 1970s. There was a period from around 1977 to 1979 when guys were actively seeking to beat up someone else no matter where they were found to be hanging out. Most beatdowns were performed with golf clubs and other savage things like nail-spiked bats. Guns only came out when things got especially serious. > These handmade guns kept some of us alive. If we were caught out of our neighborhood unarmed, we could be robbed, beaten or possibly shot and killed. Guns were very hard to come by for young Chicagoans during the late 1970s. During this time, mainly, parents and grandparents owned them. When and if we found someone selling a gun, we would try to buy it or take it. In my teenage years, we committed a lot of burglaries in search of guns. During this time, gun monitoring by older members of my gang was essential to keeping order and discipline in the ranks. The gang was a tightly structured organization with protocols. Universal elites told Branch elites to make a listing of all guns on their deck and who was responsible for their safekeeping. When Skipperdale was presented to one of our universal elites, he laughingly said, "Damn brother, y'all should've came to us and said y'all needed a weapon. I'm not gonna take this to the table until we get a new firing pin." We told the elder brother that if not for Skipperdale, we could've been hurt before the police arrived on the scene in a couple of incidents. We were able to keep guys off of us due to this raggedy gun, which was better than no gun at all. The next gun that I came to have control over — my fourth gun — was a Mossberg riot pump shotgun that I named Bucky. We acquired Bucky out of the car trunk of a CPD cruiser by orders of a universal elite. We followed his orders, knowing that, if busted, there would be hell to pay for possessing this gun. I myself never thought about getting caught. After this acquisition, we traded the Mossberg pump for two other guns. Our deck in the gang now stood tall with two guns. This is a big difference from what occurs today: Just about any youth can get a gun and use it without guidance or regulation, causing chaos in the community. I bought my fifth gun when I was 22\. It was a pearl-handled Colt .45\. This was the first gun I purchased legally. I named it General, in honor of General George Patton. I loved the feel and kick of it. I became a marksman with it at the shooting ranges. Perhaps what goes around comes around; as I had stolen guns in burglaries, I had General stolen from me in a burglary after having it for only four months. I was crushed and started having my underlings commit burglaries all over the city. > Just about any youth can get a gun and use it without guidance or regulation, causing chaos in the community. My sixth and seventh guns were twin Glocks, 9 mm. I named them MoMo and CoCo. These were the prizes of a burglary done by some of my friends. During this time in my life, I was heavily involved with street activities and drugs, I was the branch elite for my deck and the twins profited our deck through robberies, extortion, gangbanging and intimidation. My deck was profiting off crack cocaine and heroin. We were knocking off rivals. Unfortunately for me, I got busted during one of those armed robberies. received three years in the Illinois Department of Corrections for my misuse of MoMo. That cut short my love affair with guns. With a felony, I couldn't legally own a gun anymore. For a time, despite that restriction, I continued carrying and misusing firearms. I was sent to prison two more times for unlawful use of a weapon. It hurt a lot to not be able to legally own a firearm anymore. I went from being able to play with guns, to being told that if I ever carry one again and get caught with it, I will be going to the federal penitentiary for a very long period of time. Today I work with youth at the highest risk for violence, abuse and other negative things life throws at them. These young people, wrapped up in gangbanging, believe they carry guns out of necessity. They are convinced they will be hunted to death and if they don't have a gun, they don't have protection. I will never tell a youth to put his gun down, but I will ask him to do the right things in life. I continually encourage youth to sacrifice people, places and things to stay safe and out of the way. In Chicago, to get off a hunting list, you have to disappear, then hope and pray that God will eliminate your opposition either through death or imprisonment. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/amdlpwgnhvfto5mq_image1-auto-format-compress-1776259685583.jpg) Credit: Unknown. The author is the second to the right, with street outreach workers from Lawndale Christian Community Church, 2001. ### Pointing a Firearm or Looking Down Its Barrel URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/pointing-a-firearm-or-looking-down-its-barrel/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:50.000Z In America, the gun, perhaps more than any other object, is in the eye of the beholder. To place a finger on the trigger of a firearm is to feel — if not respect — its power to wound and kill; to look down a barrel is to feel profound fear. To bring personal perspectives to America's vast supply of guns — and its consequences — we asked individuals who've held and fired them, or who've been on the terrible receiving end of their power, to share their stories. These are police officers, former gang members, people carrying for personal protection or to hunt, innocent victims and more. They don't represent every experience with firearms in America — no compendium could — but they serve as a window into the kaleidoscopic relationship between Americans and the firearms so many of them carry. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Respect for the Trigger** By Peter Moskos I was 28 years old when I touched my first gun. Twenty days later, I fired it. I was in the Baltimore City Police Academy. The Baltimore gun range, aptly named Gunpowder (for a river running through it), was a ramshackle place. I was taught to disassemble the Glock 17 into five parts, clean it with a dry brush and a solvent-soaked brush and then oil a few parts before reassembling. There was no safety in the traditional sense. If a bullet was in the chamber, pulling the trigger would fire it. Not having grown up in gun culture, I was impressed with the engineering. The gun made me think of my Bianchi road bicycle. Both are beautifully engineered machines with no wasted parts. Both, properly maintained, are well-oiled machines that perform just as they are designed. The gun, of course, is more powerful. Not just metaphorically but literally. When you pull the trigger, it causes an explosion. Shooting a pistol accurately involves breathing, trigger control and relaxing before the recoil. Anticipating the recoil makes one jerk the gun down before it goes bang. And if you do that, you miss. Before I fired my first round, the training sergeant asked if I had ever shot a gun before. I told him no. He smiled and told me to relax. On the outdoor gun range, the cardboard target flipped from perpendicular to parallel to face us. I remember pulling the trigger, wondering what would happen. I was surprised how little kickback there was from the pistol, and also that I hit the target. My first 12 rounds hit the target before I missed. I shot off 50 rounds before reholstering my gun. "For a guy who doesn't like guns and had never picked one up before," said the sergeant, "I have to say that's not too bad." That didn't give me swagger, but confidence. On the street, a field training officer told me: "We're partners when we're out there. You can pull out your gun. You can point your gun. You can even put your finger on the trigger. That won't be a big deal. But it's up to you when you think you have to pull that trigger." Three days later, perhaps just to make him less apprehensive, I took my gun out of the holster for the first time as we were going through a vacant house. I had no idea who or what I might find. That quickly became routine. I no longer saw my pistol as a foreign object that might unexpectedly go bang, but a powerful tool firmly in my control. There is a responsibility that goes with the knowledge one may have to kill to stop a threat. "You must think about whether you are willing to take the life of another," said an instructor. "There is nothing wrong with saying no, but then you are in the wrong wind of work." I've never fired a gun outside of training. But on duty, perhaps every other shift I took my gun from its holster (most often while searching vacant buildings). Only twice did I point my pistol at another person. For the infrequency of that I credit luck and my less-than-two-year tenure more than any "de-escalation" ability on my part. A threat is a threat. One gets used to carrying a gun, but one never forgets one is carrying. Within Baltimore City limits, outside of my house, I was required to carry my gun both on and off duty. Going for a jog, I would switch to an elastic "belly band" holster to secure my gun. At a movie theater, I'd place dates on my "weak" (nonshooting) side, so the gun wouldn't be a wedge between us. I would strap up to take out the trash. Because you never know when something might happen. When I quit the police department and moved to New York City, many of my police friends asked if I would have a gun. No. I know that I can carry and use a gun responsibly. But I'm happy to live in a city where I don't feel the need to. *Peter Moskos is a professor at John Jay College and author of "Back from the Brink: Inside the NYPD and New York City's Extraordinary 1990s Crime Drop."* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Keeping Firearms at Arm's Length** By Josiah Bates I grew up in Brooklyn, New York, in the early 2000s. I had an uncle, Willie Young, who was a police officer, a correction officer at Rikers Island and a private investigator. He was law enforcement through and through, a true believer in law and order. He loved telling me and my cousins stories about his experiences during family gatherings. He'd go on about confrontations with inmates at Rikers, an arrest he made that got violent or riveting PI jobs. It was like listening to a live audiobook of a thrilling cop novel. I had family involved on both sides of the street — the police side and the criminal side. No one on the street side shared their stories with the kids, but Uncle Willie was happy to. His stories were so compelling that my cousins and I would talk about them when he wasn't around. One time, my cousin shared a startling fact. "You know, he got guns in the house," he said. "Really?" I asked. He explained that Uncle Willie kept them in a trunk container by the stairwell to his attic. "I've never seen them," I told my cousin. "I'll show you the next time we there," he declared. Sure enough, the next time we were at his house, we snuck upstairs real quick while the rest of the family enjoyed each other's company downstairs. The narrow black trunk was against a closet door, right next to a stairwell to the attic. As my cousin opened the trunk, I kept watch, making sure none of the adults wandered in. He opened it to a long-barreled silver shotgun. I can't recall what kind it was, but it was probably a 12-gauge pump-action. Before that, I'd never seen one up close, just what was depicted on TV shows and movies. "He got a couple handguns too," my cousin said. He reached into the closet and grabbed a revolver in a black holster. He held it for maybe 15 seconds before he put it back. At the moment, it didn't seem like a big deal. We didn't point the guns at each other. We didn't play around with them. He just wanted to show me that they were really in the house. Because I had a zero on the street-smarts scale, I foolishly told another cousin about it, who told his mother, who told my mother. Needless to say, it wasn't a small deal to her. Rather than beat my ass, she told Uncle Willie, and he wanted to talk to me and my cousin in person about it. We met at my grandmother's house. I felt like I was about to get a dose of that same no-nonsense energy he directed at criminals. Instead, he spoke like a concerned uncle. He explained that guns were nothing to mess around with, that he didn't have guns in the house because he thought it was cool — but so that he could protect his family. He told us to never play around with guns because you have to be ready to use them when you have one. Today, I don't use guns at all. I've never fired one, and I've never carried one. Uncle Willie's voice still rings in my head. *Josiah Bates is an enterprise reporter at The Grio. He is the author of "In These Streets: Reporting from the Front Lines of Inner-City Gun Violence."* ════════════════════════════════════════ **It Made Me Feel Formidable** By Joseph Wilson He died. He fell to the ground. His shoulder skidded on the concrete. His body folded like a soft blanket. That was after the second shot. I thought he had turned to retaliate, but it was just the force of the first bullet moving him from within. Before that, I jutted past him and spun as I pulled the gun from my pocket. Before that, he made a suspicious move. Before that, we talked tough, bending our brows into W's. Before that, we were friends with guns. Then I ran. The sun was like a spotlight; it made me sweat and exposed my shame. The gun somehow felt weightier, as if his body had attached itself to it. I was bonded to it as well, by guilt. I could not drop it now. I put it back into my pocket. A few days later, from the Manhattan port, I boarded a New York City Staten Island Ferry. I lurked on the bottom of the boat where cars were parked. Once we were midway, close to the famed Statue of Liberty, I dropped the gun into the Hudson River as tourists photographed Ellis Island. The gun plopped, with a soft splash. It was easily disposed of. The guilt was not. The weight of my friend's life ascended out of the water, over the bow and into my chest. I sobbed quietly. That same gun used to make me feel equal, equal to bad guys and bad good guys too. The handheld steel tool, matte black finishing and sound of chambering slippery, shiny bullets — all of it made me feel formidable. I knew that I was not invincible. I had seen too many people die with guns in their hands to believe that. But I felt capable of holding my own, with a chance to live. There was danger lurking everywhere. There were the crazies, the stickup kids and the bad cops. However, in the dark corners of our minds, those of us who had set up drug stands knew to watch our family members and friends more than anyone else. If anyone could penetrate the force field, it was them. Flash forward. I'm in prison. My friend has been in the ground, in the dark, for 20 years. The gun in the deep, eroded by the running river. Me, I'm still in the sun. It is still a spotlight, revealing to me the contents of my heart. *Joseph Wilson is a father, composer, librettist, singer, songwriter, pianist, art curator, writer and co-founder of the Sing Sing Family Collective. He is currently incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility in New York.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A Family Wounded** By Jessica Mofield My father was shot in Philadelphia while I was in graduate school at NYU, where I was pursuing a degree in mental health counseling. I had enrolled hoping to make sense of my community's trauma and my dad's, and, if I'm honest, to become clever enough to outrun my own. The early-morning call I received, jarring and far too familiar for so many families, snapped me out of any illusion that education alone could protect me from the experiences I still carried with me. No degree, no matter how "fancy," can make your family bulletproof. By the time my father was shot, I had already watched violence touch too many people I loved: my brother, friends, neighborhoods that raised me. These weren't isolated tragedies. They were a pattern of policy decisions that prioritized punishment over prevention, siphoning the community's ability to even attempt to heal. So no, I didn't plan to work in government, let alone eventually come to lead the New York City Mayor's Office to Prevent Gun Violence. But when your family has bled on American soil, your understanding of safety hits differently. Violence stops being so abstract, and you stop waiting for someone else to fix it. By the time I started working for the City in 2015, the real work was already underway. Years of advocacy from survivors, grassroots organizers, local elected officials, unofficial neighborhood mayors and nonprofits had pushed the City to pilot community-led violence-reduction strategies. With support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and evaluation partnerships with John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City began building a different type of system, one rooted in healing, prevention and community wisdom. That system became the Crisis Management System (CMS), a network of community-based organizations embedded in more than 30 precincts with the highest rates of gun violence. The work was radical in its simplicity: Trust the community to save the community. Our role was to fortify it, grow its reach, refine its operations and ensure community voice remained at the center of how we defined and funded public safety. What did this look like? - Responding to shootings by mobilizing credible messengers to prevent retaliation and support survivors - Hosting peace events and community vigils to publicly denounce violence and promote collective healing - Providing trauma-informed care at hospitals and through mobile trauma units - Creating safe-passage corridors around schools and holding space for in-school and after-school programming - Connecting young people to employment through the Anti-Gun Violence Employment Program - Making healing visible through community healing circles and sharing resources - Offering community safety grants to help everyday residents coproduce public safety on their own terms And it worked. Then Donald Trump got elected — again — and now we're watching federal support for Community Violence Intervention (CVI) programs dry up across the country. The White House Office to Prevent Gun Violence is no longer and community care has been undermined, all while systems for locking people up continue to get a blank check. Easy access to guns, chronic disinvestment in Black and brown communities and harmful policy choices shaped this part of my life. It shapes the lives of too many other Americans — and will continue to until we find ways to have their experiences truly guide the political and policy choices we make. *Jessica Mofield is a community strategist and the former executive director of the New York City Office to Prevent Gun Violence. She is currently vice president of community engagement and policy at the Center for Policing Equity.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **What a Gun Took From Me** By Mia Livas Porter Growing up in the 1980s in our Catholic, Filipino family, we were expected to be well-behaved and look like (Asian) Stepford children. You didn't air your dirty laundry. What happened in the family was to stay in the family. So when my brother Junior, a few years my elder, was diagnosed with schizophrenia in his early 20s, the message I received was clear: Don't talk about his mental illness. For five years, I watched as Junior battled his demons: being paranoid that someone was "out to get him"; giggling to himself throughout the day; screaming in the middle of the night at the voices in his head. He was living a tortured life. So when he told my dad that he wanted to go back to school and finish college, my parents complied because they wanted him to be happy. Within a few months, my sweet, kind, loving brother had died by his own hand because of easy access to a firearm. I believe Junior had a plan: He wanted the pain to go away and thought this was the best solution to spare our family from the "burden" of his disease. When we came back from his funeral, he had written a letter to each remaining family member. I still have mine. But as before, our family was taught to believe that Junior's schizophrenia, and now his suicide, were shameful. In one sense, it wasn't a gun that killed him — it was his own hand and the schizophrenia that haunted him. But if a gun hadn't been in his hand, there's a high likelihood he would've seen a way forward. Decades later, thinking of Junior's last moments still breaks me. Tears flow thinking of how alone, scared and helpless he must have felt if he believed this was the only way to relieve his pain. And like a ripple in a pond, his death changed my entire family's life and everyone I interacted with in the years to follow. This is true of all survivors of violence or trauma. We are a nation of survivors of gun violence. 125 Americans die by firearms — and twice that many are wounded — every single day. And though most frequently we talk about gun homicide, gun suicides make up nearly 6 in 10 of those deaths. For those who believe Junior would just have "found another way" to end his life, [suicide attempts by firearm are around 90% fatal, compared to around 5% by other means](https://hsph.harvard.edu/news/guns-suicide/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=According%20to%20Matthew%20Miller%2C%20associate,pulled%2C%20there's%20no%20turning%20back.). Suicidal ideation can last as little as 15 minutes. Think of the countless lives we could save with lifesaving firearm legislation like secure storage, longer waiting periods after buying a gun and background checks on all gun sales. Firearms are the leading cause of death for children under 19\. We are failing an entire generation of children who have never known the feeling of security and safety. Economically, gun violence costs taxpayers $557 billion every single year. And with almost 400 million guns in circulation, the epidemic of gun violence is uniquely American. It's. The. Guns. And specifically, it is the easy access to guns. This is why we all need to use our platforms and networks to demand a country free from gun violence. We do not have to live — or die — like this. *Mia Livas Porter is a mother, gun violence survivor and activist.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Me and My Girlfriend** By LaShawn Fonza Growing up on the West Side of Chicago in the 1980s, I got to observe a lot of violence and criminal activity, and I was attracted to it. I shot a gun for the first time when I was 12 years old, in 1983\. My mom had just passed away. It was her birthday. My uncles and grandpa were in the backyard lighting fireworks and shooting their guns in the air. I asked my granny, and she showed me how to brace myself for the kickback so I didn't hurt myself. I fired a .357 Magnum. It had a forceful kickback, and I was not prepared for it — I threw my whole shoulder out from the recoil of the gun. My first personal gun was a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson snub-nosed revolver. I acquired this gun the same year, when I was 12\. When the police were chasing my uncle, he threw it and I went to pick it up. My uncle was arrested. Two or three weeks later, he was released. He never asked about the gun, and I never told him. This gun became my best friend, my protector, my leverage. My .38 was my girlfriend and I never left home without it. I was a snub, so I could hide it in my bra, or, if I had a skirt on, I would wrap it around my inner thigh. The first time I shot at someone, I was 14\. A girl was getting beat and raped by three guys under the bleachers in Franklin Park. I could not believe what I was seeing. I aimed at their legs and lower extremities. I hit one in the butt, one in the leg. The young girl was pretty bruised up, but the street knew exactly who had violated her. Although I was engaging in criminal activity, I helped someone that day. In August of 1986, I was caught in a drive while I was seven months pregnant. My baby daddy was driving a '79 Ford Maverick two-door, and there were three of us in the front seat. My nephew was on the passenger side and I was in the middle. A car pulled up behind us and started shooting. My nephew hit the floor. I reached down and grabbed his 9 mm and emptied the clip. The car that was chasing us crashed and we made it home. That incident solidified my newfound obsession with firearms; I vowed to never leave home without one. Our gang culture changed as drugs invaded our community in the 1980s. At first, we were protecting our neighborhoods — and then, in the blink of an eye, we were destroying them. The structure and rules were gone. We have all heard the script that guns do not hurt people, but people with guns hurt people. It's an NRA line, but there's some truth to it. *Lashawn Fonza is a dedicated youth advocate with a background in human services and sociology.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Armed, Against My Will** By Kerri Raissian I have a lot of roles. I am a wife, mother, daughter, public health researcher and family violence survivor. I have spent most of my life advocating for policies that keep people and communities safe from violence — including gun violence. At times, I am also a permitless handgun carrier. While many might think these things cannot coexist, they often do. Let me explain. My abuser lives in Texas, and I live in Connecticut. Generally, I can keep a safe distance, but every now and again, when I am in Texas, I know I am not safe. I know that if he found me, he would kill me. He's told me how he'd kill me. He's described it. He's got a violent criminal record, has violated protective orders and has a history of drug abuse, complex and untreated mental health issues and a lifetime of poor choices. All this is to say: When he says he'd kill me, I believe him. And yet, like many victims of violence, I've had trouble getting Texas law enforcement to believe me and follow through with meaningful action. I've reported harassment (terroristic messages, to be specific), violations of orders of protection and reasonable suspicion of firearm possession. I am lucky if I can even get my phone calls returned from the police. This does not inspire feelings of safety. So like many firearm owners, on select trips to Texas, I have carried a handgun. I grew up around guns; I was born and raised in Texas, oscillating between Houston and our family's farm two hours north. I know how to use them and am not afraid of them, but I am not a firearm enthusiast. In fact, I only carry a gun for self-defense. I would much prefer the police investigate his crimes and hold him accountable for his credible threats and other crimes. People often cite "self-defense" as a reason for carrying firearms. It's my reason, so that resonates with me. However, I think what's lost is the resentment I feel for having to do so. I don't want to live like this. I don't want anyone to live like this. I often hear, "We don't need new gun laws, we just need to enforce the ones we have." And this is where my public health research brain and lived experience brain come together. While strong evidence supports the adoption of some new laws and programs to curb gun violence, we most certainly should place strong emphasis on enforcing the laws we already have. In my case, as with so many other women, we know this would save lives. I'd much prefer to both leave my gun at home and be safe from violence. In the meantime, I will carry when I think it's necessary and when I can't avoid the risk. I will carry to keep myself safe in Texas, but I will also, in my role as a research scientist, continue to advance research that might inform policies that can prevent violence — for myself and others. *Kerri Raissian is a senior research scientist at the Yale School of Public Health and a senior fellow at the Niskanen Center.* ### Editors’ Note URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/editors-note-issue-13/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z The numbers are staggering. With somewhere between 350 and 450 million guns in a country of 340 million people, the United States doesn't just lead the world in gun ownership, it exists in a category of its own. Yemen, the country with the second-highest gun ownership rate, still has[ fewer than half as many guns per capita](https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-Annual-Report-2018.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as we do. If the U.S. vanished tomorrow, nearly half of all civilian-owned firearms worldwide would disappear with it. America's gun landscape seems to operate like a one-way ratchet. We're not Australia, and the fact that recent mass shootings — including one last week targeting children worshipping at a Minneapolis church — barely register national shock anymore demonstrates that dramatic policy action remains politically infeasible. Meanwhile, gun manufacturing and sales continue their upward trajectory with no signs of abating. But accepting this reality doesn't mean accepting futility. Most debates about guns in America get stuck in the same place: Does owning a gun make a person safer? What's the right balance between individual rights and collective safety? Who should be allowed to own one or be punished in cases of misuse? These questions, entwined with individuals' deeply held values and personal traditions, have kept us in a deadlock. While these demand-side questions remain important, what if we focused on supply? How did America end up with so many guns and what are the most realistic ways to reduce firearm related harms? Understanding the systems, policies and business practices that flood firearms into American communities might reveal new opportunities to reduce gun harms — the goal both sides of this debate actually share. For this issue, Vital City assembled an all-star cast of people to dig into the problem of gun supply, each bringing different experiences, perspectives and solutions: contributors whose lives have been touched by guns on the streets of our cities, on the battlefield and in the fields and forests of the nation; experts who have taught gun safety and worked in the trenches of government and advocacy to change the nation's gun policies; historians who have written amicus briefs for recent Supreme Court cases; scholars who have studied guns across many disciplines, including sociology, economics, medicine and history; people who grew up with guns and those whose loved ones have been taken by them. Our nation's relationship with guns was not always this fraught or this deadly. Historians [Brian DeLay](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/gun-culture-then-and-now), [Jack Rakove](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/a-brief-biography-of-the-second-amendment) and [Robert Spitzer](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/one-nation-under-guns) show how limited the availability of guns was at the beginning of the republic dedicated to uses that were essentially utilitarian, not consumerist; collective, not individual; government-led instead of government-phobic. [Emergency physician Stephen Hargarten and historian Jennifer Tucker](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-modern-bullets-maximize-lethality) reveal how firearms and ammunition have become brutally more sophisticated over time. Today's bullets can travel at more than 2,600 feet per second and deliver nine times the kinetic energy of Colonial-era musket balls, yet these crucial distinctions in lethality rarely enter policy discussions. > Understanding the systems, policies and business practices that flood firearms into American communities might reveal new opportunities to reduce gun harms — the goal both sides of this debate actually share. [Nick Suplina](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/forging-firearm-folklore), from [Everytown](https://www.everytown.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — an organization that has been at the forefront of shaping the strategies for "common-sense gun laws" — adds to this explanation of our current gun culture. He shows that the intense political polarization around firearms isn't some inevitable part of American DNA. Instead, it was an explicit marketing strategy starting with the 1893 World's Fair, known as the "the fair that changed America." The "Wild West" mythology that dominates our gun debates would be unrecognizable to most Americans throughout history. What we think of as timeless gun culture is actually a modern creation. [Andrew McKevitt](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-growth-of-the-firearm-industry) and [Greg Lickenbrock](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-money-behind-mass-shootings), each from their different perspectives as historian and firearm analyst, trace how firearms manufacturers and importers deliberately transformed their market from sporting goods to political identity. McKevitt locates a major inflection point after World War II, when enterprising gun dealers capitalized on military surplus firearms from across the globe to fuel mass consumer demand for guns. They didn't just sell guns; they sold the idea that owning a gun was essential to being American. They marketed military weapons to civilians and funded the lobbying infrastructure that fights any regulation. When you follow the money, you see how financial incentives have shaped our current crisis. But this manufactured gun culture doesn't just exist in marketing; it gets transmitted through training and culture. Combat veteran [Chris Marvin](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/licensed-to-kill-concealed-carry-training-course) exposes how civilian gun courses teach people "how to get away with shooting" rather than military-style discipline about when not to shoot. Sociologist [Samantha Simon](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-good-gun-owner) reveals how police training creates a paradox among cadets. Officers learn to fear guns as threats while remaining staunchly pro-Second Amendment, resolving this tension by distinguishing between "good" and "bad" gun owners along racial and class lines. Perhaps, if gun culture can be manufactured, it can also be reengineered. [Nina Vinik](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/breaking-through-with-the-next-generation-on-firearms), founder of [Project Unloaded](https://projectunloaded.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), demonstrates this possibility by using social media, peer influence and targeted messaging to reach young people before they form opinions about guns. Unlike older generations, teens seem open to changing their minds when presented with facts about gun risks, suggesting that the cultural tide may be reversible. Some of the most prominent gun researchers in the land draw on their lifetimes of experience to suggest what can be done. As the economists [Philip Cook and Rosanna Smart](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-case-against-futility-in-gun-regulation) point out, efforts on the regulatory front are not futile at all, because even "seemingly weak regulations can often have leverage on even life-and-death outcomes." The research reveals key leaks in the system and leverage points to patch them up. Sociologist and public health expert [Daniel Semenza](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-80-20-rule-of-gun-supply) reminds us that just 5% of federally licensed dealers are linked to nearly 90% of crime guns recovered by law enforcement. Focusing on this small fraction of bad-apple dealers offers a clear path to reducing gun violence. Economist [Jens Ludwig](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/before-the-trigger-is-pulled) offers a crucial reframe in thinking about gun violence: We may be deterring the wrong behavior. Most gun violence stems from heated arguments that escalate impulsively, making the trigger-pull among the least deterrable moments. Instead, deterrence should focus upstream on the deliberate choice to carry guns illegally in the first place. > This isn't about finding a silver bullet, but recognizing that incremental changes can have cumulative effects. Supply-side interventions offer clear leverage points for reducing gun violence without requiring impossible legislative overhauls. They may lack dramatic appeal, but they provide realistic pathways to reduce the harm that America's 400 million guns (or more) inflict on our communities through the slow but steady work of making America safer. But patching federal leaks isn't enough when millions of guns change hands in the secondary market — private sales at gun shows, online transactions and sales between individuals — completely outside federal oversight. In this vast space, regulation falls entirely to states. Three scholars of firearm policy, [Morgan Williams, Megan Kang and Patrick Sharkey](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/state-gun-laws-matter), demonstrate that, contrary to popular belief, state gun laws make a significant difference both when restrictive laws are repealed (leading to more gun deaths and racial disparities in policing) and when enacted (decreasing gun deaths). In a country where the federal government has become increasingly hostile to gun regulation, Minnesota Attorney General [Keith Ellison](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-civil-law-can-help-prevent-gun-tragedies) and reporter [Olivia Li](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-missing-fingerprints-at-crime-scenes) suggest states could pick up the slack by holding gun manufacturers more accountable. Economists [Brendan O'Flaherty and Rajiv Sethi](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/when-products-can-kill) highlight how guns remain exempt from the basic safety standards we demand from every other consumer product. They argue for treating firearms more like cars through registration, licensing and mandatory liability insurance, noting that automobile regulation also evolved from scattered state laws to coordinated national standards. These pieces shift the focus from ideological battles to tractable levers at key supply points that could have an outsize impact. Hanging over it all, however, is the warning that Cook and Smart point out: "The problem in regulating gun commerce to reduce gun violence is not some intrinsic futility but rather the lack of political will." What happens then when a nation musters the political will to change? Reporter and researcher [Ted Alcorn](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/learning-from-australias-gun-evolution) diagnoses how Australia was able successfully to reduce gun deaths without eliminating gun ownership, with a set of regulations that brought back much of the nation's supply of guns. Not least, the [personal stories](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/pointing-a-firearm-or-looking-down-its-barrel) in this issue remind us that behind all these policy discussions are real people — some with rich familial traditions of gun ownership, some with scars of gun violence and some with both. These voices reveal nuance that gets lost in our polarized debates. Our issue makes a case for shifting focus toward gun supply, where the evidence shows that slow but steady progress through basic governance tools can actually work. This isn't about finding a silver bullet, but recognizing that incremental changes can have cumulative effects. Supply-side interventions offer clear leverage points for reducing gun violence without requiring impossible legislative overhauls. They may lack dramatic appeal, but they provide realistic pathways to reduce the harm that America's 400 million (or more) guns inflict on our communities, through the slow but steady work of making America safer. ### The 80/20 Rule of Gun Supply URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-80-20-rule-of-gun-supply/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:50.000Z In the late 1800s, Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto was harvesting peas in his garden when he noticed something peculiar: About 20% of the peapods produced roughly 80% of the peas. He later observed the same pattern in broader society, finding that roughly 20% of Italy's population owned 80% of the land throughout the country. That insight became the foundation of what we now call the [Pareto Principle](https://betterexplained.com/articles/understanding-the-pareto-principle-the-8020-rule/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), or the law of the vital few: A small number of causes often drive most of the consequences. More than a century later, the law of the vital few helps explain many of the key dynamics of gun violence in America. A small network of people in a handful of neighborhoods are typically responsible for an outsize share of violence in many U.S. cities. In one[ study](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.056?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) led by sociologist Andrew Papachristos, about 70% of all nonfatal gunshot injuries in Chicago occurred within social networks containing just 6% of the city's population. A[ 2024 review](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2024.101951?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) documented similar Pareto-style dynamics in Dallas, Boston, Minneapolis, Indianapolis and Buffalo. In [New York City](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-7649-9%5F6?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), researchers found that shootings cluster in patterns that closely mirror the Pareto Principle, particularly in northern Manhattan, northern to southeastern Bronx and central-to-northern Brooklyn. The same principle applies to the gun markets that fuel our country's unique brand of violence. While the majority of licensed gun dealers in the U.S. operate legally, a small fraction are responsible for feeding the lion's share of the illegal supply.[ One estimate](https://assets.bradyunited.org/production/files/SUPPLYSIDEv5.pdf?dm=1716461312&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggests that just 5% of dealers are linked to nearly 90% of crime guns recovered by law enforcement. These are the weapons that drive interpersonal gun violence in the U.S., pushing our national homicide rate[ orders of magnitude](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30817955/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) higher than any other[ high-income nation](https://www.healthdata.org/news-events/insights-blog/acting-data/gun-violence-united-states-outlier?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Pareto's peas and property may feel far removed from the modern gun debate, but his insight still offers guidance: If we want to curb gun violence using a supply-side strategy, we should start by focusing on the small group of dealers doing the most harm. **How legal guns fuel illegal violence** Every firearm in the United States — whether manufactured domestically or imported — enters the market legally, through a licensed seller with a federal firearms license. (The exception to this rule is "ghost guns," which are built from kits containing unassembled gun parts or constructed using components made with a 3D printer). But most guns used in violent crime are not purchased legally by the people who use them. In fact, [surveys](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0091743515001486?via%3Dihub&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of [prisoners](https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/source-and-use-firearms-involved-crimes-survey-prison-inmates-2016?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who possessed a gun while committing a crime find that 90% to 97% of the guns were obtained through secondary channels. These secondary channels are fueled by straw purchases (where one person buys a gun for someone else who is often barred from possession);[ theft](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2025.103761?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from homes, vehicles or gun stores; unlicensed street sales; or guns that are simply[ lost and never recovered](https://www.policinginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/NPI%5FFirearmTheftReport%5FFinal424.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Think of firearm dealers as faucets at the top of a vast distribution system. They're the[ legal points of entry](https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12621?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) where guns begin to flow into the broader market. Most faucets work as intended. But some are left running, faulty or deliberately misused. These are the negligent dealers. They[ manipulate paperwork](https://www.kpbs.org/news/local/2022/09/09/gun-shop-owner-convicted-of-firearms-sales-involving-former-san-diego-county-sheriffs-deputy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ overlook obvious red flags](https://www.phila.gov/2023-07-25-city-of-philadelphia-announces-lawsuit-against-gun-shops-that-facilitate-illegal-straw-purchasing-of-firearms/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) or intentionally[ look the other way](https://apnews.com/article/boston-massachusetts-business-431077475d654d89496751c4416bb352?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on straw purchases. Over time, these dealers contribute to an ever-growing pool of firearms on the secondary market, available with relative ease to those looking to skirt legal markets. Yesterday's bad-faith dealer is responsible for tomorrow's gun violence. When oversight is weak and accountability is minimal, guns leak into places they were never meant to go. Some of those leaks are intentional, like straw purchasers diverting guns into the hands of those prohibited from owning them. Then there's unlicensed dealing, where illegal sellers operate entirely outside the system, tapping into the flow to feed[ underground markets](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-020-00477-z?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) via high-volume dealers, middlemen and one-off transactions. With more than[ 400 million guns](https://www.thetrace.org/2023/03/guns-america-data-atf-total/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in circulation and limited enforcement capacity, the pressure on the system is immense. Leaks turn into floods. And downstream, it's often the[ most disadvantaged communities](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lana.2025.101101?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that bear the brunt. > If we want fewer shootings, we need fewer guns leaking into the wrong hands. Sure, we could pour resources into endlessly repairing the leaks that spring throughout the system — but doesn't it make more sense to fix the faucets? In recent years, we've seen clear examples of how a small number of dealers can fuel illegal gun markets. In South and Northeast Philadelphia, just[ six retailers](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/28/us/politics/gun-shops-weapons-resell.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) sold more than 11,000 weapons between 2014 and 2020 that were later recovered at crime scenes or seized from people who obtained them illegally. A 2021[ report](https://brady-static.s3.amazonaws.com/Pennsylvania-Crime-Guns-Trace-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found about 1.2% of Pennsylvania's licensed firearm dealers accounted for 57% of firearms that ended up at crime scenes through illegal resale or straw purchases. Even with limited access to firearms tracing data, a 2022[ letter](https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/house-committee-atf-guns/bcb0abe2fc89407f/full.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the House Oversight and Reform Committee to the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) detailed a small number of dealers in Florida, Georgia, Indiana and Michigan responsible for a high proportion of crime guns. Whether you call them negligent, "bad apples" or just careless with paperwork, it's hard to deny that a small group of dealers plays an outsize role in supplying the guns that fuel everyday violence. **From oversight to action** If we know where the leaks are, the next step is obvious: Fix the source. That means holding gun dealers accountable, closing well-documented gaps in oversight and investing in the agencies tasked with enforcement. These upstream interventions must come before downstream efforts to contain the damage. Without stopping the flow of guns into the illegal market, efforts to disrupt trafficking networks or reduce shootings will remain reactive and incomplete. What's needed is a coordinated strategy that aligns federal, state and local authorities. A layered approach led by the ATF and reinforced by state policies and local action is not duplicative. It's resilient against failure at any one level. There is no doubt that this is politically and logistically difficult, but it's the key to moving forward. In recent years, there has been some progress at the federal level. In 2021, the Biden administration implemented a zero-tolerance policy for gun dealers who willfully violated core regulations. The ATF was directed to revoke licenses for dealers guilty of any of five serious violations, including falsifying records or selling firearms without conducting background checks. This resulted in the[ steepest increase](https://www.thetrace.org/2024/10/atf-gun-dealer-licenses-revoked-biden/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in license revocations in the agency's history, driven largely by the kind of serious dealer violations that result in guns being diverted toward illegal channels. Yet in a reminder of how fragile regulatory gains can be, the ATF[ announced](https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/enhanced-regulatory-enforcement-policy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=As%20of%20April%207%2C%202025,to%20these%20previously%20set%20guidelines.) in April 2025 that it would abandon the zero-tolerance policy under the newly installed Trump administration. The message was clear: Even when oversight improves, it can be swiftly undone. > Just 5% of dealers are linked to nearly 90% of crime guns recovered by law enforcement. The ATF is the only federal agency responsible for regulating gun commerce, but it is consistently undermined. It has suffered from years of[ unstable leadership](https://apnews.com/article/atf-director-army-secretary-driscoll-kash-patel-9de7e829b0585a9c4b5c13c08d4e7a38?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), chronic underfunding and a shortage of[ specialized field agents](https://www.atf.gov/careers/industry-operations-investigators?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Industry%20operations%20investigators%20%28IOIs%29%20support,regulated%20firearms%20and%20explosives%20industries.) that conduct dealer inspections. There are[ about 80,000](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-12-14/arming-america-how-we-did-the-analysis-gun-dealers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) gun dealers around the country, more than the combined total of McDonald's, Burger King, Subway and Wendy's locations. Many are ["kitchen table"](https://www.thetrace.org/2021/05/atf-inspections-kitchen-table-home-based-ffl/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) dealers that run out of people's homes with no storefront. Yet federal data show that the ATF inspects[ only about 15%](https://www.thetrace.org/2021/05/atf-inspection-report-gun-store-ffl-violation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of licensed gun dealers each year. This means that most dealers are visited just once every seven years, simply because there aren't enough agents to conduct regular inspections. Without a consistent audit strategy and meaningful follow-up, we will continue to miss the small proportion of dealers who account for a disproportionate share of crime guns. Strengthening ATF capacity is not a threat to lawful gun ownership — it's the best way to protect it. With proper resources, authority and staffing, the ATF can target lawbreaking dealers while ensuring that those playing by the rules are not penalized. It's not just about hiring more people to build better capacity — there is a real technological opportunity for improvement. In an era of big data and AI, the ATF should leverage machine learning to analyze firearms tracing data and flag dealers linked to disproportionately high numbers of crime guns or unusually short [time-to-crime](https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/firearms-trace-data-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) patterns. By integrating inspection reports, trace results and transaction records, and applying techniques like natural language processing and predictive modeling, the agency could more effectively prioritize inspections and enforcement. Moving toward 21st century solutions is essential to meet the scale of the problem, especially given the availability of relevant data, although challenges like poor digitization, data silos and legal restrictions must be addressed. Reform also means removing structural barriers. For instance, the[ 2003 Tiahrt Amendment](https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF11371.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) prohibits the ATF from sharing firearms tracing data with the public and restricts its ability to require dealer inventory audits. Repealing or revising the Tiahrt Amendment would allow the ATF to work more closely with local and state law enforcement, providing the intelligence needed to identify high-risk dealers before more guns end up in the wrong hands. In the absence of strong federal enforcement, states can and should step in. Many still do not require dealers to obtain a state-specific license, nor do they enforce uniform standards for inventory control, recordkeeping or physical security. But evidence shows that states with stronger dealer oversight have[ less gun trafficking](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-009-9351-x?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) across state lines and[ lower rates of firearm homicide](https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2014.301999?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). States may not have the ATF's infrastructure, but they can create the [proper policy environment](https://journals.lww.com/epidem/abstract/2023/11000/the%5Fera%5Fof%5Fprogress%5Fon%5Fgun%5Fmortality%5F%5Fstate%5Fgun.3.aspx?context=latestarticles&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to deter illegal conduct, support compliance and ultimately save lives. Local jurisdictions also have a role to play — particularly where[ preemption laws](https://cardozolawreview.com/the-firearm-preemption-phenomenon/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) don't block municipal capacity to enact localized firearm regulations. Local law enforcement can work with ATF agents to trace guns, identify patterns of dealer misconduct and pursue repeat offenders. In cities with the authority to pass additional regulations, local ordinances can restrict reckless dealer behavior and mandate responsible business practices. Across all levels of government, the goal should be the same: to identify and disrupt the small number of dealers responsible for the most harm. The law of the vital few should guide actions across the board. > This isn't gun control — it's proper market control. And it provides an actionable path toward real public safety. **The guns already out there** While these recommendations focus on preventing future diversion, they don't address the 400 million firearms already in circulation — many of which are untracked or illegally possessed. That's the elephant in the room: No matter how tightly we regulate dealers moving forward, the vast existing stock of guns poses a serious risk. One of the most effective strategies for managing this risk is requiring secure storage of firearms. The most secure form of firearm storage is locked, unloaded and separate from ammunition. Child access prevention (CAP) laws, which vary by state, generally require gun owners to lock their firearms when not in use and hold owners accountable if a shooting occurs due to negligent storage. These laws are associated with [reductions in suicides, violent crime and unintentional shootings](https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/child-access-prevention.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). CAP laws can also prevent theft, keeping guns already in circulation from flowing into the secondary market. We also need better infrastructure for safe gun disposal. Many people inherit firearms, receive them as gifts or simply no longer want them — but they have no idea what to do with them. Without better options, they keep them. Proper disposal can be[ complicated](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/how-properly-destroy-firearms?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and most people don't have a reliable vendor or service to handle it. Traditional gun buybacks in the U.S. are often limited and underfunded, while[ research has shown](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2013.08.002?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that they don't directly reduce violent crime. But reducing crime isn't their only potential benefit. Buybacks and disposal programs can also[ shrink the pool](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2825397?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of guns that might be lost, stolen or diverted into secondary markets. New disposal models could make a bigger impact — such as mail-in disposal kits, drop-off programs at retailers or community centers, or modest tax incentives for relinquishing firearms. With more innovative and accessible options, fewer unwanted guns would remain in homes where they pose a risk of misuse or theft. Finally, only 15 states and the District of Columbia currently[ require individuals to report lost or stolen guns](https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/lost-or-stolen-firearms.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), even though these weapons are frequently used in crimes. A federal law already mandates that dealers report missing firearms within 48 hours. Extending this requirement to private owners could help stem the flow of guns into criminal markets. Research suggests that[ public reporting of stolen guns increases](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-010-9113-5?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when people are aware of mandatory requirements, but more data are needed to assess the impact of these laws on firearm recovery and crime prevention. These strategies won't solve everything. But they acknowledge a basic truth: Preventing future harm requires not only regulating future sales, but also reducing the risk posed by the enormous and poorly monitored supply of guns that already exists. **Market control, not gun control** This strategic approach isn't about taking guns away from law-abiding citizens. Instead, it's about imposing basic accountability on a commercial market that has operated with far too little of it. In nearly every other high-risk industry — [automobiles](https://www.nhtsa.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ pharmaceuticals](https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-consumers-and-patients-drugs/overview-our-role-regulating-and-approving-drugs-video-series?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com),[ alcohol](https://www.ttb.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — we accept regulation as necessary to protect public safety. Yet when it comes to firearms, we allow a small number of dealers to violate rules, supply illegal markets and fuel community violence with little oversight and few consequences. This should be unacceptable to all of us, but especially to the firearm owners, dealers and manufacturers that are doing the right thing and following the law. If we want fewer shootings, we need fewer guns leaking into the wrong hands. The law of the vital few tells us that a small number of sources account for a disproportionate share of harm. We need to shut down the worst dealers and build systems that keep the next wave of guns out of the illegal pipeline. This isn't gun control — it's proper market control. And it provides an actionable path toward real public safety. ### The Money Behind Mass Shootings URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-money-behind-mass-shootings/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:50.000Z I had spent two years working as an editor on magazines like AR Rifleman, Ballistic, Black Guns, Combat Handguns, and Tactical Weapons, but I still didn't know what to expect when I attended the gun industry's largest annual trade show — the ill-named Shooting, Hunting, Outdoor Trade (SHOT) Show held in Las Vegas every January — a few weeks after the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012\. Would there be a memorial for the 20 students and six teachers who were murdered? Would Bushmaster, the company that manufactured the killer's AR-15, even attend? Maybe there would be signs indicating that the industry was reconsidering selling military-grade weapons to civilians. Indeed, the only distinction between the military's M16 and the AR-15s sold to civilians is that the former can fire automatically, allowing a soldier to unleash multiple shots with a single trigger pull. Thanks to a federal law designed to crack down on Tommy guns in the 1930s, the civilian version is semiautomatic, requiring a trigger pull for each shot. Otherwise, the rifles are identical. They both use the same gas operating system, the same plastic and aluminum components to reduce weight, the same controls. Both can fire the same bullets, which leave the barrel at well over 2,000 miles per hour — over three times as fast as a 9 mm bullet leaves a handgun — and eviscerate multiple organs and shatter bones. Both have light recoil impulses, making them more accurate, especially in rapid fire. Both are quick to reload using magazines that hold anywhere from 10 to 100 rounds of ammunition. Of course, that year's SHOT Show was no different than any other. There was no self-reflection, no hint of changing course. In response to the Sandy Hook shooting, the Freedom Group, a conglomerate that owned several firearm brands, simply moved the Bushmaster section of its city-block-sized booth to another part of the SHOT Show floor at the Venetian Expo Center, one that was less prominent. That's it; the company didn't want to give outside reporters easy access to the gun that the Sandy Hook killer had wielded. Like many other exhibitors, Bushmaster still had dozens of AR-15s on display. When I walked by, an employee in a red polo shirt smiled at me, seemingly unconcerned that the rifles on the tables and walls around him were identical to the one used in such a heinous murder. Yes, a few industry professionals I spoke to were worried about what had just happened — but their concern was not for the families of the victims or those who survived, but for their own bottom lines. They worried that lawmakers might reenact the federal assault weapons ban that had expired in 2004 and cut off a big source of revenue. Because the truth is that AR-15s are very profitable. This is why gunmakers have insisted on manufacturing and selling them even after their use in the country's deadliest mass shootings — in Aurora, Newtown, San Bernardino, Parkland, Sutherland Springs, Uvalde, Buffalo, Highland Park, just recently in [Midtown Manhattan](https://nypost.com/2025/07/28/us-news/smears-of-blood-seen-on-the-assault-rifle-shane-tamura-used-during-his-deadly-rampage-inside-345-park-avenue/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and countless other places. The mass shooting in Las Vegas, where a gunman used [14 AR-15s](https://smokinggun.org/guns-used-in-the-deadliest-u-s-mass-shooting/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) outfitted with bump stocks to mimic machine gun fire and kill 60 concertgoers and wound more than 400 more, occurred just two miles down the Strip from where the SHOT Show is held, but you wouldn't know it from walking the show floor, where thousands of AR-15s debut every year. **Profit in its sights** The AR-15 is a rather simple design, and that fact is key to its profitability. This isn't like an iPhone, which takes billions of dollars of sophisticated research to design and refine, or like a modern automobile, which has hundreds if not thousands of moving parts and sensitive safety technology. If you know how one AR-15-style rifle works, you know how they all work. That's why the name for one very specific Colt AR-15 now represents an entire class of weapons. A manufacturer might install a longer barrel on one model, or a different stock on another, but the configuration remains the same. These guns also are easy to assemble with hand tools. If you can assemble an Ikea dresser, you can build an AR-15 — possibly in less time and with fewer expletives. Finally, while a few key components of AR-15s are made of steel, namely the barrel and bolt, every other part is made of either aluminum or plastic — materials that are relatively cheap to produce in bulk. Manufacturers rely on a handful of forges to complete their aluminum parts or use computer-controlled machinery to cut blocks of raw aluminum into their desired shapes. The plastic is injection-molded. Put all of this together, and gunmakers can forgo research and development, and even skilled labor, to reproduce the same gun over and over again. In 2011, Smith & Wesson, the country's largest gunmaker, told its investors that the civilian AR-15 market, which has grown through aggressive marketing, was worth an estimated [$489 million](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/12/assault-weapon-stats-how-many-assault-weapons-are-there-in-america.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the Freedom Group claimed that the AR-15 market segment grew by 27% from 2007 to 2011, compared to the 3% growth of all long guns. At scale, I estimate that it costs an established gunmaker less than $100 to manufacture one AR-15 that they can then sell for between $400 and $2,000\. (For comparison, author Paul Barrett said that it costs Glock $65 to produce one pistol that sells for $500 to $600 — and it's why so many other gunmakers now sell competing designs.) Cheap AR-15s come in cardboard boxes with no frills or extras; the higher-end models arrive in hard-sided cases with more durable parts and finishes and additional magazines. What doesn't change is what a .223 Remington or 5.56 mm NATO bullet — the most common ammunition used in AR-15s — will do to the human body. As numerous [doctors](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2023/ar-15-damage-to-human-body/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [trauma surgeons](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/what-i-saw-treating-the-victims-from-parkland-should-change-the-debate-on-guns/553937/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have said, it's much harder for people to survive even one .223 gunshot than multiple 9 mm wounds. **A platform for more purchases** With a handgun, you can buy a box of ammunition and hit the shooting range. With an AR-15, ammunition is just the beginning. You'll likely need to buy sights or an optic (such as a scope) to aim and hit your target with the rifle, a sling to carry it, and a case for storing and transporting it (if you chose the $400 Cardboard Special). Thanks to the gun industry's marketing tactics, you might want to install a forward grip to mitigate recoil, a laser or flashlight for better aiming and target identification, or a silencer to reduce the rifle's sound signature, making it harder for bystanders to figure out where a gunshot came from. Because of how easy it is to fire off 30 rounds, you'll need more magazines, not to mention tools for quickly refilling those magazines. And much more ammunition. Before you know it, you're buying 1,000-round boxes of .223 Remington ammunition, or military-surplus 5.56 mm NATO rounds designed to punch through steel helmets hundreds of yards away. These ["barrier penetrating" rounds](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/11/us/army-ammunition-factory-shootings.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are cheap because of taxpayer subsidies. In this way, this gun *is* like an iPhone; it's an entry point into an ecosystem of products and companies. According to a survey conducted in December 2021 for the National Shooting Sports Foundation, the gun industry's trade association, [86% of AR-15 owners](https://smokinggun.org/nssf-report-ar-15-owners-stockpile-weapons-seek-silencers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) said that they had accessorized their most recently acquired rifles with extra magazines, optics and sights, grips, slings, flashlights and other products, and spent an average of $618 on those purchases. Three-quarters of the respondents said they had added accessories to their rifles within a year of purchasing them, and 37% said that they planned to purchase a silencer within a year of taking the survey. To capitalize on this phenomenon, Smith & Wesson — whose AR-15s were used in the Aurora, San Bernardino, Parkland, Poway and Highland Park [mass shootings](https://smokinggun.org/guns-used-in-the-deadliest-u-s-mass-shooting/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — bought Gemtech and Crimson Trace, companies that manufacture silencers and weapon-mounted lights and lasers, respectively. Other larger gunmakers, such as Ruger and SIG Sauer, have diversified by offering more products compatible with AR-15s, including optics, silencers and high-capacity magazines. **Creating a market** The profit margins of AR-15s help explain why dozens of large gun manufacturers and countless smaller gun shops build and sell them, and scores of companies produce parts and accessories so their owners can customize and modify them. In terms of size, the AR-15 ecosystem of aftermarket parts and customization is unrivaled in the gun world, and gun owners call AR-15s either "Legos for men" or "Barbies for men." Today, the gun industry's trade association boasts that over [30 million AR-15s](https://www.nssf.org/articles/nssf-releases-most-recent-firearm-production-figures-2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and other assault weapons have been produced in the U.S. This figure is distorted, because it does not distinguish between military, police or civilian rifles and appears to include those in the hands of prohibited owners, such as criminals and domestic abusers, and rifles that have been illegally trafficked. The association states that it arrived at its number using firearm production data from the ATF — which does not separate semiautomatic rifles from non-semiautomatic rifles, and many companies produce both — and "industry estimates," but the organization has never published the underlying data. Still, one must wonder: How did we get here? It's an illuminating story. Colt first began selling semiautomatic AR-15s to civilians in 1964\. For the next 30 years — until the federal assault weapons ban was enacted in 1994 — the company and its competitors struggled to sell the rifles made of plastic and aluminum, unlike the wood and steel rifles before them. Records show that Colt and the few other companies that copied its design manufactured fewer than [800,000](https://www.generalstaff.org/Firearms/Count/AR15%5FProduction.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) AR-15s between 1964 and 1994, compared to millions of hunting rifles and shotguns produced in that time frame. Well into the 2000s, gun owners predominantly shunned AR-15s and similar assault weapons that they deemed too "military" or "tactical" for civilian life. They didn't need a combat rifle designed for rapid-fire engagements and quick reloading to hunt or shoot competitively or protect themselves. In his book "Gunfight," Ryan Busse, another former member of the industry, explained how a group of gun writers stopped a young man from firing an AR-15 at a shooting range in 2004, saying that "normal people" don't use those kinds of guns. So what changed? The gun became a symbol of power and defiance. It's a story of marketing shaping politics and culture, and politics and culture shaping marketing. After lobbying for Congress to allow the federal assault weapons ban to [expire in 2004](https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna5946127?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the gun industry poured millions into rebranding the AR-15 for a new batch of customers, overwhelmingly men who were seeing footage of soldiers carrying M16 rifles and shorter M4 variants into battle in Iraq and Afghanistan and wanted that same firepower, perhaps to amplify their masculinity. This is why gunmakers like Daniel Defense depicted soldiers carrying AR-15s [in their ads](https://smokinggun.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Military-Daniel-Defense-Ad.jpg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and promised that customers could "Use What They Use." In other words, civilians could simply buy AR-15s and cosplay as their American heroes overseas. Some of the magazines I worked on focused exclusively on the AR-15's military pedigree. Others made it a point to showcase the rifles in the hands of hunters and people protecting their families and homes — roles where AR-15s were previously considered inappropriate. No marketing tactic was considered taboo. Gunmakers entered into licensing agreements to get their AR-15s placed in video games like [Call of Duty](https://www.wsj.com/business/media/remington-gun-call-of-duty-video-game-93059a66?gaa%5Fat=eafs&gaa%5Fn=ASWzDAg3XM-LH2sWuXimiiZbiyhIw4iDcndsEMMJiTdESNAyxanrOU6OPEqVLwI05es%3D&gaa%5Fts=683f22bf&gaa%5Fsig=1Z21ImN637RKycpkdkOY7UvZHkoZfUffokze2wD8Xvzfp20aioEqfjFIxnZ2vpCjfx8-1GH66YBSJqtJ6o72zg%3D%3D&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When I first became a gun magazine editor in 2010, the Freedom Group had just begun running ads promising that men could have their "man cards" reissued if they purchased [Bushmaster AR-15s](https://www.salon.com/2012/12/17/bushmasters%5Fhorrible%5Fad%5Fcampaign/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The most memorable print ad from the campaign noted in fine print, "If it's good enough for the professional, it's good enough for you." Gunmakers even produced .22-caliber versions of AR-15s, like the [Wee1 Tactical JR-15](https://smokinggun.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Youth%5FWee1Tactical.jpg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Smith & Wesson M&P 15-22](https://smokinggun.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Youth-SW-Post-2.png?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to teach new shooters — especially children — how to use AR-style rifles and interest them in larger-caliber versions. The whole point was to make AR-15s seem fun and inviting. Going even further, the gun industry created [shooting matches](https://www.nssf.org/shooting/3-gun/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) where competitors must "run and gun" and hit as many targets as they can in seconds — tasks for which AR-15s excel. **Mission accomplished** The marketing paid off, creating a very dedicated following of enthusiasts who, according to the gun industry's trade group, own [nearly four AR-15s on average](https://smokinggun.org/nssf-report-ar-15-owners-stockpile-weapons-seek-silencers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While AR-15 owners still represent a fraction of all gun owners in the U.S., their numbers are growing, and more people today see the guns as both a hobby and lifestyle than ever before. And they're more than that: They're a symbol. These days, you'll see AR-15s on bumper stickers, flags at protests, even bags of coffee. Ignoring the lives that have been lost along the way, the gun industry, driven by cold, hard profit, worked hard to transform the AR-15 from a hunk of plastic and metal into an identity. And it worked. ### What We Know and Don’t Know About Guns URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-guns/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:50.000Z If the United States were to disappear tomorrow, the world would lose nearly half of all civilian-owned firearms. With somewhere between 350 to 450 million guns in a country of 340 million people, America doesn't just lead the world in gun ownership. It exists in a category of its own. To understand how we got here, we provide some background on America's gun supply: the basic facts we do and don't know, the regulatory system that determines what we can know and the cultural divisions that drive both our policies and our debates. **The basics** The terms "American" and "gun" have become entwined, and the numbers explain why. We have way, *way* more guns than any other country in the world in terms of stock (total number of guns) and per capita rate (number of guns per capita). Switzerland, often cited as rivaling American gun culture, has a civilian ownership rate less than one-quarter of ours. The country with the second-highest gun ownership rate, Yemen, still has fewer than half as many guns per capita as the U.S. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24731717?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24731821?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Guns have always been present in the U.S., but the last 25 years have seen manufacturers nearly triple the production of firearms. Since a relatively small proportion — [around 5% or less](https://www.thetrace.org/2023/03/guns-america-data-atf-total/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — of guns made in the U.S. are exported each year, that means that the vast majority of these guns are hitting American commercial markets. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24730813?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) This exceptional scale translates into exceptional consequences. American gun violence rates dwarf those of other developed nations, with firearms accounting for nearly [80% of our homicides](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/03/05/what-the-data-says-about-gun-deaths-in-the-us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#what-share-of-u-s-gun-deaths-are-murders-what-share-are-suicides). Nearly all the difference between American murder rates and peer countries is accounted for by murders committed with guns. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24731657?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Though it fluctuates considerably decade by decade, the United States' homicide rate is basically unchanged from 100 years ago, and data going back to the 1940s show that firearm homicides have increasingly grown as a share of overall homicides. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24730916?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Each year, gun violence [costs the United States $557 billion](https://everytownresearch.org/report/economic-cost-calculator/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in medical bills, criminal justice costs, recovery care, lost wages from disability or death and quality-of-life costs for pain and suffering of victims and their families. Given that most murders are committed with guns and that murders make up 70% of the cost of crime to society, gun homicides account for more than half of the cost of all crime. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24731887?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Not to be forgotten, gun violence includes other crimes committed with guns, like nonfatal shootings and robberies. Nor do these numbers account for the additional toll of firearm suicides, which make up more than half of all gun deaths each year. Yet for all these staggering statistics, there's a fundamental paradox at the heart of America's gun story. We know remarkably little about the very thing that makes us unique. Unlike virtually every other consumer product, those who study guns and their consequences in the United States lack reliable data on how many guns exist, who owns them or how they move through markets. These aren't accidental oversights — they're deliberate policy choices. A Reagan-era bill made federal gun registries illegal, while the Tiahrt and Dickey Amendments have restricted access to crime gun data and eliminated federal funding for gun violence research, making it difficult to answer basic questions about guns' impact on society. What emerges is a portrait of a nation where guns are everywhere yet largely invisible to official tracking. The data we have tell a clear story about American exceptionalism. The data we don't have tell an equally important story about American politics. **Who regulates what, and how** While other developed countries typically regulate firearms through comprehensive national systems, the U.S. operates through a federal-state framework that creates a complex patchwork of laws varying dramatically across jurisdictions. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24795769?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The federal government establishes minimum regulations on dealer licensing, interstate sales, the manufacturing and sale of certain types of guns, and eligible buyers. States are able to add stricter requirements above this minimum as long as they remain constitutionally permissible. Current federal regulations on firearms are few. From the National Firearms Act of 1934 to the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022, there have been about five or six major (and a few minor) pieces of restrictive federal legislation in all of American history, usually watered-down versions of the originals due to opposition from the gun lobby. This sparse federal framework means states bear the responsibility for further gun regulation, including efforts to address the secondary market. States handle everything from carrying rules and enhanced penalties for gun crimes to additional ownership requirements that exceed federal minimums. This arrangement creates a complex web of laws that can vary significantly even between neighboring jurisdictions. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24701566?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The data reveal a clear pattern: States with stronger gun restrictions tend to have lower gun deaths, while states with more permissive regulations see higher rates. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24701768?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The U.S. regulatory framework contains several significant vulnerabilities that undermine even well-intentioned policies. **Leaks in the faucet** The United States has no registration system of guns, gun sales or gun buyers. This leaves significant barriers to addressing the various "leaks" that allow guns to find their way into the wrong hands. **The secondary market** American gun policy grapples with a fundamental problem: two separate gun markets with vastly different rules. The first market includes all sales by federally licensed dealers (FFLs), who must conduct background checks and maintain records. The second, the secondary market*,* covers everything else: private sales at gun shows, online transactions and sales between individuals who aren't professional dealers. These are legal transactions but have minimal federal regulations. Sellers only need to avoid "knowingly" selling to prohibited buyers without any requirement to verify eligibility. The [vast majority of guns](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0091743515001486?via%3Dihub&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that end up being used in crime come from the secondary market, since these weapons circulate with little oversight. It's the flow of guns from the licensed to the secondary market that should cause concern. Licensed dealers sometimes illegally sell firearms through straw purchases, fake IDs or corruption. Just 5% of firearm dealers are linked to almost 90% of crime guns recovered by law enforcement. In New York City, the "time-to-crime" (period between a firearm's legal sale and recovery in a crime) dropped from 12 years in 2019 to nine years in 2022, suggesting guns are moving into illegal markets faster. Despite this acceleration, New York still has the longest average time-to-crime in the continental United States. This shows that illegal gun markets depend heavily on the legal market structure and geographic proximity to permissive gun laws. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24780816?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Firearms sold in the secondary market are also a major source of trafficked guns — that is, firearms illegally transported across jurisdictional boundaries, typically from areas with weaker gun laws to areas with stricter regulations. While two-thirds of recent ATF trafficking cases involve new guns, 40% involve firearms acquired secondhand. There's no telling how many times these firearms have changed hands. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24701934?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Trafficking across state lines** Regardless of federal laws, firearms are easily transported across state borders. Major cities with strong gun laws — particularly in New York and California — become magnets for trafficked firearms from states with weaker regulations. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/story/3282227?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New York City had the highest share of trafficked guns originating out of state (86%), followed closely by Newark (86%), with Boston (56%), Washington (53%) and Baltimore (49%) also among the top interstate trafficking cities. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24780493?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Enhanced lethality** Legal modifications undermine policies meant to keep automatic weapons from civilians. Glock switches and bump stocks turn semiautomatic guns into fully automatic weapons, while high-capacity magazines make it easy to fire dozens of times without reloading. The internet makes these modifications easily accessible. Meanwhile, firearms and ammunition have become magnitudes more lethal over time. **It's the culture** Perhaps as defining as America's gun abundance is the nation's stark cultural divide over them. [Four in ten](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/07/24/key-facts-about-americans-and-guns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) U.S. households own guns, and about [32% of American adults](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/07/24/key-facts-about-americans-and-guns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) say they own one personally. But ownership rates only tell part of the story. Gun owners are more likely to say they think guns make us safe and should be more accessible. Gun owners are also more likely to be white, men, Republicans, living in rural areas and from the South. This leaves the United States with major contradicting opinions, even within households, on how to handle guns. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24731510?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Among those who live with a gun in the house, gun owners are 40% more likely to feel safe with a gun and 120% more likely to enjoy having a gun in the home. In contrast, more than a quarter of people who live with a gun in the house but don't own the gun say they worry about having a gun in the house. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24731118?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) For a long time, firearms were seen as primarily a sporting or hunting tool. Less than 30 years ago, half of surveyed gun owners said the main reason they owned a gun was for hunting, while only a quarter cited protection. The 1980s and '90s then saw some of the worst rates of violent crime in recent American history. Fast forward to 2019, when Americans had enjoyed 20 years of homicide rates that were 25% to 50% lower than the '80s, yet gun owners were still twice as likely to say they owned a gun for protection rather than hunting. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24731289?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Support for gun control is highest among groups that have lower rates of ownership: women, people of color, young people, city residents, Democrats and those with college and advanced degrees. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24732005?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1yxPaMQsodP-WFaHUvlYR3RrA498AQToe025cg7kJ1xQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ### The Good Gun Owner URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-good-gun-owner/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:51.000Z On an unseasonably cold April day in 2018, I stood with police academy instructors on a large training campus of a municipal police department. This week, the cadets were completing "use-of-force scenarios," putting into practice weeks of classroom instruction focused on the laws and policies dictating when and how officers can use force. All over the campus, dozens of officers served as role-players and evaluators as the cadets responded to a range of scenarios. In one — the "park scenario" — cadets were told that there was a suspicious person sitting in the park who might be selling drugs. I watched the first pair of cadets arrive on scene, where a man was sitting at a picnic table by himself. Within seconds, one of the cadets firmly shouted "GUN!" This response aligned with their training, where instructors insisted that cadets yell the word "gun" as loud as possible to alert other officers on scene about the threat. A feeling of anxiety circulated the air as both cadets drew their guns while shouting commands. One cadet kept his gun fixed on the man while the other carefully disarmed him, pulling the revolver from the front of his waistline and clearing it before completing the arrest. (All departments and individual officers I write about have been assigned pseudonyms to protect confidentiality. Maintaining anonymity was a condition of access to these departments.) Following the scenario, the instructors debriefed each pair of cadets, repeatedly emphasizing the importance of identifying the gun and acting appropriately. A lieutenant explained to me that to pass this scenario, the cadets needed to "recognize the deadly threat," alert their partner and draw their pistols and aim at the man. Cadets who failed this scenario, instructors told me, either did not see the gun, or when they saw the gun, did not draw their own pistols. In this scenario and others, cadets learned that they needed to be constantly aware of the possibility that someone may have a gun and prepared to respond with lethal force. As a police researcher, I spent nearly 600 hours conducting ethnographic field work at four police training academies in 2018\. I observed and participated in as much of the training as possible, including sitting in on classroom instruction as well as working out, learning defensive tactics and shooting guns alongside the cadets. I found that this emphasis on guns — and the threat they presented to police officers — permeated nearly every aspect of the training. In many different classes, including those focused on de-escalation training, instructors repeatedly showed cadets graphic, disturbing videos of police officers being fatally shot. The 1998 video of Deputy Kyle Dinkheller's murder appeared throughout the curriculum, usually prefaced and prologued by impassioned warnings about the danger of dropping their guard while on duty. The dash camera footage of Dinkheller's murder shows him initiating a traffic stop that ends in the driver pulling a rifle out of his pickup truck and fatally shooting Dinkheller. The video captures Dinkheller's panicked screams and labored breaths as he dies alone at the side of his patrol car. The videos instructors played at the academy showed real events, where officers wearing uniforms very similar to theirs were brutally beaten or killed. These videos reflected the uniquely American reality of an exceptionally armed society, one in which [there are more guns than people](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19/there-are-more-guns-than-people-in-the-united-states-according-to-a-new-study-of-global-firearm-ownership/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This broader landscape of firearms both shapes and is shaped by U.S. policing. Existing research has highlighted this intertwined relationship between civilian gun ownership and police use of force. In states with [higher firearm prevalence](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002716219896259?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, the [police fatally shoot civilians at significantly higher rates](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6391295/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Relatedly, in states with more stringent gun control laws, the [police kill fewer civilians](https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2017.303770?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Thus, police fear of guns is certainly not unwarranted, and the presence of guns has a real impact on civilians' overall risk of dying at the hands of the police. This fear of guns was both psychologically and physically ingrained into the cadets, where the instructors designed tactical and scenario-based training emphasizing the exceedingly high stakes of an interaction with a gun gone wrong. This was perhaps the most intense in situations where cadets either had their gun taken from them during a fight or when they missed a gun while frisking or searching a subject. In one police department, cadets who had their gun taken from them during a tactical exercise were required to write their own obituary at home that night. "Write about everyone you're leaving behind," the instructor directed. > Over and over, the training for new officers seemed to communicate that the No. 1 threat to their lives while on duty was guns. During one day of scenario-based training at another department, the cadets learned that it was not just their own lives at risk, but also their co-officers'. One of the scenarios that day mimicked a routine traffic stop, where the driver was unknowingly armed with a gun and became agitated during the exchange. When a cadet missed the gun while searching the driver, the instructor lamented, "We've taught you control, we've taught you how to make an arrest, and you missed a gun." To emphasize her point, the instructor added: "So, which one of you is going to tell your partner's family that you missed the gun and your partner's dead?" Over and over, the training for new officers seemed to communicate that the No. 1 threat to their lives while on duty was guns. Interestingly, while academy instructors inundated cadets with warnings about the dangers of guns, the officers I met also remained staunchly supportive of gun ownership and wary of gun control measures. Some of these officers were remarkably enthusiastic about guns, pursuing shooting as a recreational hobby and making guns a key part of their identities. A white, 37-year-old instructor in one department once told me that he would "die" if he had to go a year without shooting. Symbols of guns also physically appeared across the academy space: Wooden figurines of guns adorned the instructors' cubicles; officers often wore gun-related clothing, including items featuring the NRA logo; and patches and stickers referring to shooting competitions and gun-related organizations appeared on officers' bags and cars. When the Second Amendment came up, officers insisted that this was a right that could not be infringed upon, that constituted an essential pillar of the country. This complex police relationship with firearms — with officers both intensely fearful for their safety on duty while being supportive of gun ownership — was representative of a broader pattern. [A 2016 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center](https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2017/01/11/police-views-public-views/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that almost half the officers surveyed nearly always or often had serious concerns about their physical safety while at work. In this same poll, 74% of the police officers surveyed felt it was *more* important to protect the right of Americans to own guns than to control gun ownership. This percentage represented a distinct position from the general public, where just 53% of civilian respondents agreed with this statement. Police officers were also much less likely than the general public to support a ban on assault-style weapons, with just 32% of officers surveyed (compared to 64% of civilian respondents) supporting this kind of policy. As I continued to conduct research about the police, this combination of ideological commitments continually cropped up. I began to wonder: How is it that officers could recognize the threat that guns presented to them as part of their daily lives, while remaining so pro-Second Amendment? To resolve this ideological tension, police officers relied on narratives that wove together logics of threat, criminality and race to make clear distinctions between types of gun owners (good vs. bad) and to draw conclusions about the potential effectiveness of gun control policies. Gun control measures would never be capable of eliminating the illegal possession and use of guns by criminals (i.e., bad gun owners), officers explained, so it was not worth pursuing. Any attempt at restricting gun possession, they concluded, would take guns out of the hands of law-abiding citizens, leaving everyone more vulnerable to violence resulting from illegally owned firearms. This sentiment is neatly summarized by the phrase popularized by pro-gun advocates, including the NRA: ["The only way to stop a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun."](https://www.nrablog.com/articles/2016/7/a-good-guy-with-a-gun/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) > For many police officers, gun ownership and carry are considered legitimate and nonthreatening when the person with the gun embodies expectations of white, middle-class respectability — but not otherwise. [Gun scholars have consistently shown](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-018-9374-2?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that these narratives of the good gun owner vs. the bad one are [deeply wrapped up with race and gender](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/citizen-protectors-9780190902148?cc=us&lang=en&&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), where guns enable mostly white men to enact a form of protective masculinity of "innocents" (which, in effect, means white women and children) from Black and brown men they imagine to be engaged in violent crime. Race, gender and class have shaped gun ownership and gun reform from the very beginning, where some of the earliest gun regulations included [weapons restrictions for Black and Indigenous people](https://lcp.law.duke.edu/article/gun-law-history-in-the-united-states-and-second-amendment-rights-spitzer-vol80-iss2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), among other groups. Several centuries later, the National Rifle Association began supporting some gun control measures [only when the Black Panthers became armed](https://www.history.com/articles/black-panthers-gun-control-nra-support-mulford-act?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These distinctions — between good and bad gun owners — and their connections to gender, race and criminality, map onto the ideologies police officers use in explaining their positions on guns. In her [study of police chiefs](https://doi.org/10.1086/707609?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, Jennifer Carlson found that specific racial frames are used to conceptualize two distinct groups of gun owners: Black and brown men who are imagined to be "hyperviolent gun criminals (e.g., the 'gangster')," and white, middle-class, law-abiding armed citizens, respectively. This conceptualization of legitimate vs. illegitimate gun ownership, Carlson argues, effectively extends the state's monopoly of violence into this second group. This series of narratives is not just restricted to police chiefs; similar ideologies came up in my interviews with officers. When I asked a white homicide detective in his 40s who he thought should be allowed to have a gun, he began to describe his views on gun control, explaining that ultimately: > You can get a gun anywhere. … It's so easy to go get a gun. People say "more gun control." Well, how are you going to control guns that are being stolen, people leaving guns in their cars? Or things that are coming over the border, or wherever they're coming from. … So, it's easy to say that we need more gun control, but it's not just that. This detective expressed the first piece of this overarching logic about guns: that even with gun control policies, it simply would not be possible to address the acquisition of illegal firearms. He went on to make distinctions between types of gun owners, highlighting that his treatment of gun owners depended on his own interpretation of threat. He explained that he was "all about someone carrying a gun for the right reasons," and elaborated that when conducting a traffic stop, if the person is "up front about it … they say, 'I have a gun in the car,' then that's cool. That's what you're supposed to do. And I normally still watch their hands and stuff, but I'm usually going to be pretty cool about that, because I respect that." However, he went on to explain that his decision-making depended on how someone looked, explicitly saying he engages in some level of profiling: > If I ever get the slightest thought that something doesn't feel right, then I'm going to pull them out (of the car). I hate to profile, but if someone, it's not illegal to have tattoos, but if someone is all tatted up, and to me, appear to be possibly some sort of gang member. But it may not be illegal for them to own a firearm, but I might have them step out. Although this detective did not explicitly mention race or class here, he used images fraught with race- and class-related assumptions to describe who he thinks is likely engaged in crime. In very sharp contrast, just a few moments later, he explained that if someone is carrying their gun for the "right" reasons, the law should be a bit flexible: > I always tell people, if you are doing the right thing, like say you go to church, and you bring your gun, which I'm not against that, although I guess, it would be illegal. You go to church, and there's a shooting that happens, and you pull out your gun, and you kill the shooter, and stop a lot of lives from being killed, then in my mind, I'm pretty sure you're not going to get arrested for killing the bad guy. … Despite the color and gender-blind language that the detective uses, it is not difficult to ascertain what he means. In one of his scenarios, he describes a person with a gun, who is "tatted up" and looks like a "gang member" as a threat, even if they legally own the firearm and inform him that they are armed. On the other hand, he enthusiastically endorses someone who is "doing the right thing" by illegally bringing their firearm to church to protect others in the event of a mass shooting (which could potentially be prevented by stronger gun control measures). For many police officers, gun ownership and carry are considered legitimate and nonthreatening when the person with the gun embodies expectations of white, middle-class respectability — but not otherwise. These folks are just like them, they reason, and in many ways, represent an extension of police power. The answer, then, to this puzzle of police officers' ostensibly conflicting ideologies about guns is simple: It depends entirely on who is holding the gun. ### A Different Frontier, a Parallel History URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/learning-from-australias-gun-evolution/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z On a Saturday in late July, the main showroom of Cleaver Firearms was busy. Shoppers pored over custom-made armored glass cabinets or gazed up at walls bedecked with rifles and the taxidermied heads of a buffalo, dingo and banteng. The store's scale is typical of a gun shop most anywhere in America — but here in northern Queensland, Australia, that makes it the largest gun retailer in the country. Americans might be surprised to see so many firearms changing hands in Australia, said Jade Cleaver, whose dad founded the business nearly 50 years ago and is now at the shop running things most days. "The American perception," he said, gesturing to the customers around him, "is this doesn't exist." That's because in U.S. debates about guns, Australia often gets pulled in to play the foil, the through-the-looking-glass, the what-if. For a time, the two countries followed similar trajectories: British Colonists spread across vast territories, violently displacing Indigenous inhabitants. Both countries developed cultural mythologies of life on the edge of settlement — the American "frontier" and the Australian "bush" — that prized toughness and self-reliance. And in each place, at the forefront of all of this were guns. But after Australia experienced a terrible mass shooting in 1996, when a disturbed 29-year-old used two semiautomatic rifles to kill 35 people in the town of Port Arthur, the country did what some American gun violence advocates dream of: embarking on among the world's largest mandatory gun buybacks and instituting a slate of new restrictions on the firearms that remained. Australian gun buyers must undergo a background check without exception, their purchases recorded in a state registry, with a 28-day waiting period before receiving the weapons in most cases. After mass shootings in the U.S., Australian leaders have occasionally proffered their own course as an example to follow, and [a string](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-11/barack-obama-praises-australias-tough-gun-laws/5516978?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [of Democratic Party](https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/dem-primaries/257172-hillary-australia-style-gun-control-worth-looking-at/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [standard-bearers](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GT2lrTIpuDM&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have complimented Australia on its laws. > America's gun death rate is 18 times higher than Australia's, even though the supply of guns there is larger now than it was before the Port Arthur massacre. But the reforms hardly put an end to Australian gun ownership. Indeed, the supply of guns is larger now than it was before the Port Arthur massacre, according to [a recent analysis](https://australiainstitute.org.au/post/australias-gun-ownership-scorecard-a-growing-problem-in-need-of-reform/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the Australia Institute. There are over four million licensed firearms in the country, and the total has been steadily rising. That trend, and pressure in some states to water down the existing laws, worries the rare local gun control advocate like Stephen Bendle, governor of the Australian Gun Safety Alliance. But Australia experiences just a fraction of the gun violence of the U.S.: 206 Australians died from firearm injuries in 2023, compared to over [46,728 Americans](https://publichealth.jhu.edu/center-for-gun-violence-solutions/2024/continuing-trends-five-key-takeaways-from-2023-cdc-provisional-gun-violence-data?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Controlling for population, America's gun death rate is 18 times higher. Is there anything the U.S. can learn from Australia, a place where a significant gun supply coexists with far less lethal violence? Few are more deeply versed in the country's legacy of gun ownership or have a finger more tightly on its contemporary pulse than Cleaver. In one room of the store's labyrinthine interior, he shows off his dad's collection of 19th-century Colt handguns, many of them shipped to Australia in colonial times. There are sidearms used by the New South Wales Police, two original Walker pistols (of just a couple hundred in existence, according to Cleaver), three guns customized for Tiffany & Co. and an 1851 Navy revolver so early in its line of production that it bears a serial number of just a single digit. "This is Australian history," Cleaver said. He's also brought the store into the modern era, building out a robust online business. Strolling with him through the store, we pass through a storage area where staff are preparing the hundreds of orders that ship out daily. Another room is lined with plastic bins containing purchase records. "There is 30 years of paperwork on that wall," Cleaver says. Gun ownership is less normative in Australia than in the U.S. — 1 in 30 adult Aussies have a license, whereas about 1 in 3 adult Americans are thought to possess a gun — and the reasons for ownership are different. As part of the reforms instituted after the Port Arthur massacre, Australia requires would-be gun purchasers to articulate a "genuine reason" for buying a firearm and a "genuine need" for each gun. Under the law, "self-defense" is not an acceptable reason for firearm ownership. Most of Cleaver's customers are recreational competition shooters or use guns for culling pests, he said. (Invasive species are a huge threat to the island country's fragile ecology, from tubercular pigs to tick-carrying deer.) Bendle, the gun control advocate, said this reflected a different vision of the meaning and utility of firearms. "We've never had the construct of, well, you know, 'If we all have guns, we'll be safer,'" he said. Consistent with that, pistols are far less common in Australia than are rifles or shotguns: In New South Wales, the most populous state, they make up [fewer than 5% of all registered firearms](https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/%5F%5Fdata/assets/pdf%5Ffile/0006/912354/Firearms%5FRegistry%5FPublic%5FWebsite%5FData%5FReporting%5FPresentation%5FJune%5F2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Cleaver Firearms is an outlier in prominently displaying handguns; most gun stores in Australia keep them in a vault in the back or don't offer them at all. > Australia requires would-be gun purchasers to articulate a 'genuine reason' for buying a firearm and a 'genuine need' for each gun — and 'self-defense' is not an acceptable reason. That marks a stark contrast with the U.S., both in the threshold for buying a gun and the character of ownership that has thrived. In fact, over the last 25 years, the U.S. gun industry has pivoted away from hunters and recreational shooters to make handguns the primary product, overwhelmingly marketed to customers as a means of self-defense. That, in turn, has been the handmaiden of policy change: The National Rifle Association and other organizations leveraged this shift to pass state laws allowing people to carry concealed, loaded guns outside the home, then won a crucial Supreme Court case that expanded the Second Amendment to permanently secure the right nationwide. In Australia, even gun rights activists reject that vision. Graham Park, president of the country's leading advocacy organization, Shooters Union, said purchasing guns for self-defense in the home should constitute a "genuine need," since prohibiting that as an overt purpose leads to a great deal of legal fiction in which gun-buyers make up other qualifying reasons. But he acknowledged there was little popular support in Australia for concealed weapon carrying outside the home. "I would hope that Australia doesn't have enough violence that a lot of people feel the need to do that," he said. "I'm not against it. I just think culturally, it's not going to play here. And so why fantasize. If we're not America, America is not us." Lawful gun owners bear too much stigma and too much regulation, Cleaver said, echoing familiar tropes from the U.S., albeit in an Australian vernacular. "Everybody is sick of the B.S. in this country of labeling the licensed shooter as the baddie who needs his guns taken off him," he said. "They're not the problem; the crims are the problem." ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/amdrdggnhvfto5sy_image2-auto-format-compress-1776259685442.jpg) Credit: Ted Alcorn. A large collection of Colt firearms displayed in glass cabinets at Cleaver Firearms in Margate, Queensland, Australia, July 2025. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/amdrpwgnhvfto5ss_image1-auto-format-compress-1776259685562.jpg) Credit: Ted Alcorn. Nineteenth century .36-caliber Colt handguns displayed in glass cabinets at Cleaver Firearms in Margate, Queensland, Australia, July 2025. But his attachment to his guns and opposition to gun laws didn't seem as fierce or uncompromising as that of his American peers. He balked at calling all of this a gun culture — "It's more of a hobby, a sport, a passionate pastime" — and even if he wouldn't endorse some of Australia's gun laws, he wasn't dead set against them. Asked to gauge their acceptability on a scale from 1 to 10, he thought a moment before rating them a three. "The regulations, if they're applied correctly, then there is no issue," said Cleaver. "The personal interpretation of a regulation is the issue." Park, similarly, disputed the impact of the Port Arthur reforms, pointing out that firearm deaths in Australia had been declining well before they were enacted. (The RAND Corporation, a nonprofit think tank, reviewed the evidence and, although it was difficult to tease out the laws' effect from other factors, concluded that the strongest evidence was consistent with their ["caus(ing) reductions in firearm suicides, mass shootings, and female homicide victimization."](https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/essays/1996-national-firearms-agreement.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) Park nonetheless ticked off three categories of policy he said would lower misuse of firearms and associated injuries. "Background checks work," he said. "Safe storage works." And thirdly, "some type of safety training." He just didn't want to see the measures used "to punish or restrict gun ownership." A few weeks later, Americans woke up to [a rare headline](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/26/world/australia/australia-police-shooting-porepunkah.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of firearm carnage in Australia, after a man in rural Victoria allegedly killed two police officers who were attempting to serve a warrant on him. The following day, attention shifted to a Catholic church in Minneapolis, where a 23-year-old opened fire on students and teachers during morning Mass, killing two children and injuring 18 other people. According to an analysis of [data collected by the Gun Violence Archive](https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/mass-shooting?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it was the United States' 207th mass shooting of the year. Sure enough, when Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz called for new gun regulations, he [invoked Australia's example](https://alphanews.org/gov-walz-says-he-intends-to-call-special-session-on-gun-control/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In the wake of Port Arthur, "They simply made changes," he said. But in Minnesota's divided legislature, it was not clear whether his package would have the necessary votes. ### Before the Trigger Is Pulled URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/before-the-trigger-is-pulled/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:49.000Z Gun violence is a uniquely American problem among rich countries of the world. To solve it, we've relied mainly on deterrence: Compared to 50 years ago, prison penalties have gotten much harsher for all sorts of crimes, including gun violence. But have we been trying to deter the wrong thing? In my new book,[ Unforgiving Places: The Unexpected Origins of American Gun Violence](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo244203115.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), I summarize new data suggesting the decision to pull a trigger might not be among the most deterrable moments of someone's life. The overwhelming cause of gun violence is arguments that end in impulse shootings — meaning, the shooter didn't set out to fire his weapon and might not even have "meant to" until he was overcome by the urge to do so in the heat of a moment. This finding leads to an important policy insight. Deterrence might have more of an impact if it is focused on the behavior that is the precursor (and necessary condition) of most shootings in America: illegal gun-carrying itself. **Deterrence and its limitations** Starting in the 1970s,[ America increased its prison population](https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-causes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in a way that had no historical or international precedent. That change was the[ result of a series of deliberate policy decisions](https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/08/incarceration-as-incapacitation-an-intellectual-history/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) motivated partly by rising violent crime and partly also by a[ consensus view at the time](https://www.nationalaffairs.com/public%5Finterest/detail/what-works-questions-and-answers-about-prison-reform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that not much could be done to prevent crime or rehabilitate criminals. Prison serves multiple goals at once. There's plain old punishment: making sure perpetrators experience consequences for their actions. There's incapacitation: Someone behind bars can't commit crimes against the public. There's also deterrence, which rests on the assumption that before someone decides to commit a crime, including a gun crime, they first weigh the benefits and costs of their action. But most shootings are not premeditated or motivated by economic considerations. They're instead garden-variety arguments that escalate and end in tragedy because someone has a gun. Criminologists distinguish between "instrumental" violence, where the violent act is a means toward some other end (taking someone's wallet and phone in a robbery, capturing some other gang's drug-selling turf) and "expressive" violence, where the entire goal is to express one's rage at another person and hurt them. A careful look at 20 years' worth of murders in the U.S., captured by the FBI's Supplemental Homicide Report system, suggests that 23% of murders are instrumental, and 77% — nearly 4 of 5 — are expressive (Miethe, Rogoeczi and Drass, 2004). This distinction is important because one of the main findings from behavioral science over the past 50 years is that our minds engage in two different types of thinking that have implications for how deterrable these two types of violence are. As Daniel Kahneman described it in his wonderful book, "Thinking, Fast and Slow," there's the voice in our head that we recognize as thinking — slow, measured and giving us the capacity for careful, rational deliberation (which doesn't mean the voice in our head is always rational). That's most relevant for instrumental crime, and is most responsive to changes in incentives (like deterrence). But there's another type of thinking, too — fast, automatic, below the level of consciousness. That's what we rely on when we're pissed off in a heated argument and experience an adrenaline dump that makes the little voice in our head nowhere to be found. That's not us at our most deterrable. And that's the type of thinking behind most expressive violence. The implication is that deterrence is a tool that's limited in its ability to prevent most of the gun violence in America. Some evidence that interpersonal violence is much more of a "fast-thinking" problem than we have appreciated comes from a clever study by Swedish economist Michael Priks. He looked at what happened when the Stockholm subway system installed surveillance cameras in different subway stations at different points in time to determine the contours of crime declines. The answer is yes — overall crime dropped in subway stations that got cameras. But more important for present purposes is the pattern of which crimes were affected. Property crimes declined, but violent crimes didn't. As a staff member in the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center here in Chicago put it a few years ago to me, 20% of the residents (in his view) are dangerous and need to be locked up, but the other 80%, he always tells them, "If I could give you back just 10 minutes of your lives, none of you would be here." The lesson here is that deterrence works, but mostly when crimes are more premeditated and rational. Deterrence works substantially less well for interpersonal violence because so much of it is driven by momentary passions. **Deterring illegal gun carrying** Even though gun violence itself may not be quite as deterrable as we long assumed, there is perhaps a place where deterrence might do some real good: illegal gun carrying. The overwhelming majority of murders in big cities like Chicago — something like four of every five — occur in public places, and the overwhelming majority of those murders involve illegal guns. Ergo, most murders are preceded by illegal gun carrying. Without a gun on the scene, there might have been a fistfight or maybe a stabbing, but less likely a murder. And contrary to the in-the-moment, passion-driven decision to swing a fist or pull a trigger, the decision to take a gun with them on their way to the party or the mall is more likely to be rational and deliberate — and hence deterrable. There's a second reason this is so important: This is a collective action problem. In surveys, people say they carry a gun because they're worried about other people carrying guns. This means that not doing anything about illegal gun carrying can create a vicious cycle: More people carry guns, which gives everyone else an even greater incentive to carry themselves, which begets further carrying, etc. In lots of areas of life we speak metaphorically of "arms races." In this case, it's literally an arms race. So what could be done to deter this behavior? To say the obvious, using police is fraught. The U.S. Supreme Court says that police can make a "Terry stop" or "stop-and-frisk" when there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. That might help get guns off the street — but as we've seen, it can also generate lots of collateral harm. What else might be done beyond policing? For one, judges and prosecutors could more commonly request pretrial detention for illegal gun carrying cases. People who are arrested for this are, according to the data, at elevated risk for future violence both as victims and, according to publicly available data from the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, as offenders as well. And so, from a public safety perspective, pretrial detention for illegal gun carrying makes the sanction feel more "swift and certain," thought to help maximize deterrence. If they want to focus their pretrial detention on a smaller group, prosecutors and judges could aim more narrowly at people caught with guns that have high-capacity magazines or machine gun conversion devices, so-called "Glock switches," which allow semiautomatics to fire continuously so long as the trigger is depressed. The growing use of both devices in cities like Chicago seems to be an important factor in explaining why shooting fatality rates have increased substantially since 2010\. More people are being wounded more times per shooting. The rise from 13% to 19% has meant 1,581 more murder victims in Chicago alone over this period. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24748665?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1dO-neBs26sz1ISzbPSA1H68f-ggLgNHb%5FUnXT1bx05A/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24748637?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Anything we can do to deter illegal gun carrying, or at least deter the carrying of the most lethal types of guns, can help make America at least a little bit less of an outlier compared to the other rich countries of the world. People in London, Paris, Berlin, Istanbul and Tokyo are also prone to acting irrationally and even violently in heated situations. But in all these places, because guns are so less readily available, people settle these conflicts in ways that are much less lethal than we do here in the U.S. **Conclusion** Gun violence seems to be a type of crime where the scope of deterrence is much more limited compared to many other types of crime. But deterrence may do more good focusing on some of the key decisions that sit upstream of gun violence itself. ### The Long Chain URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-civil-law-can-help-prevent-gun-tragedies/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:51.000Z When 27-year-old Marquisha Wiley went out for a fun evening with friends in October 2021, she didn't know Seventh Street Truck Park bar in St. Paul, Minnesota, would be host to a shootout between two gunmen. When the shooting stopped, she would lay injured along with 14 other innocent bystanders. Those 14 survived. Marquisha didn't. Marquisha's story, like nearly every instance of gun crime, happens at the end of a long chain of events. Our criminal justice system tends to focus on the person at the end of that chain — the one firing the gun. While it's important that perpetrators of gun crime are held accountable, there are other links in that chain that deserve our attention. Further up the chain, there are many parties whose actions, or lack thereof, make gun crime possible and even foreseeable. If public safety officials don't pursue those parties, they will never have to answer for their behavior. But if we look in the right places, use the right tools and take the right actions, we can perhaps prevent gun crime and the tragedies it causes before they happen. \* Don't get me wrong: Prosecuting individuals who commit violent crime is an essential tool of accountability and an important step on the road of healing for victims and justice for communities. It is and will continue to be an important tool in our toolbox and is one I am proud to use as attorney general. It is not, however, the only tool we have at our disposal to keep people safe. Across America, the role attorneys general play in criminal prosecution varies widely. In some states, they do it all, and in some states, they do none of it. Here in Minnesota, responsibility for prosecuting felonies rests with county attorneys in Minnesota's 87 counties, and they prosecute the vast majority of felonies committed in Minnesota and have original jurisdiction to do so. The attorney general plays a limited but important role in criminal prosecution: Under the law, my office can assist in criminal prosecutions only when a county attorney or the governor formally requests our help — often in situations where a county may not have the resources or expertise to handle a complex case. We are always ready to step in and lend a hand when we're called upon to do so. In the last five years, we have helped 39 Minnesota counties prosecute more than 100 criminal cases, and I'm proud that our track record is stellar. But across all 50 states, attorneys general have broad authority in civil law to protect consumers and advance economic opportunity. In Minnesota, my office uses this authority every day to protect consumers from fraud, to make sure workers get paid what they deserve and to help maintain a level playing field for businesses that play by the rules, among many other ways. > For every offender who pulled the trigger, there could be someone in a corporate boardroom who also bears some responsibility for a life cut short. But attorneys general need not limit our broad consumer-protection authority in civil law only to helping consumers, as important as that is. Whether or not attorneys general have original criminal jurisdiction, we can also use our broad civil-law authority to advance public safety. This includes working to keep communities safe from gun violence. Because for every offender who pulled the trigger, there could be someone in a corporate boardroom who also bears some responsibility for a life cut short. We're doing this in Minnesota. \* The two men at the center of the St. Paul shooting that killed Marquisha Wiley, Terry Brown and Devondre Phillips, were criminally charged by the county attorney with murder and attempted murder. Both were convicted and sentenced to long terms in prison, as well they should have been. But what do we find when we follow the chain of events? During their investigation, law enforcement discovered that James Fletcher Horton Jr. (not among the shooters) had purchased and provided at least one of the guns found at the scene in St. Paul. Horton is known as a "straw purchaser," someone who uses a clean criminal record to pass a background check and buy guns on behalf of others who would have been prohibited from possessing them. Straw purchasing is illegal under federal and Minnesota law. Like the shooters, Horton was ultimately held responsible for the role he played. He was charged by federal prosecutors with making false statements during the purchase of a firearm. He pled guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison. But even further up the chain is Fleet Farm, a regional sporting goods retailer based in Appleton, Wisconsin. Over a four-month period, a Fleet Farm store in Minnesota sold Horton 24 firearms, including one found at the scene of the St. Paul shootings. The red flags were there for all to see. Some of these purchases were just days apart. Horton would often take pictures of the firearms Fleet Farm had available for purchase. At one point in the middle of this buying spree, a Fleet Farm manager raised to his supervisors that the frequency of Horton's purchases and his behavior seemed suspicious, but his concerns were ignored. Their inaction was dangerous. Weapons purchased by Horton turned up all over the Twin Cities: one at the scene of Marquisha's death, another fired in the middle of Minneapolis and yet another found by a 6-year-old boy in his front yard. Gun dealers like Fleet Farm sell an inherently dangerous product, and though there are few regulations on the sales of firearms, dealers are required by law to ensure they are only selling firearms to those who can lawfully possess them for their own use — similar to the regulations on any dangerous product. In my office's view, Fleet Farm failed to perform this crucial function. Despite Fleet Farm allegedly failing to perform this crucial gatekeeping function, however — unlike the shooters and the straw purchasers — the gun dealer did not face any immediate legal repercussions. > Guns are the leading cause of death for young people in our country, cutting short more young lives than cancer or car crashes. In October 2022, my office sought to ensure that Fleet Farm would be held accountable for its inaction, just as Horton, Brown and Phillips were for their actions. My office filed a lawsuit against Fleet Farm, alleging that they negligently entrusted firearms to straw purchasers, aided and abetted straw purchasers' violation of the law and permitted a public nuisance that endangers the public health and safety of Minnesotans. We're demanding that Fleet Farm turn over the profits from its unlawful firearm sales and strengthen their oversight of future firearm sales through training, more customer screenings for repeat buyers and supervision from an independent monitor. Our case has cleared numerous challenges and is currently pending in federal district court. If successful, the measures we seek could save lives by keeping more guns off the streets and out of the hands of people who shouldn't have access to them. \* Fleet Farm is by no means the only corporation whose inaction has led to gun crime and its tragic consequences. In May 2021, 21-year-old Charlie Johnson was enjoying a night out, celebrating his coming graduation from the University of St. Thomas the following morning. He would never reach that milestone. A gunfight broke out between two assailants outside the Monarch nightclub in Minneapolis, and dozens of bullets sprayed the sidewalks in seconds. Eight bystanders were injured. Two people were killed, including one of the shooters and Charlie Johnson. Jawan Carroll, the surviving shooter in the gunfight that took Charlie Johnson's life, was convicted on nine counts of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to 70 years in prison. But once again, we must look further up the chain of events to get a fuller picture of accountability. The weapon that killed Charlie was a modified Glock handgun. Whereas standard, semiautomatic Glock handguns fire one bullet with each trigger pull, the handgun in this case had been converted into a fully automatic weapon using a simple, cheap device called a "Glock switch." Glock switches can be purchased online for as little as $10, and installing one doesn't require any special tools or technical know-how. Once converted, these handguns can fire continuously with virtually no delay between rounds. This makes the recoil much harder to control, and consequently aiming becomes much more difficult even for trained shooters, greatly increasing the potential risk to any bystanders. > We can't just prosecute shooters and hope for a better tomorrow. We have to look at every link in the chain. This is a growing problem in my city: Rounds of machine-gun fire detected in Minneapolis went from 154 in 2020 to nearly 2,600 in 2023\. And each one of those rounds has the potential to kill. Glock has known about this issue for decades and has taken no action to address it. Gaston Glock, the founder of Glock, Inc., showcased a handgun in automatic fire mode using a Glock switch as far back as 1988\. Over 35 years later, Glock's handgun design hasn't changed, and the company has yet to face any accountability for the deaths made possible by its refusal to fix the design flaw. In December 2024, my office sued Glock, Inc., for its violation of several Minnesota consumer protection, negligence and product liability laws. We are not asking Glock to stop selling firearms: We are asking Glock to change the design of its semiautomatic handguns available to the public so that they cannot be easily converted into illegal machine guns. Our ongoing case has the potential to make a big impact in keeping streets safer in Minnesota and beyond; Attorney General Matt Platkin of New Jersey announced a similar suit against Glock on the same day we filed ours. \* The firearm industry is a powerful one, with fleets of lobbyists that tilt the laws in their favor and well-resourced legal teams prepared to fight tooth and nail against any attempt at holding them accountable. That has made taking them to court a daunting task and has likely kept many potential suits from ever being filed. But we can't afford to ignore the courts as an important aspect of the fight against gun violence. Guns are[ the leading cause of death for young people in our country](https://publichealth.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/2024-09/2022-cgvs-gun-violence-in-the-united-states.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), cutting short more young lives than cancer or car crashes. It's true that U.S. Supreme Court decisions like *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen* have made it harder to hold gun companies accountable for their role in these tragedies, but that is even more reason to get creative and strategic in our efforts. It is my responsibility, and the responsibility of every attorney general or elected official, to use every tool at our disposal to address this issue. And people across this country should hold every one of their elected officials accountable for that responsibility. Those of us tasked with upholding the law can't just prosecute shooters and hope for a better tomorrow. We have to look at every link in the chain: The companies that let guns find their way into the hands of people who shouldn't have them; the manufacturers that allow their guns to be easily made even more dangerous than they already are. Criminal law is insufficient to go after these upstream issues. Marquisha and Charlie should still be with us, but effective use of civil law could be a path to a world with fewer tragic stories like theirs. ### The Missing Fingerprints at Crime Scenes URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-missing-fingerprints-at-crime-scenes/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:52.000Z It's no secret that the current presidential administration has a more pro-gun orientation than the last. Just a few weeks into his second term, President Donald Trump disbanded the first-ever[ White House Office of Gun Violence Prevention](https://www.newsweek.com/white-house-gun-violence-prevention-website-offline-2018801?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ ordered the attorney general](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/protecting-second-amendment-rights/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to review a huge swath of federal regulations with the goal of prioritizing Second Amendment rights. A pillar in this executive branch's pro-gun shift, which is only nine months in the making, is the deregulation of the gun industry. Already, the Trump administration has[ diverted thousands of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearm and Explosives (ATF) agents](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/thousands-agents-diverted-trump-immigration-crackdown-2025-03-22/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to work at other agencies or on nonfirearm issues, such as immigration enforcement. Trump's[ Department of Justice has settled enforcement actions](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-settlement-litigation-between-federal-government-and-rare-breed?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) against makers of machine gun conversion devices, effectively legalizing devices that the federal government used to outlaw. The administration has also[ repealed a Biden-area ATF policy](https://www.atf.gov/news/press-releases/doj-atf-repeal-ffl-inspection-policy-and-begin-review-two-final-rules?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that empowered the agency to revoke gun dealer licenses after one serious willful violation of federal law. The current ATF is even abandoning a[ decades-old program](https://smokinggun.org/atf-stops-monitoring-dealers-who-sell-the-most-crime-guns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Since%20February%202000%2C%20the%20ATF,25%20or%20more%20crime%20guns.) to identify and monitor gun dealers that sell notably high numbers of guns recovered from crime scenes. Against this backdrop, policymakers who believe there's a need for stronger gun safety rules in America should look for new ways to impose and enforce regulations on gun manufacturers, distributors, marketers and dealers. Industry regulation — not just controlling the behavior of individual consumers — is a critical tool in policymaking that has curbed other public health crises. For example, in addition to licensing drivers, we[ force car companies to make cars safer](https://www.nhtsa.gov/how-vehicle-safety-has-improved-over-decades?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We both[ set age minimums for cigarette purchases](https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/retail-sales-tobacco-products/tobacco-21?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ prohibit tobacco companies from marketing to kids](https://www.fightcancer.org/releases/federal-rule-restricts-big-tobaccos-marketing-children?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In addition to criminalizing the possession of narcotics, we[ limit prescription opioid production](https://ashpublications.org/ashclinicalnews/news/3616/New-Federal-Regulation-Limits-Opioid-Production?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We have learned from these other contexts that the solution does not lie in perfecting the behavior of hundreds of millions of individuals, but in restraining the industries profiting from the crisis itself. States can take inspiration from these approaches when it comes to combating gun violence within their borders. **Obstacles to federal firearm industry regulation** To be clear, better state regulation of the gun industry was a worthy project long before President Donald Trump began his second term, and indeed, many states have passed laws that exceed federal rules on gun dealers and firearm manufacturers. Part of the reason our gun violence crisis is so sprawling and enduring is because the federal government has not sufficiently regulated the gun industry, often in response to advocacy from the gun industry itself. For example, guns are clearly consumer products. But in 1976, the[ National Rifle Association successfully lobbied](https://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/92-Geo.-Wash.-L.-Rev.-87.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to forever keep firearms out of the purview of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. As a result, there is no federal agency that can force a recall of firearms that malfunction, like[ firing when dropped](https://www.thetrace.org/2016/01/gun-safety-standards/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Most importantly, the ATF has never had the resources or legislative authority necessary to thwart or punish gun industry malfeasance. A 2023[ DOJ audit of the ATF](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/23-062%5F0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) found that the agency doesn't monitor or reprimand many gun dealers that violate federal rules and regulations, tasks at the core of its duties. At the behest of the gun lobby, Congress has also[ prohibited the ATF from adopting practices](https://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/9/c1/6/1017/3/access%5Fdenied.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that experts believe would make[ the tracing of crime guns](https://www.everytown.org/solutions/gun-trace-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) speedy and effective. At times, the federal government has even stepped in to stop states and local governments from taking actions against gun companies. In response to public nuisance lawsuits that[ dozens of cities and counties](https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/thinktank/City-lawsuits-had-impact-on-gun-makers.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (and one state) brought against gunmakers, Congress passed the[ Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in 2005](https://www.thetrace.org/2020/01/gun-industry-legal-immunity-plcaa/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to try to close the door on those cases and protect gun dealers and manufacturers from many kinds of civil liability claims in the future. > States can prohibit the manufacturing and sale of assault weapons like the AR-15 and high-capacity magazines, which cause unique devastation to victims' bodies and can overpower police forces. There are already about[ 400 million firearms in circulation](https://www.thetrace.org/2023/03/guns-america-data-atf-total/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) nationwide, and gun companies make and sell around [10 million](https://smokinggun.org/atf-releases-gun-production-and-export-data-for-2022/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Six%20of%20the%20top%2010,to%20the%20ATF%20each%20year.%29) more every year for the U.S. market. In the absence of sufficient federal regulation, gun companies achieve this volume of business in concerning ways. Gun manufacturers have put more focus into making [high-margin](https://fortune.com/2018/06/20/why-gunmakers-would-rather-sell-ar-15s-than-handguns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) assault weapons like the AR-15, roughly[ doubling their production](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2023/ar-15-america-gun-culture-politics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the 10 years following the Sandy Hook mass shooting in 2012\. Now, law enforcement officers encounter AR-15-type weapons in[ more than half of the public mass shooting incidents](https://www.thetrace.org/2024/07/police-ar-15-rifle-trump-shooting-uvalde/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to which they respond. Gun retailers fail to secure their inventory, and[ ATF data confirm](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iii-crime-guns-recovered-and-traced-us/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that thousands of guns lost by or stolen from dealers end up recovered from crime scenes. Companies that market firearms[ target youth](https://adage.com/article/marketing-news-strategy/call-duty-and-instagram-advertise-gun-brands-kids-sandy-hook-promise-says/2524736/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), even though children under 18 years old[ can't legally buy firearms from federally licensed dealers](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/does-customer-have-be-certain-age-buy-firearms-or-ammunition-licensee?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The gun industry[ eschews product safety innovations](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/-simple-device-prevent-accidental-gun-deaths-most-guns-lack-rcna182834?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that could prevent children or unauthorized users from firing a gun. Every year,[ hundreds of children](https://everytownresearch.org/report/notanaccident/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) get their hands on household firearms and unintentionally shoot or kill themselves or other children. Luckily, many tools are available to state governments that want to involve gun manufacturers, retailers and marketers in the project of reducing gun deaths. Some states are already implementing these policies, but in a crisis of this scale, there is always more to do. **Regulating manufacturers** Behind the front lines of the gun violence epidemic are companies driven first by the desire to make more money. For example, gun manufacturers are making[ increasingly lethal firearms](https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/how-did-guns-get-so-powerful?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that lack any safety features — and instead have combat-level capabilities — rather than firearms commonly used for self-defense or hunting. It might seem counterintuitive to demand that firearms be "less lethal," but amid the current gun industry trend of pushing military-style weapons, policymakers should ask: How dangerous do we want guns to be, and should gun companies be able to make a gun's unmitigated lethality its central selling point? States should begin by accepting that some firearms and firearm accessories are just too dangerous to make for and sell to civilians. They should prohibit the manufacturing and sale of assault weapons like the AR-15 and high-capacity magazines, which cause[ unique devastation to victims' bodies](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/health/parkland-shooting-victims-ar15.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and can[ overpower police forces](https://www.texastribune.org/2023/03/20/uvalde-shooting-police-ar-15/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Since the Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting in 2012, gun companies have made[ over $11 billion](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2023/ar-15-america-gun-culture-politics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from making and selling AR-15-style rifles. Those guns now make up[ a quarter of all firearms produced](https://www.wsj.com/us-news/the-selling-of-americas-most-controversial-gun-3c86127f?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) each year, and some gun manufacturers have[ tripled their revenue](https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2022/07/27/gunmakers-made-1-billion-from-ar-15-style-weapons-in-10-years-lawmakers-find/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on sales of these rifles alone. We're seeing the fruits of the[ manufacturers' focus](https://fortune.com/2018/06/20/why-gunmakers-would-rather-sell-ar-15s-than-handguns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on these kinds of guns, as assault weapons are now recovered in[ hundreds of shootings a year](https://www.thetrace.org/2024/07/police-ar-15-rifle-trump-shooting-uvalde/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > Every year, around 15,000 firearms are lost or stolen from licensed gun dealers, and thousands of those guns later turn up at crime scenes. States should begin by accepting that some firearms and firearm accessories are just too dangerous to make for and sell to civilians. They should prohibit the manufacturing and sale of assault weapons like the AR-15 and high-capacity magazines, which cause[ unique devastation to victims' bodies](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/health/parkland-shooting-victims-ar15.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and can[ overpower police forces](https://www.texastribune.org/2023/03/20/uvalde-shooting-police-ar-15/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Since the Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting in 2012, gun companies have made[ over $11 billion](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2023/ar-15-america-gun-culture-politics/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from making and selling AR-15-style rifles. Those guns now make up[ a quarter of all firearms produced](https://www.wsj.com/us-news/the-selling-of-americas-most-controversial-gun-3c86127f?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) each year, and some gun manufacturers have[ tripled their revenue](https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2022/07/27/gunmakers-made-1-billion-from-ar-15-style-weapons-in-10-years-lawmakers-find/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on sales of these rifles alone. We're seeing the fruits of the[ manufacturers' focus](https://fortune.com/2018/06/20/why-gunmakers-would-rather-sell-ar-15s-than-handguns/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on these kinds of guns, as assault weapons are now recovered in[ hundreds of shootings a year](https://www.thetrace.org/2024/07/police-ar-15-rifle-trump-shooting-uvalde/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Policymakers should force gun companies to focus their product design on what they say is the central reason for gun ownership: safe and lawful self-defense. What if gun companies actually had to make saferguns? Guns that told you when a round was in the chamber so you couldn't mistake it to be unloaded? Or guns that couldn't be fired by anyone but the owner, thanks to biometric technology?[ California and Massachusetts](https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/child-consumer-safety/design-safety-standards/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#footnote%5F26%5F5641) have already required many handguns to have chamber load indicators or magazine disconnects, and California is even preparing to force handgun makers to[ cure a design flaw](https://www.abc10.com/article/news/local/sacramento/california-bill-seeks-ban-guns-convertible-o-machine-guns-switches/103-990d51be-ac91-4444-9c9e-e2aa76feba1e?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=%E2%80%94%20Democratic%20leaders%20in%20California%20are,known%20as%20a%20%22switchhttps://www.abc10.com/article/news/local/sacramento/california-bill-seeks-ban-guns-convertible-o-machine-guns-switches/103-990d51be-ac91-4444-9c9e-e2aa76feba1e#:~:text=%E2%80%94%20Democratic%20leaders%20in%20California%20are,known%20as%20a%20%22switch.%22.%22) that enables shooters to easily convert pistols into machine guns. Forcing this innovation toward safety has precedence in the opioid context, where the[ Food and Drug Administration encouraged the development](https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-information-patients-and-providers/abuse-deterrent-opioid-analgesics?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of opioid medications that are chemically modified to deter abuse and addiction. **Reining in marketers** Every year, gun companies spend tens of millions of dollars on advertising to create demand for firearms, even though there are already more guns in circulation than there are Americans. In such a saturated market, gun advertising has some[ extreme elements](https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-oversight.house.gov/files/2022.07.27%20Supplemental%20MEMO%20for%20the%207-27-2022%20FC%20Gun%20Manufacturer%20Hearing.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), such as militaristic imagery and suggestions that firearms are an essential component of manhood. While advertising doesn't seek to directly put guns into the hands of people with felony records, the gun industry's aggressive approach has put firearm advertisements in front of an[ estimated 80% ](https://www.newsweek.com/guns-children-marketing-social-median-us-firearms-2059384?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)of boys between the ages of 10 and 17. Gun marketers pursue this "consumer" base even though children under the age of 18 can't even legally buy guns from federally licensed dealers. Documents released in the Sandy Hook litigation revealed that Remington used several strategies to solidify young consumers' interest in their AR-15-style guns[ before they turned 16](https://www.prweek.com/article/1845025/gun-manufacturers-target-children-firearm-ads-report-finds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). One gunmaker has even made a kid-friendly ["JR-15."](https://smokinggun.org/maker-of-child-sized-ar-15-rifles-rebrands-for-hiking/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Over the decades,[ governments have addressed tobacco marketing to kids](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9938337/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=In%201971%2C%20the%20Public%20Health,the%20age%20of%2018%20%28National) by outlawing the use of cartoons, advertising on television and radio, and sponsorships of sporting events. State lawmakers could pass laws that take a similar approach for firearms, like the[ federal Protecting Kids from Gun Marketing Act](https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-introduces-legislation-to-ban-marketing-of-firearms-to-children-through-ftc-rulemaking?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Illinois' consumer protection law [prohibits gun advertising](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/illinois-to-outlaw-gun-advertisements-that-appeal-to-children-pose-safety-threat?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that encourages youth to unlawfully acquire or use firearms. Lawmakers should also [encourage social media platforms like YouTube](https://www.amny.com/news/da-bragg-youtubes-role-ghost-gun-assembly/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to improve their policies and practices so as not to serve up firearms content to [young users](https://smokinggun.org/youtube-places-new-age-restrictions-on-gun-content/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > Across the country, states with strong dealer regulations are seeing gun trafficking reductions up to 64%, as well as significant reductions in homicide rates. **Inspecting and overseeing gun dealers** There are[ more than 78,000 federally licensed gun dealers](https://www.everytown.org/report/the-life-saving-promise-of-state-gun-dealer-licensing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the United States, and some of these businesses are a significant source of crime guns. The[ ATF's own data](https://smokinggun.org/atf-found-violations-in-one-in-five-gun-dealer-inspections/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and reporting show that gun dealers often don't follow the federal rules already in place to prevent illegal gun sales and thefts. These failures are part of the reason why [70% of recovered crime guns](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iii-crime-guns-recovered-and-traced-us/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Between%202017%20and%202021%2C%2014%2C605,interstate%20shipment%20theft%20%2F%20loss%20reports.) are traced back to dealers. Federal law requires licensed gun dealers to run background checks on every sale, but in 2023,[ dealers finalized over 20,000](https://smokinggun.org/atf-found-violations-in-one-in-five-gun-dealer-inspections/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) sales without finishing the check. Notably, the [ATF trace data](https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/firearms-trace-data-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) show that more than 80,000 firearms sold by FFLs in 2023 were recovered from crime scenes that same year. (The agency considers a "time-to-crime" of less than one year to be a very strong indicator of gun trafficking. Generally, around [20% of traced crime guns](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-iv-part-iii-%E2%80%93-crime-gun-tracing-updates-and-new-analysis/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) were bought less than a year before their recovery.) Gun dealers are also supposed to report lost and stolen firearms from their inventory to federal law enforcement, but they sometimes don't. A[ federal audit](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/23-062%5F0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) confirmed that gun dealers largely avoid the legally prescribed consequences for these kinds of violations, such as dealer license suspension or revocation. Even in administrations that prioritize gun safety, federal law enforcement has never had the capacity to inspect all licensed gun dealers (in the Biden administration, there were an[ estimated 180 federally licensed dealers per every ATF inspector](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/23-062%5F0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), nor the willingness to sanction gun dealers that flout essential public safety laws. States should require, at a minimum, that licensed gun dealers follow the laws and regulations that already exist. The next step is to impose sensible requirements on dealers that are bafflingly absent from federal regulations. Every year,[ around 15,000 firearms](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-iv-part-ii-%E2%80%93-firearm-thefts-and-losses-updates-and-new-analysis/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20total%20number%20of%20firearms%20stolen%20in%20FFL%20theft%20incidents,thefts%20were%20relatively%20rare%20events.) are lost or stolen from licensed gun dealers. Between 2017 and 2021, [over 14,000 such firearms](https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iii-crime-guns-recovered-and-traced-us/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) were recovered from crime scenes, according to ATF data. But[ federal law doesn't require](https://www.everytown.org/report/the-life-saving-promise-of-state-gun-dealer-licensing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) gun dealers to secure their premises or their firearm inventory. For comparison, our[ federal regulations](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-21/chapter-II/part-1301/subject-group-ECFRa7ff8142033a7a2/section-1301.72?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) dedicate multiple paragraphs to the storage and access control of *methadone*. People can get a federal license to sell firearms without ever having to install bars on the windows of their business, use video surveillance systems, lock up firearms in a safe at night or install alarms that warn of burglary, even though the[ leading gun industry trade group recommends](https://nssfrealsolutions.org/programs/operation-secure-store/resources/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) many of these practices. Illinois has already seen a[ tremendous reduction in thefts](https://isp.illinois.gov/Media/PressReleaseFile/2104?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from licensed gun dealers — a decline of 90% — after state lawmakers required gun dealers to install video surveillance systems and resourced compliance inspections[ beginning in 2021](https://isp.illinois.gov/foid/fdlc/signage?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). States can even require gun dealers to get a state-specific business license, even though the ATF already licenses gun retailers. [Twelve states](https://www.everytown.org/report/the-life-saving-promise-of-state-gun-dealer-licensing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — including Illinois, Pennsylvania, Washington and Colorado — already require gun dealers to get a state license in order to sell firearms of all types. Business licensing is commonplace nationwide, and many states license hairdressers, cannabis dispensers and restaurants. By creating dealer licensing regimes, states can empower their own agencies and law enforcement departments to enforce dealer regulations that work best for the state and are likely more extensive than the floor of dealer regulation at the federal level. As a condition of the dealer license, states can require gun dealers to train employees on identifying straw purchasers and refusing suspicious sales. Across the nation, some bad-apple gun dealers are selling multiple firearms to the same person, only for law enforcement to soon trace dozens of crime guns back to that purchaser. For example, one [man in Albuquerque](https://www.krqe.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2023/01/criminal-complaint-%5FLarryArchuleta.pdf?ipid=promo-link-block3&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) was caught supplying guns to a gang after buying dozens of firearms from just three local gun shops over the span of five months. While the buyers at the counter might be able to pass a background check, dealers often [have good reason to suspect](https://oag.dc.gov/release/attorney-general-schwalb-sues-three-maryland-gun?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that these guns are meant for people with criminal records. States with gun dealer licensing schemes can put bad-apple gun dealers out of business before straw-purchased guns are trafficked and used in dozens of shootings. States that require gun dealers to obtain a state license to operate have the power to inspect gun dealers for compliance and revoke licensing, thereby shutting down stores that are significant suppliers of crime guns. Across the country, states with strong dealer regulations are seeing gun trafficking reductions [up to 64%](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-009-9351-x?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as well as significant[ reductions in homicide rates](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4103238/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). **The way forward** States like New York and California have already adopted many of the firearm industry regulations described above and will need little further encouragement to continue those efforts. On the opposite end of the spectrum, many of these proposals will likely be nonstarters in states that don't even require background checks on firearm purchases or concealed carry permits. But policymakers in political environments between these two extremes can still pursue gun industry regulations that work for their constituencies, and it is a particularly worthwhile endeavor in the face of the second Trump administration's steadfast commitment to gun deregulation. ### State Gun Laws Matter URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/state-gun-laws-matter/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:52.000Z In 2007, Missouri's legislature repealed an 86-year-old law requiring all gun purchasers to first obtain a permit after a background check by the local sheriff's office. The federal government requires background checks on all purchases from federally licensed dealers, but Missouri's "permit to purchase" law supplemented federal requirements by mandating a more rigorous background check by local law enforcement for allsales. In the months and years that followed, sales of handguns rose quickly throughout the state. The percentage of suicides carried out with a gun, a common proxy for gun ownership rates, [rose by 24%](https://morganwilliamsjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Missouri%5FGun%5FViolence%5FWP%5FDecember%5F2020-2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Firearm homicides [increased by 20%](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-014-9865-8?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the years following the law's repeal, while non-gun homicides stayed the same, suggesting the rise was directly caused by easier access to guns. The gap in the homicide rate between White and Black residents widened, along with gun assaults among law enforcement in urban centers such as Kansas City and St. Louis. Despite the rise of gun violence in the wake of this reform, Missouri would go on to adopt a series of other deregulatory measures, including an attempt to nullify federal firearms regulations, lowering the age to carry a concealed firearm to 19 and making it legal to carry a concealed firearm without a permit. What transpired in Missouri reflects a broader trend between state policy, the prevalence of guns and the problem of gun violence. Despite the challenge of accessing high-quality data on the supply of guns, a growing body of evidence makes it clear that state policy has a strong impact on the sales, accessibility and usage of guns, and the prevalence of guns is linked directly with the prevalence of gun deaths. This literature sheds light on states that have made major progress in regulating the free circulation of guns, but it also illuminates several challenges states face in attempting to confront gun violence. As three researchers who have each contributed to the gun control policy literature, we view state reforms as a key lens through which America's gun supply problems are best understood. States not only dictate the local gun market conditions within their own jurisdiction but also influence gun markets in other states operating under different policy regimes. **Federalism and the patchwork of gun laws** Though the interpretation of the Second Amendment describes the limits of what courts will consider constitutionally permissible at any given time, the American system of federalism gives states wide discretion to set their own firearm policies, resulting in a patchwork of gun laws that vary dramatically by jurisdiction. The federal government sets a floor — such as licensing dealers, regulating interstate sales, banning certain types of guns and barring certain individuals from owning guns — above which states can enact stricter laws, so long as they're deemed constitutional. Hence, it's states (and sometimes cities) that do most of the regulatory work by setting rules around gun carrying, strengthening penalties for gun crimes and deciding whether to go further than federal standards regarding who can own a gun and what their rights are. While federal policies such as the [Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act](https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/laws-alcohol-tobacco-firearms-and-explosives/gun-control-act/brady-law?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) regulate firearm sales among licensed dealers, private handgun sales outside of these settings — [an estimated 40% of the total](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1006326?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) gun sales annually — fall squarely within the jurisdiction of each state. In 2023, [only 20 states](https://www.thetrace.org/2023/06/background-check-buy-a-gun-america-map/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) required some form of background check among private firearm sales, and [even fewer](https://everytownresearch.org/rankings/law/background-check-and-or-purchase-permit/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) involved a permitting process to purchase a firearm. State regulations of private firearm sales also shape local gun availability, since [many gun owners](https://www.acpjournals.org/doi/10.7326/M16-1590?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) purchase firearms through secondary markets. > The more regulations a state adopted, the more gun deaths were averted. In recent years, state firearm policies have moved in opposing directions. Many Republican-led states have eliminated permit requirements for carrying firearms, rolled back existing regulations and blocked local governments from passing stricter laws. Meanwhile, Democratic-led states have expanded background checks, banned assault weapons and high-capacity magazines and broadened red flag laws. Courts have played an increasingly active role in shaping this landscape. Since the U.S. Supreme Court's [Bruen](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843%5F7j80.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) decision in 2022, lower courts have been required to assess gun laws based on historical analogs, leading to legal uncertainty around policies like assault weapon bans, waiting periods and public carry restrictions. The result is a fragmented and polarized policy environment in which access to guns and the risks they pose depend heavily on where one lives. Yes, guns are mobile — and many of them travel from states with weak regulations to states with stronger ones. But state laws have very powerful local effects. The Missouri case illustrates how making state gun regulations more lenient can have lasting effects on gun supply, public safety and racial inequality. [Research](https://journals.lww.com/epidem/abstract/2023/11000/the%5Fera%5Fof%5Fprogress%5Fon%5Fgun%5Fmortality%5F%5Fstate%5Fgun.3.aspx?context=latestarticles&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from two of the authors of this piece (Sharkey and Kang) investigates the other side of this equation, that is, what happens when states pass more restrictive gun policies? When researching this question, we found a consistent pattern: The more regulations a state adopted, the more gun deaths were averted. Background checks and waiting periods were especially effective. In 2016 alone, we estimated the cumulative effect of stronger laws in 40 states to have prevented more than 4,200 deaths, about 11% of the total gun deaths for that year. California accounted for the largest share of lives saved, followed by New York and Florida. In contrast, six states that weakened their laws saw an estimated 111 additional gun deaths in that same year, with nearly half of them in Missouri, where regulations had steadily eroded. These findings provide strong evidence that the accumulation of restrictive state laws can make a meaningful difference in reducing gun deaths, and additional evidence suggests broader effects on related outcomes like police shootings. [Previous research](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002716219896259?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) finds a strong link between gun availability and fatal encounters with police, including cases involving unarmed individuals. This suggests police behavior changes in areas with high levels of circulating guns, and reducing fatal police shootings will require more than just reforming policing — it also means addressing the widespread availability of guns. > Private handgun sales — an estimated 40% of the total gun sales annually — fall squarely within the jurisdiction of each state. **Three Key Challenges** There are three key challenges to overcome when turning to state gun laws to prevent gun violence. The first is the most obvious: As the political winds shift, many states have reversed course and weakened state-level gun regulations. Since 2016, many states loosened their laws, some voluntarily, others in response to Supreme Court rulings. Strong evidence suggests this is not a coincidence. One of us (Williams) examined the [consequences](https://morganwilliamsjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Missouri%5FGun%5FViolence%5FWP%5FDecember%5F2020-2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of Missouri's 2007 repeal of a state law requiring background checks and permits for handgun purchases. The impact was severe, and it was felt most acutely among Black residents of the state's major cities. In St. Louis and Kansas City, firearm homicides among Black residents jumped by 17 per 100,000 people in the aftermath of the repeal, and non-gun homicides fell slightly by almost 4 per 100,000 people. A second challenge is that more restrictive gun laws do not necessarily have an immediate impact on gun deaths — potentially due to the existing stock of firearms already in circulation — and in some cases may lead to a surge in gun purchases. [Research](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/192946?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the rollout of the Brady Act, for example, found no evidence of an impact on firearm homicides, but did identify a selective effect in reducing firearm suicides among older Americans. Additionally, high-profile events shifting expectations concerning future gun control and market forces can be important in accounting for the increased proliferation of firearms. For example, [one study](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272715000857?via%3Dihub&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shows that fears of a stricter gun control policy regime under a potential Obama administration leading up to the 2008 U.S. presidential election resulted in sharp increases in nationwide gun demand. Using data from futures markets, the author shows that as markets provided stronger indications of then-U.S. Sen. Barack Obama winning the presidential election, gun demand rose by nearly 4.5%. Notably, these effects are strongest in states with weaker gun laws. > Porous state borders mean what happens in one state affects those around them. A strand of research over the past two decades has shown how incidents like [mass shootings](https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.aan8179?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the [election](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/07guns.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of pro-gun control politicians or pending changes in state regulations can lead to spikes in gun and ammunition sales amid anticipation of new restrictions.[ ](https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.aan8179?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)Gun purchases [soared](https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.aan8179?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the aftermath of the 2013 Sandy Hook shooting, for instance, leading to an increase in gun deaths that was most pronounced in the states with the largest increase in gun sales following the horrific mass shooting. More recently, a group of researchers [studied](https://edrub.in/Papers/draft-114.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) how residents of Oregon responded to a 2022 public referendum providing voters the choice to strengthen gun control throughout the state. They found that background checks rose by 14% before the referendum and then by more than 150% after it was passed. The long-term impact of the new regulations may well reduce the prevalence of guns in Oregon, but in the short-term, the state is clearly seeing a surge of gun sales. A third challenge arises from the flow of illegal firearms across state borders. It's common in America for guns to flow from states with weaker laws to gun markets in states with more rigorous policies. A [2013 paper](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.5.4.200&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) finds strong evidence that being exposed to nearby states with weaker gun laws increased criminal gun possession. States such as California, Illinois and New York, which possess some of the strongest gun laws in the country, often suffer from considerable gun trafficking due to this phenomenon. In a previous Vital City [contribution](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-yorks-iron-pipeline-problem), one of us (Williams) argues that a surge in postpandemic gun sales among nearby states with weaker gun laws could present enormous public safety challenges to the state of New York. Commonly referred to as the "Iron Pipeline," these states — including Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia and in some cases Ohio — accounted for 40% of crime recoveries throughout the state in 2021 and 80% of crime gun supply in New York City alone. Thus, even when states adopt stringent measures to regulate the proliferation of firearms, they must also contend with market forces imposed on them by states with weaker gun control policy regimes. Porous state borders mean what happens in one state affects those around them, and gun violence in states with strict regulations cannot be effectively addressed through local policy alone. **Why States Matter** What happens when states repeal gun regulations or enact laws that make guns more accessible? The three of us have studied this question from several angles — across states, within states and within communities. The bottom line is the same: State gun laws matter. While recent federal legislation such as the [Bipartisan Safer Communities Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2938/text?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) provides much-needed reforms, such as enhanced background checks for gun buyers under the age of 21, these changes will do little to curb the flow of illegal guns from primary to secondary gun markets. Coordinated legislative efforts within and across states will be required in order to better oversee both private gun sales and gun trafficking within and across states. Achieving this coordination, however, requires moving beyond our current patchwork approach to something more systematic. Sociologist and technology policy expert Alondra Nelson offers a framework for this shift in what she calls [policy innovation through governance](https://albert.ias.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/80a2266d-f3ac-4b7c-8ec9-5cb461b3543e/content?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Nelson distinguishes between reactive "regulation" and proactive "governance"; the latter shapes the conditions under which technology develops rather than just responding to harms after they occur. Applied to firearms, governance means not just reacting to gun violence after it occurs, but proactively shaping the conditions under which firearms circulate in society. Gun rights advocates often promote the false choice between public safety and constitutional rights, when effective governance can achieve both. We would be remiss not to offer some of the lowest-hanging fruit in addressing the proliferation of firearms: having access to better data. Despite our best efforts to study these problems using survey questions and other proxies for gun ownership, we often know very little about legal gun owners and only have access to very crude snapshots of interstate gun trafficking. While restrictions such as the [Tiahrt Amendments](https://www.everytown.org/solutions/gun-trace-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which determine how firearm data collected by the ATF can be used and shared — severely limit access to the gun trafficking data, studies leveraging [local gun permit data](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272723000567?via%3Dihub&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or [gun trace data](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jclc104&div=30&id=&page=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) via academic-government partnerships have provided fascinating insights into gun proliferation and its effects on gun violence. Future opportunities to leverage similar data could prove to be equally rewarding in our efforts to inform evidence-based gun control policy. ### When Products Can Kill URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/when-products-can-kill/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:52.000Z Imagine a durable product that is implicated in the deaths of thousands of Americans each year, by homicide, suicide and accident. These objects are sometimes stolen and used in the commission of felonies. And there are more of them in circulation than there are people in the country. By law and tradition, however, private ownership of such products cannot be infringed upon. They also have a number of legitimate uses. Police officers need them, and life on farms and in sparsely populated areas would be more difficult without them. They are also used for recreational purposes and are popular with collectors. These products are the subject of cultural divides — in general, liberals prefer that their use be curtailed while conservatives see no harm in their proliferation. We are talking, of course, about motor vehicles. But every statement above also applies to guns. It is true that cars are much larger and harder to conceal than arms, and there is no constitutional right to keep and bear them. Nevertheless, the many similarities suggest that one can learn something about the regulation of guns by looking at the manner in which motor vehicles are regulated in the United States. There is no limit on the number of cars or trucks an individual may own. However, each of them must be registered, inspected periodically and driven only by those with a valid license. The responsibility for registration and licensing lies with the states, and there is a fair amount of uniformity in practices across jurisdictions. Short-term movements across state lines are easily accommodated, as documents issued by one state are recognized by the others. Relocation to a different state does require a new license and registration to be issued, but the process is relatively seamless and there is a grace period. Driving while intoxicated is a serious crime in most states because alcohol impairs judgment and reflexes. It is a crime even if an intoxicated driver causes no harm to persons or damage to property. Measures to reduce drunk driving have been shown to reduce traffic fatalities without reducing the number of vehicles in operation. Such measures could be expanded to include weapon possession while clearly impaired. A bar or liquor store that sells alcohol to a person who is intoxicated and likely to drive is responsible for any damage that person causes. Similar liability could extend to selling a weapon or ammunition. Dram shop liability could also extend to selling weapons or ammunition to a person who appears or is known to be suicidal or homicidal. Standard tort law may also be relevant here. If one person injures another, tort law generally requires that the former compensate the latter, regardless of whether the injury was inflicted by a Buick, a bullet or a baseball bat. The instrument of harm, however, may affect the standards under which tort law operates — whether, for instance, the plaintiff has to prove negligence or the defendant can countersue. Most motor vehicle matters are handled under a weak standard, comparative negligence, and gun issues would probably fall under that standard too. The general ineffectiveness of tort law as a check on gun carelessness and error is due mainly to judgment proofness: Defendants may not be able to pay the full amount of the damages they cause. Judgment proofness discourages plaintiffs from filing suit, and blunts incentives for gun owners to exercise caution. With motor vehicles, judgment proofness is usually avoided by mandatory liability insurance. Mandatory insurance would also give insurers a stake in reducing gun violence through research and lobbying. Health insurance companies might also play a role. Insurers could be permitted to collect information on gun ownership and to adjust the premiums they charge based on that information. A priori, it is unclear whether they would charge higher or lower rates to gun owners, but they would have good information on which to base that decision and an incentive to make the decision correctly. They would also have incentives to research health-promoting practices for gun owners and to encourage their customers to follow those practices. Cars are subject to federal standards that most buyers find unobjectionable. You can't buy a car without headlights or windshield wipers, for example, even if you have no plans to drive in the dark or in the rain. Some agreement on minimal design and safety standards for firearms should be possible at the federal level, perhaps building on regulation that already exists in a few states. A significant proportion of [crime guns](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1745-9125.12187?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) originate in straw purchases or as lost and stolen weapons. Tens of thousands of guns are stolen from [parked cars](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/25/us/illegal-guns-parked-cars.html?unlocked%5Farticle%5Fcode=1.eU8.qOvS.BdT6E8ENqgV5&smid=url-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) annually, with vehicles advertising support for gun rights being especially attractive to thieves. Gun dealers are required to file reports when they face theft or loss; such reporting requirements could be extended to owners more broadly. If individuals faced civil liability when a lost or stolen weapon is used to injure or kill, incentives for safe storage would be significantly amplified. Smart guns (which can only be operated by authorized users) would start to appear more attractive, and accidental discharges would become less frequent. If civil liability for injury or death caused by one's weapon appears far-fetched, consider the fact that people have already been found criminally liable for the same. In March 2024, a Michigan couple (Jennifer and James Crumbley) were [found guilty](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/crumbley-sentencing-oxford-high-shooting.html?unlocked%5Farticle%5Fcode=1.eU8.kQD5.dUnIP3iurDex&smid=url-share&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on four counts of involuntary manslaughter for a school shooting perpetrated by their teenage son. Prosecutors argued successfully the parents could have prevented the crime by taking their son out of school when the risks became apparent and by keeping their firearms secure. In 2023, after the shooting but before sentencing, [Michigan enacted a law](https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-28-429&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that makes adults criminally liable if a minor gains access to their unsecured firearms and brandishes them in public or in a threatening manner. This law is enforceable because a gun can easily be traced from a child to a parent or other source. Universal registration of firearms by states would allow crime guns to be traced more easily to their original owners more generally. Following the Port Arthur massacre of 35 people in 1996, [Australia](https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/national-firearms-agreement.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) made significant changes to its national gun laws. Ownership of automatic and semiautomatic assault rifles was restricted, a 28-day waiting period for purchases was imposed, a national gun registry was established, licensing requirements were strengthened, and a large-scale gun buyback program was initiated. The result was a very sharp decline in gun suicides, as much as 75% by [one estimate](https://academic.oup.com/aler/article-abstract/12/2/509/99272?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and a smaller but still significant fall in gun homicides. There was no evidence of displacement in the form of increased nonfirearm deaths. A policy shift of this kind is unimaginable in the United States; judicial rulings and political realities simply would not allow it. If the supply of crime guns is to be curtailed, it will have to be along lines that do not infringe on legal ownership. Licensing, liability and mandatory insurance would be highly effective in curtailing straw purchases, encouraging safe storage and interrupting the flow of lost and stolen guns from legal owners to people who are more likely to use them in the commission of felonies. With regulation under the control of states, such initiatives would not run afoul of federal law, which explicitly prohibits the creation of a national gun registry. At present, however, there are just a handful of states in which registration and licensing is required. Safe storage laws and reporting requirements for loss or theft are also rare. For a policy built on regulation by states to work effectively, there would need to be much more harmonization and coordination than we have seen evidence of to date. One obstacle to coordination across states is the extraordinary level of polarization that contaminates debate on such issues. Gun rights advocates fear that even modest regulations will put us on a slippery slope to confiscation, and this is fueled in part by claims by some gun control advocates that the Second Amendment does not grant an individual right of ownership. This chasm has to be narrowed if there is to be any hope of progress. But motor vehicle regulation was also haphazard and highly decentralized once. New York began to mandate license plates in 1901, but it took two decades for this to become a nationwide standard. Rhode Island started to require a driver's exam and license in 1919, but the mandate did not become universal for another four decades. It is possible that we will see this pattern repeated with guns. ### A Brief Biography of the Second Amendment URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-brief-biography-of-the-second-amendment/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:52.000Z “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” For much of the nation’s history, the Second Amendment was a neglected part of the Constitution, an obscure clause of little interest to jurists and scholars. It did make one notable appearance in United States v. Cruikshank (1876), a case involving the horrendous Colfax, Louisiana, massacre of 1873, when an armed white militia murdered scores of African American freedmen in the bitter aftermath of the recent gubernatorial election. Here the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment applied only to the national government, and that the question of whether the citizens of the states were entitled “to keep and bear arms” was solely under the jurisdiction of state governments. Its other noteworthy appearance came six decades later, in U.S. v. Miller (1939). This case involved two gangsters who were prosecuted for carrying a sawed-off shotgun across state lines, in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934\. The defendants argued that the Act violated their Second Amendment right, but the Supreme Court unanimously held that because the weapon in question had no “reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,” its private ownership was not protected. Throughout this period, state and local governments adopted numerous laws, ordinances and regulations relating to the ownership and use of firearms. They were acting under the general authority of the “police power,” which long enabled governments to act broadly in defense of public health and safety. This can be regarded as one of the reserved powers of the states protected by the Tenth Amendment, which was adopted at the same time as the Second Amendment. No one then would have thought that these two articles of the Bill of Rights conflicted with each other. It was not until the 1980s that a rival interpretation of the Second Amendment began to appear, propagated primarily by student-edited law reviews, but also prompted by the National Rifle Association. This new perspective advanced an “individualist” explanation of the original purpose and import of the Second Amendment. The Amendment clearly was concerned with the status of an institutional militia that was organized by state governments but that the new Constitution subjected to congressional oversight and control. But the new individualist interpretation emphasized another function. Not only should the militia be “well regulated,” this view held, but the people themselves, the citizenry, should also be well armed. Of course, the kind of militia the revolutionary generation had known no longer existed. The real purpose undergirding this new interpretation was to constitutionalize a personal right of self-defense. This concern became more compelling as ordinary Americans grew increasingly obsessed with violent crime, which would grow throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Repeated often enough in the law reviews, this new interpretation gained a modicum of respect in the legal academy. Two prominent constitutional scholars on the left, Sanford Levinson and Laurence Tribe, took the individualist approach seriously. But the true purpose of these individualist-school writings was not to gain scholarly credit. It was rather to lay a foundation for litigation that would overturn the long-prevailing view of the Second Amendment. > No one in the late 1780s ever referred to the need to constitutionalize a personal right of self-defense. The culmination of this campaign came with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which was handed down in the summer of 2008\. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which was cosigned by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Stevens wrote the main dissent, which was joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter and Stephen Breyer. As it happens, I was the main author of the amicus curiae Historians’ Brief that was filed in support of the traditional position holding that the sole concern of the Second Amendment was with the militia. Ordinarily, it lies beyond the competence of historians to decide — as lawyers often do — whether a case was rightly or wrongly decided. Most cases involve a variety of legal arguments that historians cannot ably assess. But D.C. v. Heller was distinctive in one critical respect. It was and still remains the one Supreme Court opinion that depended most heavily on originalist jurisprudence, which assumes that the meaning of the constitutional text was fixed at the moment of its adoption. That means that the debate about the Second Amendment is essentially historical in nature, relying on the primary sources that historians use. Once one examines those sources and reconstructs the context within which they were composed, the majority opinion in D.C. v. Heller becomes a joke — but one with tragic consequences. The Syllabus of the opinion notes that the “drafting history” of the Second Amendment, “while of dubious interpretive worth,” did provide several statements that “unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms.” This statement is deeply flawed on two points. First, far from being “of dubious interpretive worth,” the sources conclusively establish that the sole subject under debate was the militia. The specific controversy was whether Congress, acting under the powers assigned to it in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, would use its legal authority to create a “select militia” that could be more intensively trained than the traditional “citizens militia” that theoretically consisted of all free adult males. In his opinion, Scalia assumed what he had to prove: that because the militia would retain its traditional form, of course citizens must possess the right “to keep and bear arms.” The second problem is that the few historical references that did allude to an individual right never reached the issue that drives contemporary Second Amendment jurisprudence. No one in the late 1780s ever referred to the need to constitutionalize a personal right of self-defense, any more than they would have thought it important to constitutionalize the right to own property or to marry or to travel by horse or carriage or even canoe. There were ample rules and remedies available in common law for matters of self-defense. Nor in all likelihood would they have wished to modify the capacity of government to regulate the ownership and use of firearms as they became exponentially more lethal than they were in the 18th century. > A vague appeal to “history and tradition” is an inherently nebulous method — and a poor foundation for judicial practice and democratic principle. But the first rule of litigating at the Supreme Court asks you whether you can count to five, the number of justices who form a majority. The swing vote in Heller belonged to Justice Kennedy. Most commentators believe that he made the decision more moderate than it otherwise might have been. The only constitutional right to bear arms that Heller asserted was restricted to protection within one’s home. Because Heller concerned only the District of Columbia, its initial use applied solely to Washington. Extending it to the states, however, proved simple. Two years later, in McDonald v. Illinois, the Second Amendment was incorporated against all the states. But this left open the question of what kinds of regulations were still permissible, something that had to be litigated out, state by state and regulation and regulation. Gun rights advocates became increasingly ambitious in their claims. If self-defense now defined the modern purpose of the amendment, why should its exercise be limited to domestic surroundings? Moreover, what level of judicial scrutiny was needed to assess the validity of particular regulations? The crucial break with the post-Heller framework came in 2022, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. The suit challenged a statute requiring anyone wishing to carry a firearm outside the home to provide a “proper cause” for doing so. In the opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court rejected the means-and-ends testing that courts had been applying in assessing specific regulations. The majority instead agreed that henceforth acceptable regulations of firearms had to be either faithful to the “history and tradition” of prior regulations or at least “analogous” to them. This interpretive shift has created far more problems than it has solved, in terms both of judicial practice and democratic principle. A vague appeal to “history and tradition” is an inherently nebulous method. Federal judges around the country have complained about the difficult task the Court has assigned them and the lack of a fixed standard to determine which analogies work, which fail. Lawyers are trained to reason by analogy — as historians are not — but analogies can be drawn either narrowly or broadly. Does the absence of an apt analogy between some present practice and a historical antecedent make a modern regulation invalid? Or does it simply mean that prior regulation was unnecessary because firearms then never posed the problems we face now? The more fundamental problem, though, is a matter of constitutional theory writ large. The whole premise of justifying modern action by invoking history and tradition makes no sense in a democracy. Nothing in the Constitution instructs us to reason this way. The living principle of democracy is to make the actions of our elected representatives responsive to our current opinion, not the uncertain desires of our predecessors. And there is no area of law where the irrelevance of past practice is more apparent than the contentious realm of firearms regulation. ### One Nation Under Guns URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/one-nation-under-guns/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:52.000Z Americans today own between 350 million and 450 million guns — more than one gun per person, though only about [one American in three](https://news.gallup.com/poll/264932/percentage-americans-own-guns.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) owns them. On a per capita basis, no other nation, developed or developing, has more guns. This is also a nation with few gun laws, especially at the national level. American gun mythology would have us believe that both of these trends — lots of guns, few if any gun laws — are also baked into America's gun history. But that's not so. In fact, our history is the opposite. Yes, gun ownership is as old as the country, but so are gun laws. Two corollary facts: First, guns were more or less obtainable early in our history, but this was mostly through imports, not American manufacturing. That proved to be a significant problem for early America, especially during the Revolutionary and early Federalist period of the late 1700s to early 1800s, since Great Britain embargoed arms shipments to the new nation. Early military records and [gun censuses](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/upset-about-a-census-of-p%5Fb%5F521389?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) consistently report chronic shortages of working arms. Second, early American Colonies, states and localities enacted literally thousands of gun laws of every imaginable variety. When changing weapons technologies made guns and other weapons more plentiful, reliable, cheaper and more dangerous, governments responded with waves of new gun laws. The federal government did not weigh in on gun regulation until the 20th century, for the obvious reason that policing and criminality were viewed as state, not federal, obligations. **No Colonial "Guns-R-Us"** In modern America, gun and ammunition purchases can be made easily and rapidly from [tens of thousands](https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2021/05/Inside-the-Gun-Shop-One-Pager.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of licensed gun dealers, private sales, gun shows, and through internet sales. No "Guns-R-Us" outlets existed in the 1600s, 1700s or most of the 1800s. In the 18th century and before, the vast majority of firearms available in America were European imports. [According to early American historian Brian DeLay](https://www.californialawreview.org/print/gun-continuity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), most American gunsmith work consisted of repair work, not the construction of firearms from scratch. Moreover, for the few that did manufacture firearms from start to finish, "It would have taken an early American gunsmith around [a week of work](https://www.californialawreview.org/print/gun-continuity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to produce a basic, utilitarian long arm from scratch." Firearms were obtainable for early Americans through purchase or barter, but for no little cost. As historian [Randall Roth reports](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674064119?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), homicide rates in the Colonies and early Federalist era were generally low, and when homicides occurred, guns were seldom the weapon of choice because of the time involved loading them, their unreliability and (especially for pistols) their inaccuracy. More specifically, muzzle-loading firearms were problematic as implements for murder: They did not lend themselves to impulsive use unless already loaded, and it was generally unwise to leave them loaded for extended periods because their firing reliability degraded over time. Nearly all firearms at the time were single-shot weapons, meaning that reloading time rendered them all but useless in an interpersonal conflict if a second shot was needed. Even so, we had lots of gun laws. From the 1600s through the start of the 20th century, [old gun laws regulated or restricted](https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4825&context=lcp&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) weapons access to Indigenous people, African Americans (before the Civil War), indentured servants, vagrants, non-Protestants, those who refused to swear an oath of loyalty to the government, felons, foreigners, minors and those under the influence of alcohol. Numerous laws regulated hunting practices, as well as firearms' carry, use, storage and transport; restricted dangerous or unusual weapons; regulated the manufacture, inspection, storage and sale of firearms; imposed gun licensing; prohibited the discharge of firearms in or near towns, buildings, after dark, on Sundays, in public places, in cemeteries or near roads; or firing that wasted gunpowder. Penalties for violating these laws were generally some combination of fines and imprisonment, and sometimes gun confiscation. Hardly anyone living then, much closer to the drafting of the Second Amendment, saw these laws as inconsistent with its text. **The first gun wave** Societal gun proliferation first emerged after the Civil War, when mass production techniques, improved technology and materials, and [escalating marketing campaigns](https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/how-the-government-launched-the-us-gun-industry-213892/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) made handguns in particular relatively cheap, prolific, reliable and easy to get. As [Lee Kennett and James LaVerne Anderson](https://www.amazon.com/Gun-America-National-Contributions-American/dp/0837175305?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) note, "By the 1880s gunmaking had completed the transition from craft to industry." Revolvers were heavily marketed to the civilian population in newspaper and magazine advertisements extolling their virtues. When gun manufacturer Smith & Wesson's near-monopoly over the manufacture of cartridge revolvers ended with the expiration of its key patent in 1870, numerous other gunmakers entered the market. Soon these other manufacturers were producing abundant, cheap revolvers at low cost to the consumer. As Kennett and Anderson noted, Colt's initial revolvers sold for $35, but by 1900 the "'two dollar pistol' was a fixture in American life." Further, as the mail-order business boomed from the 1870s on, companies like Montgomery Ward and Sears began selling revolvers through their catalogs — especially small, cheaper, lighter-weight models that cost less to mail. When the adverse consequences of the spread of cheap handguns began to be felt, especially in urban areas where they were most popular, states enacted numerous anti-gun carry and other restrictions. By the start of the 1900s, [every state in the country](https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2944&context=ulj&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) had enacted anti-concealed carry weapons laws, and many had enacted gun purchase and carry licensing laws. In addition, [three-quarters of the states](https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2944&context=ulj&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) had enacted laws against the open carrying of weapons. **The Tommy gun era** New, devastating weapons technologies developed for battlefield use emerged from World War I and came to pose a public safety threat when guns like the Thompson submachine gun, the Browning Automatic Rifle (often known as the "BAR") and sawed-off shotguns made their way into civilian hands. These initially unregulated weapons did not circulate widely, but had an outsize effect on criminality. Most notoriously, the Tommy gun — ["the gun that made the Twenties roar"](https://www.amazon.com/Gun-That-Made-Twenties-Roar/dp/0025508903?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — could fire hundreds of rounds in less than a minute. Its popularity among gangsters, coinciding with the rise of Prohibition-fueled gangsterism, prompted calls for reform. From 1925 to the early 1930s, two-thirds of the states criminalized their possession and use. In 1934, Congress enacted the first significant national gun law, the [National Firearms Act](https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/laws-alcohol-tobacco-firearms-and-explosives/national-firearms-act?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which closely regulated these weapons. When the law was challenged on Second Amendment grounds, it was upheld by a unanimous Supreme Court in the 1939 case of [*U.S. v. Miller*](https://scholar.google.com/scholar%5Fcase?case=17128640835628801970&q=U.S.+v.+Miller+1939&hl=en&as%5Fsdt=6,47&as%5Fvis=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In the ruling, the high court affirmed that the amendment was about government-organized and regulated militias, not personal self-defense. **The Second Great Gun Leap** The next great surge in civilian gun sales came out of the Second World War, when entrepreneurs obtained massive quantities of war-surplus weapons at bargain basement prices. According to [Andrew McKevitt](https://uncpress.org/book/9781469677248/gun-country/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), they then stoked U.S. market demand for the guns "[with new styles of advertising](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/gun-country-gun-capitalism-culture-and-control-in-cold-war-america-by-andrew-c-mckevitt-chapel-hill-nc-university-of-north-carolina-press-2023-319p-9900-cloth-2495-paper/C634968AE8C8BDCF6D1379872FD1FE4C?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that pitched dirt-cheap rifles as throwaway toys for the weekend warrior." Key to that marketing was cultivation of a [more militaristic](https://www.historians.org/perspectives-article/the-right-to-buy-arms-gun-consumption-in-20th-century-america-december-2023/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and eventually political appeal, extolling gun buying as a patriotic expression of virtuous citizenship. The National Rifle Association embraced a more radical and political agenda when a dissident faction within the organization took control at its 1977 annual convention. The new leaders pushed more political and extremist messaging that emphasized armed patriotism as a form of political expression to both buttress its membership and boost gun sales. It also shifted in emphasis from guns for hunting/sporting purposes to acquisition of handguns for personal self-defense. Epitomizing this political turn to armed militarism was the aggressive marketing of [assault-style rifles like the AR-15](https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4970&context=lcp&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Developed for use during the Vietnam War, gun companies pursued the civilian market when America ended its involvement in that conflict. Civilians initially showed little interest in the weapon (the military version could fire in both fully automatic and semiautomatic modes; the civilian version fires in semiautomatic mode only, meaning that it fires one round with each pull of the trigger), owing to their cost and the fact that they provided no special utility for typical gun purposes. In the aftermath of highly publicized mass shootings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, public outcry led several states to impose restrictions on assault weapons. [In 1994, Congress enacted](https://abcnews.go.com/US/understanding-1994-assault-weapons-ban-ended/story?id=65546858&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a limited 10-year ban on 19 types of assault weapons. That, in turn, provoked an angry response from gun owners, the NRA and the gun industry. When the ban lapsed in 2004, assault weapons sales skyrocketed and gun marketing leaned heavily into gun purchasing as a political act. As former gun industry executive Ryan Busse [has written](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/ar-15-rifle-mass-shootings-gun-control/661275/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the "tactical lifestyle" came to dominate gun marketing, and the AR-style rifle became a symbol of right-wing hostility to government. The gun industry found this marketing strategy both [effective and lucrative](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gunmakers-made-over-1-billion-in-assault-weapon-sales-in-the-past-decade-congressional-report-finds/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as assault weapons — and their many accessories — were also more profitable than other guns. Aggressive AR marketing even extended to children: A company called ["WEE1 Tactical"](https://vpc.org/press/manufacturer-of-ar-15-assault-rifles-designed-for-children-returns-with-new-sales-campaign/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has sold a smaller, lighter-weight semiautomatic assault rifle specifically for children. Even in the face of this political and marketing campaign, [10 states](https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/hardware-ammunition/assault-weapons/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (and the District of Columbia) have legislated assault weapons restrictions. In April, [Colorado](https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/semi-automatic-firearms-colorado-restrictive-gun-law-signed-governor-jared-polis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) became the 11th state to do so. Despite numerous legal challenges, the laws have mostly been held constitutional to date, even in the face of the U.S. Supreme Court's more expansive interpretation of gun rights. Despite all this, gun law research has demonstrated the efficacy of gun laws; large majorities of Americans [continue to support most gun safety measures](https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Gun-Control/Spitzer/p/book/9781032458519?srsltid=AfmBOopJ7fKaotg0oUyCmuAbDitIiaW2YrwVG724SpQvrEWC3pSXQW1R&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as do [most gun owners](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/19/gun-owners-support-safety-policies-00062335?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); even with the Supreme Court's expanded definition of gun rights, most gun laws continue to pass constitutional muster; and congressional enactment of a [new gun law](https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-bipartisan-safer-communities-act-1-year-later/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2022, passed with bipartisan support, demonstrates that new federal gun measures are not beyond reach. Yet this history demonstrates the enduring power of American gun mythology (stoked by commercial marketing forces), tied to the revolutionary and frontier traditions, which evolved even as the events giving rise to that mythology unfolded. In the 1962 John Ford Western film, "The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance*,*" a newspaper editor is asked to correct a long-standing historical mistake about the killing referenced in the movie title. [The editor declined, saying](https://www.persuasion.community/p/when-legend-becomes-fact-print-the-legend?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): "This is the West, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend." ### Forging Firearm Folklore URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/forging-firearm-folklore/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:53.000Z At the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition on July 12, 1893, the historian Frederick Jackson Turner presented a lecture to the American Historical Association titled “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” It hardly mattered that the West was at that point barely “history” — the U.S. census had only declared the frontier “closed” three years prior. A unified American identity was a post-Civil War necessity, and Turner thought he had captured it. The taming of the West was the crucible that yielded a sturdy, self-reliant American character. For the less high-minded, one could witness the birth of that character in another form at Buffalo Bill’s Wild West show, just outside the World’s Fair grounds. Dubbed “purely and distinctly American” by Mark Twain, the spectacle, scripted for the viewing pleasure of thousands of onlookers, was meant to dramatize the intersection of savagery and civilization. There were Lakota warriors in feathered regalia, settlers staving them off, cavalry charges and a sharpshooting act featuring Annie Oakley. Winchester rifles cracked, Colt revolvers spun, and the West was won, over and over again, thanks to rugged Americans armed with guns. Both Turner’s simplistic expository and Bill Cody’s embellished exposition were deeply influential in shaping the larger tale America tells about itself. But neither went so far as to claim that guns had won the West. That task would be left to admen at the leading gunmaker Winchester, who marketed the company’s flagship lever-action rifle as “The Gun That Won the West” to a postfrontier audience eager to be a part of an emerging American identity. These marketers didn’t seek to intellectualize history, nor to dramatize it. They aimed to brand it. And did they ever succeed. So much of what we think of today as an absolute truth — that guns are integral and essential to the nation we know — was forged by gunmakers and marketers that, time and again, were eager to create demand by shaping the United States’ very sense of itself. Those of us grappling with the consequences need to understand what made those early gun marketers geniuses of an emergent field, and we need to appreciate how their successors have only gotten more savvy and cynical in the modern era, suffusing a political debate with a mythology of their own making. \*\*\* Around the time of the “Gun That Won the West” campaign, manufacturers like Colt and Winchester had a challenge: how to pivot from military production to peacetime consumerism. The answer, they determined, was to build an emotional economy, associations with guns that included nostalgia, masculinity and patriotism. It is what historian Pamela Haag calls the “industrialization of myth,” and it would place firearms at the center of the American story for a century. These early admen were canny in understanding that they needed to tell a story. So they gave their products not just model numbers, but names. When you bought a “Peacemaker,” Colt’s iconic revolver, you got a newly manufactured gun with a built-in history. In ads, manufacturers touted American battlefield pedigree — Union soldiers frequently carried Remington and Colt revolvers, while Winchester’s lever-action rifles had supplied scouts and militias in the West. Each peacetime invitation for sale was a portrait of rugged individualism in a violent past, sometimes literally: Winchester calendars featured lush paintings by Frederic Remington depicting cowboys and Native American warriors locked in dramatic battles, while Smith & Wesson lithographs portrayed settlers heroically defending their homesteads. These weren’t just ads for guns, they were opportunities to purchase an heirloom of manifest destiny. > The persistent idea that firearms are central to our character is, in the end, a marketing lie agreed upon. Along the way, gun industry marketers took advantage of the burgeoning pulp folklore of the West, leaning heavily on real-life figures like Buffalo Bill, Bat Masterson and Wild Bill Hickok — and their tales of gunplay. These men, heroes and performers alike, were the influencers of their day and lent credibility to reliable firearms as part of the myth. Their endorsements, both tacit and explicit, turned firearms into aspirational commodities, a way of buying frontier courage and a piece of Americana. Haag characterizes this time for the gunmakers as “a transition of imagining a customer who needed guns but didn’t especially want them to a customer who wanted guns, but didn’t especially need them.” The emergent industrial gun sector was melding myth and customers in the same crucible. No wonder, then, that at the 1893 World’s Fair — dubbed by many as “the fair that changed America” — Smith & Wesson was sure to have hundreds of its guns on display and ready for sale. \*\*\* Americans’ relationship with this dangerous product was set in motion with the culture taking shape alongside it. But the partnership wasn’t entirely self-sustaining. In each generation, marketers had to find ways to rekindle the romance. And they did. During World War II, the war effort and nationwide rationing required gun manufacturers to mostly set aside the civilian market. But that didn’t stop the industry from running ads to past and future customers. The makers of military guns knew that on the other side of lucrative government contracts, they would need a civilian market, so they ramped up ads tying their brands to American valor in the European and Pacific theaters, associating hunting and sport shooting with war readiness and capturing a wistful longing for an American pastoral interrupted by global conflict. Winchester, for example, featured paratroopers in battle with M1 carbines, under the headline, “Relying upon Winchester is an Old American Custom.” The ad reminded readers that Winchester had been “On Guard for America Since 1866” and used this legacy to assure future consumers that Winchester would still be there after the war — for sport, for family, for freedom. While other kinds of products also leaned into wartime imagery and patriotism for solidarity and sales, ads for Coca-Cola couldn’t lay claim to being “battle-proven” at Iwo Jima, as the Winchester M1 marketing did. For its part, Remington ran an ad featuring a tired, homesick soldier longing to go hunting again. It promised its customers on the homefront that, after the war was won, it would again be serving sportsmen with shotguns, rifles and ammo. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/amghkggnhvfto_7o_winchester-relying-upon-winchester-png-auto-format-compress-1776259688588.jpg) Credit: Winchester Repeating Arms Co. advertisement, 1943\. “Relying Upon Winchester is an Old American Custom” In the postwar years, with a flood of returning GIs, military-surplus rifles and excess manufacturing capacity, the industry found a ripe opportunity to sell nostalgia. The M1 Garand and other service-style rifles were repackaged as heirloom-grade sporting rifles. Ads encouraged veterans to bring their wartime marksmanship into the American wilderness — or to pass that skill on to their sons as both a pastime and a future preparation. Meanwhile, with a double dose of Westerns and WWII epics, Hollywood did its part to canonize American valor and the weapons used to obtain it. There are simply too many examples to list here, but if you know that the Winchester Model 1873 was “The Gun That Won the West,” that might have something to do with Jimmy Stewart cradling one in “Winchester ’73,” the 1950 film that made the rifle talismanic. The film personifies the object worship that characterizes much of the gun industry’s marketing strategy, a story of a gun coveted both on-screen and in the audience. Winchester supported the movie and leaned into the synergy: It created marketing schemes to leverage the film while its catalogs reproduced stills, using the gun’s cinematic legacy to solidify its real-world brand as an American icon. Winchester would later capitalize on silver-screen exposure in “To Hell and Back” (1955), which stars real-life war hero Audie Murphy as himself, dramatizing his extraordinary battlefield exploits — most often with an M1 carbine — including the time he took on an advancing German unit on his own. The film, which was Universal’s most lucrative until “Jaws” two decades later, was a silver screen update to Remington’s painted platonic ideals: A plucky American and his rifle can single-handedly defend freedom from the advancing hordes. The man and the gun meld; maybe you, too, can get Murphy-level grit when you buy his gun. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/amgd_mgnhvfto_54_winchester_73_-1950_film_poster--auto-format-compress-1776259688811.jpg) Credit: Reynold Brown, illustrator. "Copyright 1950 by Universal Pictures Co., Inc.", Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons By the early 2000s, guns were firmly ensconced in the stories America told itself. Still, the gun industry nevertheless faced shrinking interest in firearms. For one, an increasingly urban America was losing interest in hunting, impacting sales of rifles and shotguns. The industry’s pivot to pushing handguns misfired, sparking backlash and lawsuits stemming from the widespread gun violence of the ’90s. Overall, households with guns dropped from around 50% in the late ’70s to less than one-third at the turn of the century. Americans, it seemed, did not need, nor particularly want firearms. Then came the horror of 9/11, delivering a new crucible for American identity, along with two prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The gun industry, seizing an opportunity, once again pivoted — this time not to meet military needs, but to profit on wars being fought by a volunteer army and televised to the unenlisted. The national moment coincided with the expiration of the federal assault weapons ban, presenting gun manufacturers with a massive opportunity. For the first time in a decade, they could freely market civilian versions of the latest military-style rifles. And they did so aggressively. Goodbye Winchester and the gun your grandpa’s grandpa used to win the West; hello AR-15, a semiautomatic twin of the military M4, just like the ones used by modern warriors to conquer terrorism in the Middle East. The “AR” stands for Armalite — the original manufacturer — but the gun industry saw a time-tested opportunity to co-opt patriotism and rebranded it “America’s Rifle.” For the next 20 years, gun manufacturers would continue to tap into this emergent special ops, “tacti-cool” aesthetic and were happy to offer middle-management types elite association through sophisticated weaponry. No mere hat tip to distant conquest, now valor was for sale with ads promising that customers could “Use What They Use” or own “a piece of the new U.S. warfighting next-gen kit.” Another marketed “the world’s most battle-proven rifles.” > Gun marketers have only gotten more savvy and cynical in the modern era, suffusing a political debate with a mythology of their own making. Manhood was another critical American attribute that apparently needed to be reclaimed in the modern era, as ads said that you could have your “man card reissued” by buying an AR-15\. You could become an “Alpha” and “never (be) a victim, always a victor.” If early gun ads were selling an instant fix of nostalgia for a violent, bygone frontier, the new era of marketing puts you in the battle and sets up a dangerous innuendo: Use the guns that are fighting the “savages” abroad to resist the “savages” at home. The ads conveniently let *you* decide who is the “savage” in the crosshairs. “Not Today Antifa” barks one ad from Spike Tactical. “Forces of opposition, bow down,” declared another one from Bushmaster, a brash subsidiary of Remington. Just as in the past, the companies needed validation from real characters to sell the fiction. While dramatized ads overlay battle rifles, flags and freedom, plainspoken and practical returning soldiers now vouch for the weapons and their efficacy on social media — with demonstrations garnering hundreds of millions of views that make Buffalo Bill’s act look like a sideshow. YouTube personas Garand Thumb and IraqVeteran8888 display for their young male audiences battlefield proficiency while reviewing the latest firearms from Sig Sauer and Springfield Armory. It hardly matters that some of the content is gun industry-sponsored and some is purely organic: The authenticity is ever present. And the testimonials echo the bona fides of the past. Wild Bill Hickock preferred to carry a pair of .36‑caliber Colt Navy revolvers; YouTube’s hickok45, with his 8 million subscribers, prefers a .40-caliber Glock 23. As online personalities akin to those who help market beauty products or tech gadgets demonstrate the lethal functionality of a new generation of firearms to a new generation of buyers, the modern industry capitalizes on a quintessentially American attribute: individuality. There are endless configurations of parts and accessories to make the firearm you purchased distinctly *yours*. Gunmakers are happy to sell you rail systems, sights, scopes, grips and camouflage finishes for the stateside tactical warrior who didn’t so much need a gun but wanted one so he could be part of something bigger. And the more individualized the gun, the less it is a tool and the more it is a part of you. Try taking that away. > The new era of marketing sets up a dangerous innuendo: “Use the guns that are fighting the ‘savages’ abroad to resist the ‘savages’ at home.” The gun industry’s multigenerational marketing campaign has always been about selling weapons, but its true triumph lies in how it has shaped the political and public safety debate. “Both sides” now seem to accept — if sometimes grudgingly — that guns are intrinsic and immutably American, essential to our history and endemic to our body politic. But are they? We might do well to admit that, as a country that nearly destroyed itself a century after its founding, we forged a national identity around resiliency, endlessly recommitting ourselves to the ideals of freedom and individuality. Yet each time America sought to define or redefine itself, there was the gun industry drafting off our collective story, standing next to heroes real and fictional, edging ever further into the frame. The persistent idea that firearms are central to our character is, in the end, a marketing lie agreed upon: American fortitude and love of liberty spring not from our fundamental character, but from an inanimate object that periodically goes on sale. The truth is that we might actually be a country that sometimes needs guns, but that needn’t especially want them. We’d do well to not mistake the folklore of the firearm for our true grit. ### Let New York Vote for More Housing URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/let-new-york-vote-for-more-housing/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:52.000Z The city's Board of Elections is on the cusp of a decision that could substantially set back housing production and local democracy in New York. When they consider the question this week, they must reject the City Council's attempt to prevent voters from approving or rejecting a series of pro-housing ballot questions this fall. Virtually [all the major candidates for mayor](https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/mountain/politics/2025/09/02/mayoral-candidates-largely-agree-on-how-to-tackle-housing-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as well as the last two mayors agree that New York City needs more housing. [Virtually every economist agrees as well](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120%5Fbarriers%5Fshared%5Fgrowth%5Fland%5Fuse%5Fregulation%5Fand%5Feconomic%5Frents.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Moreover, they all agree that new housing will not be built until the city makes it *legal* to build more housing by passing rezonings that allow more density. If there's so much agreement, why hasn't it happened yet? The answer lies in the dark, dank corners of local politics, institutions and people that are untouched by changing attitudes towards rezoning, where narrow interest groups and Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) homeowners' groups dominate. The mass public and the press pay little attention to the obscure politicians and activists competing in judicial elections, community boards and City Council primaries. As a result, self-dealing and discredited old ideas fester in these crevices of the political system, producing officials and decisions that block needed change. There is no part of New York City politics that fits this description better than the New York City Board of Elections. [Commissioners are chosen by party bosses](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/nyregion/nyc-voting-election-board.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — one Republican and one Democrat — in each of the city's five boroughs. Civil service laws do not apply to the board; the appointments are the last major refuge of pure party patronage. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the BOE [has](https://nypost.com/2025/07/22/us-news/dead-voters-cast-ballots-in-nyc-primary-as-calls-for-probe-intensify/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [often been corrupt](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/bronx-district-leader-and-board-elections-employee-charged-bribery-extortion-fraud-and?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [incompetent](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A%5F%5Fwww.newyorker.com%5Fnews%5Four-2Dlocal-2Dcorrespondents%5Fnew-2Dyork-2Dcitys-2Dneedless-2Delection-2Dfiasco&d=DwMF-g&c=slrrB7dE8n7gBJbeO0g-IQ&r=eE7QrqWYqmgFgBO1VcU2beehDcC5MaH4Dstn0OJ-F6E&m=p7azhiXpElB8yBxRYjdDP-iKKvhsaR63BvziWJIpheTorQ1t6f9LIHBWrN9%5F5DJ6&s=qBls6lmU3YG8zNFeqqEtXRnmpLiRPRdi93qivQAT6aA&e=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [full](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A%5F%5Fgothamist.com%5Fnews%5Fnyc-2Dboard-2Dof-2Delections-2Dhead-2Dkeeps-2Djob-2Dafter-2Dwatchdog-2Dfound-2Dhe-2Dmade-2Dracial-2Dsexual-2Djokes&d=DwMF-g&c=slrrB7dE8n7gBJbeO0g-IQ&r=eE7QrqWYqmgFgBO1VcU2beehDcC5MaH4Dstn0OJ-F6E&m=p7azhiXpElB8yBxRYjdDP-iKKvhsaR63BvziWJIpheTorQ1t6f9LIHBWrN9%5F5DJ6&s=uljsEz1Vx080gRtaVZEkuSmgXujLeGz4PbPwW%5FdODT0&e=&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of [unsavory](https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-board-of-elections-head-keeps-job-after-watchdog-found-he-made-racial-sexual-jokes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) characters. Former Mayor Michael Bloomberg called it "[worse than the gang that couldn't shoot straight.](https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/vote-mistake-not-the-first-flub-for-nyc-board-of-elections/3134242/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" So it should come as little surprise that now, on the cusp of critical measures to help New York produce more housing going to voters on the November ballot, the BOE is considering engaging in some crazy NIMBY nonsense. The Charter Revision Commission proposed several changes to the city's charter designed to encourage new housing construction, for voters to decide on this fall. [These changes would significantly weaken the City Council's ability to block some land use changes and streamline the onerous approval process known as the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure.](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A%5F%5Fwww.nytimes.com%5F2025%5F07%5F01%5Fnyregion%5Fnyc-2Dcharter-2Drevision-2Dhousing.html&d=DwMF-g&c=slrrB7dE8n7gBJbeO0g-IQ&r=eE7QrqWYqmgFgBO1VcU2beehDcC5MaH4Dstn0OJ-F6E&m=p7azhiXpElB8yBxRYjdDP-iKKvhsaR63BvziWJIpheTorQ1t6f9LIHBWrN9%5F5DJ6&s=wxjXavT9v15ya%5FxxM2xQvZKu0pnw31iDWcNs0E6Ob8o&e=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/01/nyregion/nyc-charter-revision-housing.html&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Unsurprisingly, Council members are unhappy with the proposals. The prerogative of individual members to veto projects in their districts — or, better yet, to extract juicy concessions from developers — is a major source of members' clout. So members of the City Council asked the BOE to rule that the ballot questions were badly worded and to exclude them from the ballot. [The BOE is apparently seriously considering this end run around a democratic vote. ](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/nyregion/charter-revision-nyc-housing.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)The deadline for the BOE's decision is Thursday, Sept. 11. This brazen gambit should fail — for two reasons. [First, the ballot language is plenty clear](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/appendix-a-adopted-questions.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Second, the BOE has no power to reject proposed charter revisions. The law clearly states that the Charter Revision Commission "[shall prescribe the form of the questions to be submitted](https://codes.findlaw.com/ny/municipal-home-rule-law/mhr-sect-36/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)." As numerous [courts](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/591486b1add7b049344d9a72?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have [repeatedly](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59148ae5add7b049345194d9?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) held since [the early 1920s](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59146fc1add7b0493435028e?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the BOE's responsibility is "strictly ministerial," meaning that the BOE may enforce only the specific requirements written in the Election Code, not make its own discretionary judgments about the desirability of a measure. More than 20 years ago, [a state Supreme Court justice observed](https://api.anylaw.com/api/document/F7%5FoVmYBTlTomsSB039t/download?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that no court has ever allowed a board of elections to reject a proposition "because they disagree with the wording." This assignment of responsibility makes sense. The Board of Elections is not made up of experts in linguistics or voter behavior. There's no reason to think that state legislators wanted to give them the job of guessing whether a ballot measure is clearly written enough for voters to understand. All of which means that any decision by the BOE to yank these proposals from the ballot will likely lose in court. But it might be too late by that point. Depending on how long it takes and what a court is willing to order, a BOE rejection could still make it impossible to get the charter revision proposals on the ballot. The BOE hasn't decided yet. If public pressure ramps up maybe it will yet do the right thing and let city voters decide whether to change the land-use decisionmaking process. Before the Board of Elections gets any closer to taking this terribly antidemocratic step, mayoral candidates Zohran Mamdani and Andrew Cuomo should speak out — and speak up for keeping the measures on the ballot. If not, their own ambitions to increase housing will be stymied by the muck that resides in these dank, dark corners of New York. ### Reality Check: Who’s the Guard Really Guarding in U.S. Cities? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/reality-check-whos-the-guard-really-guarding-in-us-cities/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:53.000Z President Donald Trump, who paints a picture of U.S. cities run by Democrats as crime-ridden wastelands, in August issued [an executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/additional-measures-to-address-the-crime-emergency-in-the-district-of-columbia/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [prepare the National Guard](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/25/us/politics/trump-national-guard.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and other federal law enforcement for deployment to U.S. cities, ostensibly to combat violence, disorder and undocumented immigration. He's already started sending large contingents of troops to some major U.S. cities, with threats to send them to more. The National Guard reports both to individual states' governors and to the president as commander-in-chief, with different permitted uses in each case. Trump claims his federal deployments are necessary to respond to a "crime emergency" in "lawless" cities and escalate immigration enforcement. Under [the Posse Comitatus Act](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1385?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the military may not engage in domestic law enforcement unless specifically authorized by federal law or the Constitution. Title 10 of the U.S. Code, including the Insurrection Act, specifies limited legitimate federal uses of the Guard, including to [suppress an insurrection](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10/subtitleA/part1/chapter13&edition=prelim&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [repel an invasion](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/12406?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or protect the civil rights of citizens when a state is unwilling or unable to do so. Trump's first deployment of troops occurred in June, when he sent the Guard to Los Angeles over the objections of California Gov. Gavin Newsom and Mayor Karen Bass — an action [that a federal judge this week ruled to be illegal](https://apnews.com/article/trump-newsom-los-angeles-national-guard-d6c8450a3ac2de34e669ef0836d22cbc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Then came the current, ongoing deployment of troops to Washington, D.C., which, as the nation's capital, is federally controlled. Though the president's use of the Guard there is legally less restricted than in the states, [the District has sued](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/us/dc-trump-national-guard-suit.html?campaign%5Fid=60&emc=edit%5Fna%5F20250904&instance%5Fid=161893&nl=breaking-news®i%5Fid=1443325&segment%5Fid=205270&user%5Fid=d78f96ec42886cbf3cb223e344403254&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), asserting that this use of the Guard to address a purported "public safety emergency" is illegal. Trump [has made clear that he plans to send troops to other American cities](https://apnews.com/article/trump-chicago-baltimore-law-enforcement-6d7c80258f17c3d679358467531f7e9d?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including Baltimore, which [he has called a "hellhole."](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xESKmGJKJkI&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Of Chicago, [he said](https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-vows-crime-chicago-fast-after-violent-labor/story?id=125181053&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) this week, "We're going in. I didn't say when, we're going in." He has also suggested deployments to New York City, Oakland and San Francisco. But how dangerous are the cities the president is targeting? Is there really an "emergency"? Even accepting the dubious proposition that this is a legal, appropriate or effective use of the National Guard, which cities is he ignoring as he zeroes in on population centers run by Democrats in blue states? **The most dangerous cities?** The cities where Trump has deployed or threatened to deploy the National Guard are not America's most dangerous metropolises. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24843121?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wNFahNXXZo%5F54Exst78e8GYED2ZC5NCdTdufQpkxdes/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24843431?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1VXDACW8m06g-xN7pKy2UjeFfEXGsTY1BjmW0DqKlY8I/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **An emergency?** In recent years, the cities where Trump has sent or threatened to send the Guard have all experienced noticeable homicide declines. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24974517?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mWG8LNP%5FzzKUVbvVNHZwQI5KT7KVF5IZkD11KrvKzbU/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Safety or politics?** The most pro-Trump states in America are likelier to have more violent crime than the most anti-Trump states. Indeed, the eight states with the highest homicide rates all voted for Trump in 2025, as did 22 of the top 25 states ranked by homicide rate. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24847351?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KK6FrAgzQZ-f1YH-y7FD1Q0RQ-kh0A4NufsR0SuTIAY/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) To the extent that there is any correlation between Trump vote share and homicide rate, it is that — with exceptions — the higher the Trump vote share, the higher the homicide rate. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/story/3309291?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1J452CkxwrRQ2Upn1cvSW6VQ0FCI%5FJBi9RbeTRJ4-iIo/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Trump is transparently flooding Democrat-run cities with federal troops — but a number of U.S. cities with higher homicide rates than New York, L.A., Chicago and Baltimore have Republican mayors. Indeed, at least three Republican-led cities — Dallas (13.6 homicides per 100,000 population), Oklahoma City (10.3) and Fort Worth (7.4) — have higher homicide rates than New York (3.9), Los Angeles (7.0) and San Francisco (4.4), three of the cities Trump has singled out that are led by Democrats. Finally, though Trump often discusses crime and undocumented immigration interchangeably — and is sending Immigration and Customs Enforcement personnel alongside members of the Guard — the cities run by Democrats to which he has deployed the Guard are [far from the only undocumented immigration population centers](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/07/22/what-we-know-about-unauthorized-immigrants-living-in-the-us/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20six%20states%20with%20the%20largest%20unauthorized,%2A%20New%20Jersey%20%28475%2C000%29%20%2A%20Illinois%20%28400%2C000%29). ### Five Years That Shaped the Modern City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/five-years-that-shaped-the-modern-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:53.000Z In "The Gods of New York: Egotists, Idealists, Opportunists and the Birth of the Modern City: 1986-1990," New York Times writer Jonathan Mahler chronicles what he refers to as "four of the most convulsive and consequential years in the modern history of New York." Actually, Mahler understates his case. New York in the late 80s was a city on steroids — and not the good kind — seemingly careening from crisis to crisis, headline to headline, demagogue to demagogue. The 1980s were a hot mess, and this book will blow the mind of anyone who did not live through it all. For pure reading pleasure, "The Gods of New York" merits a spot on the bookshelf of anyone who loves New York. But by virtually ignoring the economic and political forces propelling NYC (remember "it's the economy, stupid?"), "The Gods of New York" fails to explain how New York recovered from the chaos to reassert itself as a world capital. But before we get to the lessons — and misfires — of this compelling story, let us first consider a partial list of the sad, tragic and utterly insane occurrences that New Yorkers endured during that four-year period — please place your seatbelt low and tight across your lap. One of the worst municipal corruption scandals in the city's history culminated with the accused Queens borough president plunging a steak knife into his chest. In separate incidents, two African-American youths who one night found themselves in the "wrong" neighborhoods (namely Howard Beach and Bensonhurst) were chased down and killed by separate packs of white youths. A jogger was brutally raped in Central Park, while an affluent teenager from the Upper East Side was found murdered and partially unclothed on a patch of grass in the shadow of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The AIDS and crack epidemics ravaged communities. Police brutality, largely though not exclusively directed against Black New Yorkers, was a regular occurrence on the evening news. A severely mentally ill woman was briefly lionized by Phil Donahue and Harvard University for refusing to stop living on the city's street, while a trio of putative civil rights leaders held New York State captive by promoting demonstrably false claims by an African-American teenager that she had been raped by a white state trooper. A mob boss was gunned down outside Sparks Steak House on E. 46th St. and a Goldman Sachs partner had his career destroyed by an overzealous prosecutor whose agents led him out his office in handcuffs. These events were dutifully chronicled around-the-clock by no fewer than four viciously competitive daily newspapers, local TV news crews employing first-class journalists, a robust ethnic press and a mayor who was known to give two or three press conferences per day. > New York in the late 80s was a city on steroids — and not the good kind — seemingly careening from crisis to crisis, headline to headline, demagogue to demagogue. Amid these intersecting narratives, readers will search in vain for heroes. At the center of it all was Mayor Ed Koch, who during his third term, found the city to be growing weary of his *schtick.* His polarizing racial rhetoric threatened to obscure the meaningful achievements of his twelve years in office. Donald Trump was a young, combative and charismatic developer whose ability to attract media attention dwarfed his modest NYC real estate achievements. Here we begin to witness the ugliness behind Trump's rhetoric, his reckless business decisions, and his supernatural ability to survive adversity. Rudolph Giuliani showed early promise as a prosecutor determined to break up the mob and go after municipal corruption and Wall Street malfeasance. But as prosecutors often do, Rudy overreached, ignored due process, leaked profusely to the media and eventually joined his future friend Donald Trump in resorting to racist rhetoric that inflamed the public. Finally, Reverend Al Sharpton was a larger-than-life character whose occasionally lucid analysis of racism and police brutality was obscured by his demagoguery and self-aggrandizement. Like the others, he could play the media like a flute. In fact, just about the only truly sympathetic character to emerge from this circus was David Dinkins, a lifetime machine politician whose soothing rhetoric helped him defeat Koch and Giuliani in 1989 to become the city's first African-American mayor — and, in my opinion, one of its most underrated — before being defeated by Giuliani in his 1993 reelection bid. Beyond drama, what do we make of it all? Mahler both gets New York and loves New York. In his "Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bronx is Burning," he zeroed in on the summer of 1977 and weaved the stories of the Yankees winning the World Series, the storied mayoral race (starring Ed Koch, Mario Cuomo, Percy Sutton, Bella Abzug, Herman Badillo and incumbent Abe Beame!), the blackout and looting that followed and the Son of Sam murders into a compact narrative that perfectly captured New York City's zeitgeist, back when there was nary a glimmer of hope for the near-bankrupt, job-hemorrhaging, arson-ridden city. That "Gods of New York" is being released on the eve of New York City's mayoral election is fitting, as it should be required reading for each of the mayoral candidates, including frontrunner Zohran Mamdani, who was born two years after Ed Koch left office. Mamdani has instilled a sense of hope among many New Yorkers excited by his advocacy on behalf of residents who are being priced out of living in New York City. Among his ideas is an ambitious $6 billion proposal to offer New Yorkers free child care. To pay for this and other programs, Mamdani will face a critical choice faced by each of his predecessors, and here the real lessons of the 1980s become more relevant. > With little fanfare, the city embarked on a $5.1 billion, 10-year housing plan that led to the construction or renovation of a staggering 250,000 housing units. Entire neighborhoods, once abandoned, were rebuilt. He can certainly try to find ways to raise taxes and fees on New York's wealthiest citizens and corporations — actions that could easily backfire if they lead to an exodus of wealthy New Yorkers and corporations from the city. This has happened before, and often ends badly. Alternatively, he can put his mayoral muscle behind building New York's economy, attracting corporations and strengthening its tax base. This will involve allying with large employers and attempting to engage them in the civic life of our town. Despite Koch's resentment of "the richies" as he called them, this was the path his administration took, and I would argue it paid off huge for low and middle-income New Yorkers. Most notable, of course, was his historic 10-year housing program that literally changed the face of low and middle-income neighborhoods. Having restored the city's fiscal health through a painful period of post-fiscal crisis austerity, the Koch housing program gets only a single passing mention in "Gods of New York." With little fanfare, the City embarked on a $5.1 billion, 10-year housing plan that led to the construction or renovation of a staggering 250,000 housing units. Entire neighborhoods, once abandoned, were rebuilt. Crime in those once-desolate neighborhoods began to fall. Wayne Barrett, the legendary Village Voice writer and frequent Koch critic, likened the Koch housing program to building the pyramids. The rebuilding of Times Square, another monumental city and state urban reclamation project that helped fuel New York City's economic recovery, does not get mentioned even once, and neither do the Koch administration's strenuous efforts to retain corporations that fled, or threatened to flee, the city. Those oversights stayed with me, as does an overstatement. The book's title suggests the "modern city" we currently live in was born out of the havoc of the 1980s. Yes, the many crises Mahler describes were real and painful and left scars. But away from the headlines, and largely ignored in this otherwise fine book, New York was also quietly making extraordinary strides in addressing its housing abandonment crisis, stabilizing neighborhoods and rebuilding its corporate tax base. It would take years before the public could see the benefits of these efforts, and it is a less sexy story. But if one wants to understand what makes New York tick today, one cannot ignore the monumental policy and planning decisions that would alter our streetscapes and skyline for decades to come. "Gods of the City" needs no postscripts, for we all know how the story ends. Ed Koch is long gone. Having broken onto the scene in the early 1980s, Trump has devolved from a relatively harmless tabloid darling into a malignant force of global dimensions. Reverend Al has mellowed, while Rudy is now a pathetic figure peddling conspiracy theories while fending off his legal troubles. The mafia is also a diminished force in the city, and while income disparities are arguably worse than ever, racial division appears less pronounced today than it was then. In his closing chapter, Mahler writes that "The great working class city was gone, and so was any realistic expectation that it might ever be bound by a single civic culture." I am not sure that's the right takeaway; New York City has always been a city of a tribes struggling to coexist amid a rapidly changing world. "The Gods of New York" is a fascinating read about a raucous period of New York's history. The real lessons behind the economic forces that make New York City tick have yet to be written. ### Mamdani’s Facilitators, Frenemies or Foes URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdanis-facilitators-frenemiesor-foes/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:53.000Z In most elections, voters and political observers pay too little attention to what candidates actually say they will do. Contrary to the eye-rolling conventional wisdom, [campaign rhetoric](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12313?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is [actually quite predictive](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457280802227652?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of what candidates wind up doing in office in most contexts. But while we should pay attention to what candidates promise, it is not the *only* thing we should pay attention to, particularly in local elections like this year's mayoral contest. Even though New York City has a "[strong mayor](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/21/eric-adams-charter-revision-committee-00159306?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" system, mayors are not all-powerful. Formally speaking, cities are creations of state law, and mayors need help from the state legislature to achieve their goals. Both capital and people can move in and out of cities. What happens in Washington directly affects their budgets and more. And cities have internal forces — public employees, media and political groups — that can frustrate mayoral agendas. When we think about a candidate's pledges, we need to put them in context alongside these sometimes countervailing forces and constraints. Polls say that Democratic nominee Zohran Mamdani is [very likely to be the next mayor](https://www.newsweek.com/zohran-mamdanis-mayoral-odds-increase-amid-trump-threat-2113937?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What that means for the city will be, in part, down to his agenda. But how others react to him being mayor will also be important, maybe even more important. Here are some of the forces and groups that will determine, in large part, what effects a Mamdani mayoralty will have on the city. **The state legislature and governor**. Many of Mamdani's policy proposals require state permission. [His proposed tax increases need state legislative authorization. So do his proposals for the MTA](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/28/nyregion/mamdani-policies-economy-housing-buses-childcare.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including his plan for free city buses. So does [his plan to borrow an additional $70 billion to build 200,000 units of affordable housing](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-17/mamdani-seeks-70-billion-of-nyc-debt-to-fund-affordable-housing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). As a state legislator with [some Democratic Socialists of America allies in the Assembly and Senate](https://www.newyorksocialistsinoffice.com/about?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Mamdani is well situated to get some support, but also some strong opposition. [Gov. Kathy Hochul has already come out against local tax increases](https://nypost.com/2025/07/16/us-news/hochul-suggests-she-will-block-zohran-mamdanis-tax-the-rich-plan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — a stance reminiscent of [Gov. Cuomo's opposition to a tax increase on the wealthy](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2014/01/cuomo-de-blasio-hold-firm-on-opposing-funding-plans-for-universal-pre-k/181521/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when Bill de Blasio was newly elected mayor. We should remember: The current mayor, Eric Adams, is himself a former legislator with a number of legislative allies, proof that one's history in the Assembly or Senate is no guarantee of results in Albany. **Wealthy residents and businesses.** Mamdani has proposed two big tax increases, one an income tax rate surcharge for those making more than a million dollars and the other to the state's corporate tax rate. The worries with tax increases are twofold. The first being that, like a tax increase at any level of government, they will depress economic activity. The second, that it may generate exit, or people leaving the city or state — particularly the very high-income residents who fund a highly disproportionate share of New York's generous social programs. The economy is [already shaky](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/13/nyregion/nyc-jobs.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), so the direct harms from tax increases — money out of the pockets of local firms and residents — could be substantial. The worries about exit are real, if debatable. [Research suggests that wealthy individuals do not leave](https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/media/%5Fmedia/pdf/pathways/summer%5F2014/Pathways%5FSummer%5F2014%5FYoungVarner.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at high rates in response to income tax increases. But that research predates the Zoom era, which has already seen increased movement to suburbs. Because the City and State budgets overwhelmingly rely on revenue from an increasingly small number of very highly paid taxpayers — as of 2019, [those earning $1 million or more annually were paying 37% of income-tax revenue](https://cbcny.org/newsroom/new-york-relies-heavily-tax-dollars-millionaires-report-finds?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — and because New York City already has [the highest combined income-tax rates in America](https://cbcny.org/research/new-york-still-top-charts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it doesn't take many people leaving to create negative effects on the economy and to limit the revenue gains from tax increases. And unlike in some cases, the services the increased taxes are supposed to pay for are not aimed at the people paying more — this is intended to be a progressive policy. Even so, risks of tax increases generating exit are just that, risks. The same thing is true about the state corporate tax increase. Mamdani argues that there will be no risk of businesses leaving, since the corporate tax applies any time entities do business in New York — not only to those with offices, employees or headquarters here. Even so, corporate tax increases may yet [discourage local investment by businesses](https://microeconomicinsights.org/measuring-the-impact-of-us-state-taxation-on-business-activity/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Corporations [that sell goods and services to New York firms and customers pay corporate taxes](https://www.eisneramper.com/insights/tax/sales-apportionment-tax-considerations-ny-0221/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). As a result, firms might have an incentive to locate offices and employees in other states to reduce the taxes paid by the businesses that sell them things (and thereby get lower prices). Many big firms have already moved back-office operations out of the city to cheaper locations; one worry is that the tax increase will speed this trend up. Again, these are risks, not certainties. The question of exit is as much social as it is purely economic. If business leaders and/or the local rich feel like things are getting worse (or are going to get worse in the future), or even that they are not receiving sufficient respect, they may leave or not invest, no matter what actual policies are enacted. But the opposite is also true: People may not leave if they are confident in the city's direction, even if taxes go up. Mamdani is clearly aware of the risk and seeking to contain it. When he does things like visit with [the Partnership for New York City](https://pfnyc.org/news/pfnyc-statement-on-july-15-meeting-with-zohran-mamdani?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the alliance of the city's top employers, he is in part trying to convince them to support him, or at least not oppose him so vigorously, in the election. But perhaps more importantly, he's trying to convince them to stay in the city if and when he gets elected. **The budget (and the supporters of current priorities)**. One of the ironies of the debate over Mamdani's tax proposals is that almost everyone who knows anything about city budgets thinks that the city is going to have to raise taxes in the next few years in one way or another, no matter what. The city has to balance its budget annually, but the cost of providing services and paying public employee salaries is increasing more than revenue is. The result is a [huge structural budget deficit](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-12/nyc-may-face-annual-budget-gaps-of-13-billion-dinapoli-says?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — about [$3.6 billion this year, according to the Citizens Budget Commission, projected to rise as high as $10 billion](https://cbcny.org/research/running-empty?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in out years ([the size of the overall budget is $112 billion](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/comments-on-new-york-citys-fiscal-year-2025-adopted-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), [with expenses going up](https://cbcny.org/research/running-empty?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and a [huge city workforce](https://cbcny.org/research/nyc-employee-headcount?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [that is getting raises](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/04/nyc-adams-parental-family-leave-00139328?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And that's not counting federal and state cuts to come (see below). That's [in comparison to the roughly $9 billion annually Mamdani's tax proposals are supposed to raise](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14-aM9DKG337SDMilmfQtLRR-pDwyWSTc/view?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mamdani has pledged to spend the money from his proposed new taxes on new programs — a huge public housing boom, child care for all, paying the MTA to provide free buses and so on. But even if he gets tax increases, he may have to devote the revenue to existing programs just to keep the lights on. He *could* try to do more with less. New York governments [spend much more](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/ny-schools-spend-36k-per-student-highest-in-the-us-yet-test-scores-lag-behind-national-average-heres-why/articleshow/117431198.cms?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=January%2021%2C%202025-,NY%20schools%20spend%20$36K%20per%20student%2C%20highest%20in%20the,behind%20national%20average:%20Here's%20why&text=Despite%20New%20York's%20highest%2Din,the%20reasons%20behind%20this%20paradox.) [to get](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-cost-of-incarceration-per-person-in-new-york-city-skyrockets-to-all-time-high-2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [the same services](https://www.curbed.com/2023/02/nyc-subway-overspending-second-avenue-nyu-transit-costs-project-goldwyn.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (or worse) as most other cities. But making city programs more efficient will require challenging political powerful groups — unions, contractors — including those that are part of Mamdani's coalition. Unless he can convince these groups to support reform, any new revenue will be eaten by old promises. **The bond market**. When the City nearly went broke in 1975, the precipitating event was major banks refusing to underwrite the city's short-term debt. We're a long way off from 1975 — the City doesn't rely on short-term debt for operations, and uses honest accounting rules. But that doesn't mean that a mayor and his budget director can ignore the investor class. If the bond purchasers become skeptical of Mamdani's many promises, particularly in light of pending federal spending cuts, interest rates could rise, making efforts to build infrastructure or housing prohibitively expensive — or, I should say, *more* prohibitively expensive, given that the cost of building in New York is already so high. **The police.** The NYPD have been willing to criticize mayors, often harshly, when they aren't happy. When cops were upset with Bill de Blasio, they famously turned their backs on him at a police funeral. Mamdani has tried to distance himself from his past comments casting aspersions at cops and in support of defunding the police department, but it may be hard to put the genie back in the bottle. We have seen instances around the country of [police pulling back from enforcement in response to public criticism](https://hub.jhu.edu/2016/03/15/baltimore-crime-study-ferguson-effect/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), leading to crime spikes. [Crime rates are key to mayoral popularity](https://people.duke.edu/~nwc8/arnold%5Fcarnes%5Fholding%5Fmayors%5Faccountable.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). How the police react to Mamdani will be key to the success of his mayoralty. **The left.** Mamdani is a part of the city's left, and would surely be considered its new leader. But it's a famously fragmented group that doesn't just fall in line. For Mamdani to succeed as mayor, he will need the continued support of his passionate base, but he also might need or want to make compromises that, to some of his most passionate supporters, look like selling out. For instance, there would be clear political benefits from trying to keep popular Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch. Not only would it help address Mamdani's potential problems with the police, it would keep a potential future political rival on his side. But [parts of the local left have already made arguments that Mamdani should abandon Tisch because of her support for "regressive police policies."](https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/zohran-mamdani-nypd-policing-crime/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Will the local left give Mamdani grace when and if he does things that they don't support? Relatedly, will campus groups take Mamdani's pro-Palestinian politics as a reason to rally on campus, hoping he'll order the police not to help college administrators who have cracked down in recent months? **Donald Trump and Congress**: The [federal budget is going to be brutal on state and city budgets](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/27/nyregion/trump-budget-new-york.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This would be true no matter who the mayor is, but Republican hostility toward New York will likely grow especially intense if the city is led by a man who's perceived as hostile to capitalism and cops. How big the cuts are will determine whether the state is willing to allow the city to pass local tax increases for new programs, or whether it will try to keep any new revenue for itself (and whether it will cut aid for city programs). And it will determine whether the city can afford new programs even if it gets new taxing authority. President Trump is [almost surely looking forward to having Mamdani as a foil](https://www.axios.com/2025/07/03/trump-zohran-mamdani-escalates-attacks-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the [feeling is mutual](https://nypost.com/2025/08/11/us-news/socialist-mamdani-launches-trump-bashing-tour-across-5-nyc-boroughs/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What the president will do is unclear, but there's lots he can do to make life difficult for Mamdani and city residents, from increased ICE activity to sending in the National Guard to limiting federal funds. **The Press**: Mamdani has dominated new media, but the old media is not on board. The [New York Post](https://www.ebay.com/itm/297434860652?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [*loves*](https://x.com/nypost/status/1938948348528017454?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [to](https://www.instagram.com/p/DH8PL3Otk2O/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [hate](https://x.com/nypost/status/1944021736678215770?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [Mamdani](https://www.instagram.com/nypost/p/DMxOO88Nl%5FA/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [The New York Times editorial page is skeptical too](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/16/opinion/new-york-mayor-election-advice.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mayors can certainly succeed without love from the papers, whose influence is a shadow of what it once was — de Blasio was reelected despite substantial skepticism in the press — but the press can make an uphill climb even steeper. Mamdani is unlikely to ever get the Post to stop attacking him, but a hostile reception from other outlets will be costly. — What does all this add up to? The challenge facing Mamdani is not only proposing policies that will work, but convincing many groups, to the extent possible, to row in the same direction — or at least not actively undermine his policy agenda. That's very tricky when groups are pre-wired to react differently to the same stimuli. Mollifying the cops may enrage the local left; getting the budget balanced and the bond market happy may involve revenue increases that the local rich do not like. The City could try to try to stem exit by reducing housing costs — an even bigger part of personal budgets than taxes — by rezoning areas for more housing, but doing so without including set-asides for labor and subsidized housing would enrage all sorts of groups, from construction unions to NIMBYs. And so on. When voters go to the polls on November 4th, and when they try to figure out what the result means for their lives the day after, they should not only focus on what the candidates say, but also on what the rest of the power structure of the city, state and country will feel and do about the election result. The actions of these groups will shape the next four years as much as any campaign promise. ### Free Child Care in Real Life: What It Will Take to Implement URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-it-will-take-to-implement-free-childcare-in-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:53.000Z One of Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani's signature campaign planks was universal, zero-fee child care. As a vision, this pledge is sound: Mamdani is embracing child care properly — not simply as a nice-to-have that helps parents work, but [as essential social infrastructure](https://www.amazon.com/dp/0197799299/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that undergirds the health and strength of the city and even dictates whether families with children can remain here. His universal vision also stands as a welcome contrast to the administrative morass that characterizes America's current [means-tested, welfare-based approach](https://prospect.org/health/will-federal-child-care-support-vanish-again/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to child care support that serves few families well; in New York, for instance, a mere [10% of eligible families](https://www.ffyf.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-New-York-CCDBG-State-Fact-Sheet.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) receive public subsidies. At the same time, Mamdani's child care plan is heavy on goals and light on details. The success or failure of his vision will rest on policy and governance decisions that should be under discussion now. In a video [on his website](https://www.zohranfornyc.com/platform?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Mamdani lays out certain basic building blocks for his program: opening centers using city space and finding opportunities to co-locate them within existing educational institutions; easing regulatory burdens; boosting the workforce by ensuring all early childhood educators get paid a living wage on par with Department of Education-employed teachers; and helping existing child care providers stay in operation through steps like subsidizing commercial rent and guaranteeing on-time payment from the City. Generally speaking, these ideas have good research backing and good precedent from other localities. For instance, cities in Montana and Indiana have [repurposed municipal spaces](https://hechingerreport.org/old-school-buildings-give-new-life-to-child-care-centers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to improve child care supply, while Washington, D.C.'s efforts to create pay parity between child care and K-12 practitioners have [had a measurably positive impact on their early childhood workforce](https://www.mathematica.org/projects/washington-dc-early-childhood-educator-pay-equity-fund-impact-and-cost-effectiveness-study?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The challenge is that New York City's population is roughly equal to the combined populations of D.C., Indiana and Montana. As Mayor Bill de Blasio learned during what ended up being a successful rollout of universal pre-K (more on that in a moment), there are major questions and tensions that come with implementing a policy of this magnitude and complexity. > A fragmented system with large numbers of informal care providers who don't even have to tell the City they exist poses a governance challenge. Start with the relationship between child care providers and the Department of Education. Child care is offered by a diverse range of individuals and groups. In addition to licensed centers operated by nonprofits, for-profit companies and community-based organizations, there are licensed family child care homes and large amounts of care provided — especially for infants and toddlers — by family, friend or neighbor caregivers, as well as stay-at-home parents. While no hard numbers exist for New York City specifically, [national-level data suggest](https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2024/2024112.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that only half of 1-to-2-year-olds have a regular weekly care arrangement outside the home, meaning there's a lot of informal care happening. A fragmented system with large numbers of informal care providers who don't even have to tell the City they exist poses a governance challenge. Mechanisms will need to be established or adapted in order to create smooth on-ramps for different types of providers who do not have experience interfacing with the City — and for the City to remit payments and ensure a measure of accountability. If not designed thoughtfully, one can easily see a clash between compliance-minded City administrators and autonomy-minded providers that ends up hurting the efficacy of the program. At the same time, better contracting practices must be established to restore trust with existing providers who have struggled with [persistently late payments](https://gothamist.com/news/city-still-behind-on-paying-nyc-child-care-providers-years-after-promising-rapid-fix?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) under the Adams administration. This is especially important for licensed family child care providers — those who care for unrelated children in their homes, a type of care that [has been shrinking rapidly](https://childcareta.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/addressing%5Fdecreasing%5Ffcc%5Fproviders%5Frevised%5Ffinal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — who will likely need stronger networks of support in order to remain open, much less expand to meet the needs of a universal system. Similarly, places like D.C. have had to wrestle with difficult tensions with regards to workforce policies. "Pay parity" comes with a big question mark around credentials: Is the expectation that a toddler teacher only gets paid the same as a first-grade teacher if the toddler teacher has a bachelor's degree? Either side of that answer has its proponents and detractors, which makes for messy politics once you get unions, advocates and other interest groups involved (indeed, divergent payment rates are [already a source of intra-sector conflict](https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-day-cares-struggle-to-retain-staff-paid-less-than-doe-employed-child-care-workers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). Workforce issues loom large over any universal child care plan because, due to adult-to-child ratio limits, child care supply can only scale as fast as educators are available. In New York, for example, the ratio for children between six weeks and 18 months of age is 1:4 — and building up a well-trained roster of educators takes time. > The valley between a policy vision and effective implementation, however, is a graveyard of good ideas. These considerations, in turn, generate additional questions: How fast can universal child care realistically be achieved without sacrificing quality? Will the City impose some sort of profit cap in order to ensure that [investor-backed for-profit chains](https://www.the74million.org/zero2eight/the-end-user-is-a-dollar-sign-its-not-a-child-how-private-equity-and-shareholders-are-reshaping-american-child-care?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) don't siphon off an undue amount of taxpayer money? Given that 40% of the city's child care workforce is made up of [immigrants](https://hechingerreport.org/americas-child-care-system-relies-on-immigrants-without-them-it-could-collapse?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [some percentage of whom are undocumented](https://immigrationforum.org/article/explainer-immigrants-critical-role-in-the-u-s-childcare-workforce-and-in-increasing-labor-force-participation-rates?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), how can the system be truly inclusive? And of course, there's the matter of cost. As Bradley Tusk and Jamie Rubin [wrote recently](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-zohran-mamdani-could-succeed-as-mayor) for Vital City*,* "Even at the estimated $5 billion annual price tag, universal child care can be paid for within the current City budget; but it may mean other priorities are less well funded." The good news is that Mamdani doesn't have to start from scratch: He and his team can look both to the City's universal pre-K precedent and to sophisticated policy analyses and plans that have been created over the past few years. As journalist Bryce Covert wrote in an extensive [New York Magazine retrospective](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/bill-de-blasio-universal-prek-ten-years-later.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on the universal pre-K rollout, the effort required a Herculean amount of resources in terms of personnel, time and political capital: > *Shortly after de Blasio won the general election, he created a working group of early-childhood experts … By his swearing-in in 2014, the group was meeting as often as ten times a week. "His mandate was, 'How fast can you do it?'" \[policy advisor Ursulina\] Ramirez said. At first, the group pushed for three years, which seemed "aggressive but also achievable," Ramirez said. But de Blasio decided they had to go faster, launching in the fall of that year and achieving full universality by September 2015\. Most of the staff would, at one point or another, question that timeline and whether they could really pull it off. "He was just very dead set on it," Ramirez said. The going joke was that the team could have anything it wanted except for more time. ... There were five core pieces to getting the program up and running in time: securing the funding, building the capacity, hiring the teachers, ensuring high quality, and putting kids in seats.* Mamdani doesn't even have to wait until his swearing-in. Last year, the advocacy group New Yorkers United For Child Care produced [an extensive phased plan](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/64989b0dc1b2fa02e6188180/t/673c98333262f44fce460451/1732024373382/NYUC+UPC+Full+Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for achieving universal, no-fee child care, some of which is already coming to fruition in the form of the $10 million ["2K" pilot](https://www.newyorkfamily.com/nyc-budget-2k-child-care-vouchers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the City Council recently authorized. Also last year, the think tank 5BORO put forth a [policy roadmap](https://fiveboro.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Report%5FInvesting-in-Families-and-Our-Future.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that, while not going all the way to universal, offers a series of concrete recommendations that map onto Mamdani's stated principles. For instance, 5BORO details ways to streamline licensing and regulatory systems so providers have an easier time opening and hiring staff. If he taps those that have already been deep in thinking through the implementation weeds, Mamdani will have a much greater possibility of success. Truly universal, free-for-families child care has the potential to be transformative not only for New York City's children and parents, but the city writ large — to say nothing of setting a benchmark for the rest of the nation. The valley between a policy vision and effective implementation, however, is a graveyard of good ideas. If Mamdani wants his signature achievement, he's going to need to start fleshing out his plan sooner rather than later. ### When Buses and Subways Were Free URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/when-buses-and-subways-were-free/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:53.000Z Some have applauded and some have scoffed at Zohran Mamdani's proposal to provide free bus rides to make the city a little more affordable, an idea that would cost the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (meaning, taxpayers and straphangers) some $600-$800 million a year. The idea is not without precedent: Some buses and subways were free during and just after the 2003 blackout, Superstorm Sandy and the COVID pandemic, among other times. And cities around the country have experimented with the idea. But there was a long-ago New York City episode when the buses and the subways were free not because of an unforeseen disaster, but because of an idealistic plan thrown together by the City and State. Albeit it was only for two nights, one year apart, and for an entirely different reason. But it gives us insight into what can happen when public transit no longer requires a swipe or a tap (or in those days, a token), and how the best-intentioned plans can go very wrong, even comically so, when they unfold in New York City. On New Year's Eve 1984, no fares were collected on the subways, buses and commuter lines from 8 p.m. until 8 a.m. the next day. The metal gates near the token booths in subway stations stood open, and the bored clerks looked on as thousands of riders streamed through. The turn of the following year, the buses and subways were again free, but the commuter lines opted out of the plan. That was it. For every New Year's Eve, since it's been pay-to-ride in the city and region. The rationale for the free rides was to cut down on drunk driving accidents on the drunk-drivingest night of the year. Naturally, the decision by Metro-North, the Long Island Railroad and NJ Transit not to participate in the second year undercut this goal, as the suburbs were where most such accidents occurred. The program's origins are fascinating to contemplate in the context of today's somewhat dysfunctional city and state governments, as are the reasons it ended. Basically, it was seen as a disaster, with bands of revelers turning the trains and buses into rolling New Year's Eve parties and engaging in all kinds of mayhem. The Daily News reported that the Long Island Railroad "was plagued with vandalism, including broken windows and slashed upholstery, littering and drunken joy riding." And the MTA, then as always strapped for cash and against the program from the start, refused to lose what it said was $1 million for a third free New Year's Eve. "The ridership was much heavier than anyone anticipated," remembered Joseph Smith, at the time assistant general manager for the Manhattan division of the Department of Buses for the MTA. "People would go bar-hopping on the bus. You have to remember, there was no Uber back then." While Smith doesn't recall any specific vandalism, or at least any more than usual for the time, he noted, "We did have a lot of dirty buses." > Though largely forgotten, to New Yorkers of a certain age those two distant holiday nights of open gates remain a particularly visceral memory, both bad and good. The plan was thrown together at the last minute with enthusiastic buy-in from then-Gov. Mario M. Cuomo, Mayor Edward I. Koch and Carol Bellamy, president of the City Council. All were Democrats, and while it was rare that they all agreed, they apparently worked together better than the three officials who today inhabit those roles, also Democrats (well, one independent). "We had different views, but we still tried to work with each other, and find some area of common agreement," Bellamy told me in a recent interview. MTA Chairman Robert Kiley, a key architect of the remarkable resurgence of the then-graffiti-slathered subways, resisted the idea but ultimately bowed to pressure. He was able to reach [11 of the 14 MTA board members during Christmas week](https://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/28/nyregion/free-new-year-s-eve-fare-set-on-subways-and-buses.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and poll them, and despite concerns about the loss of revenue, they agreed. The news was met with pun-happy joy by the newspapers. "A Token but Sober Gift," wrote The New York Times, which dismissed the MTA's financial concerns. "Token of city's love on New Year's," headlined the Daily News. At the time, groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) were very much in the news, as was federal legislation to make the driving age 21\. But in hindsight, Bellamy wondered about the seriousness of the problem in New York City, especially among young New Yorkers who generally didn't get behind the wheel until their early 20s. She recalled, for example, putting extra money in the police department budget to teach raised-in-the-city cadets to drive. Were the free rides on New Year's Eve a bid to curry favor with voters by giving them something? To placate MADD? Or perhaps the aim was to mitigate the sting of a fare increase to 90 cents from 75 cents that kicked in the same night? (In other New Year's Eve 1984 news, Brooklyn and Queens broke free of 212 and got their own 718 area code.) "I don't think anyone thought, 'Oh Gosh, people are going to vote for us because we gave them 12 hours of free subway rides," Bellamy said. On the other hand, she warmed to the newspapers' suggestion that it was a gift to New Yorkers. "It was New Year's Eve," she said. "It was one of those things, where you could say – 'Hey, boy, we really did something here.' There's nothing wrong with that. You occasionally look for something that actually makes people feel good about themselves. Not just about you, but about themselves as well." In the end, [not everyone felt good about it](https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/21/nyregion/mta-votes-free-rides-for-holiday.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Especially those cops who had to bust the drunks and those subway workers who had to clean up the mess. The MTA said there were 55 felonies aboard subway trains and in subway stations and 29 felony arrests in 1984-into-85, as opposed to 33 felonies and 15 felony arrests the year before, according to The Times*.* '"There were a fair number of groups who got on trains with no particular destination other than to ride the train as a place to have a party," said Bruce McIver, head of the Long Island Railroad. Of the 225 trains operating that night, 100 were delayed because of incidents, including 53 that required police assistance, 43 cars suffered interior damage, such as ripped seats, and 31 stations were vandalized, The Times said. > I benefited immensely from that New Year's Eve gift, even if it wasn't meant for me. In 1985, William Murphy, an MTA spokesman, noted that the higher crime rate the year before could have been partly due to the high ridership. ''There was more crime last year when the fares were free, but there were also more people and we don't know how to match it up,'' he said. After the slimmed-down repeat in 1985, Kiley wouldn't budge in 1986, and everyone who rode that New Year's Eve had to pay (in theory at least). The idea cropped up a few more times later in the '80s, but was shot down, and has since faded from memory. Other world capitals still do it, such as Paris – where the Metro is free on New Year's Eve and early the next day. (Although, as usual, it doesn't run all night.) What are the lessons for Mamdani's bus plan, if any? Several transit professionals and Bellamy said they were against the free buses — "I don't support giving away things for free," she said — but no one believes bus riders will go bonkers and vandalize the vehicles and turn them into rolling parties. Indeed, pilot programs have shown that free or reduced fare buses [result in fewer attacks on drivers](https://thechiefleader.com/stories/to-decrease-assaults-on-bus-operators-eliminate-fares-twu-mayoral-candidate-say,53789?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). At the same time, it seems clear that even if the fare is seemingly modest, removing it will bring far more riders to the system. Though largely forgotten, to New Yorkers of a certain age those two distant holiday nights of open gates remain a particularly visceral memory, both bad and good. I'm one of them. I was a freshman in college home for the holidays in Park Slope. That night I took the D train from 7th Avenue to Avenue U — "Avenue next!" the conductor would announce — to meet a girl who was a senior at my old high school. We rode the train to Greenwich Village, where I took her to dinner at Pizzeria Uno. Then we subwayed all the way back to her apartment, where we toasted to 1985 with some random bottle from her parent's liquor cabinet. Later, I rode the trains — still packed — to Cobble Hill to meet two friends, brothers. They were nowhere to be found despite our plans, and with cell phones long in the future, I could only sit miserably on their stoop in the cold and hope for the best. I gave up after an hour and walked to the IRT station in the St. George Hotel. I had an egg sandwich at the counter in the lobby, chatting with another kid I'd known from high school whose name I've forgotten. Homebound revelers and workers were all around us, including off-duty and clothed topless dancers from the notorious and grim nearby "Club Wild Fyre." Then I took the IRT from the St. George to Grand Army Plaza, walked home, and fell asleep as the sky lightened. So I benefited immensely from that New Year's Eve gift, even if it wasn't meant for me. After all, I was just like those raised-in-the-city cops: I didn't know how to drive. ### What’s Behind Baltimore’s Drastic Reduction in Violence URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/whats-behind-baltimores-drastic-reduction-in-violence/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:53.000Z At the end of 2021, Baltimore's streets told a grim story — candlelight vigils in the cold, police tape in familiar corners, a weary city in its [seventh straight year with more than 300 homicides](https://www.cbsnews.com/baltimore/news/baltimore-city-records-300-homicides-for-seventh-consecutive-year/?utm&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Alongside St. Louis, it was regularly cited as the most dangerous city in America, with a homicide rate 10 times higher than New York City's, even amid its COVID-era surge in violence. Three-and-a-half years later, Baltimore is making news again, this time for *reducing* violence. In 2024, Baltimore saw its lowest homicide toll in a decade. The first half of 2025 closed with the fewest killings ever recorded in the city. Behind the decline is Baltimore's most effective iteration of a cohesive strategy to prevent and reduce violence — a deliberate shift from reacting to shootings to actively managing the dynamics that drive the city's most lethal violence, built on identifying the small number of people most likely to shoot or be shot in Baltimore, delivering them a clear message of support and accountability, backing those words with meaningful services and focusing law enforcement precisely on people who continue to commit violence. It's the first time Baltimore has built systems with the staying power to reduce gun violence, not just endure it as a crisis. Known as the Group Violence Reduction Strategy (GVRS), the city's integrated framework for managing serious violence is not just bending Baltimore's violence curve — it has begun to reshape how the city manages and governs. **How we got here** Baltimore's current strategy grew out of a pilot launched in early 2022 in the Western District, the city's most violent district and one of the most dangerous in the nation, a part of the city that will be familiar to viewers of "The Wire." By midyear, violence in the Western District declined faster than anywhere else — an early sign, amid persistently high citywide numbers, that[ something might be starting to shift.](https://www.thebaltimorebanner.com/community/criminal-justice/gvrs-data-gun-violence-data-west-baltimore-XITLPKVQXBAZPH7L3NWJJMJQDU/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Baltimore has tried versions of a group violence reduction strategy before: Operation Safe Neighborhoods in the late 1990s and Operation Ceasefire in 2014 (not to be confused with the later community-led Baltimore Ceasefire 365 movement). Built on the same theory, each showed early promise before ultimately unraveling amid missing components, fractured leadership and poor coordination. This time, on the third attempt, city leaders set out to avoid those pitfalls, working with a team from the University of Pennsylvania's Crime and Justice Policy Lab (CJP) to design, launch and scale an integrated and sustainable approach. To ensure an unbiased evaluation, CJP brought in two outside researchers — Max Kapustin of Cornell University and Aaron Chalfin of the University of Pennsylvania (both Vital City contributors) — who were unaffiliated with implementation or city funding. Their independent[ evaluation](https://crimejusticelab.org/publication/analyzing-the-impact-of-baltimores-group-violence-reduction-strategy-in-the-western-district/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), completed in early 2024, confirmed that the Western District's reductions were a direct product of the pilot. In the strategy's first 18 months, homicides and nonfatal shootings fell by roughly one-third, with no rise in low-level arrests or signs that violence was simply being pushed to other parts of the city. The city began expanding the new GVRS beyond the Western District in early 2023\. Not long after, Baltimore began to see historic citywide declines. By the end of 2024, the city recorded 201 homicides — the first time the annual toll fell below 300 since 2014\. The first half of 2025 saw just 68 killings, the city's lowest six-month total ever. As of mid-August, homicides are down roughly 25% year-to-date, on pace for another record low. Plenty of other cities have seen post-COVID declines, but Baltimore's drop stands out for its scale and consistency. We can't credit this strategy for all of it, but evidence strongly suggests that it drove the Western District reductions — and the broader citywide drop closely tracks with its expansion. From our front-row vantage, it's clear something is working in Baltimore. It would be a mistake not to examine what's driving the change — and what lessons other cities might draw from it. **The theory behind the results** The strategy in Baltimore builds on decades of practice and research often referred to as[ "focused deterrence"](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/no-program-is-a-panacea-the-fate-of-focused-deterrence) — a term that has been applied to so many different approaches that it's lost much of its clarity. While the policing component relies on deterrence, the strategy also mobilizes community leadership, applies procedural justice in how city agencies engage with residents and partners closely with outreach workers and service providers. Measuring the true impact of strategies like this one is challenging. Because they operate at a community or city level, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are often infeasible, making causality hard to determine. [A 2021 survey](https://cjexpertpanel.org/surveys/reducing-gun-violence/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showed that crime researchers generally believe the strategy reduces gun violence, but the[ gap in rigorous research](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/cl2.1051?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at that time left lingering doubts. Some of that uncertainty may be out of date, as the evidence base around GVRS has grown considerably in the last few years. Recent studies — including several RCTs — show increasingly consistent evidence of impact. Evaluations in cities like[ Oakland](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022427818821716?icid=int.sj-abstract.similar-articles.1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ Stockton](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12682?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, have demonstrated that this approach can produce substantial violence reductions. Still, one of the most enduring reasons for skepticism is how rarely cities get implementation right — and sustain it. The theory only matters if a city can translate it into disciplined, day-in, day-out practice — something few have managed to do. The "[Boston Miracle](https://cwinship.scholars.harvard.edu/sites/g/files/omnuum1506/files/cwinship/files/pulling%5Flevers%5Fskeptic%5F-%5Fsecond%5Fedition%5Fupdate.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" of the mid-1990s was the first widely recognized example of an effective GVRS. But even Boston eventually stepped away, saw violence rise and later returned to the strategy. Baltimore's previous attempt collapsed on multiple fronts: leaning too heavily on enforcement, failing to deliver services and, ultimately, damaging community trust. **The architecture of a turnaround** A key starting point we and others built into Baltimore's approach: GVRS was never meant as a one-off program, but as a citywide systems change. The goal was to move away from reactive and fragmented government toward focused, coordinated action across partners working on violence intervention and reduction. Scaling from a single-district proof of concept to a citywide strategy forced the city to manage and govern differently — building durable systems, scaling capacity and earning legitimacy through sustained coordination and deep institutional change. The following elements define that shift — a suite of complementary and reinforcing changes to government operations. Baltimore conducted a data- and intelligence-driven analysis to understand who was most directly affected by gun violence — as both victims and suspects. Across districts, the findings were consistent: fewer than 2% of residents were linked to up to 75% of shootings and homicides. Many were older men (over 30) with extensive criminal histories, often appearing as both victims and suspects. The violence didn't stem so much from drug markets as from retaliatory disputes among criminally active groups. In short, a small number of high-risk individuals — shaped by shifting group dynamics — were at the center of harm, both experiencing and inflicting it. This shared understanding helped align city agencies, law enforcement and community partners around a single focus — the people at the center of the violence. The city established a cycle of real-time management structures to identify those at very highest risk and coordinate responses as violence unfolds. These include the Baltimore Police Department's weekly shooting reviews — law enforcement-only meetings where investigators, analysts and proactive enforcement units assess shootings, flag retaliation risks and identify those needing immediate attention. State and federal partners join to align investigations and prosecutions. Intelligence from those meetings flows intothe Mayor's Office for Neighborhood Safety and Engagement's (MONSE) coordination meetings, where front-line workers from law enforcement, community violence intervention (CVI) — the city's network of credible outreach workers and service providers — and community partnerscome together to share information, align on cases and develop action plans with the explicit goal of intervening to save lives. These meetings are carefully structured and decision-oriented, designed to translate intelligence into targeted action. This intelligence-driven focus triggers a tightly organized intervention to deliver the strategy's core message: the community wants the violence to stop; help is available; and if the violence continues, consequences will be swift and certain. Baltimore built the capacity for custom notifications — these are small, face-to-face meetings that take place shortly after someone surfaces as a likely shooter or victim. Unlike the large, infrequent "call-ins" other cities rely on, custom notifications make the message personal, immediate and hard to ignore. Each intervention team is a deliberate partnership of authority, legitimacy and help — typically a law enforcement and city representative, a service provider and a credible community "moral voice" such as residents directly affected by violence, members of the clergy and other trusted leaders who speak with authenticity and moral credibility. The power of that message rests on the city's investment in outreach and services. Baltimore built a new partnership with Youth Advocate Programs to engage older men (25 and up) while bolstering Roca's long-standing work with high-risk young men and boys ages 16–24\. These professional outreach teams work exclusively with the small number of people at highest risk, offering a range of supports: relocation, stipends, housing assistance, trauma counseling and intensive mentorship. This is CVI fully integrated with system partners — not a parallel effort, but the infrastructure that makes an effective violence reduction strategy possible. At the core of the strategy is trust: in the messenger, in the consistency of the offer and in the integrity of the system behind it. That trust takes time to build, and can be lost quickly. These support structures set the stage for enforcement. When someone rejects the community's message and continues to engage in violence, the strategy shifts to focused enforcement and prosecution. Police Commissioner Richard Worley, building on the groundwork laid by former Commissioner Michael Harrison, prioritizes violence-focused precision policing and partnership, rejecting outdated and harmful practices such as "zero-tolerance" and indiscriminate sweeps. That focus may sound simple, but it rests on deep reforms inside BPD, which is integrating intelligence, outreach, enforcement and investigations in ways it has never done before. When done this way, enforcement can actually make services more effective — it's difficult to focus on change if you remain at immediate risk of violence. The fact that the evaluation of the strategy found no increase in arrests suggests that BPD was serious about restraint and precision in their operations. **Keeping the system honest** Many cities stumble because their systems are fragile, ad hoc or simply nonexistent. Baltimore confronted this by intentionally designing meetings to foster consistency, trust and focus among partners who had rarely shared the same table. Principal leaders in City Hall, BPD and the State's Attorney's Office all committed to meeting monthly to review performance, make decisions and keep the strategy on course — exhibiting strong leadership even amidst occasional public disagreements. City leadership has also exercised discipline. Mayor Brandon Scott made a rare political choice: resisting calls to expand too quickly, insisting, "We're going to do this the right way." In a city impatient for change, that patience was a gamble — and it's paying off. All of this raises a major question: Can other cities succeed at this type of violence reduction without the political leadership and institutional commitment seen in Baltimore? Both are essential — without them, a strategy rarely survives. But as more cities show results, we now have a clearer picture of the[ specific capacities needed to reduce violence](https://crimejusticelab.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Key-Capacity-Brief-FINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We also see more clearly how those capacities can be built. Some cities may not be ready now, but capacity can be developed — and with the right analyses, leaders can be educated and aligned around the sustained work the strategy demands. Today, the strategy is active in five of Baltimore's nine police districts, covering roughly two-thirds of shootings and homicides, with the strategy's reforms already shaping government citywide. Shooting reviews now inform police and prosecutors' priorities, and the mayor's office is engaging community and service partners more cohesively. The plan is to scale citywide by early 2026. There's still work to do. Group conflicts persist. Progress is uneven. But the drop in gun violence is hard to ignore — and it's no accident. Baltimore didn't get lucky; it got serious.Andin doing so, it's helping to rewrite the playbook for how other cities can make lasting reductions in violence possible. ### Zohran Mamdani’s Uphill Battle on Public Grocery Stores URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdanis-uphill-battle-on-public-grocery-stores/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:54.000Z Zohran Mamdani took the city by storm with a handful of catchy policies in his improbable — and ultimately successful — bid to win the Democratic mayoral primary. Promising to freeze rent, offer fast and free bus service and open a network of city-run grocery stores, Mamdani deserves praise for elevating affordability as the centerpiece of his campaign. Now that he's won the primary and appears well-positioned to win in November, Mamdani's campaign promises demand close scrutiny. After all, transitioning from lofty campaign promises to the nitty-gritty of governing has [bedeviled](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/nyregion/east-coast-storm-brings-snow-and-disruptions-to-the-new-york-region.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [far more experienced operators](https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/nyregion/30snow.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than Mamdani. As an academic researcher whose scholarship focuses on internet and utility policy, Mamdani's pledge to open a handful of city-run grocery stores immediately caught my eye. Cities rarely, if ever, enter a line of business in direct competition with the private sector. But this is exactly what Mamdani's city-owned grocery stores would do. They would compete with [small businesses](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/29/opinion/lina-khan-mamdani-democrats-small-business.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) like bodegas and fruit vendors; local chains like Gristedes; apps like Amazon; gig platforms like Instacart; delivery services like FreshDirect and major brands like Wegmans and Trader Joe's. As others have [observed](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/23/opinion/mamdani-grocery-stores-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the grocery business in New York City is already competitive. Coupled with [razor-thin margins](https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2025/07/public-grocery-stores-new-york-mamdani/683388/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), even a nonprofit city-owned grocery store would have little room to struggle. The slightest under-performance would be greatly magnified under these conditions and could doom an outlet, or the entire network, and would likely necessitate a face-saving bailout to stay afloat. This is how things have [played out](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2025/07/18/city-owned-grocery-stores-crime-funding/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the handful of other large cities that have experimented with municipally-owned groceries. Indeed, a city-backed grocery venture in Kansas City, Missouri, [recently closed](https://www.kcur.org/news/2025-08-12/kansas-city-grocery-store-sun-fresh-closed-despite-18-million-city-investments-food-desert?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) after [years of struggle](https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/in-depth-millions-invested-in-linwood-shopping-center-why-is-sun-fresh-market-failing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The city, with a population one-seventeenth that of New York City, ended up investing $18 million in this failed foray. ([The rural story of government investment in grocery stores is a bit more promising](https://stateline.org/2024/03/01/the-lifeblood-of-the-community-states-invest-to-save-rural-grocery-stores/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but that's likely because the economic conditions there are much different from those in cities, where there are many more grocery options.) > When a city chooses to enter a market dominated by private companies, it is exceedingly difficult for the government-run venture to compete on a level playing field with entrenched rivals. Alternatively, a city-run grocery could try to out-compete its private counterparts by subsidizing artificially low prices. This would likely be [ruinous](https://news.northeastern.edu/2025/07/02/government-grocery-stores-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for competition and create significant financial strain for the City, requiring it to keep pumping money into the venture to keep prices at a predatory level, all while having to pay the myriad other costs — employee wages and benefits, marketing, etc. — associated with running a business. In short, when a city chooses to enter a complicated economic market dominated by private companies, it is exceedingly difficult for the government-run venture to compete on a level playing field with entrenched rivals. It will either fail to measure up (because government is not as nimble as its competitors) or it will seek to tilt the playing field in its favor by siphoning taxpayer funds to prop up its business. These dynamics have been evident in one of the only other instances where cities have sought to compete with private providers in the name of affordability: broadband. Municipal broadband remains rare because high-speed internet access is almost universally available, especially in large, densely populated cities like New York City. Nevertheless, a few hundred small cities have chosen to deploy their own internet infrastructure to deliver low-cost services to residents. In many cases, these [projects struggle](https://broadbandexpanded.com/posts/nycplantestimony?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the very start, encountering higher-than-expected construction costs and vigorous responses from incumbent providers, who aggressively seek to protect their customer base. In addition, because the broadband market is already mature, with lots of different options from different providers, it is difficult for new entrants to stand out from the crowd. As such, when presented with a new offering from a city, even if it is slightly faster or cheaper than a private offering, many people choose to stick with their current ISP. Higher deployment costs and lower-than-expected revenues create significant financial friction, making it difficult for most city-owned internet systems to stay afloat without continuous subsidization. This dynamic has [played out in many cities](https://broadbandexpanded.com/blog?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#category=muni-broadband) across the country and is evident in New York State. Many public broadband networks have benefited immensely from [generous subsidies](https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/jamestown-ny-receives-funding-broadband-infrastructure?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), giving them a theoretical head start to becoming self-sufficient. But even with these subsidies, public broadband projects in the state are struggling. One need only look to Erie County, which is facing [significant obstacles](https://www.wgrz.com/article/news/local/only-20-miles-of-fiber-cable-have-been-installed-for-400-mile-erienet-broadband-system-officials-cite-onerous-paperwork-as-the-cause/71-128dfdc6-dd33-4fab-b2c7-df27d09eeb27?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as it tries to build a public fiber network despite benefiting from [$34 million](https://www3.erie.gov/environment/ARP%5FInvestments%5FStrengthen%5FErieCounty?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in grants to help it get started. > A few hundred small cities have chosen to deploy their own internet infrastructure to deliver low-cost services to residents. In many cases, these projects have struggled. In New York City, local officials have long been seduced by the idea of launching a city-owned broadband network. At first, the City built one — just for public safety purposes. But that network, NYCWiN, encountered substantial [financial and operational](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/nyregion/nyc-gps-wireless.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) challenges. For example, the network [cost far more to build and maintain](https://nypost.com/2019/06/21/nyc-tech-agency-failed-to-oversee-wireless-network-report/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than initially estimated, and it [crashed](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/nyregion/wireless-network-crash-gps-rollover.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at one point because its operators failed to upgrade the underlying software. It was eventually [decommissioned](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/office-of-the-mayor/nycwin-incident-assessment.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). A [partnership](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/100-25/mayor-adams-chief-technology-officer-fraser-t-mobile-major-carrier-city-new?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with T-Mobile replaced this doomed effort. Undeterred, the de Blasio administration devised an even more ambitious idea: a [citywide public fiber network](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cto/downloads/internet-master-plan/NYC%5FIMP%5F1.7.20%5FFINAL-2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The price tag? At least $2 billion. Why would the city spend this much money to deliver something that was already available from multiple private providers? The rationale was affordability. But there was [little evidence](https://www.cityandstateny.com/sponsors/sponsor-content/2020/02/sticking-to-new-yorks-model-for-achieving-universal-broadband/176372/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the proposed network would drive down prices and connect more people, or that it would be able to sustain itself, especially in a competitive marketplace. Shortly after taking office, Mayor Eric Adams pulled the plug on de Blasio's plan and shifted the city's resources to providing subsidies to low-income households. This program, Big Apple Connect, has been [successful](https://nychajournal.nyc/over-100000-nycha-households-have-enrolled-in-big-apple-connects-free-internet/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), bringing well over 100,000 New Yorkers online. Broadband and groceries are very different businesses, but the lessons to be learned from city-run initiatives in both sectors are valuable and timely as Mamdani's proposals are being examined more closely. City-run broadband networks that struggle usually face two choices when trying to determine next steps: seek subsidies from a local government or exit the market. In an even larger and more competitive market like New York City, a government-led business will likely find it very hard, if not impossible, to stay afloat without significant additional government resources to prop it up. This raises the question of whether it is worth it for the City to gamble with precious taxpayer funds or whether it should just provide subsidies directly to residents to help them pay their bills. The latter might be even more attractive now given the significant pullback in federal resources by President Donald Trump. The best ideas don't always involve building something new. Sometimes, they involve making the most of what's already there. Instead of trying to rewire the economy, the next mayor should realize that many affordability issues can be effectively addressed via subsidies and partnerships with private providers. Oftentimes, the most effective way to help people isn't by owning the store, it's by helping them afford what's already on the shelf. ### New York City's Catholic Church at a Crossroads URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-catholic-church-at-a-crossroads/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:32.000Z At St. Nicholas of Tolentine, a Gothic cathedral a few blocks west of the Grand Concourse in the Bronx, the doorway was adorned this Spring in gold and white bunting, as doorways were at Catholic churches from Rockaway to Riverdale, to celebrate the shocking selection in May of an American pope. At St. Nicholas, where Masses are celebrated in Vietnamese, English and Spanish, the pride is particularly personal: Robert Prevost, the new Pope Leo XIV, is an Augustinian, a member of the same order, or subset of Catholicism, as the priests who sponsor Villanova University — along with schools and parishes in 50 countries around the world — and who have run this sole New York parish since it was founded 120 years ago. Back then, the neighborhood was bursting with Irish immigrants. Now, the families of delivery drivers and healthcare workers, restaurant employees, civil servants and shop owners arrive from Congo, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Honduras, Ecuador and Venezuela, joining the children of Vietnamese refugees who were resettled in the neighborhood in the 1980s. On a recent Sunday, many slipped prayer cards with a portrait of the new pope into their pockets before stepping out onto the broad apron in front of the church for gossip, taquitos and ice cream from the Mr. Softee truck. The naming of Leo XIV, who [has signaled that he'll put the needs of migrants at the center of his mission](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/09/pope-leo-shares-predecessors-concerns-over-us-immigration-policy-brother-says?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), arrives at a critical juncture for New York City Catholicism. Cardinal Timothy Dolan, who delivered the opening prayer at President Trump's 2025 inauguration, is expected to be replaced in the next few months. He submitted his resignation upon turning 75 in February, as is required by church policy. Cardinals can be asked to stay past 75, but that is unlikely in Dolan's case, according to David Gibson, director of the Center on Religion and Culture at Fordham University and a close Vatican watcher. He expects the new pope to name a Spanish-speaking cardinal — and one focused on poverty, migration and labor issues — to lead the nation's second largest and traditionally most influential diocese, home to 2.8 million faithful. While Dolan has occasionally spoken out on poverty, migration and labor, he is more frequently focused on opposition to abortion, maintaining Catholic identity and cultivating donors, many of whom skew conservative. He is not a vocal advocate for social justice, unlike his counterparts in Los Angeles, San Diego, El Paso, Newark and Washington D.C. The archdiocese that Dolan's successor will lead is under tremendous strain and its immigrant members are frightened. It is belatedly facing the financial fallout of sex abuse settlements dating back to the 1930s — something other dioceses dealt with years ago — and is in court with an insurer that is balking at the [$859 million](https://www.nydailynews.com/2024/09/16/insurer-locked-in-battle-with-ny-archdiocese-over-abuse-payments-sues-ags-office/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) it will have to pay. In part to fund the settlements, the archdiocese sold its headquarters at 1011 First Avenue to a luxury [real estate developer](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2024/10/14/vanbarton-sets-sights-on-another-office-to-resi-conversion/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) late last year for $100 million. Meanwhile, the Trump administration's evisceration of federal funding for a wide swath of social services cost the church's charitable arm [millions of dollars](https://pix11.com/news/local-news/nyc-nonprofits-say-theyve-lost-millions-of-dollars-in-federal-funding/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in taxpayer-funded contracts for everything from migrant services to summer meals for school kids. That's against a broader backdrop in which Mass attendance is dropping, parish schools continue to close in neighborhoods that are no longer as overwhelmingly Catholic as in previous generations and where rising tuition puts the schools out of reach for poor and working-class families. Each school and parish closure produces a wealth of real estate, which the diocese needs to decide what to do with. Some see wisdom in selling the properties to fund the church's charitable work. Others want disused buildings turned into housing for the very poor. A New York State[ Faith-Based Affordable Housing](https://nyfaithhousing.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) bill that would have given faith institutions zoning exemptions to build low-income housing stalled in committee this spring and is expected to be reintroduced in the next legislative session. In practice, many closed Catholic schools are rented to charters. A provision for [federally-funded school choice](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/23/us/religious-charter-school-movement.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) vouchers which could mean an influx of funds and students to struggling parochial schools was adopted in the federal budget bill signed July 7, but a last-minute provision means states need to opt-in, something unlikely to happen in New York. > One in three New Yorkers is Catholic. Meanwhile, and despite Dolan's muted reaction to the Trump administration's aggressive deportation campaign that has sent immigrant communities into panic, Catholic parishes and organizations throughout the city are in fact deeply immersed in the care and integration of the newest New Yorkers. Catholic Charities Community Services of New York is an [$87 million nonprofit](https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/135562185?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) employing thousands of people across more than [50 sub-agencies](https://catholiccharitiesny.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/CCNY-2023-Annual-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), without regard to the religious beliefs, or lack thereof, of clients. It runs legal clinics, day laborer centers, language classes, food pantries and housing help, and an emergency immigration help hotline among other services. But perhaps more to the point, parish churches offer succor — a place to feel known and familiar a long way from home. "We're here to be with one another, to give people some sense that they are not alone," said Fr. Luis Vera, pastor of St. Nicholas of Tolentine. He's been encouraging people to formally register with the parish — because it helps when he's writing letters opposing their deportation. He's also been advising people to fill out paperwork designating who should have custody of their children if they are deported. Like pastors across the city, he connects people to immigration lawyers and listens to their worries. "I fear for my people," he said. "When I'm sitting behind the altar facing the congregation, I'm always looking at the back of the church to see if a policeman comes in." The parish has a protocol for what to do if ICE comes looking for someone. Houses of worship were long designated "sensitive areas" and off limits to ICE, but the Trump administration rescinded that. Vera looks at the many buildings at St. Nicholas — the convent where nuns have not lived for years, the high school that closed decades ago — and thinks of ways they could be of use to the newcomers. But there has been no specific guidance or directive from the archdiocese, no marshalling of the institution's clout to resist Trump's accelerating deportation campaign — of which tens of thousands of New York City Catholics are a target. While religious adherence in the U.S. and in much of New York City declined for decades [before leveling](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2025/02/26/decline-of-christianity-in-the-us-has-slowed-may-have-leveled-off/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) off a few years ago, in the heavily immigrant parts of New York, the pews are full. About 2,000 people attend St. Nicholas of Tolentine each weekend, a few hundred at each Mass. 300 school-age kids take religious education classes in the evenings, and so many people came to the tri-lingual Easter vigil service — 1,400 — that they filled the aisles and overflowed onto the sidewalk, Vera said. > 19th-century migration turned a WASP city into a place with a Catholic parish serving a different ethnic and language group every five blocks, reshaping the city politically and economically. "The immigrant community will lose practically everything on their journey to the U.S., but they will not lose their faith," said Jairo Guzman, executive director of The Mexican Coalition, a social service agency and immigrant rights group headquartered at a different Bronx parish, Immaculate Conception on 150th Street. Last year it served 17,000 families between its food pantry, meals service, clothing room, referrals, counseling and legal clinics. Filaments of prayer winch people up the continent — an invocation made in Darien, a candle lit in Guatemala — and then Guzman sees people fall into the doors of Immaculate Conception, offering prayers of thanksgiving that they made it. He's frustrated that the cardinal and clergy aren't mounting more public opposition to Trump's policies, despite their devastating effect on so many Catholics and others. Ana, offering only that name for fear of ICE, arrived in the Bronx from the Mexican state of Guerrero. For 12 years, she's been selling tamales and arroz con leche in the shadow of Immaculate Conception. She does a steady business from a cooler balanced on a granny cart, deftly wrapping 80 chicken and cheese tamales each day, long time customers crossing the street for a friendly chat. *Cuidate*, they say as they depart: *be careful*. She said she feels a little safer there, under the statue of Mary, steps away from priests she trusts. "What can I do? I need to work," she said in Spanish, wrapping plastic forks in paper napkins. "There's a great fear. I don't know about being taken, deported or sent to some other country." New York City Catholicism has always been global. 19th-century migration turned a WASP city into a place with a Catholic parish serving a different ethnic and language group every five blocks, reshaping the city politically and economically in ways that dwarf the impact of the current arrivals. While there had been some English and Spanish Catholics in New York from the earliest days of European settlement, it was the flood of German, Irish, Italian, Polish and others that turned Catholicism in New York into a source of mighty and complex power — at least until the end of the 20th century. From the 1840s, it expanded rapidly into a network of hospitals, schools, churches and social institutions, everything from orphanages to settlement houses to worker associations, following the needs of its members. It's the remnants of those structures built more than a century ago for earlier immigrants that are integrating the newest New Yorkers today. [One in three](https://www.pewresearch.org/religious-landscape-study/metro-area/new-york-city-ny/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New Yorkers is Catholic, according to the Pew Research Center; by comparison, the New York City metro area is 22% Protestant, 8% Jewish and 3% Muslim, and the [nation](https://www.pewresearch.org/religious-landscape-study/region/united-states/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is 33% Protestant, 22% Catholic, 2% Jewish and 1% Muslim. > Like institutions from universities to law firms, the leadership of the Catholic church in New York is navigating how to deal with the Trump administration in hopes that it can continue its core work. Mass here is celebrated in 20 languages. While the Archdiocese of New York stretches north all the way to Sullivan County, in the five boroughs the church — like Catholicism globally — is decidedly Latin and southern hemisphere. The city is split into two dioceses, with the diocese of Brooklyn and Queens serving those boroughs — a holdover from when Brooklyn was its own city. "I love being Catholic, I don't think that I could imagine growing up any other way," said Gisele, a sunny Mexican-American 15-year-old, while her mother bought tamales from Ana. The family has been coming to Immaculate Conception for years. "The faith gives us strength," Gisele said. She feels embraced by the local parish, but she wishes the cardinalwould more boldly address the terror so many New York Catholics feel in the face of Trump's mass deportation campaign. "I know that there are so many Catholics who are so afraid. We need to know he is with us," she said. Like institutions from universities to law firms, the leadership of the Catholic church in New York is navigating how to deal with the Trump administration in hopes that it can continue its core work. There is a tension between the cautious hierarchy and the parishes on the ground, who would like to see more forthright opposition to Trump's immigration and budget policies. In precincts serving the new immigrants, frustration runs deep. Fr. Vera at St. Nicholas is blunt in discussing who the next archbishop ought to be. "We need a pastor. We need someone who can say, 'I am walking with you.' Say *something*, *anything*." He's hopeful the new pope will appoint someone vociferous in their advocacy for immigrants. Elsewhere in the country, Catholic prelates have forcefully denounced Trump's attacks on immigrants. In June, less than a month after being named to the post by the pope, Bishop Michael Phan of San Diego arrived at immigration court to accompany people to their hearings — a means of protection from extra-judicial ICE detentions that have occurred at courthouses across the country. Bishop Mark Seitz of El Paso, head of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' committee on migration, called the mass deportation campaign "dystopian" and "morally indefensible" in a lecture at the Loyola University in Chicago in April and called for each diocese to "muster all the legal services we can to protect our people from deportation." A spokesman for the New York archdiocese said in a statement that Dolan had not read that speech, which was reprinted in the magazine [Commonweal](https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/living-vein-compassion?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The spokesman said the cardinal is "a strong supporter of the rights of immigrants" and "has often spoken out on their behalf," and pointed to the work of Catholic Charities. That work of ministering to the needy, at the center of the church's mission, is getting harder to do. Fr. Eric Cruz, regional coordinator for Catholic Charities in The Bronx, Westchester and Putnam Counties, is feeling the impact of the Trump budget cuts and cancelled contracts. He speaks warily, at pains not to sound political, but points to food pantries forced to curtail service and says that while Catholic Charities was once running monthly legal clinics for immigration help, "We've had to be more prudent. It has had an impact." He's worried about cuts to Medicaid. He's also worried about Catholics who don't seem concerned about caring for their neighbors. "You have an obligation to look at what is happening. Is this Christian? Is this an unjust law?" Cruz grew up in the South Bronx in the 1970s — a time of devastation, but also a time when churches were centers of social action. He sees a model for the present crisis. "Many reforms in the church are originated by the grassroots. I could see that happening very likely with Leo," he said. "You see it often in the parishes, the grassroots are inflamed. And then, thank God, it inflames the body. It could be a time of renewal for the church. We're people of hope." ### Reality Check: Does the NYPD Need To Hire More Cops? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-new-yorkers-should-know-about-nypd-staffing/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:54.000Z ## Background: The status quo and proposals for change How many police officers should the New York Police Department employ? In this mayoral campaign season, headcount has become a proxy for wider crime-fighting strategy. Before debating numbers, the city must first pin down the department's mission. What exactly do we expect police to accomplish? Only once that purpose is clear can we weigh how added officers might influence crime, what they would cost, whether hiring constraints make a ramp-up feasible and how rapid growth could affect force quality. The NYPD's headcount has risen and fallen over the past three decades, but its relationship to crime has never been linear. In 1990, New York City's three police departments — the NYPD, Transit Police and Housing Police (all since consolidated into one NYPD) — fielded 32,451 sworn officers. That year, the city registered an unprecedented 527,257 index felonies. A mid‑1990s hiring binge, fueled by Mayor David Dinkins' [Safe Streets, Safe City](https://cbcny.org/sites/default/files/report%5Fpoliceservices%5F12042002.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) initiative and the federal COPS hiring [grants](https://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/98a/pr031-98.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), pushed the roster to an all‑time high of [40,280](https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/RevenueSpending/nypd.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) officers in FY 2000\. Crime [plummeted](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/data%5Fhub) in the mid‑ to late‑1990s. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, budget pressures and rising pension costs reversed the rising personnel tide. Mayor Mike Bloomberg and Commissioner Ray Kelly [let](https://nypost.com/2008/05/11/bloomy-delays-hires-in-budget-cop-out/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the force shrink through attrition; 3,846 officers [departed](https://www.foxnews.com/us/nypd-sees-largest-staff-exodus-decades-as-leaders-refusing-acknowledge-mounting-crisis-union-boss?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2002 alone, and headcount settled near 34,000 by 2011\. Today's payroll lists [33,198](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/Civilian-Complaint-Review-Board-Police-Officers/2fir-qns4/data%5Fpreview?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) officers — about 1,800 shy of the [budgeted](https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2024/05/NYPD.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ceiling of 35,001 because recruitment lags retirements — leaving the department only marginally above its post‑1990 low and well below its turn‑of‑the‑century peak. Yet over the period between 2001 and today, when force strength fell from an all‑time high to a 30‑year low, crime plummeted even as the city's population increased. In 2024, the city recorded [123,890](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis%5Fand%5Fplanning/historical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-2000-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) index felonies while operating with about 6,700 fewer officers than in 2001, when 162,908 such crimes were logged — a 24% decline. Staffing expansions clearly coincided with the early, steep phase of New York's crime decline and may have helped drive those reductions, but the sustained fall that followed — even as headcount ebbed — signals that deployment strategies, technological and managerial innovations, demographic shifts and broader social and economic forces have been at least as consequential as sheer numbers in driving public safety gains. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24380927?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jQIen7oZjaQyOJe3VxQtc7vN3LacFlBzKRSj3oQf4v4/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) What does this evidence say about whether today's NYPD is too large, too small or just right? Consistent with campaign themes that call crime and disorder unacceptably high, former Gov. Andrew Cuomo has been pushing a [5,000-officer increase](https://www.andrewcuomo.com/sites/default/files/documents/public-safety-plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in headcount, framing it as necessary to return to the [early-2000s](https://www.andrewcuomo.com/press/city-crisis-governor-cuomo-unveils-first-plank-public-safety-plan-15-increase-nypd-ranks?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "tipping-point" strength that, in his telling, helped drive record crime drops. The Democratic nominee for mayor, Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani, says New York should keep the force size as it is — essentially the same result that Mayor Adams is chasing. Adams has pledged to "[add](https://nypost.com/2024/11/20/us-news/nypd-classes-canned-over-migrant-crisis-budget-cuts-to-be-reinstated-adding-1-6k-cops-by-next-fall/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" roughly 1,600 recruits by restoring two canceled academy classes and filling vacancies so that the NYPD can get to its authorized headcount. The ledger lines hide tougher questions. Even if more police might, all else being equal, help crime decline, given the multi-million-dollar cost of staffing up the NYPD, what is the relative utility of this strategy compared to others? How many of the 35,001 already-funded positions can the NYPD be expected to fill when recruitment has stalled and [attrition](https://nypost.com/2024/05/18/us-news/nypd-headcount-faces-record-lows-200-nyc-cops-leave-per-month-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is topping 200 veteran officers a month, outpacing hiring? Are there better ways to increase effective headcount than simply hiring more cops? Given the loss of veteran supervision and investigative know-how, how might the department recalibrate so that it replaces lost judgment and skill rather than merely adding bodies? ## Broad-brush evidence: Adding cops can reduce crime — with caveats Decades of empirical work across economics, criminology and public policy converge on a finding: Increasing force size can reduce crime. [Research published in 2017](https://eml.berkeley.edu/~jmccrary/chalfin%5Fmccrary2018.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#page=10) by Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary looked at 242 U.S. cities between 1960 and 2010 and concluded that a 10% rise in staffing on average translates into roughly a 3% to 4% drop in violent crime. Their results align with [a study by economist Steven Levitt](https://metricsf22.classes.ryansafner.com/files/readings/Levitt-2002.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showing that each additional officer added prevents both violent and property crime such that a 10% increase in officers causes a 4-5 % drop in violent crime and a 5% drop in property crime. Broader evidence from American public policy history seems to support this finding. During the 1990s, the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) initiative pumped federal grant money into police hiring. Using that natural experiment, [Evans and Owens](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272706000831?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (2007) found that a 10% increase in staffing led to a 10% reduction in violent crime and 3% reduction in property crime. ## New York's recent history tells a more complicated story But the COPS program was based on the premise that force strength had dipped to dangerously low levels at a time when crime was historically high. Can similar logic be applied today to a city like New York, which is much safer than it was then, and to a police department that is much better resourced than in the 1990s and is currently driving down crime? Recent New York City history challenges the premise that the department's total headcount is a decisive factor in crime trendlines. From 2001 to 2011, the city allowed its uniformed rolls to shrink by about 15%, more than 6,000 officers. Over the same period, felony index crimes fell by 16%, even as the population of the city grew from [7.8 million](https://www.qc.cuny.edu/academics/aac/wp-content/uploads/sites/68/2020/08/acs%5Fdemo%5F05.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [8.2 million](https://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/dcp/assets/files/pdf/data-tools/census/acs/boro%5Fdemo%5F2011%5Facs.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Scholars have pointed to CompStat's [data-driven accountability](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/109861119900200306?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and "[Operation Impact](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" hot-spot flooding as proof that smart resource allocation and deployment play a more important role than leaner headcounts. > Even if more police might, all else being equal, help crime decline, given the multi-million-dollar cost of staffing up the NYPD, what is the relative utility of this strategy compared to others? Indeed, of the 14 years since 1998 in which NYPD staffing fell, crime still declined in 11 of them. All of this suggests that raw headcount is half or less than the story; more important is where those officers are deployed and what they are asked to do. Calibrating police strength to crime levels matters because hiring 5,000 more officers is costly. The NYPD's $6 billion operating budget is only the visible half of its price tag. Add the pension contributions, health-care premiums, Social Security, workers' comp, and retiree health insurance that the City books in central accounts, and the department's recurring costs rise to roughly [$12 billion](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/exec25/mm5-25.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a year. Bringing on 5,000 new officers would lift spending by about $500 million in their first year and close to $1 billion once they hit top pay. Some of this investment could be recouped because, theoretically, with more cops there will be less overtime, which has [exceeded](https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/police-overtime-trends-examining-the-relationship-between-tenure-and-overtime-hours-worked-march-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) $600 million in four of the last five years. But given that resources are limited, the bang for the buck of a hiring spree must be smartly compared to other investments, not in isolation. Any payoff must be weighed against other uses of the same funds — such as upgrading technology and dispatch systems or funding community and mental‑health programs — to identify the greatest public‑safety return. ## So, what about overtime? The Cuomo plan is not simply premised on the notion that more cops equal less crime. It's rooted in the idea that morale is low and police are now fleeing the force in large numbers in part because forced overtime is high. This deserves some scrutiny. Overtime is indeed rising. Between FY 2019 and FY 2024, total NYPD uniformed overtime costs[ ballooned](https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/police-overtime-trends-examining-the-relationship-between-tenure-and-overtime-hours-worked-march-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) 59.2%, reaching a high of $955 million in a $6 billion department operating [budget](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/adopt25/adopt25-expreso.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The average annual overtime for those who earned any overtime rose from 204 to 251 hours, and the share logging 500-plus hours in a given year jumped from 1% to 15.5%. While some share of officers unquestionably appreciated the sizable pay boost that overtime provides, the increase has nonetheless become a [drag](https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1569&context=jj%5Fpubs&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on morale and retention, arguably aggravating the problem that it's intended to solve. Attrition also now outpaces new hiring. The uniformed attrition rate rose to 8.7% in 2024, up from [4.8%](https://www.nycpba.org/news-items/post/2023/nypd-cops-leave-force-in-alarming-rate-over-2-500-turned-in-badges-so-far-in-2023/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2018\. The NYPD managed to hire only [2,600](https://zeta.creativecirclecdn.com/chief/files/20250122-151953-0dd-phpKqxKJf.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) recruits last year, fewer than the 2,951 officers who retired or resigned, leaving the department with a growing personnel gap and prompting the agency to [relax](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/26/nyregion/nypd-recruiting-college-credits-run.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its hiring standards. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24380897?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1B-TxYtDC%5Fk9D8456ZV097iGqlU9Zn5M-MBRArdmXn1U/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Is hiring the only way to get more cops on the beat? Increasing topline force strength isn't the only way to add more police to the streets. Commissioner Jessica Tisch has already shown how much capacity hides in plain sight. In the first few months of her tenure, she pulled roughly [500 officers](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/19/nyregion/jessica-tisch-nypd-appointments.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) out of "unofficial assignments" and trimmed oversized executive entourages. The manpower was immediately reassigned to precincts and detective squads. [Roster data](https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/Civilian-Complaint-Review-Board-Police-Officers/2fir-qns4/about%5Fdata?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) confirm more opportunities. The Court Section, which handles pre-arraignment processing and shares detention-cell supervision with the City's Correction Department, now has 510 sworn members, roughly 130 more than at the start of 2024\. Pruning these peripheral posts could send hundreds back to the front line without hiring a single recruit. Wellness is another force multiplier. Since 2019, average sick leave has risen from [7.1](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2019/paid%5Fabsence%5Frates.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to [10.9](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2024/paid%5Fabsence%5Frates.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) days per officer, a loss of 3.8 shifts each and about 1.6% of annual availability. Across the 33,000‑plus force, that equals 525 to 530 full‑time positions, the manpower of an entire mid‑size precinct. Mandatory overtime and low morale feed the problem as much as illness, so any staffing strategy must include policies that cut fatigue and improve health. Last comes civilianization, or moving people from "desk duty" to patrol while keeping the desks sufficiently staffed. More than 250 officers on the roster still handle fleet fueling, property-clerk work, discovery compliance and other clerical chores that require no weapon or arrest powers. The chief bottleneck is the City's [two-for-one vacancy policy](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/title-vacant/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for "non-safety" titles: Under current policy, an agency may fill only one civilian position for every two vacant lines it carries, leaving the second slot permanently empty. Because half the clerical lines stay unfilled, police brass substitute higher-paid officers for missing civilians. Lifting, or at least exempting public-safety agencies from this cap would let the NYPD hire lower-cost civilians, return sworn personnel to the street and trim overtime, adding hundreds of patrol hours each day without increasing the authorized headcount. ## Could more police drive down response times? Beyond morale and overall crime rates, the question is what significantly upping the current number of cops might mean on the street for callers waiting for a patrol car. As head count shrank after 2019, critical call response times, i.e. to shootings, robberies and life-threatening assaults, slowed from 4 minutes 42 seconds in [FY 2019](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2019/2019%5Fmmr.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to 7 minutes in [FY 2024](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/pmmr2025/2025%5Fpmmr.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a 49% increase. The wait for police in response to serious crimes, such as burglaries or assaults, rose from seven minutes to over 11 minutes, a 61% jump. The wait in response to non-critical complaints such as disorderly groups and past crimes stretched even longer, expanding from 16 minutes 18 seconds to 26 minutes 53 seconds, up 65%. [Empirical studies](https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/police/paae002/7609902?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of 911 queues predict exactly this pattern: Lower staffing leads to higher response times. But staffing isn't the only lever. Smarter deployment, clearer priorities and allocation of personnel, including decisions about where officers are assigned and what tasks they focus on, can all improve response times. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24490769?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1s2clC-PqSSFSeeMUbxKIcghkKn16AIJRp37wmaHwC2k/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ## Beyond headcount Headline promises to substantially increase police headcount have surface appeal, but the evidence suggests there are other potent and cost-effective ways to reduce crime — not to mention other ways to get more police on duty. Because attrition is now outpacing recruitment and the force is losing officers each month, the next mayor cannot count on a bigger headcount anytime soon. Until the NYPD can retain current staff and fill its existing vacancies, the more reliable path to better public safety is to redeploy idle cops, civilianize clerical work and steer every patrol hour toward tactics with a proven track record. Voters should ask not just "How many officers?" but also "Doing what, where, and to what effect?" ### How New York City’s Building Emission Law May Harm the Environment and the Economy URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-new-york-citys-building-emission-law-may-harm-the-environment-and-economy/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:54.000Z In 2019, New York City enacted Local Law 97 — legislation intended to curb greenhouse gas emissions associated with the city's buildings. While the motivation was to lessen the city's environmental impact, the law could easily have the opposite effect. Typically referred to by its number, [Local Law 97](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/buildings/local%5Flaws/ll97of2019.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) might sound mundane or arcane. But it's ambitious, and essential for New Yorkers to understand — especially at a time when Zohran Mamdani, Andrew Cuomo, Eric Adams and others running for mayor are debating how to make housing in this city more affordable. The law requires most buildings over 25,000 square feet to meet new greenhouse gas emissions limits. Even with exceptions for a few industrial facilities, apartment buildings that meet specific rent-regulated unit thresholds, some city-owned buildings and religious places of worship, [this law is expected to apply to approximately 50,000 buildings](https://climate.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Getting-%5FLL97Done.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20most%20important%20thing%20New%20York%20City,by%20LL97%20mobilization%20in%20New%20York%20City.) (out of about [a million buildings citywide](https://buildingstechlab.nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Over%20One%20Million%20Buildings.%20From%20skyscrapers%20to,and%20quality%20of%20the%20city's%20built%20environment)). These limits become stricter over time, with the goal of slashing such emissions by 40% by 2030 and to reach net zero by 2050. Specifically, the law requires each of the 50,000 buildings to collect detailed data on their total energy consumption by source (for example, electric, gas, oil, solar, etc.). This can be complicated by the fact that different forms of energy may be consumed for different purposes, such as heating, air conditioning, running computers, preparing food or operating factory equipment. Each source of energy is then multiplied by an "emissions factor" that is based on various factors, the most important being the specific type of energy it is. These are then summed to get an estimate of the total emissions for the building. The data needs to be certified by a licensed professional and reported to the city annually starting this year. If the report indicates greater emissions than are allowed for the size and type of building for the year in question, significant fines are imposed. These fines can be mitigated in several ways, such as by purchasing beneficial electrification credits, renewable energy credits and the like. The law has been embraced by a wide array of elected officials, including the Democratic nominee for mayor, Zohran Mamdani. The New York City Buildings Department, under Mayor Adams — who personally lobbied against some of the law's more onerous provisions — called the final bill ["one of the most ambitious plans for reducing emissions in the nation."](https://www.nyc.gov/site/buildings/codes/ll97-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reductions.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) But will it? **The economic impact** In order to assess the law's effects, we have to first look at its costs. The cost of retrofitting the 50,000 largest buildings in New York City to meet the law's increasingly onerous standards is difficult to estimate, especially since the law's requirements can, in theory, be met by conserving energy. I wrote "in theory" because approximately [two-thirds of the city's residential real estate](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/spotlight-new-york-citys-rental-housing-market/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and an even larger share of its commercial real estate is rented to tenants who are given no incentive to conserve their energy use under this law. Therefore, most building owners will face costs directly related to how much energy their tenants consume, something over which they have little control. This could lead to the anomalous situation where the owner of a more energy-efficient building is required to spend more money and do more work retrofitting their building than the owner of a less energy-efficient building simply because the former rented to a tenant who, for whatever reason, uses more energy. [The city estimates](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-01-08/nyc-condo-owners-may-bear-costs-of-local-law-97?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that roughly 15,000 buildings would need to invest between $12 billion and $15 billion just to meet the 2030 emissions cap. Assuming owners implement the easy and cheap fixes first to reduce emissions, achieving the required 100% reduction by 2050 is certain to cost a multiple of that. These tens of billions of dollars in construction costs are not the only expenses associated with this law. For example, they do not include the cost of complying with the complex reporting and professional certification requirements, which can be particularly significant for smaller buildings and landlords. They do not include any of the fees that will be charged by the City for filing the reports, for failing to meet the timelines imposed or for other types of noncompliance with the law's many requirements. They do not include the cost of trying to reconcile the inevitable situations where work is performed and the law's complex algorithm does not yield the expected emissions reductions. Finally, they do not include the cost associated with the complicated system of credits that can be purchased to delay, but not ultimately avoid construction work. Who will pay for all of this? It depends. If the building is a market-rate rental, either commercial or residential, the landlord gets the bill. But given the strong demand for space in the city and the lack of new construction, much — if not most — of the cost will be passed on to tenants. If the building is a rent-regulated rental — rent-regulated buildings have a different schedule under the law, but they're still required to comply with the mandates — again the landlord gets the bill. Much of that cost will be passed along to tenants, but this will only happen to the extent possible under rent-regulation law; if rent hikes in a given year are limited to 2%, or possibly held flat in a Mamdani administration, owners, many of whom say they're already struggling to keep up with rising maintenance costs, will wind up eating the increased fees. Finally, and most obviously, if the building is owner-occupied, the owner pays. What is the effect of all of this? Higher expenses for New Yorkers, whether they live, work or own property here. The irony should not be lost on us that this law is bearing down on New York at the precise time when mayoral campaigns are promising a laser focus on making the city more affordable. These are not the only costs associated with Local Law 97\. According to [the New York City Comptroller's office](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), there were 26,310 vacant rent-regulated apartments in New York City as of 2023\. [Landlords explain](https://www.thecity.nyc/2024/02/14/rent-stabilized-apartments-vacant/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that they have no choice but to keep these apartments vacant because the cost of bringing them into compliance with current building codes is too high given the amount of rent that can legally be charged. The upgrades required by Local Law 97 may therefore result in even more of our housing stock being pulled from the market, putting more upward pressure on rents. At worst, this could deprive some buildings of a path to profitability, leaving them to consequently be abandoned. Furthermore, any loss of existing units will not be made up for with new units since the law increases construction costs, discouraging new development. **The environmental costs** This is where we finally get to the environmental impact — and the perverse possibility that a sweeping local statute intended to reduce emissions may well wind up having the opposite effect. People and businesses locate in New York City for a variety of reasons. To the extent that it becomes more expensive, some of those people and businesses will locate elsewhere. And when they locate elsewhere, they're leaving the densest and most mass transit-rich city in America for places where people live on much more land and overwhelmingly get around by private automobiles, invariably causing much higher greenhouse gas emissions. How much more greenhouse gas emissions this will generate is difficult to estimate precisely, but consider these facts. [Free standing suburban homes are estimated to use 25% more energy than urban apartments](https://medium.com/@rijuldahiya/urban-vs-suburban-energy-showdown-whos-winning-the-climate-game-354a2a0797dd?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Vehicle trips consume much more energy, whether gas or electric, than mass transit trips, [five million of which are taken each day by people in New York City](https://www.mta.info/agency/new-york-city-transit/subway-bus-ridership-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). New York City's density also allows for much shorter trips, many of which can be accomplished by walking or biking with no environmental impact. Finally, [the Trump administration is proposing](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/29/climate/epa-endangerment-finding-repeal-proposal.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to loosen, if not obliterate, federal greenhouse gas emission limits, making the rest of America even less eco-friendly than New York City. Every person and business lost to a suburb or less dense metro means more harm to the environment, which does not respect municipal borders. Therefore, forcing tenants and landlords to spend tens of billions of dollars to make their already low carbon footprint even lower is far from the optimal way to help the environment. A far better way would be avoiding making New York even more costly, thereby encouraging the rest of America to abandon their less eco-friendly lifestyles and move to what is already the most environmentally friendly place in America. ### Calling the Cops Less Often URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/calling-the-cops-less-often/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:54.000Z Polling shows that public safety is among New York City voters’ top concerns. But it’s important to be specific when talking about the issue. Candidates in the recent Democratic mayoral primary focused mainly on quality-of-life issues — homelessness, mental illness, public drug use — and not on violent crime. There’s good reason for that: New York has seen a remarkable drop in murders, with [the NYPD reporting](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr011/nypd-record-low-shooting-victims-first-half-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shootings at an all-time low through the first half of the year. Of course, there is work left to do, including stemming a years-long rise in felony assaults — but it seems as though lower-level crimes are top-of-mind for many New Yorkers. This raises a serious question: What is the best way for the city to address these quality-of-life issues that are preoccupying people? One candidate running for mayor, Zohran Mamdani, wants to lean most heavily into non-police responders by creating a Department of Community Safety. Though there are many details left to fill in, the broad idea is that non-police responders in this new agency would handle many calls where there is no clear threat of violence — freeing up the police to focus on major crimes. Many are skeptical of this approach, known in the field as “alternative response,” but both experience and research suggest it holds significant promise. That’s why it is [quietly proliferating across the country](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/opinion/911-public-safety-george-floyd.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as a new way of addressing mental health and a host of other reasons people call 911\. **Quality of life matters** Public attention to quality-of-life concerns is understandable. The presence of people living with serious mental illness and other health concerns is highly visible. Public drug use can lead the people witnessing it and its externalities to feel uneasy. Homelessness [continues to](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2025/01/dinapoli-numbers-homeless-population-doubled-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [spike](https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/basic-facts-about-homelessness-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), due to the ongoing housing affordability crisis and a more recent influx of asylum seekers. But addressing these issues, particularly those that involve mental illness, requires a more nuanced approach than simply deploying the police — who are oriented to patrol and gain compliance. Not only do police lack the training to deal with some of these issues, but research shows that police also are [11.6 times](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34641794/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) more likely to use force when dealing with individuals with serious mental illness. [Police](https://www.policeforum.org/assets/MBHResponse.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [themselves](https://crisisnow.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Open-Letter-in-Response-to-Exec-Order.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) do not want to be the primary or default responders to these situations, which can be more effectively resolved by others trained in the specific skills needed to not only deescalate crises, but also connect people to a range of supportive services. [Alternative response](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/opinion/911-public-safety-george-floyd.html?unlocked%5Farticle%5Fcode=1.LE8.AcZM.-5A9KUJQtAJQ&smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) can take different forms, but here’s what almost all its applications have in common. In response to 911 calls, many cities now send specialized, unarmed professionals trained specifically to resolve many kinds of calls traditionally handled by police — mental and behavioral health crises, certainly, but also traffic violations and other issues that call takers determine not to carry a specific risk of violence. By matching responders’ expertise to the scenarios at hand, alternative response enables safer, more effective problem resolution, and allows police to focus instead on higher-priority issues like violent crime. The STAR program in Denver, Colorado, for example, was associated with fewer mental health and substance use crises being recorded as low-level criminal offenses, as well as [reductions in more serious incidents](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abm2106?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which would always be classified as crimes. The Policing Project has worked to [study and expand](http://safetyreimagined.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the use of alternative response programs in cities nationwide. A recent Vital City article was somewhat dismissive of alternative response approaches for New York, citing issues here like lagging 911 response times, the risk of escalation during street encounters, and, simply, that [“\[c\]ops remain best equipped to handle”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-in-the-balance) certain issues. But the evidence in many cities across the country shows that these kinds of concerns are unfounded. **How alternative response works** Calls regarding people who are unhoused, experiencing mental health crises or engaged in substance use [don’t escalate to arrest](https://yotamshemtov.github.io/files/cahoots.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or uses of force as frequently when a city sends only unarmed, trained practitioners in response. The option to send these kinds of service providers does not mean that dangerous situations are effectively ignored, as defenders of the status quo suggest. Rather, with the right dispatch protocols in place, the approach calibrates the response to the situation, ensuring that the “right” people — those trained to address the situation at hand — arrive on the scene. This means cops are freed up to focus on the concerns in the community that they are, in fact, best equipped to handle. As a result, in our work across the country, we’ve seen that 911 response times [can drop sharply](https://jasher.substack.com/p/new-orleans-and-the-case-for-civilianization?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when police no longer have to respond to certain call types, like traffic crashes in which there is no injury. Yet today, the simple and sad fact is that New York City lags far behind other cities in alternative response adoption, with the City’s primary alternative response program — [B-HEARD](https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — barely scratching the surface of even the mental health-related calls it could take off the hands of police, with more than one in three eligible calls not receiving a response. Given the successful experiences seen elsewhere, the question for our next mayor shouldn’t be *whether* to consider alternative approaches — but how widespread their use should be, and how to lead city agencies to do the work of actually embracing this approach. Consider the example of Minneapolis, a leader in alternative police response. There, the city has diverted nearly 9% of 911 calls to alternative programs through a mix of behavioral crisis response, traffic control, animal control, 311 and online responses. After [our report showed](https://www.minneapolismn.gov/media/-www-content-assets/documents/Minneapolis-Community-Safety-Ecosystem-Asset-and-Gap-Analysis%5F%5FFindings-and-Action-Plan.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the city could safely divert nearly half of its calls through expanded programming addressing these and other call types (such as neighbor disputes, which are diverted from police to trained mediators in other cities), the city set a goal of sending [20%](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/opinion/911-public-safety-george-floyd.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of its 911 calls to alternative programs, becoming the first jurisdiction in the nation to name such a goal. In Denver, a rigorous evaluation showed that a pilot alternative response program has helped drive a [34% reduction](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abm2106?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the kinds of quality-of-life incidents it was designed to address (such as intoxication, indecent exposure and trespassing) at a quarter the cost of traditional policing. After one year, not one of the [1,400 emergency calls](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abm2106?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) handled by STAR led to an arrest, injury or call for police backup. Similarly, the nation’s longest-running alternative response program, in Eugene, Oregon, [handled 10%](https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2022.307107?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of calls that otherwise would have been directed to police — [mostly involving](https://citizensleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Alternative-Response-Models-and-Research.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) people experiencing homelessness or serious mental illness — at 2% of the police department’s budget. In 2019, they called for police backup 1.6% of the time. When New Orleans [turned to alternative response](https://jasher.substack.com/p/new-orleans-and-the-case-for-civilianization?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the city’s emergency call response time fell from 180 minutes in April 2023 to 53 minutes in September 2024, even though the number of police officers dropped in the same time period. New Orleans now relies on non-police responders for a range of issues, from traffic crashes to behavioral health. By mid-2024, these responders were even resolving nearly 8% of calls focused on non-violent property crimes, over the phone. Albuquerque, New Mexico, [created a Community Safety Department in 2021](https://www.cabq.gov/acs/news/albuquerque-community-safety-marks-100-000-calls-for-service-milestone?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which responds to crisis calls and routine matters like welfare checks, as well as overseeing the city’s violence intervention programming. Earlier this year, the department’s alternative responders served their 100,000th call for service. Fewer than [1%](https://www.cabq.gov/acs/faqs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#autotoc-item-autotoc-18) of the department’s responses have resulted in the police being brought in. **Applying the model to New York City** New York, of course, faces a higher volume of calls than other U.S. cities — some 9 million calls to the NYPD each year. But that only makes its failure to turn more decisively to alternative response all the more remarkable. If a significant proportion of those calls were diverted to alternative response, the City would not only produce better outcomes for people facing non-criminal crises, but it would free up NYPD resources to focus on what they’re trained to do. NYPD response times — which have been [rising in recent years](https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/2024-911-response-time-nyc-mayors-management-report/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — cannot be solved by increasing the number of officers alone when post-pandemic recruitment challenges have made staffing relief a [near impossibility](https://pix11.com/news/local-news/not-going-to-sugarcoat-it-nypd-faces-staffing-crisis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). New York has already taken some steps to roll out an alternative response approach. In 2021, the City launched B-HEARD, a pilot program to deploy EMS and mental health services, rather than police, to calls about mental health crises — the vast majority of which do not require police presence. Where the B-HEARD program has been deployed, it has been successful: After its first six months, it resulted in [43%](https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/pressrelease/mayor-adams-announces-key-milestones-and-strategies-to-improve-crucial-911-mental-health-crisis-response-initiative/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of those who received a mental health assessment accepting help and being connected with care in their community, rather than being cycled through hospital emergency rooms. But despite a clear track record of success, a recent [audit](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/new-audit-comptroller-finds-over-a-third-of-eligible-mental-health-calls-did-not-get-a-b-heard-team-response-for-untracked-reasons/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by the Comptroller’s Office found that B-HEARD is falling far short of its potential — because it’s been underfunded. Between 2022 and 2024, B-HEARD responded to 24,071 calls, and 99% percent of surveyed recipients of the program felt B-HEARD treated them with courtesy and respect. But the teams were unable to respond to more than 35% of eligible calls due to issues like limited program hours. New York City urgently needs to scale B-HEARD to address more mental health calls and reach more parts of the city at more times of day. And more resources are needed to assess and improve its performance — including a formal evaluation. Mental health crises are far from the only 911 call types that can and should be diverted to other responders. A [2022 analysis by the Vera Institute of Justice ](https://vera-institute.files.svdcdn.com/production/downloads/publications/911-analysis-we-can-rely-less-on-police.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)found that more than 60% of New York’s 9 million 911 calls were for non-criminal matters such as reporting a suspicious person or requesting a vehicle be towed. Many of these are perfect candidates for alternative response teams. In order to get there, the City must leverage data to better direct New York’s public safety resources. A full analysis of emergency calls for service data, broken into clear categories, can illuminate a range of additional opportunities to reallocate resources more effectively. That is typically the starting point for the Policing Project’s work elsewhere. Pursuing innovative, tailored 911 and emergency response solutions frees up police to better handle high-stakes situations. It’s one reason why a growing number of law enforcement leaders are themselves [speaking out](https://safercitiesresearch.com/the-latest/xew9k9z75fh764a4kck2t5ct5nf9cp?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in favor of alternative response programs. Cities should heed their advocacy — and avoid dismissing all alternative response simply because there are some issues best left to police. ### A Budget Crash Course for Zohran Mamdani URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-budget-crash-course-for-zohran-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:54.000Z Zohran Mamdani has not been elected yet, but his stunning success in the Democratic primary means that there is a strong possibility he will be inaugurated New York City's mayor on Jan. 1, 2026. If that happens, a young activist whose only government experience is a short stint in the state legislature will need to prepare a preliminary budget for fiscal year 2027 for a city with a budget larger than all but four states (NY, California, Texas and Florida) in his first month on the job. Now is the time for him to show that he is not fiscally naive and that his goals of affordability and better services are not inconsistent with fiscal responsibility. In the coming months, Mamdani can and should take steps to demonstrate to voters that he understands that the job of mayor is to responsibly run a massive and complex government, not lead a political movement. Specifically, as soon as possible, he should: - Assemble a fiscal team — a prospective first deputy mayor, director of the Office of Management and Budget and finance commissioner — that is knowledgeable and experienced. Making the names of top candidates public now will show doubters he is serious about the work; - Reach out to the entities that follow and critique New York City fiscal policies, i.e. the Independent Budget Office and the Citizens Budget Commission, to better understand their areas of expertise and concern and offer to work with them; - Engage in ongoing dialogues with these groups for himself and his closest advisors, to better understand the fiscal pressures and legal constraints on the city budget including, in particular, the statutory and bond markets' limitations on the amount the City can borrow. He should show an understanding of the causes of the 1975 fiscal crisis and a commitment to avoid past mistakes. - Develop a detailed approach and plan to respond to federal budget cuts that are coming soon. As comptroller, Brad Lander has done a lot of [analysis](http://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/for-the-public/protecting-nyc/overview/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on this, which should be helpful. Taking these steps now will show that he understands the very serious challenges of funding the City's important functions and will be ready to hit the ground running instead of requiring extensive time for on-the-job training. Mamdani is a great communicator. He can use this skill and the credibility he clearly has with many New Yorkers to get beyond the slogans of "free this" and "free that" to discuss how he can carefully and realistically begin to achieve his ambitious campaign goals. Much has been written about why the large-scale expenditures Mamdani touts are not achievable, especially in the face of massive federal cuts to state and city revenues. Indeed, many depend upon the state Legislature approving new taxes or borrowing authority, something that could very likely not happen. But the redistributionist philosophy that underlies Mamdani's calls for tax increases on high earners can be readily channeled into good policies that do not risk alienating crucial parts of our tax base or triggering insurmountable opposition from Albany. For example, instead of trying to allow everyone to ride buses for free, including those who can afford to pay, he could reform the Fair Fares program, which halves fares for low-income riders, to expand eligibility for that program to a higher income level (as the current Adams administration plans) and/or establish an income level below which fares will be free. This will be much less costly than free for all, won't subsidize riders who don't need it and will avoid distorted travel routes and overcrowding that would hurt all riders. Another way to derive more revenue from higher-income people and entities is to eliminate unnecessary tax credits and incentives. To name just one example, the film production tax credit costs the state $700 million a year. Mamdani could work with the governor and state legislature to reform and/or eliminate tax incentives that are not cost effective and return the savings derived from NYC-based operations to the City. And then there is the property tax, which privileges single-family homes and co-ops over the rental apartment buildings that house two-thirds of New York City residents. It is well past time to rectify this economic injustice. Andrew Cuomo has said he would try to impose a 2% per year cap on the growth of homeowner property taxes, which would make it even more difficult to achieve overall reform. Mamdani said in his answers to a Citizens Budget Commission questionnaire that he is in favor of reforming the property tax system; let's hear him articulate and explain why and how he plans to make that happen. Finally, Mamdani can use his appeal to working- and middle-class voters to reach out and work with public employee unions to identify and share savings from more efficient workforce practices. [On Derek Thompson's podcast, he talked about how big of a problem it is that public sector projects are expensive and take so long.](http://practices.he/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Now he should identify specific areas where he wants to find savings. It is important that our very possible next mayor immediately dig into preparing for the job and be expected to answer questions about how he will address substantial budget shortfalls without risking basic services. He needs to recognize and tell the public that, short of implementing grandiose new programs on day one, there are feasible ways he can improve affordability and provide need-based services. The next six months will be a test to see whether Mamdani can earn the confidence of those who didn't vote for him in the primary by seeking out and listening to experienced advisors and preparing for a serious and intense job that will require making smart choices. All New Yorkers and the future of the city are depending on it. ### Zohran Mamdani Needs a Staffing Plan URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-needs-a-staffing-plan/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:54.000Z Zohran Mamdani could well be the next mayor of New York City. He's captured imaginations with big, exciting promises: more housing, free buses and city-run grocery stores. The vision is bold, and the energy is real. But translating that energy into real outcomes for New Yorkers hinges on a question every mayor must answer: Who's actually going to do the work? Government is powered by the people who process permits, pave roads, close affordable housing deals and design the bus lanes those free buses will drive on. When Bill de Blasio took office in 2014, he inherited a city government that was well-staffed and financially stable after years of economic growth. That foundation mattered. It made it possible to deliver big, complex initiatives like Universal Pre-K, IDNYC and Vision Zero at scale. This time is different. After years of [attrition](https://nypost.com/2024/05/18/us-news/nypd-headcount-faces-record-lows-200-nyc-cops-leave-per-month-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [hiring freezes](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2023/09/20000-city-jobs-would-stay-vacant-under-adams-hiring-freeze/390231/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) and budget cuts, the workforce is [smaller than it was prepandemic](https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/changes-to-new-york-city-employee-staffing-levels-february-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the fiscal outlook is more uncertain than ever. What the city needs now is a smart, targeted rebuilding of its workforce grounded in fiscal reality and focused on service delivery. Here are three ways Mamdani can quickly and decisively rebuild and reimagine New York City's workforce: **1\. Bring in operational leadership with deep knowledge of how city government works.** The next mayor needs a senior team that shares his vision and a desire to get to yes, but also understands all the reasons people inside the government will say no. These are the super-nerds — often with cross-sector experience — who know the nuances of ULURP (the arduous Uniform Land Use Review Procedure that development projects go through), the realities of municipal finance, how to navigate labor agreements and how to negotiate with both developers and community stakeholders in equal measure. Some senior roles will, and should, reflect the mayor's values, but positions that make up the operational backbone of government must prioritize experience and execution. When de Blasio took office with a big promise to deliver 200,000 units of affordable housing, he appointed Alicia Glen — a civic-minded leader with a decade of experience at Goldman Sachs — as deputy mayor for Housing and Economic Development. On paper, she didn't fit the rhetoric of his campaign. But de Blasio understood that if he wanted to push developers toward more affordable housing at greater scale, he needed someone who spoke their language and knew how to move projects through both the private sector and the city bureaucracy. That bet paid off: The administration exceeded its audacious goal, largely because he brought in someone willing and able to challenge him and translate vision into execution. The next mayor will need to do the same: build a leadership bench with people who understand how government works, how systems break down and how to push through resistance to deliver real results for New Yorkers. **2\. Commission a real citywide talent and capacity assessment within the first 90 days.** There's no magic number for how big — or small — New York City's government should be. The right size is the one that allows the city to deliver the level of service New Yorkers deserve, within the fiscal realities we're facing. That means starting with outcomes, not headcount. What services do New Yorkers expect? How quickly should housing applications get processed? How fast should potholes get filled? How responsive should emergency services be? Once the administration defines those service goals, it can work backward to determine the staffing levels, skills and organizational changes needed to deliver them. Sometimes that will mean hiring more people. Other times it will mean streamlining, innovating, or rethinking how work gets done — especially given new and emerging technologies. But without a clear, data-driven picture of current capacity and gaps, the City risks either overcorrecting or continuing to under-resource critical functions. This kind of operational workforce planning isn't radical. It's standard practice in the private sector. When companies start missing performance targets, they conduct a capacity and talent analysis, mapping where work is getting done, identifying bottlenecks and deciding where to redeploy, retrain or make targeted hires. And once the City knows the workforce it needs, it can't ignore the structural barriers to building it. Hiring for critical roles often takes months — or years — thanks to outdated civil service rules. Comptroller Brad Lander's recent mayoral campaign offered [some proposals to address these challenges](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/67a2f550954e9c463f4a2ef6/t/6839d7ba133be44eb77db810/1748621242594/Investing+in+a+World+Class+City+Workforce.docx.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), including civil service reform, faster hiring processes, and stronger retention strategies. It's a good start for whoever takes office next. **3\. Rebuild morale and retain the workforce we already have.** Before focusing on recruitment, the City needs to re-engage the people already doing the work. That starts with visible, sustained outreach to frontline and mid-level civil servants. Restoring pride in city service is critical. Every City employee should feel clear on why they love serving New Yorkers and feel equipped and excited to share that story with others. At [Work for America](http://www.workforamerica.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we're partnering with cities across the country to help workshop what makes their workforce special. We help frontline employees identify their own "why here, why now" story — why this job, in this place, at this moment matters to them. We pair that with marketing materials that humanize city government and help prospective applicants see the real people behind public service. Brand matters. Messaging matters. And no one can sell the value of government work better than the people already doing it. This is an area where Mamdani is especially well-positioned to excel. His campaign has shown a deep understanding of how to connect with people on the channels they actually use, with messages that speak to them as humans, not as faceless constituents. That same approach can, and should, extend to how the City recruits, engages and retains its workforce. Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia famously said there's no Republican or Democratic way to pick up the trash. The same holds true today: There's no Democratic Socialist way to build a bus lane or respond to an emergency. There's just service delivery, plain and simple. With the right people in the right roles, and a serious plan to strengthen the city workforce, Mamdani has a real chance not just to imagine a better New York, but to make it happen. ### Siesta Time, New York? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/siesta-time-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:54.000Z From around Memorial Day to Labor Day, New York City has always been transported to the tropics. Long before global warming stalked us, the city's summer months seethed with high temperatures and punishing humidity. But the first Europeans who settled here did not come from Mediterranean Europe, where residents were accustomed to avoiding the midday sun. Though we're at about the same latitude as Rome and Madrid, we've never had siestas. Could New Yorkers use an afternoon nap in the shade, or some other change to our daily cycles to keep us a little cooler? It's worth more than a thought experiment. Once, all Mediterranean cities had siestas from about 2 to 5 p.m.. Small cities in Andalucia or in Greece and elsewhere still have total shutdowns, but the major cities have sprawled too far for workers to go back to their homes to eat lunch, take a nap and then return to work — although some midday closures of shops and offices are still common, even in big cities. New York commutes tend to be too long for a workday split into two shifts. But in the summer, the workday could easily start and finish earlier. An ideal situation, in my view, would have New Yorkers wake up in the cool of the early morning, get to work by 7 a.m., and leave by one in the afternoon — adding up to a six-hour summer workday that could be compensated for by longer hours in the cooler months. A proposal for such a dramatic seasonal shift would be a big challenge to enact, but no larger than the way work from home has already altered workers' schedules. I'm old enough to remember New York before air conditioning. I recall the red eyes of morning subway riders who hadn't slept the night before and were now jammed into a hot IRT car. I heard tales of people who slept on the fire escapes or roofs of apartment buildings. My parents told me that was common in their generation. Now we get relief when the windows are sealed shut, surely a good thing overall. Alas, all the ACs whirring in windows or blowing cold air into our rooms from a central source account for a substantial share of the city's energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. As we cool our homes, offices and vehicles, we make the outside air hotter still. Are there other ways we might get some relief? Shade is a big help, but gone are the once-ubiquitous awnings that projected over storefronts, creating shaded gallerias on commercial streets. Only at cross streets did pedestrians have to squint in the sun. Small awnings once also hooded the windows of apartment houses. Gone also, in office buildings especially, are windows that can be opened. The city would do well to rediscover these low-tech sources of relief from heat and rely less on air conditioning. Mayor Michael Bloomberg gave the city a great gift by directing that a million trees be planted on our streets. Some of these streets hadn't known shade since the Lenape dwelled here. [This arboreal renewal](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/cities-need-more-trees) may be a more consequential legacy than any urban renewal project in the city's history. Lines of trees shade miles of sidewalks that would otherwise cook in the sun. If earlier and shorter summer hours were in effect, workers could sleep in the afternoon and enliven the city at night. Or they might pass their afternoons in or alongside water — the greatest cooler of all. The city has plenty of it. The Central Park Reservoir (no longer used to store drinking water) could be converted into a very big swimming pool. Access would be only on foot. There would be no reduction in parkland; changing rooms could be built over the water. And not only are the beaches at Coney Island and the Rockaways within city boundaries, but so are the Hudson and East Rivers. Those rivers once held cribs for swimmers and could again. Waterside recreation shouldn't require trips upstate or to Long Island. We seem to have forgotten that the digital revolution was supposed to allow people more leisure. And what better time for that leisure than summer? Swimming in the reservoir and in a cleaner East River are not impossible goals. Parisians are now swimming in the Seine because the government devoted resources to cleaning it up. How about it, New York? ### How Zohran Mamdani Could Succeed as Mayor URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-zohran-mamdani-could-succeed-as-mayor/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:55.000Z As veterans of government, business and politics, we're more optimistic about a potential Zohran Mamdani mayoralty than many of our peers. Mamdani won the primary because he's skilled politically and understood that affordability is the top issue for voters. In that, he differs dramatically from Bill de Blasio, who thought he had a mandate to make New York a progressive utopia — with limited skills to then achieve that goal. Mamdani may actually have the chops to be a mayor for all New Yorkers without making his base feel betrayed. First and foremost, Mayor Mamdani, who we're likely to get next January, will be a progressive, and as such he'll have a choice. Assuming he wins the general election — which both of us consider close to a sure thing at this point — he can either be like Brandon Johnson of Chicago, a fully owned subsidiary of the teachers union and an utter disaster or he can be like Michelle Wu of Boston, a smart and creative progressive. Here are some ideas we believe will tilt the field in his favor. **1\. Dispense with the anti-semitism issue.** This is the biggest obstacle to Mamdani coming in as a unifying force and starting his mayoralty with momentum. We are both Jewish, and like most New Yorkers, we are worried about increasingly overt anti-Semitism. We both realize that it's possible to oppose Israel without being prejudiced against Jews. The truth is that what the New York City mayor thinks about the Middle East is mainly irrelevant. What matters is how the New York City mayor treats his Jewish constituents. If Mamdani can actively protect Jews from hate crimes and violence and make clear that he vigorously opposes prejudice, if he spends time working with Jewish leaders (like he would any constituency), and if he focuses his energy on making New York City clean, safe, well run and more affordable and not on geopolitics, he can put this issue to bed. Otherwise, it will be a constant distraction that could end up becoming the defining issue of his mayoralty. **2\. Be creative about how to deliver on core ideas.** If Mamdani becomes mayor, it will have been because, alone among the candidates, his policy proposals broke through, and his relentless focus on affordability was organic and authentic. Mamdani's proposals for free buses, a rent freeze, free child care and city-run grocery stores obviously resonated with voters. He absolutely should pursue this agenda. But he should do it in a way that acknowledges trade-offs and demonstrates a mastery of government. And he should know that, at times, he will have to stand up to his own supporters in order to get anything worthwhile done. Free buses will be expensive, about $630 million per year. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority loses an estimated $300 million per year from subway fare evasion. If you updated the turnstiles to install true, nine-foot doors (like in Paris) that only open when you pay the fare (while also swiftly letting people out, including people with strollers or in wheelchairs), you could end most fare evasion. Then use those savings for free buses. The mayor doesn't control the MTA, but he's got a bully pulpit — and if this isn't part of MTA chair-CEO Janno Lieber's agenda, the mayor should try to jawbone it into existence. Another signature Mamdani proposal is freezing the rent in rent-stabilized apartments, which in practice would mean instructing his appointees on the Rent Guidelines Board to reject annual increases for some 960,000 apartments. This is hardly new: de Blasio's appointees did this three times. If he wants to keep this promise, he should make it part of his broader housing plan. First, take seriously many landlords' arguments that costs are so high that they can't afford to maintain rent-stabilized buildings. Real estate is a knife's edge business in New York City, and there are some responsible small and mid-size landlords who can't keep up with costs. Mamdani should appoint a task force to dig into the economics of this regulated building stock and then recommend a solution. And make the Rent Guidelines Board process and calculations completely transparent in a way that New Yorkers can understand. Finally, he should embrace the fact that the solution to the affordability crisis is building many more homes. His housing plan needs far more detail and some recognition of fiscal reality, but it has the benefit of emphasizing supply. Once he's underway, he can distinguish himself from past mayors by holding himself fully accountable. He should design a housing plan that starts from zero on the day he takes office so the public can see exactly what City Hall is accomplishing rather than giving the new mayor credit for work in progress that he inherited. One of us, Jamie, was the state housing commissioner and understands the pressure to include everything in the year end report on progress; Mamdani should set a higher bar. He should also make the speed it takes to build just as important a metric as "units built or preserved," which has been politicians' chosen measure of success for years. Mamdani may find that the pressure on the Rent Guidelines Board eases as people have more options. Mamdani will know he has a good housing strategy when everyone is unhappy. Developers will make less money than they want. Environmentalists will see their concerns reflected far less in policy and zoning decisions. Community boards and council members will lose veto power over rezonings in their districts. Unions will not be able to insist that their members work every job (or that the jobs always pay prevailing wage). Right now, in order to make all of these special interests happy, regular New Yorkers lose. That has to change. Mamdani's promise to deliver universal child care can be a signature move and could make New York City far more liveable and affordable for a lot of people. The question is one of cost. Even at the estimated $5 billion annual price tag, universal child care can be paid for within the current City budget; but it may mean other priorities are less well funded. Making it happen would probably mean getting much tougher with municipal unions in contract negotiations. It might also require scaling back the plan, and it will certainly mean standing up to the left on some funding issues, but it's worth pursuing. Simultaneously, Mamdani should still try to avoid defaulting to the notion that you can endlessly tax the rich to fund new programs. The rich have more flexibility than anyone else. They see living in New York City as a value proposition. If the city is clean and safe, and taxes are not out of control, it'll be worth it to them to continue living here. If it feels bad or becomes too expensive, they'll go someplace else. And as the tax base dwindles, resources for all city and social services would fall with it. Driving the city's largest taxpayers away ultimately punishes the people Mamdani cares about the most: the working poor. Even if Mamdani doesn't buy those arguments, politically, he can't raise taxes on the rich without Albany. 2026 is an election year and Gov. Kathy Hochul already has a tough fight in store without pushing through a tax increase, particularly since the impacts of the federal budget will create statewide demand. Picking this fight and losing in his first year will empty his political equity store.Mamdani's big ideas don't require tax increases to happen. He shouldn't put the ideological desire to raise taxes ahead of policies that can actually make the city more affordable. **3\. Govern based on what really matters.** That means the following to us: **First, hire the most talented people you can get, independent of their politics.** Just like Mike Bloomberg would always say he would happily hire a member of the Communist Party if they were the best person for the job, the same (although on the other end of the spectrum) should be true here too. When Zohran was on Bradley's podcast, he said he would not factor in the ideology or politics of any job candidate as long as it's not related to the subject matter at hand. We believe him. Mamdani has the ability to attract a lot of talent, but it has to be done with the belief that the vast majority of the job of mayor is to run the city well and not to impose an ideological agenda on every decision that comes across his desk. If Mamdani can bring in talented operators to run agencies like Transportation, Sanitation and Parks, he can allay many of the concerns expressed by center-left pundits. Not every appointment has to be a political statement. One example: keeping Jessica Tisch as police commissioner. At the same time, revitalize the Civilian Complaint Review Board. **Relatedly, he should realize that the best political path to run a city is to do so apolitically.** Voters may choose someone to become mayor based on their politics, but once that person is in office, they mostly want the city to feel safe, clean, affordable and well run. In a weird way, because Mike Bloomberg was so not personally attuned to politics, by just doing the job based on what he thought was right — rather than what was popular — he ended up becoming very popular. There are a million different interest groups looking to pressure, bully, flatter, cajole, coerce or incentivize the mayor into doing what they want. The minute Mamdani starts trying to maneuver all the chess pieces is the minute he will start to fail. He will have to take meetings and pay lip service, but at the end of the day, the best political strategy is to ignore as much of the politics as possible. **Quality of life doesn't have to be a left-right issue.** Mamdani has a plan on how to deal with the mentally ill in our streets and subways. Let's give it a chance and see if it works. Hopefully it will. There are a lot of other issues that impact New Yorkers meaningfully on a day-to-day basis like closing illegal weed shops, reducing the endless scaffolding, solving the e-bike chaos and reducing shoplifting that are not inherently ideological but can easily be portrayed otherwise. Just use common sense. **Mamdani should think of being mayor as a dead-end job; he shouldn't worry about preparing to run for anything else.** Virtually every single mayor thinks he should be president or hold some other office. They all lose. Mamdani is so young, maybe he can be the exception here, but the best way to do that is put it off for sometime far in the future. Zohran should just plan to do the job really well for eight years, proving to all New Yorkers that he delivered for them, and then think about another office if he wants. But mixing the two only results in disaster. **Use technology.** There's a premise that the far left has to hate new technology (most famously in AOC's efforts to kill Amazon's HQ2 from coming to Queens, costing the city 40,000 new, good paying jobs). To implement his agenda, Mamdani will have to utilize new technology intelligently. AI could make functions like licensing, permitting and procurement far more cost effective and efficient. Drones could get rid of the need for most scaffolding. Waymo wants to come to NYC. They're adding real value for riders in cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco and Austin. Find a way to make it possible here too. One final note. We just offered a plan for Mayor Mamdani. For the next month, all eyes will be on Candidate Mamdani as he navigates the demands of a frontrunner and standard bearer. Who he meets with and what he says will send a message to his critics and, if handled with the skill he's shown so far, can send him flying through the general. Will Mamdani be a good mayor? We don't know. But none of these ideas conflict with his core beliefs, many of them directly benefit his core constituencies while also boosting the economy. If he does become mayor, all of us should stand ready to help him succeed. ### Zohran Mamdani in the Balance URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdani-in-the-balance/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:55.000Z Eric Adams won't go down without a fight, but Democratic Socialist Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani is the odds-on favorite to be New York's next mayor. In recent years far-left progressive mayors in major cities offer a tale of two outcomes. Chicago's Brandon Johnson has proven ideological and beholden to public sector unions, becoming deeply unpopular in the process. But Boston's Michelle Wu was also caricatured as dangerously progressive before winning office.[ As The New York Times noted in 2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/us/michelle-wu-boston-progressives.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "Ms. Wu had time to pivot toward the center, but she did not" — her campaign championed fare-free transit, climate action and rent control right through election day. Wu has governed well: Crime is down, affordable housing is getting built, pre-K is expanding and the economy is relatively healthy. Which model would New York get with Zohran Mamdani? The prospect of a Mayor Mamdani has triggered preemptive panic among many New Yorkers, especially people who focus most on the city's economy, its public safety and its quality of life. Progressives dismiss this as typical establishment hysteria from Cassandras, or Cassandrews. Critics once predicted Bill de Blasio's[ stop-and-frisk rollback](https://www.mediamatters.org/new-york-post/ny-daily-news-defends-nypds-stop-and-frisk-policy-warns-body-count-will-start-rising?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and tax hikes would destroy the city. I[ parodied the histrionics](https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/mayor-bill-deblasio-new-york-city-102648/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the time. Instead, de Blasio's first six years brought crime lows, shrinking jail populations, economic growth and universal pre-K. The city thrived, at least until COVID. If Mamdani becomes mayor, will we get a de Blasio sequel, a Johnson replay or a record more like Wu? **Public Safety** De Blasio signaled balance immediately, appointing Bill Bratton — architect of "broken windows" policing and CompStat — as police commissioner. Bratton ended discriminatory stop-and-frisk while strengthening proactive, community-based policing. Mamdani charts a different course entirely. In the past, he's advocated for deep police cuts, voted against[ tougher gun trafficking penalties](https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?bn=A06066&term=2023&ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ tweeted support for defunding the NYPD](https://twitter.com/ZohranKMamdani/status/1273750951836477440?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and called for[ police-free crisis response](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2021/04/zohran-mamdani-wants-to-reimagine-public-safety-in-nyc/182670/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While well-intentioned, these policies risk reducing safety in[ neighborhoods already suffering from slow response times](https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2024/02/06/nyc-911-call-response-times-2023?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mamdani may envision refocusing cops on major crimes while delegating smaller issues elsewhere. But those "smaller" crimes — misdemeanor assault, menacing, shoplifting, noise violations, subway infractions — shape daily life. Cops remain best equipped to handle most of them, especially when seconds count. He's particularly naive about street homelessness, where severe mental illness and addiction are common. Compassion matters, but dismissing current proposals to engage in more involuntary treatment — even when people pose clear dangers to themselves and others — abandons the most vulnerable while surrendering public spaces to the few rather than improving them for everyone. Social workers pair with police officers precisely because any given situation can go sideways in an instant. He's not being straight about the jail predicament either. Closing Rikers Island by 2027, as required by local law, means building and opening four borough jails holding 3,300-3,900 people total. Those facilities are hopelessly behind schedule. Today's jail population routinely exceeds 6,000, with thousands of those incarcerated people facing violent felony charges. Mamdani hasn't been honest enough about how he'd solve this math problem. Part of the answer is processing cases more efficiently, and part of it may well be maintaining more jail beds. Will he bend? **Budget** New York's finances walk a tightrope. Federal COVID aid is ending, recession threatens and the city[ faces multi-billion-dollar deficits](https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/nyc-budget-outlook-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mamdani proposes billions in new spending without credible funding. Governing this city demands brutal tradeoffs. Mamdani[ talks as if there are none](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/zohran-mamdani-and-andrew-cuomo-arent-as-different-as-you-might-think). His money would come from tax increases requiring Albany's blessing — raising corporate rates to 11.5% and adding 2% on incomes over $1 million. In a gubernatorial election year, this won't happen.[ State lawmakers know our tax rates, raised this year, already concern businesses](https://nypost.com/2025/06/08/opinion/soaking-the-rich-as-mamdani-and-other-lefties-want-wont-pay-for-a-supersized-nyc-govt/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When tax plans fail, Mamdani will face a stark choice: abandoning his campaign promises or engaging in dangerous fiscal irresponsibility. A mayor openly hostile to corporations and wealth could trigger an exodus of the city's golden geese. We've heard this threat before, but that doesn't mean it[ couldn't finally happen](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2024/03/dinapoli-and-heather-briccetti-mulligan-op-ed-nys-tax-base-dips-population?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That would devastate the budget — including the social services Mamdani champions. New York City's mayor has to worry every day about who will fund the shelters where 100,000 people sleep nightly, the housing vouchers that prevent evictions, the transit that moves millions to work, the[ schools spending $36,000 per pupil](https://cbcny.org/research/highest-costs-middling-marks?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and more. **Schools** About schools. For decades, New York has tried[ pursuing both equity and excellence](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/618-15/equity-excellence-mayor-de-blasio-reforms-raise-achievement-across-all-public?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — lifting struggling students while challenging high achievers. This balancing act is one of government's toughest challenges. Tip too far toward equity, abandoning excellence, and our system resembles other big cities hollowed out by middle-class flight. Mamdani too tightly embraces a misguided law to reduce class sizes across the board; it gives schools no flexibility, forcing them to spend billions to get far too little educational bang for the buck. He'd weaken mayoral control, a bad idea. He's[ signaled broad-based hostility to achievement-based tracking](https://x.com/tracewoodgrains/status/1936808625164693766?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and programs placing high-performers in rigorous environments. Mamdani previously[ supported abolishing the Specialized High School Admissions Test](https://nypost.com/2025/06/21/us-news/nyc-socialist-mayoral-candidate-zohran-mamdani-a-fan-of-abolishing-shsat/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — the sole factor determining whether students will be admitted to the city's competitive high schools serving mostly working-class families. He's[ since moderated this position](https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2025/06/13/nyc-mayoral-candidates-education-platform-school-system-overview/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). (It's reasonable to want to keep the SHSAT and add in other admissions measures.) Continue this path, and thousands of families valuing academic rigor could flee the system — and the city. **Housing** Housing costs top New Yorkers' concerns. While other Democratic candidates proposed ambitious housing goals, Mamdani's are far less workable than others. He's flirted with the YIMBY movement — even [going on Derek Thompson's podcast to speak positively about abundance](https://podcasts.apple.com/kh/podcast/nyc-mayoral-candidate-zohran-mamdani-on-abundance-socialism/id1594471023?i=1000714169498&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — but for now remains committed to building housing in one of the costliest ways possible. Namely, he wants government to build 200,000 units over 10 years, without relaxing any of the very costly requirements that make affordable housing more expensive to build than market-rate housing is. Even if you believe this is a good use of government money and energy, the math doesn't work. The city is just $30 billion below its debt limit; Mamdani needs Albany to raise it to $100 billion. That's almost certainly impossible, with no Plan B. Meanwhile, he'd freeze rent-stabilized rents for four years regardless of economic conditions. This will devastate some struggling building owners, risking widespread disinvestment, especially in low-income neighborhoods. **What's promising** All this having been said, and it's a lot, the anti-Mamdani brigades overreach by insisting he'll be a disaster across the board. Some of what they grouse about doesn't matter, and some of what he offers is actually, well, exciting. Mamdani's foreign policy views aren't a real problem. Yes, his support for[ a single democratic Israeli-Palestinian state](https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-01-18/ty-article/.premium/nyc-mayoral-candidate-zohran-mamdani-calls-for-one-state-solution/0000018e-2d7e-dc5b-a1af-3d7f2c5f0000?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) troubles many Jewish New Yorkers, but he's not running for president. (Cuomo recently wouldn't endorse a two-state solution either.) When asked about whether he cares about protecting Jewish New Yorkers on Stephen Colbert's "Late Show," Mamdani [gave a genuinely rousing answer](https://x.com/rafaelshimunov/status/1937367107081036241?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). His public grocery idea — which critics call Trader Joe Stalin's — doesn't scare me either. The government providing us with free books (aka "libraries") coexists easily with capitalism — why can't public grocery stores? While government groceries are hard to launch (Chicago's Johnson[ struggled mightily](https://fee.org/articles/the-problem-with-a-chicago-municipal-grocery-store/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)), a few won't doom the republic. Besides, Mamdani has made clear that if the proposal doesn't pan out, he'll just scrap it and move on. That's a rare, welcome admission. Free buses may be fiscally silly given MTA shortfalls, but the idea has merit for improving speed and convenience. Anyone who has waited for what seems like hours on brutally hot days only to watch a series of bunched buses arrive will not be entirely hostile to this idea. Even Mike Bloomberg considered free crosstown buses. I don't expect Mamdani to be a managerial disaster on day-to-day delivery of public services either. Yes, Mamdani[ told the New York Editorial Board](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/p/zohran-mamdani-interview-transcript?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that "a mayor is a messenger, a delegate, a liaison." When I noted he omitted "manager," he admitted that matters too. Duh. Past that rhetorical flub, the key piece of the abundance agenda Mamdani endorses is that American public services are too bureaucratic and unresponsive,[ needing to work better, cheaper and faster](https://www.theringer.com/podcasts/plain-english-with-derek-thompson/2025/06/23/nyc-mayoral-candidate-zohran-mamdani-on-abundance-socialism-and-how-to-change-a-mind?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Because most big unions were with Cuomo, he arguably has a good deal of freedom to push for crucial flexibility, efficiency and cost-savings. He's said that unlike Eric Adams, who stocked his early administration with corrupt flunkies — and unlike de Blasio, who was an infamous micromanager — he intends to hire capable agency heads and give them flexibility to run their departments. Easy to say, harder to do — but I believe he wants to try, and there are many committed public servants eager to join an administration that is directionally appealing and not corrupt. It's important to step back and look at the man himself, and this one is clearly a very quick study. His age, while a legitimate worry, is also an asset; he's reading, listening, learning and growing all the time. His campaign has been a thing to behold, and I'm not just talking about the social media videos. He's out in the streets walking the length of Manhattan. He's on podcasts with ideological opponents. He's mixing it up with New Yorkers, including those who don't care for him. As even a Cuomo adviser observed, [he has impressive emotional intelligence](https://x.com/nealkwatra/status/1937822108635054379?s=46&t=aPsI0u385IlDMNKeO3EMxw&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That's a winning way to lead people in the most diverse city on the planet. If Mamdani wins the general election, he just could govern better than many of his critics anticipate. But to do that, he'll probably have to abandon some of his unwise ideological commitments. Can he? I've got a thimble of hope — and a barrel of concern. ### The June 24 New York City Earthquake URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-june-24-new-york-city-earthquake/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:32.000Z *New York City just got through its most intense and divisive Democratic mayoral primary in memory, with a stunning finish: Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani defeated former Gov. Andrew Cuomo in the Democratic primary. What does the historic campaign say about the changing city and its politics?* *To get perspective, we sat down with Basil Smikle. Smikle has spent his career moving between politics, policy and academia. A Bronx native, he served as executive director of the New York State Democratic Party and as deputy state director for U.S. Sen. Hillary Clinton. He now teaches at Columbia and CUNY, while also offering political analysis on MSNBC.* *This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.* **Vital City:** Thanks for taking the time to talk. To start, what did this Democratic primary campaign reveal about New York City's politics? What did it teach you? **Basil Smikle:** I think it showed us a generational divide in local politics — something we've seen nationally as well. While progressive candidates have won legislative seats over the years — like Jumaane Williams, Brad Lander, and, to some extent, Bill de Blasio — the progressive electorate today is different. It's not 2013 anymore. Since that year, the electorate has been majority-minority, and signals a reshaping of the Democratic coalition. Jesse Jackson ran nationally in 1984 and '88, the Rainbow Coalition helped elect Bill Clinton — and David Dinkins in New York. That framework has underpinned the party for over 30 years. But now we're seeing a new, younger Democratic coalition coalesce. My mentor told me in the early '90s, "Every movement becomes an institution." And there's a younger generation of voters who see the Democratic Party as an institution that's no longer central to their political and economic empowerment. It's a party in need of a new movement. This election seems to have produced that locally. **VC:** Zohran Mamdani, a 33-year-old assemblyman, ended up besting Andrew Cuomo, the ultimate establishment figure in New York. Why Mamdani? Other progressives could have ridden the same movement. Was it charisma? The message? Something else? **BS:** All of that could be true. He has charisma, a compelling story. He's young. And he raised a lot of money from a cross-section of New Yorkers. That early fundraising became the first narrative about him — not his age or background, but his donor base — which made him look like a candidate with broad appeal. There's also a perceived authenticity. Take Jessica Ramos: a strong legislator and candidate, but when she cross-endorsed with Cuomo, voters asked, "How do those things align?" Mamdani, early on, was seen as an authentic progressive. That mattered to voters trying to figure out what "real progressive" means today. > There's a younger generation of voters who see the Democratic Party as an institution that's no longer central to their political and economic empowerment. It's a party in need of a new movement. **VC:** For a Democrat, is being a member of the Democratic Socialists of America a liability? **BS:** I don't think so. Back in 2016, there was more of a litmus test — specific things you had to support to be "legitimately" progressive. That's loosened. The connective tissue now is that you're full of big ideas, independent from the Democratic machine, maybe even in your party registration. **VC:** Some of the attacks on Mamdani liken him to Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson, but Mamdani doesn't seem as enmeshed with labor in the same way Johnson was in Chicago. **BS:** Mamdani doesn't seem beholden to anyone. That matters today — whether you're compromised or not. Progressive voters want someone authentic, unencumbered by political history. The Rainbow Coalition of the 1980s and '90s was deeply tied to organized labor. But over time, Democrats moved toward the center, and Republicans became the party of the working class. Now Democrats need to rebuild that connection. As labor leaders change — like American Federation of Teachers president Randy Weingarten stepping down — there's potential for a reconstitution of the coalition. That might include some unions joining a newer, less establishment formation. **VC:** In polls, Cuomo tended to win among high school grads, Mamdani among college grads. What does that signal? What's behind that divide? **BS:** I'd want to know the age and race of those high-school-grad Cuomo supporters. Older voters may remember his governorship — or even his father's. A lot of it is name recognition, and unions often stick with known quantities. If you've never heard of Mamdani, you're less likely to endorse him. Cuomo also leans into quality-of-life issues, which haven't been front and center in exactly this way for a long time. In Giuliani's era, those were often proxies for criminalizing poverty. Progressives pushed back on that framing. But some older voters — even those who supported de Blasio — liked Bloomberg's managerial style. They want order, not necessarily ideology. And many of those voters — especially older Black voters in places like Southeast Queens — supported Eric Adams and now support Cuomo. Voters engage with multiple identities. They may like Mamdani's ideas but still feel drawn to Cuomo's managerial experience. **VC:** That complexity can be overlooked. For example, Cuomo's strongly pro-Israel stance might resonate with Orthodox Jewish voters, but parts of his Black working-class base may feel differently. Sympathies with the Palestinian cause are said to be rising among African-Americans. Voters don't fit neatly into blocs. **BS:** Right. You see that in reactions to the sexual harassment allegations against Cuomo, too. People ask how voters — especially those who support Attorney General Letitia James, who led the independent investigation into those accusations — can still vote for him. But voters negotiate with themselves all the time. Voters can compartmentalize. They care about safety, security, city management. That doesn't mean they don't care about #MeToo, but their day-to-day concerns might feel more urgent. **VC:** You worked with Hillary Clinton, a candidate who also had baggage but was widely respected for competence. Cuomo has some of that dynamic. And ranked-choice voting was supposed to reduce negative campaigning — yet here we are. **BS:** Ranked-choice can confuse voters. It hasn't reduced negative campaigning. It's just shifted how alliances form. Maybe, over time, voters and candidates will adapt. As for Clinton and Cuomo: both are known names, but their "baggage" is different. Clinton suffered from what I call "infinite regress" — people disliked her without always knowing why. That dates back to her time as First Lady, talking about healthcare. Cuomo never had that. He's long positioned himself as the grown-up in the room — since his time as attorney general and after the Senate coup, when he ran for governor. He's savvy, and people know that. But gender plays a role. Where Cuomo is seen as tough or experienced, Clinton was seen as overly ambitious. > Mamdani doesn't seem beholden to anyone. That matters today — whether you're compromised or not. **VC:** On social media, many people say Cuomo ran a bad race — avoiding forums, dodging tough questions. Do you agree? **BS:** He's not a retail politician like Eric Adams. He's used to a statewide role where there's distance between you and the press or public. That doesn't work in New York City mayoral politics, where the press is tough and the public expects to see you. But his strategy matched his strengths — and what some voters were willing to tolerate. For communities that know him, it was enough for him to show up once and deliver a message. That might not fly with younger voters, who want engagement. So it feeds the generational divide. **VC:** What about [the "asshole" factor](https://www.politico.com/newsletters/new-york-playbook-pm/2025/06/20/cuomo-the-a-hole-00415569?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? Cuomo has a reputation as being a very tough person to work with. Mamdani comes off more like a happy warrior. Some people might think the city's challenges, internally and coming from Washington, require someone strong and cantankerous. Arguably, if you don't think the city is facing a crisis, you don't need Cuomo to come to the rescue — maybe Mamdani and his sunnier presentation becomes a better fit. **BS:** It depends on the constituency. Some ask, "Can I work with this person? Do I know who they'd bring into office?" With Cuomo, people know. With Mamdani, it's a blank slate — but also an opportunity to shape his vision. Giuliani ran on law and order. Bloomberg was the manager after 9/11\. Cuomo's first campaign ad leaned on quality of life because people feel the city has lost something since COVID. The perception that the city is mismanaged is widespread, and Cuomo leans into that. That appeals to voters who want competence over ideology. **VC:** Mamdani has had a remarkably disciplined message: free buses, free childcare, freeze the rent. Some of the other candidates seemed caught off guard by changing conditions — Adams' legal troubles fading, crime trending down. Did that hurt them? **BS:** Yes. Mamdani's consistency made him look authentic. When candidates have long records, they end up explaining — defending their votes, clarifying positions. That hurts. As they say, when you're explaining, you're losing. Mamdani's new, so he has room to define himself. It's like Obama in 2008, and I wouldn't compare Mamdani to the former president in many other respects: People questioned his experience, but that also meant he wasn't tied to unpopular decisions. Mamdani had a clean slate — and he made the most of it. One last point, and it speaks to the divide between Mamdani and Cuomo supporters. Politics is probably the only profession where leaders don't develop succession plans. Someone can be in office for 40 years and then voters are left to figure out who replaces them. Younger voters feel that acutely. They believe the older generation hasn't made room for them — and they don't trust the institution itself. That's different from my generation, which still had faith in the Democratic Party. That lack of trust is a big part of the generational divide we're seeing now. ### A Tale of Two New Yorkers: Didarul Islam and Zohran Mamdani URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-tale-of-two-new-yorkers-didarul-islam-and-zohran-mamdani/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:55.000Z Two New Yorkers of South Asian Muslim descent have been on the city's mind of late. One, Didarul Islam, 36, was a first-generation Bangladeshi immigrant who joined the NYPD as a traffic agent and worked his way up to police officer. While working a city-managed security detail in his police uniform, he was killed this week by a crazed gunman in a Park Avenue office building as his pregnant wife and two children waited for him to come home. The other, Zohran Mamdani, 33, is the son of a prominent anthropologist and a famous filmmaker, both born in India. He is the frontrunner in the city's next mayoral election, which would make him a Democratic Socialist responsible for both the NYPD and the city's public safety writ large. One man saw the NYPD as a way to make a life in one of America's great cities, the other helped build his political career by declaring the NYPD racist and in need of defunding. It's harder to find two people who more clearly illustrate the visceral cleave between many New Yorkers at this moment as the city decides its direction in the coming years. When people ask me about the evolution of policing in New York City, one of my talking points is that South Asian Muslims are among the fastest-growing demographics in the NYPD. This is something I learned at headquarters shortly before I retired from the force in 2015, and it made sense: As each new wave of immigrants arrives, many seek the best city job they qualify for as a ticket to the middle class and a key to the city itself. These days, traffic enforcement and school safety agent positions provide such pathways into civil service. Once they have a stable footing, many immigrants then vie to become police officers. For others, their children are the ones who climb the ladder to the NYPD. In this tradition, an NYPD badge is an immense source of pride for new Americans. My father immigrated from Cuba, and sometimes I think it barely registers with him that I racked up two Ivy League degrees as the family's first college graduate. The first thing he tells everyone about his son is that I was a New York City cop. It excites me that this demographic of Muslims is appearing in ever greater numbers on the beat, because it means that an important cultural part of New York City and its police endures. **A protective institution** These new officers become part of an institution that fiercely protects them. Many will remember that when Police Officers Rafael Ramos and Wenjian Liu were executed by an assassin as they sat in their police car in Bed-Stuy in December 2014, vast parts of the rank and file were furious at then-Mayor Bill de Blasio. They turned their backs on him by the thousands, literally, from the hospital to the officers' funerals. It wasn't that he was responsible for the killings, but rather that his apparent disdain for the NYPD and its officers was more than they could bear at a funeral. Many officers saw their about-face as a way to honor the dignity of the fallen son of Chinese immigrants and a Latino who had begun his service as a school safety agent. As the world watched de Blasio feebly [speak to the backs of an ocean of officers](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io7hOfnMldY&pp=0gcJCfwAo7VqN5tD&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), there is little doubt he saw his political career flash before his eyes. This was not only because the police make up powerful municipal labor unions with tremendous influence over the media and public opinion. Police officers have families who love them and neighbors who respect them, forming a network of relationships that extend to every corner of the city except, perhaps, certain enclaves of hipsters and the very rich. When you love your child, are innately proud of them having chosen this calling and worry about them coming home safe, and the mayor who leads your city seems to disdain their professional identity and by extension your pride in it, you are likely to assume there is something irredeemably wrong with your mayor. It is a hard hole for a politician to climb out of. De Blasio was able to avoid political catastrophe in no small part because he had shrewdly appointed the veteran police executive Bill Bratton as his police commissioner. After the deaths of Ramos and Liu, he gave Bratton a wide berth to run the police department as he saw fit, as well as to hand-pick his senior team. This allowed Bratton — who had not only run the NYPD before, but spent seven years leading the Los Angeles Police Department as well — to reassure officers that City Hall had put the department in the hands of a leader who understood and respected cops. What it cost, however, was the momentum of the police reform agenda de Blasio had campaigned on. Apart from enacting the extensive reforms mandated by the landmark stop-and-frisk civil rights case the prior administration lost, only small pieces of de Blasio's vision of reimagined policing ever came to fruition or endured. The NYPD will bury Police Officer Islam with Muslim rites, and, consistent with tradition for police officers killed by gunfire, we can expect he will be posthumously promoted to detective first grade. His wife, children, and the child he never met will have their healthcare provided by the city. Officer Islam's survivors' benefits will provide them with an income. The children will get college scholarships. Police officers will drive the family to holiday parties and memorial events for years, doing for them what they do every day, in other ways, as a basic feature of their role: serve and protect people they hardly know. Imagine how it must feel to come to America as a brown-skinned Muslim fleeing poverty and oppression and be adopted into this civic institution a few years later. It is hard to find anything else like it in the world. **A challenge for Zohran Mamdani** If the oddsmakers are right, Zohran Mamdani will be the city's next mayor. He, too, has an ambitious police reform agenda. Strategists have no doubt advised him to speak reverently about fallen officers, and to disown [his tweets from 2020](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/20/mamdanis-social-media-savvy-comes-at-a-cost-00464117?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that were full of unambiguous scorn and mockery toward police. He has since asserted police perform an indispensable function, and he will surely seek out a police commissioner who is willing to enact change but brings enough bona fides to prevent the NYPD from actively working against him. These moves are all indicators of political savvy, but Mamdani should consider something else. He attended Bowdoin, the elite liberal arts college in Maine. For the son of an intellectual and an artist, it's not a ticket to anything, it's just a pro forma place to go to school. But the year Mamdani graduated Bowdoin, there was a sophomore there named [Justin](https://www.bangordailynews.com/2014/12/22/news/bowdoin-offers-to-cover-full-tuition-for-slain-new-york-city-police-officers-son-a-student-at-the-brunswick-college/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Justin's father never made it to his son's graduation, because Justin's father was Rafael Ramos, the NYPD police officer murdered in the police car in Bed Stuy in 2014\. Imagine how proud Officer Ramos would have been to see his son get his diploma, for his family to go from beat cop to Bowdoin graduate in one generation. There are things Mamdani can learn from his Bowdoin classmate, [who considers his slain father his hero](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2886797/Family-murdered-NYPD-cop-welcomed-open-arms-visit-old-station-house-teenage-son-hails-father-hero.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Until Mamdani truly understands this New York City, the one full of immigrants born without silver spoons who join the NYPD to live a decent life and protect their neighbors so their children can be the first in their families to go to liberal arts colleges where they dorm with the progeny of professors and artists, until he convinces voters that despite the NYPD's flaws, he understands there is much more to the city's police than his 2020 tweets suggest, there are millions of New Yorkers who won't trust him because they'll worry he doesn't understand their lives or what they value. It will make for a very rough four years. ### Beyond Free Buses URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/beyond-free-buses/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:55.000Z Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani's historic victory signals that Democratic voters embrace his vision for New York. The appeal of these ideas is clear, especially against the backdrop of an affordability crisis that Mamdani effectively spoke to over the course of his campaign. New York's transit system serves millions of riders every day. New Yorkers rely on it and understand that it enables them to access everything the city has to offer, from jobs to schools to beaches to Mets games. Yet despite transit's central role in all of our lives, the mayor doesn't control the buses or the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The MTA is largely controlled by the governor. This asymmetry helps explain why previous mayors have ignored straphangers' pressing needs year after year. Mamdani, undeterred by this imbalance, took the unusual step of featuring buses prominently in his mayoral campaign. ## What free buses deliver — and don't "Fast, free buses" is pithy and memorable, but as policy, it is less than meets the eye. While buses are subsidized, they still generate an estimated $600 million a year in revenue. (More on this below.) This $600 million is used to help offset $4.1 billion in annual operating costs. Without a long-term plan for where an additional $600 million would come from year after year — either through fare increases in other parts of the transit system, higher taxes or more funding from the City and/or State — the MTA will be forced to reduce service. Each is a serious tradeoff; no one should pretend that "free" is really free. Charles Komanoff, who has endorsed Mamdani's free bus pledge, found that eliminating the fare would boost ridership by an eye-popping 23% — and generate close to $1.5 billion in benefits for that $600 million cost. This sounds great, but it is worth noting that the $600 million estimated loss is low. Mamdani has said that he plans to make every bus in New York free, but Komanoff's numbers only include New York City Transit buses. To make every local bus free, we need to include the buses operated by both New York City Transit and MTA Bus. In 2023, MTA Bus riders paid $179 million to ride the bus. Looking at prepandemic farebox revenue (rather than 2023 farebox revenue, when ridership was only at 62% of what it was in 2019), buses generated more than $1.1 billion — or $1.38 billion in 2025 dollars. That's a lot more than $600 million in lost revenue. The "fast" part of Mamdani's promise is equally important. He's right to say that ending fare collection would likely enable much swifter boarding, as would all-door boarding, which would speed up buses along their routes. This is a real benefit of going free — but it assumes bus service would remain robust and reliable after that revenue disappears. That might not be possible with a brand new $600 million to $1.4 billion hole in the MTA budget. There are better, more fiscally sustainable ways to make surface public transit more responsive to the needs of riders. ### Alternative idea 1: Make buses faster while expanding Fair Fares Rather than making buses free for all New Yorkers, let's first make them fast. In my own research with colleagues at NYU's Marron Institute on bus networks and informal transportation in New York City, I have found that passengers prefer frequent and reliable bus service to free fares. New Yorkers care more about speed and frequency, because, on average, New Yorkers spend a bit less on transportation than their fellow Americans. This is important because it suggests that transportation is not the root cause of New York's affordability crisis. Affordability is a worthy goal. However, instead of making buses free for all, why not build on the Fair Fares program that provides a 50% discount on buses and subways for low-income New Yorkers? The current program's uptake has been lackluster; one study estimated that only 34% of eligible users are enrolled in it. Fixing Fair Fares by raising the income limits, providing deeper discounts and increasing participation would offer assistance to those who need it. Fortunately, policies making buses faster and more reliable have already been implemented in New York and in cities around the world. First, dedicate space in the roadway to buses to free them from traffic; second, consolidate bus stops where they are spaced too closely together so that buses can maintain higher travel speeds over longer distances; third, provide signal priority at traffic lights to ensure buses zoom through red lights at intersections; and, fourth, allow passengers to board at all doors so that buses aren't forced to linger at stops as each passenger pays to enter. In 2018, Alon Levy and I proposed a Brooklyn Bus Network Redesign that combined all of these best practices and increased bus speeds by as much as 40%. Holding all else equal, which is a fudge, and using some of the same assumptions that Komanoff used for his model, we can assume that ridership would increase by 20% if these best practices were implemented citywide. (In our modelling, we assumed a more conservative trip time to ridership elasticity, but we also accounted for things like greater walking time and changes in frequency. Additionally, we redesigned the bus network in Brooklyn in a specific fashion that differs from current MTA proposals and doesn't apply citywide.) There are also other important benefits to faster trip times, namely an increase in service frequency without increasing operating costs. If bus operators can complete their trips in a shorter time period, they will be able to complete more trips per shift. In New York City, the mayor decides, via the New York City Department of Transportation, how streets are used. In fact, as recently as 2019, the New York City Council passed a streets master plan compelling the DOT to add 150 miles of protected bus lanes over a five-year period. Sadly, as a recent New York City Comptroller report notes, the "NYC DOT has failed to meet any of the dedicated bus lane targets mandated by the Streets Plan." This is clearly an area that a new mayor and an empowered DOT Commissioner can address on Day 1. ### Alternative idea 2: Help the MTA work with municipal agencies New York's high capital construction costs have been documented by the New York Times, my team at NYU and many, many others. While Mayor-elect Mamdani was a genuine bus champion on the campaign trail and took on capital cost issues in Albany, as mayor he will have an opportunity to work with the MTA as it builds Phase 2 of the Second Avenue Subway to address its capital construction costs and show New Yorkers that we can still do big things quickly, cheaply and well. During Phase 1 of the Second Avenue Subway construction, the MTA and the City negotiated individual agreements that spelled out how the MTA planned to mitigate its construction impacts. Every time the MTA needs to shut down a city street to get a tunnel boring machine into place or remove underground pipes, the City needs to sign off on these actions before the MTA can proceed. From this perspective, the City holds considerable power over the MTA. The City has used this leverage to extract improvements beyond the project's scope, driving up schedule delays and project costs in the process. To take one example, during construction of the 86th Street Station, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection forced the MTA to renegotiate its agreement with the MTA after the MTA had hired a contractor to move gas, sewer, electric and water utilities for the new underground station. This last-minute change introduced costly redesign work, a six-month delay and contributed to a $2.24 million change order on a $34 million contract. Had the mayor explicitly prioritized collaborating with the MTA, these predictable conflicts could have been avoided. ### Alternative idea 3: Change land-use rules to help transit Finally, as the MTA moves forward with the $5.5 billion Interborough Express (IBX), a new rail line connecting the southwestern Brooklyn waterfront with Woodside and Jackson Heights in Queens, the mayor has a unique opportunity to bring more transit riders to the train by rezoning the entire 14-mile right-of-way before construction begins. Land-use is a deeply polarizing issue that is often shaped by City Council members rather than mayors or governors. IBX, however, cuts through multiple jurisdictions, rendering councilmanic privilege — the de facto practice of letting a local councilmember determine land-use decisions in his or her district — less salient. This creates an opening for the mayor to champion comprehensive land-use changes spanning the entire route without being hostage to any individual council member. Rather than rezone each neighborhood one by one, it is better to make funding, even though half of it was recently secured, contingent on the City upzoning all of these areas. By making way for new housing, the City would also be helping to facilitate new transit riders. The recent "City of Yes" rezoning allows for increased residential density in areas within a half-mile of existing subway stations. The area around the proposed Eliot Avenue station, a station that doesn't currently exist, is not subject to the City of Yes zoning changes. According to our forthcoming research at NYU Marron, people living near the proposed Eliot Avenue station will gain access to 423,000 more jobs within a 45-minute commute once the station is operational. This is the biggest gain in access to jobs for any of the 14 IBX stations, but the dominant zoning around Eliot Avenue is R4, which caps building heights at just 35 feet, or two to three stories, limiting how many people will be able to travel to those jobs once IBX opens. \*\*\* New York is New York because of its high-capacity transit system that enables millions of people to access millions of jobs surrounded by countless amenities rather than city-killing surface parking lots. Our transit system is one of the few things in all of our lives that is reliably affordable relative to housing, food, childcare and health care. There are big, important ways to make above- and below-ground transit work better for New Yorkers that make more sense, especially in the near term, that we should pursue before making buses free. *This has been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### The State of Crime in New York City at Midyear 2025 URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-state-of-crime-in-new-york-city-at-midyear-2025/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:55.000Z *This is* [*the latest*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-state-of-crime-in-new-york-city-at-midyear-2024) *in a* [*continuing Vital City series*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/vital-signs-state-of-the-city-on-crime-2024) *that takes a deep look at the data to put New York's current public safety trends in context.* How safe is New York City today? Mayor Eric Adams has said the city is "shattering crime record after crime record" and should therefore stay the course. Former Gov. Andrew Cuomo, during his failed bid for mayor, said "New Yorkers feel unsettled, they feel unsafe" — and called for the hiring of 5,000 new police officers. And Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani wants the NYPD to focus on major crimes while creating a new Department of Community Safety to take over many police responsibilities. Among New Yorkers themselves, just 42% rank neighborhood public safety as excellent or good, with a wide range of opinions across the city. This much is beyond debate: The COVID pandemic represented a rupture for many American cities, including New York. After years of declining crime, violence spiked and public disorder spread rapidly. In November 2021, the city elected Adams in large part on a promise to bend those curves. Four years later, as many other cities' violent crime rates have essentially recovered from the pandemic, New York sees real progress but serious continuing challenges. *Where not otherwise stated, this report covers the period through June 30, 2025.* **Overview** Here are the city's trends in shorthand: The good news: - Major felonies are dropping so far in 2025 compared to 2024. - Murders and shootings are near or at historic lows. The bad news: - Except for murder, major felonies are still well above prepandemic levels. - New York City's recovery from pandemic crime spikes lags that of most other large American cities. - Assaults, both felony and misdemeanor, remain a stubborn problem. - Total crime counts — including offenses that occur far more frequently than the seven major felonies — remain much higher than they were in 2019, undoubtedly shaping New Yorkers' sense of safety. The positives first: New York City is making substantial progress in reducing major felony crime, with a 5.7% decline in the seven major categories compared to this time in 2024\. Murders and shootings are near or at historic lows. In 2025, murders fell below one per day for the first time since before the pandemic. And across nearly every major felony category — except rape, which was redefined in 2024 to include a broader set of offenses, a change that may be related to rising numbers — New Yorkers are the victims of crime less frequently now than they were last year. But it's not all rosy. The city has yet to return to prepandemic levels for any major index crime category. In the first half of 2025, the overall count of major crimes — a term that comprises murder, rape, felony assault, robbery, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny of a motor vehicle — remains elevated by 30% compared to the same period in 2019\. Felony assaults, which typically involve causing serious injury, using a weapon or assaulting a protected worker like a police officer, have held steady this year after years of especially steep increases. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23960130?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mXF98M6E4xQ0A19B2yx1OrKvN0612Omcj6Gh9fe3xjE/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24161794?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wWmxap6RY2YqbwHa18gdnWqREJp9t-ETu3srD89YEUY/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Shooting incidents, in particular, have hit record lows. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/story/3251878?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tViNwh8%5F4vMVkusaHmWD0JDgnKpCUXdXpLYQmcnw8RE/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) What will full-year 2025 totals look like if current annual trends hold? Begin with this caveat: Prediction is more art than science, and there's no perfect way to predict how crime will trend in the second half of 2025\. Crime is seasonal and affected by many factors, both known and unknown. But because the same seasonal patterns tend to repeat each year, they shouldn't distort year-over-year comparisons. So, to estimate where 2025 will end up, we assumed that the percentage decline seen in the first half of the year will continue at the same rate in the second half. It's not a guarantee — anything can happen — but it's a reasonable way to project the full-year totals. If current trends continue, murders and shootings are on track to fall below 2019 levels by year's end. The other major felony crimes will still remain meaningfully elevated compared to the city's prepandemic low-water mark. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24162158?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1G-VFgOEHlk3PLWJ0okrvJweECZADEanJnlWfrgXrICY/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) When compared to the nation as a whole and other populous cities, New York City is lagging in returning to prepandemic levels. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24231616?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/16l-YG7lTYC3v7yjZ-RAj%5FMjKas-EvMZjibVvgJw-ZdE/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) If 2025's year-over-year decreases hold to the end of the year, cities with over a million people, mid-sized cities (with populations of 250,000 to 1 million) and rural areas will all see meaningful drops in murder compared to prepandemic levels. With the exception of Houston, the only city projected to have more murders in 2025 than in 2019, New York City is expected to see the smallest decrease in murders among the remaining eight cities. All other major cities are projected to experience declines ranging from 14% to 42%. One caveat to these comparisons is that several cities, including Chicago and Philadelphia, were experiencing rising murder rates even before the pandemic, giving them a higher peak from which to decline. In contrast, New York entered the pandemic period near historic lows, which may have limited the magnitude of possible reductions. Still, San Diego — the city with the lowest prepandemic murder rate among the top nine — managed to produce a larger postpandemic decline than New York. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/story/3226643?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ZNrUWl%5FQJukksAXVhtcnGa%5FEQIo6AzSdP%5F86%5FBpJLfI/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Assaults: a persistent and brutal problem** As the city has made notable progress on murders and shootings, both felony and misdemeanor assaults remain a significant issue. Assaults have been on an upward climb since 2008, reaching their highest point since 1998 in 2024, even as other violent crimes have been declining back closer to prepandemic lows. Looking first at felony assaults: By definition, [felony assaults](https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/120.05?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) result in disfiguring or similarly serious injuries or are committed with weapons, and/or are attacks against some public servants, police officers or other protected classes of people. And they occur often. While murders for many years have numbered annually fewer than 500, felony assaults are regularly counted in the tens of thousands. Put another way, in the first half of 2025, felony assaults happened 98 times more frequently and 43 times more frequently than murders and shootings did, respectively. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24183081?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1loanNFY49IjMIPuQhl%5FSnv4rfZtqKIgPTAPqraGEyKQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Why felony assaults are increasing is a puzzle. Typically, murders, shootings and felony assaults rise or fall together. The NYPD attributes the rise to several factors: [increases in attacks by strangers, attacks on the elderly, attacks by a domestic partner](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/529-24/transcript-mayor-adams-citywide-crime-statistics-the-second-quarter-2024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [attacks on police officers or public administrators](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/006-25/transcript-mayor-adams-nypd-commissioner-tisch-crime-down-2024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Major%20crime%20in%20public%20housing,want%20to%20be%20very%20clear.). Data on stranger victimization is currently not available to the public, but Vital City was able to confirm that there have been increases across the other three categories. In terms of volume, most of the rise in felony assaults is being driven by two categories: domestic violence cases and a broad category of other felony assaults, some of which may involve attacks by strangers. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24166084?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1oYRo4Cvr3vwjVQCNNJ4VmjOmJfU%5Fv6d3vNRVoZQRm0Y/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Misdemeanor assaults are also significant crimes. While these assaults can be as simple as a punch, they can also encompass serious injury, [such as leaving the victim unconscious or requiring stitches](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/who-eric-moneyham-finance-consultant-turned-violent-lands-jail-after-shocking-assaults-1729547?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and are even more numerous than felony assaults, consistently outnumbering them by more than 2-to-1 over the years. Misdemeanor assaults, like felonies, have also risen since the pandemic, with no signs of a downward turn. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24034174?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1esdn0nJgpm0AJOj9AR-jCbM2FqepyK5zu4D6dbJ2Drc/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **The total number of offenses has reached an 18-year high** Many wonder why there is a persistent sense of unease in the city despite declines in many felony crimes. One likely explanation is the rise in overall crime. Traditionally, law enforcement and the media focus on the seven major crimes tracked by the FBI — murder, rape, felony assault, robbery, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny of a motor vehicle — to standardize crime analysis across jurisdictions. But city life is shaped by far more than these serious, relatively rare, offenses. For example, in 2024, there were 332 misdemeanor assault complaints for every one murder, and 13.4 petit larcenies for every robbery. Examining "all crimes" — felonies (which numbered 188,418 in 2024), misdemeanors (which numbered 299,929) and violations (which numbered 88,761) — offers a fuller picture of life on the street and the types of incidents that most often affect New Yorkers' sense of safety. Tracking changes in overall crime is challenging because what gets reported or recorded can depend heavily on police enforcement practices. If police suddenly surge enforcement of a particular offense, it will make it appear as the incidence of that crime is increasing greatly, whether or not that is actually the case. For example, the count of fare evasions may rise sharply, reflecting more that police are enforcing more heavily and thus recording the crime than that people are reporting or that incidence of the crime is increasing. With the federal adoption of a new way of recording crime — NIBRS (the National Incident-Based Reporting System), which requires law enforcement agencies to report a wider range of offenses — many minor violations like fare evasion that were previously underreported or excluded from official complaint files are now counted. As a result, increases in certain crime categories may reflect shifts in reporting standards rather than actual changes in criminal behavior. To better understand trends in crimes that directly affect New Yorkers, we grouped offenses into two categories: those likely to be influenced by police enforcement practices, like fare enforcement on public transit, vehicle offenses or offenses related to drugs, and those more likely to reflect victim- or witness-reported incidents, like assaults, larcenies and sex crimes, which are unlikely to be affected by enforcement. [Our classification of offenses can be found here.](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xkCVZN6sQr44CE9t6JDl8H%5FApobnYv%5FxvkhtXAJzeTg/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24353480?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-YJqoVe6acfc2PPBKYwx36T5ii-S2wRQOKcz74TEcKA/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The top three victim-reported crimes by volume are petit larceny, which typically includes shoplifting or other thefts under $1,000; harassment, where a person intentionally harasses, annoys or alarms someone through physical contact, following or repeated annoying behavior; and misdemeanor assault. These increased by 23.1%, 20.6% and 15.3% respectively when comparing the first half of 2024 to 2019\. These three crimes surpassed 250,000 in 2024, more than double the total of the seven majors combined. There are some encouraging signs in the first quarter of 2025, which saw modest but real declines in many crime categories compared to the same period in 2024: 11 of the top 17 victim-reported crimes dropped. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24355270?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Uddd%5FIgzSSg%5FcBNJn3V7nD1V7Wp%5FNIUvf6IVSK0S3TU/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **The subway** The subway is New York's mobile public square, which millions of people use every day to get to work, school, doctors' appointments and more. How safe it is and how safe it feels shapes how New Yorkers perceive the city more broadly. Federal officials [claim the subways have dangerous levels of violence](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/17/nyregion/nyc-subway-safety-nadler-duffy-hearing.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but the numbers are clear: The rate of violent crimes on the subway is lower than on many of its peer transit systems. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24447811?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KrCZqOL7Pkh4MQgn78DoGm5CwLBuhSbRGpFL%5FMEpdyQ/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) What are subway crime trends like when we compare the New York City subway in 2025 to recent years? There are two ways to measure this. The first is to compare overall crime counts in the transit system — not taking into account the number of rides. Looking at total crime counts, in the first half of this year, major crimes in the subway system fell by 3% compared to the same period in 2024, including a 7.7% drop in both robberies and grand larcenies. Both of these categories of crimes are now lower than they were before the pandemic. Compared to the first half of 2019, overall major crime underground is down nearly 10%, robberies are down 18% and grand larcenies are down nearly 27%. The one exception, mirroring trends above ground, is felony assault. These incidents are now 65% higher than in 2019 and have continued to rise from 2024 to 2025\. These are not especially common crimes underground — there are just 5.8 major crimes per day in the transit system vs. 317.1 per day in the city as a whole — but the increase is worrying nonetheless. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24144961?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1CINscPCLiRQZsmkjda85HIK9Ob-%5F%5F3DB37hk40Ny%5FMA/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Murders on the subway are especially rare events. While last year's 10 murders tied a grim record last experienced in 2022, so far the first six months of 2025 have included two murders, a pace that is more in line with prepandemic patterns. (Note: Two murders occurred on the subway in July shortly before the publishing of this report.) [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24290622?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18FwCdLhOOg-K%5FQ--5jCNimodSx9yHbWURGF0wI3N2Kg/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Murders, felony assaults and grand larcenies are, of course, not the whole story. Any subway crime — not just the seven major felonies — affects how safe riders feel. Victim- and witness-reported crimes underground have been rising year after year from 2020 to 2024, as riders have steadily returned to public transit. But the totals haven't quite climbed up to 2019 levels, which were relatively high (in contrast to city crime counts, which were low), along with very high ridership. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24355937?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1dPv4AzENT8lLV5IJg2nyw5EGURlM6V%5FuR2Y32D8btN8/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The second way to measure crimes in the transit system is not by counting their totals, but to calculate how many occur on a per-rider basis. This gives a more precise sense of relative risk, especially as ridership has dipped to modern lows during the pandemic and has been steadily climbing up ever since. By this measure, crime has been dropping — but remains far higher today than it was over the period from 2006 to 2019. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24356156?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1LPRRlALt3Tnl2v3%5FSTuybcb-8zDqYu1IAjuC%5F-KbjLo/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) In the first half of 2025, total victim-reported offenses on transit decreased, driven by a reduction in grand and petit larcenies. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24356315?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1fNEMZkmYq2PFH%5F5sITRUDygUI50rviRa9lXXtrKia6g/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **Youth crime is near historic lows** New York's Raise the Age law, implemented in 2018 and fully in effect by 2019, ended the automatic prosecution of 16- and 17-year-olds as adults in most criminal cases. Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch [has argued](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/382-25/transcript-mayor-adams-removal-over-2-200-illegal-firearms-new-york-city-streets?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the law had unintended consequences, saying "When the age of criminal responsibility went up, the age of criminal suspects went down," and suggesting that gangs began recruiting teenagers to carry out violent crimes with fewer legal consequences. This argument is not new. The NYPD was a vocal critic of Raise the Age before and after its passage, [especially following the 2019 murder of Barnard College student Tessa Majors by teenagers in Morningside Park](https://jjie.org/2019/12/16/opponents-of-raise-the-age-in-ny-speak-out-about-tessa-majors-murder/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That case was widely cited by law enforcement as evidence of rising youth crime and the consequences of juvenile justice reform. There is little public evidence to support the claim that Raise the Age has led to increased youth crime. There is admittedly a lot of noise in these data, as many of the ages of suspects in the complaints file are unlisted or unknown. But when looking only at cases where the suspect's age is known, 4.3% of complaints today involve suspects under 18, compared to 5.6% in 2018, the year Raise the Age began to take effect. That share remains lower than in the years before the law took effect. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24197777?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uBdD-nrAsENYLT6NvgNI2oKlSSpcogIyccbdxuZYHzc/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) There has also been a decrease in arrests among those who are under 18, and the data do not show that this cohort is arrested more often when they get older. Arrests of those in the 18-24 age group have also decreased year after year since the law was enacted. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24164956?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UK6h63Ki7Mj-1nE230UyLrtJiVSYZ7Z2A692gvpHBrg/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) **The criminal justice system, arrest and post-arrest** A key measure of how effectively crime is being addressed is whether reported offenses lead to arrests and whether arrests turn into prosecutions — in other words, whether prosecutors assess that the evidence presented by investigators is strong enough to file a complaint or indictment. Similarly, the degree of deterrence a criminal justice system might bring to bear is affected by whether charges lead to convictions (whether by plea or trial), and then by the kind of penalty imposed. After an arrest is made, the strength of the evidence is tested by whether the prosecutor decides to proceed with the case, and then whether the evidence is sufficient to convict. Without a conviction, there may be little deterrent to future offending. Even before the pandemic, New York City's conviction rates lagged behind the rest of the state by 20 to 30 percentage points. That gap has only widened in recent years. Conviction rates elsewhere in New York remained steady through the pandemic. But the city's rates have fallen sharply. In the most recent data, just 36% of felony arrests in the city led to a conviction, compared to 80% statewide. For misdemeanors, the city's conviction rate was 21%, versus 69% in the rest of the state. Overall, only 27% of arrests in the city resulted in a conviction, compared to 73% statewide. This growing disconnect between arrest and conviction raises real concerns, not only about accountability, but also about deterrence and public confidence in the justice system. If the vast majority of arrests don't lead to any meaningful consequences, people may reasonably question whether the system is functioning at all. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24251135?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mbA%5FHHW4t47hpZyR7ERkThYN3qx1gY1EA7Ggo2rLe5U/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) While conviction rates remained well below prepandemic levels — and even further below the rest of the state — the average monthly jail population has returned to levels not seen since 2019\. Data show the monthly length of stay declining, but why that might be and whether it reflects a reality or a quirk of the data is not known. We suspect that what appears to be a steep drop in time spent in jail may actually reflect problems in city Department of Correction data. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/24361389?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ZqErOs8uAUKWZm4rzNwuVtKqObNgQ9KhtMemF9Y7JDA/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *This piece was originally published in July 2025 and has since been edited to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### Guess What? Government Is Already in the Grocery Business. URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/government-is-already-in-the-grocery-business/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:56.000Z When then-candidate Zohran Mamdani proposed opening city-owned grocery stores to combat rising food prices, his opponents [dismissed it as radical "socialist" policy](https://nypost.com/2025/04/05/us-news/socialist-nyc-mayoral-candidates-city-run-supermarket-plan-under-fire/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). To many, the idea conjures images of DMV-style bureaucracy taking over a private-sector function — yielding long lines and wilted produce. But this criticism reveals how little attention we pay to what already surrounds us. Far from being radical, city-owned grocery stores would represent a logical next step in New York City's century-long commitment to food access through public-private partnerships. The public sector already operates and supports a diverse network of food retail that has been hiding in plain sight for generations — in large part because it works well and without much fanfare. The question isn't whether the city can run grocery stores; it's what the next generation of municipal food retail will look like. **Government grocery stores in context** There's already a prominent American example of government grocery stores we ignore at our peril. The largest and longest-running network of such stores in the U.S. is the military commissary system, dating back to the 1800s. Commissaries are supermarkets operated by the U.S. Department of Defense to provide affordable groceries to servicemembers and their families. The Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) [runs about 235 stores worldwide and 177 on bases in North America](https://corp.commissaries.com/sites/default/files/2024-11/DeCA%20FY%202024%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with annual revenues of $4 billion. These stores are fully owned and operated by the federal government, staffed by government employees or contractors, and offer groceries at cost plus a small surcharge (about 5%) to cover overhead. They sell food that [averages 25% below private supermarkets](https://corp.commissaries.com/sites/default/files/2024-11/DeCA%20FY%202024%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) due to the small markup, reduced overhead and economies of scale. They don't turn a profit, with all nominal earnings from the surcharge reinvested. I've heard no one describe them as a dangerous socialist or even communist experiment. In New York City, there is a commissary at Fort Hamilton, in the Bay Ridge neighborhood of Brooklyn. This market has [193 ratings on Google Maps averaging 4.6 stars](https://maps.app.goo.gl/xte4NsxQVHEageju5?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — demonstrating that the government can operate efficient, popular grocery stores that customers genuinely appreciate. The commissary model proves that large-scale government food retail isn't just possible; it's already successful. **Public markets** When it comes to serving civilians, New York City has been in the food retail business for nearly a century, building and refining a sophisticated infrastructure. Beginning in the 1930s, [Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia built a network of city-run indoor markets](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23703146?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to provide sanitary spaces for the food pushcarts that clogged city streets. [Six of these LaGuardia markets still operate today](https://publicmarkets.nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They are owned and managed by the city's Economic Development Corporation, which keeps vendor rents below market rate to enable lower food prices. Each market reflects the character of its neighborhood: Arthur Avenue Market is a center for Italian traditions in the Bronx; La Marqueta celebrates East Harlem's Latino culture and hosts an incubator kitchen for food entrepreneurs; and Certo Market in Brooklyn contains kosher vendors and a kosher supermarket serving the neighborhood's Hasidic Jewish community. These markets demonstrate the City's long-standing role in food retail infrastructure and its ability to adapt to current needs. **Publicly supported supermarkets** Even among traditional grocery stores, the city has developed increasingly sophisticated ways to support food retail through partnerships that leverage both public resources and private expertise. The Food Retail Expansion to Support Health (FRESH) program subsidizes new and enlarged supermarkets in underserved neighborhoods through zoning incentives for developers who incorporate a supermarket in their projects and tax incentives to supermarket operators. To receive these incentives, FRESH supermarkets must reserve 30% of their space for perishable foods and have at least 500 square feet for produce. The program currently doesn't require affordability standards or even SNAP acceptance — criteria that would be worth adding to ensure public investment yields social and health benefits. Since 2011, New York City has subsidized 27 stores through 25-year tax abatements worth $29.2 million to date. The City also functions as a supermarket landlord, using its commercial space to reduce real-estate barriers to conventional supermarkets. For example, [Associated Supermarkets](https://commercialobserver.com/2022/03/associated-supermarket-lease229-247-graham-avenue-williamsburg-houses/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) leases space at Williamsburg Houses, a Housing Authority development in Brooklyn. In the Rockaways, Queens, [Ocean Bay Community Development Corporation](https://www.lisc.org/our-resources/resource/ocean-bay-commercial-community-center/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) partnered with the non-profit Asian Americans for Equality to develop a supermarket on NYCHA land. Other U.S. cities are implementing similar strategies. For example, [Madison, Wisconsin](https://www.cityofmadison.com/news/2024-11-18/promise-kept-city-of-madison-secures-lease-for-maurers-market-on-s-park-st?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is purchasing 24,000 square feet of ground floor retail space and offering a 15-year lease to Maurer's Market, a well-regarded family-owned Wisconsin grocer. The new store is slated to open in 2025, showing how cities can use their real estate assets to enable grocery retail. Atlanta's economic development arm, Invest Atlanta, [approved up to $8.1 million in public funding](https://www.investatlanta.com/about-us/news-press/city-of-atlanta-partners-with-invest-atlanta-board-to-approve-81-million-to-help-establish-two-grocery-stores-with-fresh-food-options-in-food-deserts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to facilitate the opening of two new grocery stores in neighborhoods with limited food retail. These funds help build out locations, purchase equipment and inventory, and cover operating costs for stores operated by private company Savi Provisions. Municipal involvement in grocery retail is becoming mainstream urban policy. **Publicly supported greenmarkets, mobile vendors, digital platforms and pantries** The government's involvement in food retail runs still deeper. New York City has one of the largest farmers' market networks in the U.S., [with more than 120 markets across the city during the growing season](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/pdf/cdp/farmers-markets-map.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While vendors are private farmers, the "market" itself is a product of public investment and facilitation. The City provides land and supports operational costs and enables markets to accept federal SNAP benefits by subsidizing EBT card readers. The Department of Health distributes [Health Bucks](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/business/food-operators/green-carts.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — $2 coupons for fresh produce purchased at farmers' markets, making them more affordable for low-income New Yorkers. New York City also supports mobile vending of healthy food. The city's [Green Carts program](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/business/food-operators/green-carts.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) allocates 1,000 pushcart permits to vendors who agree to sell within designated neighborhoods that need more access to affordable fresh produce. These permits create entrepreneurial opportunities for the vendors while addressing food access gaps. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's [Groceries to Go program](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/health-topics/groceries-to-go.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) helps low-income New Yorkers with chronic diseases purchase healthy groceries online. Participants receive monthly credits and a 50% discount on fresh produce through an e-commerce platform featuring neighborhood supermarkets. Not least, New York City [funds more than 700 food pantries and soup kitchens citywide](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hra/help/food-assistance.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), ranging from small operations in church basements to large supermarket-sized pantries. As food insecurity has increased, these have evolved from emergency providers to essential and permanent parts of the local food environment. The City also supports the distribution of prepared meals to seniors at home and in community centers, provides food at homeless shelters, and supports a range of other food distribution programs. **Designing new food retail** Mamdani has proposed a network of government-run stores, which wouldn't be a radical idea. But rather than choosing between approaches, New York City could weave together the best features of existing programs into new, integrated models. The most innovative might combine the bulk purchasing power of a public commissary with Greenmarket's regional sourcing, creating stores that offer both the cost savings of institutional procurement and the freshness of local farms. Mobile Green Carts could serve as neighborhood extensions of fixed public markets, bringing affordable produce directly to residents while maintaining connections to larger retail hubs. The City could also expand its food pantry infrastructure to serve a wider range of low-income customers on a sliding scale, transforming emergency food assistance into a permanent affordability program. FRESH program incentives could be enhanced with mandatory affordability requirements. Instead of simply leasing commercial spaces on City land to private supermarkets, the city could also contract with operators to maintain control over pricing and accessibility. Online food retail programs like Groceries to Go could evolve to connect regional producers directly to neighborhood pickup points, creating a city-managed supply chain that bypasses traditional distribution markups. This synthesis approach could also incorporate the elements of successful features from other business models and public programs, such as sliding scale grocers that adjust prices based on income, stores dedicated to participants who receive federal assistance that provide nutrition education alongside food access, and food-as-medicine programs that offer groceries tailored to the needs of those with diet-related diseases. **Why municipal groceries could well make sense** [More than 1.4 million New Yorkers are food insecure](https://map.feedingamerica.org/district/2023/overall/new-york/organization/food-bank-for-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — meaning they lack sufficient access to affordable, healthy food — and nearly half of households with children are at risk of food insecurity. A big reason for this is the high cost of living in New York and the high cost of food itself. [Groceries in the New York City metropolitan area](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/reports/osdc/pdf/report-2-2026.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are more expensive than the national average and have increased in price rapidly in recent years, growing by 65.8% from 2012-2013 to 2022-2023, compared to 48.8% nationally. In a city where grocery prices place enormous strain on working families, municipal food retail isn't some crazy policy; it's an extension of what the city is already doing. When markets fail to meet basic needs, government has both the capability and responsibility to act. We do it with housing, transportation, health care and food — complementing, not replacing, private options. A city that operates one of the world's largest transit systems, manages [1,700 parks and playgrounds](https://www.nycgovparks.org/about/faq?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=New%20York%20City%20has%20more,from%20woodlands%20to%20skating%20rinks), runs libraries and schools in every neighborhood, and delivers some of the best-tasting drinking water in the nation can certainly sell groceries. The infrastructure, expertise and successful models already exist, but they just need to be refined and scaled up to meet the unique needs and tastes of the city's neighborhoods. That'll take vision, intelligent execution — and the willingness to face down the fearmongers. ### Adams’ Abdication Has New York City at Trump’s Mercy URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/adams-abdication-has-new-york-city-at-trumps-mercy/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:56.000Z What's happening inside one building in lower Manhattan is building toward a potential federal occupation of New York City. That may sound like hyperbole, but it has already begun in and around federal properties here, more or less with the blessing of Mayor Eric Adams, who keeps saying — when he's forced to say anything at all about the administration of the president who got the criminal charges against him dropped — that he's powerless to do anything about any of this. Mostly, he's simply ignored those officers wearing masks inside the halls of a federal building containing an immigration courthouse at 26 Federal Plaza, who are roughly arresting people in the halls as they show up to court appearances and removing them to a makeshift new jail of locked office rooms on the 10th floor. Adams has consistently supported theconcept of a sanctuary city, meaning a city that protects otherwise law-abiding undocumented immigrants from deportation, but he also regularly complains that the city's specific laws limiting cooperation with ICE's civil immigration enforcement help protect violent criminals — without saying how exactly he'd like them changed. So perhaps Trump's Justice Department provided him another assist with [Thursday's federal lawsuit challenging the city's policies](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/07/24/trump-administration-sues-sanctuary-protections-immigration-enforce/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The suit gives Hizzoner the opportunity to distance himself from Trump, at least on paper, which he needs to do while running a longshot bid for a second term, while also setting him up with an alibi for complying and doing what Washington wants or at least staying out of ICE's way. Every day, this bizarre, grotesque scene in lower Manhattan — a Soviet Russia joke where the conviction comes before the trial — becomes less of a news story, since that's what ICE has been doing the day before that and the day before that. The frog keeps boiling as the Trump administration promotes its cruelty, gleefully tweeting about shipping immigrants it often calls "terrorists" and "invaders" — without evidence, let alone trials — willy-nilly to jails like [Florida's "Alligator Alcatraz"](https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/1940128362892337660?lang=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and deporting people to countries they have no ties to — including [South Sudan](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/04/trump-south-sudan-deportation-00440024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), where there hardly is a state in the middle of a brutal civil war, and the infamous CEECOT hellhole in El Salvador. Over recent weeks, when Adams has been pressured to address ICE's new unofficial jail in his city, he's insisted that he — and New York City by extension — were powerless to do anything about an office space in Manhattan. On Wednesday, the day before the Trump administration sued the city, he was [shamed into writing a letter](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/07/23/26-federal-plaza-jail-brad-lander-jumanne-williams-ice/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the federal agency that controls real estate demanding that they do something — never mind that the agency had said weeks ago that it's also powerless to oversee Department of Homeland Security facilities. Who watches the watchmen? No one, as far as New York City's mayor is concerned, and certainly not him. There are no easy answers here, of course, but passing the buck entirely is an abdication. Democratic members of Congress who've tried to visit the lockup here in Manhattan — as federal lawmakers are entitled by law to do anywhere that Immigration and Customs Enforcement is detaining people — have been barred from entering. Republicans would presumably be rejected, too, though none have bothered trying, as the Department of Homeland Security insists there's no jail there, never mind the people in cuffs and cells. My colleagues at THE CITY published video earlier this week giving [the first public glimpse](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/07/22/video-26-federal-plaza-immigration-ice-dhs-cells/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) inside the office rooms that, months ago, were converted into makeshift jail cells where people are locked up — most of them presumably the same ones who were arrested after showing up at their civil court dates in the same building. They're sleeping on the floor, with no privacy or showers, and limited food or access to medicine. The number of people imprisoned there and the length of the average stay are both rapidly rising, according to [THE CITY's analysis of the federal data](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/07/14/ice-migrant-arrests-trump-administration-deportations-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). On May 1, just one person out of the seven being detained there had been held for 24 hours. By June 25, 34 of the 160 people there had been locked up on the site for at least that long. Trump insists these are all violent criminals, but the government's own numbers show a rapidly rising share of people arrested whose only crime is their immigration status. And since many have open court cases, it's not even clear that many of them are illegal immigrants, let alone immigrants who are committing other crimes. That's not a justice system. It's also not a jail, according to the feds who seem to be channeling, with no humor, the immortal words of Chico Marx: ["Who are you going to believe: Me or your lying eyes?"](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHxGUe1cjzM&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) There's nothing funny about this, even as the scenes get increasingly surreal. The masked agents are mocking members of the press and [taking selfies with a male reporter they surrounded](https://www.amny.com/immigration/ice-coverage-press-groups-journalists-freedom/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as if they were about to arrest him. One told a female reporter she should smile more. That was the same agent, said the reporter, who hours earlier had body-slammed a middle-aged, no more than five-foot-tall woman he was arresting and escorting away, presumably to the 10th floor. Back to Adams: He vowed not to publicly criticize the Trump administration after it dropped the criminal charges against him, in a deal that the judge in his case wrote ["smacks of a bargain"](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/donald-trump-vs-the-rule-of-law-and-new-york-city) meant to give the feds free rein on immigration enforcement in New York City. While he's said precious little about the scenes inside 26 Federal Plaza, the mayor did weigh in after Comptroller (and, at the time, mayoral candidate) Brad Lander was arrested there while escorting immigrants to and from their court hearings, mocking the arrest as a stunt. DHS, for its part, gloated that "No one is above the law, and if you lay a hand on a law enforcement officer, you will face consequences. New York City Comptroller Brad Lander was arrested for assaulting law enforcement and impeding a federal officer." Hours later, Lander was released without charges since footage showed clearly he'd assaulted no one. These people — the Trump administration and its half-ally-half-hostage in City Hall — are not people to take at their word about anything. Their enemies will always be terrorists and criminals. Consider [this tweet](https://x.com/dhsgov/status/1948468662421119396?s=46&t=%5F%5FNXyoH3pWY0b%5F6bnjxcig&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from DHS Thursday afternoon about an "illegal alien" and his "assault" on "brave" law enforcement officers who "saved" other detainees: > 🚨UNHINGED ILLEGAL ALIEN RELEASED INTO AMERICA UNDER BIDEN ATTEMPTED TO STAB ICE OFFICERS > > Bass Ndiaye, an illegal alien from Senegal, attempted to stab ICE officers and about one dozen other detainees with a pair of scissors while awaiting processing. > > Thankfully, our brave… [pic.twitter.com/iKS8kxSssK](https://t.co/iKS8kxSssK?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)— Homeland Security (@DHSgov) [July 24, 2025](https://twitter.com/DHSgov/status/1948468662421119396?ref%5Fsrc=twsrc%5Etfw&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) This is how these liars and lunatics describe a middle-aged guy with no criminal record, locked up in a packed office room with other prisoners and stabbing *himself* with the scissors that were there to open food. Federal prosecutors in Manhattan are now trying to imprison this man here for as long as 20 years for supposedly then charging at and "assaulting federal officers," before presumably moving to deport him. Those details come from [the government's own account](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/senegalese-national-charged-assaulting-federal-officers-26-federal-plaza?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Keep him in mind along with Brad Lander when the feds put [out wild numbers](https://nypost.com/2025/07/24/opinion/the-week-in-whoppers-jeff-daniels-dishonest-anti-trump-complaint-jerry-nadlers-unbelievable-ignorance-on-ice-assaults-and-more/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about how assaults on ICE officers are supposedly through the roof. This is crazy and cruel stuff, from trolls with cuffs and an ever-tightening grip on the state's monopoly on violence, now reserved for the new federal cops and those local authorities that comply with them. Never mind the rule of law; this is the law of who rules. President Trump just had ICE officers in military garb ride in formation on horseback through MacArthur Park — not to enforce the law, but rather, as [leaked planning documents show](https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/exclusive-operation-excalibur-in?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to "demonstrate, through a show of presence, the capacity and freedom of maneuver of federal law enforcement within the Los Angeles Joint Operations Area (JOA)." That sounds an awful lot like the military planning documents showing our supposed paths to victory in Iraq and Afghanistan, the forever war on terror Trump claims credit for ending coming home to roost — if the president can get there before his poll numbers give in. Stand by, Sunset Park. Adams is still hoping to somehow win a second term as an independent, despite being the second least popular political figure in the city, just ahead of Trump. He's been punching left at Democratic nominee and avowed socialist Zohran Mamdani, while the president and his people are musing [about deporting Mamdani](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/07/01/trump-threatens-deport-zohran-mamdani/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or [somehow taking over the city](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/07/16/zohran-mamdani-breakfast-house-democrats/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They're not doing it yet, but they're not joking, and this crew will simply up the pressure, using every opportunity to frame New York City as a "shithole" and insist the answer is giving masked federal cops free rein. Of course, Trump's insults and incursions will almost surely ramp up no matter who's mayor. Remarkably, Adams' main appeal at this point might be that his corrupt cop friends who go golfing with the president, [accompanied by their public security details](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/07/12/chell-daughtry-golf-outing-with-trump-sparks-inquiry-over-use-of-nypd-security-detail-bedminster-new-jersey/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [on Dr. Phil's dime](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/07/23/a-paid-for-trip-to-talk-immigration-with-dr-phil-sparks-questions-about-nypds-john-chell/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), might be the last thing standing between New York City and an armed federal occupation. That's probably not a winning pitch in this election, but it's not necessarily wrong. Notably, after his arrest, Lander avoided using the phrase "civil disobedience." His ally Mamdani has taken a similar approach, while also dodging specific answers to questions about how *his* NYPD would work with, or against, ICE, and how it would handle anti-ICE protesters or pro-Palestinian protesters who, say, try to block vans from leaving 26 Federal Plaza or bust into a train car to declare it a Zionist-free zone. It's hard to focus on the open questions about Mamdani, though, when the president who stepped in to save the current mayor from a criminal trial is now threatening the mayoral frontrunner with deportation, and threatening New York City voters with a federal takeover if they elect him — while also holding the possibility of criminal charges over the candidate closest to Mamdani in the polls, former Gov. Andrew Cuomo. This endless pressure test from Washington is very real, and just ramping up. Whoever's mayor next year, New Yorkers are in for a rough ride as Trump aims to assert his dominance, and make the city comply. ### How You (Yes, You) Can Help New York City Thrive URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-you-yes-you-can-help-new-york-city-thrive/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:56.000Z Between a summer of punishing heat, the stress of spending more and getting less for the privilege of living here, a mayoral race that promises to be one of the nastiest in recent history, ominous ICE agents everywhere and the passage of a One Big Beautiful Bill that is anything but for New York City, we New Yorkers have every right to feel more cantankerous than usual, more besieged and more bewildered about the future of our city and our place in it. In short, we have the jitters. Myriad factors determine what makes our city more or less livable, and we face daunting challenges that require stepped-up political and civic leadership, collective will and money wisely spent. But we can all do our part to ease the anxieties of these polarizing and stressful times, and to make life a little more pleasant and hospitable for all who call New York City home. These suggestions are eminently doable and require little more than lifting your eyes from your phone, noticing those around you and acknowledging that you are part of a beating heart that is the greatest city in the world — a place that needs a bit of civility and consideration to thrive. Try to take on at least a few. - Say hello to the people you pass by in your neighborhood — or at least smile at them. - Say thank you to the people who make it possible for you to live here: the transit workers, store clerks and public servants, whether in uniform or not, who offer courteous service, and the cleaning staff in offices and workers in residential buildings who take out your garbage and clean up after you. - Don't block the subway doors or bus exit when people are trying to get out. Thank the people who step outside the trains or buses to let you out. - Don't shove or elbow people aside while climbing or descending subway stairs. The 30 seconds you save might be harrowing for the person you pushed past. - Offer help to people who are carrying strollers and shopping carts up and down subway stairs. There are far too few elevators — but plenty of helping hands. - For God's sake, offer your seat to a visibly pregnant woman, parents and caregivers juggling small children and babies, people with canes and the elderly. They can always refuse your kind offer, and you will both feel better for it. - Don't use public spaces as your private domain. No one wants to hear about your date last night, your latest business deal or whatever nonsense you choose to talk loudly about on the bus, in the park, walking down the street or in any other public space. If you must take a call, keep it down. - Having a phone doesn't mean your eyes must be incessantly glued to it while walking down the street. Why should everyone else have to get out of your way because you are screen-obsessed? Take a look around, you might catch some amazing sights and discover something wonderful that you hadn't noticed before. (You'll also help protect yourself from getting hit in the process.) - Bikers, e-bikers and scooter riders — obey traffic signals! Pedestrians have the right to cross the street without constant fear for their safety. - If you can afford DoorDash or GrubHub, you can afford a nice tip. I know the fees are high, but most of those don't go straight to the deliveristas who are rushing to bring you your tacos or sushi. - Don't litter. Every piece of trash, bottle and can you drop is making life more unpleasant for the rest of us. The same goes for dog poop that isn't picked up. - Visit your branch library, browse the shelves, meet the staff, or even a neighbor. Get a library card, download a free pass to a museum of your choice and enjoy the incredible cultural riches of our town. - When November rolls around, vote! The June Democratic primary saw record total participation topping 1 million, but that still represented only about 30% of registered Democrats — and around a fifth of all registered voters in the city. In short, be a good neighbor and engaged citizen. It may bring as much delight to you as it will to your fellow New Yorkers. ### Urban Infrastructure, Reexamined URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/urban-infrastructure-reexamined/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:56.000Z A collection of essays written by the architectural critic Ada Louise Huxtable was waggishly titled, "Will They Ever Finish Bruckner Boulevard?" Spearheaded by Robert Moses, the Bruckner Expressway, built on and above the eponymous boulevard (a dubious tribute to Bronx Borough President and U.S. Congressman Henry Bruckner), was begun in 1957, while Moses's infamous Cross-Bronx Expressway was still under construction. Though officially deemed "complete" by 2024, work on the expressway's Hunts Point Access Improvement Project remains ongoing, raising the questions: How has New York's infrastructure, with all its strengths and weaknesses, come into being? Who is responsible for designing, building and maintaining the city's transportation, water and sanitation systems, not to mention its urban development projects? When will the city truly be "finished?" Visitors to New York from cities around the world — London, Tokyo and Shanghai, among many others — may well be surprised by the comparatively distressed state of our mass transit, which features rats on subway tracks and buses out of service or stuck in traffic. They may be dispirited by streets that flood in heavy rain and other basics that seem to lag behind our global peer cities. At the same time, the city's staggeringly complex infrastructure daily serves 8.5 million New Yorkers, who rarely take notice of its effectiveness and efficiency. The tunnels that deliver water to New York, for instance, [are a special engineering marvel](https://olympianwatertesting.com/a-journey-through-new-yorks-historic-water-tunnels/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). While exalting how well the city functions most of the time, a new long-term exhibition, CityWorks, at the New York Hall of Science in Flushing Meadows-Corona Park, lends a gimlet eye to New York's infrastructure, zeroing in on both its achievements and its challenges. The 6,000-square-foot exhibition, more than six years in the making, is aimed at a broad audience, from small children and teenagers to adults. The adeptly configured hands-on displays, with clear sightlines allowing adults to read text while keeping their kids within their peripheral vision, incorporates extensive text as well as interactives, such as games focused on park design, water distribution and waste categorization. At its core, the exhibition instructs visitors that while many of us may take for granted that buses and subways run (with the latter, unlike in every other major city in the world, operating all night long), water appears when faucets are turned on and toilets flush, every urban system exists because someone designed and built it, and every system functions because thousands of people are dedicated to doing their jobs. Additionally, we're clearly informed, the city's infrastructure is a work in progress. Change is incremental and often slow, and every decision profoundly affects a raft of other choices in the future. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/aiezj1gsbswqtmdi_as-2025-04-11-cityworks_1520-jpg-auto-format-compress-1776259693939.jpg) Credit: Learning about what holds the city together. Photo Credit: New York Hall of Science It's a timely moment to absorb such lessons. The challenges facing the city are undeniably huge. Much of the city's infrastructure is over a century old (with some of it considerably older), critical maintenance has been too-long deferred and regulation can be complex. Costs, it almost goes without saying, are astronomical. The Second Avenue Subway tracks were the world's most costly expense, priced at $2.5 billion per mile, until they were surpassed in 2023 by the East Side Access project, which connected the Long Island Rail Road to Grand Central Terminal, costing a whopping $3.5 billion per mile. (Current estimates suggest that the price tag of extending the Second Avenue Subway from 96th to 125th Street may be as high as $4.3 billion per mile.) Where will the necessary dollars come from? Federal funding is particularly unpredictable at this moment, when the sentiment unforgettably expressed in the 1975 New York Daily News headline, "Ford to City: Drop Dead," may once again become a reality. Today, the critical Gateway Program improving the rail connection between New York and New Jersey has yet to be completed, and the fate of Con Edison's offshore wind project remains unclear. Other improvements have long languished due to a lack of available resources. As many as 10 years ago, Richard Ravitch, former head of the MTA, asserted that then-existent subway switching mechanisms could increase the speed of trains threefold, that it was simply a matter of being able — and willing — to pay for it. Notwithstanding the $500 million in revenue that the city is expecting to earn during the first year of congestion pricing, funding remains a critical issue. Yet, while challenges abound, so too do improvements, whether competed, in progress or proposed. The creation of generously scaled waterfront parks in formerly industrial or neglected areas, including Brooklyn Bridge Park, the Hudson River Greenway and Hunter's Point South Waterfront Park, as well as the High Line, has already proven hugely successful. And the proposed Interborough Express, which would include the repurposing of a former freight railroad line, suggests that the adaptive-reuse lessons learned from the High Line may continue to reap benefits. The proposed QueensLink would reactivate an existing rail line and further incorporate bicycle and pedestrian pathways and parkland, in an effort to resolve long-fought battles between transportation and park advocates. And the completion of Water Tunnel No. 3 (tunnels 1 and 2 were completed in 1917 and 1936, respectively) will radically enhance the city's "invisible" infrastructure. CityWorks leaves the economic and political realities surrounding any aspect of infrastructural improvement and expansion largely unaddressed. Perhaps public lectures and discussions — arguably a better substrate for the productive analysis of controversial issues than exhibitions — will compensate for this lack. It's been over a decade since Superstorm Sandy served as a wakeup call in 2012 — waterfront cities throughout the world, including New York, are now acutely aware of the need to innovate and implement new ways of building in a sustainable and resilient manner during a time of climate change. (A variety of coastal resiliency projects are currently underway.) Considered more broadly, it is clear that effective infrastructure serves as a cornerstone of maintaining public health standards, economic vitality and community stability. And it is equally evident that in the face of sometimes daunting obstacles, the desire to simply get the job done must be balanced by taking a long view. It is critical that planners, engineers, architects, landscape architects and government officials, not to mention the public, think not in terms of years or even decades, but centuries, and not in terms of the five boroughs, but of the entire metropolitan region, and beyond. CityWorks instructs us that in order to address New York's infrastructural needs, we must first recognize that the city as we know it simply would not be possible without its myriad systems, both seen and unseen. Equally important, the exhibition suggests, is putting a human face on infrastructure. Numerous displays focus on the contributions of municipal workers, with several incorporating audio recordings of city employees talking about their jobs. If engagement and a sense that we're all in this together are the first steps towards agency, CityWorksmay inspire New Yorkers, especially younger New Yorkers, to take the city's pressing infrastructure issues into their own hands. And who knows, maybe someday, they'll finish Bruckner Boulevard. ### How Small Acts Shape Great Cities URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-small-acts-shape-great-cities/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:57.000Z I've been photographing New York for more than 50 years, documenting this city's endless capacity to surprise and inspire as I've explored its neighborhoods. But during the pandemic, something shifted in how I saw our shared spaces. With fewer people around, the litter that's always been there became impossible to ignore — coffee cups wedged in tree grates, takeout containers blown against stoops, the daily debris of city life that we'd all learned to look past. Very soon, I realized how the small things we do every day, the split-second choices we make when no one's watching, don't just add up — they define what kind of city we're building together. We love to talk about New York's greatness, and rightfully so. But greatness isn't just about towering skylines or world-class culture. It's about whether our residents see a city that cares about itself. It's about whether a parent can walk their child to school on clean sidewalks. It's about whether the bodega owner who's been serving your neighborhood for decades feels like his block is worth taking pride in. Here's what most New Yorkers don't realize: when you toss that coffee cup on the sidewalk, the Department of Sanitation isn't coming to clean it up. [That's not their job](https://www.sanitationfoundation.org/clean-city-faqs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The Department of Sanitation is responsible for collecting bagged trash and recyclables, as well as street sweeping on designated routes. But individual pieces of litter scattered on sidewalks? It falls on New Yorkers to make sure trash is placed where it belongs so that DSNY can do its part. By law, property owners are required to [keep the sidewalk in front of their building](https://portal.311.nyc.gov/article/?kanumber=KA-02443&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and 18 inches into the curb clean and free of litter. This isn't a suggestion, it's a legal obligation that can result in fines if not followed. This division of labor makes sense: our sanitation workers handle 24 million pounds of properly disposed trash daily with remarkable efficiency. But they're not a cleanup crew for our individual choices to litter. That responsibility rests with property owners and, ultimately, with each of us as we move the city. Recent research conducted by the Sanitation Foundation revealed a troubling disconnect: while 83% of New Yorkers say they're proud of their city, [nearly 40% admit to littering](https://www.sanitationfoundation.org/nyc-litter-study-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We love New York in the abstract, but we're not always willing to act in a way that expresses that love in practice. That's a shame, because how we treat our shared spaces reflects our commitment to each other as neighbors and fellow citizens. I've occasionally started carrying a trash picker on my walks, not because I think I can single-handedly clean up the city, but because someone has to take responsibility for the block where they live and work. When you see a piece of trash and think, "Someone else will get that," you're probably wrong. That someone else should be you. Quality of life isn't just about crime statistics or school ratings, although those matter enormously. It's mostly about whether your daily environment feels cared for, whether the people around you are invested in the shared project of urban life and whether walking down the street makes you feel like you are a part of something bigger than yourself. It's what it means to be a New Yorker. Consider the small shop owner who sweeps the sidewalk in front of her shop every morning, not because she has to, but because she understands her success is tied to her neighborhood's well-being. Think about the parent who teaches their kids to hold onto their candy wrapper until they find a trash can because there's no age limit on being a responsible citizen. Picture the teenager who volunteers to pick up litter in her neighborhood because she understands that this is her city, and it's her responsibility too. These aren't heroic acts. They're the basic civic behaviors that make urban living possible. In a city of 8 million people, we succeed or fail together based on whether we see ourselves as responsible for our shared spaces. The beautiful irony is that taking care of our city actually makes us better New Yorkers. When you're invested in keeping your block clean, you notice things, you feel connected to your neighbors and you become a player in your community instead of someone who's just passing through. These small acts — holding onto trash until you find a proper receptacle, picking up something that isn't yours, taking pride in the appearance of your block — don't just keep our streets clean. They keep alive the idea that we're neighbors, not just consumers; that the greatest city in the world stays great because people who live here never stop working to make it so. That's the New York I want to live in. That's the New York worth fighting for, one small act at a time. ### Four Ballot Items to Unlock More New York City Housing URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/four-ballot-items-to-unlock-more-new-york-city-housing/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:56.000Z In July, the City’s Charter Revision Commission held its final vote on the ballot proposals to amend the City's charter. In November, New Yorkers choosing their next mayor will also get to decide whether to vote “yes” or “no” to five separate ballot measures, four of which are designed to improve the process to create new housing. Approving these revisions is imperative. The housing crisis in New York City should be treated like an emergency; vacancy rates are at an unthinkable 1.4%, which is why rents have been going up and up and up for decades. Homelessness has been increasing for so long, we’ve stopped treating it as a crisis. The single best way to improve housing affordability and bend the housing-cost curve is to increase housing supply. Instead, we have a process that makes building new homes a Herculean and even Sisyphean effort. The ballot provisions will finally give us a chance to push the boulder all the way up the hill. The current process takes — well, it takes as long as it takes. While technically each step in the process has a prescribed time frame, the cost of entering into the process is so significant that a housing developer would never take on the financial risk unless they had a very strong indication that it would turn out in their favor. The process creates risk that no developer — much less a nonprofit or minority- or women-owned business enterprise — would ever take on without first having some certainty of how it will turn out. I have followed the Commission’s deliberations with no small interest. That’s because for more than a decade, working at New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development's Division of Special Needs Housing, it was my job to go before community boards and make the pitch for supportive housing projects for chronically homeless New Yorkers in an attempt to win their advisory approval. I have stood in school auditoriums and senior center cafeterias in every borough, including a couple of times pregnant and in heels, answering questions and hearing community concerns, sorting out fact from fiction. I have been shouted at in every neighborhood in this city and been called every name in the book. > “Housing is a Human Right” is a lovely phrase and a powerful one, but if you want that right to ever have any hope of being realized, you need to actually build some housing. I truly appreciated the moments when things got heated in those meetings, because it gave me the opportunity to set the record straight about the challenges faced by New Yorkers experiencing homelessness and to build some empathy and understanding, in hopes that when the building ultimately opened, the community would welcome their new neighbors. I have seen the way the current process stacks the deck against our homeless neighbors and against new housing in general. For every project that had a small but vocal army of opponents, it was my job to help build a base of support. I knew that if the opponents could just meet some supportive housing tenants, they would see that their fears were unfounded. But I also always had my misgivings about this strategy. In an effort to win a little grace for the next homeless New Yorker who desperately needed a place to live, I’d ask formerly homeless New Yorkers who had just achieved a measure of stability to appear publicly before an angry crowd, to tell their traumatic stories and describe how they overcame the worst times in their lives. I was uncomfortable about putting them in this position — but the system we have forced me to do so. The burden of proof is on those desperate to find places to live, going up against stably housed New Yorkers with time and money to spare. [“Housing is a Human Right”](https://www.housingisahumanright.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a lovely phrase and a powerful one, but if you want that right to ever have any hope of being realized, you need to actually build some housing. We shouldn’t ask for a show of hands to determine whether our homeless neighbors live stable lives or die in the street. Yet a show of hands is what the current land use process requires. The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure or [ULURP](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/applicants/applicant-portal/lur.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (pronounced YOU-lurp, for the uninitiated) is the process by which land-use decisions get made in New York City, and it has been around since the mid-1970s. To sell City land, make zoning changes or effect other decisions, ULURP dictates that each project must be reviewed by the City Planning Commission, City Council, Community Board, borough president and Mayor’s Office, each holding separate public hearings and debating the project at every step along the way. In running this gauntlet, hundreds of thousands of dollars are typically spent on attorneys and consultants to make sure every procedure is followed. The discussions in these hearings range in depth and quality, but once the process begins, the same steps have to be followed regardless of whether you are making a small change to a single-family home or building a giant new skyscraper. > The combination of short term limits for local elected officials and long timelines for development projects is a structural problem that inhibits new housing in New York City. The current ULURP process was designed before there were term limits for public officials, so the process was generally steered by elected officials who had been in office a long time and would continue to hold their seats long after the controversy about any particular project had died down. In most cases, the principal players in the process would be around to see a project go from idea to implementation, from an angry community board meeting to a round of applause at a ribbon-cutting. This made it bruising but still somewhat manageable. Today, term limits mean that even the most pro-housing council members will likely not be in office to see the new development projects they can bless or kill come to fruition. This combination of short-term limits and long development timelines perverts incentives. It is a structural problem that inhibits the production of new housing in a way that was not the case when New York City’s current land-use rules were first created. The tradition of “member deference” — an unwritten rule that the City Council will rarely override an individual member who wants to reject a project within their district — makes things harder still. Indeed, over the past generation, there have been only a handful of instances where the Council has overridden a member and greenlit a project in their district, despite the fact that the housing shortage is a citywide issue. The moment is ripe to amend our land-use process to adjust to the current times — and the language proposed today by the Charter Revision Commission will go a long way. Question 1 would create a fast-track public process for affordable housing by creating a new zoning process administered by the Board of Standards and Appeals, and an expedited review procedure specifically in the community districts that produce the least amount of affordable housing. Question 2 would create a simpler, faster and more predictable review process (Expedited Land Use Review Procedure or “ELURP”) for modest changes, to address the fact that under the current system, tiny changes are subject to the same level of public review as the largest skyscraper. > The moment is ripe to amend our land use process to adjust to the current times. Question 3 would eliminate the mayor’s veto power in the ULURP process and replace it with a land-use appeals board consisting of the borough president, the Council speaker and the mayor. This would better address citywide and borough-wide voices in the land-use process, since affordable housing is a citywide concern. This change maintains the role of the local council member and community board, but also gives a last look to the newly created appeals board who will have more of a citywide and borough-wide lens. Question 4 would modernize the City Map, an uncontroversial but sorely overdue change. It may come as a surprise to many voters that there exists an arcane system with 8,000 paper maps administered separately by each borough that represents the official record of the location and grade of streets where housing and infrastructure can be built and dictates the procedures for development. So every time the City Map needs to be updated, it feels like we are carving out new stone tablets, and the time it takes to make the change reflects this prehistoric requirement. Even Fred Flintstone would agree that it’s time for an update. Question 5 proposes moving citywide elections to even years to improve turnout. That isn’t technically about housing, but engaging more New Yorkers in the process of selecting their leaders is likely to have a positive effect on the climate for producing new places for people to live. No charter reforms will solve New York City’s affordable housing crisis overnight, but these are the types of modest but meaningful land-use changes that will move us emphatically in the right direction. A more affordable, more livable and more participatory city is within reach. ### Is Modular Part of New York’s Housing Solution? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/is-modular-part-of-new-yorks-housing-solution/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:56.000Z *As debates rage about how to make housing production cheaper, Cara Eckholm — formerly of Sidewalk Labs, modular growth company Nabr and Cornell Tech — has her eyes on modular construction. Cara, who now runs the urban consultancy Eckholm Studios, sits down with Jamie to discuss what New York should do — and what pitfalls it should avoid — to build good homes faster.* *You can listen to this episode on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-future-is-modular/id1794619189?i=1000717521563&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/1e8mCiYDGftQfV30mY7T5u?si=2ea85191657f4724&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### Safe Only at Certain Speeds URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/safe-only-at-certain-speeds/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:56.000Z Not since the 1980s has New York been so roiled by bicycles. The offending element then was unruly bicycle messengers slicing through Manhattan gridlock with contracts, renderings and other valuable bits of commerce and culture. Today's controversy is more diffuse. It encompasses a new industry (food deliveries mediated by rapacious app companies); a new class of workers (immigrant deliveristas, whose economic precarity is now compounded by Trump's crackdown on undocumented workers); and a new technology (the e-bike) that lets any rider hit cruising speeds of 20 or even 25 miles per hour. As e-bikes proliferate, a good chunk of the citizenry is discombobulated, the authorities are flummoxed, and cycling advocates appear confused. Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch [proclaimed in April](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/218-25/mayor-adams-nypd-commissioner-tisch-launch-new-quality-life-division-enhance-public-safety?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/0) that red-light running and other traffic violations by e-bikes, mopeds and such would be met not with the customary $190 fine but with summonses answerable in criminal court. Last month, first deputy mayor Randy Mastro began readying a citywide e-bike [speed limit of 15 miles per hour](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/07/14/mondays-headlines-e-bike-regulations-edition?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Cycle campaigners, led by the venerable advocacy group Transportation Alternatives and the "livable streets" news outlet Streetsblog, declared Code Red. The advocates are right to see a double standard when Tisch proposes criminalizing traffic rule-breaking by two-wheeled travelers but not by motorists. But they are wrong to inveigh against the 15 mph e-bike speed limit. Activists' adamant refusal to consider *any* speed governance for powered bicycles is blinding them to this new technology's singular potential. The true liberating value of e-bikes doesn't lie in helping riders go faster ― it's in unlocking city cycling for the multitudes who badly need cycling's utility but also require help surmounting its physical demands. I'm speaking about New Yorkers who because of age or disability or temperamenthave been deterred by cycling's strenuousness or whose personal circumstances leave them with little margin to arrive at their destination even slightly disheveled, and who at the same time await deliverance from torturous transit commutes that consume hours but which an e-bike could trim to 20 minutes. > We cycling advocates are chasing our tails in a circle. I have in mind 67-year-old Bronx clothing boutique manager Nazir Zahid, who in 2017 [told a New York Times reporter](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/nyregion/new-york-subway-deserts.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) he spends an hour and 45 minutes riding and transferring among four buses to get from Kingsbridge to East Tremont Avenue ― a four-and-a-half mile commute he could manage aboard an e-bike in half an hour. (A New York City "bus mayor" unafraid to carve out [a bus lane on Fordham Road](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2024/07/29/fordham-rd-still-hell-for-bus-riders-after-mayor-adams-scrubbed-a-better-road-design?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) would help, too.) And teacher Megan McCormick, who must allow an hour for what she told the same reporter should be a mere 20-minute hop by bus to her East Flatbush school from Bensonhurst. The reporter was Sarah Maslin Nir, and her stories affected me when they appeared in 2017 and 2018 (["Left Behind by the Nation's Largest Subway System"](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/nyregion/new-york-subway-deserts.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); ["The Subway Is So Late, It's Making New Yorkers Early"](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/nyregion/subway-late-early-new-york.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). "These commutes," I told Maslin Nir then, "seem to me precisely the daily journeys that electric-assist bicycles could enable to be made expeditiously, reliably, inexpensively and humanely ― without having to break a sweat or become a bicycle enthusiast." I believe the same today. Which explains why I'm vexed by the latest verbal merry-go-round over e-bike speeds. We cycling advocates are [chasing our tails in a circle](https://genius.com/Xtc-river-of-orchids-lyrics?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). I would like us to break out of our bind, beginning by ceasing our offputting, knee-jerk "First do cars" line of attack that would forbid intruding on two-wheeled vehicles until cars and trucks are brought completely to heel. We should instead tout the emancipatory power of small electric motors to banish many New Yorkers' commuting drudgery and toil. As part of this new orientation, cycling advocates should accede to a 15 mph limit on e-bike speeds ― even "in traffic" ― until new geo-fencing technology enables e-bike speed limits to be confined to lanes and paths. Let's also put aside the claim that cyclists need the safety boost that only higher-speed e-cycling can confer. "I can tell you it feels much safer as a cyclist if you're going close to the speed of the traffic than if you're going half the speed of traffic," former city Department of Transportation senior official Michael Replogle posted to a city [online comment page](https://rules.cityofnewyork.us/rule/speed-limits-for-e-bikes-e-scooters-and-pedal-assist-commercial-bicycles/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as [Streetsblog reported](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/07/03/ex-dot-official-warns-nycs-counterproductive-e-bike-speed-limit-will-curb-biking-safety?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) earlier this month. Replogle, co-founder of the seminal not-for-profits [Bikes Not Bombs](https://bikesnotbombs.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [Institute for Transportation and Development Policy](https://itdp.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), said he helped the de Blasio administration determine "that 20 mph was a more sensible \[e-bike speed\] limit because it better corresponded to matching car traffic speeds, which cyclists need to do to remain safe when they're biking in traffic." Say what? If 20-mph cycling is truly safer than 10- or 15-mph cycling, how is it that [New York City e-bike fatalities exceed traditional-bike fatalities fivefold](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pr2025/vision-zero.shtml?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? (Please don't retort by citing the app companies' slave-driving terms of employment. Those help explain why deliveristas feel compelled to speed; they do not support an argument that slower delivery cyclists would die at even higher rates.) Equating higher cycling speed with greater cycling safety is preposterous. I have racked up nearly 10,000 hours biking daily in the five boroughs since the early 70s with barely a scratch. I go fast when I can, but it's not fundamental to my safety. Being assertive, predictable, hyper-aware and attentive to traffic is how I minimize my chances of hitting or being hit. I also ― confession coming ― slip through red lights to gain clearance from cars and avoid the energy drain from frequent stopping and starting. None of that requires I go above 15 mph or, as I age up, beyond my current ambient speed of 10 or 12 mph. > Trad cyclists in bike lanes and on bike paths now must constantly look over our shoulders and attune our ears to make sure we maintain our line and don't get clipped and toppled by a fast-overtaking e-biker whom we didn't know was coming. Replogle is no outlier in arguing against a 15 mph speed limit. As I was finalizing this article, my inbox lit up with an action alert from Transportation Alternatives that deemed the proposed e-bike speed cap "unfair, dangerous, and part of a broader war against New Yorkers who bike." Transportation Alternatives doesn't just reject the social merit of [topping cycle cruising speeds at 15 mph](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/06/12/komanoff-a-philosopher-of-cycling-takes-on-e-bike-speeds-well-sort-of?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), it denies cyclists' inherent visibility deficit as well. Like it or not, people on bikes present a lesser visual profile than cars. The motorcyclist motto, "Loud pipes save lives," isn't just a rationalization for love of loudness. A bicyclist going 20 mph is more likely to be unseen by drivers (as well as by pedestrians and other cyclists) than one riding at 10 or 15. Thanks to groundbreaking work by advocates like Replogle and Transportation Alternatives, we in New York now do a lot of our riding on an extensive network of protected bike lanes and exclusive bike paths on which cars and trucks present zero threat. What *is* threatening there, to a 10-12 mph traditional cyclist like myself, is e-bikers who need only turn a dial to go at twice my speed. We trad cyclists in bike lanes and on bike paths now must constantly look over our shoulders and attune our ears to make sure we maintain our line and don't get clipped and toppled by a fast-overtaking e-biker whom we didn't know was coming. This new vigilance is consuming some of the acuity we previously devoted to watching the action in front of us. Or we ride less, diminishing the safety-in-numbers effect that helps reduce cycle-car collisions. One thing we can all agree on is that New York needs more people riding bikes ― both electric and traditional — for their benefit as well as ours. We'll get it sooner if instead of fetishizing e-bikes' speed, we valorize their capacity to help everyday working New Yorkers get up on two wheels. We must grapple with the reality that too-fast e-bikes ― along with motorized stand-up scooters and the like ― have become yet another risk factor making traditional cycling more dangerous and less appealing to people who should be our allies and fellow travelers. The 1980s civic froth over bicycle messengering reached a remarkable resolution in 1987 when Mayor Edward I. Koch first sought but then abandoned an intended ban on weekday cycling in midtown. That came after the messengers won over public opinion with pedestrian-friendly protests and Transportation Alternatives won a State Supreme Court ruling invalidating the ban on a technicality. In the aftermath, newly energized cyclists fought for and won expanded cycling infrastructure, and the city experienced a pronounced reduction in bike-pedestrian conflict as each constituency came to regard the other as more ally than adversary ― a saga I recounted a dozen years ago in ["The Bicycle Uprising,"](https://www.komanoff.net/bicycle/Bicycle%5FUprising.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a multi-part series published in Streetsblog. Our city is no less riven by bicycles today, even as the technology and the actors have changed radically. Resolving the multiple competing interests will be no easy task. Let us begin by acknowledging the social value of controlling e-bike speeds as we help electric-assisted cycling infuse dignity and autonomy into the working lives of everyday New Yorkers. ### Does Eric Adams Have a Chance? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/does-eric-adams-have-a-chance/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:57.000Z A deeply unpopular incumbent mayor of New York City fails to secure his party's nomination for reelection but is determined to continue running for a second term. This sounds a lot like Eric Adams in 2025\. But it was John Lindsay in 1969. Lindsay was the last New York City mayor reelected without a major party nomination. How he pulled it off is something that Eric Adams should study — quickly and closely. At first glance, Lindsay and Adams couldn't be more different: One was a patrician politician who ascended to City Hall along the gilded path of Yale, a federal job in D.C. and a congressional seat representing the Upper East Side. The other rose from the streets of inner-city Brooklyn, a job as a cop and a stint in the state Senate. But it's the similarities that are important. Both were seen as out of touch with their party's base. Adams is too conservative for today's Democratic primary voters, while Lindsay was too liberal for Republicans. Adams is viewed as a poor manager overseeing a city adrift, and may never fully recover from the corruption scandals that culminated in his indictment. Lindsay was beset by a transit strike that crippled the city at the outset of his first term — and by badly bungling the response to a snowstorm that shut down Queens for a week and left dozens dead just months before the primaries. Yet Lindsay won reelection in 1969, with just over 42% of the vote in a three-way race. (The Democrat finished second and the Republican a distant third.) Adams needs to dust off a copy of his playbook if he hopes to defeat Zohran Mamdani. Lindsay began by putting together a coalition of Blacks and Jews. That is the same coalition that Adams needs to win back. He should study how Lindsay regained their trust. It began by focusing on the concerns of the middle- and lower-middle class who live in the outer boroughs and in the forgotten precincts of Manhattan. He forthrightly apologized to New Yorkers for his mistakes. He owned up to what he had done wrong without mincing words. He [looked directly into the camera](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ku9%5FChEoxU&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and said, "I guessed wrong on the weather before the city's biggest snowfall last winter, and that was a mistake... the school strike went on too long and we all made some mistakes." Of course, he contrasted those mistakes with his accomplishments, which "were no mistakes." CNN has included Lindsay's ad, [titled "Mistakes,"](https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/07/politics/political-ads?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on its list of the half-dozen most effective political ads of all time. Adams hasn't apologized yet. Neither did Andrew Cuomo, and we know how that turned out. > Adams is viewed as a poor manager overseeing a city adrift, and may never fully recover from the corruption scandals that culminated in his indictment. Lindsay also embraced New York with an affirmative vision of what life here can be. Adams needs to articulate his own positive vision for the city if he stands a chance of countering Mamdani's framing of the election around affordability. Adams and his advisors need to recognize that he won't win if he relies on scare tactics alone. Whatever one thinks of Mamdani, he is an incredibly skilled politician. It is political malpractice to refuse to recognize that he possesses the political gift of charisma and affability. Mamdani simply doesn't come off as menacing. Twenty-five million dollars of wasted advertisements and mail from the Cuomo campaign proved that. To be sure, Adams has a tougher road ahead than Lindsay did. For starters, the concerns about Lindsay related to his competence, not his character. Lindsay's main opponent in the 1969 general election was City Comptroller Mario Procaccino, whose campaign was characterized by a series of verbal gaffes. To say that he was no Zohran Mamdani is an understatement. And while Lindsay ran as an independent, he also had the Liberal Party line, which was a real political force in New York those days. All these add up to an uphill battle for Adams, but not an insurmountable one. The 1969 primaries were conducted in June, just like this year. That provides a rejected incumbent time to reset his campaign and recover. Adams needs to begin by spending far more time in the streets with the middle- and lower-income New Yorkers whose votes he needs to win. He needs to ride the subways, walk the streets, attend Mets and Yankees games — sitting in the stands, not a luxury suite — and generally grab every opportunity to interact with New Yorkers who worry that those in power don't care about their concerns. Fundraising is an imperative in politics, but Adams needs to shake the perception that he prefers to hang out with those who live 500 feet above the streets of New York and work in offices at similar altitudes. Lindsay also very cleverly nationalized the campaign by making it a referendum on the Vietnam War, going so far as to run television ads detailing the war's toll — in both financial and human terms — on New Yorkers. Especially since the dismissal of his indictment, Adams is seen as very cozy with the Trump administration. That will be a political liability in New York, even in the general election. But imagine if he talked about the surplus of tax dollars New Yorkers send to Washington as compared to what they get back in return, and the impact of federal policies on New York residents. The Fiscal Policy Institute characterized the recently passed budget as "an assault on New York" — but Adams' response to date has been muted. That needs to change if he is going to have a shot at a second term. For all the challenges that confronted New York City in 1969, Lindsay's campaign triggered our collective imagination about life in the City, not our fears. Adams needs to do the same. In the past six months, Adams has brought on Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch and First Deputy Mayor Randy Mastro. Those appointments are a welcome departure from his prior overreliance on friends and associates. He needs to continue to make more top appointments like those. Adams should pledge to govern with an ideology of excellence, bringing into his administration those with a track record of accomplishment rather than those whose main credential is loyalty to him. That not only signals a departure from his past and a future in which he will hire the best and brightest, it also reminds voters that Mamdani is campaigning on his ideology, not management experience or expertise. Urban legend is that Lindsay hitched his reelection campaign to the Mets late-season surge, and that their World Series victory was a decisive factor in his reelection. Time will tell whether the 2025 Mets will also be the Comeback Kids. But if Eric Adams makes the right moves, he still has a chance to emerge as the winner this fall. ### How to Get Smarter About Fighting Crime URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-to-get-smarter-about-fighting-crime/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:57.000Z As we debate whether artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence, one thing is clear: Humans aren't putting their best foot forward. Anti-intellectualism is currently rising faster than Bitcoin. Just recently, Vice President J.D. Vance [bristled](https://x.com/DerrickEvans4WV/status/1930060737927360582?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when asked about his time before politics as "an intellectual" and *National Review* contributor, casting both as insults. There's a wellspring of anti-intellectualism on the left as well. The Biden administration, for example, [refused to acknowledge the consensus among economists](https://www.yahoo.com/news/does-government-spending-cause-inflation-100250416.html?guccounter=1&guce%5Freferrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce%5Freferrer%5Fsig=AQAAALXzRnKP6NX-4adv7Mwae7W3JmFP%5FBX9MNnXktDfZwxKJiPBkXiv7-TCfUGHumEUPkN3ZhwVo8J0%5F1cBymg4uO26zWmU5MHLsiTfs6Ws1gA5-uTvo5iJ04Pa1I%5FT39fxeDurf77bMqlhzAPyvMhE62Vayw4hQtNK9zYZWIVSvvtn&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that excessive government spending contributed to inflation, instead invoking the [bogeyman of corporate price gauging](https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/corporate-greed-not-blame-price-pressures-fed-study-shows-2024-05-13/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Anti-intellectualism has always had a certain appeal in this country, as meticulously documented in historian Richard Hofstadter's book "[Anti-Intellectualism in American Life](https://ia802903.us.archive.org/6/items/richard-hofstadter-anti-intellectualism-in-american-life-vintage-1966/Richard%20Hofstadter%20-%20Anti-Intellectualism%20in%20American%20Life-Vintage%20%281966%29.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)." This is despite our shared inheritance as a people shaped by erudite figures like James Madison and Benjamin Franklin. We are, after all, a nation that once had a [Know-Nothing Party](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/immigrants-conspiracies-and-secret-society-launched-american-nativism-180961915/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Now, with more information than ever at our fingertips, anti-intellectualism persists, and its presence makes it harder to get public policy right, particularly when it comes to criminal justice. Why does this often damaging outlook endure? And what can be done to challenge it? One aspect of anti-intellectualism that impedes sound policy is a reluctance to consider the context and baseline on which potential policy solutions are overlaid. In criminal justice, the public debate all too often boils down to a contest between those who believe we always need more police and more incarceration and those who believe the reverse. All things being equal, [research](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8356500/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) does suggest that more police visibility deters many types of street crime. But it's commonsensical that having four officers monitoring a high-crime location instead of one won't yield four times the benefit. The relevant context and baseline is not just the existing number of officers per capita, but the crime rate, number of calls for service and other factors that influence the need for officers. Consider that Baltimore and Washington D.C. have [three times as many officers per capita](https://www.vera.org/publications/what-policing-costs-in-americas-biggest-cities?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as El Paso and Fargo. It would be intellectually dishonest to conclude that because [crime is higher in the former cities](https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#/pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend), the [visible presence of police](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047235223000624?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and their [efficacy in solving crimes](https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/85/2/855/4104675?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) does not contribute to crime control. Instead, it is [likely](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666614?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that if Baltimore and Washington D.C. reduced their police forces by two-thirds, they would have even more crime. > Anti-intellectualism makes it harder to get public policy right, particularly when it comes to criminal justice. The need to account for the baseline and context is just as clear when examining incarceration rates. [Research](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/599202?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggests that incarceration plays a critical role in incapacitating the most dangerous offenders, but that rates above a certain level can lead to diminishing or even negative returns, in part because [prison is often criminogenic](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032885520978374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The return on investment must also be compared with investing the same dollar in other crime control strategies. Massachusetts has [four times fewer](https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2024.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) people in prison per capita than Louisiana. The countries with the lowest incarceration rates — rates a fraction of the level of those in Massachusetts — are among the poorest nations in the world, a list including Yemen, Gambia and the Republic of Guinea. These low rates may not stem from a desire to avoid incarceration, but from a [lack of sufficient resources](https://shs.cairn.info/journal-politique-africaine-2019-3-page-5?lang=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Understanding factors such as the baseline incarceration rate, the rate of serious crimes and the length of carceral sentences is crucial to evaluating whether there are too many or too few people being locked up in a given jurisdiction. Anti-intellectualism is often characterized by a refusal to acknowledge trade-offs. There is no free lunch — a dollar spent one way can't be spent in another. Trade-offs can be found almost everywhere you look in the field of criminal justice. For example, policies like [stop-and-frisk](https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=13496&context=journal%5Farticles&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [civil asset forfeiture](https://americansforprosperity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AFP-Sheriff-Ret-Currie-Meyers-White-paper-The-impact-of-fines-fees-and-forfeitures-on-policing.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) may identify criminality and contraband in the case at hand, but they also do damage to the broader fight against crime by sowing distrust between communities and police. Finally, anti-intellectualism can lead to a lack of interest in evaluation. Ideologues often don't want facts to get in the way of a compelling narrative. For example, some on the right continue to push bootcamps for youth, despite a significant body of [research](https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1229&context=criminaljusticefacpub&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) showing that any improvement in kids' behavior while they are in such camps evaporates upon their return to society. Meanwhile, some liberal advocates still promote gun buybacks to address community violence. But research indicates that while buybacks [may reduce suicides](https://journals.lww.com/epidem/fulltext/2023/01000/handgun%5Fdivestment%5Fand%5Frisk%5Fof%5Fsuicide.13.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), they have [no discernible impact on violent crime](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37802644/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), since those inclined to misuse guns don't turn them in. How can we counteract these tendencies? First, we can equip policymakers with more information. We should bolster the capacity of institutions that provide objective analyses like the [U.S. Government Accountability Office](https://www.gao.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and similar entities at the state level like the [Washington State Institute for Public Policy](https://www.wsipp.wa.gov/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which is known for its [cost-benefit analyses](https://www.wsipp.wa.gov/BenefitCost?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > Some skepticism of expertise is healthy. But being smart on crime requires actually being smart. The current moment could also prove serendipitous for partnerships with universities. Academia is reeling from funding losses and, especially in the humanities, it has often justly been criticized for focusing too much on esoteric topics while shortchanging research with practical applications. A new [Brookings Institute proposal](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/building-state-and-local-government-innovation-capacity-investing-in-university-government-innovation-partnerships/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) envisions university-government partnerships to develop more innovative ways to deliver public services. Perhaps when more universities engage in such a practical way, it will in turn reduce the [resentment](https://news.gallup.com/poll/646880/confidence-higher-education-closely-divided.aspx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with which many Americans view the "Ivory Tower." One remarkable example is the [Criminal Justice Innovation Lab](https://cjil.sog.unc.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) at the University of North Carolina, which has partnered with local governments and law enforcement agencies to develop and spread best practices across the state. For example, the lab has built a [Court Appearance Toolbox](https://courtappearance.cjil.sog.unc.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that has helped many counties adopt solutions such as text reminders that boost the rate at which defendants show up for their hearings in court. Some skepticism of expertise is healthy. After a pandemic when we were initially [warned against touching surfaces](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00277-8?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and when [many schools were closed far too long](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/18/upshot/pandemic-school-closures-data.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), we know the state of knowledge is always evolving. Moreover, public policy cannot be monomaniacally focused on maximizing a single metric, whether that is public health or public safety. Constitutional rights must be sacrosanct, even when abridging them might help stamp out disease or crime. But being smart on crime requires actually being smart. That means rejecting an anti-intellectualism that provides a license to indulge our own intuitive impulses and ideological fixations at the expense of doing what makes Americans safer. ### Why “Abundance” Matters URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-abundance-matters/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:57.000Z "Abundance" is *the* policy book of the moment, the hardcover that launched a thousand podcast episodes, Tweet storms and Substack posts. Written by Ezra Klein (of the New York Times) and Derek Thompson (of, until very recently, The Atlantic), "Abundance" is basically the platonic ideal of a modern policy book: lean (250 pages, give or take) and well-written, with a clear and provocative argument. In terms of style, Klein and Thompson are gifted practitioners of the Malcolm Gladwell mode of highbrow journalistic nonfiction writing. Wherever possible, they launch each new idea with a snappy historical anecdote that foregrounds a compelling individual story — the contradictions of Horace Greeley's life, say, or an unknown scientist suffering years of unwarranted rejection from federal grantmakers — using the personal as a jumping off point to make larger, more general claims. Critics may carp that this approach obscures as much as it reveals, but it endures for a reason: it works. "Abundance" is never less than a sprightly, engaging read. Klein and Thompson define their core idea as a new way of looking at the world: > Abundance reorients politics around a fresh provocation: *Can we solve our problems with supply?* Many valuable questions bloom from this deceptively simple prompt. If there are not enough homes, can we make more? If not, why not? If there is not enough clean energy, can we make more? If not, why not? If the government is repeatedly failing to complete major projects on time and on budget, then what is going wrong and how do we fix it? If the rate of scientific progress is slowing, how can we help scientists do their best work? If we need new technologies to solve our important problems, how do we pull these inventions from the future and distribute them in the present? In arguing for "a liberalism that builds," Klein and Thompson make the case that rules and regulations — many of them put in place over the past half century by Democrats and their nonprofit allies — are currently preventing our government from achieving important goals. As Klein and Thompson detail, fierce advocacy, both in the courts and in Congress, has led to the creation of multiple rounds of review, or veto points, where new initiatives can be stymied. Over time, a fetish for hewing to the proper procedure has become the focus of government rather than a relentless focus on achieving good outcomes. This is not exactly a new argument. Among others, [Philip K. Howard](https://www.commongood.org/pkh?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (who is not acknowledged anywhere in "Abundance," unless I missed it) has been making a similar point for decades. "Abundance" might not be advancing a wholly original thesis, but its central argument would seem to be irrefutable. Who could argue that government isn't sometimes hamstrung by unnecessary red tape? Lots of people, as it turns out. Dozens of critics have stepped forward to pick a fight with "Abundance." The Baffler argued that ["the last thing society needs is more stuff."](https://thebaffler.com/latest/whats-the-matter-with-abundance-harris?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Washington Monthly bemoaned the ["meager agenda"](https://washingtonmonthly.com/2025/03/23/the-meager-agenda-of-abundance-liberals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of "Abundance." Boston Review alleged that "Abundance" suffers from ["a severe case of myopia."](https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/the-real-path-to-abundance/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The American Prospect accused Klein and Thompson of ["an abundance of credulity."](https://prospect.org/culture/books/2025-03-26-abundance-of-credulity-klein-thompson-dunkelman-review/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Why so much hate for such a common sense, and arguably banal, premise? Some of the reaction is no doubt a case of [Ezra Klein Derangement Syndrome](https://x.com/Noahpinion/status/1934678754598777113?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The high-profile New York Times columnist doesn't exactly suffer from underexposure. He also has the kind of self-satisfied manner that practically invites contradiction. But something deeper is at work in the critical reaction to *Abundance* than personal antipathy for one of the most influential pundits of the day. > "Abundance" might not be advancing a wholly original thesis, but its central argument would seem to be irrefutable. Who could argue that government isn't sometimes hamstrung by unnecessary red tape? The negative responses to "Abundance" have been largely driven by Klein and Thompson's decision to announce that their book is addressed to "the pathologies of the broad left." In doing so, Klein and Thompson helped to ensure that their book would be received as a salvo in an ongoing war between moderates and progressives. The past few years have been littered with proxy fights between the two factions vying for control of the Democratic Party (see, for example, Zohran Mamdani v. Andrew Cuomo). "Abundance" has become just another thing for the two sides to argue about, with endorsement of the book becoming center-coded and many left-wing critics furiously looking for reasons to attack it. That's a shame, because Klein and Thompson are not really culture warriors at heart. In truth, "Abundance" is more olive branch than battle cry. Klein and Thompson actually work pretty hard not to unnecessarily offend their friends on the left (tellingly, there is no entry for "woke" in the book's index). "Abundance" is, in essence, an argument for a host of progressive priorities, including increasing the scope of the government, developing clean energy sources and improving affordability. The left-wing objections to "Abundance" mostly amount to accusing Klein and Thompson of being handmaidens for "neoliberalism," that omnipresent but ill-defined progressive boogeyman. According to these critics, Klein and Thompson are pointing the finger at the wrong enemy. "What constrains political action for the public good?" asks Hannah Story Brown in a review of "Abundance" in The American Prospect. "Call it industry influence, corporate capture, consolidated power. Call it the societal consequences of the profit motive. Whatever your shorthand, what's missing from \[the book\] is a substantive engagement with the fact that powerful entities profit from the government failing to meet the public's needs." If you are the kind of person who requires every policy argument to begin and end with an indictment of capitalism, "Abundance" probably isn't the book for you. The other major complaint that progressives have levied against "Abundance" is that eliminating unneeded rules and regulations doesn't provide the answer to many of the problems currently confronting our country. According to Paul Gastris and Nate Weisberg, writing in [Washington Monthly](https://washingtonmonthly.com/2025/03/23/the-meager-agenda-of-abundance-liberals/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), > "There's an old saying that 'If all you have is a hammer,'" the psychologist Abraham Maslow famously observed, "everything looks like a nail." For abundance liberals, the nails are government-created bottlenecks. Remove them (via the claw end of the hammer, to extend the metaphor) and a world of plenty will flow." Fair enough. It is safe to say that "Abundance" isn't a skeleton key that unlocks every challenge that bedevils the United States. You won't find the solution to the war in Gaza or controversies over trans rights or a million other thorny issues in these pages. For all the hype about the book, both pro and con, the insights of "Abundance" are of a more modest variety. But that doesn't mean that Klein and Thompson aren't offering something valuable. Perhaps the most important contribution that the book makes is to focus attention on two topics that are often absent from the public conversation about government: tradeoffs and discretion. As Klein and Thompson outline, the labyrinth of process and procedure that has built up within American government over time exists for some good reasons. Environmental impact reviews, worker safety standards, disability access provisions — all these things (and more) are good-faith responses to real problems. But all of these things create burdens as well, adding time and cost to any government project. How should we balance competing priorities like fairness and efficiency or free speech and inclusiveness or public safety and individual freedom? It is impossible to answer these questions if we can't admit that, per Thomas Sowell, ["There are no solutions. There are only tradeoffs."](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3%5FEtIWmja-4&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) > Perhaps the most important contribution that the book makes is to focus attention on two topics that are often absent from the public conversation about government: tradeoffs and discretion. Similarly, "Abundance" helps to advance a more forthright discussion about the nature of discretion within government. According to Klein and Thompson, "We hire skilled, dedicated people to do the public's work and then make it impossible for them to do that work well. We ask people to work on society's hardest problems…and then rob them of the discretion and agility they need to solve them." Without some measure of discretion, government workers won't be able to adapt to changing conditions on the ground or figure out how to expedite priorities — as Pennsylvania governor Josh Shapiro famously did when he managed to re-open a damaged stretch of I-95 in record time. But it is also true that some of those entrusted with discretion will make bad, and even corrupt, decisions. [The American public does not usually react with patience or understanding when this happens.](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/when-the-cure-for-corruption-is-worse-than-the-disease) "Everyone, everywhere is afraid of being implicated in fraud or waste or having their funding cut or seeing the public turn on them," according to Klein and Thompson. Far easier for government workers to keep their heads down and just follow the rules. Thus, [CYA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cover%5Fyour%5Fass?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) becomes the dominant ethic within government. All of which leads to the real villain of "Abundance": Lack of public trust in government. Klein and Thompson cite public polls documenting a dramatic decline in public trust over the past 50 years. In 1964, 77% of the public believed that government would do the right thing most of the time. By 2023, that number was down to 16%. By itself, reducing government red tape won't reverse this trend, but Klein and Thompson make a persuasive case that is an important piece of the puzzle — a significant step toward not just restoring faith in the public sector but also tamping down the populist distemper that has deformed our politics. ### How Mamdani Can Win, and Govern URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-mamdani-can-win-and-govern/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:57.000Z *You couldn't have missed it — on Tuesday, June 25, state assembly member Zohran Mamdani won the New York primary, beating favored contender and former governor Andrew Cuomo by 12 points. Everyone and their mother has an explanation for what happened and what a Mamdani mayoral administration would look like. But none have quite the perspective of Bradley Tusk, political strategist and founder of Tusk Strategies. Prior to his current role, Bradley served as deputy governor of Illinois, campaign manager for Michael Bloomberg, and communications director for Chuck Schumer. Jamie and Bradley sit down to recap the race and share why they think everyone should throw support behind Mamdani.* *You can listen to this episode, "How Mamdani Can Win and Govern," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/how-mamdani-can-win-and-govern/id1794619189?i=1000715377377&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/show/0RIVt6trVUf3kDU071chXT?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### New York’s Primary and the Power of Better Elections URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-primary-and-the-power-of-better-election/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:57.000Z This year’s primary election felt different — and for good reason. We saw the highest turnout since 1989, energized young voters, small-dollar donors driving competitive campaigns and a rejection of big-money politics. How did this happen? The Democratic primary winner Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani ran a remarkable campaign. *And* his campaign took full advantage of hard-won election reforms, including early voting, ranked-choice voting, and a strengthened public matching funds program that made it easier to vote, encouraged cross-endorsements and positive campaigning and helped everyday New Yorkers support candidates they believe in. Let’s start with early voting. More than 380,000 New Yorkers voted early in the Democratic primary — double the turnout from our last citywide primary. Ranked-choice voting led to a new level of cooperation between candidates — think Mamdani and Brad Lander hyping each other's records in the run-up to Primary Day. These kinds of cross-endorsements only happen when candidates must reach beyond their base to make their case to a broader swath of the electorate. Thanks to public matching funds, small-dollar donors played a major role in powering campaigns, proving that New Yorkers — not special interests — are the heart of our democracy. Mamdani alone[ collected more than 20,000 contributions](https://www.nyccfb.info/vsapps/CandidateSummary.aspx?as%5Fcand%5Fid=2899&as%5Felection%5Fcycle=2025&cand%5Fname=Mamdani,%20Zohran%20K&office=Mayor&report=summ&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The average donation to his campaign was just $82, but each contribution was significantly amplified through the city’s matching funds program. Meanwhile, super PACs failed to deliver victories for their preferred candidates. Roughly $25 million in independent expenditures were spent boosting Andrew Cuomo and attacking his opponents — with little to show for it. This trend held not only in the mayor’s race, but in several competitive down-ballot contests. In the Manhattan borough president’s race, Keith Powers was supported by almost $340,000 of outside money and lost. In Central Queens, Dermot Smyth, a teachers union official who was the favorite to win an open Council seat, benefited from almost $700,000 spent in his favor by outside groups; he finished third. And in Park Slope, super PACs boosted Maya Kornberg’s challenge against the local council member with over $400,000, yet the incumbent Shahana Hanif won the election handily (other super PACs were spending against Kornberg’s bid, but weren’t as well funded). A similar story repeated across the five boroughs. In total, super PAC spending reached more than $14 million on council races alone. All of this shows how election reforms have made our democracy more open, fair and responsive. But we’re still leaving too many New Yorkers behind. More than a million New Yorkers who sit outside the political party system are sidelined from critical primary elections. Because New York’s primaries are closed, only party members can vote. Despite paying taxes and caring deeply about their communities, registered voters who aren’t members of a party have no voice in these early contests, which historically have played a huge role in determining who leads our city. Our last few citywide elections have been effectively decided in the Democratic primary. Registered Democrats outnumber Republicans in NYC by nearly six to one, leading to general election contests that are often uncompetitive. And while turnout in this year’s primary was better than recent mayoral primaries, only about 30% of eligible voters turned out. Which means that despite his decisive victory in the primary, Mamdani won support from less than 10% of all registered voters in New York City. We have a chance to change that — and we must. New York City should build on this momentum and put before voters reforms that expand access and participation. And we have an opportunity to do that in November, if the 2025 Charter Revision Commission moves forward with its plan to ask voters to approve shifting local elections to even-numbered years to align with high-turnout presidential races — and advances a proposal to open up our closed primaries. Moving local elections to even years when federal races are taking place and turnout is naturally higher is a surefire way to ensure more New Yorkers weigh in on city campaigns. It would also reduce confusion, make the electorate more representative and save taxpayer dollars. According to the city’s Independent Budget Office, aligning local elections with state and federal races could save about $42 million every other year. In the run-up to this primary, we saw efforts from campaigns to get voters enrolled in the Democratic party before the February deadline to register. But there is no reason those voters should be left behind, with the burden placed on campaigns to do outreach and make the case. Shutting out voters who are not part of a political party, many of whom are young, sends the wrong message: that their voices don’t count. Voters who don’t want to join a political party are the fastest growing group of voters in New York City and they deserve a meaningful say in selecting their leaders. It’s time for a new model. An open primary where all voters and all candidates would be able to participate in one Ranked Choice Voting primary election and the top two vote getters would advance to the general election would revitalize our local democracy. On this election reform, New York is totally out of step with the rest of the country. [Most major U.S. cities — including Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and Dallas — already have a more inclusive election system](https://citizensunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Charter-Reforms-for-Better-New-York-City-Government-Citizens-Union-Report-Feb-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). We are one of the few holdouts clinging to a closed primary model that discourages participation and stifles competition. The surge in this year’s turnout was driven by younger voters and voters who had never participated in a primary before. In fact, nearly one in four early voters hadn’t voted in a Democratic primary from 2012 to 2024, [according to analysis by the CUNY Graduate Center.](https://gothamist.com/news/nearly-a-quarter-of-nycs-early-voters-hadnt-voted-in-a-democratic-primary-since-2012?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Many registered as Democrats solely to vote. It’s an inspiring show of engagement, but one we should be expanding through open primaries. At an event just before Primary Day, I spoke with a New Yorker about open primaries and her eyes lit up. “I’m a Democrat, but I don’t want to be one,” she told me. “I only registered because I have to if I want to vote in the primaries.” That New Yorker joined the Democratic party to ensure her voice was heard, but it shouldn’t be a requirement. Consolidating our elections and opening our primaries would help build a system that reflects the full energy and diversity of our city — and ensures that far more New Yorkers have a meaningful say in the outcomes of our elections. This election proved that New Yorkers want a better system — and that when we give voters the tools, they’ll use them. They want to vote early. They want their $10 to mean as much as a PAC’s $10,000\. They want a system that reflects them and makes it easier to be engaged. New Yorkers are ready for a system that treats them like full participants — not just party insiders or political spectators. Let’s finish the job and build a democracy that includes all of us. ### How Do You Solve a Problem Like Fees and Fines? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-do-you-solve-a-problem-like-fees-and-fines/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:57.000Z > Findings from a pilot project in Birmingham, Ala. suggest it's possible that a relatively simple intervention can reduce debt burden, improve compliance and increase revenue. Wisely evaluating arrest-, prosecution- and incarceration-related fines and fees, which are assessed in nearly every traffic and criminal case where the defendant is found guilty — and even in some cases where they are not — is a kaleidoscopic endeavor. This is partly a criminal justice question: Fines are meant as punishment, and fees are framed as the cost of "using" the system. But since they cumulatively result in revenue that's used in much the same way tax dollars are, fines and fees can also be fairly viewed as a public finance matter. Until about 10 years ago, fines and fees were rarely studied. But in the decade since a U.S. Department of Justice [investigation](https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson%5Fpolice%5Fdepartment%5Freport.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department surfaced grave questions about the fairness and constitutionality of fines and fees practices in that city, researchers have developed a body of evidence demonstrating that fines and fees are a pain point in jurisdictions across the country. Far from being a minor nuisance, fines and fees can add up quickly, hanging over low-income Americans like a dark cloud for years after they have left the justice system. Now the question is how to responsibly go about reforming a system that implicates both municipal finance and public safety, two notoriously ticklish areas of public administration. Recent findings from a mixed-methods research collaboration out of Jefferson County, Ala., suggest that it is possible to improve compliance, accountability and efficiency without compromising the fair administration of justice. In a 2024 special issue of Vital City devoted to the question, "Does Evidence Matter?" editors Elizabeth Glazer and Greg Berman wrote, ["The relationship between academic research and the 'real world' of government work is a vexed one."](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/editors-note-issue-7) It doesn't have to be. Fees and fines are a great example of a realm where academic studies and public policy reform have been working in carefully coordinated tandem. Consider the case of Jefferson County, whose county seat of Birmingham has historically played host to many courageous confrontations with unjust laws and administrative systems. Starting in the fall of 2021, sitting judges and other practitioners in the jurisdiction worked with a multidisciplinary group of researchers, including the three of us, to examine how fines and fees assessed at sentencing in criminal cases play out — and to devise practical, effective ways to improve the assessment and collections process. Less than two years later, this collaborative produced a pilot intervention designed to mitigate the harm of fines and fees on individuals without sacrificing revenue. Findings from this project suggest it's possible that a relatively simple intervention can reduce debt burden, improve compliance and even increase revenue. The story of this project begins in 2018, when Alabama Appleseed, a public policy organization, [surveyed 980 Alabama residents](https://alabamaappleseed.org/underpressure/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who owed debt from fines and fees that they couldn't pay off immediately and from which they were experiencing severe consequences. These consequences included job loss, suspended drivers' licenses and incarceration. Almost 40% of survey participants reported committing an additional crime — most commonly, selling drugs, stealing or engaging in sex work — to get the money needed to pay their fines and fees. Negative consequences were not confined to the individuals who owed the debt. Most debtors borrowed money to pay what they owed, usually from their family networks. Judges in Birmingham's 10th Circuit Criminal Court, which has jurisdiction over most felony and misdemeanor cases in Jefferson County, were unsettled by these findings. They wanted to know more about the scope of the issue, the consequences for those who owe debt, and what happened to the revenue that was collected via fines and fees. To that end, they obtained data from more than 20,000 Jefferson County cases from between 2015-2019 in which people were assessed fines and fees at sentencing and partnered with us to assess the findings. > Findings from a pilot project in Birmingham, Ala. suggest it's possible that a relatively simple intervention can reduce debt burden, improve compliance and increase revenue. From a justice perspective, [the picture we painted](https://www.mdrc.org/work/projects/jefferson-county-equitable-fines-and-fees-project-project-jeff?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for judges and court practitioners was grim. Due to a 30% collections fee levied on debt in arrears for 90 days, most people, including those making regular payments, saw their balances increase over time. After controlling for a host of related factors, researchers found that Black people had 57% higher cumulative balances when compared to white people, while those judged indigent by the court had 48% higher cumulative balances than those who were not. Moreover, we found fines and fees debt was highly concentrated in low-income, and primarily Black, census tracts. The picture on the public finance side was no brighter. Most people didn't pay anything, and, on average, the court collected 30% of the total assessed. That collection rate is low when compared to other sources of public revenue. Local governments receive more than 90% of the property taxes they levy, and even the federal government brings in about [85%](https://www.irs.gov/statistics/irs-the-tax-gap?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the income taxes Americans owe. These collection rates are higher because governments have whole departments dedicated to assessment and collection, and they invest resources to increase compliance. Public finance researchers, too, have dedicated significant time and effort to understanding how to [optimize tax collection](https://mdrc365-my.sharepoint.com/personal/sarah%5Fpicard%5Fmdrc%5Forg/Documents/Desktop/runner,%20E.%20J.,%20Robbins,%20M.%20D.,%20&%20Simonsen,%20B.%20%282021%29.%20Experimental%20evidence%20about%20property%20tax%20word%20aversion.%C2%A0Public%20Budgeting%20&%20Finance,%C2%A041%284%29,%2050-70.?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mapping the system as a whole and watching how the money flowed — or did not flow — contextualized what practitioners were seeing daily and assigned numbers to problems that were typically viewed through an anecdotal lens. For example, most judges knew that legal financial obligations went unpaid, but worried that not assessing fees would create a budget crisis for the courts. The data helped them understand that the court maintained an outstanding assessment amount of about $10 million, and that even if they improved collections, there would still be questions to ask and answer about how the money was distributed. For instance, unless judges manually override it via order, a priority system built into Alabama's docketing software determines where money paid toward fines and fees is disbursed. When debtors pay, that revenue flows to the first prosecutor's office and clerk. If those accounts are satisfied in full — a relatively rare occurrence — the remaining money flows to an array of additional funds. Near the bottom of the list is a state fund earmarked to compensate victims of violence. Our findings showed that people who owed less money generally paid more (not just a larger proportion, but more actual dollars), and people who finished paying were most likely to pay on or close to the same day debt was assessed. This suggested that less debt paired with greater immediacy might be a smart way forward, if there was a way to get there within the legal and ethical constraints of the criminal justice system. > Findings from a pilot project in Birmingham, Ala. suggest it's possible that a relatively simple intervention can reduce debt burden, improve compliance and increase revenue. Faced with this information, the judges asked the research team to help devise a better approach to assessing and collecting fines and fees. After a day of intense conversation, the contours of a novel approach that would tackle excessive debt, poor collections and lack of compliance emerged. The idea was straightforward. Alabama judges have [broad discretion](https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/rules/cr26%5F11.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to reduce fines and fees for defendants who lack the ability to pay. Judges would leverage this rule with respect to the most common felonies in Jefferson County — simple drug possession and theft — and offer indigent defendants the option of paying $100 on the day of sentencing in exchange for having the rest of their debt from fines and fees forgiven. Restitution, if any was owed, would not be included in the deal. If it worked, the pilot would increase compliance, generate at least the same amount of revenue on these case types, and be less likely to leave defendants saddled with debt. Implementation was a challenge because courts are not, and never will be, laboratories. Judges must still make individual determinations on a case-by-case basis and cannot set aside their discretion unless required to by law. Meanwhile, docketing software built in 1992 is not equipped to handle novel orders. Still, after nine months and 40 participants, including 15 people who accepted the terms of the pilot and 25 who were offered and rejected it, the results are promising. Of the 15 people who accepted, 13 paid, and average revenue per treatment case was $25 more than revenue on non-treatment cases. The Jefferson County Circuit Court now has some limited proof of concept: At least on a small scale, it is possible to incentivize compliance and improve revenue by reducing overall assessments in exchange for timely payment. The pilot wasn't perfect. The sample size was small. It's perplexing that some people who were offered to participate declined. Perhaps that's because the intervention wasn't attractive to many of the people who are detained up to the day of sentencing, who would surely struggle to gather $100 — or any money at all — in a timely fashion. Nor did the project design account for differences in criminal history, even though it's reasonable to imagine that people facing their first felony convictions might be more able or more inclined to accept the $100 deal than those with multiple felony convictions and commensurate outstanding debt. Then again, high-quality science often starts with a study of anatomy, to develop a detailed understanding of a complex system through descriptive and exploratory analysis. After that, perhaps, it progresses to a fruit fly lab, where small changes in a relatively simple system signal whether an intervention should be iterated on or abandoned. In this imperfect analogy, the $100 pilot could be looked at as the fruit fly lab phase of understanding how interventions affect outcomes. It's not scalable precisely as designed, but it gives us a sense of what's possible and provides valuable information about where obstacles exist so that future iterations will be more effective. Evidence matters. But the *kind* of evidence and how that evidence is created also matters. To deliver pragmatic models with the ability to improve complicated processes, researchers must be flexible in thinking about how they fit into participatory public policy work. That means mapping systems that are inadequately understood, even by those who run and use them; building shared knowledge with practitioners; and jointly developing and testing hypotheses before attempting to scale interventions that can lead to more rigorous causal research. In sum, Glazer and Berman are right: Ethical, structural, cultural and administrative differences can indeed "vex" the relationship between academia and "real-world" government. But with creativity and a collaborative spirit, they can also yield promising evidence — and better outcomes. ### Fifty Years of Injustice at Rikers URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/fifty-years-of-injustice-at-rikers/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:33.000Z The long-overdue decision by Federal District Judge Laura Taylor Swain to place Rikers Island under receivership marks a critical turning point in a decades-long struggle for justice. But before anyone celebrates, it's essential to understand and take to heart the many times potential progress has been thwarted. Only by understanding what went wrong — and why — can those who want to build better jails create the conditions for success. Over 50 years ago, as project director of the Prisoners' Rights Project at the Legal Aid Society, I engaged with my colleagues in litigation that repeatedly exposed the inhumane conditions in New York City's jails, including detention facilities on Rikers Island. The story began when the newly established Prisoners' Rights Project initiated litigation in the federal courts of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, challenging a wide range of conditions in borough jails. [These cases](https://clearinghouse.net/special-project/10/24?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) addressed issues such as overcrowding, double celling, sanitation, fire safety, non-contact visitation, severe movement restrictions, excessive lock-ins and the broader maltreatment of individuals awaiting trial. One major outcome of these legal efforts was the closure of the infamous Tombs jail in lower Manhattan after the City failed to comply with a court injunction. In response to that case, and to judicial orders to end overcrowding in detention centers across Brooklyn, the Bronx and Queens, City officials attempted to circumvent these rulings by relocating thousands of detainees to Rikers Island — a remote and imposing facility. We, however, continued to fight, following our clients to Rikers Island and launching further lawsuits to address conditions there. In our litigation over conditions at Rikers Island, we presented overwhelming documentary and testimonial evidence demonstrating that detention centers there, in their location, design and operation, were fundamentally unfit to hold individuals awaiting trial, and were plagued with conditions like those we had successfully persuaded federal courts to condemn in the borough jails. It is both frustrating and tragic that these same conditions persist today, despite our warnings all those years ago. Half a century ago, our federal civil rights lawsuits showed that Rikers Island is uniquely and cruelly isolated. Thousands of people charged with crimes – yet not convicted – are torn from their communities and transported to a remote outpost in the middle of the East River. Accessible only by a single bridge and far from mass transit, Rikers severely restricts access for attorneys, making it extraordinarily difficult for detainees to confer with counsel and prepare their defenses. Families, too — spouses, children and loved ones – face immense challenges in maintaining contact, further deepening the isolation. Even if Rikers were a humane detention center, its location alone would make it intolerable. But tragically, it is the very opposite of a humane environment. At trial, we demonstrated that, even then, Rikers' jails were decrepit, poorly maintained and deeply unsanitary. Peeling paint, unpalatable food and a lack of basic fire safety measures were just some of the many deficiencies. New Yorkers detained inside those walls were denied even a modicum of human dignity. More recent litigation in [Nunez v. New York City Department of Correction](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2011cv05845/383754/847/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)revealed yet another horror: the pervasive risk of violent assault at the hands of both staff and fellow detainees. Inadequate supervision leaves those incarcerated at Rikers vulnerable to unchecked brutality. Thus, for those sent to Rikers Island, the reality is stark: isolation, inhumane conditions and persistent danger. This remains the system of pretrial detention that tens of thousands of New Yorkers endure each year. Decades ago, the City of New York did not mount a serious defense against our claims that the City's Department of Correction was failing in numerous ways to respect the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees in its custody. Indeed, Mayor Ed Koch — soon after taking office — publicly admitted that our concerns were "indisputably justified" and vowed to address the crisis. In response, we negotiated comprehensive consent decrees, signed by the City and approved by Federal Judge Morris Lasker. These decrees provided a detailed blueprint to remedy these longstanding issues, including a host of topics ranging from sanitation and fire safety to due process and protection from aggressive searches. These decrees gave us reason to believe that change was coming. How wrong we were. Now, 50 years later, a new generation of talented, dedicated attorneys has had to make many of the same arguments about the failure of the City to meet its responsibility to keep detainees safe and to treat them humanely that we made before they were even born. At last, their voices have been heard. Recently, Judge Swain found that "the continuing existence of extremely dangerous and unsafe conditions," and the City's failure to meaningfully address them, warranted the appointment of an independent remediation manager. This necessary step is encouraging but from my perspective it is long overdue. For 50 years, over a hundred thousand — if not more — New Yorkers have suffered injustice that the City pledged to eradicate. That is inexcusable. **Three big reasons why change hasn't happened yet** The possibility of meaningful change is cause for hope, but a lingering question remains: Why has it taken 50 years to reach this point? Looking back, three primary reasons explain why the horrific treatment of New Yorkers detained on Rikers Island persisted for half a century — long after one might have reasonably expected reform. First, while there was a fleeting moment in the late 1970s when then-[Deputy Mayor Herbert Sturz led a visionary effort to overhaul the City's prison and jail system](https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/qa-inside-campaign-close-rikers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — including a 1980 proposal to sell Rikers Island to the State and fund borough-based facilities — the commitment to change was never deep enough to endure beyond his tenure. Successive administrations failed to prioritize jail reform. The effort to sell the Island to the State fell through during the Ed Koch administration. The indifference, if not outright opposition, to the enforcement of constitutional rights of people held in New York City's jails continued thereafter. Mayor Rudy Giuliani actively resisted change, not only neglecting to enforce consent decrees but aggressively seeking their dissolution. Mayor Michael Bloomberg, for his part, rarely engaged with his first corrections commissioner, who might have been empowered to achieve reform had he been given the opportunity. Mayor Bill de Blasio did not prioritize reform, was a latecomer to the decision to close Rikers Island and failed even to visit Rikers Island until his failure was so well reported that he finally went. The administration of Mayor Eric Adams, as the court demonstrated in its recent ruling, has failed to meet the challenge as well. Second, Congress provided the City with a powerful mechanism to unravel progress when it passed the [Prison Litigation Reform Act](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1997e?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 1996\. This deceptively named law severely restricted incarcerated persons' access to the courts to vindicate their rights and allowed cities, like New York, to break their commitments under consent decrees. That law allows consent decrees to be vacated even when not complied with, unless the plaintiffs can meet an arduous burden not imposed on any other group of litigants. A consent decree is a promise by the government to do what it says. But when it came to the City's jails, despite not doing what it said it would do, the City demanded that the decrees be dissolved, and they were. Thus, [Giuliani leveraged this law to eviscerate nearly all provisions of the consent decrees](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/172/144/599413/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [effectively erasing the small amount of progress](https://clearinghouse.net/special-project/10/29?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that was made under the direction of Judge Lasker to enforce these decrees. The ongoing tragedies at Rikers are a direct result of this law and the City's willingness to exploit it. Third, the courts — led by the Supreme Court — have steadily narrowed the scope of protections for incarcerated individuals. While they have not fully returned to the "hands-off" doctrine, under which courts refused to intervene regardless of the severity of mistreatment, a series of rulings has left only a small opening for justice. In [Bell v. Wolfish](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/441/520/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the Supreme Court upheld jail restrictions even when they infringed upon fundamental rights, requiring only a reasonable explanation from the government — regardless of whether less harmful alternatives existed. In [Wilson v. Seiter](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/501/294/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), one of the most damaging rulings in the Court's history, a 5-4 decision held that prison conditions depriving individuals of even life's most basic necessities were nonetheless lawful unless plaintiffs could prove that officials deliberately intended to harm them or were willfully indifferent. No matter how dire or life-threatening the conditions, this heightened standard made relief extremely difficult to obtain. Moreover, 50 years ago, the Rikers Island case benefited from the oversight of the aforementioned Morris Lasker, a brilliant and deeply committed federal judge. There are few judges on the bench any longer of the caliber of Lasker and those who are struggling under the admonitions of the Supreme Court warning that enforcing the rights of marginalized people is not a priority. Thus, because of the City's reluctance to safeguard human rights, the formidable legal obstacles imposed by Congress and the courts' persistent erosion of prisoners' protections for five decades, hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers have endured injustices that the City once vowed to eliminate. **Cautious optimism** Now that the City has been held in contempt and the court has ordered that an independent remediation manager be appointed with power to take all necessary action to correct "ongoing violations of the constitutional rights of people in custody in the New York City jails," have we finally reached the moment where meaningful reform can no longer be postponed? After half a century of delay, is there reason to believe this time will be different? Despite the many setbacks I have witnessed over the years, I hold onto the hope that change is finally within reach. Unlike in the past, public awareness of jail conditions has grown, thanks to the relentless advocacy of dedicated individuals — many of whom have personally experienced incarceration — and the diligent reporting of the media. For decades, jails and prisons operated out of sight, allowing abuse to persist unchecked. But when the public is informed, reform becomes possible. Most significantly, for the first time, control of the jails is being taken out of the mayor's hands and placed under an independent entity accountable directly to the court — a critical step in overcoming entrenched barriers to change. These factors provide compelling reasons to believe that, unlike before, the conditions necessary for meaningful reform are finally in place. Time will tell whether this moment marks a true turning point. But one thing is certain: by confronting decades of neglect head-on, the preconditions for meaningful change are finally in place. The opportunity is here. One hopes that this time, history will not be allowed to repeat itself. ### Mamdani: Candidate Today, Leader Tomorrow URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mamdani-candidate-today-leader-tomorrow/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:58.000Z The 1972 film “The Candidate” ends with newly elected senator Bill McKay (Robert Redford) asking his campaign manager, [“What do we do now?”](https://www.governing.com/archive/bill-mckay-effect.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Zohran Mamdani has defied the odds and nearly every poll to win the Democratic primary. But he hasn’t won City Hall yet. He faces what could be a competitive election in November. [A pre-primary general election poll showed him trailing Andrew Cuomo, who may still choose to run on a third-party line](https://manhattan.institute/article/2025-nyc-mayoral-poll?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as his father did in 1977\. (Mario Cuomo lost to Ed Koch in that year’s Democratic primary and the runoff, ran in the general on the Liberal Party line — and lost to him again.) The November ballot will also include Mayor Eric Adams and independent Jim Walden. With the youthful enthusiasm of Mamdani’s candidacy comes real worry about his lack of experience and his democratic socialist agenda. While Mamdani won many Jewish votes — either as the first- or second-ranked candidate — [large segments of the community have expressed concerns about his positions.](https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/article-859034?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) There is a long time between now and November, giving Mamdani the time to better position himself to win in November and start governing on January 1. Here are some ideas that would help him to do both. Candidate Mamdani needs to demonstrate that he can govern as Mayor Mamdani. The transition from serving in a legislative role representing a single district to leading a big city isn’t easy. Ask Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson, who [saw his property tax proposal unanimously rejected by the City Council](https://news.wttw.com/2024/12/02/how-mayor-brandon-johnson-lost-control-debate-over-chicago-s-2025-budget?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Ask New Orleans Mayor Latoya Cantrell, [who currently has a 27% approval rating](https://www.nola.com/news/politics/latoya-cantrell-new-orleans-race-poll/article%5F93e8478f-6764-4a14-9e99-b77cffda778f.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). There are big differences between being a policy advocate and a CEO. While Mamdani cannot be seen as measuring the drapes at City Hall, he can take steps to show that he can make the transition successfully. During the first mayoral debate and elsewhere, he has cited [Boston Mayor Michelle Wu, another young progressive who won the big job, as a model.](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/p/zohran-mamdani-interview-transcript?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) He should spend a day with her in Boston so that he can talk specifically about lessons learned from her successes and failures. He wouldn’t be the first mayor to look outside of New York for lessons learned. [In 1993, during his transition, Rudy Giuliani met with then-Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell.](https://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/02/nyregion/the-new-mayor-the-philadelphia-story-inspiring-for-new-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Mamdani should be strategic about who he is talking to about — and potentially bringing into — his administration. [He has already said that he would consider keeping Jessica Tisch as police commissioner](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/nyregion/mamdani-policies-stances.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Even if he doesn’t commit to that, he should emphasize what he is looking for in a police commissioner and a schools chancellor. Candidate Mamdani should also consider identifying who he would pick for one or more deputy mayor slots. Again, there is some precedent here. In 1977, [Ed Koch strongly hinted that Edward Costikyan would be one of his deputy mayors](https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/24/archives/costikyan-bows-out-as-a-deputy-to-koch-when-denied-top-job.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as a means of reassuring the business community — though when he proposed an appointment other than first deputy mayor, Costikyan withdrew. People who think that budgets are about numbers don’t really understand budgets. Budgets are the most important policy document for most local governments, and they are fundamentally about choices. As many have pointed out, [vision without resources is a form of hallucination](https://www.apm.org.uk/blog/a-vision-without-resources-is-a-hallucination/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). One of the great reforms to emerge from the 1970s fiscal crisis is the requirement for multi-year financial planning. Team Mamdani needs to convene budget advisors starting now to think through just how to find the funding for his priorities — especially with uncertainty around the national economy and federal funding. [The benefit of multi-year financial planning is that it allows a new mayor to align their policy plan with their budget over more than just a fiscal year.](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/a-stronger-fiscal-framework-for-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) While affordability seems to have been the main issue in the primary, depending upon what events transpire between now and November, public safety could be the leading issue in the general election. The reality is that many in law enforcement agree with one recurring Mamdani theme — the notion that police have been asked to do too much for too long when it comes to preventing crime. Policing, prosecution and punishment are essential to public safety, but in many ways prevention is preeminent. [Mamdani’s idea to create a Department of Community Safety is interesting](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/01/nyregion/zohran-mamdani-crime-plan.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — I worked on [a similar proposal in Providence, Rhode Island](https://www.providenceri.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Providence-Department-of-Public-Safety-Executive-Summary-04.13.2021.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — but it needs more flesh on the bones. Candidate Mamdani can surround himself with national law enforcement experts, police and prosecutors alike, along with local law-enforcement allies such as Attorney General Tish James, to talk through just how the concept might work to reduce crime and increase public safety in New York. The City’s Department of Investigation has been nothing short of heroic in its independent role in investigating Mayor Adams. But the role and focus of DOI has not changed much in the century since it was [first created as the Office of the Commissioner of Accounts](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doi/about/mission.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [President Trump’s attack on federal IGs](https://www.wamc.org/news/2025-01-27/new-york-state-inspector-general-raises-alarm-about-trumps-firing-of-federal-igs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) demands a local response that reinvents the role of local watchdogs — including oversight of the impact of federal corruption on locally delivered programs. Candidate Mamdani can lay the groundwork for making DOI a national model. The enthusiasm generated by Zohran Mamdani’s candidacy creates the opportunity to attract talented young people into city government. It can also help make New York a magnet for talent made available due to the Trump administration’s war on federal workers. While the city’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development isn’t the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, laying out a plan for attracting and keeping talent would send an important signal to voters and to potential future staff. Mamdani ran a classic field campaign with extraordinary outreach to various communities. He needs to build on that. [Recent reports indicate that he has spent little time as a candidate visiting Black churches](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/20/nyregion/adrienne-adams-mamdani-endorse.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It is time to become a Sunday regular. For a mayor, city workers are an essential constituency. Candidate Mamdani should spend time with them in off-the-record settings without press, learning more about the day-to-day workings of city government from teachers, cops, firefighters, sanitation workers and others. A candidate’s religion should be irrelevant in any election — and their positions on foreign policy would seem to have no bearing on how they would govern a city. Except in New York, which has been called the only U.S. city with a history of having its own foreign policy. [Mayor Fiorello La Guardia railed against Hitler in the 1930s](https://time.com/archive/6756627/new-york-laguardia-v-hitler/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In 1977, [Candidate Ed Koch — not yet the mayor — confronted President Jimmy Carter with a hand-delivered letter on U.S. policy toward Israel](https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/05/archives/koch-mideast-protest-draws-carter-snub.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In the 1990s, [Nelson Mandela came to New York because of the role that the city played in combating apartheid through pension fund divestment and restrictions on City contracts with firms doing business in South Africa](https://www.archives.nyc/blog/2017/7/20/freedom-tour-nelson-mandela-in-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Some of the concerns about Mamdani are unjustified and unfair, undoubtedly stemming from his faith. But some of his own statements — [like his unwillingness to condemn the term “globalize the intifada”](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/nyc-mayoral-candidate-zohran-mamdani-draws-criticism-intifada-remarks-rcna213967?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — have fueled the fire. In 1960, John Kennedy gave a [speech to a group of ministers in Houston to address questions about his Catholicism](https://www.npr.org/2007/12/05/16920600/transcript-jfks-speech-on-his-religion?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ([Even Martin Luther King Sr. had concerns about supporting the first Catholic president](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/books/review/kennedy-and-king-steven-levingston.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).) And again, in 2008, [Barack Obama addressed anti-American comments by his pastor in a campaign speech on race](https://www.npr.org/2008/03/18/88478467/transcript-barack-obamas-speech-on-race?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Whether a similar speech from Mamdani would help or hurt him with Jewish voters, he should redouble his consistent statements that he will do everything in his power to protect Jewish New Yorkers from antisemitism. In addition to a speech, he should also consider spending part of Rosh Hashanah or Yom Kippur at a synagogue — not to speak, but to show solidarity with a religious minority that is increasingly being targeted for violence. Of course, it’s possible that Candidate Mamdani can win without doing any of these things. After all, he ran a brilliant primary campaign. But none of these ideas require him to abandon the issues that he ran on, and all of them can help him get through a very ambitious agenda. ### Our Advice to The New York Times About a Vexing Editorial Decision URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/our-advice-to-the-new-york-times-about-a-vexing-editorial-decision/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:58.000Z *In April 2024,* [*The New York Times editorial board said*](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/12/business/media/the-new-york-times-editorial-board-political-endorsements.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *it would stop making endorsements in local elections. This decision sparked a fair amount of derision amongst the chattering class. (For a prime example, see Harry Siegel's savage take for Vital City:* [*"New York Times to New York: Drop Dead."*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-york-times-to-new-york-drop-dead)*)* *Then, as the Democratic mayoral primary heated up, the paper on June 12 released what was pitched as a substitute for an endorsement, branded* [*The Choice*](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/12/opinion/nyc-mayor-election-candidates.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*: A panel of 15 prominent New Yorkers chose their favorite candidate. (Comptroller Brad Lander came out as the top choice of seven panelists.)* *But The Times wasn't done. On June 16, the paper released a 1,853-word unsigned editorial entitled* [*"Our Advice to Voters in a Vexing Race for New York Mayor"*](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/16/opinion/new-york-mayor-election-advice.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *in which the paper kind of, sort of told readers who to vote for — or at least told them who not to vote for (and along the way flung calumnies against former mayor Bill de Blasio that read like a ventriloquized version of Michael Bloomberg complaints). The paper urged against ranking Zohran Mamdani while saying both kind and unkind things about Andrew Cuomo, Brad Lander and Whitney Tilson, leaving many readers perplexed about what guidance to take away. (*[*We ran the editorial through a few different AI bots*](https://x.com/VitalCityNYC/status/1934616743785439610?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to see who they thought it was recommending.)* *Many believe The Times has squandered its unparalleled influence in New York City politics by failing to issue a direct endorsement this year. In May 2021, the paper* [*boosted Kathryn Garcia*](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/opinion/kathryn-garcia-nyt-endorsement-nyc-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to great effect. This year, many hoped the board would bring similar clarity to a race that has left many voters flummoxed* *What to make of it all, and what should The Times do next? We assembled our own panel to advise the paper on how better to advise the public.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Better than silence** Errol Louis I salute the staff of The New York Times opinion section and editorial board for attempting to correct the [colossal blunder](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/the-new-york-times-is-making-a-huge-mistake.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — made by the paper's management, not the editorial board itself — of no longer endorsing candidates for local offices, including mayor. As the world's financial capital and the nation's biggest city (larger than 16 states, generating more than a trillion dollars' worth of economic activity every year), the critical question of who should govern New York would be worth opining on even if The Times weren't headquartered here. Getting local government right here *matters*. Instead of a straightforward assessment of the candidates and a recommendation of who to vote for, The Times's clunky workaround involved soliciting the views and opinions of 15 New Yorkers; publishing interviews with the leading candidates; and publishing a strangely-worded non-endorsement expressing disappointment with all the Democratic candidates (as well as life in the city over the last decade) and urging readers not to rank Zohran Mamdani in the party's primary. A parade of statistics refute the paper's faulty baseline assumption that "quality of life has deteriorated over the past decade" and that politicians are to blame. [Shootings and homicides are down](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr010/nypd-record-low-shootings-murders-the-first-five-months-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) so far this year, and the 377 homicides recorded last year are, like the 333 murders in 2014, near the lowest numbers in a century (the all-time low was reached in 2017). Our city's formidable medical complex — from the 11 public hospitals to the groundbreaking research institutions affiliated with Columbia, Cornell and NYU — has made so much steady progress on chronic diseases and public health measures that life expectancy here reached an [all-time high](https://www.nyc.gov/site/doh/about/press/pr2024/nyc-life-expectancy-recovers-some-years.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of 82.6 years in 2019, the year before COVID struck. But instead of noting policy innovations like the creation of universal early education or the long-overdue curbside composting and containerization of trash, The Times (which [scoffed at pre-K](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/opinion/sunday/two-endorsements.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when then-candidate Bill de Blasio proposed it in 2013) has asked readers to reject Mamdani's proposals for free bus service and a rent freeze, dismissing them as "an agenda uniquely unsuited to the city's challenges." The board instead grudgingly sort of voted for Andrew Cuomo (whose [resignation](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/03/opinion/andrew-cuomo-resign.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as governor The Timesboard called for in 2021) — though many interpretations of the inscrutable editorial concluded that maybe they were recommending Brad Lander. So I don't like the board's logic and I think they have the facts wrong. But I'm very glad they decided to get back in the civic conversation, mistakes and all. *Errol Louis is political anchor at NY1 News and a Vital City contributing writer.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **To opine is to choose** Richard J. Tofel I hope we can all agree that The New York Times made a hash of its editorial page's role in this year's mayoral campaign. [Last August](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/12/business/media/the-new-york-times-editorial-board-political-endorsements.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) it said it would end a 124-year-old practice and stop making endorsements in local races, even as it continued to do so in presidential campaigns, and even as many readers welcome the guidance locally, while the number of presidential undecideds who depend on The Times approaches the null set. Then, this month, two days before early voting began, the paper published the preferences of a group of 15 citizens purely of its own choosing, implying some sort of group preference. Finally, on the third day of early voting, it advised primary voters directly, in an editorial which implicitly (but not explicitly) indicated that the non-endorsement policy announced 10 months earlier had been repealed. The proffered advice included denigrating the field as a whole, suggesting alternative top choices for "progressives" and "moderates," attacking the leading candidate in the polls as unfit and his leading challenger as entirely unworthy, but refusing to specify its own choice — a luxury not available to citizens who feel an obligation to participate in our democracy while we still have one. I have [some sympathy for the argument against editorial endorsements](https://dicktofel.substack.com/p/opining-about-opinion-pages?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in modern politics. Nationally, they have become unpersuasive. Even locally, they can undermine trust in the distinction between news and opinion, and strike an imperfect balance between emphasizing politics and policy. But [you're either in or you're out](https://www.imdb.com/video/embed/vi3448161305/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). French Premier Pierre Mendès-France said that "to govern is to choose." So it is with voters, who remain the rulers in a country whose foundational document begins, "We, the people." It made no sense for the same editorial page to endorse [two candidates at the same time for president in 2020](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/19/opinion/amy-klobuchar-elizabeth-warren-nytimes-endorsement.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) when primary voters could only make one choice. The approach taken in this election by The Times makes even less sense. *Richard J. Tofel is the former president of ProPublica and assistant publisher of the Wall Street Journal. He is the author of the* [*Second Rough Draft newsletter*](https://dicktofel.substack.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ════════════════════════════════════════ **Put the 'New York' Back in The New York Times** Thomas Dyja I've finally gotten over the New York Giants playing in New Jersey, but The New York Times becoming a national paper will forever drive me crazy. We needed The Times to endorse — really endorse — a candidate in the Democratic primary for mayor. We needed it to admit that it exists in New York City, that what happens next week matters on a day-to-day level to the people who write and publish it, that The Times has more responsibility to the city that named its prime gathering place after it than it does to folks clicking through to its site in Spokane, Davenport or London. While avoiding "a one-size-fits-all endorsement," as its explanation claimed, sounds like a lofty goal, voting, whether we like it or not, is exactly that. The solve is easy enough. Endorse next time! But if The Times is truly serious about helping New Yorkers "make their own decisions," it would do the job every day and revive its City Desk. Its [2016 retreat from regular city reportage](https://www.niemanlab.org/reading/the-new-york-times-metro-desk-is-moving-away-from-routine-city-news-coverage/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in favor of "larger, more consequential themes" has proven that watching New York function step by step, meeting to meeting, profoundly matters. Every morning when we opened The Times, we used to see our local democracy functioning — a messy, contentious business based more on process, involvement, and compromise than party platform slogans. Its shift to focus on "investigations of individuals and institutions that wield outsize power" and "deeply reported narratives" has delivered brilliant prize-bait journalism that tends to reduce New Yorkers to spectators and consumers. Issues are covered where there's drama and characters, good guys and bad guys. Emergencies and conflicts are all that's considered newsworthy. No wonder New Yorkers think the sky is falling. The onus, it appears, isn't on us to make something with our city; it's on someone else to come and fix it for us. Gothamist, City & State, The City, Crain's, Hell Gate and others: They've all stepped up to provide first-rate local coverage, but all together, they simply can't move the needle the way The Times can. We need a free and powerful institution that tells us what's happening this morning in City Hall, the boardroom, the street corner and the penthouse; that acts as our partner in the daily, collective mission that is New York City. *Thomas Dyja is author of "New York, New York, New York: Four Decades of Success, Excess, and Transformation."* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A step back, then steps forward** Tim Tompkins In the context of increasingly anemic metro coverage too often unburdened by nuance or history, The Times' announcement last year that it would no longer endorse in local elections hit hard for those of us who love city government. My first response was a mix of bafflement and indifference when I heard about the oddly-reality-TV-named "The Choice. "A weird non representative panel of morons," exclaimed a friend of mine. "They have no idea who lives in this city!!" But when I looked at the panel, I saw a racially and ideologically diverse group of people — eight of whom I know personally to be extraordinarily well-versed in the wants and needs and failings of the city. Is that a sign that this group is not representative of the average voter and instead representative of a highly informed civic class? Absolutely! But that's what we need. The Times panel was composed of opinionated people who also understand how hard it is to govern and to make government work. Could the panel have been more of a mix? Certainly. But finding folks not already firmly in one candidate's camp (or fearful of it) out of institutional or ideological loyalty is likely very hard. For me, the panel is a fascinating — and radical — experiment, in much the same way that The Times'[ "America in Focus"](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/10/08/opinion/undecided-voters-harris-trump-focus-group.html?searchResultPosition=2&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) pieces about the presidential race last fall were. Exhausted by The Times' often-unsubtle and intrusive framing of political issues by reporters, I found the direct thoughts of very different people about the candidates to be incredibly refreshing and clarifying. And then there was the editorial board's unexpected editorial. Cue the eye rolls. "A non-apology apology for dropping endorsements" noted a former colleague (she may have a point). But dammit, that clumsiness itself takes courage. It's more than a little embarrassing, but they did it because someone somewhere snapped back into reality about how much this matters, not just for New York, but for the country, and frankly, for all cities in the world. It provided additional complexity and context to the already abundant amount of opinion in The Choice. While meandering, it stated some strongly held opinions in a thoughtful and understated way. In a world of rigid oversimplification, I like that. Most importantly, The Times editorial board broke through the alluring fog of "what if" to see the clear reality of "what is." Attention must be paid. Not tending to the messy mechanics of government is political suicide for Democrats. The Times has spoken, and I am glad: take note, get your nose to the grindstone and your ass off the grandstand and do something. *Tim Tompkins is an NYU Marron Institute fellow, where he leads the Sustaining Places Initiative.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **There's no going back** Alexis Grenell The New York Times declared itself no longer a local paper when it [dramatically scaled back its Metro coverage in 2016](https://www.niemanlab.org/reading/the-new-york-times-metro-desk-is-moving-away-from-routine-city-news-coverage/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It scaled back local editorial coverage as well, which routinely used to weigh in on timely matters of substance. Eleanor Randolph, who led that coverage for the board, and later Mara Gay, wrote prolifically about city and state issues, providing necessary insight to give readers more than just the facts ma'am: They offered clear-eyed judgment too. That's the very opposite of the whinging, scattered non-endorsement the paper ran on the candidates for mayor. I could barely follow the logic, let alone the point. It read like a publisher's tantrum and perhaps regret, for previously deciding not to endorse in local races. It undermined the oddly composed panel the paper called "The Choice," which at least made a decision about who would be the best mayor — rating Brad Lander best overall. The editorial effectively contradicted this by claiming there were no good choices. Welcome to politics, Punch. Elections are the bus where we have to choose the candidate that gets us closest to where we're trying to go. This isn't Uber. The Choice panel understood the assignment. The editorial board did not. Voters have to make a choice, and historically The Times has helped them do so in local elections. As dubious as some of their endorsements have been, the board at least performed the task that it expected of its readers. What's so absurd about this week's screed is that not only did the paper abdicate that role — and the power and prestige that go with it — but it reversed its own positions. "The past decade has been disappointing," the editorial read, referring to a time during which Andrew Cuomo was governor, and The Times called for him to resign, but he's better for New York's future than many alternatives? Brad Lander, who The Times endorsed for comptroller in 2021, and who this editorial said "exudes competence," doesn't get the nod this time? "Subway trips can have a chaotic or even menacing quality," but let's take another look at the guy who defunded them? Get a grip. As the paper acknowledged, ranked-choice voting is the silver lining for voters struggling with the field. But then it didn't offer any rankings, just more grumbling and griping better suited to a Second Avenue coffee shop. Next time, somebody just get Sulzberger a donut. *Alexis Grenell is a columnist for the Nation and the co-founder of Pythia Public Affairs.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Callow Times** Robert A. George The New York Times' editorial board's "original sin" (as it were) was its announcement last year that it would [no longer endorse in local races](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/12/business/media/the-new-york-times-editorial-board-political-endorsements.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — including in mayoral elections, as it had done since 1897\. It was preemptive abandonment of a vital civic role which New Yorkers of diverse backgrounds had come to rely upon. Candidates saw a Times endorsement as something valuable to seek out and a mediating force in the city's rough-and-tumble politics. Rather than consider the value of its own institutional voice during a particularly complex time — the second mayoral race with ranked choice voting and the first with Donald Trump as president on top of that — The Times outsourced policy assessment to [15 intellectuals, activists and political strategists](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/17/opinion/experts-nyc-mayor-election.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), hoping collective wisdom might form a guiding consensus (seven of them picked city comptroller Brad Lander). No offense, but that panel's insights were no substitute for a board that had the power to command interviews from every candidate to assess vision, policies and character. Less than a week later, The Times [took another bite at the apple](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/16/opinion/new-york-mayor-election-advice.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringsource=articleshare&sgrp=g&pvid=0412b77c-ad41-4b47-9a7e-295441e312bb&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — only to throw their hands up in an opaque non-endorsement. It bemoaned a field which "lacks any candidate who seems likely to be the city's next great mayor. *For that reason*, we are not endorsing a candidate" (emphasis added). That's a cop out. An editorial board isn't seeking "New York City's next great mayor," as if it were some kind of reality show. Its responsibility is to identify the best to lead the city for the next four years. Beyond that, it's disingenuous not to even give a nod to the real reason for their lack of an endorsement. Why blame the field for the board's squandering of its endorsement power? In similar incomprehensible fashion, while making clear its disdain for Andrew Cuomo and Zohran Mamdani, the editorial lands on a half- (quarter-) hearted "recommendation" (whatever you do, don't call it an endorsement) that voters, maybe, possibly could consider Brad Lander. At a moment when New Yorkers most needed its voice, the old Grey Lady frittered away a 128-year legacy — for what, exactly? *Robert A. George is a veteran of the New York Post, Daily News and Bloomberg editorial boards.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Where Is the Paper of Record When New York Needs It Most?** MaryAnne Gilmartin For generations, The New York Times has been more than a news outlet — it's been part of New York's civic infrastructure. Its editorials have steered the public conversation. Its political endorsements have helped elevate thoughtful leadership. And its moral compass, at its best, has helped keep the city on course. That's why I was stunned to see The Times step away from endorsing a candidate in this year's mayoral race. At a time when clarity, courage, and civic responsibility are needed most, the paper's silence is not just conspicuous — it's consequential. I say this as someone who knows The Times well. At Forest City, I led the development of its iconic headquarters in Times Square. It wasn't just another building project — it was a shared act of faith in the future of the city. I worked closely with the institution's leaders and saw up close the values they hold dear: transparency, rigor, public service, and pride in being part of New York's civic fabric. That's what makes this decision so difficult to reconcile. The Times has never been a passive observer of city life. Its endorsements — especially in Democratic primaries — have shaped debates, elevated lesser-known candidates, and helped set a standard for what New York should expect from its leaders. You don't have to look far to see the impact they've had. The housing crisis, now front and center in this election cycle, didn't suddenly appear in campaign talking points. It rose to the top of the agenda in part because The Times has relentlessly reported on it, editorialized about it, and demanded more from policymakers. That's what a civic institution does: shine a light, set a bar and stay engaged. This mayoral race is exactly the kind of moment when The Times' voice could make a difference. Not to dictate outcomes, but to clarify stakes. To separate serious proposals from slogans. To challenge candidates to think bigger, act faster, and aim higher. So why sit this one out? The New York Times is a global institution, but its roots — and much of its influence — are right here in this city. This isn't just about an editorial board decision. It's about whether one of our most trusted institutions is still willing to engage in the messy, urgent, essential work of local democracy. Now is not the time to step back. New York needs more voices leaning in, not fewer. And when those voices carry the weight and history of The Times, the silence speaks volumes. We're in a moment that demands engagement, not retreat. And we should expect more from those who've helped shape this city for more than a century. *MaryAnne Gilmartin is founder and CEO of MAG Partners.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Endorse again, with names attached** Josh Greenman No, The Times never should've stopped making endorsements in local political races. The paper's editorial board had for generations played an indispensable role in these elections, helping educate and guide millions of New Yorkers on the most important democratic choice they make. Then it scurried away from the podium like a kid with stage fright, while bizarrely choosing to continue to endorse at the national level, where the paper's voice is relatively predictable and redundant. Insult to injury, they made a hash of things this year by publishing two non-endorsement endorsements — first presenting The Choice panel collecting the recommendations of 15 handpicked New Yorkers, then offering an incoherent editorial lamenting the quality of the candidates while especially warning against Zohran Mamdani. This is behavior befitting a non-voter sitting on a barstool; the paper of record has a responsibility to assess an imperfect field and choose. But we are where we are. What should happen now? There's nothing wrong with The Times keeping something like the Choice panel — there are probably a handful of readers who are truly burning to know restaurateur Danny Meyer's opinion of who has the best policing strategy — but The Times should simultaneously return to good old-fashioned local endorsements, with a twist. Editorial board endorsements can have real value. They help voters cut through the clutter of transactional trades and single-issue advocacy groups and see the big picture. But they've always beena strange animal. They're made "in the voice of the paper," but in reality, they're the judgment of a small group of opinion journalists, or maybe really just the publisher. They represent the opinion, not the news, side of the paper, but many readers don't understand the difference. So when the members of the board are making a call, they should be transparent about who they are and how they chose. When Mort Zuckerman owned the Daily News, he had us endorse Mitt Romney for president in 2012, and an unprepared upstart named Oliver Rosenberg over Rep. Jerrold Nadler (Mort was angry with Nadler over Nadler's support for the Iran nuclear deal). Neither was a choice the board would have made on its own. Readers are understandably confused when they read a disembodied "we" at a newspaper declaring one candidate to be superior and the other inferior, so advice should have names attached. For accountability and clarity, news stories have bylines; endorsement editorials should too. *Josh Greenman is managing editor at Vital City and former editorial page editor of the New York Daily News.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A debacle through and through** Tom Allon One of the few remaining powers print media has is the power of the endorsement in local political races. The New York Times decided last summer to squander that vestigial role and instead experimented this year with a few different ways of weighing in on the mayoral race in New York City. The Choice feature, asking 15 diverse but prominent New Yorkers to rank their personal choices for mayor, was ineffectual and confusing. Comptroller Brad Lander "won" that mini-primary, meaning the choice of The Times-chosen experts aligned with that of the stereotypical Times reader, a resident of brownstone Brooklyn like Lander. Then, sensing that its abdication of responsibility in endorsements might contribute to a Zohran Mamdani victory, The Times editorial board took out its sledgehammer to pummel the 33-year-old surging Assemblymember/Democratic Socialists of America candidate. The Times also trashed the whole field, including front-runner Andrew Cuomo, and, with faint praise, implied that Lander was the best of the worst. They concluded with a hope that in four years, New Yorkers will have better choices for mayor. The only thing The Times accomplished in this wildly inconsistent opinion coverage is ensure that [it will avoid endorsing another mayoral loser.](https://www.cityandstateny.com/opinion/2024/08/opinion-new-york-times-editorial-board-end-long-losing-streak/398912/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) It's been more than a quarter century since The Times backed a candidate who eventually became mayor. Bravo to The Times editorial board. Mission accomplished! *Tom Allon is the founder and publisher of City & State and the co-founder of the 5Boro Institute.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A pang of Gray Lady regret?** Daniel Okrent When The Times announced last year that they would be endorsing for president, but no longer for state or local offices, I imagined there were three possible reasons: 1. They wanted to declare to their national and international readership that the "New York" in their name was no longer a relevant descriptor. 2. They believed their New York (and Connecticut and New Jersey) readers to be so well-informed, so public-spirited, and so plugged-in that the paper wouldn't need to tell them whom to vote for in a contested Democratic primary in, say, the 32nd State Assembly District, or the 17th Congressional District, or a statewide primary for attorney general — and in every other similarly irrelevant (in their view) election. BUT the editors also believed these readers, despite their many civic virtues, had no idea whom to vote for in a presidential election; thus, their shocking — and immeasurably helpful! — endorsement of Joe Biden. 3. They just don't give a shit about New York. The first of these reasons is apparently true. And because reason No. 2 couldn't be (as it is completely preposterous), you have to go with No. 3\. Regarding the current mayoral race, one might say that the paper's whipsawing publication of recommendations from a panel of other New Yorkers, coupled with their nearly simultaneous non-endorsement endorsement, suggests that The Times may be regretting its egregious abdication of civic responsibility. I doubt it, but one can always dream. *Daniel Okrent is former public editor of The New York Times.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Please come home** Julie Sandorf For decades, advertising revenues and robust print subscriptions allowed local news outlets to thrive financially, hold powerful institutions accountable to the public, and exert considerable influence on our body politic with editorials and endorsements of candidates for public office. The collapse of this business model has significantly degraded this essential pillar of our civic health, and the impact has been well documented: declines in voter turnout, and increases in corruption, municipal borrowing and polarization. The Daily News Editorial Board, with a total staff of around two people, continues to punch far above its weight class, but last year, its hedge fund owner nixed all but local endorsements. And while nonprofit outlets such as The City, Documented, New York Focus, City Limits and WNYC/Gothamist are working valiantly to fill the breach with significantly less resources, these tax-exempt 501-c-3 organizations are prohibited by law from making endorsements. With savvy business decisions, The New York Times has rescued itself from financial ruin to become one of the most profitable news organizations in the world, and I am among millions who benefit from their good fortune and vast resources. Their opinion section alone, with 200 people on staff, is likely larger than the city's other newspaper newsrooms in aggregate. This makes their decision in 2024 to end local endorsements all the more confounding, especially when followed by a confusing "Advice" editorial that put its toe back in the endorsement water. Readers like me have relied on The Times' deep knowledge of local public affairs, diligence in research and knowledge of the candidates to craft an endorsement that we could trust to be fully vetted. In 2021, The Times Editorial Board [published their interviews with mayoral candidates](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/opinion/kathryn-garcia-endorsement-interview.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which were revelatory. Their [information-rich endorsement of Kathryn Garcia](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/opinion/kathryn-garcia-nyt-endorsement-nyc-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) catapulted her from single-digit polling to coming [a little more than 7,000 votes short](https://projects.thecity.nyc/nyc-2021-primary-election-results/democratic.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of winning the election. The 2021 endorsement also devoted at least a paragraph to each of the other candidates. In contrast, this year's "Advice" editorial dedicated less than one sentence each to Adrienne Adams, Scott Stringer and Zellnor Myrie, all of whom have significant experience and track records. Did they meet with all the candidates? And if they did, why give such short shrift to their readers? New York City's civic infrastructure is being battered by a tsunami of forces, both from within and beyond the five boroughs. We desperately need to restore our collective civic well-being. The New York Times couldn't be more well-positioned to step up and do their part. They have the template: Their own 2021 election endorsement. *Julie Sandorf is president of the Charles H. Revson Foundation, which has helped fund Vital City, The City, Documented and other nonprofit local media enterprises. The views represented are solely those of the author.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Whose voices count?** Bhairavi Desai The New York Times seems terrified that the working-class people who make up New York City might not follow the lead of their hand-picked elite opinion makers. First, they put together a panel that excluded poor and working-class New Yorkers in favor of their own former journalists, a couple of rich guys, a few academics, and the head of a rightwing think tank, with two token community leaders to round out the group. Where were the voices of the poor and working class whose struggles The New York Times reports on? I want to hear from people living in public housing, from people in rent-stabilized buildings, from cabbies and home care workers, from janitors and delivery workers. Why aren't they given a platform to talk about what changes they'd like to see? Poor people, too, have visions for society. Then The New York Times ran a fearmongering editorial that seemed straight out of the Giuliani era, blaming the "liberalism" of former Mayor de Blasio for the city's woes. To the paper of record, working-class people skipping out on paying subway fares is apparently as "menacing" as felony assaults. The editors asserted that New Yorkers' "quality of life has deteriorated over the past decade," and used that as fodder to argue that anyone besides the leftist should be elected. Here, they contradict the findings of their own elite-dominated panel that ranked Zohran Mamdani number one for quality of life. But once again, I want to know what poor New Yorkers think. At the same time that The New York Times editorial board is talking itself in circles to assert the agenda of the rich and ignore the voices of the poor and working class, billionaires and corporate donors are throwing an obscene amount of money into this election. Michael Bloomberg has now poured [$8.4 million](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/18/bloomberg-donation-cuomo-super-pac-00413966?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) into Cuomo's super PAC, a group representing landlords has put in [$2.5 million](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/05/nyregion/cuomo-landlords-donation.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), DoorDash [$1 million](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/12/doordash-gives-1-million-to-cuomo-allied-super-pac-00341374?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and Pro-Trump billionaire Bill Ackman [$250,000](https://nypost.com/2025/04/15/business/pro-trump-bill-ackman-gives-250k-to-andrew-cuomo-mayoral-campaign/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Pro%2DTrump%20billionaire%20Bill%20Ackman,to%20Andrew%20Cuomo%20mayoral%20campaign&text=Billionaire%20hedge%20fund%20manager%20Bill,over%20his%20more%20progressive%20rivals.&text=New%20Yorkers%20for%20Better%20Leadership,mere%20$10%2C500%20in%20sizable%20contributions.). Never one to miss a party, the gig lords at Uber have poured $1.3 million to seemingly redesign the City Council. With these corporate and billionaire voices attempting to dictate who we elect to govern New York City, The New York Times' failure to listen to working-class people is even more abhorrent. *Bhairavi Desai is a founding member of the New York Taxi Workers Alliance.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **A pulled punch** Jere Hester When it comes to writing editorials, saying exactly what you mean is easier said than done. You need to speak with clarity — and nuance. And no matter how good a job you do, you're probably going to anger half your audience (which is a sign of doing a good job). So what then to make of The New York Times' non-endorsement editorial — and[ The Choice panel](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/12/opinion/nyc-mayor-election-candidates.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) piece leading up to it — in the crucial New York City Democratic mayoral primary? The paper of record offered a puzzling punt in its[ June 16 editorial](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/16/opinion/new-york-mayor-election-advice.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as voters grapple with their ranked-choice ballots. The Times Editorial Board's mixed messages, delivered under the banner of "advice," boil down to: Don't vote for Zohran Mamdani. You can be forgiven for opting for Andrew Cuomo, despite the sexual harassment allegations that drove him from Albany. And, hey, Brad Lander's a solid (if not exciting, [pre-ICE clash](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/06/17/brad-lander-arrest-ice-immigration-court/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) guy — a plurality of our Choice panel members think so. Invoking the panel's candidate assessments in the editorial had the odd effect of elevating the 15 prominent New Yorkers The Times' Opinion team assembled — ranging from restaurateur Danny Meyer to former state senator Iwen Chu — to de facto editorial board member status. It's not The Times' job to tell people what to think, but rather to give folks information and viewpoints to help them make decisions. But there was both substantive and symbolic heft to the paper's announcement last summer that it wouldn't regularly make endorsements in local races. The Times is a key, influential player in New York's civic life. Case in point: the paper's [endorsement of Kathryn Garcia](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/opinion/kathryn-garcia-nyt-endorsement-nyc-mayor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the 2021 mayoral primary, which helped showcase the once low-profile bureaucrat's record of public service, nearly catapulting her to City Hall. This time around, The Times Editorial Board could have said, straight out, hold your nose and make Cuomo your top pick. Or it could have said to go for Lander, positioning him as this race's Garcia. Or here's our top-five slate for your ranked-choice ballot. But The Times' failure to take a definitive stand (beyond its no-way-Mamdani stance) amid what it deems a lackluster candidate lineup risks the unintended consequence of exacerbating apathy among some potential voters (and firing up Mamdani fans). That The Times published a non-endorsement editorial at all perhaps opens the door a crack to an endorsement in November's general election. But by the time The Times says what it means, will it be too late mean anything? *Jere Hester is director of the Local Accountability Reporting Program at the* [*Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism at CUNY*](https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### The Art of Urban Governance URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/meera-joshi-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:58.000Z *A lot goes wrong in New York, and as New York City deputy mayor for operations from 2021-2025, Meera Joshi was responsible for fixing much of it. During her tenure during the Adams administration, Meera led nine agencies that cover all facets of New York City life — from trash to street cleaning to buildings. In this episode, she and Jamie go under the hood of what it looks like to manage an operation of 100,000+ city employees and what lessons she'll take with her to her next role.* *You can listen to this episode, "The Art of Urban Governance," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-art-of-urban-governance/id1794619189?i=1000713365708&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/3tYPzRnkdvFOjbG22sdP4x?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* ### The Most Interesting Thing on the Ballot this Fall URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-most-interesting-thing-on-the-ballot-this-fall/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:58.000Z The New York City mayoral primary election has been interesting for lots of reasons —[ redemption arcs](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/06/nyregion/cuomo-democrats-mayor-comeback.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ celebrity socialists](https://www.vanityfair.com/news/story/zohran-mamdani?srsltid=AfmBOooTqWXS7-JSrH4sTVwPDUlZWxv0gBiM%5Fkl4qvnp4l0KwPsWlvhQ&ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ the battle of Zabar's](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/24/scott-stringer-losing-steam-new-york-city-mayor-run-00205871?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Not%20content%20with%20just%20the,from%20City%20Hall%20once%20again.). But the actual policy proposals of the candidates are not among them. The candidates all agree that the city faces substantial challenges, but then have far too little to say about how to address them. Despite the fact that it is widely acknowledged that the City faces a[ substantial structural fiscal deficit](https://www.osc.ny.gov/press/releases/2025/02/dinapoli-nyc-budget-stabilizes-new-risks-emerge?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the possibility of[ huge cuts in federal aid](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/how-new-york-city-should-prepare-changes-federal-funding?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), there are almost no substantial proposals to address these budget problems ([with the partial exception of a good idea from Comptroller Brad Lander](https://www.thecity.nyc/2024/06/07/charter-lander-adams-comptroller-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). And, despite the fact that all of the candidates agree that the city faces a dramatic housing shortage, the candidates' proposals to allow new building are weak tea, with the exception of State Sen. Zellnor Myrie's[ ambitious housing plan](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/661d72f5fdcd48687fb80031/t/674e6591e53c4b51f570df29/1733191070468/Zellnor+For+NYC+-+Rebuild+NYC+-+One+Million+Homes.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). None of the candidates have proposed workable ideas about how to address problems facing the local economy, like[ declines in tourism](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/08/nyregion/nyc-tourism.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), cuts in scientific research or parts of the finance industry leaving the city. What are we left with? Front-runners who either propose a fiscally unsustainable package of[ tax cuts and spending increases](https://www.andrewcuomo.com/press/cuomo-unveils-vision-affordable-new-york-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (Andrew Cuomo) or[ enormous tax increases](https://nypost.com/2025/04/16/us-news/socialist-mayoral-hopeful-zohran-mamdani-pitches-2-tax-hike-on-nycs-millionaires-to-raise-10b-for-freebie-filled-agenda/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that are targeted not at shoring up the budget but rather at enabling spending increases that are even larger (Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani);[ populist moves that do not consider tradeoffs](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2024/12/which-nyc-mayoral-candidates-would-freeze-rent/401519/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Mamdani%2C%20who%20committed%20to%20a,with%20the%20stability); and a few[ good](https://nypost.com/2025/03/13/us-news/lefty-mayoral-hopeful-brad-lander-pushes-paving-over-nyc-golf-courses-in-desperate-bid-to-solve-housing-crisis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) small-bore proposals. Along many dimensions of urban governance — crime, garbage, most education policy — most of the candidates' platforms are pretty similar to what the current mayor, Eric Adams, has offered the last few years. It's unlikely the fall election will prove much more compelling. **Failures of democracy** This does not mean that the election won't offer at least one set of major policy ideas for voters to chew on — at least when they go to the polls in November. That's thanks to the ideas coming out of the Charter Revision Commission, an entity charged with proposing changes to the City's charter, which essentially serves as its constitution. The mayor-appointed Charter Revision Commission, chaired by former Deputy Mayor Rich Buery with the help of executive director Alec Schierenbeck, has not yet announced the specific reforms that it will put on the ballot. But[ its staff report](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/charter/downloads/pdf/2025/2025-Charter-Revision-Commission-Preliminary-Report-DIGITAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of preliminary recommendations, which came out in April, offers a systematic challenge to the ways New York City has been governed for the past 40 or so years. While it addresses a number of issues — housing mostly, but also election reform, non-profit procurement and climate policy — it is best understood as a critique of the way democracy works, or rather doesn't work, in the city. The central argument of the staff report is that changes in government structure in post-fiscal crisis New York (and indeed beforehand) limited the ability of both the mass public and citywide interests to influence policy. This effectively left narrow groups of people — notably, neighborhood homeowners opposed to new housing and incumbent politicians seeking reelection — in charge. The power of narrow interest and incumbent politicians in turn systematically undermined the ability of the city to grow. Neighborhood groups didn't *want* new residents who would change their neighborhoods and politicians didn't *want* new voters who they didn't know to influence election outcomes. Put differently, the housing crisis is downstream from the failures of New York City's democracy. That's an essential insight, and one that the commission aims to fix. Specifically, the Charter Revision Commission plans on proposing reforms that broaden participation. Instead of most land-use decisions involving neighborhood-level negotiation and deference to individual councilmembers, the commission argues that the mayor and the City Council should set a binding target for the total number of needed housing units by neighborhood and streamline projects until those targets are met. At the same time, it argues, the most relevant city elections shouldn't be primaries held in odd-numbered years with little turnout, but general elections in even-numbered years (the same time as the presidential or gubernatorial elections) that feature higher turnout. The goal is to make the whole city consider big questions, rather than leaving decisions to the types of activists and highly-engaged voters who dominate community board meetings and weirdly-timed primary elections. This is a big idea — that reforms to the structure of government will lead to a more democratic and faster growing city. Further —[ as I and](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=3917621&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) many others[ have argued for many years](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1162%5Fm41e7ifa.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — this is the right way to think about land use politics and urban politics more broadly. We will see what the actual proposals of the Charter Commission are. But its report contains a set of concepts that are actually responsive to the challenges of New York City governance, and this is worthy of applause. **The housing crisis** The Charter Commission's understanding of the housing problem the city faces is straightforward: "New York City faces what may be the worst housing affordability crisis in its history." It is also extremely clear about why the city faces this crisis. "In recent decades, New York has built far less housing than is needed to keep up with demand to live in the city, driving gentrification, displacement, segregation, and tenant harassment." That's exactly right: Since the 1990s, demand to live in New York City has skyrocketed, but the supply of new housing has not increased enough. Further, almost all new housing is built in a small number of neighborhoods, with high-demand areas like Greenwich Village or Park Slope barely contributing at all. The result is high prices and a stagnant population. While the Charter Revision Commission notes that there are a number of reasons for slow housing growth, it points to land use controls — density controls, use zoning, historic preservation and other tools — as the primary culprit,[ consistent with a vast academic literature](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=3917621&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Since the 1960s, New York City has imposed an "increasingly restrictive set of zoning regulations that have reduced housing production and reinforced inequitable patterns of production." Just across the Hudson, Jersey City produces nearly three times as much housing per capita as New York City does; across the country, Seattle more than double. Why has New York City choked off growth with such restrictive land use controls? The academic literature is clear about why suburbs do this: They are controlled by homeowners who want to ensure they[ do not have to share their property tax base](https://www.jstor.org/stable/43081338?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with poorer new residents and want to make sure that[ new homes do not decrease the value (or increase the variance in the value) of their homes](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674015951?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > The housing crisis is downstream from the failures of New York City's democracy. But New York is a big city, not a small, exclusive suburb. Most residents are renters who would benefit from an abundance of housing. Powerful citywide interests like banks, technology companies and unions would all benefit from more population growth. The commission report argues that New York City's land use procedure has led it to adopt slow-growth policies,[ something I have argued](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1162%5Fm41e7ifa.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is true across many cities. The Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP) creates a lengthy set of procedures that privilege local control. Prior to 1989, ULURP's processes — including advisory opinions given by community boards — offered a localist balance to the land use powers of the Board of Estimate, where city- and borough-wide officials were the key players in deciding whether a rezoning was necessary. But after the[ Supreme Court found the Board of Estimate unconstitutional](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/489/688?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (it gave equal votes by borough, in violation of the one-person one-vote principle), a[ new City Charter had the ULURP process](https://www.nyc.gov/content/planning/pages/planning/public-review?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) end with a vote by the City Council. Rather than serving as a balance to the centralizing tendencies of the Board of Estimate, the ULURP process now ends with a vote of a body composed of neighborhood-level officials. The end result is "member deference" — a norm that each councilperson has the final word on rezoning in her district. (This took a little while to develop, as in the early post-1989 era, City Council Speaker Peter Vallone was able to control the council, but with the passage of term limits, that kind of centralizing force passed from the scene.) As a result, land use in New York City looks a great deal like land use in the suburbs. Homeowners and rent-stabilized tenants dominate low-information primaries for city council races and participation in public meetings. The land use process amplifies their voices, effectively giving them a veto on rezonings, while providing little incentive for citywide officials and interests to get too involved. In practice,[ Greenwich, Conn. and Greenwich Village have the same land use politics](https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2024/09/housing-crisis-local-government/679670/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), even though one is a separate town and the other is part of a major metropolis. Only a few neighborhoods agree to accept growth, which explains the uneven record of housing production across the city. How should the City address this? The Charter Revision Commission points to two possible paths for reform. One is simply giving citywide elected officials a greater say in the process by changing the order of decisions in ULURP or even giving the City Planning Commission power to override vetoes by the City Council. The other is asking the Council and the mayor to decide on a citywide target for total new units and for each district, and then streamlining projects until that target is met. ([Rick Hills and I called for something similar](https://openyls.law.yale.edu/handle/20.500.13051/4488?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).) Another way to achieve this goal would be to[ require semi-regular citywide comprehensive land use plans](https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/sites/ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/2023-02/ILR-101-1-HillsSchleicher.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that address the whole city, not just district-by-district amendments, following both academic work and successes in cities like Seattle and Minneapolis. Exactly what direction the commission will go in is still uncertain. But their basic ideas are clear: The City Charter and ULURP make land use decision making hyperlocal, which empowers NIMBY groups, while disempowering groups and officials who want to see growth generally. The Charter Revision Commission wants to move the level of decision making up — to borough-wide and citywide officials — so that citywide interests and the mass public can weigh in. That's a powerful idea whose time has come. **Beyond housing** The Commission's report broadens out from housing and sees the same problems everywhere. It shows that turnout in general elections has declined to 23% and is even lower in the primary elections, where all the action is in this overwhelmingly Democratic city. Some elections are decided by a ridiculously small number of people; a Democratic primary for City Council was won with the votes of less than 1.5% of the registered voters in the district. The housing crisis and election turnout are connected. Research shows that the people who[ show up to vote in low-profile elections are older, richer and more likely to be white than the broader population](https://now.tufts.edu/2020/10/16/local-governments-favor-white-and-wealthy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ([People who show up for public meetings are even more so](https://www.amazon.com/Neighborhood-Defenders-Participatory-Politics-Americas/dp/1108477275?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).) But most importantly, they are much more likely to be homeowners rather than renters, with clear outcomes for housing policy. What can be done? Elections could be held at the same time as gubernatorial or presidential elections. (This would probably require state legislative support as well as a change to the Charter.) The result would likely be much higher turnout. That's not just good on its own, but has clear policy implications:[ Sarah Anzia has shown that off-cycle elections increase the power of narrow interest groups that can organize people to show up even for oddly-timed elections](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381611000028?seq=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and[ Zoltan Hajnal and others have shown that holding elections in odd-numbered years results in legislatures that are less demographically representative](https://pages.ucsd.edu/~zhajnal/page1/page2/files/page2%5F2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The Charter Revision Commission is also considering suggesting that New York City elections move from a closed primary (only Democrats can currently vote in Democratic primaries; Republicans in Republican primaries) to an open primary system with a "top two" or "top four" format. Under these systems, all voters participate in a single primary, and the top 2 (or 4) advance to the general election (where turnout is higher). The idea behind both of these reforms is to broaden the electorate and hold the most crucial election at times when turnout is the highest. Again, if these wind up on the November ballot, they'll be some of the most important ideas that voters have been asked to weigh in on in years. **Towards a greater New York** Regardless of who wins the mayoral race, the politics of New York City are structurally biased towards producing a slow-growing city dominated by insiders and incumbents. While mayors come and go, the City's charter locks in a politics that encourages the existing powers that be to divide the resources, rather than growing the pie. The Charter Revision Commission is pushing structural changes to the city's politics that will make it grow faster and make it more open to more and more varied voices. Those afraid of change — both physical and political — will oppose its proposals. Regardless of who wins City Hall, its recommendations may be the changes that matter most. ### New York is Not Broken URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/is-new-york-broken/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:58.000Z I live just a few hundred yards away from the Barclays Center in Brooklyn. In the spring and summer of 2020, the arena was the site of numerous Black Lives Matter protests. Day after day, I would look out my window and watch hundreds of protestors streaming by. The vast majority of them seemed peaceful enough, but some were clearly spoiling for confrontation, chanting anti-police slogans and leaving ["ACAB"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACAB?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) graffiti in their wake on nearby signs and buildings. Over the course of the protests, helicopters routinely hovered overhead, and [dozens of arrests were made around the Barclays Center.](https://www.nydailynews.com/2020/05/29/violent-protesters-charge-brooklyn-police-precinct-in-day-of-demonstrations-over-police-killing-of-black-man-in-minneapolis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) It was a time of passionate intensity, fueled in no small part by the disruptions of the COVID pandemic and the emotions unleashed by the presidential race between Donald Trump and Joe Biden. On many days, I found myself wondering if the country could be on the brink of collapse. As it happens, I also live a couple hundred yards away from a police precinct house. During the months of protest in 2020, I would often walk past the station. To my surprise, there was no sense that the precinct or its inhabitants were under siege. Indeed, on most days I would find cops out front idly chatting with passersby. The social contract didn't feel like it was about to give way — to the contrary, it felt like things were actually going pretty well, at least in my corner of the universe. In the years since 2020, this sense of cognitive dissonance — the feeling that somehow the world is simultaneously on the verge of falling apart and continuing to function just fine — has stayed with me, sometimes waxing and sometimes waning. In recent days, it has come back in force. > To generate any kind of urgency for your cause these days, it is essential to frame the problems at hand in the most dire terms possible. Thus, crises are in bloom all around us. Former Gov. Andrew Cuomo predicated his unsuccessful mayoral campaign on the argument that New York is a city [in crisis](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpG8fngocCU&ref=vitalcitynyc.org): dangerous, disorderly and demoralized. This kind of rhetoric echoes across the internet. The Manhattan Institute claims the next mayor will inherit ["a city in decline."](https://x.com/ManhattanInst/status/1933575445070442921?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) According to prominent pundits, contemporary New York City is a place defined by failing institutions and broken systems, including our [property tax structure](https://www.bxtimes.com/op-ed-new-york-citys-broken-property-tax-system/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), [health inspection process](https://ny.eater.com/2025/2/13/24365229/restaurants-health-inspections-delays-grades-budget-cuts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [rent guidelines](https://qns.com/2025/05/gianaris-rosenthal-rent-guidelines-board/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [child welfare system](https://amsterdamnews.com/news/2025/05/08/op-ed-nycs-next-mayor-must-reform-our-child-welfare-system/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), [street vending licensing](https://hellgatenyc.com/street-vendor-fix-city-council/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [political culture](https://citylimits.org/opinion-its-well-past-time-for-new-york-city-to-get-the-right-stuff-done/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). That's a lot of dysfunction for a city that styles itself the greatest in the country, if not the world. It is of course true that New York has many problems. But any honest look at the state of New York would also reveal a city that has largely recovered from the dislocations of the pandemic, a time when violence increased and many fled the city for greener pastures. The latest [statistics](https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/regional%5Feconomy/charts/Regional%5FNYC?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are, by and large, good ones for New York. Crime — not all categories, but most — is down. The economy is strong and unemployment is significantly reduced from the heights of 2020\. The city's population is growing again. But these facts don't seem to captivate the public square. Unfortunately, the incentives that govern the behavior of headline writers, politicians and activists all point in the direction of alarmism. These actors are responding rationally to the realities of the social media era. To generate any kind of urgency for your cause these days, it is essential to frame the problems at hand in the most dire terms possible. > Thanks to social media, one example of something bad happening on the subway can instantly eclipse the thousands of positive interactions that happen underground on a daily basis. Thus, crises are in bloom all around us. Among other things, we currently have [a crisis of affordability](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-grapple-with-affordability-crisis-hard-for-me-just-to-survive/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [a crisis of mental health](https://www.amny.com/opinion/new-yorks-behavioral-health-crisis-here-to-stay/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [a crisis of inequality](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfXbzbJQHuw&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and, of course, [a crisis of democracy](https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-crisis-of-democracy-is-here?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) itself. This glut of supposed crises may help explain why Kamala Harris' campaign failed to convince most voters that Donald Trump was a danger to the country — if everything is breathlessly framed as a crisis, it becomes difficult to discern what is truly an existential threat and what is just hype. Our predilection for catastrophism is aided and abetted by an enduring truth: Bad news travels fast. To paraphrase [Jonathan Swift](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/books/famous-misquotations.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (or whoever actually said it first), a viral video can get halfway around the world before a nuanced depiction of a complicated state of affairs can even put on its boots. Thanks to social media, one example of something bad happening on the subway can instantly eclipse [the thousands of positive interactions that happen underground on a daily basis](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/when-we-ride-appreciating-the-subway). Over time, this negativity bias leaves a mark. According to a poll from the political strategists at Honan Strategy Group, [75% of Democrats in New York believe the city is in a state of crisis](https://nypost.com/2025/02/02/us-news/new-poll-shows-75-of-dems-say-nyc-in-crisis-with-nearly-half-ready-to-leave-if-things-get-worse/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And the Citizens Budget Commission reports that just [30% of New Yorkers say that they are happy living here](https://nypost.com/2024/03/19/us-news/less-than-one-in-three-yorkers-planning-to-flee-city-and-just-30-are-happy-with-quality-of-life-survey/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > Far from being broken, New York is fundamentally a miracle. Cause and effect are difficult to disentangle — it is unclear whether the public's sour mood reflects the media it is consuming or if the media is simply mirroring the unhappiness of its customers. Regardless, New York would appear to be a case study in what economist Tyler Cowen calls "negative social contagion." The basic idea is simple: Negativity breeds more negativity. ["When people feel bad and act badly, if only in rhetoric, they make others around them worse as well,"](https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2024/07/an-overly-simple-model-of-positive-and-negative-contagion.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) says Cowen. It is hard to gauge the temper of a city of more than 8 million residents (to say nothing of a country of 335 million people — similar dynamics of free-floating anger and generally positive statistical indicators have also characterized the United States over the past 10 years or so). To correctly assess the mood of the public, you have to pay attention to both the words and the music of the city. The noise on social media may be mostly negative, but the underlying rhythm of the city remains upbeat. According to Dorothy Parker, in contrast to other cities, ["New York is always hopeful. Always it believes that something good is about to come off, and it must hurry to meet it."](https://polyarchive.com/dorothy-parker-on-new-york-autumn-is-the-springtime-of-big-cities/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#google%5Fvignette) If you listen for it, it is still possible to discern this leitmotif in city life. (However unrealistic his policy proposals may be, Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani has tapped into the current of optimism that powers New York.) Somehow, millions of people speaking dozens of different languages and pursuing disparate (and often conflicting) goals manage to live and work and commute together cheek by jowl without the whole thing degenerating into chaos and acrimony. Far from being broken, New York is fundamentally a miracle, offering daily testimony to our ability to overcome the worst impulses of human nature and live together in something that reasonably approximates harmony. Our online narratives need to better reflect this reality. This is important not just for our collective mental health but for our ability to address the challenges that continue to plague our city. It is difficult indeed to solve problems if we cannot accurately assess the state of the world and we cannot summon the optimism to believe that change is in fact possible. *This piece was originally published in June 2025 and has since been updated to reflect the results of New York City's 2025 general election.* ### Zohran Mamdani and Andrew Cuomo Aren’t as Different as You Might Think URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/zohran-mamdani-and-andrew-cuomo-arent-as-different-as-you-might-think/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:58.000Z Neither of the leading Democratic contenders for mayor is grappling with the fiscal realities currently confronting New York City. The two leading Democrats running for New York City mayor, the 33-year-old starry-eyed socialist legislator and the 67-year-old realpolitik former governor, have something surprising in common: Neither is being honest about the fiscal consequences of his proposals. Candidates often fuzz over budget details when they run, but the leading 2025 mayoral campaigns are offering extraordinarily misleading promises, even by low local standards. We're talking about multi-hundred-million-dollar disconnects. That's particularly unfortunate at a time when New York City is likely to see its federal funding dry up, when President Trump is itching to escalate conflict with his hometown and when a recession could do even more damage to the city's bottom line in the years ahead. Assemblyman **Zohran Mamdani** is an incredibly effective communicator who's offering loads of free stuff underwritten by funding sources that are likely never to materialize. In Mamdani's world, landlords of rent-stabilized buildings are living high on the hog while tenants are all rubbing quarters together — and that's enough to justify four years of across-the-board rent freezes, regardless of the economic analysis of the Rent Guidelines Board. Mamdani happens to live in one of these 960,000 rent-stabilized units, like the [30% of long-term rent-stabilized tenants](https://cosm.aei.org/why-rent-regulation-remains-so-hard-to-undo-in-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who report incomes in excess of $100,000 a year. [In a New York Editorial Board interview](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/p/zohran-mamdani-interview-transcript?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), I asked him whether he needs a rent freeze; he dodged the question. Nor does Mamdani seem to care that [pro-tenant reforms](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/nyregion/rent-protection-regulation.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) passed in Albany in 2019 greatly reduced building owners' ability to raise rents, resulting in a situation where forcing repeated rent freezes is likely to result in widespread building disinvestment. Mamdani cites a 12% overall increase in landlord income as supposed evidence that building owners can absorb back-to-back-to-back-to-back freezes — but that figure masks huge variation by building type and location. Plenty of building owners, especially in lower-income neighborhoods, are [struggling to cover rising costs](https://x.com/aarmlovi/status/1932542549883064338?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). His housing production math is just as shaky. [His idea](https://www.amny.com/news/mayoral-mamdani-affordable-homes-plan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is to invest $100 billion in public capital spending and task the government, not the private sector, with building hundreds of thousands of units. To make that happen, he'd have to get the state's permission to borrow about $70 billion above the city's current debt limit. That's highly unlikely to happen, and especially unlikely if the man championing the change doesn't understand what he's arguing for. In an interview with the New York Daily News Editorial Board (another board on which I sit), I asked Mamdani what the current borrowing cap is, how it's determined and how much more he'd need to borrow to meet his goal. [He had no clue](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/05/27/mamdani-by-the-numbers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Mamdani's affordability agenda, the bumper sticker on which he's running, has three big pillars: the rent freeze I mentioned, free childcare and fast free buses. The [second of these would cost $6 billion or more](http://politico.com/news/2025/05/27/zohran-mamdani-policy-pitches-new-york-00369756?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a year, dependent on Albany approving taxes that probably won't come to pass. The third of these [would cost the Metropolitan Transit Authority $650 million annually](http://politico.com/news/2025/05/27/zohran-mamdani-policy-pitches-new-york-00369756?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which it doesn't have; that would also have to come from higher taxes, higher subway fares or both. (Congestion pricing funds are spoken for.) Mamdani often plays fast and loose with budget facts. He vilifies then-Gov. Cuomo for supposedly starving the city's public schools before he and others in the legislature in 2021 forced the state to increase its foundation aid formula. But [before and after that change](https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/ny-per-pupil-school-spending-led-all-us-by-record-margin-in-2021-22/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), New York's per-pupil state education spending was highest the nation, and by a lot. Today, New York City's per-pupil spending is nearly $40,000, putting the lie to anyone who says that the schools desperately need more money in order to educate students better. (Indeed, [every major Democratic candidate except Whitney Tilson answered](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/mayoral-candidates-questionnaire?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "yes" when asked by the Citizens Budget Commission, "Do you think increasing public school per-student spending would increase achievement?") That same sleight of hand runs throughout Mamdani's platform, all built on the fiction that New York City government, despite growing from $77 billion in 2014 to $96 billion in 2019 to $115 billion today, is systematically failing the working class and serving the wealthy. One can argue that current aid isn't effective enough — but one can't argue that the city isn't the most generous municipality in America. To name just one example, [50,000 families here get an average of $20,000 a year in rent help](https://www.nyc.gov/site/hra/help/cityfheps.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), at an annual cost to New York of $1.1 billion. What about the other candidate atop the polls? That's **Andrew Cuomo** — who, having instituted a local property tax cap and held down the rate of growth in state spending as the governor of New York State (at least compared to his predecessors), once boasted to business leaders that he'd governed [like a fiscal conservative](https://nypost.com/2018/09/25/cuomo-to-business-execs-ive-governed-as-a-fiscal-conservative/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Unfortunately, he's running a campaign made up of costly and clumsily cobbled-together promises to unions and other constituencies. For example, he has reversed himself on the wisdom of [Tier 6 pension reforms](https://www.osc.ny.gov/retirement/members/retirement-benefit-summary-tier-6-ers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the slightly-less-generous retirement benefits for public employees passed in 2012 with his support, which are [saving city government hundreds of millions of dollars annually](https://cbcny.org/research/new-york-states-sweet-tooth-forming-fiscal-cavity?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=2,full%20benefits%2C%20among%20other%20changes.). Did Cuomo's principles change or is he just bending to win union and retiree support? The need for comprehensive property tax reform has been widely acknowledged [across the political spectrum](https://www.centernyc.org/a-tax-rx-for-nyc?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — because [the current system is impossible to understand and horribly unfair to all types of residents](https://www.nydailynews.com/2022/01/02/fix-this-tax-a-nyc-property-tax-reform-commission-delivers-a-strong-blueprint-for-change/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Cuomo, who understands this well, wants to [cap property tax increases just for the city's one-to-three-family homes](https://www.andrewcuomo.com/press/governor-cuomo-no-tax-tips-tax-cap-nyc-tax-relief-low-income-new-yorkers-homeowners?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a patently political play that will make it harder, not easier, to solve the bigger problem, which calls for some sort of grand bargain. Again, the former governor knows exactly what he's doing: This is an expensive pander, not an answer. A new state class-size law, which is forcing the city [to hire thousands of new teachers to arbitrarily cap the number of students in each classroom](https://www.nydailynews.com/2023/07/15/high-price-of-school-politics-albany-class-size-law-will-cost-nyc-a-fortune/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), isn't just an unfunded mandate. It's a bad use of limited resources, forcing arbitrary limits that will require the hiring of thousands of additional teachers. Research suggests all this spending will yield limited learning gains and have perverse policy consequences; in implementing a similar mandate, California wound up putting lots of underqualified teachers in classrooms serving underprivileged students. As governor, Cuomo — who talked a lot about the importance of teacher quality and hardly at all about the need to lower class sizes — almost certainly would've argued that the mandate was unwise, unfunded or not, and that there are much better ways to increase student achievement. He probably would've pointed out that the law will wind up sending more resources to higher-performing schools, comparatively shortchanging schools that serve lower-income students. Mayoral candidate Cuomo, in near-lockstep with the teachers union, simply complains that the state failed to send new funding with the mandate, supporting the end-goal of hiring many more teachers to satisfy a rigid class-size formula even as public school enrollment has yet to recover from prepandemic and pandemic-era declines. Not least, Cuomo is promising to hire 5,000 more police officers, paying not only their salaries and health care today, but their pensions tomorrow, despite the fact that crime is falling with the NYPD's current force strength. It's cheaper than continuing to rely on costly overtime, he says, but budget experts know the math probably doesn't add up. Meaning, Cuomo would hire those cops at an annual cost of $550 million in year one and $1 billion six years in, with no guarantee of offsetting savings. And that's not all! Cuomo is [the only major candidate](https://cbcny.org/advocacy/mayoral-candidates-questionnaire%20Straight%20from%20the%20Candidates%20%7C%20CBCNY?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who said "no" when asked if, early in his term, he'd institute a cost-saving "program to eliminate the gap" (PEG), a standard-practice exercise to save taxpayers money in precarious fiscal times. Even Mamdani committed to doing a PEG. And Cuomo is the only Democratic candidate to promise to lower taxes while he's at it. How does all this begin to add up? It doesn't. So if these two are willfully bad at budget math, is anyone better? Comptroller Brad Lander may be caricatured as a pandering progressive who's promised to [solve street homelessness for mentally ill people](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/13/nyregion/homeless-mentally-ill-brad-lander.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the hard-to-believe price of $100 million a year (and then $30 million per year thereafter), and there is surely more fiscal slipperiness in his plans, but overall, his [detailed taxing and spending proposals](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/67a2f550954e9c463f4a2ef6/t/6839d7370ba4b73b8752707d/1748621111547/A+Fiscally+Responsible+City+Hall.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) make a better-faith effort not to commit hundreds of millions we don't have. He also has done [the sharpest thinking about how the city's budget can withstand a federal drubbing](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/press-releases/comptroller-brad-lander-calls-out-risks-to-nyc-in-trumps-proposed-federal-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Former comptroller Scott Stringer also deserves points for fiscal responsibility, as does hedge fund manager Whitney Tilson. A cynic may say it's not a coincidence that the two candidates with the least realistic, most fiscally disingenuous promises are sitting atop the polls. Maybe stretching math to make irresponsible promises is part of what put them there. I wouldn't be the first person to suggest that telling voters what they want to hear — that tradeoffs aren't real, that resources aren't limited — might be a feature, not a bug in an effective politician. But it doesn't always have to be this way. Does it? ### Everyone Got Cities Wrong URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/everyone-got-cities-wrong/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:59.000Z > I am not arguing that America's big cities writ large are beyond their many challenges — far from it. Yet none of this has added up to an irrevocable downward spiral or an urban doom loop. In the spring of 2020, as the gravity and extent of the pandemic's disruptions sank in, the chorus began. ["New York City is dead forever,"](https://nypost.com/2020/08/17/nyc-is-dead-forever-heres-why-james-altucher/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) one prominent commentator wrote. ["San Francisco is the next Detroit — the handwriting is on the wall,"](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8bOybAWWxI&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) another declared. Urban office towers stood empty, downtown streets were deserted and doomsday forecasts abounded. With the rise of work-from-home, the cynics insisted, we were witnessing the beginning of the end of America's dense, vibrant, economically essential cities. Without a doubt, the pandemic and its aftermath have brought serious challenges to America's cities. Yet these dramatic exhortations of impending urban doom, so confidently asserted at the time by so many, turned out to be completely wrong. Five years on, American cities have bounced back dramatically. [According to newly released Census data](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2025/05/16/census-bureau-city-population-increase/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [nearly 95% of America's largest cities](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/vintage-2024-popest.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — 68 out of 72 — experienced population growth between July 2023 and June 2024, reversing downward trends from earlier in the decade. Los Angeles added more than 30,000 residents; Chicago gained more than 20,000; Seattle added more than 16,000; and Washington, DC, gained 15,000\. Even Detroit — a city that was portrayed as the veritable poster child of urban decline — added more than 6,500 new residents. New York City led the resurgence, adding more than 85,000 residents — the largest numeric increase nationwide — though the city is still down around 300,000 residents from its pre-pandemic peak. It's not just urban populations that are bouncing back; our leading tech hubs have reclaimed their dominance as centers for innovative high-tech talent and industries. Despite predictions of its imminent decline — often gleefully amplified by critics highlighting its very real struggles with homelessness, drug abuse and crime — the San Francisco Bay Area continues to dominate the tech landscape. In 2024, startups in the region secured nearly $100 billion in venture capital funding, accounting for more than 45% of all U.S. venture investment. The Bay Area remains the epicenter of global innovation in fields like artificial intelligence, biotech and advanced computing This is not to say that the pandemic and misbegotten progressive policies didn't leave deep scars on San Francisco. They did — both in perception and in reality. But the bigger point is that none of the problems proved insurmountable. The city has already begun to self-correct, electing a more business-oriented mayor, Daniel Lurie. And even before that political turn, the Bay Area showed a remarkable capacity to adapt and reinvent itself. Meanwhile, New York has solidified its status as the nation's second-largest tech hub, with the metro area attracting over $25 billion in funding, more than 12% of all U.S. venture investment. [Over the past decade, it has been the only city in the nation to see a considerable increase in its share of venture capital investment](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-09/where-venture-capital-and-tech-jobs-are-growing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which rose by 7% between 2012 and 2021\. Overall, [tech employment in the city has increased by more than 25% since the pandemic](https://www.nycfuture.org/research/sustaining-nycs-tech-edge?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (from 2019 to 2023), nearly 10 times faster than the private sector overall. > I am not arguing that America's big cities writ large are beyond their many challenges — far from it. Yet none of this has added up to an irrevocable downward spiral or an urban doom loop. The broader Acela Corridor — which stretches from Boston to Washington, D.C. — has attracted close to $50 billion, nearly 22% of U.S. venture investment. Despite all the complaints about their unaffordable housing, worsening crime and urban disorder and troubled urban governance, the two frequently maligned coastal cities of New York and San Francisco remain crucial economic engines. Together, they house [65% of all engineers working on artificial intelligence](https://www.signalfire.com/blog/signalfire-state-of-talent-report-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Our%20predictions%20for%202025%3A&text=Companies%20will%20prioritize%20flexible%2C%20collaborative,powerful%20tools%E2%80%94no%20PhD%20required), according to a recent report. Cities like Austin and Miami, once heralded as rising stars poised to challenge and displace leading tech hubs, have seen their luster fade somewhat as a result. Venture capital funding in Austin dropped by nearly[ 20%, ](https://nvca.org/document/q1-2025-pitchbook-nvca-venture-monitor-data-pack/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)from over $4.4 billion in 2023 down to $3.6 billion in 2024, and its share of U.S. venture capital investment stands at less than 2%. The city's much ballyhooed pandemic-era lure on Bay Area tech workers has also declined noticeably in the past year, with their ranks falling by 23% between 2024 and2025\. The number of New Yorkers moving to the Texas capital fell by 11% over the same period, [according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of LinkedIn data](https://www.wsj.com/articles/austins-reign-as-a-tech-hub-might-be-coming-to-an-end-02836bc3?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Miami accounted for just 1% of U.S. venture investment in 2024, a decline of 65%, from $7.1 billion in 2022 to $2.7 billion in 2024. Let me be clear: I am not arguing that America's big cities writ large are beyond their many challenges — far from it. Crime may be down, but it is still too high, and urban disorder plagues many cities. Urban schools may be improving, but they still have a long way to go. Downtowns continue to face high office vacancies, and many will never recover. Housing is less affordable than ever, not just for the truly disadvantaged but for the middle and professional classes. Government spending is inefficient and taxes are too high. Families with children continue to decamp to the suburbs, leaving too many cities as playgrounds for the affluent, the young and the childless — and as places for the disadvantaged to find services. Yet none of this has added up to an irrevocable downward spiral or an urban [doom loop](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/issues/issue-8). It's not the first time we have been besieged with such premature urban obituaries. They are something of a recurring theme. After 9/11, many forecasted a widespread exodus from Manhattan. That was when I published "The Rise of the Creative Class*,*" arguing that urban revival was an ongoing and inevitable result of cities' growing role as centers for talent, innovation and creativity. Similar predictions emerged again in the wake of the devastating economic and financial meltdown of 2007 and 2008\. Pundits confidently declared that New York would be eclipsed as a global financial center by Charlotte or offshore hubs like Frankfurt. Yet, as I argued it would at the time, New York rebounded quickly, ultimately surpassing London to reclaim its top position. The resilience of big cities is not an accident; it's rooted in a broader transformation of the economy. The urban decline of the mid-20th century — which informs so much of the anti-urban punditry that persists to this day — was rooted in the nature of the old industrial economy. As industry spread to the suburbs and eventually offshore, cities lost their core economic functions. The middle class followed and retail moved out of downtown to suburban malls. Cities went through a protracted period of decline. The role of cities today is different — and far more central to economic progress. With the rise of the knowledge economy, which shows no signs of slowing down, cities have emerged as indispensable and renewable hotbeds of innovation and economic dynamism. This transformation hinges on a fundamental economic principle: that the dense clustering of human talent is the underlying engine of innovation and economic growth today. The late, great urbanist Jane Jacobs identified this dynamic decades ago, emphasizing that bringing diverse people into close proximity is not merely a core function of cities — it is the essential driver of economic progress. Nobel laureate economist Robert Lucas later crystallized this insight with his concept of "human capital externalities," highlighting how productivity and innovation exponentially increase when talented people cluster together. In other words, the proximity and density uniquely provided by cities don't just enhance innovation; they actively multiply human potential and productivity, fueling the very engine of economic development. > With the rise of the knowledge economy, which shows no signs of slowing down, cities have emerged as indispensable and renewable hotbeds of innovation and economic dynamism. Paradoxically, the pandemic and the rise of remote work have made cities even more crucial — precisely at a moment when technology seemed poised to diminish their necessity. Rather than dispersing economic activity broadly, digital technologies have actually reinforced the economic power of leading superstar cities and tech hubs. Throughout human history, cities have primarily functioned as physical clusters, growing outward as new transportation technologies emerged — from horse-drawn trams and steam-powered trains to electric trolleys and automobiles. Today's digital technologies enable leading urban centers to expand their global reach dramatically without having to expand their physical footprints. This new urban formation, which I call the "Meta-City," comprises globe-straddling networks of hub cities and their satellites. It enhances the dominance of key superstar cities and tech hubs even as their workforces become more distributed and populations shrink. My [detailed analysis](https://hbr.org/2023/11/the-rise-of-the-meta-city?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), conducted with collaborators at the Boston Consulting Group, highlights this structure clearly: New York and London sit at the very center of the global network for finance, San Francisco anchors the high-tech industry and Los Angeles plays a comparable role in film and entertainment. Within this networked framework, Miami functions effectively as a connected satellite of New York's financial system, Austin serves as a prominent outpost of the high-tech galaxy anchored by San Francisco and Nashville is closely linked to the entertainment industry centralized in Los Angeles. When all is said and done, American cities like New York and San Francisco retain enduring strengths that enable them to reinvent and remake themselves. While smaller cities do struggle and decline, the greatest cities have incredible resilience. Time and time again, pundits have predicted the decline and fall of these great American cities. Time and time again, their short-sighted predictions have been proven wrong. Such anti-urban histrionics have reached a fever pitch under Donald Trump, who likes to portray big, Democrat-run cities as dangerous hellholes and bastions of woke values. While that plays well with his rural and exurban base, it directly threatens America's core engines of innovation and economic progress. Our cities have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of deindustrialization, financial collapse and the more recent rise of remote work. It would be tragically ironic if, after enduring and overcoming so much, our cities were ultimately undermined by wounds carelessly inflicted by those who currently lead our nation. ### New York’s Five Political Types URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-five-political-types/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:59.000Z As Andrew Cuomo's lead over Zohran Mamdani narrows in the final days of the primary campaign, the mayoral race is being framed as a contest between establishment pragmatism and progressive idealism. Cuomo talks about growing up in Queens and focuses on management credentials and public safety; Mamdani, a state assemblyman, touts his Democratic Socialist pedigree while promising to freeze rent, deliver free child care and create fare-free buses. The contrast creates a compelling and dramatic frame for many in the media — but it's simplistic. Research I completed earlier this year — 12 focus groups followed by a survey of 2,199 New York City voters — reveals that the city's political reality is far more nuanced. Rather than progressive versus moderate, New York's voters cluster around shared experiences and priorities that resist simple categorization. Understanding these communities is key to both this campaign and effective governance in 2026. **The five communities that define New York City politics** People are complicated. Any attempt to categorize millions of people is going to risk being at least a bit broad-brush, but using statistical analysis to identify patterns in how New Yorkers think about politics, I was able to define five distinct voter types that I believe much more accurately characterize people than the labels and political lanes we typically use today. Rather than imposing predetermined categories, this data-driven approach lets the voters' own attitudes and priorities reveal the natural groupings that exist across the city. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23692128?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) First are **progressive reformers**, or 18% of registered voters. Theserepresent the city's ascendant left wing — predominantly young, white and well-educated voters concentrated in gentrifying neighborhoods in Brooklyn and Queens. With 68% of this group identifying as very liberal and 89% strongly disapproving of Mayor Eric Adams, they drive much of the city's political discourse despite comprising less than one-fifth of the electorate. Housing affordability dominates their concerns (95% say they are very concerned), but their moderate stance on crime — only 13% see it as a major problem — creates a significant perceptual gap with other segments. As one focus group participant noted, they want leaders who can deliver "structural change" rather than incremental fixes. Their digital-first engagement and high civic participation make them influential beyond their numbers; however, their concentration in select neighborhoods — which tend to be more affluent and safer — gives them relative distance from daily safety concerns, which can limit citywide coalition-building efforts without broader outreach. **Pragmatic progressives,** or 23% of those polled, occupy the critical center-left position and represent the city's political center of gravity. Geographically dispersed across all boroughs, these diverse, educated voters form a potentially decisive constituency capable of building coalitions with either progressive reformers or more moderate segments. They embody the city's anxious middle and upper-middle class — economically stable yet increasingly squeezed by rising costs and uncertain about their future in an expensive city. Think of Dan from Queens, a member of one of my focus groups, who captures their practical frustration: "I've been living in the same rent-stabilized apartment for eight, nine years now. Very tiny. I want to start a family. I have been looking for a bigger place that I can afford for, like, a year, and it has been hard." They support progressive aims but want leaders who can "be real with what you wanna do" and "make yourself accountable." Their evidence-based approach, high civic engagement, and participation in formal community structures make them natural coalition-builders and institutional Democratic voters. Still, they're skeptical of both performative politics and sweeping promises without clear implementation plans — they want meaningful progress through existing institutions, not revolutionary change. **Discontented strivers**, or 29% of voters, are the ethnically diverse working and middle-class feeling squeezed from all sides. Picture Steve from Brooklyn, who told us, "I can't see myself living anywhere but New York. I love it here," yet fears being "pushed out" as things get worse. Or Elizabeth, planning her escape: "I'm just tired of New York. It's so draining, and the environment is just stressing me out. I have my plan. I got my passport." They represent the painful contradiction of loving the city while being exhausted by it. This group is especially sensitive to concerns about crime — something our politicians sometimes fail to understand. They're parents like Denny, using tracking apps to monitor their children's movements because "everything just happens in the streets with the kids and the violence." They hold progressive values but prioritize immediate safety concerns. They want both Zohran Mamdani's affordability agenda and the basic governance competence Andrew Cuomo promises. Yet neither candidate fully speaks to their lived reality, where progressive ideals are tempered by daily survival. **Then there are what I call traditional outer-borough voters**, making up about 10% of the potential electorate. Theserepresent the smallest but most neighborhood-focused segment — diverse, working-class residents concentrated in Queens and outer areas who prioritize local concerns over citywide policy debates. Middle-aged and older, with deep community roots, they're Democratic-registered but often more conservative on local issues, and broadly skeptical of Manhattan-centric politics, regardless of party. What separates them from other segments is their intense focus on preservation over transformation and community stability over growth. They have a fundamentally different day-to-day experience than discontented strivers. For example, while strivers see neighborhood decline everywhere, traditional outer-borough voters see improvement in their areas — making them protective of community stability rather than supportive of sweeping reform.As one participant emphasized, they want mayors who understand that "responsiveness to neighborhood-specific concerns" matters more than grand ideological visions. Despite long-term residency, they feel neglected by city leadership and rely on community networks rather than mainstream media for political information. Their electoral significance is magnified in local and lower-turnout elections, where their neighborhood loyalty and split-ticket voting can have a decisive influence on outcomes. Last but not least, New York has a healthy share (21%) of what I call **law-and-order conservatives.** These are the city's center-right constituency — older, diverse homeowners concentrated in middle-class outer-borough neighborhoods who prioritize safety and fiscal responsibility above all else. More racially diverse than national conservatives (42% white, 23% Black, 19% Hispanic), they share deep concerns about public safety (80% see crime as a significant problem) and seek "basics first" governance focused on core services rather than broad policy changes. This group was less likely than others to support Kamala Harris over Donald Trump in 2024, and are far less supportive of offering city aid to migrants than their traditional outer-borough neighbors. Overall, only 18% believe the city should continue offering aid to migrants, even with time restrictions, compared to 68% of traditional outer-borough voters. As one participant noted, they prioritize "safe streets, functional services and community preservation." Their reliance on traditional, and not social media, shapes their political engagement, making them a target group for candidates who can demonstrate both safety credentials and fiscal discipline. Taken together, these five segments reveal something crucial about New York City — these aren't different voting blocs — they reflect fundamentally different lived experiences in the same city. For example, two-thirds of progressive reformers feel safe riding the subway at night, compared to only six percent of discontented strivers who say the same. When Marjorie from Chelsea describes being "literally on the phone with my partner when shots started being fired … I ran across the street, hid behind a car, called 911," it's a world away from progressive reformers debating transit policy. As one outer borough resident put it: "You're so focused on just trying to survive that there's no time for anything else." **Worlds apart, but room for consensus** Despite these perception gaps, remarkable consensus exists on specific solutions that candidates and elected officials should embrace. Converting commercial buildings into residences, for example, enjoys 91% support across the city and no less than 86% support in any one segment. Whether voters are progressive reformers seeking systemic change, traditional outer borough voters prioritizing neighborhood stability or discontented strivers needing immediate relief, addressing the housing affordability crisis head-on unites everyone. Similarly, 89% of those we surveyed support requiring treatment for disruptive individuals with severe mental illness, while 73% prefer mental health crisis teams over increased policing. New Yorkers across all segments want approaches that address root causes while ensuring immediate security — precisely the kind of evidence-based policy that transcends traditional left-right frameworks. Strong majorities also support increased police presence on transit (85%) and city control of the MTA (79%), showing an appetite for practical improvements over ideological purity. New York's future depends not on winning ideological battles but on building civic well-being that makes all residents feel invested in the city's success. The candidate who wins this month's primary — and the general election — will be the one who best understands that Steve needs both his love for the city to be validated and his fears about being pushed out to be addressed. They'll recognize that Elizabeth's exhaustion reflects systemic failures, not personal weakness, and that Dan's housing struggle represents thousands of families postponing their futures. As Steve put it: "I think we lack leadership. I think it starts at the top. If we had some good leadership, I think the trickle-down effect would be immense." New York's complexity isn't a problem to solve — it's a reality for the next mayor to embrace. ### Safer Cities, In Context URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/safer-cities-in-context/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:59.000Z There's been a lot of talk lately about sharp, ongoing homicide declines across the country in 2025, and New York City's mayor is touting record-low homicide and shooting totals so far this year. What is actually going on? Real progress on urban public safety — with a few caveats. It's essential first to understand that cities with more than a million residents experienced the sharpest pandemic-era spikes in homicide, with their murder rates climbing by an average of 52% between 2018 and the 2021 peak. They have since recorded the largest declines, yet most remain above pre-COVID levels. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23630065?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KVM%5FuFxijjOTEkRlCvNSV7MjedfrN8YoTBFF0ucCih0/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) New York City followed this overall pattern: Its murder rate rose 65% from 2018 to 2021\. The reversal has been slower here than elsewhere. Whereas Chicago, Philadelphia and San Diego were back to their 2018 homicide levels by 2024, as of the end of that year, New York City remained 28% above its 2018 baseline. Even so, New York was still the second safest American city with more than a million residents, trailing only San Diego and posting murder rates roughly one-half to one-quarter of those in most peer metros. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23708227?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/165IYA2fOPRvHH9cOIZK0hTLw37WLQW3FffAghONYXes/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Progress continues in 2025\. In the first quarter of 2025, New York's murder rate fell 33% compared to the same period in 2024\. And five months into the year, murders (and shootings) are at their lowest number year-to-date than any other year in New York's history. If this trajectory holds, many large cities, and the nation as a whole, could close 2025 with homicide levels at or below those recorded before the pandemic. That is a big "if," as the nation is just entering the time of the year — summer — when murders happen most frequently. Of course, homicides are only one type of violent crime — and a relatively rare one, at that. In New York City, robberies, while trending downward, remain 12.5% higher in the first five months of 2025 than in the same period of 2018\. Felony assaults haven't been this high in 25 years, and after several years of postpandemic increases, have merely plateaued so far in 2025. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23590226?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1neyQSv4pkvon5ldkn2AVf%5Fr12g8G8hHTL8V5Hty7wxM/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) The decline in murders is overall good news for the city and the country, yet no single city hall, police department or policy can reasonably claim credit. The same downward trend is visible across the largest metros and in jurisdictions of every size, pointing to a broad postpandemic reversion rather than to any one local initiative. ### How Trump Twists the Uses of the National Guard URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-trump-twists-the-uses-of-the-national-guard/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:59.000Z In one sense, there's a simple story behind the National Guard bearing down on Los Angeles to break the back of protests there: Donald Trump is itching for a confrontation over immigration with a sanctuary city, and L.A. presents the perfect opportunity for him to flex his muscle. He says he wants calm, but he's spoiling to fight the left on political ground that is hospitable to him. In another sense, the story is more complex. Telling it — and understanding how radical Trump's use of the Guard is — requires knowing the history, including the initial purpose and recent uses of the National Guard, a strange beast that salutes both to state governors and the commander in chief. The Guard traces its roots to the militias established by the colonies long before the Revolution. They were modeled on a longtime English tradition. Citizen-soldiers organized for local defense; all able-bodied white men had to serve and train. The militias would prove instrumental in winning the independence of the United States, which may be part of the reason the new Constitution kept the concept. The key language is in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 (the "Militia Clauses"). These grant Congress the authority to call up the militia to execute federal laws, stop insurrections and repel invasions, and to provide for **"**organizing, arming and disciplining the militia**"** — while giving the states responsibility over appointment of officers and training them in line with federal standards. Article II, Section 2 designates the president as commander-in-chief of the militias once they are called into federal service. In the years since the Constitution was drafted, use of the militias (rebranded the National Guard in the early 20th century) have reflected all the complexities and contradictions of state and federal power in this republic of 50 states. > Though Trump's actions are not without precedent, they twist the normal functions and uses of the Guard in ways rarely seen in past administrations. Under statute and precedent, the Guard answers to different authorities and performs a wide variety of crucial functions. Under the command of state governors, [the Guard responds, as directed by a governor,](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2020-title32/pdf/USCODE-2020-title32.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to state emergencies, natural disasters and civil disturbances. But the Guard also [serves](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/how-common-are-national-guard-deployments-over-unrest-a-look-at-past-presidents-actions/ar-AA1GnTZU?ocid=BingNewsSerp&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as part of the Army or the U.S. Air National Guard, and it can be deployed in combat zones overseas. Complicating matters, the president has the power to "federalize" the Guard, placing it under Washington's command, in order to "enforce federal authority or suppress domestic violence," according to the Journal of the U.S. Army. (Presidents can deploy the U.S. military on domestic soil if they deem it necessary to suppress an insurrection; Trump [invoked ](https://www.npr.org/2025/06/10/nx-s1-5428071/los-angeles-protests-national-guard-presidential-powers?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)a rarely-used provision in [Title 10 of the U.S. Code on Armed Services](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/html/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleE-partII-chap1211-sec12406.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that permits presidents to deploy troops on U.S. soil in cases of "a rebellion or danger of a rebellion" against federal authority.) Though Trump's actions are not without precedent, they twist the normal functions and uses of the Guard in ways rarely seen in past administrations, and with consequences — especially for those living in the nation's big cities. America's experience in the 1950s and '60s helps explain why Trump's use of the Guard to suppress anti-ICE protests in Los Angeles is so troubling. In 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower [federalized](https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/executive-order-10730?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the National Guard and sent 1,000 U.S. soldiers to Arkansas to protect nine Black students seeking to integrate Little Rock Central High School. But he did so only after the segregationist governor Orval Faubus had ordered the Guard to block integration; and only after Faubus withdrew the Guard and permitted white supremacist mob riots. Eisenhower ultimately put the Guard under his command to enforce the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Brown vs. Board of Education. He also did so at the request of Little Rock's mayor. During the 1960s, governors called in the Guard as their cities burned. From Newark, N.J. to Detroit, Mich., state (and city) officials led the response. During far deadlier, far more violent urban disturbances five decades ago, governors and mayors used their powers to restore law and order without the intervention of the White House. Federalization of the Guard even then was a step too far. In 1965, Lyndon Johnson federalized the Alabama National Guard on the eve of the voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery. That was the last time a president sent the guard into America's cities without a governor's consent. But Johnson had his reasons, deploying it only after Gov. George Wallace, another arch-segregationist, refused to order his state's Guard or other police authorities under his command to protect nonviolent demonstrators. LBJ took this momentous step in the wake of many years of states defying federal laws and the courts on civil rights, permitting countless acts of violence against civil rights [activists](https://www.vox.com/2015/1/9/7520529/history-colorado-bombing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). > The endgame in L.A. may well determine whether or not Trump next sets his sights on the Big Apple. In short, even during the tumultuous civil rights movement, respect for state and local authority — combined with a cultural aversion to, and constitutional limits on, deploying soldiers domestically (traceable to popular disgust with British colonial rule) — helped limit the number of drastic presidential escalations involving the federalization of the National Guard. Even during the far bloodier and far more destructive uprising in Watts in 1965, Lyndon Johnson deferred to the state of California on when and how to use the Guard to restore order. The decades after the civil rights movement were similarly characterized by presidential restraint when it came to use of the Guard. During the 1992 Los Angeles riots triggered by the acquittal of four white police officers charged with beating motorist Rodney King, Governor Pete Wilson asked President George H.W. Bush to take charge of the state's guard. Bush did so — but only at the governor's behest. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, and President George W. Bush considered federalizing the Guard, but the Louisiana governor objected, and the president backed down. The governor deployed it under her own authority. Republican and Democratic presidents alike have adhered to the principle and [statutes](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-70/pdf/STATUTE-70A-Pg596.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) holding that local and state officials are best positioned to deploy the guard and know when to ask for federal help. Presidents have respected the separation of powers in many cases, enabling states to decide when the guard is needed and when federal assistance is required. Los Angeles may be a sign that this bipartisan tradition has come to an end. Trump's highly unusual action raises a specter for New Yorkers in particular: Could New York City come next? If Trump gets the political standoff he seeks, it could play right into his political narrative to widen the tactic. New York, also led by liberals whom Trump despises, must look like a ripe target for the White House. Trump's team believes that this is a winning issue: The president can deploy the Guard, paint Democratic leaders as soft on rioters, weak on illegal immigration, and wanton in their willingness to allow crime to destroy big cities. Like Angelenos, New Yorkers seem inclined to resist ICE roundups in places of work. It's not hard to imagine the fight coming to New York. The endgame in L.A. may well determine whether or not Trump next sets his sights on the Big Apple. ### What the Mayoral Debate Missed URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-the-mayoral-debate-missed/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:59.000Z > The whole thing felt like an argument against New York City's over-elaborate elections system, with ranked-choiced contests for special elections and primaries like this one while general elections remain simple, most-votes-wins affairs. The Gracie Bunch, with a teeth-clenched Andrew Cuomo in the center square, finally debuted on Wednesday night, just 10 days before early voting begins in the Democratic primary that often functionally decides New York City's mayor. (This year [could be different](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/imagine-a-real-new-york-mayoral-election).) The debate didn't make much of an impression, but it did highlight the yawning gap between the city's politics and the concerns of its residents. For starters, only the first hour was actually on TV, with host WNBC relegating the second hour to streaming. (On broadcast, it suddenly and jarringly switched from a partially scripted drama to a totally scripted drama at 8.) There was no audience, and for some reason the press wasn't allowed inside the venue. Even for viewers who watched the whole thing, there was little new here for anyone already paying attention and no break-out moments for low-information voters just now tuning into the race. Andrew Cuomo, the former governor who resigned before lawmakers could remove him but who now regrets it and has led in every poll to date, continued slouching toward what he wants voters to see as his inevitable and necessary return to power as the one candidate who can redeem [a city supposedly in crisis](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/andrew-cuomo-sees-a-city-in-crisis-do-new-york-voters). Never mind the fact that crime is now declining pretty steeply and other things don't feel as dire to many New Yorkers as they do to the candidate; [polls](https://cbcny.org/research/straight-new-yorkers-2025?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) still show New Yorkers in a grim mood, and he's amplifying it. The debate was the first time Cuomo has had to engage directly with the rivals his campaign has memorably dismissed as "the seven dwarves." That was a good thing. But there were eight rivals crowding the debate stage, each trying to cram too much into 30-second "answers" often without responding to the actual question while frequently speaking over each other and the moderators and with seven of them collectively aiming their fire at Cuomo. They repeated well-worn campaign lines in the hopes of introducing themselves to a new audience and breaking through while also blasting Cuomo's and his record on nursing home deaths and sexual harassment charges and budget cuts and ethics and [things he said 17 years ago about Barack Obama](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-great-shuck-and-jive-debate-of-08-andrew-cuomos-staff-responds-233792/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and on and on. The collective idea is to convince voters not to rank Cuomo at all, but the range of attacks, some closer to the mark than others, made it hard to focus on any given one, and the whole exercise felt exhausting as he responded with counter-attacks, half-answers and evasions to run out the clock and move on. As the night dragged on, the group texts I'm in with political pros and junkies got quieter and quieter as even they lost interest. The whole thing felt like an argument against New York City's over-elaborate elections system, with ranked-choiced contests for special elections and primaries like this one while general elections remain simple, most-votes-wins affairs. While there's a lot to like about ranked-choice contests — they eliminate the need for run-offs and allow people to vote for candidates they actually like instead of getting caught up in considering who's winning — it's simply ridiculous to have two different systems apply in the same race, with one contest only open to registered party members and the other one to all voters. (It's also ridiculous that the city's primary, which is low-turnout to begin with, is in late June, but that's a whole other story.) The ranked-choice primary, along with the city's generous public matching-funds program, means that candidates with no path to victory have no reason to drop out and every reason to stay in the race, use their TV time and continue spending campaign funds. The system also means that candidates in broadly similar lanes — with the "dwarves" broadly representing the progressive left and Cuomo and Whitney Tilson the pro-police and pro-Israel centrists, to put it a little crudely — have no reason to go at each other. Which is a shame, because some of these candidates are [smart and serious](https://nyeditorialboard.substack.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), though you wouldn't have known it if you were just meeting them Wednesday night. Don't hate the players, hate the game. Nine candidates stuffed on a debate stage with a minute or 30 seconds each toengage with specific questions and big topics is an overload of overboiled riffs. Part of my job as a journalist is to help digest information for voters, and make sure the map stays aligned to the territory. But as it happened, I was watching or listening while also editing a story about family members in agony on the streets of Manhattan Wednesday as [ICE round-ups there get crueler and more aggressive by the day](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/06/04/ice-immigration-enforcement-manhattan-roundup-geo-group/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That felt vastly more urgent than hearing candidates talk in generalities about the Trump administration's assault on the city and their plans to resist it. Zohran Mamdani, the 33-year-old socialist with limited accomplishments who's put himself in second place by captivating younger voters and the media class with fresh messaging, [told me last week](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/05/31/harry-siegel-mamdanis-moment-for-momentum-the-surging-socialist-in-the-democratic-mayoral-primary/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that "the entire ethos of this campaign is seeking to have the bubble of New York City politics finally connect with the world of New York City itself." But he didn't do much to distinguish himself to viewers just tuning in to the race and finding out who he is in one of the biggest remaining free media availabilities he has. ([He did collect Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's much-anticipated top-rank endorsement on Monday](https://x.com/npfandos/status/1930560269182238819?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), with that presumably timed to help him ride post-debate momentum. But he really didn't have much of it and her nod comes awfully late in the game, which is why I'm skeptical it helps sway many voters who weren't already Mamdani fans.) Cuomo, for his part, dismissed Mamdani early on with a clearly rehearsed attack line that had the benefit of being fresh, since he hasn't felt enough pressure to use it until now. "Donald Trump would go through Mr. Mamdani like a hot knife through butter," Cuomo said. "He's been in government 27 minutes. He passed three bills." Cuomo, who at one point actually said that "I was there every day, leading COVID," was asked if he had any regrets from his many years in politics. The Democratic candidate replied, ignoring the question as the rest of the candidates did, that "The Democratic Party got to a point that we allowed Mr. Trump to be elected — that we've gotten to a point where rhetoric has no connection with reality. The Democratic Party seems okay with that." Speaker Adrienne Adams, who's [tied Cuomo COVID response to her father's death during the pandemic](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/22/nyregion/adrienne-adams-nyc-mayor-cuomo-covid.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), interjected, bringing up his cuts to health and childcare spending and asking: "No regrets when it comes to slow-walking PPE and vaccinations in the season of COVID to Black and Brown communities? Really, no regrets? No regrets?" ### Two Top Thinkers on Cities Dissect NYC’s Mayoral Candidates URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/ed-glaeser-and-david-schleicher-dissect-nycs-mayoral-candidates/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:59.000Z *Harvard economist Ed Glaeser and Yale Law School state and local government law professor David Schleicher don't always agree when it comes to New York politics, but on this mayoral election they do: among the 11 candidates in the crowded field, they insist, most aren't saying much of anything. Jamie, Ed and David run down this cycle's policy platforms — the most overplayed, the worst, and, somewhere in the mix, the ones that might just have a shot at doing a lot of good for New York City.* *You can listen to this episode, "Two Top Thinkers on Cities Dissect NYC's Mayoral Candidates," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/two-top-thinkers-on-cities-dissect-nycs-mayoral-candidates/id1794619189?i=1000711107786&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/05ujmrYWHwuvYPDWXCmkWy?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* **Jamie:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City Podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. On this episode of After Hours, we decided to take advantage of the fact that it's the primary season here in New York City. The primary itself is June 24th of 2025, which is a mere few weeks away. We've got a full slate of mayoral candidates who are Democrats, and then of course there's the incumbent mayor who is running as an independent. Very little has been said about the policies that all these candidates have been putting forward, and so we decided to talk to two friends who are also experts on urban policy. The first is Ed Glaeser, who was a guest on the very first episode of After Hours. Ed is a professor of economics at Harvard studying issues of state and local governance and economics. David Schleicher is a professor of law at Yale Law School. Also a very well-known academic of urban politics and policy, more recently on metropolitan municipal bankruptcies, of all things. They're also friends of each other. They're also longtime New Yorkers. In fact, I think they were both born in New York. And they both have points of view. They see the world a little bit differently than I do. I try to be analytical, although not, perhaps, as analytical as a trained economist and a trained legal academic, but I'm probably more on the progressive side. It's interesting to have those points of view to bang against. We went policy area by policy area, but the real point is to take each of these candidates seriously on their own terms — to get the focus away from the politics, which is what everybody talks about all the time, and talk about what it would actually be like to have one of these people as the mayor of New York City. Here's my conversation with Ed Glaeser and David Schleicher. \--- Ed Glaeser and David Schleicher. Thanks for being on — Ed for the second time. So you're the first repeat guest. Congratulations. **Ed:** That is amazing. I'm deeply honored. **Jamie:** Comes with a varsity letter jacket. David, unfortunately, just the first time for you. **David:** Thanks for having me. **Jamie:** No problem. And the bar goes higher, so you're not getting any varsity letter jackets for the second time — sorry. I do want to set the stage so people understand their context. Both of you are New Yorkers. How would you characterize yourselves? As center … right? **Ed:** Yeah, sure. I'm comfortable with the center-right view. I'm a traditional New York Republican. **David:** I'm a classic New York City Democrat, though on a kind of markety side of that type of understanding. **Jamie:** I would say I'm probably a more traditional left/center progressive Democrat. You know, given where the world is now, if you had to draw like a little circle — one of those scatter graphs — you'd probably capture all of us in some way or shape or form. To start things off, do you have any high level observations around what the campaign has been so far? **David:** The campaign is interesting in that there are a lot of different candidates, and the most interesting thing to me about their platforms, broadly speaking, is that they are not addressing a New York City in crisis. They're not like, "The city's about to face a huge fiscal crisis," which is what most experts seem to think. Only a few of the candidates have any ideas that are on the scale of the housing problems that New York City has, which is in sharp contrast with the City Charter Commission, which thinks that the housing problems in New York are enormous. **Ed:** I mean, another way of phrasing it is they're sort of responding to the wrong crisis. In a sense, it's exactly what I worried about when I wrote my book "Survival of the City," which was: we are in a world in which there's been building up a lot of progressive anger at real wrongs. But at the same moment, you know, Zoom has made it easier for people to depart. It's a period in which lots of money can relocate fairly easily and continue to connect with other people. That to me feels like a replay of the 1970s, when you had the ability to exit. You look at most of these platforms and they're only responding to the poverty, they're only responding to the inequality — they're not responding at all to the fact that 50% of the fanciest buildings are still empty and it's never been easier for businesses to relocate. **Jamie:** I agree with all that. An interesting thing about it is that, as you both said, experts would say that there's a crisis. And if you look at polls, a lot of New Yorkers from every stratum think the city's in crisis and it's all the same stuff. Housing affordability is number one. There's public safety, there's public disorder — that class of things. And then there's sort of all others. Okay, we're going to talk about policies of the various candidates, and we're going to have maybe a little bit of a murderers' row of some of your "favorites." David, do you want to kick us off? **David:** Yeah, so we mentioned the fiscal problems that the city is having. There's the big structural deficit; the city headcount is still extraordinarily high post-de Blasio, that's only fallen a little bit. There are some real major fiscal problems coming with the Trump administration. This city has spent a huge amount of money in the wake of getting all the COVID money and is now facing some limits. There is exactly one proposal from any candidate, as far as I can tell, that is responsive —or kind of discusses — some of the fiscal problems. The best fiscal idea I saw was Brad Lander's idea to impose by statute some things that were originally in the fiscal control response of the late '70s response to fiscal question. These are some accounting rules and other things that were imposed upon the city that are now in bond covenants but are not legally required. Lander has an idea to make these things statutory. It doesn't bring in money, but it is a set of fiscal rules — and a mandatory contribution to the rainy day fund — that I think are salutatory. On the worst fiscal side, I'd say there's two and they're worst in the opposite directions. Andrew Cuomo has a huge number of tax cuts, including no tax on tips, and a truly, truly crazy one to impose the statewide 2% annual increase on single family home property taxes. New York City's property taxes are already extraordinarily weighted towards single family home homeowners against renters. The other side of this is that Mamdani has a huge set of tax increases, including income tax increases, for people who make over a million dollars that would increase the combined tax rate to 54%. **Ed:** It's an extra two percentage points for the millionaires, right? **David:** Yeah, and he's using that money to spend on a bunch of new programs. Neither one of them is responsive to the fiscal problem. One is a huge tax increase to spend on new stuff, not to fill in the gaps. And the other one is a huge bunch of tax cuts in the face of fiscal problems. **Jamie:** So just to stop on that point for one second. The City doesn't have a whole lot of power to do anything on the tax front. I suppose the property tax proposal, I guess he could do? **David:** I think it would need state legislative approval support too, actually. **Jamie:** Alright, so forget that. And then, you know, you can say whatever you want about new taxes on millionaires, but that's always something that has to go to the state and never works. But I agree with you. They're not fully responsible. Ed? **Ed:** I agree with that. I think the thing that feels missing to me is a sense of how we actually get more out of less money. If we think that a fiscal crunch is unavoidable, how do we become smarter about delivering services for poor New Yorkers? How do we become smarter about dealing with things in the housing space or in criminal justice? Because we are facing this crisis and we do want to, at the same time, address the sort of longstanding, progressive goals. We need to figure out how to be smarter about doing things like making life better for the poorest and most vulnerable New Yorkers. **Jamie:** I had not seen the Lander proposal. Whatever you think of Brad Lander, he does know details. **David:** Yeah. The wonkiest of the candidates, for sure. **Jamie:** Wonkiest of the candidates. It sounds like there, he's sort of inadvertently going to the credit rating. He's basically saying, we're gonna highlight for investors potential fiscal instability. **David:** Yeah, it's imposing some kind of fiscal constitutional rules, which are something that all states and all cities have. This is kind of a variation on them because they are things we actually already have, but it's making them a little more permanent, which I do think would be attractive to the bond market. Obviously for New Yorkers who are scarred by the fiscal crisis of the '70s, that's a really relevant consideration. **Jamie:** Am I right that some of the structures of the '70s, like the MAC and the fiscal control board, are now gone? **David:** Gone away. **Jamie:** So those are the structures that were put in place after the crisis in the mid '70s and staffed in order to sort of protect the fiscal status a little bit. Has anybody proposed bringing any of that stuff back? Would it make any sense? **David:** I mean, you see a lot of efforts to do this around the country. You see a variety of versions around the country of fiscal controls imposed on cities. In North Carolina, cities' budgets have to get approved by a state official before they go into action. Connecticut had bailed out the city of Hartford and imposed some controls on it. **Jamie:** Ed, taking this idea of a potential fiscal crisis seriously as a budget matter: If the Trump budget in some version passes eventually, something is gonna happen to the state and city budgets, whether through cuts or through block granting or whatever it is — city budget is going to have to do the same thing. Has there been any attempt to look at what that might actually mean, for example, for New York City or other cities that you know of? Or do we just not have enough information right now? **Ed:** I don't think we're confident enough about what the bill is gonna come out of Congress as, so I think it's been relatively limited. David, have there been any good government groups in New York that have been doing this? **David:** They're all guessing. As with everything coming out of Washington, by the time you've come up with the proposal, things have changed. I do think one thing that's related is that there are a lot of things that have happened that are indirect effects of the budget that, again, are also not being talked about. There is not a single proposal in here that talks about what happens if there's a huge decrease in tourism. Tourism is a major industry in New York City. Lots of people don't want to come here anymore and there's, like, nothing. Similarly, New York is a very trade-dependent city, and obviously is a very financially dependent city. These kinds of gyrations will have huge effects even if there's no direct fiscal change. **Jamie:** Okay, so that's fiscal. How about the next category? Ed, do you want to introduce something? **Ed:** Let's talk about housing. It's gotta be done. Although I am awfully tempted with the City-run groceries to head to produce — **David:** We've gotta get there. **Jamie:** We'll get there, You don't like City-run groceries? You don't think that's a great idea? **David:** We should do it now that we've mentioned it. **Jamie:** Let's do City-run groceries. **David:** Of the problems facing all of this, the one thing that America does really well is we have very efficient supermarkets. The proposal to have City-run grocery stores — **Jamie:** This is Mamdani, I believe. **David:** Yeah. The idea that the city that has the most expensive transit projects in literally the history of the world; the most expensive jails, by an order of magnitude over others; the most expensive everything — will be more efficient and be able to provide things at lower prices than Walmart or Fresh Direct? It's so baffling that it's really hard to talk about. **Ed:** It's mind boggling. And we already have a relatively well-functioning federal program that subsidizes food with SNAP. If you really wanted to do more to subsidize food, maybe you'd wanna think more about easing the permitting for things like big box stores. **Jamie:** The grocery store policy on its face — why not? — is he trying to solve the problem of "food is too expensive" and whatever's gonna happen with inflation? Is he trying to solve the food desert problem, which in some places is an issue? **David:** Both. There's some evidence that groceries are too expensive in New York City. Jessie Handbury, a professor at Penn, has a wonderful paper that shows that the cost of high-end products in New York are cheaper on average. New York's a great place to buy caviar—there's a lot of competition for caviar. But the cost of orange juice is very high. It's not that there's not a problem to be addressed on some level. The question is, "is this a proposal that might do it, given the high costs of City provision?" The City basically has a variety of rules to stop Walmart from coming in on labor grounds, but Walmart is going to produce cheaper orange juice. New Yorkers end up buying things from bodegas, which everyone who's bought anything from a bodega knows is very expensive, and this is because there's limits on competition. **Jamie:** Although, to that point, my guess is you'd start to see displacement of bodegas pretty fast, which would make nobody happy. **Ed:** The other thing, of course, that's important, which feeds into this, is crime in retail. If you are selling in an area where there's a lot of shrinkage — whatever our euphemism for shoplifting is — prices are gonna be higher to offset that. That's hard to work against. The interesting thing about most bodegas is that they're set up with a lot of human capital there, and that's in part to reduce the amount of shrinkage, but that also adds costs and makes sure that the marginal price is gonna be higher. **Jamie:** Okay. Housing! Let's get to housing. **Ed:** Absolutely. There's a lot of housing policies which are of the form of, "we're gonna ratchet up rent control in different ways." All of which I think are largely going to be counterproductive. Mamdani is a Freeze-the-Rent guy. He also has a plan of housing by and for New Yorkers. He's gonna put our public dollars to work, and I quote, "triple the city's production of permanently affordable union-built rent stabilized homes, constructing 200,000 new units over the next 10 years." Again, it's deeply ambitious. It lives in a fiscal dream world, where there's no attention whatsoever to the idea that like New York City has a budget and there are limitations on this stuff. It's basically like the public sector is really good at building stuff, and so the public sector is gonna build stuff. What we really want to do is hyper-control the private sector and make sure that they don't increase prices on anything. It's a very interesting combination. **David:** I want to shout out a positive one. Zellnor Myrie has a proposal for a million new homes. The details you can quibble with a little bit, but the scale of the ambition is on par with the scale of the problem. It has some things I don't like, but the broader mission of that matches the City Charter Commission's idea, which is housing everywhere in every neighborhood. Cuomo has a thing to avoid all the neighborhoods and only build downtown — well, there's not enough space. New York is a dense place. I like Lander's idea of building on city-owned golf courses. **Jamie:** I knew we had to get to this, we had to get to this. **David:** Cities should not be running golf courses. Certainly not four. It's extremely valuable real estate. Golf courses are used by very few people. **Jamie:** And by the way, it's not four. I think the city has 13 and he's saying, let's take four. **David:** Let's build on four — sorry, that's right. **Jamie:** Do you play golf? **David:** Oh, no, no, no. I play tennis. **Jamie:** Oh my God. I wish people could see your face. **Ed:** No, no, no. **Jamie:** Ed? **Ed:** I have no hand-eye coordination whatsoever. I was asked by my tennis teacher in summer camp to stop playing for the good of the game. **Jamie:** There's a real anti-golf bias here, and I just think I have to call it out because it's something you're gonna have to wrestle with yourselves. But look, it may be a perfectly fine idea. The idea of then going through the process of figuring out which of the four golf courses to close — it's never gonna happen, and it'll be horrible. **David:** And it would require a state legislative vote, I think, because of the public trust doctrine. I think the broader thing on the housing bit is that it's just not on the scale of the problem. Stringer's like, "Build on City-owned vacant land." Yeah, it's never occurred to anyone that we should build on City-owned vacant land. You either think the city has a housing problem—which they all say—or you don't. And if you do, you have to approach things that will make some people angry. **Jamie:** I don't disagree. It is hard to discern in these platforms. Back to the state budget — if you look at what's in the housing piece of the state budget, it's just, it's incrementalism at its worst. It's a mystery to me at a time when everybody, including the presidential candidates, acknowledge that we have a housing crisis — I guess it's just some lingering fear of NIMBYism or something. **Ed:** It's the same basic political force that explains why we haven't tackled this as a country or as a city for the last 30 years — which is that there are gonna be losers. We don't have a way of compensating the losers that we've all agreed on. As mayor, you're trying to create as few people who think they're gonna lose out from you as possible. It takes courage to do this. **David:** I'd also say the low turnout in these elections — this is gonna be an extremely low turnout election. All the evidence is that where you bring turnout, and or where you require public participation, you get the exact same populations of people. The only people who show up are homeowners or people who have permanent housing through rent control. As a result, the demands of housing consumers are just down the food chain. One of the things I liked about the City Charter Commission idea is that one of the ideas is to move the election to an even numbered year in November, and to move to a system that puts a lot of pressure into the general election rather than the primary. Both of these ideas are about getting more voice for ordinary people. **Ed:** Part of the fundamental problem here is that people who do not currently live in New York, but who would benefit from more building — they're never gonna be at the election, no matter what you do. I agree with doing local elections on even years for sure, but you still have this fundamental issue, which is why I've always thought that some form of the state pushing back against local zoning control makes sense to me. **David:** One of the good innovations in housing policy in New York in the last couple of years has been moving to doing citywide things rather than doing everything through neighborhood rezonings. You can see this in de Blasio's Zoning for Quality and Affordability, through Adams' City of Yes. The central idea of this is, first of all, it stops like purely neighborhood competition or limits it; secondly, it gets big interest groups involved. Your big employers and your big municipal unions have a reason to care a little bit about housing because it's happening at a citywide level, it's on the level that affects them. **Jamie:** I totally agree. I will say, one of the things that has caught my eye on a bunch of the proposals, is that while the housing piece hasn't been particularly inspiring, many of them have talked about NYCHA, which is something of a new thing for them. It hasn't been the traditional, "well, we're gonna fix NYCHA." **Ed:** So can we turn around this podcast and ask you your views on this? You know more about NYCHA than either of us do. Which of these proposals make sense to you in terms of the NYCHA reforms? **Jamie:** I think it's pretty clear — several of them, including Mamdani, have said very clearly that they're supportive of increased redevelopment of NYCHA. That implies a lot of things. It doesn't necessarily say PACT, which is what we call the RAD program, which is rental assistance demonstration using Section 8 to bring private capital into the failing NYCHA buildings. It's been something that this team has done very aggressively and we're starting to do much more aggressively over the coming months to shrink the massive capital gap. It's controversial, but it has been much more controversial in the past. The fact that it's made its way into even the Mamdani platform really symbolizes something, I think. Beyond that, what they all are implicitly or explicitly endorsing is that it's time to replace buildings with new buildings — tearing down old public housing and rebuilding public housing, and then building on the underbuilt land (NYCHA is massively underbuilt to its zoning) new affordable housing or new market rate housing or whatever it is. They are endorsing that. That is something that's very controversial — not even contemplated several years ago — and we're now doing it in Chelsea, which has the most expensive real estate in New York City. That is fascinating to me. It means that there's something in the air about NYCHA that's basically either a recognition of the need to do something aggressive or a positive sense that this NYCHA can handle it, which is great. That's good housing policy in my mind. What do you make of landmark preservation or preservationism from a policy perspective? **David:** When I teach preservation, I use one of Ed's ideas — Ed had an idea once that we need to have a preservation budget. **Ed:** I love many of New York's older buildings, and I think the city would lose a great deal if some of its architectural treasures were removed. That being said, not every glazed brick post-war building needs to be preserved for eternity. There's a tendency, particularly with the districts — I see the abuse as being much more in the districts than I do in the individual buildings — to just keep on increasing the stock of preserved housing, with no sense that there needs to be any limitation on this. As a result, when I was looking at this 20 years ago, 15% of Manhattan south of 96th Street was in a historic preservation district, which is taking a huge amount out of the areas in which you could potentially build. I think that we should give the preservationists some sort of fixed number of homes or fixed amount of acreage or fixed something that they can do. If they wanna stick something else in, they should take something else out. **David:** Ed, what do you think of the crime proposals? **Ed:** Shall we move to crime from this? **Jamie:** Oh, please. **Ed:** We have moved away from where we were five years ago when Defund the Police was seriously on the table. I'm hostile to Defund the Police in terms of getting police out of nonviolent encounters with people. My friends who have been in the police business would say that it's precisely those non-confrontational interactions with ordinary citizens that build the muscles to actually work well with citizenry. I'm very wary about getting the police out of ordinary interactions with citizens. **David:** There are a few things I liked: both Stringer and Myrie had proposals that were basically aimed at improving the clearance rate. Myrie has a "hire a bunch of detectives" proposal, and Stringer has a "let's use technology more and put cameras up in lots of places." I think that this is an interesting idea because the murder rate in New York is falling really dramatically. It's gonna be down 30% this year, it looks like — down to back to where it was pre-COVID, which was kind of a low since the middle of the last century. In the past, we've had an idea that the reason to improve the clearance rate is 'cause it will reduce future murders. The evidence is fine, a little mixed. Instead we could think that having lower murders allows us to provide justice to people. A lot of the proposals are about improving quality of life, not because it has an effect on the murder rate, but because the quality of life in New York could be better. **Ed:** I thought Stringer's proposals were by and large sensible. The only problem with the Stringer proposals on public safety is that they suffered from the same problem of all the proposals that were discussed at the beginning, which is like, I don't know who's gonna pay for this stuff. **Jamie:** Right. Well, that's the issue. It's 3,000 more cops, 5,000 more cops, 10,000 more. I don't know what the average police starting salary is. I think it's probably 60,000-65,000 plus benefits… maybe it's 100,000\. It's a lot of money. **David:** Stringer's at least noted that he was just going to try to get back to the number. Everyone else had an increase in headcount. His was a little more limited. He notes that we can't fill all the positions we have now at the salaries. The police are retiring. The challenge is filling the spots much more than it's about increasing the numbers. **Jamie:** Yeah, I agree with that. It is interesting overall, I agree with you. There hasn't really been that kind of rhetoric, except for when it artificially comes up. If somebody says, "what did you think about stop and frisk?" And Whitney Tilson or somebody sort of clearly is like, "Eh, maybe so," and everybody piles on — rightly so. We were stopping and frisking 700,000 people a year in the Bloomberg era, now it's down to five digits. But there seems to be a convergence on something that looks like a middle. **Ed:** I want to shout out John Tebes and Jeffrey Fagan's paper, "Do Pedestrian Stops Deter Crime? Evidence from Reforming Stop and Frisk," which finds that basically, the places that had a lot of stop and frisk and then stopped it had no significant changes in crime. There's no evidence that stop and frisk was particularly effective on doing this. This is a paper that also finds that the areas where you threw extra police did actually reduce crime. It's not that cops don't matter. Cops matter a lot. But this particularly abusive system of stop and frisk was not particularly a productive use of police officers' time. **Jamie:** Let me ask a more broad question. It sounds like we're all coming into agreement that there haven't been a lot of revolutionary ideas. You mentioned the idea of building on city owned land — I mean, every year somebody tries to do that. Is it possible that there just aren't that many new ideas under the sun? Is that possible? I mean, we've been trying lots and lots of things for a really long time. It may be that if something terrible happens, we're gonna return to a fiscal control board and some other things. Is there really something that just hasn't been thought of? **David:** I guess the question is not, to me, whether there are some magic ideas out there. There are interesting urban policy ideas going on around the country in different ways. But if you look at New York in relation to other cities, what you see is a couple of big stories. The cost of providing services in New York is just really, really, really high. New York City's taxes are extraordinarily high and New York City residents do not get — outside of police, actually — a great package of services in response. The schools are okay. The transportation is, I mean, it was mostly built a long time ago for the tax price. The thing you'd want in response to that is someone who was — maybe visionary or maybe not — relentlessly focused on producing the narrow set of public services well. And then relatedly, they would be directly responsive to the kind of growth concerns of the city, that is to say, that the city just needs a lot of housing. That doesn't require some magic set of ideas, but it does require relentless focus. And I don't see it, man. **Ed:** I'm at the same place, David. Fix the number of services, be relentless in terms of efficiency and cost containment. I'll just give one final thing. I'm often asked about climate change in cities. I tend to think that what New York should be doing whenever it's time to do sea walls or whatever, is just figure out what Singapore is doing, figure out what Amsterdam, is doing and try not to blow up the price by a factor of 10\. Take the cities that we know are global leaders in this area and just try not to make the cost go haywire. **Jamie:** In closing, two things. One is on that point. I'll point you to a task force that I co-chaired for this mayor. We put out a report that wasn't highly publicized for a variety of reasons about how to pay for the resilient infrastructure that was already on the books — some of it underway, some of it not. It's clearly necessary at some point, unless you just don't believe in climate change. The costs were, as you expect, very, very high. It would be interesting to have a value engineering approach to those costs. One way or the other, we're going to have to find ways to pay for that. The one thing — to your guys' point — that I've noticed that nobody ever talks about is a city manager. I don't know if it makes sense. I would be interested to know whether it's something that has been effective in a lot of places. We don't have it and I have a hard time, I guess, seeing a mayor agree to turn over some of their power to a city manager. But it would sort of say, to your point, the mayor doesn't have to do that. The city manager's going to focus on performance. **David:** Most American cities have city managers. The New York City model is built around a very different theory of accountability, which is that the mayor should be powerful and the mayor should be electorally responsive. If anything, the direction of movement, at least in the last couple of years, has been towards stronger mayors, on the grounds of creating some political accountability in cities. Different mayors have adopted different management techniques that aren't formal nonpartisan city managers, but are about creating, say, powerful deputy mayors who have a lot of operation. Think Peter Powers under Giuliani or the commissioner model that Bloomberg pushed. I think that the candidates here have not been clear about what their management theories are, but you've seen radically different ones in New York City over time, all under this idea of a politically responsive mayor. But they've had very different relationships. Bloomberg had very powerful commissioners, and Giuliani had four people in City Hall who did everything. And those were very different ideas of how to run the city. **Ed:** The phrasing that I've always used is that what our crisis of the 1970s brought forth was an era of city mayor-managers who were mayors — elected mayors, as David says — but they had a deeply managerial ethos. That's Giuliani and that's Bloomberg, and that's Richard Daly in Chicago, Tom Menino in Boston. I think that's a more plausible thing for New York. I just hope that voters, when they go into the polling booths, are looking for someone who can manage well because that's a critical element of what the city needs. **Jamie:** Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### Will We Ever Swim in the East River? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/will-we-ever-swim-in-the-east-river/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:36:59.000Z In a city teeming with ambition, strolling across New York in swim trunks to take a dip in the East River shouldn't be seen as a radical act. New York City contains, after all, [520 total miles of coastline](https://gothamist.com/news/what-would-it-take-to-make-nycs-waterways-safe-for-swimming?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and its residents are [starved for public swimming areas](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/making-new-york-city-pools-accessible-to-all) during the region's stifling summers. In comparably warm European cities like Paris, [Vienna](https://www.wien.info/en/livable-vienna/water-in-vienna/natural-bathing-spots-353632?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), London, [Zurich](https://www.zuerich.com/en/inform-plan/seasons-and-climate/zurich-in-summer/outdoor-pools-in-zurich?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Munich and [Berlin](https://www.themayor.eu/en/a/view/the-berlin-s-river-spree-an-excellent-place-for-swimming-1082?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [bathing in city rivers is taken for granted](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/04/travel/europe-swimmable-cities.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and local bodies of water are treated as recreation spaces as much as commercial passageways. In New York City, however, centuries of hazardous dumping, combined with an outdated sewer system, have made it a contemporary anathema to consider swimming in any of the city's waterways. Standing on the esplanade separating the Stuyvesant Cove water treatment facility from the East River today, taking in the olfactory blend of stormwater and sewage gurgling into the tidal estuary's current, the idea of diving in for a casual dip is practically inconceivable. What bothers me is that this doesn't seem to bother anyone. This contemporary relationship between New Yorkers and our waterways is emblematic of a more general perception of the separation of the city from the natural world. For city residents trapped within New York's gridlocked, concrete streetscapes, it can often feel as if the city occupies an ecosystem of its own, distinct from the rhythms of nature. From a historical standpoint, though, this perception is a ruse, a symptom of a citywide affliction the author Jared Diamond [has dubbed](https://www.frieze.com/article/maya-lin-ghost-forest-2021?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "landscape amnesia," a gradual, multi-generational disconnection from nature whose end result is a population that cannot remember the natural world that preceded it. Despite the modern normalization of New York's relationship with its waterways, the present state of the rivers is in fact a historical aberration. As early as 1609, Dutch colonists encountered pristine aquatic conditions in the New York Harbor. Water quality then was maintained naturally by the filtration of billions of oysters, clams and mussels, a process which attracted the millions of fish and thousands of porpoises, whales, sharks, dolphins, seals and sea turtles who once called the water home. "It is not possible," Jasper Danckaerts, a Dutch journalist visiting New York in 1679, recorded, "to describe how this bay swarms with fish, both large and small, whales, tunnies and porpoises, whole schools of innumerable other fish." It doesn't require gazing back to some precolonial halcyon, either, to understand that swimming in the river can coexist with a modern New York lifestyle; in the middle of the 19th century, [swimming in both rivers was commonplace](https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/rivers-filth-and-heat-riverbaths-and-the-fight-over-public-bathing?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and beginning in 1870, the City embedded 22 popular public pools (complete with dressing rooms, offices and gas lighting for nightswimming) into waterways around the city. Since then, adventurous open water swimmers like [Gertrude Ederly, Eileen Burke](https://www.nyopenwater.org/ederle-burke-swim/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Ira Gershenhorn](https://gothamist.com/news/what-would-it-take-to-make-nycs-waterways-safe-for-swimming?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have braved suboptimal conditions to successfully swim long distances in both New York Harbor and the Hudson River. > Despite the modern normalization of New York's relationship with its waterways, the present state of the rivers is in fact a historical aberration. A legacy of local negligence, though, overshadows that history today. Beginning at least as early as the mid-18th century, when the City sabotaged its local supply of drinking water by permitting a tannery to [operate adjacent to Collect Pond](https://revolutionarywarjournal.com/new-york-citys-pristine-collect-pond-was-a-fresh-water-source-for-new-yorkers-for-nearly-two-hundred-years-what-happened-to-it/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Collect%20Pond%20in%20the%20early,which%20eventually%20destroyed%20the%20ecosystem.), New York's emphasis on economic growth often came at the expense of the health of its waterways, which were exposed to petroleum residues, heavy metals and chemicals [dumped carelessly by factories along the rivers](https://olympianwatertesting.com/the-impact-of-brooklyns-industrial-past-on-its-water-quality/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) through the industrial revolution. The water's dubious history extends into the present; today, rainfall triggers [21 billion annual gallons](https://www.riverkeeper.org/our-work/campaigns/sewer-and-stormwater-pollution?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of raw sewage flow into the city's waterways through a [Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) system](https://www.nyc.gov/site/dep/water/combined-sewer-overflows.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which [dates to the 19th century](https://www.billionoysterproject.org/harbor-history?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Simply put: when it rains, the rivers are [disgusting](https://www.billionoysterproject.org/water-quality?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). As such, just 14 miles — less than 1% — of New York City's total shoreline is open to public swimming today. This reality has devastating consequences not only for the region's ecosystem but for the public health of New Yorkers, especially as urban temperatures in summer months [escalate as a result of climate change](https://nysclimateimpacts.org/explore-by-region/new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Averaged%20over%20the%20entire%20year,region%20is%20expected%20to%20decrease.). As Julie Sandorf [chronicled in Vital City last year](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/making-new-york-city-pools-accessible-to-all), New York trails nearly every other major American city in public pool availability, and the pools that are open during the summer are notoriously overcrowded and understaffed. The lack of current free swimming spaces in the city not only exacerbates the heat stress faced by an increasing number of vulnerable New Yorkers but limits the opportunities low-income residents have to take swimming lessons, a resource which can [cut the risk of drowning by up to 88%](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19255386/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for young children. Responsibly opening up more of those 520 miles of coastline for safe, lifeguard-enforced swimming would be the most obvious strategy to alleviate the challenges New Yorkers face to gaining reliable water access. The more tragic implication of the present waterway situation, though, is that the region's creeping decimation of the natural world has resulted in the near-total separation of the city's image from nature. As the landscape ecologist Eric Sanderson argues convincingly in his seminal 2009 book "Manahatta," coming to terms with New York today requires an understanding of its natural history, of the profound role nature played not only in its precolonial era but in its modern economic development (the foundation of the island's first Dutch economy, for example, was the [beaver pelt)](https://www.nyhistory.org/blogs/beavers-john-jacob-astor?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). As Sanderson argues, New York's greatest modern "conceit" is that the city is separated from, and not a continuation of, the natural world. As much as the city's imposing streetscapes may trick us into believing we're living outside the laws of nature, New Yorkers are reminded incessantly — through curiosities like [Flaco, the Eurasian eagle owl](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/nyregion/flaco-owl-central-park-zoo.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who escaped the Central Park Zoo in 2023, and the recent preponderance of marine life in the East River — that we remain entrenched in the natural world. > Just 14 miles — less than 1% — of New York City's total shoreline is open to public swimming today. Encouragingly, many New Yorkers are embracing a more integrated ethos, and thanks to a series of local and federal interventions, New York's waterways are in better shape today than at any point in the [last century](https://www.hudsonriver.org/article/calculating-the-economic-value-of-clean-water/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Since%20the%20passage%20of%20the,like%20safe%20swimming%20and%20boating.). Spurred to action by the [1972 Clean Water Act](https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the City has [spent around $45 billion](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/nyregion/new-york-reduce-water-use-in-rainstorms-flush.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) since the 1980s to eliminate industrial toxins and upgrade sewer lines across the region, an effort which has significantly improved water quality. In 1985, 110 billion gallons of sewage was dumped into the waterways annually; today that number is closer to 20 billion. Exceptional present day initiatives from nonprofits like [Riverkeeper](https://www.riverkeeper.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and the [Billion Oyster Project](https://www.billionoysterproject.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have both aided efforts to clean the water and created a heightened sense of public awareness around the natural processes undergirding modern life in New York. In the past year alone, [whales](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PwTBrlfrno8&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [dolphins](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/24/dolphins-new-york-east-river-environment?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [seals](https://www.timeout.com/newyork/news/i-went-on-a-winter-wildlife-cruise-and-found-nycs-harbor-seal-population-020325?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have been spotted in the East River, each sighting proof that, with coordinated, serious investment, environmental progress in the city is indeed possible. On some days, water levels may even be safe for the odd [adventurous swimmer](https://gothamist.com/news/what-would-it-take-to-make-nycs-waterways-safe-for-swimming?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Though bathing options are still limited, both the contemporary transformation of Lower Manhattan's West Side Highway into a pedestrian parkway (Gansevoort Peninsula, opened in 2023, even features a small beach which descends into an off-limits Hudson), and the ongoing East River [kayak sessions](https://www.bbpboathouse.org/about-us?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) operating out of Brooklyn Bridge Park show that New Yorkers are increasingly comfortable interacting with city waterways. Future planners can look to cities like [Copenhagen](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-23/why-copenhagen-has-such-great-water?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Boston](https://thecharles.org/city-splash/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [Paris](https://www.sortiraparis.com/en/news/in-paris/articles/275883-swimming-on-the-seine-in-paris-3-sites-to-open-in-july-2025-for-paris-plages?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (the Seine is set to open to swimmers this July with a barrier system specifically designed to separate bathers from commercial traffic), to find contemporary models suiting the distinct challenge of clearing New York's water for safe swimming. With the right political will, it's not a stretch to imagine the City harnessing the strategies and technologies already in place in cities around the world (including an existing local proposal from the organization +Pool, whose alleged 2025 plan for a filtered East River pool [remains elusive](https://hellgatenyc.com/plus-pool-actually-a-minus-pool/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) to implement an equitable and sanitary rollout of more public water. Any implementation plan depends, of course, on consistent water quality levels throughout the city. Despite the environmental improvements of the last half-century, New York's waterways will remain untenable options for consistently cooling off during the city's hot summer months until its sewage and runoff issues are addressed. The fiscal reality of that challenge is stark: [a Gothamist report](https://gothamist.com/news/what-would-it-take-to-make-nycs-waterways-safe-for-swimming?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) last year indicated it would take roughly $36 billion to redirect those 21 billion annual gallons of sewage away from public waterways. Given that the City's total 2025 budget was [roughly $115 billion](https://www.citylandnyc.org/15-things-to-know-about-nycs-budget-to-be-a-city-budget-wonk/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), generating enough local support to tackle the challenge anytime soon seems improbable (not to mention the current odds of receiving any imminent federal aid). A more pressing concern than any daunting financial reality, though, has to do with our perception of the city itself. From the West Side Highway improvement project to Brooklyn Bridge Park, New York's 21st century effort to more fully incorporate its waterways into public life demonstrates its capacity to enact significant upgrades along the waterfront. Still, the ongoing implausibility of swimming in the East River speaks to the broader lack of integration between city and nature here, the wide underlying gap which remains between the pristine natural history of the region and the contemporary difficulty of meaningfully immersing oneself in that nature today. Until residents can drop the delusion that the city is a separate entity from nature and work to reimagine New York as a place embedded in, and not distinct from, the natural world, no financial windfall will transform the city into the sort of integrated landscape the realities of a changing climate and a nature-starved population demand. Will New Yorkers ever dare to jump? ### We Need Housing — and Green Spaces, Too URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/we-need-housing-and-green-spaces-too/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:00.000Z There is a beautiful [garden](https://www.elizabethstreetgarden.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) tucked away on a quiet, tree-lined street in Manhattan's Little Italy. There are rows of flowers, bushes and trees, lush, abundant and slightly wild. There is a balcony you might imagine Romeo climbing. There are stone balustrades, lions, one with climbing vines adorning his face, a sphinx, various other statues and a copy of a Hermes medallion from late antiquity. People come here to read, to sit quietly, to simply let time pass. The Elizabeth Street Garden is one of the few places remaining in New York City that is not under the sign of [Moloch](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/49303/howl?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The great parks — Central Park, Prospect Park and others — are places accessible to all, outside of the regime of commerce and hustle, but even some of our new green spaces, like the High Line and [Little Island](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/arts/little-island-barry-diller.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), are little more than theme parks for tourists. The quirky, beautiful, art-filled space on Elizabeth between Prince and Spring is the creation of long-time neighborhood denizen and outsider artist Allan Reiver, who leased a blighted city-owned site in 1991 and created a unique place filled with greenery, architectural elements and neoclassical statuary from his collection as an antique dealer; a work of art in its own right. It is among the truly great places in the city. Co-created and now led by Reiver's son Joseph, it is kept open by an army of volunteers. It should be designated a New York Landmark. Across New York, there are [many such spaces that began as neglected city-owned parcels](https://morusnyc.org/reclaiming-space-community-gardens/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and are now small, calm, green spaces. By the 1980s, over 1000 vacant lots were turned into community gardens. In the 1990s, Rudy Giuliani [aimed to sell them off](https://gothamist.com/news/nycs-community-gardens-overcame-obstacles-including-rudy-giuliani?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to developers. Many of them still survived and are now formally recognized by the city's Parks Department. Elizabeth Street Garden happens to be unofficial. > The City has stubbornly portrayed the choice as one between two desirables: affordable housing and green space. The problem with this framing is that the garden is not an empty lot waiting to be filled. Instead of preserving this small, eclectic wonder, the City has decided to destroy it. The Garden has been in a life-or-death struggle with the Housing Preservation Department for over a decade. After 12 years of strenuous efforts to keep the garden alive, it is hanging by a thread, under threat of imminent eviction. It might soon make way for a mix of affordable housing for seniors, retail and office space in its place. The City Council's insistence on pushing the project through in spite of Community Board objections, contentious town halls and tens of thousands of citizens petitioning for a reprieve has been a civics lesson in the failure of the democratic process at the local level. The City has stubbornly portrayed the choice as one between two desirables: affordable housing and green space. The problem with this framing is that the garden is not an empty lot waiting to be filled. It is *already* filled, with things both man-made and natural that people have come to love and rely on. That Little Italy is one of the most green-space-starved neighborhoods in Manhattan makes its elimination even harder to justify. The Soho/Little Italy neighborhood where Elizabeth Street Garden is located [has an open space ratio of .13 acre per 1,000 residents (6 square feet per resident), compared with the City's open space planning goal of at least 2.5 acres per 1000 residents (109 square feet per resident)](https://vparchive.gvshp.org/%5Fgvshp/pdf/CB2%20Res%2001%20January%202019.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But even if affordable housing is a greater priority than "green space" — though these values are hard to place along a linear scale in one of the densest parts of America — it still doesn't follow that the garden needs to be destroyed. We don't just look at buildings, concluding *they* should be destroyed, in neighborhoods starved for greenery. Similarly, we don't weigh the pros and cons of destroying Central Park, or, for that matter, [Collect Pond Park](https://www.nycgovparks.org/parks/collect-pond-park/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a few blocks south of Elizabeth Street Garden, to make room for affordable housing. Especially when there are alternative sites available, truly [empty lots](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-audit-reveals-city-owns-more-than-1100-vacant-lots-that-could-be-used-to-build-affordable-housing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which has been the case all along. Nevertheless, the City prioritized building on *this site*, over the other sites which it now says it will someday also build on. > City life is not reducible to abstract categories like 'affordability,' 'green space' or 'recreation.' Still, one might wonder if, despite all this, the imperative to build more affordable housing at a time when rents are punishingly high and vacancy rates are at 1.4% just might outweigh the neighborhood's sentimental attachment to this magical space. The "[abundance agenda](https://www.amazon.com/Abundance-Progress-Takes-Ezra-Klein/dp/1668023482/ref=sr%5F1%5F1?crid=174R8AV5O1QH9&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.rvhjZVT3yaFDfy9SkTvdO6HGRB1zdO%5FUW1wHYyBS%5FVf9A12%5F8eg98dTeQU9oNU9O87%5F5Xio44SzvjAEl5Y9rZi8S8xVtNJF9mQ3jScasbgTn8xMa0TkOcNxt6a0%5FzkOx5ZKHTFCPhzJCIs6SODguuBLMcymT66%5FdE8OHPdXGKpbH0%5FVeDcEbk1g7s1F1UZhr%5FzNYSDI4QrtlJfaLUUTtd4Lm%5Fm9QRTNcS5Au7nxCnts.Wb4JtAGNzjEUgjWnGWl2Ux7GJoSufRZ8PSr6iKqGvzI&dib%5Ftag=se&keywords=ezra+klein+abundance&qid=1743820368&sprefix=ezra+k%2Caps%2C84&sr=8-1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)," gaining traction in policy circles, calls for bold action on housing, for very good reasons. Still, it is not true that we should therefore build absolutely everywhere we possibly can. A great city needs *both* affordable housing and spaces of contemplation, such as parks and gardens. There were [widespread objections](https://www.thecity.nyc/2024/07/17/housing-high-rise-development-brooklyn-botanic-garden/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), even from some YIMBY types, to erecting a tall tower that would deprive the Brooklyn Botanic Garden of precious sunlight. As the great intellectual and artistic ferment in Tribeca, Soho, Greenwich Village and the East Village in the '60s shows, creative life needs *both.* In a neighborhood and city steadily [losing](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/opinion/moes-meat-market-new-york.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) its edge and character, we must hang on to places that make life worth living here, while also providing enough *places* to livehere. When Jane Jacobs opposed and successfully fought Robert Moses' plan to run a "Lower Manhattan Expressway" through Greenwich Village, Soho and Little Italy 60 years ago, she didn't merely avert catastrophe for Downtown Manhattan and win a local, although hugely important and consequential battle. Through her advocacy and her wildly influential book "The Death and Life of Great American Cities," she popularized the idea that city life is not reducible to abstract categories like "affordability," "green space" or "recreation." A real city, she argued, grows through density, yes — but also through preserving community and belonging, idiosyncrasy and beauty. She understood that city planning is at its best when it disrupts the organic life of the city as little as possible, and when it doesn't set priorities like housing against gardens. We need a city that can hold both. ### An Antidote to DOGE? Strengthening Urban Policy Entrepreneurs URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/an-antidote-to-doge-strengthening-urban-policy-entrepreneurs/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:00.000Z Since at least the 18th century, the term "[entrepreneur](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entrepreneur?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)" has been used to refer to business people, historically young men, who take on the risk of starting a new enterprise. In the 1700s, they were mercantile tradesmen backed by nobility. Today, they are founders of B2B SaaS companies, backed by VCs. When they succeed, entrepreneurs are celebrated with fame and fortune, and appear on lists like the Forbes 30 Under 30. But there is another crop of entrepreneurs who go unnoticed, but make perhaps a larger difference in our day-to-day lives: the "policy entrepreneurs" toiling away in city agencies — and on the streets — across the country. Take Justin Zwick, who has taken on the herculean task of modernizing the paper-based voucher system New York's Department of Sanitation uses to track the 100,000 tons of garbage it collects across the city. Or Olyvia Siekman at the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, who is trying to figure out how to reduce rape crimes, which have been stubbornly rising. Justin, Olivia and 400 other New York City policy entrepreneurs came out on May 22 to [the Pilot Pitchfest ](https://www.pilotpitchfest.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)— an event we started to help match city agency staff with new ideas with the supporting resources they need from civil society. Because here's the thing: Entrepreneurs of all stripes need collaborators and amplifiers to succeed. Entrepreneurship requires a team. The term "policy entrepreneur" was first popularized by [John W. Kingdon in 1984](https://books.google.com/books/about/Agendas%5FAlternatives%5Fand%5FPublic%5FPolicies.html?id=OXsdSgAACAAJ&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and more recently Michael Mintrom has [defined it to mean](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25741292.2019.1675989?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#d1e165) "energetic actors who engage in collaborative efforts in and around government to promote policy innovations." These unusually zealous individuals take on the project of policy change, often when it's not part of their formal job description. They build cross-cutting coalitions. They collect evidence to make their case. And they take advantage of windows of opportunity, like a pandemic, to advance their cause. A policy entrepreneur might work at a city agency — or might be an academic researcher, a member of an interest group, or just any person who sees something broken and decides to try to help fix it. Policy entrepreneurship is inherently a bottom-up exercise. I became an accidental policy entrepreneur before I had ever heard the phrase. In 2022, I was on a short-term academic fellowship at Cornell University, conducting research in collaboration with Daria Siegel at the New York City Economic Development Corporation on why the City had such [a hard time buying from early-stage companies](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/opinion/elon-musk-government-spending-reform.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What started as a small research project turned into a two-year campaign, culminating in the City of New York modifying its procurement code. That change was only possible because the conditions were in place for Daria and me to succeed. The academic affiliation gave me credibility, and Daria had the authority and know-how to navigate the City. But it was really the motley team that assembled around the cause of procurement reform — Julia Fusfeld, Marc Heinrich, B.J. Jones, Stacey Matlen and too many others to name — who made it happen. My own experience with policy entrepreneurship is why I am so excited about the potential of the Pitchfest. At the event, agency staff were invited to deliver low-stakes, two-minute pitches on problems they were having. We had everyone from deputy commissioners to analysts on stage. The audience was composed of academic researchers and volunteers from civil society, who now have the opportunity to "match" with a city agency. Think Tinder x Science Fair x Y Combinator Demo Day. We heard problem statements as wide-ranging as how to prevent asphalt deterioration at bus stops, to how to ensure emergency preparedness at the 2026 FIFA World Cup. (Note: The City's Department of Emergency Management wants you to have fun, "but not too much of it.") Going forward, we hope to have the privilege of running events like the Pitchfest in more places. For now, here is a sampling of the 50-plus pitches we received this year in New York. *Apply* [*by June 2*](https://forms.office.com/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=BhYtYSrXlkW%5FkD1gn-3qSPiTMMDDCDxMhx3%5FtN5meRlUM01QUjc0SUJLWTQ2UFIwQ0ZPT0c5M0xUSS4u&route=shorturl&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *to be matched with an agency and sign up* [*to follow along*](https://www.pilotpitchfest.org/contact?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*. We hope to see you at a Pitchfest in your city!* **Sample Projects** **Alec Bardey** at the Department of Transportation wants to automate the way the DOT counts traffic data using computer vision, to inform future transportation planning. **Maryanne Schretzman** at the Center for Innovation through Data Intelligence wants to study the use of Emergency Housing Vouchers during COVID to improve our understanding of tenant decision-making. **Olyvia Siekman** at the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice wants to analyze crime data to inform efforts to reduce incidents of sexual violence, and improve long-term public safety. **Meghan Shineman** at the Department for the Aging wants to evaluate the impact of the department's community-based services on cognitive health among older New Yorkers. **Justin Zwick** from the Department of Sanitation (DSNY) wants to create a digital voucher system to track trash pick-up, replacing a paper-based process. **Sherman Olivera** at the Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD) wants to assess the impact of the SafeGrowth pilot, a crime prevention program which ran in three neighborhoods. **Tom Porcelli** at New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM) wants to incorporate AI-driven transcription tools to improve the turnaround time and accuracy of call records. **Carlos Piedad** wants to understand how the burden of rising utility cost impacts low-income New Yorkers, including developing innovative rate design proposals. ### Tom Robbins and the Slow Death of Common Civic Culture URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/tom-robbins-and-the-slow-death-of-common-civic-cul/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:00.000Z > You see it everywhere you go. Even in this historically newspaper-friendly city, the cellphone has replaced the paper. Glancing at your seatmate's paper on the subway was a way to stay informed. Glancing at your seatmate's cellphone is a way to look like a creep. Every time a great reporter like Tom Robbins dies, we hear woe-is-us rounds of "they don't make them like that anymore." As Robbins — who deeply valued his work at CUNY's Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism and [who left THE CITY when budget cuts](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/05/28/remembering-city-journalist-tom-robbins/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) threatened the livelihoods of younger reporters — knew well, the nostalgia is misplaced. As I type, future Robbins (and Wayne Barretts and Jimmy Breslins and more) are still being made. There are hundreds of journalists in New York City laboring to shine a light on those in power. Young reporters are smart, hungry, idealistic and probably better trained to mine deeper repositories of information than ever before. That's the good news. The bad news is that the marketplace for this kind of work is shrinking. Despite an abundance of journalistic talent in the urban wild, the news ecosystem in which they ply their trade is no longer conducive to building long careers. This reality is typically framed as a problem of technology, as the internet has destroyed the business model that traditionally supported workaday journalism. That's not wrong, but the problem runs deeper. There are worrying signs that civic engagement is fraying, producing an electorate in which ever smaller fractions of the population seem to care that much about what is happening in their city, including in the corridors of power. New York's [mayoral election turnout hit historic lows in recent elections](https://edc.nyc/elections-and-voter-turnout?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [Newspaper staffs have shrunk markedly in the last two decades](https://www.cjr.org/united%5Fstates%5Fproject/local-news-new-york-city.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These aren't unrelated facts. How we got here is a complicated story with interwoven economic and cultural strands. [Newspaper revenue streams and staffs have been decimated](https://www.nydailynews.com/2018/07/26/local-journalism-is-sick-dont-misdiagnose-the-disease/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by classified ads shifting first to Craigslist and then elsewhere; display ads moving online and free headlines and news abstracts popping up in Google and on Facebook; and cold, calculating owners intent on squeezing every dime out of every operation. You see it everywhere you go. Even in this historically newspaper-friendly city, the cellphone has replaced the paper. Glancing at your seatmate's paper on the subway was a way to stay informed. Glancing at your seatmate's cellphone is a way to look like a creep. All this begets a palpable loss of local community. To be clear, civic engagement has many dimensions beyond the realm of news and political engagement. New Yorkers still care plenty about their neighborhoods. Many people volunteer at their schools or churches. But it all feels like less than it once was, particularly when it comes to getting citizens engaged in necessarily political questions about how their government can serve them better. Signs of diminished civic engagement are all around us. The New York Times is a journalistic colossus that has emerged from the convulsions of recent years in fighting trim. But the behemoth's [Metro section has gotten out of the rhythm of daily coverage](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/public-editor/liz-spayd-new-york-times-public-editor.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and its 200-person-strong opinion section has [stopped](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/new-york-times-to-new-york-drop-dead) ([paused?](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/05/ny-times-has-approached-nyc-thought-leaders-weigh-mayoral-race/405385/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) endorsing local candidates, deeming those tasks too small or too labor-intensive to be worth their while. Reporters at the Daily News, the Post and other outlets do yeoman's work, but nobody can deny that those papers are shadows of their former selves. Some terrific startups — [THE CITY](https://www.thecity.nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [New York Focus](https://nysfocus.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Documented](https://documentedny.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Hell Gate](https://hellgatenyc.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and others — have nobly stepped up to fill some of the gaps, but for too many journalists, the daily m.o. remains chasing stories that get clicks and engagement, or, even more enervating, freelance pitching and hustling. It's harder to become the next Tom Robbins when you're worried about paying for your family's health care. The highest praise an old newspaper boss of mine could give about prospective hires was that he or she "gives a shit." Lots of people in this business still give a shit, but it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that the people who consume our content give a lot less of a shit than they used to. **Where do we go from here?** Stopping the downward spiral so that ordinary people start caring more about politics and public policy in their city is a complicated task. It might well be Sisyphean. The economy can't be magically remade so that fully staffed, printed papers become profitable again; the entire advertising model that sustained newspapers for over a century has collapsed. But local politics still matters even if many people don't realize it. If people who care about the city can figure out how to help them appreciate it, the tide might start to turn, at least in small ways. One answer, necessary but insufficient, is better civic education in schools. Teaching how a bill becomes a law and the like sounds goo-goo to many people, but it needn't be. My daughter has a fifth-grade teacher who brings the wider world into the classroom daily. She often comes home knowing more about what Donald Trump or Eric Adams did that day than I do. In real time, I'm seeing the creation of an engaged citizen thanks in large part to the work of a public school. And [we need](https://www.presspassnyc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [more student newspapers](https://www.nydailynews.com/2022/11/27/writes-of-passage-more-nyc-high-schools-need-student-newspapers/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), not only to get more kids learning how to do the essential work of keeping their fellow citizens informed but to plant the seeds of informed engagement more broadly. At the same time, we should look for other ways to bring news back into public space. Gorgeous screens on our subways and LinkNYC kiosks get filled with ads for dating apps, injury lawyers and HR platforms, along with the occasional fun fact about the city or community listing. What about putting some real news underground and on our streetscape? Simultaneously, we need to make some [smart systemic reforms to bring public policy and politics](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/imagine-a-real-new-york-mayoral-election), which now feel like they're just for the professionals, closer to the people. That should start with [opening mayoral primaries to all comers](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/05/23/new-yorks-historic-open-primary-chance/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and moving mayoral elections to heavy turnout years. That'll breed more attention and more turnout, and candidates who play less to the factions that today determine the outcome. [Mobile voting](https://www.mobilevoting.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — letting people use their phones, those instruments of distraction and disengagement, to register democratic preferences — is also an exciting idea. Journalists have a burden too. They have to work even harder to tell more stories about the way power works in their city. The many reporters who lament Tom Robbins' passing and aim to follow in his footsteps have the opportunity to help reconnect our civic culture. They just need a little help. ### Congestion Pricing Across America URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/congestion-pricing-across-america/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:00.000Z Congestion pricing in New York City [has been a clear success](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/05/11/upshot/congestion-pricing.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Traffic is down, public transit commutes are up, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority is raising substantial revenue to modernize transit ([over $215 million in the first four months](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-28/nyc-congestion-toll-brings-in-216-million-in-first-four-months?utm%5Fsource=website&utm%5Fmedium=share&utm%5Fcampaign=twitter)) and even car accidents have seen decline. And contrary to the predictions of skeptics, congestion pricing [has not slowed workers' return to the office](https://www.placer.ai/anchor/articles/placer-ai-april-2025-office-index-recovery-apace?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — which actually appears stronger in New York than in other cities. So far, congestion pricing has also held up in the courts —[ with a federal judge this week ruling the program could stay in place, for now](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/05/28/federal-judge-blocks-trump-administration-efforts-to-stop-congestion-pricing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), despite federal attempts to cancel the program. The success of this approach should pave the way for the adoption of congestion pricing in many more traffic-choked metro areas across the country. As cities around the country struggle with sluggish transit use, fiscal challenges and quality of life problems, congestion pricing is one policy that can help revive downtown areas. > NYC's success should spur more cities to adopt congestion pricing. Here are a few zones which might work [pic.twitter.com/y507X87PSD](https://t.co/y507X87PSD?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)— Arpit Gupta (@arpitrage) [May 22, 2025](https://twitter.com/arpitrage/status/1925554974903226696?ref%5Fsrc=twsrc%5Etfw&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Let's start with the obvious problem targeted by congestion pricing: auto traffic. Despite the impact of remote work in reducing some office commutes, cities have seen traffic come roaring back in the postpandemic years. Even San Francisco, the poster child for postpandemic sluggishness, [has seen traffic volumes return to prepandemic levels](https://www.sfchronicle.com/sf/article/s-f-rush-hour-traffic-at-prepandemic-levels-20331278.php?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In part, this is due to new commutes and trips across the metropolitan area — many of them longer than before — which result in congestion and pollution concentrated in metropolitan cores. The flip side of high auto traffic is weak public transit usage. [Cities across the country have struggled to revive their public transit systems](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ensuring-the-intertwined-post-pandemic-recoveries-of-downtowns-and-transit-systems/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and are even facing fiscal cliffs in coming years as postpandemic support dries up. The fundamental risk is a "death spiral" of transit usage: unless new funding sources can be developed, transit systems will have to cut back on operations, which will further drive down usage. Congestion pricing corrects this dynamic in two ways. First, by creating a financial incentive for commuters to take transit over driving, congestion pricing can help drive further increases in transit usage. Systems with more riders typically see lower levels of disorder and crime, because "eyes on the street," or in this case, on the train and platforms, discourage bad behavior. Second, the funding generated by congestion pricing can be directly applied to transit improvements, as New York City is doing. Many transit networks across the country have seen that such improvements — for instance, the electrification of Caltrain — also help draw more commuters into the system. Congestion pricing revenue, if wisely spent, can provide a fiscal boost for these transit systems. Such resources are especially essential in today's broader fiscal environment. Urban grants of a variety of forms are drying up, and cities are facing growing pressures in their traditional revenue streams due to the population losses they experienced over the pandemic; the loss in value of office buildings in which remote work has reduced occupancy; and new cutbacks in immigration, a traditional source of new residents for cities. Cities like Chicago are [facing municipal downgrades](https://www.chicagobusiness.com/politics/fitch-gives-chicago-negative-credit-outlook?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), while cities like [Los Angeles](https://abc7.com/post/la-faces-1-billion-budget-shortfall-what-led-financial-mess/16225012/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [San Francisco](https://www.spur.org/news/2025-05-02/balancing-san-franciscos-budget-part-1-budget-process?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) face substantial budget deficits. Together with co-authors, I have referred to these challenges as potential catalysts for an "urban doom loop" if cities are not able to effectively manage them. > As cities around the country struggle with sluggish transit use, fiscal challenges and quality of life problems, congestion pricing is one policy that can help revive downtown areas. Congestion pricing — which taxes problems like pollution, which harm society, and uses the revenue to maintain essential services — is a far more appealing source of funding than most other sources, like income or sales taxes, which may trigger broader population outflows and cost-of-living concerns. How would it work? Cities across the country have already considered congestion pricing as an option, but were waiting to see New York City's experience. The first basic step for cities like San Francisco or Chicago is to develop an internal consensus that pursuing congestion pricing would be valuable, develop a proposed system and then pursue implementation. However, there are a few basic challenges that cities face in implementing congestion pricing. The first and most obvious one is legal: Cities typically lack the authority to implement congestion pricing. In New York City, this legal authority had to be granted by a vote from the state legislature. Similar efforts should be pursued in other jurisdictions, for which the success of New York can provide a motivation. Yes, federal law prohibits local taxes imposed on these roadways, which is why New York City went through extensive rounds of federal oversight and environmental clearance to implement congestion pricing in its area, which included some federal roads. This approval was ultimately [granted under a pilot program, the approval of which the Trump administration has tried to cancel](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/can-the-usdot-end-mtas-congestion-pricing-system). The Trump administration would most certainly try to stand in the way of other jurisdictions starting their own congestion pricing programs — though the first Trump administration had advocated for user fees. Cities should not be deterred by these legal challenges. Under fiscally strained conditions, it is necessary to find creative sources of revenue that come with limited costs, and congestion pricing is a key example of this. If cities are able to clear these legal hurdles, there are several choices about how congestion pricing should be implemented. Other cities would have to learn from New York City's example. The first basic choice is between a cordon- vs. a region-based method. Cordon-based congestion pricing zones (Stockholm is one example) typically focus on pricing checks through a handful of entry points. These are ideal for urban environments which already have a number of chokepoints (bridges, tunnels, etc.) on which tolls can be deployed. In the region-based approach, as seen in London, cities have to instead deploy a larger number of cameras to capture traffic from a larger number of entry points. The basic trade-off is that cordon-based approaches can be cheaper to deploy and easier to implement; however, they may require a larger congestion pricing zone in order to hit key geographical chokepoints. Region-based approaches can be more targeted to specific congestion pricing areas, but are typically more costly to roll out. New York City has a topography well-suited for a cordon-based approach, but it actually opted for the regional approach, primarily to avoid imposing tolls on the FDR Drive and the West Side Highway. This option presented the benefit of allowing commuters to avoid the congestion pricing zone if they went into Lower Manhattan. However, this design choice then required a large network of cameras and a high operational cost — New York City [spent over $500 million in startup costs, and will spend over $100 million annually in operations](https://www.mta.info/document/91711?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). An alternate strategy in New York could have entailed simply using the existing tolling structure on bridges and tunnels, perhaps adding some tolls on existing free bridges. This would have had the advantage of not requiring federal approval and would have been pretty cheap to implement. However, part of the revenue would then have had to be shared with New Jersey through the Port Authority. Other cities can consider simply adjusting tolls on existing roads and bridges to better manage congestion and traffic, as an existing approach that is easier to implement. > The first basic step for cities like San Francisco or Chicago is to develop an internal consensus that pursuing congestion pricing would be valuable, develop a proposed system and then pursue implementation. Cities would also have to choose how much to toll rideshare services like Uber and Lyft. New York City's approach taxes these rideshare services a relatively small amount (an additional congestion pricing surcharge of $1.50), which [some researchers](https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/effective-equitable-congestion-pricing-new-york-city-beyond?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have suggested may lead to relatively small traffic reductions inside the congestion zone itself, where rideshare trips make up a substantial portion of all traffic. Taxing rideshare closer to parity with ordinary traffic may help to limit the diversion of trips towards rideshare, and many cities (such as Chicago, and New York City before congestion pricing) already charge rideshare congestion charges in certain zones anyway. The other major choice cities face is how to spend congestion pricing revenue. New York City's approach has been to focus the spending on the MTA. This approach will yield important accessibility and transit improvements. However, the scale of these improvements strikes many observers as relatively small given the $15 billion in revenue generated. As has been richly documented, the MTA's spending is poorly controlled. There have been some improvements in this regard — for instance, lower station costs in the Second Avenue Subway expansion and direct-to-platform elevators that avoid a duplicated set of elevators. Still, it is essential for cities to insist on productivity improvements alongside new funding streams. Another key question is where transit investments should be made. Congestion pricing largely ends up taxing commuters coming in from New Jersey, upstate New York and Long Island — places where commuters don't have great transit options already. However, the new transit spending is largely going to the five boroughs, further improving connectivity for residents who typically take public transit anyway. An alternative approach would have been to dedicate more funding towards precisely the residents who would be most impacted by congestion pricing — focusing on additional transit improvements in buses, New Jersey Transit, Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North. The patchwork nature of local governance across multiple and competing entities is a challenge here — and would surely be so in other cities trying to implement a congestion pricing program. There are few easy fixes to urban governance, but congestion pricing is the rare policy that can simultaneously fix a big problem while raising revenue. As cities nationwide grapple with fiscal pressures, declining transit ridership and the need to revitalize urban cores, New York City's success with the policy should inspire cities around the country to adopt it. ### Avoiding the Jetsons Fallacy: AI and the Future of the City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/ai-and-the-future-of-cities/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:00.000Z Call it the Jetsons Fallacy. In the animated TV series "The Jetsons," the world of the future was one in which technology was different, but the economic and social order of mid-20th-century America was unchanged. The Jetsons were a single-earner family with a father who worked for an industrial company and a mother who was a homemaker, helped with the housework by a robot maid. The family's single flying car was used to commute from a high-rise apartment to the job site, shopping malls and schools, all of which were similar to those of the 1950s and 1960s, apart from being raised high above the earth on stilts. Even the architecture was that of the would-be "futuristic" [Googie](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/googie-architecture-of-the-space-age-122837470/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) style that was often used for diners, airports, commercial strips and apartment buildings after World War II. All too often, today's discussions of the possible impact of AI and other innovative technologies on the structure of the city are marred by this same fallacy. For example, too often prognosticators debate the effect that self-driving cars might have on commuting, while assuming that the locations of production and residence will remain unchanged. But we know from the history of the industrial era in the last two-and-a-half centuries that major changes in technology lead to the radical restructuring of urban patterns, by altering where goods and services are produced and where workers, managers and capitalists live, shop and are entertained. During the millennia of the agrarian economy that preceded the beginnings of industrialization in the 18th and 19th centuries, both production sites and dwellings were decentralized. Most people in agrarian societies were farm laborers — enslaved, free or subject to feudal overlords. They or nearby village craftsmen produced most of the tools and clothes and other items they needed at the local level. Long-distance trade was limited to luxury goods for the ruling classes who for the most part derived their wealth from ownership of land or labor. The only large cities in agrarian civilizations were ceremonial centers around palaces or temples and a few major port cities that specialized in trade. **The impact of industrialization** This pattern changed dramatically with the first wave of industrialization, based on steam-powered factories. Agglomerations of factories sprang up in places like Manchester and Pittsburgh that were near coal deposits or canals or railroads or ports that could bring coal to power steam engines. Pistons, pulleys and belts allowed factories to rise vertically. The children of farm families streamed in from the countryside to become wage workers. They lived in crowded vertical tenements near the vertical factories, warehouses and shops where they worked, often in miserable conditions for low pay. For the first — and perhaps the last — time in history, material production was concentrated in cities which, by earlier standards, were gigantic. But the heyday of the densely crowded factory city was brief. Even in the steam era, trolleys and commuter trains allowed the well-to-do and some workers to escape from crowded conditions to homes in green suburbs that ringed the factory towns. Decentralization accelerated during the second industrial revolution, based on the internal combustion engine and electricity. Once grid-distributed electric power replaced on-site coal-powered steam engines, industrial plants no longer needed to be located near canals or railroads that could deliver coal. Factories could now be built on cheap former farmland. Electric conveyor belts replaced vertical pistons and pulleys, enabling vast one-story factories to replace the vertical factories of the steam era. Trucks replaced railroads in taking products to warehouses and markets. > Each wave of innovation since the second industrial era has tended to further decentralize work and home. Widespread car ownership allowed the masses as well as the classes to escape from filthy, crowded tenements to suburban single-family homes and low-density apartment complexes. Thanks to automobility, ordinary people as well as elites could live in one place, work in another and shop elsewhere. Shopping malls and commercial strips alongside parking lots sprang up at highway intersections. Thanks to radio and television, entertainment moved partly into the suburban home. **The factory city gives way to the managerial city** As industrial production moved out of the cities, the factory city gave way to the managerial city. Downtowns specialized in administrative services. Large corporations with production sites across the country, coordinated by telephone and by occasional visits by head-office managers making airline trips, sometimes moved their national headquarters to a few big cities like New York and Chicago. Downtown office buildings contained floor after floor of mostly male middle managers and almost entirely female typists and clerks, producing paperwork for bureaucratic corporations, government agencies and nonprofits. The downtowns filled up and emptied each day, as managers and clerks and support staff commuted to and from the suburbs. Nostalgic for steam-era neighborhoods in which work, residences and shopping were accessible by foot or by trolley, many intellectuals after World War II denounced "sprawl" as dehumanizing and ugly. But suburbia was less dehumanizing to working-class families than crowded, filthy tenement neighborhoods had been. And the aesthetic preferences of some urbanist thinkers for dense cities could not overcome the cost savings of decentralization to businesses and workers alike. The first wave of the information revolution, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, led to the latest transformation of the city. The legions of typists and bookkeepers and their supervisors have vanished, replaced by laptops and software, or by workers in foreign countries to whom office services have been offshored, thanks to the Internet and wireless telephony and satellite communications. Some major corporations, law firms and accounting firms still pay top dollar for trophy buildings in the downtowns of major cities like New York and San Francisco. But most businesses, like most workers, have moved to the suburbs. > Just as the factory city gave way to the managerial city, so the managerial city is being replaced by the amenity city. The development of artificial intelligence (AI) can be viewed as the second information revolution, following the earlier development of computers and the Internet. AI and robotics promise to wipe out routine labor, both physical and intellectual. Even if some lost manufacturing is reshored in the U.S., reversing the trend of offshoring, the new factories are likely to be highly automated and sited on cheap rural land. AI may decimate the two traditional bases of the middle class — small business owners and professionals. The retail sector may undergo mass extinction, as autonomous wheeled or flying "motherships" and last-mile drones increase the ability of consumers to order products for home delivery. Professions that depend on access to codified knowledge, like the legal and medical and academic professions, are likely to be replaced in part by AI, with the jobs of practitioners redefined as tasks that only human beings can do. Many, if not most of the professionals who survive the culling of their fields by AI in the long run will probably be allowed to telecommute from home offices, because the cost of paying for downtown or suburban office buildings refilled and then emptied again by commuting workers each weekday will outweigh the dubious benefits. **The rise of the amenity city** Just as the factory city gave way to the managerial city, so the managerial city is being replaced by the amenity city. A few major corporations will keep offices downtown for reasons of status. But successful post-managerial downtowns are being transformed by gentrification into residential neighborhoods for the rich and vacation sites for tourists. The needs of the downtown rich and tourists are catered to by workers who provide amenity services — workers who themselves often must commute long distances to and from suburbs and exurbs, because they cannot afford to live downtown. The development of safe self-driving cars may lead to the extinction of passenger rail and commuter bus transit, except in a few dense downtowns and airports. Whether autonomous vehicles are personally owned or rented from companies like Uber and Lyft, most lower-income as well as affluent commuters are likely to prefer personal point-to-point transit to mass transit with fixed routes shared with strangers. Freed from the need to steer cars themselves, and able to spend commuting time working or talking to others or being entertained, people may tolerate longer commutes, with the result being even greater distance between home and workplace, where local geography permits. For some workers, particularly those in the expanding health care and elder care trades, the AI-infused vehicle may become a traveling hospital or workshop. The present pattern in which ambulances ferry patients to hospitals might be partly replaced by one in which emergency service vehicles, linked to hospitals, can perform many tests or limited surgery at the patient's home. And tomorrow's highways and streets may be full of the vans of plumbers, HVAC repair workers, physical therapists and others who have to travel to work in the homes or offices of their clients. The future will hold surprises, as always. But the concentration of production and dwellings in dense steam-era factory cities was a historical fluke. Each wave of innovation since the second industrial era of automobiles, airplanes and electricity has tended to further decentralize work and home. AI is likely to continue the trend. To expect the patterns of today's cities and occupations to be frozen or reversed, while technological advances are limited to vehicles and appliances, is to repeat the mistake of many of yesterday's futurists — to commit the Jetsons Fallacy. ### The Essential Role of Judges in the Effort to Close Rikers Island URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-essential-role-of-judges-in-the-effort-to-close-rikers-island/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:00.000Z Rikers Island has been the subject of considerable public attention and concern in recent years. Dangerous and often inhumane conditions plague the notorious jail complex, leading an [independent blue-ribbon commission](https://www.morejustnyc.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to recommend that it be scrapped and replaced by several smaller, decentralized jails throughout the city. That plan has been endorsed and accepted by two successive mayoral administrations. Meanwhile, in response to rising violence against Rikers inmates and jail staff, the federal judge handling a lawsuit brought to address these conditions has now ruled that she will wrest control of the facility from the City and [appoint a "receiver" to run the jail](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/can-a-receiver-bring-enduring-change-for-the-better). The great majority of individuals held on Rikers Island are charged with violent crimes, and they are being detained there pending resolution of their cases because they are unable to make bail or have been "remanded" without the option of bail. The size of this group is a crucially important element in any effort to reform New York City's jail system. The plan to replace Rikers with four smaller local facilities, for example, is premised on a maximum total inmate population of 4,160 — a number that would be politically difficult, if not impossible, to increase. Yet the current Rikers population is [currently more than 7,000](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/13/nyregion/rikers-island-receiver-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The overwhelming number of these individuals are not only charged with violent crimes but have a history of serious violence, making it extremely challenging to control jail violence, be it by the existing Rikers management or by the receiver the federal court will now be appointing. This grim reality underscores the pivotal role of the judges who are responsible for deciding whether individuals charged with bail-eligible offenses will be released or detained at Rikers pending resolution of their cases. While bail rulings made every day by judges directly impact the size of the Rikers population, it is important to understand that judges, in making these determinations, are constrained by statutorily prescribed factors that call for complex, case-by-case analyses. The statutory factors do not include whether the bail ruling will impact jail populations, and therefore, judges do not factor that criterion into their determinations. Nonetheless, there is much the New York courts can do to help mitigate the circumstances plaguing the continued detention of inmates at Rikers Island. It starts with efficient case management — one of the court system's core responsibilities. Court leaders are empowered to implement measures that ensure speedier resolution of pending cases in order to avoid prolonged pretrial detention. Perhaps the most far-reaching effort in recent years of this nature was the comprehensive program announced by former New York Chief Judge Janet DiFiore when she took office in early 2016\. Dubbed [the "Excellence Initiative,"](https://nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/publications/pdfs/20%5FSOJ-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) this program was a systemwide focus on speeding case management, eliminating backlogs and delays, increasing productivity and improving court services. As Chief Administrative Judge, I oversaw the day-to-day operations of this program. Over the four-year period from 2016 through 2019, just before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the program substantially reduced, and in some instances even eliminated, backlogs and delays for all case types, including the felony-level courts in New York City. > Judges, in making bail determinations, are constrained by statutorily-prescribed factors — factors that do not include whether the bail ruling will impact jail populations. So what precisely was done? While the steps taken were relatively simple, they added up to something significant. We prioritized leadership, data collection and analysis, and accountability. We developed sophisticated case management dashboards that displayed up-to-the-minute data on the status of all cases, enabling judges to better manage and control their individual case inventories. The mindset was simple: "what gets measured gets addressed," with particular emphasis on managing and resolving older cases. The data on individual judges' case inventories as well as aggregated court-wide data for individual courts were shared on a weekly basis with the administrative judges who supervise New York's courts at the county and local levels. Senior court leaders met regularly with administrative judges, both individually and as a group, to review the data, identify problems causing backlogs and delays and develop strategies and solutions to eliminate roadblocks. Administrative judges in turn met with individual judges on a regular basis to review their caseloads, reinforce goals and discuss how to continue making progress. In addition to the Excellence Initiative's systemic focus on case management, more localized programs were implemented to address backlogs. In New York City's boroughs, individual judges or small groups of judges recognized as especially experienced and skillful in facilitating case settlements were assigned to resolve the system's oldest cases. Prosecutors and defense counsel were informed that any cases that could not be settled would be assigned for immediate trial. This measure quickly resolved many hundreds of the city's oldest felony cases, demonstrating — perhaps counterintuitively — that backlogs of older cases can be substantially reduced without necessarily increasing the number of trials. In fact, it strongly suggested that the *threat* of an immediate trial is often as effective as an actual trial in resolving older cases. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was clear that strong, focused leadership at the highest levels of the court system is essential to eliminating backlogs and delays. From the chief judge and on down the leadership ladder, great pains were taken to explain and prioritize the goals of the Excellence Initiative to judges, the bar, other justice system stakeholders and the public. > The threatof an immediate trial is often as effective as an actual trial in resolving older cases. The challenges attendant to the closing of Rikers Island are many. Central to the success of the City's plan is the prompt resolution of pending cases that linger and often cause individuals to be detained in pretrial custody for years before they are moved off the Island. Effective operational steps implemented under the Excellence Initiative produced undeniably positive results. In the four-year period leading up to 2020, the overall number of pending felony cases was reduced by one-quarter. The number of older cases (*i.e.,* older than six months) — the more important number because it included many of the cases pending against individuals detained at Rikers — [declined by nearly 40%](https://nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/publications/pdfs/20%5FSOJ-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).There is every reason to conclude that had the pandemic not struck, causing many court operations to be curtailed for over two years, the Excellence Initiative would have continued to produce reductions of the felony case backlog and, as a consequence, continued to reduce the number of detainees on Rikers. It is no coincidence that the detainee population on Rikers was nearly cut in half during the course of the program's run from 2016 to early 2020\. Effective management works. The Excellence Initiative was not a complicated program; it was labor-intensive, but it was not complex. For the most part, it was carried out with existing resources, and little to no additional expenses. It required a sustained focus on collection and careful consideration of detailed caseload data. And it required strong leadership and accountability — not only on the part of judicial leaders and supervisors but on the part of individual judges assigned to handle these cases. Rikers Island presents some of the greatest challenges in our city's criminal justice system. The courts have an important role to play in helping resolve some of those problems and in supporting the City in finally realizing its plan to shut down the facility. Court leadership should strongly consider the re-institution of the most effective features of the Excellence Initiative, especially with regard to Rikers cases. There is much to be learned from the successes of the recent past, and we ignore those lessons at our peril. The courts have demonstrated that they can step up when needed to. Now is one of those times. ### Ross Barkan on Who's Not Running and Why URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/ross-barkan-on-whos-not-running-and-why/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:33.000Z *Why don't more businesspeople run for mayor of America's biggest city? Host Jamie Rubin and political commentator Ross Barkan discuss who's not on the ballot in the 2025 mayoral race and why. They analyze Mike Bloomberg's formula for political and managerial success while dissecting former Gov. Andrew Cuomo's comeback attempt. In a thought experiment, they game out exactly how a wealthy outsider might spend $100 million to capture City Hall in a wide-open race. And Barkan delivers a brutal assessment: The current mayor, he estimates, has a 5% chance of survival in what may be the most consequential election in decades.* *You can listen to this episode, "Ross Barkan on Who's Not Running and Why," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ross-barkan-on-whos-not-running-and-why/id1794619189?i=1000709216089&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/77TW8ilo4ePqvyI3g6lfob?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* **Jamie:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. **Molly:** Jamie, how are you? **Jamie:** Chaotic is what I would say. The president decided to come out with his so-called "skinny budget" last week. Somebody I know called it a "performative budget," which I think is a funny term. It lays out the president's hopes and dreams for what he can do to everything that the government does overall. For both my day job, which involves clean energy investing, and my night job, which involves New York City's public housing, there is potentially a lot of extremely difficult news in there. A lot of time now has to be spent figuring out what it is, anticipating, talking to other people who are similarly situated, and gearing up to be helpful — if at all possible — in the effort to negotiate something that's much better. **Molly:** Trump is, at least in theory, a businessman. **Jamie:** Mm-hmm. **Molly:** A successful businessman, in his telling of the story. **Jamie:** Sure. **Molly:** Is he wielding some business-y tactics here with this "skinny budget"? **Jamie:** I think it's less a question of whether he's doing something "business-y." The more interesting question may be, "What does it mean that we have a businessman, or alleged businessman, in that role?" By the way, we've got them in a lot of other roles in his administration—a lot of alleged businessmen. That means something quite different for the country than when you have technocrats or former elected officials or anything else that we've had in our history. It begs the question, how come it hasn't happened more often? **Molly:** Why do you think it hasn't happened more often? **Jamie:** Politically it's just very hard for business people who've never been in elected politics to craft a message that appeals to more people than some very, very small minority who think that business people know everything. Most people think that business people should stay in their lane, and they may well be right. Mike Bloomberg tried it in 2020 that didn't go all that well, and he had been elected before. It's just a very hard thing to run a presidential campaign successfully. **Molly:** Well, let's talk about the New York City mayoral campaign, because Bloomberg was, many would say, a very successful mayor using his business acumen. **Jamie:** I think they would say that, and that's what we're going to spend some time talking with journalist Ross Barkan about in this episode. Ross is a very well-known New York City-based journalist. He started his career at the Queens Tribune. He went to the late, lamented New York Observer. I think it's late — certainly it's lamented. It was famously once owned by Jared Kushner. Ross covered city and national politics for The Observer, and he's now writing for a lot of different outlets including New York Magazine, The Guardian and The Nation. He's written three novels, the most recent of which — "Glass Century" — just came out. He wrote a book back in 2021 that was about Andrew Cuomo, so that's also timely. I think it's being reissued just in time for the primaries. It's called "The Prince," and it followed the rise and fall of Andrew from basically the time he was elected governor until the period of the pandemic. **Molly:** Jamie, you really wanted to talk about this idea of business people running for elected office, especially in New York. How come? **Jamie:** It was interesting to me looking at the field of candidates that we have in the mayoral primaries, including on the Republican side. Why is it that despite, as you said, the fact that the last business person that we had in office was pretty much a raging success, that we haven't had anything like that since? We haven't had a serious business person as a candidate, let alone a mayor. **Molly:** Well, let's hope Ross can help us figure this out. **Jamie:** The operative question that got me here was this issue of: why is it that we don't have more business people running for mayor, and then being mayor, which I think is kind of interesting. **Ross:** Yeah. It's a very unusual mayoral race. We'll start there. It's not technically an open race, but it basically is an open race because of Eric Adams and all his legal troubles. **Jamie:** Alleged legal troubles. **Ross:** Alleged. The closest analogue is probably 1977, with Abe Beame, where he was also getting challenged by a Cuomo. But Beame was in the Democratic primary, and of course, Eric Adams has now left it. Even though Beame was so besieged by the fiscal crisis, he was in a stronger position than Adams is now. I mean, Adams has cratered totally. I think what's interesting about this field versus past ones is that there are a lot of people who on paper could be formidable candidates but have no interest in running. **Jamie:** So let's tick 'em off. Ritchie Torres. **Ross:** Ritchie Torres, right. No interest. Would be an obvious candidate, but is passing to possibly run for governor. I actually told him, "It's easier for you to run for mayor than to run for governor against Kathy Hochul." He doesn't seem to think that. Running statewide is very challenging, obviously. And Hochul, you know, has middling approval ratings, but she's not scandal-scarred. She's not cratering by any means. That's gonna be a bloody race for him, but he has no interest in running for mayor. **Jamie:** Alright, so, uh, Dan Goldman. **Ross:** Another one! There is an era where someone like Goldman's running for mayor. Absolutely. I think some of it is the nationalization of politics. I've written about this before, where the spotlight and the glory now is sitting in Congress and not going through New York City. Someone like Goldman, big off the Trump impeachment — he is not thinking about running a city of 8.5 million people. **Jamie:** AOC? **Ross:** Another one! That's what Bella Abzug was, right? I mean, Bella, in some ways, was the more accomplished AOC. She was a significant historical figure. AOC of course is mulling the presidency, mulling a Senate race. Being mayor of New York City in your thirties would be massive, but no interest, zero interest. **Jamie:** First woman mayor. **Ross:** First woman mayor. I mean, she'd be formidable if she ran for mayor. In a way, it's much more winnable than winning a Democratic primary for president for her age. **Jamie:** You said nationalization, which I think is probably right. That begs the question: what kind of person wants to be the standard-bearer for some national thing? **Ross:** With the mayor of New York City, you are of course a national figure. It's an incredibly demanding job and I have a theory that if you think of the way social media is now how you get attention — it is those national issues and those members of Congress who are able to seize public attention. And also, it's easier. The reality is that being a legislator — it's not a walk in the park, but let's be honest — you're taking votes in a body of 435 people versus being the executive of the largest police department in America by far, the largest education department by far. \[As mayor\], you are making decisions that people live and die by. You can sit in Congress for 30 years and not do all that much. **Jamie:** I don't know if people still talk about this, but the mayor of New York used to be called the second most powerful job in America. **Ross:** Second hardest. **Jamie:** Second hardest for sure, but also the most powerful. It's very powerful. You have a bully pulpit. **Ross:** And it still is. And I think it's getting underrated. And this is a challenging time to be mayor of New York City. But when was it easy? Any era. You could say when De Blasio took over from Bloomberg, it was probably in retrospect a peachier time, in terms of very low crime, good fiscal situation. But still. When I covered his first year as mayor, he had Eric Garner. He had two cops assassinated. It was non-stop crises. The difference between being a mayor and being a member of Congress is that when a cop gets killed, you have to go talk to that family and you have to be everywhere and you are responsible for almost everything. There's no off switch if you're doing it correctly. That's one of many of Eric Adams' problems: he never took the job that seriously and New Yorkers wised up to him. I think it's a credit to the electorate that Adams' showmanship was never enough. **Jamie:** So let's go back to your original point about the mayoral field. Your view is that in theory, this is a deep mayoral field. You've got people with experience. **Ross:** And then talented. Disclosure, I'm friends with Zohran Mamdani, but I would say objectively he's very talented. I have great respect for him. But also, he's a 33-year-old state assemblyman. Even the fact that he's maxed out and he's polling at like 16%, which is incredible given what I just said — as he rises in the polls and voters start to think about this race very seriously, some will think, can a 33-year-old state legislator run my city? Some will say yes, and some will say no. **Jamie:** I mean, it's 200,000 city employees, or however many it is, and a $120 billion budget. Workers in every corner of the city. Massive issues of every kind. It's every managerial issue you can possibly imagine. Why would you think that somebody who's never run anything should be given that job? It's a crazy thought, objectively. Doesn't mean nobody can do it. **Ross:** I think that the good faith argument for someone like Zohran would be if you put a talented person in place, they'll delegate. I think that's something that Bloomberg did very well. Obviously Bloomberg had massive, great executive experience running a company and becoming a billionaire, but I think what made Bloomberg on the balance a good mayor was his willingness to bring in smart people and trust them to do things. **Jamie:** As far as I can tell, every candidate gives some indication that that's how they wanna do things: "I want to hire good people and delegate." But the problem with the Bloomberg model is it assumes that the delegation is kind of easy. I've been in the business world for 30-some-odd years. Delegating is really hard. Particularly if you're suddenly the mayor of New York City. The temptation is, "I'd love to do all this stuff." You can't, and you shouldn't. The real trick is to figure out how the delegation ought to work, and there's no reason to think that some 33 year old knows how to do that. **Ross:** Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas at 32, so you never know. **Jamie:** One of one. With all that said — all things being equal — if you said to me, "Okay, I want to find somebody who knows how to run a big, complicated organization; knows how to delegate and attract talent and deal with talent." I would've said, "The private sector is a pretty good place to start." And yet, except for Bloomberg, that is never what the city of New York has done. We've never elected anybody like that. We've never really taken anybody like that seriously. Anybody who's tried has been sort of dismissed. I think about the 2021 election. We had Ray McGuire. Ray was written off. I would've thought that in New York, of all places, there's fertile ground for this. What's the issue? **Ross:** There's a two part question. One is: Why don't voters choose them? But also: Why aren't there more Bloombergs? Why aren't there more people as wealthy as Bloomberg? You have to start there. If you want to run for mayor as a businessperson, with no political experience and no political base and no real name recognition, you're starting from zero. **Jamie:** Zero. **Ross:** Like if one of us ran for mayor. **Jamie:** Well, not me. **Ross:** \[laughs\] Not you. Yeah. You have not cultivated that base in any way, which politicians do. It's hard. It's very hard to do. You need to spend a lot of money. I don't think the wealthy realize Bloomberg spent a lot of money to win. It wasn't just that, but if you look back to 2001 against Mark Green, I think he spent over $50 million, and that was in 2001 money. By '09, to beat \[Bill\] Thompson, he'd spent over a hundred million. I think that New Yorkers are open to the businessman or businesswoman running and succeeding, but that sort of candidate must get their name out there. The average New Yorker probably barely knew about Ray McGuire when that race was over. **Jamie:** Oh, I'm sure. That's right. Let's think about who credibly could do this. Could Jamie Diamond run for mayor? **Ross:** Probably not in a Democratic primary. Someone like Jamie Diamond would have to run it as a Republican or independent. I'll give you a scenario. If someone like Michael Bloomberg — obviously a little younger, he is in his eighties now — some 60-year-old billionaire with some reputation of managing things, says, "I'm going to run as an independent for mayor in 2025," and someone like Andrew Cuomo wins the nomination, or someone like Zohran wins the nomination, an independent who self funds like Bloomberg did would be very interesting in the general election. Either against a Cuomo or against a Zohran. Not saying they would win, but if you took a Bloomberg-like person who spent $50 million in November against Curtis Sliwa and a sort of polarizing democratic nominee, it's possible. I think there's a window there. **Jamie:** So here's what we're gonna do. **Ross:** That's a competition. **Jamie:** Congratulations. It's an alternative universe. You are now Ross Barkan, but with a billion dollars. You get in, you get the signatures, and you are good to go. Cool. First question: You have a hundred million dollars you're going to spend in October and November. How are you spending it? **Ross:** I would be spending a lot on TV for sure. I would have a paid field operation, because I'd be able to afford it. I'd be sending mail too. Why not? If you have the money, you can do all of it. I would do TV, mail, paid field, but I would have a strong message. I think Bloomberg, to his credit, wasn't just a rich guy. He had the right message, especially after 9/11, when people were looking for a manager. In some ways, they're looking for a manager again. I think to an extent, you know, Cuomo is great name recognition, but look, he was governor for 11 years. I think people do care about that. **Jamie:** Okay. So what's your message, given what you've seen out there? **Ross:** My message would be that I can manage the city; I can fix the city; I'm not corrupt. I'm an outsider. Look at the polarizing democratic nominee — Cuomo or anyone — they're gonna fail you. Point out all their failures. The Republican, it's Curtis Sliwa. Reality is, he's not going to matter. I would be a sort of Bloombergian style technocratic message with a little heart: we're going to get New York back to where it is. I think that's the kind of message I would run as a wealthy outsider, and I think that could succeed if I had a hundred million dollars. **Jamie:** And you don't think that the simple fact of your being a rich person turns off so many electoral voters? **Ross:** No doubt it would be hard. There are prime Democrats who will not vote for a rich outsider. But there's a segment of the Democratic electorate that has Bloomberg nostalgia. I think you have to play to that. **Jamie:** Oh, absolutely. If you had a hundred million then you'd be flooding the airways, maybe it wouldn't matter, but I bet you'd get independent expenditure committees coming out of the woodwork. **Ross:** You'd have to overwhelm the way Bloomberg did. You'd have to overwhelm the field and have the message, and I think Bloomberg had the message at the right time, plus the money. **Jamie:** If what you're saying is right, it still flummoxes me that some person hasn't emerged to try to do that. I mean — **Ross:** There's a lot of rich people **Jamie:** — a lot of people who have way more than enough money. Even if we work with the assumption that you've gotta have a billion dollars, there's plenty of them. You're talking about five months. It's not even that much time out of your life. If it doesn't work out, you can just go back to doing whatever you were doing. You hire everybody you can possibly hire. You're not gonna get unions, I guess. **Ross:** Probably not. **Jamie:** What other blocks do you think you could count on? **Ross:** I don't think there's any endorser block. You would get individual electeds. I don't think organizations would come to you. I think you'd have to be pulling certain politicians. Once Bloomberg was mayor, he could pull unions too. That's the key. If you're an incumbent, there are lots of things you can do. I think it'd be hard to get organizational buy-in. You'd be picking off individual elected officials, which is possible. If there are enough polls and enough momentum, anyone will flip. They all want to be on the winning side. **Jamie:** I would say, I spent a lot of time with Andrew Yang. I helped oversee the policy work for Yang, because my friend Bradley Tusk ran the campaign. **Ross:** Andrew's a very nice guy. **Jamie:** He's a very nice guy. He came in with very high name recognition. **Ross:** He did. **Jamie:** And he was winning. Out of the gate, he was the leader. Not a business guy, but he was as close as you were going to get. That was sort of a model for this. He had all that stuff lined up and it just didn't work. **Ross:** He struggled with college-educated and high-information voters. He couldn't quite get the buy-in from them. That part of the electorate actually is getting bigger and bigger. **Jamie:** That's interesting, let's stick with that for one second. **Ross:** The college educated voters are a bigger and bigger share of the New York City electorate, certainly Democratic primary, but I think in general. We are not, for a variety of reasons, a working-class city the way we used to be. Whereas nationally you could say, "The Democrats' problem is they're too college educated in New York City." You can win off a college educated vote. Eric Adams won, and the basic takeaway of that race is that the working class won. But really, if you went down deep into that race and looked at the numbers, Garcia would've really won if she had just started earlier, been a little more aggressive, not surged too late. The working class barely held on. The college educated vote — if you look between Manhattan and Brooklyn alone, and then the gentrifying parts of Queens — it's quite formidable. **Jamie:** It seems to me the most obvious way to win is to just expand the electorate. If all you're working with is a small slice of the population, figure out where the biggest next group of population is and go for them. **Ross:** I think going after college educateds — they're voting. There's just more of them coming in with each cycle. I'll give the example of the "gentrifier vote," which in 2013 wasn't that significant. De Blasio won an overwhelming primary victory. I always use the example of Jamaica versus Astoria. In 2013, Jamaica was outvoting Astoria; in 2021, Astoria is out voting Jamaica. That is the rise of the gentrifier, college educated vote. **Jamie:** And they're voting for who? You think Garcia ultimately? **Ross:** They were probably more Maya Wiley, but some Garcias too. Brownstone Brooklyn definitely was for Garcia. I think Zohran's strength will be that his base is going to be a high turnout base. Will it be enough to win? Probably not. But Western Queens, Northern Brooklyn. brownstone Brooklyn — trickier for someone like Zohran. **Jamie:** I don't think that's Andrew. **Ross:** No, I think Cuomo and will live or die, honestly, on white college educated voters. I think he is strong with the Black and Latino working class in the way Eric Adams was. Adrienne Adams is not really, at least as now, pulling them away from Cuomo. But the white college educated voter in Manhattan and in Brooklyn will be very crucial in this election. **Jamie:** I just keep coming back to this question. If you had a hundred million of pocket money. Let's say, instead of right this very second, it was two years ago. It wouldn't be that hard to imagine that you hire somebody smart and say, "By May of 2025 I have to be somewhat known and not hated. What do I do?" I don't know what the answer is, but it has to be doable. Don't be a bad person; don't get in a lot of trouble; do some vaguely public spirited stuff; get your name out there. And there's a whole digital world that you can figure out how to do. How hard can it be? **Ross:** I have a theory. It's a theory — it's not backed up in hard data. It's how I feel. I think the rich in New York City are less civically engaged than they used to be. If you go back to the 1960s and '70s, there was a contingent of wealthy people who wanted to be involved with New York City. You think of the Rockefellers: they could do anything and Nelson wants to be governor. It felt like there was a certain noblesse oblige in that era that has been lost. I don't have data points for that. Looking at Bloomberg: like him or hate him, he was earnest about wanting to make a difference in New York City. My sense is that there are fewer and fewer extremely wealthy people who are earnest about wanting to improve the lives of New Yorkers that care about, oh, I want to create new parks; I want to fix the schools; I want to manage the police department. It feels like the rich — they're very international. They're very in and out with New York. They want to be in New York. They view it as a luxury item and get property here. But do they want to get in the muck of New York City? I don't know if extremely wealthy people, high net worth individuals want to do it today and subject themselves to media scrutiny. Because once you run for office, yes, people will poke around. Yes, there's going to be leaks. Yes, it's going to get harder for your personal life. Do you want to go through that? I don't know that many rich people, but my sense is that they don't. They don't want to bother. Whereas Bloomberg did; Bloomberg wanted to bother. **Jamie:** Do you feel like you want to meet more rich people? Is that what this really is? **Ross:** Maybe I should. Yeah. I have to take a census. Yeah, if I had a billion dollars or three, I wouldn't want to be mayor. I think a lot of them don't. They figure, "I'll just manage my money and travel the world and go between London and New York and Shanghai," and that's it. **Jamie:** There's a lot to that. Now the problem with that is, who is the richest person we all know who has decided that he needs to get into public life desperately? It's the president of the United States. **Ross:** Well the thing about Trump is he didn't really self-fund. That's the tell with Trump — that he's not as rich as he claims to be. If he were a real billionaire… Bloomberg, when he ran for president, self-funded. Trump, I think, put in a little money when he ran in 2016, but that was it. He was a small dollar candidate when he was running, which is just funny to say. Now you obviously have big, huge donors donating to him. But Trump was never self-funding. **Jamie:** I think what you're saying about the civic-mindedness of super wealthy people — there's something to that. I think to some extent it's more dispersed. As you said, with David Rockefeller in 1975 in the fiscal crisis, they called three people. They called David Rockefeller and Walter Wriston and somebody else, Felix Rohatyn, and then they would call the president and they would work it out themselves. The world really isn't like that anymore. There's nobody you could do that with in New York City. If we have a fiscal crisis, they can try, but there's not gonna be anybody who says, "Yeah, let me get all the people together and then we'll deal with it." There's tons of rich people who do lots of stuff for New York and they do their own things. It's just a different version of impact — I wouldn't want to get into whether it's better or worse. But the one thing it does not do is it doesn't create a class of people generally who feel like what they really want to do is run for office or be in the public eye. I think we've come to some conclusions about why we don't have businesspeople. I'm gonna make you take a couple of guesses. **Ross:** Sure. **Jamie:** What are the odds that Eric Adams is our next mayor? **Ross:** I mean, you're talking like 5%. **Jamie:** You think that's it? **Ross:** I think it's quite low, yes. I don't see how, as an independent, he has any constituency. I think if there's a Democrat, they'll get his Democratic base, unless it's a very polarizing Democrat. Even there, I think Adams may not qualify for matching funds. He's going to run out of money. I think really 5%, 10% tops. **Jamie:** Alright, so we're done with that. I think we can agree Curtis Sliwa was below that. **Ross:** Yes. I think Sliwa, like Adams, is extremely low. Close to zero. **Jamie:** All right. So tell me, you wrote a book about Andrew Cuomo. **Ross:** I did. It's called "The Prince." It's actually being reprinted. It's just Cuomo now. **Jamie:** Congratulations! **Ross:** They wanted to cash in, yeah. **Jamie:** So, rather than make you speculate about Andrew being mayor, tell me something that you came away from that work thinking about Andrew Cuomo that would be important for somebody to know if they were thinking about whether to vote for him as mayor or not. **Ross:** I don't know if Cuomo can delegate. I think he had talented people in his administration. **Jamie:** Immensely talented people! **Ross:** He did — like you. **Jamie:** There we go! **Ross:** I think the challenge with Cuomo in the COVID era was — for a variety of reasons: look at his health department with [Howard Zucker](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/23/nyregion/howard-zucker-resign-cuomo.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), his [fights](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2020/03/byford-said-cuomo-made-his-job-intolerable/176298/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with \[Andy\] Byford — I have concerns about if he's mayor, will he follow the Bloomberg model of attracting talent and letting them do their thing? Someone like Jessica Tisch is a great example. I think he would keep Tisch. He has a relationship with Merryl Tisch. Would he get jealous of her? Remember with Byford — Byford was the train guy trying to turn around the subway system. After a year, Cuomo throws him out. Would Cuomo say to Jessica Tisch, after a year, "Too much press"? Jessica Tisch gets a profile somewhere, she gets a lot of attention, and he doesn't like it. I think putting everything aside — you know I have criticisms of him — I wonder: Does he earnestly want to run the city of New York or is it about political redemption? And I don't know. That's the thing. He's not talking to the media. He's not really campaigning. We'll see. I'm trying to be open; we'll see. **Jamie:** I would say, if you said to me, "Who of the current candidate crop is the most like a stereotypical CEO?" Based on what you just said and what I know: Andrew Cuomo. Andrew is a big personality. He has a history of being able to track talent and delegate pretty well. He believes in his own decision making powers and is willing to take risks and make decisions. Arguably it's not the Bloomberg model necessarily, but maybe he's the CEO mayor. Without spending a billion dollars. **Ross:** In a way, I want to know what Cuomo's big vision for New York City is right now. If Cuomo has big ideas like Bloomberg did for parks or for transportation, I'm open. I'm not seeing it yet. I want to see him make a strong argument for running the city beyond, "The left is crazy." Because you can win on "the left is crazy"! But if he wins and he's well positioned, being mayor, it is a be-careful-what-you-wish-for a thing now. It's not like being governor. When Cuomo was governor, I covered Cuomo. You could duck in and out of the media scrum. You could not talk to the press for, let's say, a week. When you're a mayor, you're at the center of the universe. He can't do the same things he did as governor as mayor. His approval rating is going to fall very quickly. I think that's something he has to be aware of. You wanna be mayor? Great. You wanna rewrite your obituary? You have your comeback. I get it. Come 2026, you're in the fire now. **Jamie:** Well, unless we see a billionaire step in in the next month or so, we may have a chance to find out. Ross, thanks for doing this. Appreciate it. **Ross:** Thank you for having me. It was fun. **Jamie:** A unifying theme of the conversation with Ross was what it means if New York is becoming a city of the wealthy and a city of everybody else. I think there are a couple of takeaways that tie back into that theme. The first has to do with what the appropriate role of the super wealthy civic elite, if you will, in the life of New York City, and how it has changed over time. And the second is scaling down from the super elite to the merely well-off. Why is it that that group — who demand less from New York City or who need less from New York City government — are still more politically active than people who need the most? Ross and I talked about the role of the civic elite in the civic life of New York City, and we talked a bit about the specific context of the 1975 fiscal crisis. I think the general understanding of what happened during those times is that among other things, very wealthy people stepped up and lent a hand. If you think about what the infrastructure looked like that allowed them to participate in the life of New York back then, some of it was the family foundations that got set up. Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller all played huge roles in New York City, and they served as repositories of expertise. Whether that was right or not, they were definitely people who were knowledgeable and experienced doing that specifically for New York City. That has definitely changed. A lot of those foundations — the biggest ones — have all become truly global in their focus and have abandoned New York City, except tangentially. That is a loss. They went away and left a big air pocket in the understanding of what works and what doesn't work in government and public policy. It's not that folks aren't giving money; it's not that there's less philanthropic activity or civic activity. It's that you have a different sense of where you want to invest for the long term — where you wanna donate your money, what you want to build. In a lot of cases they've just gone from make-money-give-money without a stop in between to say, "Okay, here's how we can do that intelligently and build on knowledge that we already have in place." Ross also talked about voting patterns. He was basically saying when a neighborhood gets, quote, gentrified, it changes the kind of candidate that it votes for — it gets more politically active. I think that's probably accurate and also very understandable and very, very hard to change. I say it's understandable because by definition the people that are gentrifying a neighborhood are probably people that are better off, better educated, and have a lot of positive reinforcement about what voting gets them. Whereas the folks that they're forcing out or the people that are living in other neighborhoods have had a lot of negative reinforcement about what the power structures look like to them. If that's symbolized by, by what a casting a vote means for them, and if they've decided that it kind of doesn't really mean all that much, it's not surprising that they would decline to participate. Government has lots of little decisions every day. Having an influence over those little decisions really makes a huge difference. The people that need more from New York City, the government of New York City, are the people that are in general voting less than they were, than the rest of the city. They should have the most influence. They should be the most aware. They should be the most catered to and they are not. Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### A Rare Remedy to Rikers’ Persistent Brutality URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-rare-remedy-to-the-persistent-brutality-of-rikers/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:00.000Z “Remediation manager” sounds more like a third-rank bureaucrat or elementary school reading specialist than a revolutionary figure. But Judge Laura Taylor Swain’s order Tuesday kicking off the process to appoint such a manager marks a turning point in the horrific history of the city’s jails because of the potent powers of the position. For 10 years, Swain has overseen the federal consent decree that the City signed agreeing to address the then-unconstitutional levels of violence in the jails. But things have gotten worse, not better. Today, [violence so dwarfs the 2015 state of affairs](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-state-of-new-york-citys-jails-year-end-2024) that returning even to those unconstitutional levels seems like a far off dream. Can any one person fix the sprawling problems of Rikers? And does the judge’s order provide the right structure and powers to ensure the “remediation manager” can negotiate the politics of the jails and the city to meet constitutional muster? The answer is far from clear, but the broad powers and the independence of the position offer the last, best option to fix an entrenched problem of long duration. The “manager,” more commonly known in the law as a [“receiver,”](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-is-a-receiver) is a rarely used and powerful remedy that — colloquially, but also as a matter of law — is intended as a last resort. To impose one, a court must show primarily that there is the presence of grave and immediate harm, that nothing short of a receiver will work, and that it is futile to continue to insist on compliance with court orders. A receiver stands in the shoes of the executive — appointing and dismissing personnel, setting budgets and remaking organization charts, even if laws need to be changed and collective bargaining agreements altered. But unlike an executive appointee, the receiver retains its independence because it is appointed by and reports only to the court. And critically, since he or she is intended to be in place until the problem is fixed, the receiver can operate, as a judge does, protected from the political pressures attendant on appointed positions of limited tenure. These features of tenure may not guarantee insulation from the day-to-day buffeting an executive or elected official faces — nothing can do that. But it provides as much room as is possible for a receiver to hold onto the single goal to tend to the well-being of those who live and work in the jails — in this case, the reining in of violence to constitutional standards. It’s not hard to see that part of the reason that courts are chary of imposing this remedy is that it skates in a potentially slippery area between the limits of executive and judicial powers. And it is possible that in this case, the modest name of the position (and unusually, the retention of a commissioner as well as the appointment of the receiver) is a Solomonic gesture to the City, wounded at the stripping of its authority. The history of violence, and the particularly gruesome nature of the record 38 deaths in this mayoralty tell the story of the long and structural failure of the jails: [officers watching as an incarcerated person bleeds out after slitting his own throat with a razo](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/12/nyregion/correction-officers-rikers-ny-prison.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)r; a [captain joking as an incarcerated person hangs himself in front of her](https://nypost.com/2023/03/14/ex-nyc-jail-captain-convicted-of-criminally-negligent-homicide-in-inmate-suicide/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); a person [choking to death on an orange](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/09/nyregion/rikers-deaths-officers.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in an unstaffed unit, as others in the unit bang on the glass for help. Each of these incidents is connected to the failure of management, organization and accountability, and fixing those failures requires, as the monitor has noted, the remaking of the agency. Yet today, accountability for brutality is a joke. Indeed, one deputy commissioner [finally “resigned”](https://www.corrections1.com/jail-management/nyc-correction-training-chief-quits-over-transfers-of-cos-who-sought-selfies-with-mayor?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) last year on the heels of scandals that he had sold settlements cheap in violence cases. The management system became so broken that at one point [a third of the staff wasn’t coming to work](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/nyregion/rikers-guards-sick-leave.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); triple shifts were the norm, leading to exhaustion and violence. This is a conundrum because the city’s jails are one of the most richly staffed in the country or, as the court put it, “overstaffed and underserved.” The lethal ineptitude has been accompanied by contumacious recalcitrance that has ranged from the comic (the failure even now after 10 years to produce an organizational chart of the agency) to the deadly (the failure to produce guidance to officers about how, when and the extent to which they may use force, the motivating and enduring complaint of the suit that led to the consent decree); and now, fatal to City control, the failure to abide by three remedial orders, in addition to the failure to meet the requirements of an “Action Plan” that the City itself devised— all leading to findings of contempt. The incapacity of the agency has also been laced with corruption. The penultimate commissioner, Louis Molina, engaged in an unparalleled campaign of mendacity, with the most egregious incident first hiding from the court-appointed monitor a set of life-altering injuries and two deaths suffered by five incarcerated people, and [then defiantly claiming that he had no obligation to report these events once they were uncovered](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/rikers-hearing-june-2023). At Rikers, a thicket of laws and lore, regulations and culture bind and barnacle decision-making. [Vital City detailed how the organization has been shaped or misshaped](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/why-the-citys-jails-are-broken) through a thousand different deals and handshakes that affect how jobs are handed out, who staffs the most challenging units, when breaks are taken, who gets promoted, who gets disciplined, all of which contribute to the chaos and violence of the institution. The role of the unions in all this is prickly, powerful and not always benign. In the face of these structural and political problems, what can the remediation manager do? Plenty. The tenure and independence of the position will end the start-and-stop and redirection that has been fatal to so many of the jails’ plans to improve conditions. And the broad powers the court has conferred to “control, oversee, supervise and direct all administrative, personnel, financial accounting, contracting, legal and other operational functions” will be essential to fix some of the structural issues that have bedeviled the jails. Although unusually the court has permitted the Correction commissioner to remain alongside the manager, “the manager shall have the authority to direct the Commissioner” to take the steps necessary to effect the course of action determined by the manager. This is a potential trouble spot. The court’s order appears to confer broad authority on the manager, with the commissioner playing a subsidiary role. But the devil is in the details and the operations: What really belongs to the manager and what to the commissioner, and how cumbersome will it be to move swiftly and effectively with this structure? Success will depend entirely on who the receiver is, a choice the court will make after the parties provide a list of candidates at the end of August. The receiver will need to be a person of consummate skill, enormous experience and indisputable gravitas. Although he or she cannot be political, the receiver must have the ability to navigate the political landscape, to negotiate with the unions and the administration and to move with alacrity and effectiveness. The receiver has great power, and he or she needs to build a structure that is remade with the participation of the City so that it will endure and the City can run it when the agency returns to its supervision. That is a steep hill. It is hard to remember a time when the city’s jails have not labored under a consent decree. The court notes six decrees alone that were meant to cure the problems of “excessive force,” the legal nicety that defines the grotesque levels of violence. Through all of these efforts, the City’s response might be summed up in the schoolyard taunt: “Make me.” We will now see whether a receiver, or a remedial manager, can indeed remake the jails. ### Why Does EMS Worker Pay Remain So Lousy? Blame Politics URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-does-ems-worker-pay-remain-so-lousy/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:01.000Z In April 2021, Eric Adams accepted the mayoral endorsement of the city's largest municipal union, District Council 37, and made a pledge that if elected, by his first day on the job he would give the union's Emergency Medical Technicians — who provide medical care to stabilize patients and then transport them to New York City hospitals — salary parity with firefighters. Four years later, not only has he failed to deliver, but the pay gap between the two Fire Department forces has widened. EMTs, who start service at $39,386, reach a top pay after five years of $59,534\. Firefighters start at $54,122, and while they spend five-and-a-half years on the job before climbing the top step on the pay ladder, max out at $105,146\. (The pay scale is higher for the higher level of EMTs who receive nine months of paramedic training and handle advanced life support cases, where those at the entry level provide basic life support. Firefighters undergo 18 weeks of training at the Fire Academy while new EMTs get from 13 to 18 weeks of instruction. There are 4,500 EMTs and officers, compared to 11,000-plus firefighters and officers.) The salary gap has grown increasingly glaring since 9/11, as EMS medical responses have dramatically increased while structural fires have continued their steady decline over the past half-century, from 56,127 in 1975 to about 24,000 in the fiscal year that ended June 30, 2024\. During that fiscal year, the FDNY reported 1,862,151 EMS runs — triple the 619,378 fire-suppression responses. The disparity has grown partly because of the pattern bargaining used by City Hall to control labor costs. It also doesn't help that, in contrast to firefighters, EMTs are working under a contract that expired in 2022 because their unions were so displeased by the city's pay offer in this round of bargaining. And in an extra twist of the knife, EMTs have been forced to accept the same raises as the rest of DC 37's 100,000-plus members under what is known as the civilian bargaining pattern. In contrast, firefighters, along with police and correction officers, generally receive slightly higher raises under what is called the uniformed pattern. The New York City Council tried to provide some relief by passing a law in 2001 that granted EMS uniformed status, which opened the door for its employees to receive the uniformed pattern. But after Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office the following year, he made clear he would not allow the Council to encroach on his bargaining prerogatives, and neither he nor his successors have negotiated contracts that recognize that law. > EMTs, who start service at $39,386, max out at $59,534\. Firefighters max out at $105,146. There have been occasions when unique circumstances have led to contracts that provide raises exceeding the established bargaining patterns, mostly for city teachers, including a couple early in Bloomberg's 12-year tenure. Such circumstances exist for the EMTs, for whom one union official put the turnover rate at 50% during their first five years on the job. As [Daily News columnist (and Vital City contributing writer) Harry Siegel](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/03/01/harry-siegel-fire-commish-sounds-alarm-ems-about-to-collapse/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) wrote in March, EMS constantly loses experienced employees to the firefighter ranks because those employees get preference in hiring from civil-service lists, and even the most dedicated medical workers find it hard to ignore that pay difference. EMS union presidents for decades have railed against the comparatively low pay for their members, and the rank and file has sometimes voted for new leaders because the incumbents were unable to significantly bridge the gap. There are two primary reasons this huge discrepancy persists, illogical as it may seem when examining the duties of the two services. One is that while there are advantages to being part of DC 37, which represents city workers in titles ranging from accountant to zookeeper, EMTs and their officers total just less than 5% of that contingent. Any raises above the norm for them would not only come at the expense of the rest of the union's members, but would cut into the pie for cops, firefighters, teachers and the rest of the city workforce. The other reason is that the distorted pay picture vis-à-vis EMTs has its roots in bargaining relationships established 60 years ago, when meaningful negotiating rights were implemented under a city law and solidified as part of the state Taylor Law. At the time, EMS was part of the city hospital system and standards for EMTs weren't nearly as rigorous as for cops and firefighters. As a result, no thought was given to linking their salaries to those groups, as had been done for correction officers and sanitation workers. EMS was moved into the Fire Department midway through Mayor Rudy Giuliani's first term in 1996\. Structural fires in the city had already declined significantly from the point in the 1970s when poorer neighborhoods were wracked by arson commissioned by unscrupulous landlords looking to recoup investments on decaying buildings. During a fiscal crunch in the early 1990s, Mayor David Dinkins ordered the closing of some firehouses, arguing that fewer were needed to deal with fire volume at that point. (Bloomberg in 2003 closed six firehouses to save money.) Giuliani, who used to speak fondly about his uncles who were firefighters, looked to restore fire service but also wanted firefighters to plug shortages left by rapid turnover in EMS by taking on some medical duties. He negotiated a deal with then-firefighter-union president Tom Von Essen that paid his members $1,400 more annually to take on that work, but that wasn't enough to quiet the grumbling of some firefighters that this wasn't what they had signed on to do. Later in the decade, when Von Essen took the unprecedented step of moving from union leader to fire commissioner, he argued that making the transition could solve two problems. The added duties, he told a reporter, were a safeguard against some future mayor seeking to close firehouses due to a decline in activity. And the clamor from EMS union leaders claiming that their members were being treated as what one called "the red-headed stepchild\[ren\]" of the FDNY could be stilled, Von Essen said, if future hiring was for a hybrid title of Firefighter/EMT. Those recruits would be trained in both firefighting duties and medical ones and would all be placed on the existing pay scale for firefighters. (Such a hybrid is now used in other cities around the U.S., most notably in Washington State, where the two jobs are combined and those holding them in Seattle and Tacoma are paid more than NYC EMTs.) The practicality behind Von Essen's suggestion was no match, however, for the protests fire-union leaders made to Giuliani, and the idea was quietly discarded 25 years ago. Even as some old-line firefighters continued to regard medical duties as an infringement on their real work, some fire chiefs and union officials came to see the preference given to EMTs who passed special promotion exams for firefighter as an opportunity. More than a few of their sons used that route to move quickly from riding in ambulances to jumping on fire engines. > The salary gap has grown increasingly glaring since 9/11, as EMS medical responses have dramatically increased while structural fires have continued their steady decline. One irony in the early months of the pandemic stemmed from the concern that firefighters who contracted the coronavirus could infect entire companies who shared quarters in their firehouses. This led to the force long known as "New York's Bravest" having its medical runs sharply curtailed, meaning EMTs treating those with the virus were the employees facing by far the greater risk of catching the virus. Union officials at the time said some of their members were sleeping on ambulance-station couches or in their cars to avoid infecting their families. Even after the pandemic subsided, EMS runs continued to rise. They have increased by half a million annually this century, and rose by 15% since the pandemic, according to one union official who spoke on condition of anonymity. (Neither EMS Local 2507 President Oren Barzilay nor EMS Officers Local 3621 President Vincent Variale returned phone calls seeking comments on the pay situation, but in March, Barzilay sought to discourage New Yorkers from seeking EMT jobs with the FDNY, stating the city treated his members like "second-class citizens." Ex-Gov. Andrew Cuomo, whom the EMS unions endorsed for mayor last month, said at the time, "We will give these heroes the resources they've earned so that the city may recruit the talent and retain the experience NYC needs." Conspicuously absent from that statement was a promise of pay parity with firefighters. With Von Essen's plan to provide a fairer wage for those who focus their careers on medical duties now a distant memory, the best chance for the EMS unions to break loose from the bargaining patterns to which they are chained seems to be to take their case to arbitration. But that route has obstacles, too: such proceedings can be expensive, and it's not clear that DC 37 would want to pay that price while taking heat from its large non-EMS membership who might feel that the money was being spent to benefit EMS workers at their own expense. Danny Burstein, who served as Local 2507 treasurer in the mid-1980s, said that while he couldn't guess at the current dynamic between DC 37 and its two EMS locals, "The District Council loves pattern bargaining and used to do its best to keep us from breaking out of that." Arbitrators generally are not inclined to radically rework longstanding bargaining relationships. In one case more than a decade ago, a small union representing environmental police officers who patrolled the city's watershed areas showed that its members in the wake of 9/11 had taken on anti-terrorism training that placed them on an equal plane with city cops. The arbitrator, Al Viani, gave them a percentage raise matching what the city PBA had won in its latest round of bargaining, but declined to raise overall salaries for the watershed cops to match those of NYPD officers. He explained in his decision that the higher pay for city cops had been achieved over decades of negotiations, and stated that the environmental officers should not make up all that ground in a single arbitration award. It was a blunt reminder of the limitations of collective bargaining in overcoming a longtime financial injustice. So far, that reality has prevailed despite the fact that the historical failure to pay EMTs a fair salary for their work has created an obvious problem for the city that employs them. But one former DC 37 official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, thought an arbitration might begin to chip away at the salary gap with firefighters. "They probably have a legitimate beef," he said of the EMS unions. "And the worst that could happen is they'd still get the civilian pattern. What have they got to lose?" ### The Retail Reckoning URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-retail-reckoning/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:01.000Z Take a walk down nearly any street in Lower Manhattan, and you'll see a startling number of vacant storefronts. One out of every four floor-level retail spaces sits empty. Walking these streets can feel eerie and disjointed — part of a broader shift in our city's street life that occurred gradually over time and accelerated following the pandemic. Manhattan's business districts are particularly troubled. In the Financial District, for example, 24% of retail space was vacant this past November, according to the[ most recent City report](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/planning-level/housing-economy/nyc%5Fdcp%5Fstorefront%5Freport%5F1024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), compared to 17% pre-COVID. In East Midtown, vacancy rates reached 19% in the same report, compared to 11% pre-COVID. Most significantly, there are clusters of prolonged vacancies: 35% of the city's vacant storefronts have been vacant since the beginning of 2020\. By contrast, [decades ago, Manhattan's commercial districts typically maintained vacancy rates below 5%](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/larisaortiz%5Furbanplanning-retailtrends-downtownurbanism-activity-7293687672550674434-uulI?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fdesktop&rcm=ACoAAAIrzPYBrp49aLh3zZ5VLSt9vsfKPGpwpPk). Put simply, we've got an excess of ground floor retail space — and it's time for the City to take bold steps to address the imbalance. This begins by acknowledging that retail in central business districts is undergoing a deep structural transformation, accelerated by COVID and driven by shifting commuting patterns and changing consumer preferences. Once dominated by office workers, our central business districts, historically the city's economic engines, are changing before our very eyes. The causes of retail oversupply are multifaceted and frankly, still in flux. Some employers are [mandating a full-time return to the office](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/21/business/return-to-office-remote-work.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But the Partnership for New York reports that just [57% of Manhattan office workers are at their workplace on an average weekday](https://pfnyc.org/news/return-to-office-reaches-76-of-pre-pandemic-conditions-1-in-4-employers-plan-to-increase-office-attendance-requirements/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=March%2031%2C%202025-,Return%20to%20Office%20Reaches%2076%25%20of%20Pre%2DPandemic%20Conditions;,Partnership%20survey%20of%20employers%20found:) — and only 10% are in full-time. Yes, Class A office space is [rebounding](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/01/22/doom-loop-office-rentals-manhattan/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but vacancy rates for [Class B and C office buildings](https://mktgdocs.cbre.com/2299/bdc577d9-6fd4-41ed-b3f5-7bbbe2e2d3f3-1923957637/NY%5FManhattan%5FMarch-25%5FFINAL.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) remain stubbornly high, dragging down foot traffic. And of course, the fewer workers, the less spending in local retail establishments during lunch or for happy hour. E-commerce is another drag on consumer demand for brick-and-mortar retail: [According to the Department of City Planning](http://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/planning-level/housing-economy/nyc%5Fdcp%5Fstorefront%5Freport%5F1024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Manhattan had a net loss of 875 stores between 2020 and 2024, driven by declines in "dry retail" such as clothing, furniture and electronics stores — items increasingly purchased online. Despite the shift in consumer demand, retail overbuilding has persisted, driven by decades of policies that required ground-floor retail in new developments, and by the construction of hundreds of millions of square feet of suburban malls that slowly supplanted the central role that urban retail once played in people's lives. No longer was a trip to "the city" necessary to access the same quality of goods and services as before. COVID didn't create these challenges, but it certainly accelerated them. The challenges left behind are a wake-up call for all of us that our downtowns are ready for a new iteration. > As more people begin to live in — rather than commute to — the Financial District and Midtown, these areas will need to transform into residential neighborhoods where people want to live, fueled by public investments including safe streets, and civic infrastructure, like community centers and libraries. If office workers — and their wallets — aren't coming back in full force, we need to attract other types of customers who will replace their spending. Residents and tourists, in particular, will become increasingly important drivers of spending potential. And while yesterday's office workers wanted midday lunch spots, tomorrow's residents will want grocery stores, and tourists will want unique cultural experiences. Retail follows markets; in the long run, our ground-floor retail offerings *will* morph to meet those needs if we help them. [Converting outdated office buildings to housing](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2024/10/23/where-office-to-resi-conversions-are-heating-up-in-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is a powerful solution for giving our business districts new life that has been unlocked through recent [zoning changes](https://citylimits.org/2025/01/22/a-little-more-housing-in-midtown-south-city-kicks-off-rezoning-to-create-10000-new-homes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and state incentives. As more people begin to live in — rather than commute to — the Financial District and Midtown, these areas will need to transform into residential neighborhoods where people want to live, fueled by public investments including safe streets, and civic infrastructure, like community centers and libraries, as championed by initiatives like the recently announced City of Yes for Families. Tourism is yet another powerful economic driver for New York City. In 2024, New York welcomed nearly [65 million visitors, the second-highest figure in the city's history](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/941-24/mayor-adams-celebrates-nearly-65-million-visitors-nyc-2024-second-highest-number-visitors?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Growing this number further will require sustained support of entertainment, culture and the arts to ensure that New York remains among the world's premier cultural capitals. Moving forward, however, we will need to keep a close eye on the [detrimental economic impacts of federal policies that compromise our appeal to international visitors](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/08/nyregion/nyc-tourism.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). As we look to the future, city leaders must be willing to embrace a new vision for our central business districts — one grounded not in pre-COVID nostalgia, but rather rooted in the ways people live, visit and play today. To support this transition and the next generation of retailers and small business entrepreneurs, we recommend urban policies across four critical areas: regulation, capital investment, programming and private-sector incentives. The first step is to rethink outdated regulatory frameworks. New York City's recently passed City of Yes for Economic Opportunity plan enacted zoning changes that allow for more uses on commercial corridors, such as a wider range of entertainment uses and makerspaces. This is an excellent first step, but we need to go further in embracing ground-floor flexibility. Retail is no longer a one-size-fits-all solution, particularly in areas where storefronts have long struggled to succeed. In some cases, flexibility might mean allowing non-retail uses or even residential units on ground floors, especially on quieter side streets. But these uses must still engage the street. That's where design guidelines become essential, encouraging features that keep the public realm active and welcoming, like elevated ground floors, frequent entrances and thoughtful landscaping. > As we look to the future, city leaders must be willing to embrace a new vision for our central business districts — one grounded not in pre-COVID nostalgia, but rather rooted in the ways people live, visit and play today. We must also invest in the physical infrastructure that makes neighborhoods livable for new users. This includes not just improvements to parks and public spaces, but also enhancements to transit and mobility — bike lanes, ferry access, accessible subway service and critical social infrastructure like playgrounds and childcare facilities. These investments lay the foundation for more inclusive, dynamic communities. Beyond the built environment, programming plays a vital role in drawing people back to our business districts. Activating underutilized spaces through pop-ups, small business support and cultural programming can spark renewed interest and foot traffic. One of the most compelling examples of this remains The Gates, Christo and Jeanne-Claude's 2005 installation in Central Park. It [generated $254 million in economic activity](https://www.forbes.com/sites/janelevere/2025/03/21/20th-anniversary-of-the-gates-art-installation-celebrated-in-nyc/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and left a cultural imprint so strong that tourists still seek out memorabilia more than two decades later. It's a reminder of how bold, creative initiatives can reshape our experience of place — and drive real economic value. Finally, to truly transform our downtowns, we must unlock private investment. The City should consider repealing the commercial rent tax, which applies to commercial tenants in most of Manhattan, for storefront businesses, who could use the extra economic boost. While tax incentives have been created to support the conversion of office buildings to housing in New York, we should go further. For antiquated office buildings that cannot be easily converted, we should create a new incentive for tearing them down and replacing them with housing. New housing means new residents — and new residents mean renewed spending power, the lifeblood of vibrant ground floors. In the end, the path forward isn't about recreating what once was. It's about building something better — an urban environment that invites people back for more than just work. As New Yorkers, we are bullish. Our city has a long history of leading the way in urban innovation and embracing dynamic change. It's time to harness this strength and create a new ground-floor landscape that supports the way we live and work today. ### A Nation and City Less Secure URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/a-nation-and-city-less-secure/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:01.000Z So much of what the media has focused on in the 100 days of Trump 2.0 has been the illegal, with judges of all political backgrounds striking down executive order after executive order on a wide array of topics: birthright citizenship, removal of planeloads of immigrants to foreign prisons, retaliation against law firms, firing of civil servants. Even the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled, remarkably in a unanimous decision, that the Trump administration has violated due process in its use of the Alien Enemies Act to arrest and export hundreds of humans. The rule of law is essential to protect all of us. But flying under the radar is the more quotidian issue of policy changes in the realm of national security, which may just be as pernicious in their effect on the United States — and on New York City in particular. As someone who has worked for over 30 years in the field of criminal and national security law — as a DOJ prosecutor, an FBI General Counsel, a defense lawyer and a professor — let me describe what it is about the second Trump term that keeps me up at night. To be clear, these reforms are entirely lawful. But just because they are the valid result of an election does not mean that they are wise. Indeed, they serve to make our world a lot less safe. **Lowering our guard** The intelligence community has the mission to make sure that terrorist attacks, foreign and domestic, don't happen. And for New Yorkers, who live in a city that has been historically top of mind for foreign terrorists, that function is of utmost importance. Much of the American intelligence apparatus has undergone radical change in the little more than 100 days since Trump's return to power — and it hasn't been for the better. For starters, the leadership of the agencies that oversee our intelligence functions has been replaced with people who, for the most part, have an extraordinary dearth of experience in the field. Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, and Pam Bondi, attorney general, are exhibits A and B. The idea that anyone can perform these critical functions without relevant national security expertise is akin to assigning a pedestrian off the street to perform brain surgery. But Gabbard was a member of Congress and Bondi was attorney general of Florida, you might say. Those positions are simply inadequate to the task. Let me illustrate why they are insufficient: When I became general counsel of the FBI, I had access for the first time to the Presidential Daily Brief, or "PBD," which compiles key national security threats from the intel community. I soon realized that the critical skillset that was necessary for our country's safety was the ability to separate the true threats from the enormous volume of noise collected every day. Everything needs to be taken seriously, but in a world of limited resources and time, performing educated risk assessments, day in and day out, is required. I marveled at how our senior leadership made those innumerable life and death judgments every day. The intelligence community leadership is no place to learn on the job. Even new FBI Director Kash Patel, who does have some national security experience, was only a line-level attorney for a short period of time, and was not called on to make these daily critical assessments for the intelligence community. **The consequences of shredding alliances** But there is more. Even if imminent and serious intelligence information is properly recognized and sifted, this administration has reduced the chances of collecting critical intelligence in the first place. Foreign terrorists act across nation-state borders, and so we and our allies have learned to work together. That sharing traditionally occurs among the so-called "Five Eyes" (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and us) as well as many other countries (some openly and some less so, on the condition that the cooperation remain secret). It should not come as a surprise that if you threaten to take over Canada, or denounce Europe and NATO, you will not be increasing the trust that is necessary for such information sharing. If you talk about war plans on a commercially available app like Signal, the same is true. (The reason you talk about such things on secure government communication systems is precisely so you do not run the risk of those without a "need to know" learning of it; today it could be a reputable journalist, tomorrow an adversarial state or terrorist cell.) When your attorney general announces that the attack plans discussed on Signal were not classified and the Signal sharing was not intentional, you send a message to your allies that you can't be trusted to keep their secrets secure. When you risk the revelation of your allies' classified methods and means for collecting critical intelligence, by exposing that information to Signal chats or the bathrooms and closets of a Florida beach resort, you should not be surprised when the necessary level of critical sharing that makes us safe is put at grave risk. The mounting risk doesn't end there. On Day One of the new administration, the attorney general announced a series of lawful but dangerous policy changes that make us a whole lot less secure. The DOJ kleptocracy initiative (which served to put teeth in the U.S. sanctions against Russia, among other things) was dismantled, the foreign election interference group discarded, and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) enforcement law gutted to only focus on nation-state espionage. (FARA is an important statute that serves to thwart foreign nation states from surreptitiously influencing our elections, public opinion and our politicians.) Why would the administration do all this if not to send a message that it is now safe for foreign actors to interfere in our elections? The task forces that comprised the DOJ's kleptocracy initiatives were completely disbanded, thereby scattering the U.S. effort to prevent Russians evading U.S. sanctions (such as those put in place to pressure Russia after its invasion of Ukraine) to the wind. Indeed, the president himself eroded the message to our allies that we will take cyber espionage seriously when he ignored the congressional statute barring TikTok from operating in the United States unless it severed ties with its Chinese parent (a law that was upheld by the Supreme Court just before it was ignored by the president). That ban was justified, at least in part, by national security concerns identified by Congress. After the president's announcement, Bondi sent a letter to providers assuring them they would not face DOJ consequences for hosting TikTok on their platforms. In case that was not a clear enough message, Bondi's Day One elimination of the National Security Division unit in charge of corporate enforcement — a unit that prosecuted sanctions violations — served to put another nail in the coffin of sanctions prosecutions. For those connecting the dots, there are seemingly dozens more. There is a lack of focus on domestic terrorism, as evidenced by the president indiscriminately handing out pardons to Jan. 6 insurrectionists, including those who had been convicted of physically assaulting law enforcement officers. None of the above takes into account the incalculable, and for now, unknowable, chilling effect on those in the intelligence and law enforcement community and those seeking to join it, who now stand to risk their careers by taking on righteous investigations into any of the above matters. In short, the statements and actions of the administration suggest an obliviousness to the terrorist threat at best, and condonation at worst. For those of us who lived through 9/11 and saw and felt the devastation and pain from that day, the current lack of vigilance is profoundly concerning. Ignoring a matter of life and death will not make it go away. ### The Truth About Shootings in New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/the-truth-about-shootings-in-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:01.000Z [](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?display=page&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fthe-truth-about-shootings-in-new-york-city)[](http://www.twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fthe-truth-about-shootings-in-new-york-city&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fthe-truth-about-shootings-in-new-york-city&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) This weekend, the New York Post ran an article that could've been titled "Be Afraid, Be Very Afraid." Under the headline ["Shootings spike as temperatures rise in NYC, surging over 50% last week,"](https://nypost.com/2025/05/02/us-news/shootings-spike-as-mercury-rises-in-nyc-surging-more-than-50-last-week-nypd-data/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) it began: "Gun violence in New York City has spiked along with the mercury, with shootings up more than 50% last week compared to the same time last year — indicating that the Big Apple could be in for a bloody summer." Where to begin? Crime of all kinds goes up and down day by day, but it is just wrong to look at a couple of days to forecast a trend — as wrong as saying a windy day means a scary hurricane season is in the offing. In fact, larger gun violence trends in New York City today are quite positive: The city had the [lowest number of shootings on record](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/03/nyregion/nyc-shootings-decrease-first-quarter.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the first three months of 2025, with the year to date now the third-best year on record, ever since officials began tracking this stat in the early 1990s. [View Chart](https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/23037568?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Download Data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/16xq1fyHHPxGSQ2cr%5FnzjZSLs1ZoVgI5NxVQ000W-glU/edit?usp=sharing&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Do shootings increase as the weather warms? Yes; that's a well-established fact, as underscored by [this research by Vital City research director Paul Reeping and David Hemenway](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7310019/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It's why all responsible coverage matches up comparable periods in any given year. But any honest analysis of the data in the city right now shows that for the first time since the pandemic started, New York City is on track to return to the historic low of under 800 shootings it achieved before the pandemic, in the period from 2017 to 2019 (along with under 300 annual murders). The total of 61 shootings in the last four weeks remains below average — and any histrionics about a single-week jump are just that. ### Can the U.S. Department of Transportation End the MTA’s Congestion Pricing System? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/can-the-usdot-end-mtas-congestion-pricing-system/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:01.000Z President Trump seems to believe that he has a lot of power over New York's congestion pricing system. On Feb. 23, he [triumphantly posted](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/19/us/politics/trump-king-image.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on Truth Social that "CONGESTION PRICING IS DEAD," adding, "LONG LIVE THE KING!" Sean Duffy, the secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, backed up this confident declaration with [a Feb. 19 letter](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/02/19/nyregion/congestion-pricing-termination-letter.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to Gov. Kathy Hochul asserting that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's system of tolls on bridges, roads and tunnels leading into New York City was not only illegal but also not "a fair deal" for "working class Americans." After Hochul rebuffed Duffy's proposal for an "orderly cessation" of congestion pricing, Duffy's tone became more threatening, with him sending [a March 18 letter](https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/2025-03/USDOT-letter-to-MTA-03-18-2025.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to MTA chief Janno Lieber expressing concern about crime on New York City's subway system and demanding information about what the MTA was going to do about it. On April 21, Duffy took the gloves off, threatening [in a third letter](https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2025-04/Gov.%20Hochul%20Cordon%20Letter%5F4.21.25%5FSigned.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to terminate the federal Department of Transportation's grants to New York unless the MTA got rid of congestion pricing. Against these federal threats, Hochul [fired back](https://www.mta.info/press-release/transcript-governor-hochul-and-mta-chair-and-ceo-lieber-update-new-yorkers-congestion?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with an invocation of federalism: "This is an attack on our sovereign identity, our independence from Washington. And we are a nation of states." Can Duffy and Trump end congestion pricing in New York? Answering that question requires answers to three more specific questions about the obscure statutes, regulations and constitutional doctrines governing intergovernmental agreements and road-tolling programs. First, why exactly should the federal government have anything at all to say about a tolling program created by the New York state legislature, administered by a New York public authority, and financed by commuters to New York City without any federal funding? Second, does the USDOT have authority unilaterally to terminate the November 2024 agreement between New York and the feds establishing New York's congestion pricing system? Third, does the federal government really have the power to strong-arm New York into ending congestion pricing by terminating unrelated federal grants that fund other transportation programs ranging from subway service to highway maintenance? The short answers to these questions are that federal law generally prohibits tolling on roads constructed with federal financial assistance — but the MTA's congestion pricing system falls comfortably within an exception to this prohibition. Moreover, the federal government may not coerce New York into eliminating congestion pricing by threatening to terminate grants unrelated to congestion pricing. Let's talk through the questions one at a time. **1\. Why does the federal Department of Transportation have any say at all in whether New York has congestion pricing?** USDOT's power over MTA's congestion pricing system rests on a prohibition on tolling of federally funded roads and an exception for bridges and tunnels that date back to 1916 and 1927, respectively. Congress enacted the initial prohibition on tolls as an amendment to the first bill to provide federal funding to states for roads way back in 1916\. The exception for tolls on bridges and tunnels followed in 1927\. This exception initially exempted bridges and tunnels from the prohibition on tolls just so long as the toll revenue was used to pay for the tolled infrastructure. (The Enos Center on Transportation has a convenient summary of this history [here](https://enotrans.org/article/federal-prohibitions-toll-roads-got-grow-america-act-proposes-change/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=These%20two%20tolling%20provisions%20%E2%80%93%20the%20general,reconstruction%20or%20improvement%20of%20those%20toll%20facilities.)). Congress modified the exception to the prohibition on tolling in complicated ways over the ensuing decades. The current version of this prohibition is now codified [23 U.S.C. § 301](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23/301?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which provides that "\[e\]xcept as provided in section 129 of this title with respect to certain toll bridges and toll tunnels, all highways constructed under the provisions of this title shall be free from tolls of all kinds." Some of the roads and bridges within MTA's central business district tolling plan (in particular, New York City's and MTA's East River bridges) were financed in part, at some point in the past, with federal funds. (For a list of New York projects currently receiving federal money, you can consult the New York State Department of Transportation's "State Transportation Improvement Plan" or "STIP," available [here](https://www.dot.ny.gov/programs/stip?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). The legality of New York's congestion pricing system, therefore, turns on whether that system falls within any exception from the prohibition. Congress provided the exception for "value pricing" of bridges and tunnels from the tolling ban — on which New York and the MTA are relying here — in section 1012(b) of the "Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act," or "ISTEA" (pronounced "ice tea" by transportation aficionados) (original text available [here](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-105/pdf/STATUTE-105-Pg1914.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)). Section 1012(b) authorizes the secretary of USDOT to "enter into cooperative agreements with as many as 5…State or local governments or public authorities to establish, maintain, and monitor congestion pricing projects." In 1998, Congress changed the name of the program to "value pricing" in section 1216(a) [a statute entitled TEA-21](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-105publ178/pdf/PLAW-105publ178.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (for "Transportation Efficiency Act in the 21st Century"), but otherwise left the program mostly unchanged. On the assumption that New York's congestion pricing fell within this federal exception from the federal prohibition on tolls, the New York legislature enacted a congestion pricing program in 2019 that then-Governor Cuomo signed into law. Pursuant to this 2019 state statute, the MTA then entered into [an agreement with USDOT in November of 2024](https://www.mta.info/document/158201?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to create a "value pricing pilot program" **2\. Does MTA's congestion pricing system comply with relevant federal statutes?** There's now a battle in the courts — but there is no plausible argument that MTA's system of congestion pricing fails to meet federal standards. In his [February letter](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/02/19/nyregion/congestion-pricing-termination-letter.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Duffy claimed that MTA's system violated some unwritten limits in federal law implicit in "the long-standing history of the anti-tolling provision" in Title 23\. As USDOT's own lawyers conceded in [an internal memo that they mistakenly filed with the federal district court](https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/congestion-pricing-internal-memo-doj.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), however, these claims are groundless. Duffy's letter claimed that acceptable congestion pricing cannot be "cordon pricing," meaning area-wide tolls that are imposed on every road leading to a central business district. Both members of Congress and the USDOT, however, have repeatedly stated that cordon pricing is an option authorized by federal law. (See, for instance, one senator's opening statement at [this Senate Committee hearing](https://books.google.com/books?id=VuoRAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs%5Fge%5Fsummary%5Fr&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false) in 1991 or the [USDOT's own primer on congestion pricing](https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop08039/cp%5Fprim1%5F03.htm?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which currently includes "Zone-Based or Cordon Pricing," defined as "\[p\]er-mile charges on all roads within an area or on a roadway network that may vary by level of congestion," as a form of acceptable "congestion pricing"). Duffy's February letter also asserted that the federal law in question, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, does not "authorize tolls that are based on considerations separate from reducing congestion or advancing other road-related goals." This statement contradicts the plain text of ISTEA. Section 1012(b)(3) of [ISTEA](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-105/pdf/STATUTE-105-Pg1914.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which authorizes the use of toll revenue for any "projects eligible under \[Title 23\]," and [section 104(f) of Title 23](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23/104?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) allows transfer of highway funds for transit projects. Again, the USDOT's own internal documents contradict Duffy's assertion: The [USDOT's "flexible funding process guidebook"](https://www.transit.dot.gov/funding/grants/grant-programs/flexible-funding-process-guidebook?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) lays out the broad discretion that states and the federal government enjoy under section 104 to use highway funds for transit purposes. A report from the Mineta Transportation Institute at San Jose State University (available [here](https://transweb.sjsu.edu/sites/default/files/2528-Schank-Toll-Revenues-For-Transit%5F0.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)) illustrates how local governments have used tolls from roads and bridges to fund buses and light rail for decades, with illustrations ranging from the Golden Gate Bridge tolls to Los Angeles' tolled express lanes. Duffy's bare assertion to the contrary is pulled out of thin air. **3\. May Duffy rescind the MTA's authority to impose congestion fees because the MTA's plan is no longer consistent with the administration's "goals or agency priorities"?** Duffy's claim that MTA's congestion pricing program violates the anti-tolling provision in Title 23, therefore, is groundless. Indeed, USDOT's attorneys from the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office so advised Duffy in its memo that was mistakenly filed with the federal court. Duffy's [April 21 letter](https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2025-04/Gov.%20Hochul%20Cordon%20Letter%5F4.21.25%5FSigned.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) accordingly added another reason for terminating MTA's program based on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines for terminating "Federal awards." According to Duffy's letter, OMB's rule on termination, codified at [2 C.F.R. §200.340(a)(4)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-2/subtitle-A/chapter-II/part-200/subpart-D/subject-group-ECFR86b76dde0e1e9dc/section-200.340?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), allows USDOT to terminate USDOT's authorization for congestion pricing because MTA's congestion pricing system "does not effectuate the goals or priorities of the U.S. Department of Transportation." Can Duffy rely on OMB's rule to rescind New York's authority to toll its bridges and roads just because USDOT now has other "goals and priorities"? Unlike Duffy's arguments regarding the alleged illegality of MTA's congestion pricing system, the argument based on OMB's rule has a textual basis. The USDOT's power to terminate, however, turns on a strained reading of the rule's text. OMB's rule allows a "Federal award" to be terminated only "pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Federal award, including, to the extent authorized by law, if an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities." For this rule to authorize termination of the congestion pricing program, therefore, the USDOT's approval of the MTA's congestion pricing system must constitute a "Federal award" and be consistent with that award's "terms and conditions" and "authorized by law." It is a stretch to describe USDOT's waiver of Title 23's anti-tolling restriction as an "award." The noun "award" more naturally refers to grants of federal money or property possessed by an agency and transferred to a recipient, not to waivers of restrictions that would otherwise apply to both the agency and the state. Even if such a waiver could be regarded as an "award," however, USDOT has yet to point to any "term or condition" in the value pricing agreement or any other USDOT document that would authorize termination because of USDOT's changing priorities. Some of USDOT's subdivisions have adopted "termination for convenience" conditions for their grants, but these "T4C" conditions still give grant recipients power to control timing of and conditions for termination. The Federal Transit Authority, for instance, issued ["award management conditions" in 2017](https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/docs/Grant%20Management%20Requirements%20Circular%5F5010-1E.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that allow the FTA to unilaterally terminate an award, but even this guidance requires that "\[b\]oth parties must agree upon the termination conditions, including the effective date." There's no sign of any similar guidance for value-pricing agreements. Even if the Federal Highway Administration had issued a similar guidance, however, New York would still be entitled to veto any termination conditions proposed by USDOT. Rather than adopt a strained analogy between termination conditions for federal grants and value-pricing agreements, courts would more likely look to the statutory provisions governing value-pricing programs. Section 1210(b) of (5) of ISTEA provides that "\[t\]he Secretary shall monitor the effect of such \[value-pricing\] projects for a period of at least 10 years, and shall report to the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate and the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House of Representatives every 2 years on the effects such programs are having on driver behavior, traffic, volume, transit ridership, air quality, and availability of funds for transportation programs." It is difficult to read this provision as anything other than a requirement that the USDOT maintain value-pricing agreements "for a period of at least 10 years" in order to collect data about variables like driver behavior" and "transit ridership." The whole point of a pilot program, after all, is to observe its operations long enough to see how tolls affect traffic congestion. If this 10-year minimum term is the best reading of the statute, then OMB's rule on termination to accommodate USDOT's priorities would be inapplicable, because premature termination would not be "authorized by law." **4\. May Duffy terminate grants unrelated to value pricing in order to pressure New York to eliminate congestion pricing?** Even assuming that MTA's congestion-pricing system does not satisfy some unwritten federal standard, Duffy does not have the power to withhold unrelated federal grants to ensure compliance with that standard. The U.S. Supreme Court held in [National Federation of Businesses v. Sebelius that](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/519/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Congress may not require states to participate in an expanded Medicaid program as a condition for receiving Medicaid payments under an older and less expansive Medicaid program. The Court's holding was based on the idea that making eligibility for federal grants turn on compliance with programs unrelated to those grants was an unconstitutional coercion of states. In the Court's own words: We have upheld Congress's authority to condition the receipt of funds on the States' complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the "general Welfare." Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes. Duffy's "threats to terminate other significant independent grants" in order to "pressur\[e\] \[New York\] to accept policy changes" to its congestion pricing program fit precisely into this doctrine banning coercive conditions on federal grants. Indeed, Duffy's April letter does not attempt to disguise the coercive purpose of his threat to withhold money for Manhattan's roads as leverage to force New York to eliminate congestion pricing. The statutes authorizing those other grants for subways or upstate highways do not authorize extortion. USDOT can withhold them if New York violates the purposes for which those grants were awarded, not to exert pressure on New York to comply with the Trump Administration's views on congestion pricing. In the end, Duffy has neither a freewheeling power to rescind intergovernmental agreements at the whim of the president nor any argument that New York's tolls violate anything in federal law. The most likely outcome of the litigation, therefore, is that the court will find that the Trump administration lacks any power to kill congestion pricing in New York. ### A Challenger for the Council URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/maya-kornberg-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:33.000Z *City Council candidate Maya Kornberg, running in a district that's been represented by Bill de Blasio, Brad Lander and now Shahana Hanif, discusses her race — and what she thinks connects it to larger local and national trends. She argues that many constituents feel unheard — a problem she says she would address through mobile district offices and continuous engagement. She also argues that today's divisive political climate, while troubling, isn't unprecedented for American democracy.* *You can listen to this episode, "A Challenger for the Council," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/a-challenger-for-the-council/id1794619189?i=1000706622953&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/5QTJmzlP0Cvk5IaYDv4KZx?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* **Jamie:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City Podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. So on this episode, we're gonna try something a little different. We decided to zoom out from the citywide politics and policy issues that we've usually talked about and into local and hyperlocal politics and policy. Almost everybody pays more attention to what's happening at the highest levels of government. What's really happening in the neighborhoods often tells you a lot more about where the city really is, what's working and what's not, and what people really care about than, for example, the mayoral race does, particularly right now when it's still, believe it or not, quite early in the mayoral race. So I wanted to take a look at one particular city council race to see how the citywide issues that we already are familiar with interact with the hyperlocal issues, and to see if the candidates who are running for city council in that district are focused on the same basic issues that plague the city, or if it's a totally different set of issues that are very, very local. And most people wouldn't recognize 'em unless they lived within a 10 block radius of the district. So to talk about this, I invited Maya Kornberg to come on the show. Maya is running for City Council in District 39\. She had spent a lot of time studying how legislative bodies work both here and abroad. She's a senior fellow and manager at the Brennan Center for Justice, where she works on issues like combating political violence, making voting more accessible, and making government work more effectively, all of which will come in handy if she is actually elected to the City Council. Her district, District 39, covers large areas of Brooklyn, including Park Slope, Carroll Gardens and Gowanus. It very much runs the economic spectrum, which makes it a really interesting microcosm of New York City issues across the board. And I wanted to talk to Maya because she's not a professional politician, at least not at this stage, but she decided that she wanted to actually make something better in the city and the world at large, and she thought she could best do that by running for local offices. She actually got up and decided to do it. And as we discovered from this conversation, she's learning a lot about what it means to run, to actually represent individuals who live around you. And to think about what it's going to be like to be in a legislative body when you've been studying one for your entire career. I should note that we also invited her opponent to join us, and she declined. So here's my conversation with Maya Kornberg. **Jamie:** Maya, thanks for being with us. **Maya:** Thanks for having me. **Jamie:** So what inspired you to get involved in this race? **Maya:** I've spent my whole career defending democracy. When Trump was elected, which was shortly after my son was born, it became clearer to me than ever before that the local government is going to be our best line of defense in protecting democracy and in guarding funding for things like healthcare and education and transportation that the administration is attacking. And in continuing to fight for the rights of women and the LGBTQ+ community and seniors and immigrants. I think that that's gonna matter more than ever before here in New York City Council. **Jamie:** Certainly, I agree fully with the notion that that local is where a lot of this is gonna happen. But the district was represented already, obviously, by a Democrat who was not termed out — Shahana Hanif. What prompted you to go ahead and challenge her? **Maya:** I think that what matters now is uniting people in this moment as Democrats and standing up against Trump. And what I hear across the district is that a lot of folks don't feel listened to. To me, listening to people, meeting them where they are, even if they disagree with you — that is the ABCs of good government. I've spent my whole career studying what good government is. Good government is listening to people, and I think we can do better at that here in District 39\. And that's a big reason for running. **Jamie:** Aside from your willingness to fight and represent the district generally, where would you say is the biggest point of difference in terms of policy between you and the incumbent? **Maya:** In terms of specific policy issues, we do not necessarily see eye to eye in our approach to safety. My opponent has consistently called to defund the police. I have done work on how to keep elections and elected officials safe, and I do not believe that defunding the police is going to make us safer. I do believe in police reform. I do believe that our criminal justice system is broken in many ways and in need of fixing. I think we have to be investing in more deescalation and anti-racism training for NYPD officers and fostering more positive interactions. I think we need to be pushing to close Rikers Island, pushing to eliminate unnecessary court fees, to have crisis intervention first responders continue to invest in programs like the Brooklyn Mental Health Court and other restorative justice practices. I think we need to do all of this, but taking a stance like defunding the police completely is just not going to, in my mind, make us safer. **Jamie:** Got it. You know John Della Volpe? He's the Harvard Pollster. **Maya:** Okay. **Jamie:** He's at the Kennedy School. He does these annual national youth surveys. He did a bunch of work in New York City recently and he has basically the same principles you do, which are that everything is about listening. **Maya:** You know, we can't do surveys and all that stuff if we're not out in the field listening to the voters. It's interesting you mentioned that he worked with youth. One of the jobs that I had was during the pandemic. I worked for the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which is a union for all the parliaments in the world, running a project that showed how legislatures around the world were engaging with citizens during the pandemic. I led a team that did this. We looked at 180 legislatures around the world, and one of the things we looked at was youth engagement. And frequently what we heard, and we actually did a focus group and talked to young people also about how they felt listened to around the world. One of the things that we found was that often, especially with youth, they feel tokenized, and sometimes the engagement is genuinely window dressing. I'm very passionate about teaching young people how much their voice matters and to think critically and to get involved in the parliaments and the legislatures that are doing that well, or the legislatures that are actually engaging. But what I found internationally in this project, and I see this actually here, running locally, is that oftentimes when you ask parliamentarians around the world, "What is super frustrating to you when you engage with citizens?" — which is what we asked in some of these focus groups — they'll say, "People come to me with issues that are just not my issue." Like, they're not national legislative issues. They want their trash dealt with, whether it's Egypt or New York City. People get confused as to who to contact about that, and then it breaks down trust. In the national government when they say, well, I contacted this national legislator and they didn't fix my composting issue, and so if we taught civics better, they would know who to contact. **Jamie:** Oh, interesting. So it's a failure of civics understanding that gets into the wrong place. **Maya:** Exactly. There's a misunderstanding of where to go, how to get there. And one of the things I'm super passionate about is reinvigorating civic engagement here locally in a way that meets people where they are. I've talked a lot about doing things like a mobile district office. It's not rocket science, but it makes a big difference to have a continuously open district office, which I should mention the incumbent did not have here. But also to have a table that you just set up. You could have it in a library if it's cold outside, you can have it in a park if the weather is nice, and move it around the district to different parts of the district and say, "Come to me with your issues." I'm meeting you where you are. I'm not gonna assume that you know where to find me. **Jamie:** John Della Volpe, who I talked about earlier — he wrote a really interesting Substack a few months ago, right after the election, about what the Democratic Party could do to reinvigorate itself. And one of his suggestions was that they take on local volunteerism. The Democratic Party should be known as the National Party that sends people to help you wherever you are with whatever. **Maya:** Yeah, I think people see it if you help them with something tangible, and they care if you come and listen to them and help them deal with their issue. **Jamie:** It seems ridiculously intuitive, **Maya:** But the Democrats have failed at showing people that they're there and that they're listening. I think that is why we lost the national election. **Jamie:** Yeah, that seems to be part of the reason. But back to your election. The reason I brought \[John Della Volpe\] up was the following. He did 20 focus groups or so all over the city, and then did a 2,000-plus person public survey. Very, very, very detailed. What he really came out with was from across the city, the shared issues that were top of mind for different geographic and different affiliation groups, from super liberal to progressive — **Maya:** Like ideological differences. **Jamie:** Yes, exactly. Not surprisingly, there were probably four issues that were the highest in everybody's minds. Before I tell you what those were, tell me what, if you had to say what the four issues on your listening to tours, what are you hearing from your would-be constituents? **Maya:** One of the things I hear about every day and I experience myself is the affordability crisis that we're facing. You know, for me, I'm a renter in this district. I work at a nonprofit. My husband is a teacher. We have a six month old baby. I genuinely don't know how we can afford to stay here long-term with the current crisis. So one of the things that I'm really committed to doing is addressing the childcare affordability crisis that we're facing, pushing to fully fund 3-K to implement universal 2-K. The other issue that I would say matters a lot to folks — and of course I've spent a lot of time thinking about it in what I've shared — is our democracy. People care about the state of this country. They tell me how afraid they are, but I keep saying this is the time to engage. The other issue that I would say I hear about from folks is safety. I conceptualize safety as including climate safety. People are afraid that we don't have the flooding infrastructure that we need and that we're not implementing the green infrastructure plan that the city has. And we have to make sure that we have bike lanes and that we're protecting congestion pricing, and that we have safe streets. And of course we have to make sure that at a time of rising hatred, we are working to keep the community safe, that we are working to implement restorative justice practices like crisis first responders, and that we are working to foster dialogue with local law enforcement. **Jamie:** Okay. So I would say you got most of the issues. **Maya:** What did I miss? **Jamie:** Housing was the number one across, if you take everybody. Housing basically ranked number one and it wasn't even all that close. **Maya:** I'm not surprised. **Jamie:** Mm-hmm. And then public safety. You know, crime. Even though you can argue with people until the cows come home that you know about how safe the city is, if people have that perception, they have the perception. Yeah. And then — but it doesn't sound like it was as much of an issue for your folks — **Maya: —** but plenty of folks say to me, "I don't feel safe on the subway," and I hear them. I commute by Subway too, to go to work, and I get that. That's part of why I think we have to be addressing some of the mental health crises that we see affecting the subway with crisis first responders. I think that's very much a part of people's sense of safety. **Jamie:** And that was what the third one is. It was interesting, the mental health, it all sort of lumps into disorder is what we were calling it. And a lot of it is, so, you're exactly right. A lot of it is subway related; that's where people seem to encounter the most issues. So let's say you win, you're in the city council now. Guess what? You get to live it out. You've got 50 colleagues, so you show up every day. It's gonna be fantastic. You're gonna love every single one of them. What's your view about how that institution works and maybe could be reformed? **Maya:** There are two really important things that I plan to do when I start, that I have seen successful legislators at all levels of government do. Number One, and I know I keep coming back to this, is having as many conversations as you can. You're not going to push forward any kind of legislation if you don't have any relationships. So I think building those relationships across the ideological spectrum, even if folks don't agree with you, having as many meetings as possible is the way to do it. The second thing that I think is the marker of the most successful legislators is to hire capable staff. Staff are the backbone of the legislative process, and hiring staff who have been in the council, which I have not worked in. Those are seemingly trivial, but I think crucial things. **Jamie:** You're always best if you get your best staff. Okay, quick lightning round: term limits. City council term limits — good or bad? **Maya:** I think that term limits are good in that we have too many ways to keep people out of politics. I think term limits exist to say, "Okay, we're gonna try to open up the process." But I do think that we need to think long and hard about what term limits look like and about how they can actually be used as a tool to bring people in. **Jamie:** Okay, so on balance, I'm gonna say pro for city council term limits. **Maya:** I think in the council we should have term limits. **Jamie:** I think I agree. I was a skeptic, but having watched it play out over a bunch of years, it has refreshed the quality of the people. There's not a lot of old "stick-in-the-muds." Next lightning round question: member deference. So, land use, big land use projects in your district. Typically members get deference if they don't like it. **Maya:** I would respect member deference. I know that it is a norm. But, you know, if I felt that it was not doing what it was meant to do, then of course I would be thoughtful, again, about doing what I think should be the number one priority, which is to be listening to the local community voices and doing what's in their best interest. **Jamie:** Okay. What about your own member deference? So there's a project in your community, it's a 10-story building. The community is up in arms, the five blocks around are all upset. And even though it's gone through, it's done everything that needs to be done, they're going to call you and they're like, "Councilwoman, we voted for you for this. You gotta block it." **Maya:** I think that in the hypothetical that you just explained, the priority for me would be making sure that the folks locally feel that they've been listened to. I mean, I started out by saying this earlier with a lot of people who don't feel seen and heard here in District 39\. I think that holding many different town halls will allow me to be fully immersed in what the community wants and be able to really fight to bring the best result for the community. That is my number one priority. And as I said at the outset, building more affordable housing is a number one issue right now for a lot of folks, including myself, with the affordability crisis. And so that to me is the center. The member deference is a manifestation of that larger issue. **Jamie:** Okay. All right. Fair enough. I'll tell you — I don't know if this is advice or just observation — but having been around this stuff for a long time and working for the governor for a long time, the hardest thing to do is to tell people what they don't want to hear. **Maya:** That's not just in government. **Jamie:** Absolutely. But here, they happen to be your boss in effect, and you're up every two years. So your best weapon is probably to establish a track record of being somebody who actually goes out and listens and responds and does something. And then when you have to deliver bad news, you can say, look, I heard it, you know that I'm here and this is just gonna be a tough one, and I will fight for you every time. But this is one where, you know, it is what it is. **Maya:** I couldn't agree more. And I think that the thing that makes people feel least heard, and we see this locally, I've seen this in a lot of the work that I have done, is when you come and you say, "I'm here to listen to you. Let's have a community listening session," and then everyone tells you what they think and then you never come back to them. You never come back to them and say anything. Then they feel the least listened to. I think that the most important thing is to have a continuous engagement process. Sometimes that means being the bearer of bad news. And of course, folks could disagree with me, folks already do. And that's okay. I think sitting with discomfort and sitting with disagreement is something that I'm quite well-versed in, even if I have not held elected office before. **Jamie:** Okay, final question. Let's just step back, pull back and talk about something national and even long-term. Obviously it's a very unusual time, to say the least. There is a sense of whatever it is — fear, despair, confusion. Everybody's sort of got their heads spinning. There is a real concern that this is effectively the end of history, which is, you know, we thought it was the end of history before it was not. This may be. As somebody who has studied all the relevant areas for a while, what's your view about where we are in history, and what the prospects are for getting the ship back on track? **Maya:** I could obviously talk forever about this, but just to give a general sense, I am somewhat — I don't know if contrarian is the right word — but I wrote a whole book on Congress that wasn't about how everything is only broken and everything is only bad and there's no hope. When folks talk about Congress, that's what they frequently write about. I think that our institutions are malleable, and I think they are shaped and reshaped by the people who are there making them. I think we see this in the council. I think we see this in the New York State legislature. I think we see this in Congress. That is why it is all the more important to elect people who represent us and to be continuing to engage. The other thing that I think is that a lot of the scary currents that we're seeing here under Trump are not new. I taught a course — I'm not teaching it right now, but I've taught it a few times — about American political development in different ways. I show students how a lot of the racism and the misogyny and the xenophobia and the brokenness is baked into our institutions in different ways, and it is not new. It's really scary what's going on with anti-immigrant sentiment, for example. But, you know, folks, remember: Just about a hundred years ago, the 1924 immigration law was horrifying and it limited immigration from whole parts of the world for several decades. The ways in which we are trying to control women's bodies and control sexuality — that is not new. We can trace that back to the puritanical roots of this country. We can look at the Comstock Act that Trump is trying to resurrect now, which banned mailing obscene materials and was targeted at immigrant communities. It was targeted at communities of color. These are not new forces, and I think that we can learn from history. We've been here before. We have fixed things before. We have fought back before, and I think we're just in another one of those moments. I don't think this is unprecedented. **Jamie:** Interesting. I agree, but boy, it can be hard to convince people of that. Some of it is young people who just have never had this. **Maya:** I think some folks have just not lived through it. And you know, I'll say I'm a millennial and what I experienced in my generation was like, we came of age when Barack Obama was president, and those were eight really critical years of our lifetime. And then when Trump was elected, I think that there was a real shock among folks in my age group. There's a lot of things that I keep pointing out to folks that are, you know, similar to Richard Nixon in the '70s; the post-Watergate election was when we elected one of the largest freshmen groups ever elected to Congress. What I will say is that I don't think that everything has been seen before. I think that the way in which big money is controlling politics right now after Citizens United and the way in which we see Elon Musk, who is an unelected person, an extremely wealthy person having disproportionate power is really scary, and I don't think we've seen it to that extent. **Jamie** I agree with that. I think the assumption is that he controls them. It may be that you can sort of see it now as people are quickly understanding what he's doing to the economy; it may be that he finds out that it does to some extent. It goes both ways when you are relying solely on people's self-interest. When their self-interest erodes, you can quickly find out that they aren't any more friendly to you than you are to them. **Maya:** Well, I think that the problem of money and politics is broader than Trump, so I think that we just have to fight it. **Jamie:** Maya, thank you for doing this. I really appreciate it. Thank you for taking the time to run and thank you for taking the time to talk to us. **Maya:** Thank you so much for having me. It was really fun to chat. **Jamie:** Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### More Homes for More New Yorkers URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/annemarie-gray-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:02.000Z *Housing advocate and Open New York Executive Director Annemarie Gray argues that scarcity drives New York's housing crisis, with restrictive zoning and ULURP processes empowering local opposition to block development. She reveals how both Republican states and progressive Democratic cities outpace New York in housing reform, despite recent wins like "City of Yes" legislation. Annemarie advocates for balancing tenant protections with increased supply and discusses her organization's push for the Faith-Based Affordable Housing Act, which would allow religious organizations to build affordable housing on their underutilized properties.* *You can listen to this episode, "More Homes for More New Yorkers," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/more-homes-for-more-new-yorkers/id1794619189?i=1000704586762&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/62V85SOE5uB32kzfCsr0th?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* **Jamie:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City Podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. **Molly:** Here's a question for you. What is your favorite city that is not New York City? **Jamie:** Does it have to be a city that I've been to? **Molly:** Well, you can give me an answer for a city you've been to and one you haven't. **Jamie:** The Emerald City. **Molly:** Tell me why. **Jamie:** Emerald City? It just seems really well run. **Molly:** Yeah, that's the pinnacle of ordinance. **Jamie:** It seems clearly well run. I mean, they have a lot of good mass transit because they're able to, to gather large crowds at a moment's notice, right. A lot of the population seems to be very, very short people, so I'm assuming they have favorable accessibility rules. And I mean, architecturally, it's interesting. **Molly:** What do you think the housing situation is there? **Jamie:** I mean, hard to say because I haven't had the opportunity to review all of the data. **Molly:** Mm-hmm. **Jamie:** But I'm told they have really, um, progressive zoning. **Molly:** Is it a YIMBY city? **Jamie:** Totally YIMBY. Because there's a lot of different species, sentient species, and they have different housing needs. For example, munchkins have special housing needs and so you have to be zoned for munchkins, but also, they have to have a place for the horses. **Molly:** Right. And the flying monkeys. **Jamie:** And the flying monkeys. And then they have occasional visitors who are like, lions and tin men. So you have to have accommodations for them too. Just to keep reflecting on this though, I do think that you're gonna have issues with historic preservation. Because they're sort of ageless, so that's a problem. I don't know how you do new construction.Think about "The Lord of the Rings" by contrast, where the elves are living in the trees. The hobbits are living in the things that look like trees, but they're houses. That's adaptive restoration or something like that, where you're using existing structures rather than tearing them down and building something new that doesn't fit with the neighborhood. You use the existing structure, but you turn it into housing. I mean, that's a really impressive use of existing structure. **Molly:** That's like what I feel like many New Yorkers wish would happen with our empty office buildings. **Jamie:** A hundred percent. **Molly:** It would be hard to beat your take on this, Jamie, but I feel like you actually have a friend who would offer some very interesting and helpful info on this. **Jamie:** Yes, my good friend Annemarie Gray. Annemarie is the executive director of an organization called Open New York, which I would say is the city and the state's only grassroots pro housing advocacy organization. They organize volunteers to advocate for more housing in their own communities, in their own backyards.They're totally separate from the real estate industry, so they really are just people who live in communities who want more housing. **Molly:** How does the grassroots piece work? **Jamie:** Grassroots in this case means real grassroots. It is a membership organization, so you can sign up to be a member of Open New York. The membership is organized into chapters, which I think are geographically located, and the chapters sort of work together with the center staff to organize campaigns around specific proposed developments. So, you know, in Brooklyn there's a multifamily housing development that's being proposed, and there's a lot of opposition. The local chapter of Open New York will come out to public meetings and speak in favor of it without people being able to say, *oh yeah, but you're the developer, so of course you want it.* They're just people who live in the community who think that the community needs more housing, affordable housing, whatever the development is. And then, more broadly, they have worked with legislators to introduce some really forward-looking zoning reform in Albany. I mean, full disclosure, I'm a big supporter of Annemarie and her work. I've spent a lot of time with her over the last couple of years. We move in the same sort of housing policy circles and I think that the work that she's doing is extremely high quality and very important. **Molly:** So I guess tonight we all get to be part of this housing circle. **Jamie:** Absolutely. **Jamie:** Annemarie. Hey, how are you? **Annemarie:** I'm doing well. How are you, Jamie? **Jamie:** So you are pro-housing. How do you align yourself with or not with the real estate development community? **Annemarie:** Our fundamental take is the root of the housing crisis is a housing shortage, that we are not building enough homes. **Jamie:** As opposed to other explanations like… **Annemarie:** Like it's all an issue of there's not enough money going into subsidies, or it's 100% an issue of tenant protections. Our theory here is that we're fighting over scarcity. And that exacerbates every issue we care about, frankly, from economic growth, from homelessness, from racial equity, from climate change, from transit access. But we're coming at this from a policy perspective. For example, we've been organizing a lot in this one project in Windsor Terrace in Brooklyn, and it's the people that live right around there being like, I think it'd be great to have more housing here. Someone's trying to propose a building that's a little higher, but not much higher than the building that exists now. Some of my neighbors are proposing it. I'm gonna come out and say, actually I think this is great. **Jamie:** Forget why it's controversial, but the reason it's not automatically whoever it is proposing to develop the Windsor Terrace thing doesn't just have the right to do it, is… **Annemarie:** We have a land use system that has been built up and changed and layered on top of for decades and decades that has basically allowed a hyperlocal veto on new homes, so sometimes we align with real estate. You need to build. We also, frankly, fight for housing of all types, some of which is not the sort of stuff that the real estate industry in New York builds. For example, we should legalize backyard cottages in single family neighborhoods. So we're really positioning ourselves such that we need a huge coalition. We partner with tenants' rights groups, we partner with real estate, we partner with climate groups, we partner with unions — all of the above. **Jamie:** All of the above. You're aligned with housing developers, generally speaking, but you don't take money from housing developers, correct? **Annemarie:** Correct. We are a very independent organization driven by two questions: What is the right policy solution and how are we growing the biggest coalition possible? So we're funded by philanthropy and our members. **Jamie:** And philanthropy. **Annemarie:** By philanthropy, I mean like, foundations. **Jamie:** Foundations. Excellent. Which foundations? **Annemarie** Open Philanthropy. They actually were the seed funder for all of the sort of YIMBY Pro housing groups around the country. And what's been really, really important is — and the funders fortunately have really recognized this — you need to empower each city and state to figure out the politics the way they need to. So we talk about the issues differently. We have different legislative strategies. We organize people in different ways, we use different messaging, but we're all fighting for the same types of policies. But the comparisons actually just recently did an episode of David Roberts' Volts podcast with the person who runs the Texas group, comparing notes with the Texas YIMBY group. We're dealing with the opposite problems for very, very similar policies. **Jamie:** I was talking to somebody at a NYCHA business with a banker, and he said the Austin real estate market has completely cratered because they've just built way too much housing. **Annemarie:** Rents have dropped. **Jamie:**. It's amazing. **Annemarie:** It's the reference I use when people think it's not possible. It's like, no, that's exactly what happened. They did that. **Jamie:** Yeah. It turns out it's not great for the developer community. **Annemarie:** And this is where you have to talk about like, are you a builder? Are you an owner? Because people make money off of scarcity. There's a reason it exists for sure. That's not a good policy solution, and that's where we're coming from for everything. **Jamie:** But we're sitting here in New York City, where they do not have the Austin problem. We're at 98.6% rental occupancy, which is crazy. **Jamie:** Rents are obviously not going down anytime soon. I had a really interesting experience recently. I was tooling around looking for something and it turned out that NYCHA's archives are all digitized by LaGuardia Community College. One of the really interesting things for me was that there were all these photographs of the board of NYCHA and whoever the CEO was, or whatever, standing around hunched over models of all of this stuff that they were getting ready to build from the '30s, '40s and '50s, when we built all of the NYCHA housing. You don't see that anymore in the public sphere. Every once in a while there's a big project of some kind, but it's not getting done in bulk that way, where everybody sort of stands around and talks about 10,000 units at a time. Do you have a sense of when that started to flip at all? **Annemarie:** Yeah, we built many, many times more than we built now in the 1920s. A full hundred years ago, basically. A coup. There were a couple big milestones. There was the 1961 zoning resolution that basically put some notes on this explicitly — my favorite zoning resolution. **Jamie:** It's my favorite of all the zoning resolutions. **Annemarie:** The 1961 zoning resolution was the one that I really like. It complicated the zoning code in ways that made it very hard to build housing. And then that, plus a number of process changes to what's called the ULURP process, the formal legal land use review process that we go through in New York City. In New York City, there were some changes, especially in the '80s, that really swung the pendulum so that the hyperlocal concerns have the ability to kill projects. **Jamie:** Why in the '80s did this happen? **Annemarie:** ULURP was established in 1975, right? And it was trying to balance local versus citywide and boroughwide perspectives. But at that time, the final vote ended in the board of estimates. The city council didn't exist yet. Right? So in 1989, there was a charter commission that scrapped the board of estimates created by the city council. There was a lot of destructiveness from lack of representation, especially in communities of color, and so you know, what they were trying to correct for made a lot of sense, but it created this practice of member deference. The whole city council defers to the local member for a land use vote. We actually don't do this with our laws, right? **Jamie:** What do we have? 51 Council Members? Back to Windsor Terrace for a second. There's a controversial proposal to construct something that requires ULURP approval or any, basically anything in a member's district if the member decides for whatever reason. Historically they get just a deference for their preference, call it. **Annemarie:** And it's important to note in all of this, people are acting logically, but we created the community board process. Community boards are famously unrepresentative of the districts that they represent. They have an outsized voice in this. You're doing this all via hearings that are not happening at times when the majority of people can participate. Just barrier after barrier, which means that the council members end up hearing some voices far more than others. And frankly without political cover from other people, from other elected officials. **Annemarie:** Thinking about this from a boroughwide or citywide lens, they're gonna pick what's gonna make their immediate constituents least mad. **Jamie:** Yeah. I mean there are so many obvious problems of public policy with this. But I hadn't thought about it exactly this way. It's the squeaky wheel dynamic, but it's exactly what you said. Most people don't want to be on the school board. Most people don't wanna be on the community board. Most people don't wanna be on the co-op board. **Annemarie:** But our members also represent a different subset of people that actually really do want to be on their community boards and stuff. But they're not normal either, for sure. **Jamie:** It's people who really want to take the time. **Annemarie:** Yeah. And that would be fine if it weren't having a really immediate impact on who can live in New York City. The problem is that that is the binding vote for any home built in New York City. Right. If the consequences weren't so large, it might not be as big a deal, **Jamie:** But you know, if I was on a community board of, for example, a West Village Preservation group, I might say, yeah, look, whoever it is that shows up to vote or shows up to say something, does their part, and the other folks don't show up. It's not my fault. You're asking a lot of your elected officials to take into account unheard voices and opinions. **Annemarie:** You are asking a lot of one particular hyperlocal elected official, and this is why we organize people in their neighborhoods on one-off projects. But we have a growing professionalized staff that is focusing on citywide policy and most importantly, statewide policy. Because what you really need to do is deal with the issue of housing in the way you would deal with other issues of such huge social and economic importance. Well, we don't deal with any of those issues very well. **Jamie:** We don't think about the healthcare on 90th Street. **Annemarie:** But you need to set citywide and statewide policy that accounts for some of these. A really good example is what was just passed at the end of last year called City of Yes. This actually just said there's a whole set of things that just make sense to just make legal. Rather than them having to go through this rigorous moral discretionary process every single time, let's just make those things legal. And then you have just negated the need for tons of hyperlocal fights. Then similarly, you know, the real level that we're trying to work on — and other states are frankly far ahead of New York at this — is at state legislation. We're talking mostly about New York City here, but New York City suburbs have some of the most restrictive and exclusionary zoning in the entire country, right? **Annemarie:** We have parking lots next to train stations that are half an hour from Grand Central. And New York State is alone in completely allowing that to happen without any check. And they are the ones that actually grant zoning authority to all the municipalities, right? **Jamie:** Through home rule. **Annemarie:** We need to bring this all to higher levels of government also, because people don't care as much as it seems in these one-off projects. An interesting thing about this Windsor Terrace project is that the same community board that was just fighting tooth and nail over what ended up being literally a 10-story building in Windsor Terrace unanimously approved City of Yes, which does almost the same thing. **Jamie:** It's so interesting. What do you think happened? **Annemarie:** I mean, I think it was unanimous, but they might've made some recommendations and changes. But generally, it was not nearly as big a fight. I agree. If someone wants to build some massive, massive building that's like, 20 times higher, that's different, right? We're talking about stuff that's one or two stories. **Jamie:** I have this argument with people I love very much **Annemarie:** And I think, sometimes people need some line. We just need to set the line way, way further away than we do right now. **Jamie:** Yeah, absolutely. So, New York City and New York State are both behind or way behind other places in the country. Who's the leader, would you say, who's out front? **Annemarie:** Honestly, the real answer is Republican controlled states. Democratic controlled cities and states are the ones driving people out of their state. And to be honest, this is further than your question asked, but we are projected to lose a lot of actual congressional representation and electoral college representation out of that. Frankly, places like Texas are where the future of America is growing, you know? We're in Albany trying to pass things. It's Democrats blocking stuff. Democrats, right? Always. And Windsor Terrace is one of the bluest parts of the country. However, California, Colorado, Montana, Washington, Massachusetts and Oregon have all had some sort of state intervention. The state has a really, really important role to play in this. There's been a lot of research on what policies are working and what aren't. This is all really new, right? This has all passed in the last five years**.** But they are engaging with the question at a state level and not afraid that the balance of power has swung way too hyperlocal. The stakes are too high; we need to intervene. **Jamie:** Let's play a game. The game is called "Convince Me." So I'm gonna be two people. First, I'm gonna be a dues paying member of the DSA*. Anne-Marie. The rent is too high in this city. Rents are just too high. Why isn't the first order of business to make sure that rents go down? Why shouldn't we just legislate rent freezes?* **Annemarie:** First of all, landlords know that renters have far too few options. Your landlord should always be worried that you can find another apartment, not the other way around. And that is not how it works. Right now the balance of power is dramatically off. And guess who's making all the money off of scarcity: landlords. This is layers of policy problems decades in the making that we're not gonna solve overnight. The root cause of it is that we're fighting over scarcity. At Open New York, we actually have a policy agenda that includes a really wide range of things, including. Um, certain tenant protections that make a lot of sense because people are hurting right now. Tenant protections mean like eviction protections or different types of tenant protections, anti-discrimination protections, fair housing protections. We absolutely need all of those things that are not going to solve the problem for someone who doesn't live here now and wants to. **Jamie:** Mm-hmm. **Annemarie:** For someone that's stuck in an apartment that's too small for them. **Jamie:** Right. **Annemarie:** It's not the whole solution. And again, the root cause of it is that there's an imbalance of power between landlords and tenants. **Jamie:** I think that's right. I tend to think of everything through the NYCHA lens. You know, we have somewhere between five and 800,000 people living in NYCHA apartments. We have a waiting list of 250,000 people. If you think about the NYCHA tenant who makes on average of $25,000 a year, if the person living in an apartment outside of NYCHA now lives in a rent controlled apartment, then the rent never rises a dollar. They're never leaving. That, and my friend from NYCHA is never moving in. **Annemarie:** You have to create more and new options for people as well as make sure that people that have been here a long time can also stay. You also need the option to stay. Sure. But that's not the history of how New York has actually retained its diversity and vitality. **Jamie:** Agreed. Okay, next one. So now convince me: I live in, I don't know, the West Village. And there are these two lovely townhouses next to each other, just lovely, and they're for sale and the footprint. If you took them both down and took 'em down to the ground, the footprint would absolutely support a 10-story affordable housing development. *But Annemarie. I've lived in this neighborhood for 50 years and I raised my kids here. I walked my little doggy here, Jane Jacobs lived right around the corner. It would destroy the neighborhood character. So is it really worth destroying an entire neighborhood culture for one building that'll house maybe 50 people, half of whom are paying luxury rate rents?* **Annemarie:**That's a fun one. **Jamie:** Deal with that. **Annemarie:** The thing that has made your neighborhood amazing over a very long period of time is not the buildings, it's the people. You cannot freeze anything in amber, and cities that have tried to do that die. We have to be open to every way of keeping every neighborhood a place that has options for a lot of people. And the thing that makes your neighborhood exciting is the fact that it has a big mix of people. It's vibrant. This is about people that live in a city. This is not about the buildings. **Jamie:** Wow. Sounds like you hate all of us. \[Laughs\] I like the idea that you can't freeze in amber. **Annemarie:** Yeah. **Jamie:** Yeah. **Annemarie:** But there are a couple City-owned properties in these neighborhoods. Haven Green has been decades in the making of that project. Where is that? Ooh, this is a fun one. So Haven Green, Elizabeth Street Garden. **Jamie:** Yes. I got, I got a text from one of my daughters about this. *What do you think about the Elizabeth Street Garden?* I said, "gotta go." She didn't like that very much. **Annemarie:** The story of this is that it is a city-owned parcel. That's an extremely valuable asset. It was never a garden. It is a private storage yard for a person that decided to open it to the public. When the city expressed interest in redeveloping it, it was proposed to be deeply affordable LGBTQ senior housing. It has gotten stuck in lawsuit after lawsuit after lawsuit. A lot of these lawsuits are tied to a whole 'nother can of worms. We could go down the process of environmental review, which is a bit of a misnomer because it doesn't necessarily measure things that have to do with climate and the environment and things that we care about. It becomes a really, really good way to create frivolous lawsuits to stop projects. And this one was a really big case of that, and it's been stalled for a full decade. **Jamie:** There's a bunch of celebrities that are supportive. Name one. **Annemarie:** I believe Patti Smith has signed on, which is sad because I love Patti Smith. **Jamie:** That is probably why I got the text from my daughter. Yeah. Because she's a huge Patti Smith fan, and I love Patti Smith. How do we reeducate Patti Smith so we can change the trajectory of housing development? **Annemarie:** It's just the New York City that Patti Smith wrote about is a very different city right now. **Jamie:** It's so true. It really is true. It's a very different city.. **Annemarie:** And we're really at risk of losing the magic of it. **Jamie:** But it's hard to convince people that it's magical to have a 10-story newly constructed building that's gonna house a bunch of affordable stuff and then a bunch of kids who are gonna work at Goldman Sachs or something. **Annemarie:** It's also tough that one building's not gonna do it. **Jamie:** No. **Annemarie:** I have this pet theory — and I studied architecture, so maybe it comes from that. Humans like things that feel lived in. And a new building by definition is not gonna feel that way. Right? So there are buildings that were once hated for being new or being tall at their time, but nobody thinks about that anymore. Another thing, though, is that one building's not gonna do it. If we actually had smart policy across the entire region… **Jamie:** If we had a citywide housing plan. Right where you said we're gonna allocate housing across the boroughs equally, in some measure. And it was fair, we wouldn't have to build in every corner because we'd be building everywhere. **Annemarie:** If you did that across the whole region, all of this would feel different. It's just, how do you create a big enough movement and momentum and understanding that that's possible? Because we're never gonna solve this through one off projects. **Jamie:** Alright, so tell me, with all of this complexity of politics — and I will give you credit for this — there's been a change, I think. What do you think? **Annemarie:** Yeah. Far more people across the political spectrum and far more elected officials say we need more homes. That didn't used to be accepted even four years ago. Projects I was really proud to work on when I was at the City, the Gowanus rezoning and the Soho/NoHo rezoning, started to create more momentum that everywhere needed to build something, including these places that have sort of been defacto off limits. That laid the groundwork for City of Yes, which was frankly the first pro-housing win New York City has seen. It's the only thing that I put on our tally when we compare ourselves to other states. **Jamie:** What is the next priority for you in Albany? **Annemarie:** We are working on a bill with a big coalition of faith-based organizations called the Faith-Based Affordable Housing Act, which is the state saying, okay, let's just legalize housing, set affordability requirements, set height requirements smart and fill housing for land owned by faith-based organizations. A really good example of a leading member of our coalition is a pastor in Rotterdam, NY, who has a parking lot on land that the church owns. For three years, they have been trying to build a three-story building of affordable housing in a neighborhood that has three-story buildings for anyone in their community. They know how dire the need is for more housing, and they figured out how to do this. They got down zoned in the dead of night by their town board because they don't want a building. The only recourse for that is to have a higher level of government say you can't do that, right? So that is exactly the type of thing that a piece of state legislation should do and should make happen faster. It's just that this is a new thing for Albany. Frankly, getting anything done in Albany is, um… **Jamie:** It is a challenge, but my experience of being in Albany is that if you don't show up, you don't get anything done. So you have to give it a shot. I'm weirdly optimistic about things in general, notwithstanding that when you wake up in the morning and you look around, it's a little hard to be. But then you look at the City of Yes. It's complex. It's politically controversial, and it was backed by a mayor who is wildly unpopular, and at the time was in the middle of being indicted, and it passed. **Annemarie:** Totally. And again, I am a hopeful person by nature. Otherwise I should go to a different profession. But the movement is so young. So young. I mean, we didn't even exist in this organization four years ago. We're building an actual constituency to make it possible for elected officials to take votes on this. **Jamie:** Well, you will be successful. Because you're on the right side of this and we can't continue to have this problem. And then, when you're successful and you get something passed in Albany, whether it's faith-based or something more comprehensive, it'll look like it happened overnight, but it's like everything — nothing happens overnight. It takes a long time for it to happen. So, great work. **Annemarie:** Thank you. **Jamie:** That was a great conversation with Annemarie. Here are a couple of takeaways. Number one, Annemarie has actually been a lot more successful in her work over the last couple of years, and she's only been running the organization for — I think — three years, than a lot of full-time real estate developers-sponsored lobbying groups have been in a much longer time, even though they've got a lot more resources at their disposal. I think part of it is because people can tell that authenticity really matters in a lot of ways, and she is authentic. Her members are authentic. They live in the communities where they're members, and so when they get up in a public meeting and say that the community needs something, they speak from knowledge. They're often speaking against people who may either come from the community but have some other deleterious motive, or they sometimes come from outside the community. She's just super smart and she can't be attacked on the grounds that she's got some kind of ulterior motive. She just wants what she wants and again, I think people, even legislators, can pick up when somebody really is coming from the right place. And that does matter still. Number two. Open New York is part of the YIMBY movement, which is really at this point, a national movement, and they've been really successful in a lot of different places. At the same time, there's been this surge of interest in something that people are calling abundance, and it's taken off in part because influential commentators are writing books about it and talking about it on podcasts and all that kinda stuff, like Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson. It seems like there's a lot of overlap between abundance and YIMBY, let's call it. I mean, maybe it's just me intellectually, but I find it kind of unsatisfying to think about them as if they're the same thing. The work that Annemarie does doesn't necessarily translate into deregulation, which is a lot of what abundance theorists seem to be talking about. It's not deregulation. It's often just better government. Deregulation is taking a particular sector, whatever environmental regulation or something and figuring out what is still important and what is not, thenweeding out regulations that are either not relevant anymore or conning them down or whatever it is. The kind of rezoning work that Annmarie is pushing for aims to get to a point where it's not that there's no zoning and unfettered development everywhere. It's that you can have intelligence, zoning and development that makes sense for the communities that are in question. The ultimate goal is to spread housing around, but not indiscriminately so that you have sprawl everywhere. It's to put housing where people wanna live and make for fair, equitable and sensible — economically and otherwise — housing. Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### Rethinking Gun Violence URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/jens-ludwig-interview/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:33.000Z *Sometimes an idea comes around to solve a hard problem that is so stunningly simple you wonder why no one had thought of it before. And once it sticks in your mind, it is impossible to unthink it, as it rearranges your world.* *This is the effect of the argument that*[ *Jens Ludwig*](https://harris.uchicago.edu/directory/jens-ludwig?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*, an economics professor at the University of Chicago, makes in* [*"Unforgiving Places."*](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo244203115.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Ludwig has been studying gun violence for 30 years as both a researcher and a doer. He founded*[ *the University of Chicago Crime Lab*](https://crimelab.uchicago.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *as a place where ideas — often sourced from neighborhood groups — could be tested with a rigor that is usually reserved for medical science. It has become a wellspring of important ideas to reduce gun violence, many of which have their roots in behavioral science.* *In his new book, Ludwig argues that both the "lock 'em up" and the "solve poverty" approaches have missed the central driver of most gun violence: the seemingly uncontrollable impulse of the moment. This insight has important implications for a country that has a long track record of failure when it comes to preventing violence. (Our rates of mortality from violence remain where they were in the 1900s even as advances in science have radically reduced mortality from disease.)* *Ludwig shows how changing individual behavior is in fact possible — and that these changes can result in dramatic declines in gun violence. His erudite but engaging book provides a ray of hope about this perniciously American, confoundingly intractable and tragically damaging problem.* *Vital City sat down with Ludwig last month. This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.* **Vital City:** Reading your book, I'm just struck by its incredible richness. It does so many things at once: It's social history. It's an intellectual history. It's a history of government. Most importantly, it weaves all that together to show a new way of thinking about addressing gun violence. Could we start with you explaining how you think our current approach to dealing with gun violence has put us on the wrong foot? **Jens Ludwig:** I wrote the book largely because after working on this problem for 30 years, I had an epiphany: much of what we think we know about gun violence might be wrong or incomplete. This might explain our lack of progress. So, if you look at survey data, it shows that most Americans think about what causes gun violence in one of two ways. Those right-of-center often see it as a problem of incorrigibly bad people who are unafraid of whatever the criminal justice system is going to do to them. If that's your view, the only thing to do about the problem is have ever harsher penalties. But those left-of-center view gun violence as being caused by economically desperate people doing whatever it takes to feed their families. This leads to the belief that the only way to solve this problem is in improving the alternatives to crime — better jobs, a stronger social safety net. We've toggled between either carrots or sticks being the two policy levers for over the last hundred years. The thing that these carrot and stick ways of thinking have in common is that they both assume that before anyone pulls a trigger, they are actually thinking in deliberate, premeditated ways about what the consequences of their actions would be. If this is the underlying assumption, then incentives, positive or negative, naturally seem like the solution. But I think that, for starters, this misses what the gun violence problem in America actually is. When you actually look at the data, the overwhelming majority of shootings in America are arguments. They start with words, they end in tragedy because someone's got a gun. This is not the sort of violence that incentives are going to solve. **VC:** In some ways, your approach is that of the ultimate realist: You can't solve poverty, or solve it quickly enough to stop gun violence. And you can't change the number of guns in circulation — 400 million guns. But you say: We can change behavior. To me, that seems like the hardest thing of all. **JL:** Yeah. Before I get to that, I would start with two things I hope readers take from the book: a new understanding of the problem, and at least as important, that people feel even a sliver of optimism about a problem that I think lots of people have essentially given up on. And I think the reason people have given up is that we have 400 million guns in a country of 330 million people, and they aren't going anywhere. The odds we get the kind of UK-style gun laws that you'd need to dramatically make a difference in gun availability to high-risk people, doesn't look like that's happening anytime soon. The main problem with guns in America is that they make violent crime deadlier: Gun Violence equals Guns plus Violence. If we can't get rid of the guns, maybe we can reduce the violence. That gives us a second path. And New York City showed this was possible — a 90% drop in murders from 1991 to 2019\. That wasn't due to removing all the guns; it was a behavior change. **VC:** You show the historical trend lines — the rise and fall of gun violence — but note we might be hitting a floor. Is behavior change the key to breaking through this floor? That seems pretty daunting. **JL:** "Behavior change" sounds really difficult. Yes, it's a "you'll have to carry me out in a pine box before I give up coffee" kind of thing. But what I've learned from working on this problem for 30 years is that a huge share of shootings are mistakes made in difficult situations — actions people later regret. Instead of "behavior change," think about it as helping people avoid mistakes they themselves would regret, made under pressure. That feels more achievable. I think some of the most important breakthroughs in the last part of the 20th century were the things we learned from behavioral economics and science that show how much differently our brains work than we intuitively understand. Our minds employ two types of thinking, but we're typically only aware of one. We recognize "thinking" as the deliberate, logical voice in our head — weighing pros and cons. This is System 2 thinking: slow, often rational, but also mentally taxing. Think about how drained you feel after 15 minutes of a tough crossword puzzle. You're like, "I need to take the rest of the day off." Because System 2 is so effortful, our minds evolved a second, parallel type of thinking: System 1\. This is fast, automatic, low-effort thinking that operates below consciousness, handling routine situations. When you see a word, you read it automatically. You don't deliberately think: oh, here's a word, should I actually read it? [Danny Kahneman](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2002/kahneman/biographical/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), in ["Thinking, Fast and Slow,"](https://www.google.com/search?q=https://www.britannica.com/science/System-1-thinking-and-System-2-thinking&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) labels slow, effortful thinking System 2 and fast, automatic thinking System 1\. What my book is arguing is that we've largely treated gun violence as a System 2 problem — a deliberate weighing of consequences — when it's far more influenced by System 1 than we've appreciated. And all our policies and incentives are designed to address the slow thinking, rational part of the brain. So it's no wonder that the murder rate today in America is almost exactly the same as it was in 1900, right? — we've misunderstood the problem and applied the wrong levers. It's crucial to recognize this tendency is universal. Poker players talk about "going on tilt" — playing emotionally rather than rationally (that is, System 1 rather than System 2) when frustrated. The term comes from pinball machines flashing "TILT" if jostled. Experienced poker players learn to recognize their tilt triggers, what tilt feels like, and how to recover quickly. They benefit from a feedback loop — trial and error over many hands — an opportunity most of us lack in high-stakes real-world situations. > What I've learned from working on this problem for 30 years is that a huge share of shootings are mistakes made in difficult situations — actions people later regret. **VC:** This connects to your point that it's not just about "bad people". How our brains react and the decisions we make are heavily influenced by our situations. Living in a neighborhood with constant gunfire taxes mental bandwidth differently than a peaceful environment. Your reaction to conflict could be vastly different depending on the context. **JL:** Exactly. If you think about the problem as mistakes made in difficult situations, I think one way to think about what's going on, is that there are some situations that make it much more likely that you'll make a mistake, go on tilt. And in some situations and some neighborhoods, the consequences of those mistakes are much more severe. The 20th-century debate often centered on whether behavior is driven by inherent traits versus situational factors. Is it the person or the situation? My book argues that the left has been right to focus on the importance of situations. But the tendency to focus on really hard-to-change macro issues like poverty and segregation has led us to overlook other aspects of people's social environments that matter enormously and are much easier to change. To see that big root causes don't capture all the situational factors that matter for gun violence, you just have to look at two adjacent neighborhoods on Chicago's South Side: Greater Grand Crossing and South Shore. They share the same demographics and the same level of poverty (and, for that matter, the same justice system and gun laws), yet the shooting rate per capita is twice as high in Greater Grand Crossing. So what are these under-appreciated, feasible-to-modify aspects of the social environment? Thinking about gun violence as "mistakes made in difficult situations" points us in the right direction. Some situations increase the likelihood of making a mistake (engaging System 1 inappropriately), while others, often in the same neighborhoods, make the consequences of those mistakes far more severe. These things are correlated with big "root causes" but they're not exactly the same thing. Why might people be more likely to make mistakes in some neighborhoods than others? Because there are more stressors there. My friends Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, in their wonderful book "Scarcity," show how stressors deplete mental bandwidth in ways that make people less reliant on the mentally taxing System 2 type of slow thinking and more reliant on the lower-effort System 1 fast thinking. And you can see in the data that there are more stressors of all sorts in Greater Grand Crossing than in South Shore, ranging from more premature mortality — for example, COVID hit harder there — meaning more residents are grieving and traumatized, to more physical disorder — graffiti, trash, vacant lots — things Vital City focuses on. Why might the consequences of these mistakes be more severe in some neighborhoods than others? Because of what Jane Jacobs, the giant of urban planning, called "eyes on the street" and what sociologists "collective efficacy" — the willingness of community members to intervene informally. This second factor, the presence of informal social control, also varies dramatically between neighborhoods. South Shore benefits from the accident of history of sitting right next to the crown jewel of Chicago – Lake Michigan — and so has lots more commercial development mixed in among its houses and apartment buildings, which serve the function of drawing people out into public to go to the store or local restaurant — to create, in other words, more eyes on the street. That's notably less true in Greater Grand Crossing, which has more vacant lots, lower population density and less commercial activity, and so has fewer people around to step in and interrupt potentially violent events before they turn deadly. **VC:** Your examples are pretty vivid. Living where a loud bang is likely gunfire, not a backfire, puts you constantly on edge. You might carry a gun for self-preservation, making an impulsive, defensive reaction more likely if you feel threatened — a reaction you might not have in a less stressful environment. We all experience stress and react impulsively sometimes, like in traffic, but the stakes are usually much lower. **JL:** Exactly. And the stakes differ partly due to the varying prevalence of gangs, guns and drugs across neighborhoods. But another critical factor is the social environment's capacity to cushion mistakes. This is something that happens to all of us. Here's one example. I've lived in Hyde Park, the University of Chicago neighborhood, for 18 years. Every Wednesday morning, I walk my dog, Aiko, while on a conference call with the senior leadership team of my research center, [the University of Chicago Crime Lab](https://crimelab.uchicago.edu/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). One morning, a neighbor's off-leash dog charged towards me, baring its teeth, barking and snarling. My deliberate self would've thought: what's the worst thing that's going to happen here? My dog is 65 pounds — a lover, not a fighter. It's very possible she could've taken care of herself. Or I could've just lifted her up. Worst-case scenario is maybe she gets bitten and I take her to the vet. That's not the end of the world. The thing that would be really bad is for me to lose my mind in front of another University of Chicago faculty member in front of everyone who lives in my neighborhood. I wasn't planning on moving, and they weren't planning on moving, and so rational Jens would've behaved one way. But actual Jens totally went on tilt and used every four-letter word I could think of. At high volume in front of everyone in the neighborhood and with the senior leadership of my center on the phone. This is System 1 at work, and making mistakes. I instantly assumed malicious intent ("How could this jerk let his dog off leash?") when it was likely an accident. My neighbor likely felt unfairly attacked for an honest mistake. We both felt justified, a common feature in violent interactions. What de-escalated it wasn't our rationality, but a University of Chicago security guard who came by and said, "You guys alright, or do you need me to call the police?" That broke it up then and there. About 60 years ago, Jane Jacobs coined a term for that in her wonderful book, "The Death and Life of Great American Cities," which is "eyes on the street." Then 30 years ago, [Rob Sampson, Steve Raudenbush and Tony Earls](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/210356?seq=1&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) had a related term, "collective efficacy," the willingness of people to step in and break things up. The presence of eyes on the street or whatever you want to call it helps keep a lid on the social environment that varies across neighborhoods. Luckily, we were in Hyde Park, nobody had a gun and there was someone around to step in and deescalate it. In Greater Grand Crossing, for example, there are way more vacant lots, way fewer people walking around, so who's available to step in and deescalate? > To see that big root causes don't capture all the situational factors that matter for gun violence, you just have to look at two adjacent neighborhoods on Chicago's South Side: Greater Grand Crossing and South Shore. **VC:** One feature of the deescalation is the interruption of system one thinking, right? That officer asking you "everything okay here?" forces you to back off, pause and let System 2 re-engage: "I have to see this guy again; maybe this isn't so serious; maybe I was wrong." **JL:** Yeah, exactly. Novelty and high stakes tend to activate System 2\. In the moment, I was catastrophizing about my dog — once System 1 concluded literally nothing is worse than having my dog attacked, then screaming at this guy in front of my work colleagues and the whole neighborhood seemed (mistakenly) less bad. The security guard's question was like a bucket of cold water: Wake up System 2, you do not want the police department to come into this. **VC:** In more unforgiving environments, without that intervention, the escalation continues. And the catastrophizing — "There's nothing worse than looking like a coward in front of my friends" — can lead you to doing something that will affect the rest of your life. **JL:** Exactly. And one thing I would add is that those system 1responses aren't always mistakes. We have them because they make sense in neighborhoods where, for example, social control has broken down, where there aren't many storekeepers, or lots of adults around or whatever. Kids learn that it is really important to develop reputations as not being easy victims. Because if someone challenges you today for your lunch money and you just hand it over, tomorrow they're coming back for your jacket, the day after for your phone. You learn to push back — not necessarily in a way that's proportional — because it's not retaliation for what just happened, it's forward-looking. I'm signaling, "don't mess with me, I'm not an easy victim." **VC:** So, we've been talking a little bit theoretically. But you, the Crime Lab and others have translated these ideas into concrete interventions. Programs like Becoming a Man (BAM) and Choose to Change show significant results — reductions in violence involvement and arrests. These programs seem animated by the same core behavioral ideas. You suggest behavioral economics could provide a "map for the end to gun violence nationwide." What does this map look like? How do we implement it? **JL:** At a high level, the map involves pivoting away from an exclusive focus on changing incentives towards recognizing the problem of gun violence as one of people making mistakes in difficult, unforgiving situations. Concretely, this takes two forms. One is, how do we help people be less likely to make mistakes (go on tilt) in high-stakes situations? And then how do we reduce the chances that going on tilt leads to disaster? Think about the poker analogy again. Players learn through constant feedback — trial and error over many hands. Losing $5,000 after going on tilt is painful but not catastrophic, and it provides a valuable lesson. So losing $5,000 isn't great, but it's not the end of the world. But most people never get that feedback, especially for high-stakes decisions. Newer, behavioral economics-informed social programs aim to provide this practice. Traditional programs, assuming poverty drives violence, focus on job training, income support and things like that. While addressing poverty is vital for its own sake, if the goal is specifically ending gun violence, we also need programs that directly help people recognize their triggers, understand what being "on tilt" feels like and learn strategies to manage it — much like poker players do. Programs like [Becoming a Man](https://www.google.com/search?q=https://youthguidance.org/programs/becoming-a-man/&ref=vitalcitynyc.org), [Choose to Change](https://educationlab.uchicago.edu/projects/choose-to-change/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [READI Chicago](https://crimelab.uchicago.edu/projects/readi/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) give participants practice in simulated high-pressure situations, allowing them to recognize, anticipate and adjust their responses. The other key is that they're engaging, letting people practice, not just be talked at — they're "show, don't tell" programs. > How do we help people be less likely to make mistakes in high-stakes situations? And then how do we reduce the chances that going on tilt leads to disaster? The challenge is scaling these interventions. One way to do so is to leverage existing social systems — schools and detention facilities — which currently contain vast amounts of low-value time. Think about required health education classes. For years, we teach teens things they often already know or ignore, like eating broccoli or where babies come from. Yet, the biggest health risks for teens are gun violence (especially among minority teens), suicide, drug overdose and car accidents. These behavioral economics programs typically require only 15-20 hours total. Why not repurpose a small fraction of that time in classes that no one wants to go to — using the same teachers, students and buildings — to deliver content proven to reduce violence and improve adolescent health outcomes? We should implement this in schools and similarly integrate it into programming within jails and juvenile detention centers, replacing unproductive time. **VC:** I love that idea because it drips these ideas into the drinking water in a wholesale way that seems really important. As you were talking, it made me think that, if you pull the camera back, there's a kind of institutional version of System 1 and System 2 thinking. System 1 is the institutional and hardwired response to call the police. And police can do a lot of things but not necessarily everything. And then there's societal system 2 thinking, which might be lighting dark places, cleaning up abandoned buildings. I'm wondering, does the larger social structure shift the dominant paradigms — "bad people" requiring punishment or "root causes" being the only solution — that have stalled us? This behavioral economics framework seems uniquely positioned to navigate the typical left-right divides. How does it become more broadly accepted? **JL:** Firstly, I hope the book helps by providing the underlying coherent idea that connects seemingly disparate, evidence-based interventions like community violence interruption, cleaning vacant lots, and behavioral economics-style programs. Imagine trying to understand the response to the COVID pandemic without a unifying theory, like the germ theory for disease: masking, social distancing, vaccines — it just looks like a random laundry list. This book tries to provide that consilience, showing how different approaches are actually facets of the same underlying principle. Hopefully, this helps people see a unified third way, beyond just bad people or bad conditions. Secondly, we need to acknowledge our collective track record of failure. If we were succeeding, we wouldn't need new ideas. But the U.S. murder rate hasn't fundamentally changed in over a century, unlike almost every other major cause of death, which all have plummeted. We clearly haven't mastered this. Cities compete for residents and businesses, creating a dynamic for change. [Look at Los Angeles and New York](https://www.chicagotribune.com/2015/09/18/a-tale-of-3-cities-la-and-nyc-outpace-chicago-in-curbing-violence/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org): In 1991, their murder rates were nearly identical to Chicago's. [Since then](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/18/us/chicago-murder-problem.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), L.A.'s rate dropped significantly, and New York's plummeted by almost 90%. This prompts other cities, like Chicago, to ask what they did differently. While perhaps not always intentional, many strategies employed by L.A. and New York align with this behavioral perspective. Hopefully, presenting a coherent framework, combined with inter-city competition, can create a flywheel effect, pushing cities to adopt more effective, evidence-based approaches. **VC:** You talk in the book about an "FDA for public policy" that doesn't exist. And in a way, you're playing that role — showing what the evidence says works. **JL:** Yes. The reason we don't have an FDA for policy is because we see these as political fights, not technical challenges. The right says gun violence equals bad people. The left says gun violence equals bad conditions. The real issue is complex and hasn't been solved because we haven't used data well. That's the promise of evidence-based policy. Social problems persist because they're complicated, not because one side is evil. And we're on the steep part of the learning curve. **VC:** That's a hopeful note, especially now. These ideas sidestep the left-right binary. Some last reflections? **JL:** Yes. One aha moment was reading the history. James Q. Wilson, a conservative icon, architect of what became mass incarceration, was originally open to crime prevention. But in the 1970s, the prevailing view was that prevention didn't work. So he pivoted to punishment, pragmatically. Now, we have gold-standard evidence — randomized trials — showing prevention works. My hope is that people across the political spectrum, who can all see that prevention is clearly the first-best way to deal with this terrible problem, can get on board with this agenda once they're really convinced that gun violence is more preventable than we've long thought. From there we can really change things. **VC:** That's a hopeful and a pragmatic note. Not about right or wrong, but about what works. Thanks so much, Jens. **JL:** Thank you. ### When New York City Truly Teetered on the Brink URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/drop-dead-city-review/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:02.000Z If I were running beleaguered Mayor Adams' reelection campaign, I would do everything in my power to have each and every voter watch "Drop Dead City." It gives us gloomy New Yorkers a healthy dose of perspective. The 108-minute documentary, directed by Peter Yost and Michael Rohatyn and [now screening at IFC Center](https://www.ifccenter.com/films/drop-dead-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), offers an almost lighthearted account of New York City's 1975 minuet with bankruptcy. Through rich use of archival footage and interviews with the men and women who navigated us through the crisis, "Drop Dead City" captures one of the city's most harrowing episodes. As hard as it might be to imagine today, but for the last-minute change of heart on the part of the teachers union president to participate in a public bond offering, the greatest city in the world would have defaulted on its public debt. A bankruptcy filing appeared inevitable. But "Drop Dead City" is more than simply a faithful retelling of the city's brush with disaster. It is also a valuable period piece which perfectly captures the city at its most dystopian, dysfunctional and, yes, utterly wonderful. You think the streets are dirty now? Wait until you see the mountains of trash piling up on the sidewalks during the sanitation workers' strike. Do voters have crime on their minds? In 1975, a year when the population was less than 7.5 million, 1,645 people were killed in the five boroughs, more than four times the 377 who were killed in our city of 8.5 million last year (FYI, 2025 is running 25% below 2024's level). And fires? Fuggedaboutit. Entire neighborhoods were seemingly engulfed in flames, the result of arson for profit and arson for fun. "Firemen were dealing literally with this apocalypse," noted one historian. "There were fires everywhere." You think our infrastructure is crumbling now? Well, one day in 1975, three northbound lanes of the West Side Highway collapsed, and 50 tons of hot asphalt spilled onto the service road below. Even the lamented toll takers got into the act, bringing traffic to a standstill by simply lifting the drawbridges. In 1975, I was something of a New York City immigrant myself, having moved from the suburbs to attend the Upper West Side progressive oasis called the Walden School. Of course I recall the graffiti, decay, garbage and violence. But what sticks with me was the thrill of magically discovering a city pulsating with life, ideas and diversity. "Drop Dead City" manages to convey the good and bad of New York without making it ugly. For the most part, 2025 New York compares favorably to that of 1975\. But in one area, today's city comes up wanting: In that era, the city was blessed with a surplus of mature, far-thinking civic leaders who helped pull us back from the fiscal brink. If things suddenly turned that bleak these days, it's hard to imagine such brilliant and farsighted people rising to meet the moment. The film's title is based on the iconic October 30, 1975 [Daily News headline](https://www.nydailynews.com/2015/10/29/ford-to-city-drop-dead-in-1975/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "Ford to City: Drop Dead." At the time, New York City and State were seeking federal loans to forestall bankruptcy. President Gerald Ford resisted the bailout, saying it was not the federal government's responsibility to reward liberal New York City's profligate spending. The Daily News headline came to symbolize the city's toughness; for some of us, it is also a reminder of when our local press was an integral part of public discourse. Eventually, Ford capitulated; later he blamed the headline for contributing to his 1976 electoral loss to Jimmy Carter. The 1970s fiscal crisis was eventually resolved by high-pressure negotiations between the banks, unions, and state and city officials. A half century later, it is still inspiring to watch these people at work. In particular, three dedicated New Yorkers from utterly different backgrounds emerged as true New York heroes. One was New York Gov. **Hugh Carey**, who inherited the mess from his predecessor, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller. Carey, a recent widower who in the film is shown sweetly making breakfast for his young children, put together a financial package for the city whereby the newly formed Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) would provide fiscal oversight for the city's finances. Carey proved an eloquent proponent of working to save the city. **Victor Gotbaum** was the powerful and feisty leader of the city's largest municipal labor union, D.C. 37, which had over 100,000 members. While Gotbaum initially saw the fiscal struggle as one between the union and the rapacious banks balking at buying the City's bonds, he eventually rose to the challenge of the time by negotiating concessions from the banks and the City, in exchange for the union's participation in the City's municipal bond offering. Finally, there was **Felix Rohatyn,** the European-born investment banker who brought the parties together, negotiated a final rescue package and served as MAC's first chair. The soft-spoken Rohatyn actually offers one of the more prescient lines in the film, when he's asked if New York City can survive. "I think ultimately the federal government has to realize you can't have an industrially advanced culture without having thriving urban centers." (Co-director Michael Rohatyn is Felix Rohatyn's son.) One cannot help but wonder whether our business and union leaders, not to mention our governor and mayor, would have the mettle to lead the city through a comparable crisis today. Cowardly responses to the menace from Washington from our mayor, a certain university and several giant law firms suggests they do not. I loved being transported back to a time of New Yorkers wearing Afros, when salsa music was in the air, men sported wide sideburns and women wore coke-bottle glasses and spoke with thick New York accents. It's a great time. That said, I do wish the filmmakers had more deeply explored the lessons of the crisis. They take a rather goodhearted approach to governmental accountability — with the exception of Nelson Rockefeller's overambitious social welfare schemes, no individual really gets much criticism. John Lindsay, mayor for the eight years preceding Mayor Abe Beame and one of the people who effectively helped land the city in the soup, barely merits a mention. Why exactly did New York face the abyss in 1975? For those who worry about history repeating itself, it is crucial to answer this question accurately. Was it because the City was simply too generous with its municipal unions, free college tuition and public hospital system? This is known as the high cost of good intentions. Or was it because the City was caught flat-footed by economic forces beyond its control, i.e. the collapse of the manufacturing and industrial job base? Still, whatever its shortcomings as a work of history, "Drop Dead City" shines as a love letter to the city. It reminds us how, even in what was then our darkest hour (this was before 9/11), the city's disparate interests united behind a common purpose. Our current leaders — business, non-profit, political and labor — would do well to apply these lessons to our current crisis. ### The Bizarro New Deal: Trump’s Dark Inversion of FDR’s First 100 Days URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/trumps-bizarro-new-deal/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:03.000Z Not long after President Trump took office, Elon Musk stood onstage at the Conservative Political Action Conference [waving a chainsaw](https://apnews.com/article/musk-chainsaw-trump-doge-6568e9e0cfc42ad6cdcfd58a409eb312?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It was an appropriate prop for Musk, who at one point said his Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, could cut ["at least $2 trillion"](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4j33klz33o?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in federal spending. It was also an apt image for the Trump administration as a whole, which has slashed its way through not only the government but major American institutions and legal and societal norms. We are now 100 days in, which has been a much-heralded benchmark for presidencies since 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt's first One Hundred Days were hailed for reviving a nation paralyzed by economic depression. It is clear that Trump's first 100 days have been a mirror image of FDR's — a funhouse mirror image that renders things upside down and in reverse. While FDR's first few months were dedicated to establishing new and dynamic governmental departments, creating a social safety net that recognized society's responsibility for its most vulnerable members, and building things, Trump has been hard at work destroying federal agencies, firing workers and gutting welfare programs — and leaving destruction in his wake. The differences between the 47th and 32nd presidents are seen in personality as well as substance. Roosevelt was, famously, the man with a ["first-class temperament,"](https://www.amazon.com/First-Class-Temperament-Emergence-Roosevelt-1905-1928/dp/0804173354?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who in his first One Hundred Days promised Americans that "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself" and invented the Fireside Chat to reassure Americans that they would survive bank failures and mass unemployment. Trump's temperament could be regarded as "last-class," and he has given Americans many new things to fear — from losing their life savings in a tariff-driven stock market crash to being rounded up and thrown in a prison cell in Louisiana. In his governing style, Roosevelt was likened to a self-effacing "master of ceremonies" of his own administration, putting brilliant thinkers and doers in top positions and empowering them to follow their visions. Trump is, by contrast, a petulant autocrat, issuing pronouncements that seem to have emerged fully formed from his own id, which his advisors then scramble to make sense of and carry out. But there are also uncanny similarities between Trump and Roosevelt. Both men were the scions of wealthy New York families with famous last names. Both were desultory students who nevertheless found their way to the Ivy League. And both were swept into the White House on a populist wave, promising to remake the country. With this combination of external similarities and more deep-seated differences, Trump is something of a "bizarro Roosevelt" — in the tradition of "Bizarro Superman" in the classic comic book, or "Bizarro Jerry" on "Seinfeld" — and what we are now living through looks like a dramatic inversion of Roosevelt's presidency, a "bizarro New Deal." > Trump's temperament could be regarded as "last-class," and he has given Americans many new things to fear — from losing their life savings in a tariff-driven stock market crash to being rounded up and thrown in a prison cell in Louisiana. FDR's first One Hundred Days thoroughly deserve their reputation as a time of unrivaled government action and extraordinary results. In this short period, Roosevelt shepherded 15 major laws through Congress and created an array of new agencies and regulatory regimes, from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to rescue starving farmers to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to protect families' bank accounts. It was, as [the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has said](https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/arts/21fearexcerpt.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "a presidential barrage of ideas and programs unlike anything known to American history." While they were expanding the government, the New Dealers were also building up the nation. To give jobs to millions of unemployed people, FDR launched the Works Progress Administration, which constructed buildings and schools, more than half a million miles of streets and more than 10,000 bridges. The Civilian Conservation Corps put millions of unemployed men to work planting trees and improving national parks, and the Tennessee Valley Authority stimulated economic development in one of the nation's poorest regions. There was so much visible progress in every direction that the journalist Earnest K. Lindley declared that "the nation was bewildered, thrilled, happy with hope." If FDR gave the nation 100 days of building, Trump has given us 100 days of tearing down. He has been trying to kill off the Department of Education and the Voice of America, and he has been hollowing out many other agencies. The cuts are wiping out a wide array of basic government functions. The Department of Health and Human Services cut, or otherwise lost, 20,000 jobs, including experts on disease tracking and drug approvals, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Food and Drug Administration are likely to lose 20% of their staff. The administration plans to eliminate the research department of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and close weather and climate labs, gutting weather forecasting and early warning systems for natural disasters. Trump has also been wreaking havoc on the rule of law. He and Musk have demonized federal judges for simply doing their jobs, excoriating them on social media and calling for their impeachment. And harsh new immigration policies have so degraded legal norms that the administration deported a Maryland man to El Salvador erroneously, and has refused to bring him back despite a Supreme Court order. And Trump has said [he is considering putting some American citizens](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/25/trump-americans-foreign-prisons-interview-00309297?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) who are convicted of crimes in prison in El Salvador, rather than the United States. The Trumpian chainsaw has not been confined to government. The administration has withheld or threatened to withhold more than $12 billion in government funding from universities, and it has been slashing funding for cutting-edge scientific research. Francis Collins, a geneticist who headed the National Institutes of Health under three presidents, has said that this assault "tears the long-standing fabric of the government's contract to pursue medical research that seeks to better the healthspan and lifespan for all Americans." > There are also uncanny similarities between Trump and Roosevelt. Both men were the scions of wealthy New York families with famous last names. Both were desultory students who nevertheless found their way to the Ivy League. And both were swept into the White House on a populist wave, promising to remake the country. Not all of the destruction has been intentional. Trump's tariffs, which have the purported goal of strengthening American companies, are having the opposite effect. CNBC [recently warned](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/12/trump-tariffs-on-china-mean-irreversible-damage-for-most-businesses.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that "Trump tariffs on China will soon bring 'irreversible' damage to many American businesses." Even worse, hedge fund billionaire Ray Dalio [had cautioned](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/13/billionaire-ray-dalio-im-worried-about-something-worse-than-a-recession.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the tariffs could break the global financial system. Trump insists that he is adopting his most destructive policies for high-minded reasons, but these claims are hardly convincing. The administration says it is withholding funding from universities because they have not done enough to clamp down on antisemitism. But there are many ways it could fight antisemitism — including aggressive civil rights lawsuits, and more targeted funding cuts — that would not threaten the functioning of our leading universities. Similarly, there are many ways the nation could take a tougher line on immigration without deporting actual citizens or ignoring court orders. It is clear that the administration is pursuing destruction for its own sake. Some of it fits an ideological agenda, like shuttering USAID and making undocumented immigrants live in fear. But much of it does not — where, exactly, is the constituency for stopping promising cancer research? Its real roots seem to be more psychological than political. Freud wrote of a fundamental drive called thanatos, also known as the "death drive," that represents "the aggressive instincts, whose aim is destruction." Destructive energy has animated a great deal of Trump's life, from his star turn on "The Apprentice," where he humiliated contestants with the catchphrase "You're fired" to his love of attending bloody mixed martial arts fights — something he did, this month, with Musk and members of his Cabinet. This dark inclination seems to have played a large role in setting the policies of the past three months. At the end of Roosevelt's first One Hundred Days — which could be said to have been driven by eros, thanatos' opposite, the drive to preserve life — he had created the beginnings of a compassionate, well-functioning modern state. FDR gave us a regulated stock market, savings account insurance, support for farmers and jobs and benefits for the poor. Those hundred days were the moment when America as we now know it emerged. In Trump's first One Hundred Days, we have seen a very different kind of New Deal. Our universities and science laboratories are reeling. America's economic prosperity, and its place as the world's economic leader, are in danger. People are worried about their futures in a way they were not before inauguration day. And there are still three years and nine months to go in this presidency. It is possible that all of the damage can be reversed — but it is certainly not inevitable, even if the Democrats take back the White House and both houses of Congress. It is far from certain that the nation will ever again have the political resolve to fund the agencies and institutions Trump has targeted at the same level they once were. And guarantees like the rule of law, once taken away, are difficult to restore. It is easy, the saying goes, to turn an aquarium into fish soup, and very hard to do the reverse. It's critical that we find a way to turn down the heat. [Adam Cohen](https://vital-city.obox.agency//contributors/adam-cohen?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is author of "Nothing to Fear: FDR's Inner Circle and the Hundred Days That Created Modern America." ### Trump’s Executive Orders Have Cities in the Crosshairs URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/trumps-executive-orders-have-cities-in-the-crosshairs/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:03.000Z One hundred days into Donald Trump's second term, American cities are reeling. In [Milwaukee](https://urbanmilwaukee.com/pressrelease/trump-admin-halts-more-than-35-million-from-wisconsin-head-start-centers-a-50-cut/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#google%5Fvignette), federal grants for Head Start programs have been slashed. In Baltimore, [grants for violence reduction programming](https://www.baltimoresun.com/2025/04/28/baltimore-violence-reduction-agencies-call-doj-grant-cuts-under-trump-illogical/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have been halted. In Pittsburgh, devastating cuts to [National Endowment for the Humanities grants](https://www.wesa.fm/arts-culture/2025-04-17/doge-neh-pittsburgh-carnegie-phipps?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for museums and a conservatory will leave a void in education and civic life. In Miami and Tampa, [cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration](https://www.clickorlando.com/weather/hurricane/2025/03/11/cuts-to-noaa-may-impact-floridians-this-hurricane-season-nhc-says/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) will make hurricane forecasting and preparation more difficult. In New York City, beneficiaries of the Home Energy Assistance Program, which helps over 1.5 million households across the state each year, [fear the worst](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/04/15/heap-energy-assistance-applications-trump-cuts/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), as the state has yet to receive about $36 million of its expected [$360.2 million](https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocs/CORR%5FLIHEAP%5F1stFundingReleaseAtt1%5FStatesTerrs%5FFY2025%5F2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in funding for the program. Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency, DOGE, has cut all federal staffing that administers the program. And in [Washington D.C.](https://statecourtreport.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/washington-dc-needs-stronger-home-rule?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), Mayor Muriel Bowser was pressured to paint over Black Lives Matter Plaza and alter the city's policies for managing the unhoused. All of these changes, and dozens more in cities around the nation, are the result of executive orders signed by President Trump using that ubiquitous Sharpie. These executive orders are a direct attack on cities, a manifestation of the president's hostility to the people who live in them and lead them. There are three primary categories of executive orders that threaten cities right now: [those targeting so-called sanctuary cities](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-american-people-against-invasion/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that refuse to cooperate with the administration's draconian deportation polities by cutting their federal funding, stopping benefits to the undocumented and cutting funding to organizations and NGOs that serve them, along with other low income people (as I write, a new, additional punitive order is being announced); those that authorized DOGE to order [hiring freezes](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/hiring-freeze/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [terminations](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/implementing-the-presidents-department-of-government-efficiency-workforce-optimization-initiative/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which are gutting programs that deliver essential services in urban areas; and those ostensibly [targeting diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programs](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/ending-radical-and-wasteful-government-dei-programs-and-preferencing/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) which have the effect of cutting funds to schools, libraries, historical sites and cultural institutions, as well as education and training programs for educators and public employees. What is an executive order, anyway? Reporting in the press sometimes says President Trump "passed" an executive order. That's misleading, and for urban policymakers and planners, it is worth understanding why. Legislation is passed by Congress, with bills requiring passage through both chambers. An executive order is simply a directive issued by the president. [When founded on the authority of the president derived from the Constitution or statute, it may have the force and effect of law. An executive order is otherwise no more than an expression of the president's policy preference](https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS20846.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This principle goes back to a Korean War-era case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court [held](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/343/579?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the president had exceeded his powers when he attempted to seize steel mills to sustain production in the face of a strike by mill workers. > The role of the executive branch, and the president specifically, is to "see that the law is faithfully executed" — that is, to implement the will of Congress. An executive order's authority must derive from an already existing statute or a constitutionally enumerated presidential power under Article II of the Constitution. For example, since the president has the pardon power, his pardon of Jan. 6 insurrectionists, while odious, is lawful. When the president exercises an Article I power which belongs to Congress, like spending, through an executive order, then a legal challenge [should be enough to void the order](https://www.acslaw.org/inbrief/what-is-an-executive-order-and-what-legal-weight-does-it-carry/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Of particular concern right now is federal grant funding to states and cities, in the form of formula and discretionary grants, which are included each year in the federal budget. Under the constitutional separation of powers, Congress holds the power of appropriation. The role of the executive branch, and the president specifically, is to "see that the law is faithfully executed" — that is to implement the will of Congress. This includes ensuring, through the federal agencies, that the funds appropriated for programming — whether directly to cities or agencies within them, or as passthroughs from the states — is carried out each year. Trump is interfering with the implementation of the budget in unprecedented ways. The first is through what is known as impoundment. Contrary to federal Constitutional doctrine, reaffirmed in 1974 by an Act of Congress, [Trump is acting on the false belief he has the power](https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1232435554?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to halt the disbursement of funds appropriated by Congress, and his OMB has even made it difficult to follow how much that is happening by [deleting the online tools that allow tracking](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/omb-sued-for-shutting-down-federal-spending-transparency-site?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of whether outlays are getting to their intended recipients in local government. Stakeholders have sued to restore that data access. The second way Trump is collapsing the constitutional guardrails on executive authority is through executive orders that contradict the express direction of Congress for expenditures. While we are just starting to see the judiciary react to this overstepping since January, actions of the first Trump Administration are illuminating. > Trump is interfering with the implementation of the budget in unprecedented ways. During Trump One, the Department of Justice, following one of Trump's executive orders to punish sanctuary cities, [ceased to release grant funds to local governments appropriated by Congress through a formula grant program called the Byrne Grant program](https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/doj%5Fgrants%5Fsanct%5Fcities-20180808.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Byrne Grants were designed to fund capacity building programs for local police and public safety agencies. Federal courts found that the implementation of the executive order by the Department of Justice exceeded what is called a "reasonable condition" on the grants. Byrne grants were for general capacity building, not immigration enforcement. To hold the cities hostage to the peripheral purpose of immigration enforcement violated the intent of Congress. By insisting on the invalid condition, courts in multiple federal circuits found that the Justice Department had exceeded its power. But we are back again. Last week, one of the same federal district judges who had ruled against the Trump Administration in 2017 [ruled](https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/5265622-judge-finds-trumps-sanctuary-cities-order-likely-unconstitutional/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the new iteration this year directing Attorney General Pam Bondi and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to ensure that "sanctuary" jurisdictions "do not receive access to federal funds" is [likely unconstitutional](https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69623767/111/city-and-county-of-san-francisco-v-donald-j-trump/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Because federal funding infuses every aspect of municipal government in the U.S., arbitrary cutoffs imposed by DOGE mean that the president's personal policy preferences are being made into law, bypassing both Congress and any agency independence. Congress funded these programs for the current fiscal year. It could choose, in future years, to cut the funding. That would be a bad idea, and could result in some Members who choose to vote for draconian cuts losing their seats. But that is the point of the separation of powers; voters who dislike a budget passed by Congress can vote in new members in the next election. Finally, stepping away from the budgetary issues and the horizontal separation of federal powers, Trump is also violating the vertical checks of federal-state affairs, and perhaps the state-protective Tenth Amendment, by interfering directly in areas that until now have been matters of local control. Education, in particular, is an area where local government has been the prime mover. Local governments and boards of education set K-12 curriculum and standards. Using his "anti-DEI" executive order as a roving warrant, Trump substitutes the judgment of his ideologue cronies for historically local determinations. Government by executive order, which is what the president is doing now, collapses the separation of powers between the two federal elected branches. It violates the autonomy of states and cities in their historic areas of authority. The judiciary may well step in as a corrective. Meanwhile for cities, funding of local grant programs will be disrupted and locally responsive policy will be replaced by the policy preferences of Project 2025 and a handful of presidential advisors. City officials would do well to investigate collective action through lawsuits challenging executive orders that impact our cities and communities. ### Donald Trump vs. the Rule of Law, and New York City URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/donald-trump-vs-the-rule-of-law-and-new-york-city/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:02.000Z New York has mostly whistled past a lot of graveyards already this century, starting with 9/11, the fiscal crisis and the pandemic shutdown. Those catastrophes all ended up doing far less long-term damage than was widely feared in the moment, in large part because of federal policies and funds that were boons to the state and city. One hundred days into the second Trump administration, that era is gone for good. The Trump Two assault, 100 days in and before he's signed many laws or a single budget, is already bringing the Bannonite ideal (that's Steve Bannon, Trump's longtime political adviser) of ["flooding the zone with shit"](https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/16/media/steve-bannon-reliable-sources/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) past the journalists it was initially intended to overwhelm. Now it's America's international relations, the federal government's relationship with the states and their cities, and the president's nakedly corrupt favoring of friends and targeting of enemies, among many other things that are being nastily flooded. Judges are being arrested, the attorney general is writing memos about how warrants aren't a necessity for entering the home of an "alien enemy" gang member, and America is officially in a new era of North American Peronist politics. It's marked by inflation, palace intrigue and a personality fandom or cult as the president ratchets up his assaults on the Bill of Rights' First, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Amendments, not to mention the plain language of the 14th Amendment. Never mind laws, this is government by late night posts on the Truth Social network he personally owns. The old line about how one death is a tragedy but a million is a statistic is being applied to governmental abuses. There are so many punishments and threats and indignities that it's impossible to keep track, which is the point. New York can forget about getting extra help from Washington to get through rough moments until at least 2029\. The new normal even after that will be much less reliable support for the state or the city as Washington's promises, once a gold standard, are already scraping junk bond status. In the meantime, the president will keep creating new points of leverage, like [his executive order this week](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-protects-american-communities-from-criminal-aliens/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) "protecting American communities from criminal aliens" that aims to remove federal funding from these "death traps" — his word — that don't fully comply with the federal mass deportation effort that's just gearing up. The order doesn't define what makes a "sanctuary city" or what would constitute "compliance." > The old line about how one death is a tragedy but a million is a statistic is being applied to governmental abuses. Most of these threats may be emanating from Washington, but New York City is probably being hit hardest — and not only because we're the nation's immigration capital, not to mention its global capital. William Gibson famously said that the future's already here — it's just not very evenly distributed. For a quarter century, New York has benefited from that dynamic, as a safe port for the world's money amid its many troubles. Now, those troubles are hitting here directly as global confidence collapses in America's promises and currency while a vengeful president takes a "common sense" chainsaw to the administrative state and any conception of regular procedure and due process. None of that squandered credit is going to be easily restored by a future administration. Just as past administrations had been bound by the promises of their predecessors, future ones will be limited in what they can promise by the current one's willingness to tear up inherited commitments and expectations. Bestowing favors to friends and flunkies and punishments to foes and schmendricks is a politics of personality rather than procedures or principles. This is a Page Six presidency, where the allegedly corrupt mayor is no longer facing criminal charges, but instead is in the president's personal debt and expected to comply with his mass deportation agenda that's just gearing up in an arrangement that the judge overseeing his case wrote, "smacks of a bargain." This isn't a problem that gets fixed simply by voting out Eric Adams in November. The leading candidate to replace him, former Gov. Andrew Cuomo, is the subject of a new criminal referral to the Justice Department, which is also looking to prosecute the state attorney general in part as payback for her victory in a civil case against Trump. There are weak spots to test with everyone, and not just through prosecutions, including a wholesale pressure campaign aimed at the governor and focused on demolishing a congestion pricing scheme that's reducing traffic and bringing in money the trains the city relies on to keep running, just as intended. Trump is treating a previous federal approval, and the word of the government, like a mere suggestion for his personal whims. It's a win-win politically as he sees it: Either the "shithole" trains his secretary of transportation (and another potential scapegoat) is railing against get worse, which gives him more reason to bash the state's Democrats and conditions, or they somehow improve and the glory goes to him. Same for his abrupt seizure of control of the long-in-the-works Penn Station renovation plan. It's a personal praise Ponzi scheme where the buck never stops, and there's always a slaughter line of scapegoats. He's taking that same approach to key New York City-based institutions from big law to higher ed, singling out actors to demand compliance or punishment with little regard for proof or procedure while yanking grants from nonprofits and threatening anyone who helps support them. The idea is to get institutions and people to either go along with his agenda, with him reaping all credit for perceived improvements and them on the hook for any failures, or be destroyed by a federal government that's less and less of an administration and more and more of a one-man wrecking ball. Which requires a brief aside about the New York Post, which led the way over the past couple of years in using NYPD sources, mostly speaking on background, to turn a series of very real moped robberies and purse snatchings and chain store pillagings by young men tied to Venezuelan street gang Tren de Aruga into a supposed "invasion." That's the thin gruel the administration has used to invoke the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 for the first time in decades, but with even less due process for anyone caught up there than alleged Nazis received during the second World War. > It's a personal praise Ponzi scheme where the buck never stops, and there's always a slaughter line of scapegoats. Much of this was foreseeable, and foreseen. A first Trump term that could have been an interregnum, another near miss or last chance for the country's institutions and leaders to get their house in order, turned out to be merely a prelude to what many people are already feeling directly while others are still reading about the shockwaves that will reach them soon enough, and further wallop an already staggering New York. That's obvious, though you wouldn't know how bad things already are, with much worse to come, reading about the quarter-*trillion*\-dollarbudget Albany is about to pass. The increase in spending from last year and from what the governor first proposed for this year is less than in years past — as if that were sufficient to cover huge holes that Trump's first federal budget is about to tear into the social safety net and the state's finances. Or from the politicians running for mayor making expensive new promises, as if much tougher choices about protecting the services the city already provides weren't rapidly approaching. It's everywhere and all at once, and more than fits into any single column. It's also painfully obvious — more text than subtext. The people who can't see it simply don't want to. Trump is counting, with reason, on Democrats overstepping and making martyrs of dubious characters, whether those are campus radicals or illegal immigrants, to give people an excuse to look away from these naked abuses and to justify his dragnet approach to everything that boils down to "you don't have anything to fear if you don't have anything wrong" — with him and his lackeys deciding at every step what's right or wrong. This president's plan — drawn from a playbook Argentines and Turks and Russians and Chinese and others around the world know all too well — is to take firm control, juice short-term economic growth to buy space for him to increase social control by constantly circumscribing the range of acceptable dissent and requiring people to demonstrate their compliance *before* it's demanded. To get people to police themselves *before* the cops get to them. Talk's been cheap in New York City for a long time, buoyed by ever-rising property values and tax collection and lots of space from the feds for the State and the City to take their own approaches to matters ranging from policing protests to safe injection sites. Now, the table stakes of resistance are much higher and the choices much harder. All that rhetoric about core beliefs and budgets as expressions of values is now in play, and it's time for New York to decide where it wants to put its money and its mouth over the uphill 1,361 days remaining in this presidential term as it starts fending for, and defending, itself. ### What You Can Do About Trump URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-you-can-do-about-trump/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:02.000Z *We are only a few months into Donald Trump's second term, and the administration's predilection for taking aggressive action and defying democratic norms has already left many people feeling dispirited and powerless. What should liberals, moderates and conservatives who are concerned about the rule of law, the health of civil society and the preservation of basic small-l liberal ideals be doing at the moment? We asked a dozen leading thinkers and doers for concrete steps that Americans might take if they want to have a good answer to the question that many of us might get asked in the future: "What did you do to stand up to Trump, grandma/grandpa?" These are their replies.* ════════════════════════════════════════ **Write Some Checks** *Christina Greer is an associate professor at Fordham University and co-host of the FAQ.NYC podcast.* So what can "ordinary people" do in this moment of rampant cruelty and incompetence? Political tithing. Just as one donates to religious organizations to invest in their growth and success, we must do the same for our democracy. When looking at some of the (to put it in political science terms) jokers and busters walking the halls of Congress or sitting in seats in Albany, I realize that small contributions to competent candidates can help create a more robust and competent crop of elected officials in state houses and Congress. Far too many people coast into state houses with little competition and a minuscule vote count. Many of those individuals parlay that first stepping stone into elected positions at the federal level and are then in line for important leadership positions throughout government. Contributing funds to quality candidates and elected officials allows us to create the democracy we want to see. When elected officials say they are too scared to speak out at this moment, it is time for them to go. If elected officials are blindly supporting policies antithetical to our values, it is time to vote them out. Money in politics is sadly a very sobering reality. I want to make sure my elected officials can spend more time thinking about policy and writing clear-eyed legislation instead of sitting in a call center dialing for dollars most of their day. I want to make sure individuals who have the passion and courage to stand up in this moment have the resources to take out incumbents who have lost their way. I don't just support candidates in my area, I support candidates across the county in races large and small. Financially supporting candidates and elected officials who have the courage to speak out and fight for substantive legislation is just one small way ordinary folks can do something in this moment. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Build Some Bridges** *Jonathan Rauch is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book is "Cross Purposes: Christianity's Broken Bargain With Democracy."* Often, when an authoritarian faction moves to dismantle democracy, elites are the first line of defense. In the case of President Trump and his MAGA movement, however, ordinary people are in the vanguard. That's because Trump moved quickly to harass, intimidate and de-fund institutions like law firms, universities and tech and media companies that might oppose him. As a result, many sought to placate him. By contrast, he has little leverage against ordinary folks who do not depend on federal dollars and whose voices he cannot easily chill. That makes direct action — public protests, town hall meetings, even quilting — essential for slowing his momentum, diminishing his public approval, and denting his claim to a popular mandate. In the longer run, though, indirect action is just as important, if not more so. By that I mean action which diminishes the country's vulnerability to demagogic, divisive and fear-mongering political actors. That's why I recommend taking a look at [Braver Angels](https://braverangels.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a national grassroots movement aimed at reducing toxic polarization. Originally founded by a handful of activists after the 2016 election, Braver Angels borrowed methods from marriage counseling to hold workshops in which equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats relearned how to push past their stereotypes and reconnect as citizens. Since then, Braver Angels has developed a rich array of workshops, debates and other programs for schools and universities, legislatures and political groups, churches and communities. It engages and trains volunteers in every state. The single most common reaction to Braver Angels programs: "We are not as divided as we believe." Which is true. In fact, just showing people that polarization is exaggerated can reduce it. If Braver Angels isn't right for you, many other groups work in the depolarization space. The insight they share is correct: Rebuilding our civic culture is the only lasting way to make America great again. ════════════════════════════════════════**Thinking — and Acting — Through the Second Trump Administration** *Daniel Stid is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he writes about questions related to civil society, philanthropy and governance.* **Keep up the struggle to see without illusions.** In 1946, while trying to make sense of a confusing and contradictory swirl of events after World War II, [George Orwell observed](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/in-front-of-your-nose/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that merely "to see what is in front of one's nose needs a constant struggle." Orwell knew that, given the crooked timber of humanity, we are always tempted to see what we wish for or fear. Both patterns of thought lead to blind spots that prevent us from grasping the nettle of reality. The dark funhouse mirrors of Donald Trump's leadership have a way of imposing such blinding illusions upon his supporters and opponents alike. **Write down what you think, then update it as necessary.** Orwell went on to add that, when it comes to discerning reality, "one thing that helps toward it is to keep a diary, or, at any rate, to keep some kind of record of one's opinions about important events." Only in this way can we force ourselves to see where, how, and why we have gotten things wrong, as we inevitably will. I keep my diary in public, via [Substack](https://artofassociation.substack.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). I have already had to [update my priors](https://artofassociation.substack.com/p/competitive-authoritarianism-comes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), for example, on whether we are living in a democratic or authoritarian regime. In contrast to what I once held, I now realize this is not an either/or judgment. The [competitive authoritarianism](https://www.amazon.com/Competitive-Authoritarianism-Problems-International-Politics/dp/0521709156?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Trump is actively pursuing includes elements of both regime types. **Do your part from where you live**. The president wants to pull all of us into the polarized Thunderdome of our national politics. If he succeeds, he will be the center of our collective attention. The vast majority of us will be reduced to passive spectators. National and social media (and the lack of grounded local alternatives) further rivet us to our circles of concern and divert us from our circles of influence. But we can always be good and even-keeled neighbors. We can contribute to, help lead and defend the integrity of our associations, congregations and professions. We can join forces with others to better our communities. As citizens, we can engage our local, state and federal representatives — and replace them if needed. Faced with top-down democratic decline, we can strive for [bottom-up civic renewal](https://artofassociation.substack.com/p/top-down-democratic-decline-vs-bottom?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). ════════════════════════════════════════ **Shine More Light in Dark Corners** *Bruce Western is a sociologist and president-elect at the Russell Sage Foundation.* A hundred days into the second Trump administration, friends and colleagues in the social science research community have lost grant funding, faced hiring freezes and confronted political attacks on their universities. These are scholars who study poverty, employment, health, crime and countless other indicators of the well-being of American society. Social research makes a critical contribution to our civic discourse. For scholars who study the devastation of opioid addiction, or solitary confinement in our prisons, or the epidemic of loneliness afflicting America's youth, social research shines a light on dark places. Research brings objective evidence to bear on urgent problems for policy. Research informs public conversations at the heart of our democracy. At a time when social media algorithmically manipulates reality, social science grounds us in systematic data collection and analysis. In such a time, the job of social science — shining a light, bearing witness — is indispensable. There's no question that we researchers are in a bind: The environment for rigorous research is hostile, but the need is urgent. While university leaders are beginning to coordinate and defend themselves in court, our core institutions are stressed to a breaking point and the safety of our most disadvantaged communities is threatened. The great sociologist, Max Weber, said science is a vocation — we are called to it. Although times of crisis can feel paralyzing, we must follow our vocation and get out in the world and study our pressing social problems. We should find ways to communicate our work broadly, beyond the bubble of the university, which can be too insular and elitist. We should engage with those ideas and communities that, in good faith, challenge our own. The American experiment is facing an historic test. Understanding a moment like this is the whole point of social research. We should get to work. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Look Harder** *Adam Klasfeld is co-founder and editor-in-chief of All Rise News.* The levers of power are always closer to people than they realize. We recently ran a [story on All Rise News](https://www.allrisenews.com/p/skadden-students-georgetown?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) about Georgetown Law students who created a more than 800-row spreadsheet detailing which major law firms resisted or capitulated to Donald Trump's attacks. Now, some powerful firms face recruitment problems because students declined interviews with ones that settled with the administration. Having worked as a legal journalist for nearly two decades, I'm also a strong believer in the impact of attending court proceedings. Take Wisconsin judge Hannah Dugan's recent [arrest](https://www.allrisenews.com/p/dugan-trump-arrest?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The impromptu protests outside the courthouse made [public outcry](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/25/wisconsin-judge-arrest-fbi-ice-immigration-enforcement/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) part of the story. Imagine if nobody showed up. Quietly attending a courtroom hearing can have the same impact, and as an added bonus, you also get the chance to see compelling and historic proceedings. I witnessed the moment a jury convicted Trump of 34 felonies as a journalist, but anybody who went to the courthouse early enough could have, too. It's our constitutional right, and it's a way to signal that the cases are being watched. Using internal data from the app 5 Calls, we've reported on what [drives](https://www.allrisenews.com/p/5calls-kilmar-reps?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) people to call their representatives. We [list](https://www.allrisenews.com/p/rising-this-week-hundreds-of-actions?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) protests and congressional town halls every week. The options are everywhere. People just need to know where to look, and helping the public find them is our editorial mission. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Do Better** *Nicole Gelinas is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute focused on urban economics.* It's been almost 10 years since Donald J. Trump glided down that escalator to launch his [joke](https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/donald-trumps-troubles-are-just-beginning?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of a long-shot presidential candidacy, and Democrats still haven't figured out how to neutralize him. The one neat trick: When you're obsessively focused on Trump, you'll only get more Trump. Focus on something else, anything else — but most productively, on the void of competent politics and policies that got us Trump in the first place (and the second place). Trump won in 2016 and won again in 2024 because of deep anxiety about bipartisan business as usual. Eight years before 2016, the massive bailouts of Wall Street created both Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party — but the Democrats decided that it was a good idea to run the spouse of the president [who had deregulated Wall Street](https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/250838-bill-clinton-defends-repeal-of-glass-steagall/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Hillary Clinton had herself [taken six-figure fees](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/hillary-clinton-speeches-wikileaks.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from the banks. Eight years later, after Trump's personal and policy failures had become all too apparent, his re-taking the White House was almost inexplicable – except it was perfectly explicable to any normal person not in the Democratic bubble. For most of the Biden administration, voters had been very clear about their mounting concerns over uncontrolled immigration and inflation as well as persistently higher crime in Democratic cities. The elite Democratic answer was to ignore these concerns. Where was the Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, when a line of unvetted migrants formed around the Roosevelt Hotel, to national and global headlines? You lost your power because you didn't use it. Democrats fretted over why voters didn't appreciate the two massive bills Biden signed into law, the Inflation Reduction Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, but voters didn't appreciate them because they were the wrong laws at the wrong time: massively stimulatory to an economy already running hot. What to do now? Democratic state and local leaders should focus on what they actually control: basic day-to-day competence in public safety and public services. It would be refreshing, for example, if New York's Governor Gov. Hochul actually took some responsibility over why New York released an illegal migrant on a serious felony theft charge earlier this year, only for this migrant [to similarly victimize](https://nypost.com/2025/04/28/us-news/illegal-migrant-accused-in-kristi-noems-purse-snatching-had-ny-arrest-warrant-out/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) a woman in Washington, DC. What will Hochul do to prevent similar incidents? It would be refreshing, too, if Hochul, in this year's state budget, *hadn't* immediately turned to a multi-billion-dollar [annual tax hike](https://nypost.com/2025/04/28/us-news/hochul-and-legislators-announce-preliminary-deal-on-budget-28-days-after-deadline/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on downstate jobs to fund the transit system's perennial deficit, just months after launching congestion pricing to fund the transit system, with no public debate or discussion. As for what ordinary people can do: maybe scroll past Trump's latest outrage, and learn a little about what your state and local government do: what's the crime rate in your city, compared to a decade ago? Are local parents happy with the public schools? For now, Trump's second-honeymoon antics are so outrageous — a tariff in every pot, changing every day — that public attention isn't on the chronic workaday government failures that got us Trump in the first place. But every time the Trump administration flouts a court order or deports an American child, his loyal opposition in the Democratic party should remember first, before saying a word: we failed the people so badly, that the voters freely picked this guy over us — twice. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Get in the (Social Media) Fray** *Cara Eckholm is a fellow at the Social Science Research Council and the founder of Eckholm Studios, an advisory firm.* Use your voice on social media. 54 percent of American adults read below the equivalent of a sixth-grade level. People are increasingly getting their news from TikTok. The right has an entire media ecosystem catered to this new media environment. It starts at the top, with [Karoline Leavitt posting get-ready-with-me videos](https://www.instagram.com/karolineleavitt/?hl=en&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But it also includes Joe Rogan and the many derivatives of his podcast, and micro-influencers espousing the ideal of Trumpism in local politics — folks like the Queens Crapper in New York, who are pernicious Twitter shit-talkers. The left really does not have an equivalent. Instead, we have the 1% arguing amongst themselves over the definition of the term "abundance," and Charli XCX describing Kamala as "BRAT." The former is far too highbrow for the average American to care or even notice, while the latter is totally devoid of substance. What we actually need are thoughtful political takes delivered in formats that people will consume. We are starting to see a shift among the next generation of electeds. For example, [Chi Ossé's "Why Shit Not Working" Instagram series](https://www.instagram.com/chiosse/reel/DFdoUxiyAiC/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has garnered millions of views because it contains real messages delivered in comedic, short formats. But I want to see more everyday folks on the left giving social media a shot — and yes, that may mean you have to talk policy while applying make-up. Among New York's intelligentsia, I find there is still a tendency to write off people who succeed on social media as "unserious." But if you stick exclusively to the "serious," no one consumes it. Folks on the left need to lighten up a bit to have a shot at electoral politics. ════════════════════════════════════════ **We Are Not Powerless** *Errol Louis is a Vital City contributing writer. He is political anchor at NY1 News.* President Trump's weaponization of the federal budget is most likely to hit New Yorkers hard. There's been no shortage of news coverage of the half-dozen-or-so prosecutors in the Southern District of New York who resigned rather than cooperate in the Trump administration's attempt to arrange a quid pro quo deal to dismiss criminal charges against Mayor Eric Adams in exchange for cooperation in facilitating the mass deportation of migrants. But much less attention has been lavished on the [nearly 47,000 ](https://www.datawrapper.de/%5F/2A7Re/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)federal government workers who live in New York City. Like other employees, they have been subjected to sudden firings, public denigration and, in the case of Transportation Safety Administration workers, an abrupt cancellation of collective bargaining rights that is currently being [disputed in court](https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/union-bargaining-federal-workers-trump/index.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). There are plenty of ways to fight back against the chaotic daily disruptions emanating from Washington. Organized call-in campaigns to one's member of Congress are more effective than most people realize: 20 calls on the same subject on any given day will definitely get a politician's attention and 50 or more will pretty much shut down the office's ability to do regular business. If you feel like putting money where your mouth is, spend a few minutes on the website of [Oath](https://app.oath.vote/?utm%5Fterm=&utm%5Fcampaign=Performance%5FMax%5FSeptember%5F2024&utm%5Fsource=adwords&utm%5Fmedium=ppc&hsa%5Facc=8186765803&hsa%5Fcam=21775611256&hsa%5Fgrp=&hsa%5Fad=&hsa%5Fsrc=x&hsa%5Ftgt=&hsa%5Fkw=&hsa%5Fmt=&hsa%5Fnet=adwords&hsa%5Fver=3&gad%5Fsource=1), a Democratic platform launched in 2023 that analyzes hundreds of data points to identify races all over the country where small donations can have the greatest effect. "It is data driven, and we have receipts," the group's founder, Brian Derrick, [told me](https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/you-decide-with-errol-louis/2024/09/26/brian-derrick-creating-a-one-stop-shop-for-political-giving?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The majority of my team are engineers and data scientists, and we work to analyze where dollars are likely to have the greatest impact in advancing a particular goal." A similar group, the [States Project](https://statesproject.org/our-goals-for-america/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which was founded by ex-state senator Daniel Squadron, organizes groups of small-money donors and directs the cash to local candidates. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Think Big, Don't Despair** *Rosalie Genevro is an architectural historian and urbanist.* I have been trying to operate on the basic premise that action builds hope, and that inaction and despair are mutually reinforcing. The actions I am taking and the ideas guiding them are the following: 1. Put your body in the street; join with others on every possible occasion both to show the size of the resistance and to take strength from acting with others who are appalled and showing up against the illegality, unconstitutionality and fundamental cruelty of this administration. 2. Study and be prepared to use all the tools of non-violent resistance, including a general strike. 3. Read Timothy Snyder, Jamelle Bouie and M. Gessen. 4. Provide as much financial support as possible to organizations in sectors being attacked: independent, non-corporate media; environmental groups; cultural and education organizations whose missions serve fairness and inclusion. 5. Boycott companies acquiescing to and encouraging the administration's move to autocracy and deep corruption and cronyism. 6. Keep multiple timeframes in mind simultaneously. The need for resistance through immediate protest is urgent; so is the need to continue the fight on matters of long-term urgency, especially climate change. 7. Imagine the processes and goals of the reconstruction. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Engage Face-to-Face** *Dave Fleischer directed the team that developed deep canvassing; he writes on voter persuasion on* [*Substack*](https://davefleischer.substack.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* Trump's strategy is dehumanization. Every time he humiliates, caricatures, ostracizes, bullies, arrests, deports or incarcerates, he creates terror. That's what will end our country. The job of those who disagree with where he's trying to take the nation is to humanize: to be clear about who and what we're fighting for. Don't say "Medicaid." Instead, talk about "making sure every mother and child can see a doctor and can get a prescription filled when they're sick." Sure, mention Medicaid, but explain what Medicaid looks like in real life. Don't say "due process." Instead, say "stop Trump from arresting people just because of their skin color — stop his mass arrests without evidence they've done anything wrong." Don't say "tariffs." Instead, say, "stop Trump from destroying our jobs and any savings we've managed to put aside." Go beyond mere words. Share real-life experience. Tell a story about someone you love who got sick, and what happened when they did or didn't get medical care. Describe how someone you love just lost their nest egg or job. Ask the person you're meeting if they have faced prejudice firsthand: perhaps they were judged unfairly, or even experienced race-based assault by criminals or the police. When we share our stories — one-on-one, face-to-face, in person — we not only give each "issue" a human face. We connect. Finally, focus on the 15,000 voters who will decide our country's fate. Just 15,000 voters in three to five districts will decide who controls the House of Representatives in 2026. You're probably within driving distance of one. Volunteer now. Volunteer specifically to connect with voters face-to-face. Start now. Help the Democrats win. It's up to you and me and our friends. Are we willing to talk with some people who aren't yet with us? We need them. And they need us. ════════════════════════════════════════ **By Any Means** *Candice Jones is president and CEO of the Public Welfare Foundation. She previously served as director of the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice.* When asked how he planned to bring about change so that Black Americans would be seen as human beings, Malcolm X responded, "By any means necessary." Today, we find ourselves in another "by any means necessary" moment as fundamental freedoms are being rapidly eroded. We must do whatever is needed to ensure justice in this moment. It's going to require a broad range of solutions. It's going to take anything and everything that works. We cannot be selective with the methods and means. We need every single avenue to be explored, every method entertained and every voice welcomed to create solutions to answer the questions of our day. That means we all have a role to play. From lawyers to podcasters, organizers to parent-teacher association moms, clergy to emergency responders, it will take all of us. [The Building Movement Project](https://buildingmovement.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)'s [social change ecosystem map](https://buildingmovement.org/our-work/movement-building/social-change-ecosystem-map/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is one tangible tool to help identify your part of the movement. The reality is that no one is coming to save us. We are the leaders we are waiting for. It's us, in all of our humanity and in all of our power. We need to plant our feet and stand with the knowledge that we have every right to be here and every right to make our voices heard. And when we each say "yes" to holding up our piece of the sky, we move closer to realizing the future we demand. ════════════════════════════════════════ **Invest in Civic institutions and Life** *Michael Rohatyn and Peter Yost are the directors of "Drop Dead City," now showing at the* [*IFC Center*](https://www.ifccenter.com/films/drop-dead-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *in Manhattan.* What's so striking about the first 100 days of the Trump administration is not just the extent to which they have dismantled much of the federal government — and impacted the world economy — but how quickly many of our most trusted civic institutions, the pillars of civil society, have, at least until now, remained quiet, and in some cases been almost complicit. One wonders what Simon Rifkind, a man who played a central role in organizing a government-led rescue of New York City in 1975, would have to say about the response of so many of the nation's most esteemed law firms, including the one that used to bear his name, Paul Weiss. The 1975 fiscal crisis, which we tell the story of in our new film, "Drop Dead City," unfortunately teaches us that we often must reach a collective low before we can come together and dig ourselves out. But even then, you need a shared appreciation of the city's — or in this case the country's — civic institutions to help reconstruct something better. This was true in New York City in 1975, and it is true in America today. We must invest in strengthening the civic institutions that can help us resist but also rebuild: our college and universities, the organizations that protect human and legal rights, law firms and media, both national and hyper-local. This includes giving money, of course, especially with so many nonprofits experiencing horrific cuts, but that's not where it ends. If you can't contribute, show your support. Speak out on your social media platforms, go to meetings, talk to your friends and family. This is a critical moment to flex those civic muscles and do everything you can to get people to dispose of their apathy and to get involved. Go out and register people to vote. What was so striking about New York City during the fiscal crisis was not just how overextended the city was, or how poor the bookkeeping was, but how quickly our institutions can atrophy and grow weak. What allowed New York City to turn around was the shared belief that the city was too important to fail, that we had enough in common, even with all our divisions, that we could come together and trust one another to come up with a plan. We need that same confidence today. The health of our democracy, today and for future generations, requires our attention. ### Is It Time for Cities to Go It Alone? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/is-it-time-for-cities-to-go-it-alone/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:02.000Z > Populist anti-urbanism of the Trumpian kind has a long pedigree. The Trump administration is attacking cities again — threatening to withhold federal funds if they don't align with Washington's new priorities. This is no surprise. In both of his presidential campaigns, Trump denigrated and insulted cities and city leaders, decrying them as violent, corrupt, poor, dirty and full of gangs and illegal immigrants. The main targets of his ire, in his first term and again now, are so-called "sanctuary cities" — those cities that have adopted more protective policies for undocumented residents. Trump re-upped an Executive Order seeking to withhold federal funds from such cities. More prominently, he [dangled the dismissal of a federal corruption prosecution](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-mayor-and-new-york-city-held-hostage-by-the-trump-administration) against Eric Adams, New York's embattled mayor, as a means of inducing the mayor to cooperate with his policy of mass deportations. Whatever one thinks of Adams, it is startling to see the lengths that the president will go to make the mayor of America's largest and richest city his lapdog. The assault on New York has continued with ongoing attempts to cancel congestion pricing. To those who care about America's cities, two messages should be heard loud and clear. The first is that anti-urbanism is now a core feature of U.S. politics, not simply a rhetorical trope. The second is that the federal government can no longer be considered a reliable partner to America's cities, which over the generations have become (like many institutions in the country) dependent on federal support. Cities may well seek to repair their partnerships with Washington. But given that neither anti-urban politics nor federal hostility to cities are going away anytime soon, it's probably wiser for them to to think about how they can increasingly go it alone. Populist anti-urbanism of the Trumpian kind has a long pedigree. Consider the Reverend Josiah Strong's indictment of the city in his 1885 book "Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis." Strong's list of fears included immigration, Romanism and socialism. "The city," he wrote, is where "each of the dangers… \[are\] enhanced and all are focalized." Nativist and anti-immigrant voices have long associated the city with unsavory and un-American elements. But these are not the only flavors of anti-urbanism. Anti-urbanism also shows up in all those schemes meant to fix or improve the city, from Victorian-era slum clearance to urban renewal. Jane Jacobs' "The Death and Life of Great American Cities" still stands as the most incisive indictment of those moralists, planners and bureaucrats who, in every age, believe that the city needs to be rationalized, rebuilt or deconcentrated — and who treat urban residents (and especially the urban poor) as pieces in a puzzle to be deployed to create an idealized image of what the city *should* be. In reviewing the results of a generation of urban renewal, highway building and public housing developments from her vantage point in 1961, Jacobs concluded: "This is not the rebuilding of cities. This is the sacking of cities." > Populist anti-urbanism of the Trumpian kind has a long pedigree. Indeed, federal support for cities has been both a blessing and a curse. At the height of the New Deal, mayors had a significant voice in national affairs through the United States Conference of Mayors (USCM), which was established in the early 1930s and was an important political component of the New Deal coalition. Fiorello LaGuardia, the first president of the Conference, was a close personal friend of Roosevelt, and that connection meant that cities exercised influence in the administration of New Deal programs and the flow of federal resources to the cities. Coming out of the Depression, cities helped to create the post-war social welfare state and the urban liberalism that defined a generation. But federal monies have also underwritten the destructive projects that followed: highway building, slum clearance and systematic suburbanization. Urban renewal, with its massive displacement of working class and minority residents, was spurred by federal funds; federal highway dollars financed the infrastructure that destroyed urban neighborhoods, induced white flight and made the suburbs possible; federally backed mortgages promoted suburbanization too, and were accompanied by [redlining](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-stains-of-redlining); federal housing aid helped build low-income housing, but also public housing projects that collapsed when federal maintenance support dried-up. Urban-focused federal policies meant to do good contributed to the decline of the mid-century industrial city. Today, the threat is both broader and more direct. The Trump administration is targeting the social safety net, and these cuts will have disproportionate effects on cities. It is seeking to send home millions of immigrants who are a huge net positive to the economic and cultural lives of cities. Its trade policies are especially punishing to places that thrive on imports and exports, like New York. Its K-12 education policies are a threat to big cities, and the administration is essentially at war with institutions of higher education. The administration is also seeking to attach conditions on federal funding in a number of areas, including housing and public safety. Unless one bows the knee to diktats on purging DEI or otherwise falling in line, those monies may stop flowing. > Advocates should be pushing for city independence, not federal favor; city autonomy, not oversight; city fiscal freedom (to tax and spend), not financial dependence. The deeper reason behind all this is political economy: Cities are not where Republicans get their votes, and Republican candidates don't seem to need urban residents to win elections (though ironically, Trump improved his standing in many urban areas in 2024). Put differently, anti-urbanism has become a tenet of the Republican Party. And efforts to punish, penalize and immiserate cities are part of a larger national, conservative program to reduce or eliminate the New Deal social welfare state. Cities are suing to stop the federal tap from turning off, as they did during the first Trump administration. The district and appeals courts previously held that it was illegal for the administration to condition federal grants on immigration enforcement cooperation — so the most obvious precedent already favors the cities, who should win their lawsuits again. But this does nothing to address the long-term unreliability of federal support, which needs to be confronted. Cities should rethink their dependence on federal monies and administrative favor — indeed, city leaders should assume a hostile federal administrative state going forward. Can they afford to wean themselves off of funds from Congress? Not entirely, of course. Federal social safety net programs are hugely important to city residents, and removal of federal funds would blow large holes in local budgets, [including New York City's](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/nycs-federal-funding-outlook-under-trump/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But cities can take this opportunity to become somewhat less dependent. They have done so before. Prior to the New Deal, cities had to build whatever social welfare apparatus existed using mostly local resources. More recently, cities have acted in the absence of congressional action to adopt local minimum wage ordinances, anti-discrimination laws, tenant protections and minimum basic income provisions. New York City, for example, regularly sends more money to Washington than it receives, per capita, though temporary COVID-19 funds have [flipped that relationship in recent years](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/reports/budget/pdf/federal-budget-fiscal-year-2022.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The conventional wisdom has been that local redistributive programs will fail as capital flees efforts to tax it; if redistribution isn't happening at the national level, then it can't happen at all. But I [have made a sustained argument](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/city-power-9780190246662?cc=us&lang=en&&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that this is incorrect, at least for those cities enjoying a decades-long urban resurgence. Cities have more leverage to redistribute than is commonly assumed, if they are permitted to do so. > Advocates should be pushing for city independence, not federal favor; city autonomy, not oversight; city fiscal freedom (to tax and spend), not financial dependence. That is the rub, however. A city can try to wean itself from federal money and the strings attached to it but still be stymied by "preemptive" federal and state laws. Indeed, Trump is learning from the anti-city playbook that red state legislatures have been using for years now: simply pass state laws that prevent cities from doing *anything*. A city adopts a minimum wage ordinance? — just have the state legislature override it. Cities adopt tenant protections, a budget that shifts money from the police to social services, a wage theft ordinance to protect migrant workers, a sales tax to fund social services? — just tell them they can't. From the cities' perspectives, the best they can expect from hostile state legislatures and a hostile Congress is that they both do nothing at all. City weakness is built into our constitutional foundations. 19th-century state constitutions limited the representation of urban counties in state legislatures — a deeply anti-democratic feature that was not declared unconstitutional until the 1960s. Two 19th-century legal doctrines remain potent to this day, however: the federal constitutional rule that cities are simply creatures or convenient instrumentalities of their states and the general principle that cities can only exercise the powers that states see fit to grant them. Cities in our federal system simply do not have enough constitutional heft to resist entirely; they must always be in a bargaining relationship with their states and with the federal government. But they can and should realize that the halcyon days of the New Deal are not coming back. And so, city advocates should be pushing for city independence, not federal favor; city autonomy, not oversight; city fiscal freedom (to tax and spend), not financial dependence. Some reliance on federal support is inevitable. But the city is vulnerable to the strings attached to federal aid, and though the nationalized social welfare state has been an essential tool in the fight against urban poverty, the influx of federal funds to cities in the second half of the 20th century did not prevent urban decline. Cities' need for local own-source revenue is essential, and cities should zealously guard it. This principle can be applied to city power more generally: Those of us who want to see cities do well should protect local power, even if it is sometimes exercised poorly. The independence of American cities is a necessary precondition for democracy and a bulwark against tyranny. We should not be surprised again when federal or state support turns into hostility. ### A Real New York Mayoral Election URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/imagine-a-real-new-york-mayoral-election/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:03.000Z For the first time in a long time, the nation's largest city may be treated to a genuinely competitive 2025 general election for mayor: former Gov. Andrew Cuomo vs. incumbent Eric Adams vs. Republican Curtis Sliwa vs. independent Jim Walden vs. a [still-to-be-determined candidate running under the Working Families Party line](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/04/03/working-families-party-general-election-candidate-mayor/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). More competition should yield more media and public attention, higher voter turnout and ultimately a more engaged citizenry. But we arrived at this place by anomaly, not design. The question is how to reform our municipal democracy so that competitive general elections become the norm and not the exception. First, a quick primer on how things usually work, and why they generally don't work well. New York City has [4.7 million active voters](https://elections.ny.gov/enrollment-county?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), about 3.1 million of whom are registered Democrats. Republicans number just 523,000, and unaffiliated independent voters about 1 million. Put differently, the city electorate is two-thirds Democratic, about 11% Republican and about 21% independent. No question, Democrats dominate our politics and probably would continue to do so any way we cut it. (The last two competitive elections were when Democratic standard-bearers ran against billionaire Democrat-turned-Republican-turned-Independent Michael Bloomberg.) But the rules of the game distort things further, like spotting the home team an extra few runs in every game — while paradoxically also benefiting the Republicans by granting a guaranteed general election slot to whoever wins the Republican primary, often with a minuscule number of votes. How? Nominees for the general election emerge from closed primaries where only party members can vote. These primaries occur on odd, off-years, in mid-September or even in the summer — this year, it's June 24 — which means turnout is abysmally low. In 2013, the year that yielded Bill de Blasio, about 20% of registered Democrats turned out for the primary. In 1997, as Democrats rallied to deny Rudy Giuliani a second term, it was around 15%. What passes for robust primary participation: 1989, the year David Dinkins beat Ed Koch, and 2021, in which Eric Adams edged out Kathryn Garcia. About a quarter of city Democrats voted in each case. No matter how much political spin you apply, it is hard to argue that this amounts to a popular mandate. Whoever wins the Democratic primary typically enjoys a leisurely stroll to victory in a pro forma November general election where far fewer voters turn out than should — typically less than 25% — no doubt in part because the electorate knows that the results are essentially a [Bald Bull vs. Glass Joe](https://kotaku.com/every-punch-out-opponent-ranked-1750664537?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) matchup pitting a dominant Dem against a punching-bag Republican. Eric Adams coasted in November 2021 with 67% of the vote; Bill de Blasio, with 73% and 66% in 2013 and 2017, respectively. The appearance of a left-leaning billionaire independent or the rare, timely rise of a credible liberal Republican in a moment of crisis are the only things that have disrupted the pattern. So, more often than not, a few hundred thousand people choose the mayor for our city of 8.5 million, giving outsized influence to public-sector unions, interest groups and others who control large voting blocs. Equally problematic is how the general election, which should showcase the two most popular candidates, automatically reserves a spot for the winner of the Republican primary. Curtis Sliwa netted a paltry 40,000 votes in the GOP primary in 2021 — but those totals were enough to get him through to the final round, while Kathryn Garcia, who got nearly 400,000 votes in the Democratic primary and may well have been appealing to Republicans and independents, was not on the November ballot. Meantime, independents, more than a fifth of the city's electorate, have no primary of their own, relegating them to spectator status in the decisive early phases. While unaffiliated candidates can technically appear on the November ballot, without the party label, they're effectively doomed to sideshow irrelevance unless they have Bloomberg-level resources or name recognition. (These structural problems multiply for City Council and other local races, which generate even less voter attention and participation.) > Even in a good year, a few hundred thousand people choose the mayor for our city of 8.5 million, giving outsized influence to public-sector unions, interest groups and others who control large voting blocs and further dispiriting the broader electorate. Why did this year wind up different? Happenstance. The incumbent mayor, a Democrat, happened to be indicted on federal corruption charges, and that federal indictment then happened to get dismissed by a corrupt presidential administration, resulting in a situation in which Eric Adams was doomed to lose the primary but still had a puncher's chance running as an independent under a custom-made ["Safe Streets, Affordable City"](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/04/09/mayor-adams-safe-streets-affordable-city-ballot-tagline-points-to-election-strategy/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) general election ballot line. Add to that the fact that the Working Families Party, which has a significant voice in local elections, can't stomach Cuomo and might choose to run one of its four endorsees, perhaps the charismatic Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani, in the general. With that array of competitors, while the former governor is now dominating Democratic primary polls and would at this point be the wise wager for any bettor looking forward to November, it's less likely he'll be allowed to coast. The spotlight will burn brighter and the voters will lean in closer. That's the way it ought to be in a real democracy. How can we institutionalize such democratic vitality rather than reverting to our undemocratic norm? Start by moving city elections from off-off years to align them with congressional or presidential election years, to piggyback on higher-profile contests and ensure robust turnout. Turnout in presidential election years often tops 60%. Then, have an all-comers, ["jungle" primary](https://www.npr.org/2018/06/05/617250124/how-californias-jungle-primary-system-works?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in which candidates compete regardless of their party affiliation — and all voters can turn out. Make it ranked-choice, like party primaries already are, so that it's not zero-sum. And to make turnout easier still, schedule it in September, not in the heat of the summer. (It's the State Legislature in Albany, now dominated by Democrats, that sets the calendar.) Lastly, make the November general election a contest between the top three, four or five finishers in that all-comers primary. That might mean that a bunch of Democrats are competing against one another in the general; or perhaps an independent or Republican would crash the party. Regardless, it would produce a genuine competition between those with the most popular support, which will likely engender more interest, more civic engagement, less playing to the partisan base — and ultimately, better local government. Some such democracy-enhancing reforms are [currently under consideration by Mayor Adams' Charter Revision Commission](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/04/nyc-charter-revision-commission-seriously-considering-election-reforms/404426/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), a body tasked with recommending improvements to our city's foundational legal document. While the changes would ironically need to be approved in yet another low-turnout election, they represent our best chance to build a more responsive, representative and engaging democracy. The question isn't whether we need these changes — it's how long we can really afford to keep operating under the broken status quo. ### If Free Buses Aren’t Wise, What About Cheaper Citi Bikes? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/if-free-buses-arent-wise-what-about-cheaper-citi-bikes/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:03.000Z It's easy to forget that there was a time when Citi Bike wasn't a ubiquitous presence on our streets. Last year, the network of Lyft-operated, blue-and-grey two-wheelers hit new heights, as riders[ set three daily](https://x.com/CitiBikeNYC/status/1834314653033181375?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ two monthly](https://x.com/CitiBikeNYC/status/1852379895453687828?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) ridership records on the way to reaching[ 250 million all-time rides](https://x.com/CitiBikeNYC/status/1858922789006155968?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Citi Bike has become a mainstay on our streets, and the soaring ridership isn't showing any signs of slowing down. The only thing rising faster than Citi Bike's ridership numbers is its fees. On New Year's Day in 2024, the e-bike fare was $0.17 per minute for members and $0.26 per minute for non-members. Three days later, [the rate rose to $0.20 for members and $0.30 for non-members](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2023/12/28/new-years-peeve-citi-bike-fare-hike-to-ring-in-2024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Six months later, [the fare jumped again to $0.24 for members and $0.36 for non-members](https://www.amny.com/nyc-transit/citi-bike-hiking-prices-for-second-time-this-year/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And this past January, [the fee rose one last time to $0.25 for members and $0.38 for non-members](https://gothamist.com/news/higher-citi-bike-prices-take-effect-in-nyc-what-to-know?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), totaling at a nearly 50% price hike in just over a year. It's a trend that advocates and planners have sought to reverse as part of a broader push to[ publicly fund Citi Bike](https://act.transalt.org/a/publicly-fund-citibike?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Those efforts have failed to gain traction in the City Council. That changed last fall, when Brooklyn Councilmembers Chi Ossé and Lincoln Restler introduced[ legislation](https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6860228&GUID=3A0AEA97-7F4E-402E-8048-D91A40360876&Options=ID%7CText%7C&Search=%09Int+1039-2024&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to cap Citi Bike fares for members at the cost of a subway fare: $2.90\. The fare cap would apply to all rides on e-bikes under an hour (or two hours for conventional, non-pedal-assist bikes). Ossé and Restler hope the fare cap incentivizes drivers to switch from driving to using Citi Bike. This marks the most concrete push to reduce the cost of Citi Bike with the help of public subsidies. The efforts mirror the[ free bus initiative](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/01/zohran-mamdani-wants-make-nyc-buses-free-mayor-how-would-work/402425/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that Queens Assemblyman and mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani has advocated for. In October,[ I analyzed Mamdani's plan](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/should-new-york-city-have-free-fares-for-better-and-worse) (and fare-free transit writ large) and recommended against implementing it. With Citi Bike fare cuts, similar dynamics and viability questions are at play. However, some variables argue in favor of bringing down the price of bikeshare. **How we got here** What Ossé and Restler are proposing for Citi Bike is standard practice for American public transit agencies; fares typically comprise a fraction of the revenue agencies receive. The MTA, for example, [only gets around a quarter of its revenue from fares](https://www.mta.info/budget/MTA-operating-budget-basics?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20largest%20share%20of%20MTA,comes%20from%20fares%20and%20tolls.) — the rest comes from taxes, tolls and federal COVID aid. Los Angeles' ratio is [even lower, at 5%](https://www.saje.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/SAJE-The-Road-to-Transit-Equity.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These lower ratios are due to post-pandemic ridership drops; in 2019, [the MTA's farebox recovery ratio was 53%](https://enotrans.org/article/the-mass-transit-fiscal-cliff-estimating-the-size-and-scope-of-the-problem/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), one of eight transit agencies nationwide with recovery ratios over 50%. Still, transit agencies routinely get a lot of outside revenue support beyond their fares, whereas Citi Bike currently gets nothing. The full implementation of Intro 1039 would bring the bikeshare's recovery ratio down to 60%, exceeding all but three American transit agencies' pre-pandemic recovery ratios. This request would seem entirely reasonable if Citi Bike were a subway system. But one doesn't have to point to public transit subsidies as justification for a bikeshare subsidy;[ several North American cities already dedicate public subsidies to help fund their bikeshare networks](https://nabsa.net/2024/03/28/public-funds/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), like Mexico City, Montreal, San Francisco, Washington D.C. and Boston. Typically, these cities used the money to fund operations rather than fare cuts. (Boston did allocate $550,000 for subsidized passes during MBTA closures in 2022). But there is plenty of precedent for using public funds to help pay for bikeshares. Nothing is preventing the City Council from dedicating subsidies to replacing fares. To establish how much public money is needed, we must establish how much revenue we need to replace, which requires creating a new fare structure with the cap. For simplicity's sake, I will round up to $3\. Currently, Citi Bike caps rides across boroughs at the equivalent of a 20-minute fare ($5 plus tax), so we can use that interborough limit as a model for our cap. Setting the price at $3 for a 20-minute-or-longer ride translates to a $0.15 per minute fare for the first 20 minutes and then free fare beyond that. Therefore, a subsidy would have to replace 40% of the revenue for the first 20 minutes of a ride and the entire fare beyond that. In 2024,[ Citi Bike raked in about $215 million in total revenue, $80 million of which came from e-bikes](https://mot-marketing-whitelabel-prod.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/nyc/December-2024-Citi-Bike-Monthly-Report.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In 2022,[ NYU Wagner's Rudin Center](https://wagner.nyu.edu/rudincenter/2023/02/citi-bike-ridership-trends-fall-2022?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Total%20number%20of%20rides%20and,Top%2010%20origin%20stations) estimated that members accounted for 79% of Citi Bike rides. That puts the approximate subsidy requirement at about $25.25 million annually. That estimate does not consider the 20% of rides that exceed 20 minutes, which must be entirely replaced from the 21st minute. However, there is also a higher e-bike fee that non-members must pay, decreasing members' overall contribution and balancing out the cost of longer rides. Therefore, sticking around $25 million is reasonable. Restler and Ossé would likely end up attempting to rally the City Council behind generating revenue through new taxes and fees. However, a funding source exists at the state level that could pay for the program with no extra impact on New York City taxpayers' wallets. Last year, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority pointed to the $3 billion Mass Transportation Operation Assistance fund as a revenue source for bikeshare systems. Their report used Albany's network as an example, estimating that their bikeshare could receive $139,000 annually using the subsidy model for public transit agencies. The state would have to reclassify bikeshare as public transit, which isn't guaranteed. Theoretically, if Citi Bike did get reclassified,[ Streetsblog](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2024/06/05/transit-subsidies-for-bike-share-would-get-huge-bang-for-small-bucks-report?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) estimated they could earn about $51 million annually using 2023 ridership figures, double what's needed to fund the fare cap. Considering the system's growth, that number could go even higher, unlocking the opportunities to pursue other expansions or improvements to the system. However, the uncertainty of the fund's availability necessitates other funding options.[ Restler and Ossé did not directly reference any funding sources in their](https://x.com/OsseChi/status/1863621200590618658?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [promo video](https://x.com/OsseChi/status/1863621200590618658?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but their motivations provide directions on where they could go. The council duo invoked a desire to encourage people to switch from driving to bikeshare, making car usage fees a natural funding source.[ Dynamic parking pricing models](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0739456X221141317?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), allocating some speeding, parking and red light ticket revenue, as well as gas and[ vehicle weight](https://www.curbed.com/2023/06/new-york-suv-trucks-weight-based-fee.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) taxes, could help pay for fare subsidies. More conventional[ tax hikes](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/raising-revenues/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and[ additional enforcement revenue](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/01/zohran-mamdani-wants-make-nyc-buses-free-mayor-how-would-work/402425/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) can also finance the bill. None of these proposals are glamorous, but they provide pathways to the required revenue. Another revenue source? The bill itself. The savings from Mamdani's free bus pilot led to a [30-40% increase in ridership on those routes](https://www.thenation.com/article/society/new-york-city-bus-free-fare/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). It stands to reason that similar price cuts on Citi Bike would also lead to ridership boosts. Unlike free buses, however, Citi Bike would still get fare revenue with a fare cap. Ridership growth would increase revenue for Citi Bike, demonstrating the key difference between a fare reduction and a fare removal: Even if the net fare loss is identical, any farebox revenue will make a fare reduction more financially feasible than a fare removal. **Pluses and minuses** Citi Bike's increasing fees have become a [growing financial strain on commuters](https://www.brooklynpaper.com/too-much-citi-bike-rate-hike-bk-riders/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), leading some riders to reconsider sticking with the bikeshare and deterring prospective riders from adopting it. The fare cap introduces a new incentive for people to adopt biking as a mode of transportation, with many environmental benefits. The [foregone and reduced greenhouse gas emissions are immense](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1361920920306696?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and e-bikes can be a[ viable choice to replace car trips](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2950105924000342?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20simulation%20results%20suggest%20that,residents%20in%20the%20study%20area.). A more affordable Citi Bike means more people are biking instead of driving, thereby reducing traffic, emissions and pollution. It also creates a safer experience for bikers and pedestrians. Increased biking results in a more prominent presence on the road, making drivers more aware of them and reinforcing their ["safety in numbers."](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022437522001402?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20safety%2Din%2Dnumbers%20effect%20refers%20to%20a%20phenomenon%20wherein,in%20a%20crash%20is%20lower.) Fare reductions and increased ridership would also help curtail reckless ridership. The current cost structure incentivizes riders to do whatever they can to reduce costs, like speeding, running red lights and riding the wrong way, contributing to increased pedestrian injuries. Reducing fares and introducing a fare time limit removes the financial incentives to these reckless habits, which, coupled with increased ridership leading to slower riding, could help create a safer pedestrian experience. But Citi Bike's fare cap is one of many needs competing for the same subsidies. The reliability and longevity of e-bikes have deteriorated thanks to vandalism, improper use, and, most critically, [ridership overperformance](https://www.curbed.com/2023/07/citi-bikes-electric-bikes-lyft-broken-maintenance-batteries.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The bikes have worn down three times faster than Lyft initially anticipated. Coupled with vandalism, the surging ridership has resulted in skyrocketing demands for repairs and battery swaps, straining the system's workforce. Citi Bike's workforce is already underequipped to handle existing demands. A fare cap could further increase those demands, and Citi Bike's usability would continue declining without additional personnel assistance. Then there's the reach of Citi Bike. Advocates have long fought to get new docks deeper into the outer boroughs. However, even after the[ Citi Bike network expansion planned for this fall](https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/920-24/mayor-adams-major-expansion-citi-bike-service-outer-boroughs-ridership-continues?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), 36% of New Yorkers will live more than five minutes away from a dock and won't benefit from a fare cap. Far more people would enjoy the benefits of a system expansion, whereas a fare cap only benefits those within reach. There are also external variables that can undermine the success of a fare cap. It is worth scrutinizing how many ridership gains would materialize from a price cut.[ Cost does influence people's commuting preferences](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856423001209?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but[ convenience and reliability](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214367X22000333?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#s0085) are more influential factors. While Citi Bike is easy to use, imbalances in bike placement and its relative absence in the outer boroughs hamper its availability. The issues with breakdowns and operations also hurt its reliability, something that[ Comptroller Brad Lander found to be more prominent in the parts of the outer boroughs where Citi Bike is present](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptrollers-review-of-citi-bike-finds-worrying-decreases-in-service-reliability-under-lyfts-operation-especially-in-low-income-neighborhoods/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Safety is another factor to consider. The Department of Transportation has[ failed to install the required 50 miles of bike lanes per year since the NYC Streets Plan bill passed in 2019](https://projects.transalt.org/bikelanes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the city's disjointed bike lane network[ has deterred commuters from adopting micromobility, particularly women and seniors](https://www.gettingthere.city/what-we-learned-about-people-upper-west-side-micromobility-users-survey?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Even if Citi Bike were free and in every corner of the city, the lack of bike infrastructure would still undercut its usage. Until DOT starts building bike lanes properly, these qualms will quell whatever ridership increases come from a price cut. **Should they go for it?** The social benefit of embracing micromobility[ is immense](https://campuspress.yale.edu/ledger/eco-friendly-commuting-benefits-of-electric-bikes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20most%20significant,zero%20emissions%20while%20in%20use.), and DOT should heavily encourage increased Citi Bike ridership, something that affordability helps to achieve. However, those other priorities must be addressed in order for the bill to succeed. The Mass Transportation Operation Assistance fund provides flexibility to address those priorities while funding the fare cap. Without that funding, it becomes more challenging. The different funding sources could generate sufficient revenue, but they could be watered down, and they aren't guaranteed to pass. The operational priorities of network expansion and reliability must be dealt with. Suppose the secured funding packages aren't sufficient to finance the bill completely. In that case, the Council should explore more modest price interventions, like only implementing a 20-minute temporal cap or a higher $4 fare cap. Nevertheless, Citi Bike is here to stay, and it behooves our politicians to embrace its presence. A price cut should not overshadow the other measures needed to help bolster the bikeshare, but it is worth exploring, and the Council should consider pursuing it. Encouraging micromobility is a critical part of the city's climate and transportation goals; making the system more affordable is one way to accomplish that. ### When Pro Bono is a Con URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/when-pro-bono-is-a-con/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:03.000Z *Nonprofit legal expert Sean Delany discusses unprecedented agreements between the Trump administration and major law firms pledging $125 million each in pro bono services for administration-selected causes. These vaguely defined arrangements could significantly reduce legal resources for traditional nonprofits serving disadvantaged communities while potentially violating established pro bono standards and creating a chilling effect on attorney participation.* *You can listen to this episode, "When Pro Bono is a Con," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/when-pro-bono-is-a-con/id1794619189?i=1000704300137&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/5yQr3POqsa3mrnGsIHaWsa?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* **Jamie:** You are listening to "After Hours with Jamie Rubin," a Vital City Podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. Okay, so in the last few weeks there's been a lot of interaction between the presidential administration and some of the largest law firms in the country. What some of those firms have agreed to with the administration — it's all been publicly disclosed — could have real impacts on one of the most important sectors in New York City, which is the nonprofit sector. So in light of that, I decided it was time for another "emergency podcast," and I couldn't think of anybody better to talk to about what all this might mean than Sean Delany. Sean was the executive director of Lawyers Alliance for a long time. He ran the Charities Bureau of the Attorney General's office in New York State, which means that he was sort of overseeing a lot of the nonprofit sector. He has intimate knowledge of what it means to do legal work for and around nonprofit organizations, particularly in New York State and New York City. And we'll talk about what it all means and how this all might work its way through the system in the next couple of years. So Sean, thanks for being with us. **Sean:** Happy to be here. Thank you for inviting me, Jamie. I've been a nonprofit lawyer for more than 30 years at this point, and relevant to this conversation, as you've already mentioned, I was the executive director at Lawyers Alliance for New York for 20 years. By way of background, Lawyers Alliance provides free and low cost legal services to nonprofits that are working to improve the quality of life in New York City's low income neighborhoods. That 20 year period from 1999 through 2009 was an extraordinary period in the pro bono world, but nothing like what we're experiencing today, which is completely unprecedented. **Jamie:** Sean, why don't you tell us your version of how we got here. **Sean:** So, it's my understanding that representatives in the Trump administration began to initiate conversations some weeks ago with the leaders of selected large law firms, ostensibly about their diversity, equity and inclusion programs, and whether they were out of compliance with the law or the administration's priorities. Those conversations evolved into threats that the administration extended to punish those firms by cutting them off from the access that they would need in order to represent their clients before the federal government. Two to three weeks ago, those conversations began to emerge as agreements. Those agreements have not been shared publicly. There's considerable doubt about whether they exist beyond a set of bullet points, in a Truth Social posting or emails between the parties. We now have nine firms that have consented to provide uncompensated pro bono services to support causes that the administration maintains have not historically been supported by the firms in either their paid practices or their pro bono practices. **Jamie:** By those specific firms? **Sean:** By those specific nine firms. That's right. The "arrangements" list examples, at least in the social media postings from the administration and from the President, that give an indication of what kind of work he has contemplated. So for example: "assisting veterans and other public servants, including among others, members of the military, gold star families, law enforcement, and first responders, ensuring fairness in our justice system and combating antisemitism. The law firms will take on a wide range of pro bono matters that represent the full political spectrum, including conservative ideals." That's a statement that was made following the most recent of these arrangements that involve five different law firms, each pledging $125 million in uncompensated services supposedly to do that work. **Jamie:** Those were, those are just examples of work that could be — **Sean:** — not limited to including, right, At the same time, however, there have been other postings on social media by the president in which he has mused about whether this work could also include negotiating trade deals on behalf of the Trump administration, or doing legal work associated with supporting the profitability of the coal industry, or indeed even providing personal legal services to either the president or his businesses. One can't tell at this point whether those musings are serious or not, but they suggest that there's a certain amount of ambiguity in what's been agreed to by the parties. **Jamie:** I think the answer is no, but the law firms in question haven't really responded exactly. Is that right? **Sean:** What we know about the law firms is primarily from internal messaging that has pretty much uniformly spoken about this as no change at all in their pro bono policies and practices, that it is something that's intended to encourage them to do what they already are doing without any modification, and that the firms would have a "right to refuse." \[The work\] would have to be mutually agreed upon by the administration of the firms before it could be considered part of this compliance. **Jamie:** Got it. Okay. So the first set of examples — veterans and … I forget exactly what gold star families are. I think that's people whose kids were killed in combat or — **Sean:** Right. **Jamie:** — Okay, and conservative advocacy, let's call it, by nonprofit organizations. At least in theory, there's no particular reason to think that Paul Weiss — to take one law firm — there's not somebody at Paul Weiss doing pro bono work for somebody who is ideologically conservative. \[Paul Weiss\] chose \[it\] because it's a nonprofit organization, and they could use pro bono help. **Sean:** I can't speak specifically to Paul Weiss in this regard, but certainly there are firms who have no problem devoting some of their pro bono resources to folks who might be at that end of the spectrum. **Jamie:** Okay. And, as somebody who has overseen pro bono work, you have told me that there are standards – actual standards in pro bono work that actually mean something. So maybe you could explain what it means and then explain whether a lot of that would pass muster. **Sean:** The standards come primarily from the Pro Bono Institute in Washington, which has a mission of promoting greater, better, more effective pro bono work by law firms and corporations. And as you can imagine, because there are always gray areas as to what is or isn't appropriate pro bono representation, they have created a set of principles that helps to explain when it's appropriate for a law firm to call a project a pro bono project and to get the appropriate credit for it. But those standards essentially require, and I'm gonna quote here as well, "*that the work that is done would have to be the delivery of legal services to persons of limited means or charitable religious, civic community, governmental educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means. Number two: the provision of legal assistance to individuals, groups, organizations seeking to secure or protect human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, public rights, environmental rights, or three: The provision of legal services to charitable, religious, civic community, governmental educational organizations and matters, and further into their organizational purposes where standard payment of fees would significantly deplete the organization's resources."* **Jamie:** So in all of that — and I haven't practiced law in some 30 odd years, but — I don't think that representing, for example, the coal industry would really fall under any of those. I mean, it would be pretty hard to drive that particular truck through the standards. **Sean:** I think that's right. I'm having a hard time seeing how it could fit the basic criteria that the Pro Bono Institute has articulated. **Jamie:** Okay. And likewise — I'm just gonna go ahead and go out on a limb and say — representing the federal government in negotiating trade deals? That's probably not gonna meet the test of, you know, paying the lawyers, which would significantly impoverish the federal government. **Sean:** Likely you are right. There is, as you may have noticed in the definitions that I quoted, the possibility that representing the government in some respects might be all right. The commentary that accompanies all this suggests that that's because often government offices like the District Attorney's office or the Attorney General's office have limited resources, right? And it might be appropriate to work on their matters and claim pro bono credit for it. I don't think you can say that about the vast resources of the federal government. **Jamie:** Having worked in the federal government, I'm gonna tell you that that's not really a problem. And I don't care how many people D.O.G.E. fires. It's not a problem. So then the question for you, Sean, is, as somebody who spent a lot of time overseeing lawyers and managing lawyers who did this kind of pro bono work, real pro bono work, fully accredited, pro bono work — this city is full of nonprofit organizations. Most of the work they get done is pro bono. It's critical to their survival. And I've gotten services from Davi, Polk and Cleary Gottlieb, and Paul Weiss, and Cravath, and lots and lots of other firms. A hundred million dollars or $125 million worth of pro bono work, which is the numbers that are getting thrown around here. We don't know how many years, but let's just say two years. That is an enormous amount of pro bono work. I'm just gonna do my back of the envelope math here. A hundred million dollars — let's just say that your average senior associate in a law firm is billing out at, I don't know, a thousand bucks an hour. So at a thousand bucks an hour, a hundred million dollars is, I believe, a hundred thousand hours. Let's say it's two years, so it's 50,000 hours of senior associate work a year. Then you've got 50 weeks at a thousand hours. I mean, it's a lot of lawyers. It's 40 senior associates, full-ish time for a year or two. **Sean:** It's a big commitment almost, no matter how you measure it. Whether we're talking about two years, four years or more, whether we're talking about junior associates or mid-levels or partners, it's a big commitment even for firms that have already made a huge commitment of many hundreds of millions of dollars in pro bono work today. And that number keeps going up. The latest announcement was $125 million each from the firms that were announced most recently. **Jamie:** Let's assume for a moment that you suck all of that work out of the existing pro bono system. What does that do to the nonprofits? **Sean:** Well, even though there are more lawyers in New York City than anywhere else in the world, there are also more nonprofit groups in New York City than anywhere else in the world. So the demand is also very great for pro bono legal services. Pro bono is not mandatory in New York. It's encouraged in various ways, and it's certainly encouraged by the firms, but it's not required. And what that means is that the number of lawyers who were ever willing to do this work is a small portion of those who work at the firms. And that means that the pro bono resources are gonna be strapped by this diversion of talent to work that isn't currently being done by the firms. **Jamie:** And if you think realistically about what this is gonna mean inside the firm — I'm trying to stay away from these kinds of things — but it has to have a chilling effect on the lawyers at these firms. If they're thinking about doing work for one of their traditional pro bono clients, they're for sure gonna have to think very carefully about whether there's gonna be scrutiny on that. So even that just tamps down the availability. As you said, it's probably not gonna be the same lawyer who does work for one kind of an organization who now decides *I'll just do pro bono work for, I don't know whatever conservative organization it is, even if it's perfectly legitimate.* So now you're taking out of play this whole class of lawyers who really would do pro bono work. So the overall supply of lawyers willing to do pro bono work for the traditional nonprofits who serve disadvantaged New Yorkers — there is no way to think that this isn't going down dramatically if these settlements are for real. **Sean:** It remains to be seen just how much pressure they'll be under to take on work that they're not already doing today. So far, this is poorly defined, poorly explained and poorly understood, so we don't really know what this is gonna look like in practice, but the expansive view that the administration has taken, at least in its public statements about what this could mean — that there could be lots and lots of work that firms are taking on that is nowhere near what their current pro bono practices look like. I think it's also important to understand this in the context of why firms have pro bono programs in the first place. Large law firms are businesses. They're not charities, and their pro bono programs are a part of their business strategy. Their pro bono programs help them with public relations in the broader sense. They make them look like good citizens for doing that work. It helps them to say that to their clients, some of whom care about pro bono service, that this is one of the things that they're proud of and they do. But most importantly, it's a recruitment strategy for these firms. Large law firms are competing for the best and the brightest from among the top law schools, especially the law firms that are entering into these arrangements today. They want to be able to demonstrate to those recruits that they are more humane than that other "sweatshop down the street." There will always be young lawyers who are eager to work at these firms, don't get me wrong, but you've seen the press and the ferment that's now arising among the associates at so many of these firms that have made these arrangements. They're not happy. And that's gonna also be true of those that the firms would like to recruit, who have any kind of a public interest orientation. **Jamie:** Just to finish this off, Sean, you know, I'm just an observer. I'm a headline reader. You've been immersed in this world for basically your entire career. I bet you're right. **Sean:** We'll see how it works out. It's all very much in play, as you know, but the ambiguity in what we know so far about these arrangements is delivered on both sides. I think the administration thinks the ambiguity gives them continuing leverage. And I think the law firms think that the ambiguity gives them some wiggle room as to what they can refuse to do if they find that it's distasteful. I think we'll see. I think only one of them is going to be right. **Jamie:** Only one of them is gonna be right unless they just decide to dance off and hand in hand into the world of ambiguity together. Sean Delany, thank you so much for taking the time. **Sean:** I'm happy to do it. Thank you for having me, Jamie. **Jamie:** Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### Holding the Center URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/holding-the-center-vital-city-at-three/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:03.000Z > By surfacing new ideas about how to improve cities, by providing public access to data, and by offering a home for thinkers across a broad political spectrum, we believe that Vital City can help buttress liberal democracy in its hour of need. At Vital City, we are an optimistic bunch. We believe in the glory of cities, even if that glory may be dimmed from time to time. We have faith in institutions, even if they may not always operate as well-oiled machines. We think there is a galaxy of ideas that could make the world hum and spin for the betterment of all, even if sometimes they need to be translated and adapted in order to mesh into the mechanics of how cities work. We know that good governance, while hard, is within reach. And we think that speaking civilly and trying to understand views we may not agree with is not simply a nicety but essential to ensuring that democracy long endures. It is that democratic and pluralistic discipline that makes cities electric and binds us all together, through habit and practice, in a web of connection, order and creativity. We are thinking about all this a lot these days, as we are celebrating Vital City's third anniversary. But if you detect an elegiac note, you aren't wrong. It's in our ears as we survey our current moment. Here's what we think is happening: we have turned — slowly in New York and suddenly in D.C. — from institutions that run according to laws and regulations to fiefdoms governed by the whims and desires of the men in charge. Government has become personal. In its starkest representation, a malign symbiosis between New York City's 110th mayor and the 47th president of the United States has accelerated the destruction of mores and laws. In New York City, we have a mayor who demonstrates that he does not know the difference between what is for him and what is for the city. In Washington, we have a president who has no sense that the "art of the deal" is utterly at odds with the notion that government exists to ensure the well-being of its people, even (or especially) if there's not a dime to be made. When government is personal, when the neutral principles of the common good disappear in favor of self-interest (even if, for the sake of politesse, the self-interest is dressed up as "I am you"), we know we have descended into Hobbesian times. Without the regulating influence of principled governance and the social contract by which we accept common norms, we find ourselves plunged into a war of all against all. On the national stage, the president revels in humiliating America's friends and betraying its allies. And in New York City, the mayor has played the city and its people, turning the government into a bazaar for his cronies, who searched for ["crumbs"](https://nypost.com/2024/04/18/us-news/adams-aide-wanted-a-piece-of-lucrative-migrants-contracts-saying-i-have-to-get-mine-lawsuit/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to enrich themselves. Together, the mayor and the president have managed — through an unsavory deal to get the mayor out from under criminal charges in exchange for unswerving adherence to the president's wishes — to roll a bowling ball through any semblance of responsible and proper city governance and to smash up the long-standing barrier separating politics and prosecution. The deal is just a synecdoche for a broader destruction of neutral principles in favor of personal desires. We are indeed in a different and more perilous moment than we were when Vital City was first founded. The words of the famous Yeats poem are particularly resonant now: "Things fall apart: the centre cannot hold." But anarchy has not yet been set loose upon the world. While things have changed significantly, there are several throughlines that connect the state of affairs three years ago to our current situation. Then and now, Vital City seeks to occupy what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. once called the ["vital center,"](https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/00/11/26/specials/schlesinger-centermag.html?module=inline&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) providing a touch base for both the governed and the governors. Governance is about something different than self-interest. A social contract is different from a "deal." There are ground truths, and we seek to uncover these ideas and live by them every day. The people who live in New York and other American cities are bound together by laws tethered to principles and by mores that wrap us tighter through repetition. While elections are key to democracy, between those quadrennial events, laws and norms provide our daily guide. The work of government is crucial to our well-being, and so is our civic culture. Culture is inchoate and there is no "toolkit" for creating or changing it. But it encompasses all of us, all the time – and it is what backlights and animates how we live together (and how well). At Vital City, we believe that American cities are engines for advancing liberal democratic values. Indeed, our cities are valuable laboratories, allowing us to test our ability to live together in close quarters and manage our differences productively. Vital City was created to provide practical solutions, rooted in evidence, to urban problems. By surfacing new ideas about how to improve cities, by providing public access to data, and by offering a home for thinkers across a broad political spectrum, we believe that Vital City can help buttress liberal democracy in its hour of need. We offer this compendium of some of Vital City's greatest hits in honor of our third anniversary and the principal themes that have animated our fledgling enterprise: safety, place, governance and culture. Thank you for your time and interest in our work. ### Why Does Everything Cost So Much? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/why-does-everything-cost-so-much/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:04.000Z When I was a kid, one of my mother's friends told me that you can't leave the house in New York City without spending $20\. It was always one thing or another, she said. At the time, I thought she was crazy because I did it all the time. But as an adult, the only question I have is how much I'd have to adjust that number to capture the increasing costs of living in the city. Big cities are naturally going to be expensive in certain ways. By definition, more people want to live in them, and that demand has economic consequences. The per-square-foot cost of housing and commercial space is always going to be higher in a successful downtown and its surrounding neighborhoods than it will be in the country. The question is how much higher. That question should be central to the politics of cities, but too rarely is. New York City is never going to be as cheap as rural Arkansas. But across a huge number of areas — housing, groceries, taxes, health care, professional services — it could be much, much cheaper. Making New York City cheaper would not only be great for city residents, many of whom pay a large share of their salaries in rent — it would be economically beneficial for the country and world, as more new ideas could be fomented and more talented people could develop in its midst if costs were lower. Elections in New York are about many things, but this question should be at their core: what can officials do to make it easier to live here? **What are cities, anyway?** Our greatest contemporary urban economist (and Vital City contributor) [Ed Glaeser](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/edward-glaeser-1) once defined cities, rather unromantically, as ["the absence of space between people and firms."](https://www.nber.org/papers/w9733?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) But cities create an economic puzzle. It's more expensive per square foot to live in a place with lots of other people, so why are profit-maximizing firms or even ordinary people willing to locate in big cities? The answers economists offer, called "agglomeration economies," fall into a few buckets. The lower cost of transporting goods between residents of a city used to be a major driver of urban advantage around the turn of the last century, but that has mostly dried up as it has become cheap to ship goods across the country. Instead, the big reasons to locate in cities are deep markets and information spillovers. Firms and residents move to the metro areas of big cities because of the benefits of deep labor markets. In a big city, a worker can specialize — an actor in L.A. can become an expert in getting killed in zombie movies, because there are enough of them, while one in Topeka has to do whatever work is available, whether it is "Hamlet" or "Paw Patrol: The Musical." Workers do not face as much firm-specific risk in deep markets; the failure of an energy firm in Houston would simply lead its employees to look for work elsewhere in the city, while the failure of a similar employer in a less deep market would force its employees to move or find another field of work. Employers and workers alike find it easier to find good matches between positions and skills when markets are deeper. From dating opportunities to restaurants, city residents benefit from having lots of choices and better capacity to find matches. Further, city residents learn from each other, an idea economists call "information spillovers." Big cities are associated with [more inventions](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0048733306001661?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=We%20investigate%20the%20relationship%20between,an%20exponent%20larger%20than%20unity.) and increasing human capital (as measured by wages), as workers learn not only from co-workers, but from the vast number of people they come in contact with in dense cities. [Going to bars in Capitol Hill in Washington D.C. is a good way for lobbyists to learn how to do their jobs better](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=2037986&ref=vitalcitynyc.org); the same thing is true for healthcare experts in Atlanta and energy traders in Houston. Workers in big city metro areas are paid more than other workers. Some of this is selection, and some of it is matching with employers who are better fits, [but some of it is learning, as cities are associated with higher wage growth and not just high wage levels (and those wages persist after residents leave)](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/319563?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Notably, some of the economic benefits of cities are felt by non-residents. If AI companies, concentrated in San Francisco, are more productive, we all gain. If young biotech scientists learn from one another in Boston, companies can sell the drugs they invent around the country. If cities are so great, why don't more people live in them? Not everyone wants to, of course – indeed, [demand to live in cities has fallen in recent years](https://www.slowboring.com/p/cities-arent-back?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But cities would attract many more residents if it were not for what economists call "congestion costs." These are best understood as consisting of two separate types of costs: what [one might call true congestion costs and negative agglomerations](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=1471555&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). True congestion costs are the higher rents per square foot and increased traffic that come from people competing over the same space. Negative agglomerations are things that benefit from proximity just like agglomeration economies but are bad, like crime. Certain types of criminals can specialize, have more depth in targets and learn from one another, just like technologists; germs spread more the more people interact, turning the huge number of interactions one experiences in a big city — financial, social and personal — into a vector of disease. What's important to remember is that these are *inevitable* downsides of big cities. You can't have the benefits of a city like New York — the pulsating energy, the financial wizardry, the artistic frisson — without the congestion costs and negative agglomerations. **What should urban governments do?** One way to understand the role city government plays is that its main job is to limit congestion costs and negative agglomerations. Of course, city governments do other things, like providing the type of public services people want, like schools. But if there are necessary downsides to urban life, city government's job is to minimize them as much as it can. New York City government has focused substantially on curbing negative agglomerations. One of the greatest policy successes in New York City history was the massive reduction in germs after George Waring revolutionized the city's Street Cleaning department in 1895\. [Life expectancy in the city is now higher than the national average](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2023/11/01/new-york-city-life-expectancy/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Crime reduction is, of course, a constant focus of city politics. [Local voters punish crime increases the way national voters punish macro-economic problems](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00603.x?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And despite real problems with disorder, [the murder rate in New York City is substantially lower than other comparable American cities](https://www.vox.com/2024/3/12/24097470/new-york-crime-subway-deployment-gun-violence?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (this year, the murder rate is on track to be close to its lowest level since we started keeping statistics). While there's lots more we can do — [there's no reason to be complacent about still-too-high crime rates](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/12/new-york-city-has-lost-control-crime/681149/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — these achievements are nothing to sneeze at either. But New York has not succeeded at the other major role of government. Congestion costs — rents, the costs of consumer goods and traffic — are caused by people all wanting to be in the same place. That's what cities are, after all: the absence of distance between people and firms. But we need aggressive policies to accommodate them, lest congestion costs make capturing the economic and social upsides of urban life available to too few. Traffic is notably awful in New York, despite the extensive transportation infrastructure we built many years ago. [Commuting times are higher here than in virtually any other major city](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-u-s-cities-with-the-longest-commutes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [Building new infrastructure doesn't reduce traffic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Induced%5Fdemand?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — if there's free road space, people drive more — but it does allow more people to get around. And smart investments in trains and buses help too. But [building new infrastructure in New York City is far more expensive](https://transitcosts.com/wp-content/uploads/NewYork%5FCase%5FStudy.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) than it is anywhere else in the country or, indeed, the world. As a result, we've built very little of it. For instance, other than the short "stubway" Second Avenue Subway and the 7 train extension to Hudson Yards, [the subway system hasn't expanded since the 1940s](https://getpocket.com/explore/item/why-new-york-city-stopped-building-subways?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). [The operating costs of our subways and buses are also extremely high when compared to peer cities.](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2022/01/25/the-price-is-wrong-four-takeaways-from-the-mtas-cost-comparisons-report?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Despite the huge increase in demand to live in New York City since the 1970s — look at the prices! — if someone stepped in a time machine in 1975 and came out today, they would find that getting around the city is in many ways the same, with the exceptions of Citi Bike, other micromobility vehicles and the availability of Uber. [Our congestion pricing system is a major improvement](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/24/nyregion/nyc-congestion-pricing-revenue-mta.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), speeding commutes by pricing road access. But it is not a true congestion pricing system: It doesn't do enough to variably encourage people to drive at off-peak hours, it only covers part of Manhattan and the prices are too low at peaks. But it is a major step in the right direction, reducing congestion and making traffic flow more reasonably. Even so, New York has a long way to go to make getting around the city cheap and easy. On housing, the problem is even more acute. It is well known that apartments in New York are ridiculously expensive — that the rent is too damn high. The cause is equally well known: excessively restrictive land use regulations that stop developers from building more and more densely. [Prior to the restrictive 1961 zoning resolution, New York was adding more than 300,000 housing units a decade](https://www.forbes.com/sites/shimonshkury/2024/12/17/yes-in-my-back-yard-nycs-rezoning-ushers-in-new-era-of-housing-development/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Since then, we've never gotten above 200,000, despite the spiraling high prices. Policies like City of Yes are a step in the right direction, but only a small step. Massive zoning process changes of the [type being considered by the City Charter Commission](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/02/21/eric-adams-charter-commission-development-council/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), reforming the way [buildings are built](https://www.city-journal.org/article/deconstructing-new-yorks-building-costs?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and [maintained](https://therealdeal.com/new-york/2025/01/29/behind-the-revived-effort-to-reform-scaffolding-law/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and [moving the property](https://www.aei.org/op-eds/421as-end-means-its-time-for-real-property-tax-reform-in-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [tax system to one more clearly based on actual prices](https://furmancenter.org/research/publication/distribution-of-the-burden-of-new-york-citys-property-tax?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) are all necessary to get the city building again. Other high costs of living are downstream from our bad land use policy too. Wonder [why orange juice in New York is so expensive](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/costs-over-64-000-live-190016729.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)? Market depth in a big city means we have more choices and more competition, [which serves to drive quality-and-variety adjusted prices down for high-end products](http://www.jessiehandbury.com/papers/Handbury%5FNHP%5Fcurrentpublic.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (New York is a great place to buy caviar). But prices that matter for the poor and middle classes are high. Public policy makes this worse. We don't have a ton of competition among ordinary supermarkets, particularly from low cost retailers like Walmart, because the city makes it hard to build new supermarkets and [uses the rules to keep out Walmart specifically](https://fordhampoliticalreview.org/why-are-there-no-walmarts-in-new-york-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Politics,effect%20on%20the%20local%20economy.). Instead, people regularly shop at expensive bodegas. ([Oddly, the decline in retail shopping caused by Amazon may help this by opening up space for supermarkets](https://nypost.com/2024/04/21/real-estate/nyc-grocery-stores-are-booming-thanks-to-big-box-extinction/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org).). One final cost that New York City does not reduce is the cost of government itself. [Taxes here are very high](https://cbcny.org/research/new-york-still-top-charts?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). That might be okay if the quality of the services people received was extremely high. But there's no evidence that it is. The cost of incarcerating a single prisoner in [New York City is more than $550,000](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-cost-of-incarceration-per-person-in-new-york-city-skyrockets-to-all-time-high-2/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=December%206%2C%202021,nearly%20quadrupling%20since%20FY%202011.) a year, [more than 1.5 times the highest state government average and more than 20 times the lowest](https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-do-states-spend-on-prisons/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) (and is Rikers particularly nice?). [Funding for our public schools is the highest in the nation per student](https://www.k12dive.com/news/school-district-per-student-spending-covid-pandemic/722208/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but [outcomes are middling](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/nyregion/new-york-city-school-test-scores.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). New York City government is not indifferent to prices. New York has long directly regulated rents, through rent stabilization and inclusionary zoning programs. These provide cheaper rents for some residents, but do not increase access to the city — there are only so many rent regulated apartments to go around — and indeed can reduce access to the city by reducing incentives to build. **How are politicians responding?** To their credit, many contemporary politicians understand that the cost of living in the city is too high. But their policy proposals do not really address the problem. Consider [Zohran Mamdani's proposal for city-run grocery stores](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/12/nyregion/grocery-stores-city-owned.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What are the odds that a government that runs the most expensive jails, schools and infrastructure projects in America can run grocery stores more efficiently than Walmart or Amazon? They will only be able to offer competitive prices if the city provides huge subsidies. Other ideas, [like proposals for free buses](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/01/zohran-mamdani-wants-make-nyc-buses-free-mayor-how-would-work/402425/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), are less about bringing down costs than they are about redistribution, as the cost of the service would still have to be paid through taxes on others. These ideas do not actually address the high costs of living in the city; they simply shift them from consumers to taxpayers (or from one group of taxpayers to another), while likely increasing costs overall. New York City is a little more than seven months away from an important mayoral election. Perhaps the most important job of big city government is mitigating the inherently higher costs of living in an urban area, so that more people can benefit from the economic and social benefits of urban life. We should judge our government by how well it does this. New York City has done pretty well in the area of reducing negative agglomerations like crime and germs. But, whether you look at rents, the price of a quart of orange juice or the tax price of government services, it's safe to say that New York City government isn't doing much to keep costs for its residents down. You should be able to leave your apartment and keep your wallet at least somewhat full. We should ask candidates what they will do to drive the cost of living down and to increase the number of people who can access the city. ### How Starbucks (and Other Coffee Shops) Spark Entrepreneurship URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/how-starbucks-and-other-coffee-shops-spark-entrepreneurship/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:33.000Z Sometimes, a cup of coffee is more than just a cup of coffee. In the right neighborhood, it can represent the spark that stimulates economic development. Consider some history: In the 1980s, major coffee shop chains in the U.S. focused on maximizing revenue by rushing customers through their locations, mimicking fast-food efficiency. The more quickly coffee drinkers could walk in, pay and rush out, the more space for other drinkers to rush in and do the same. But Howard Schultz, founder of Starbucks, drew inspiration from the Italian cafés he had visited during a business trip to Milan. He envisioned a welcoming environment where people lingered, connected and built community — the kind of environment that sociologist Ray Oldenburg called [a "third place,"](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-third-places-promote-cohesion) a space which, after home (first place) and work (second), provided a respite where people could recharge, gather and socialize. The model succeeded, and a practice common in other countries and in small U.S. coffee shops eventually went mainstream. Starbucks expanded rapidly, and coffee drinkers across the country embraced the ritual of staying, reading, working on laptops and scheduling meetings. When Starbucks arrived in a neighborhood, residents and others took notice, as the shop became a signal of changes to come. Realtors coined the term "the Starbucks effect" to describe how neighborhoods would gentrify after a Starbucks shows up, attracting affluent residents who would willingly spend $5 (or, these days, a good deal more than that) on a latte. But in research with Columbia Ph.D. student Jinkyong Choi, we recently discovered that this "third place" model yielded greater benefits than even Schultz anticipated — benefits that can be quantified. **What defines a neighborhood?** Neighborhoods are not merely geographic locations. They are social and organizational ecosystems with residents, visitors and workers whose constellation of activities may alternatively nurture, stifle or have no impact on economic growth. One important source of economic growth is entrepreneurship — the decision made by people with initiative to start a new economic venture such as a local retail shop, a skilled service like tax preparation or dentistry, an establishment doing manufacturing and repair, or even, occasionally, a high-tech startup. Startups [account for a disproportionate share of job creation](https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/95/2/347/58100/Who-Creates-Jobs-Small-versus-Large-versus-Young?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the United States and [places that have more startups](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jae.2783?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) experience [higher economic growth](https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/97/2/498/58221/Entrepreneurship-and-Urban-Growth-An-Empirical?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Entrepreneurs hire [largely through their own personal networks](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1057/emr.2009.14?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), making their hiring more local to the neighborhood. They are also [more likely to identify local problems](https://www.amazon.com/Entrepreneurship-Choice-Strategy-Joshua-Gans/dp/1324072180?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and to [benefit from local connections](https://jhr.uwpress.org/content/58/1/183.short?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In addition, the profit generated can be assumed to remain in the neighborhood given that, when a large corporation moves in, part of its goal is to generate profit that moves back to headquarters, whereas this is not the case for entrepreneurs. But some neighborhoods see far more entrepreneurship than others. Why? Entrepreneurs, as everyone knows, need networks — to gain resources, to borrow money, to brainstorm ideas, to develop strategies. And networks are formed, and maintained, in third places. Every entrepreneurial phase — from ideation to team formation, funding acquisition and customer attraction — thrives on robust social connections. Our research examined whether introducing third places — specifically, neighborhood cafés — into neighborhoods boosts entrepreneurship through these network effects. We investigated one of the most significant transformations in U.S. neighborhood social spaces in recent decades: Starbucks' large-scale expansion of the third place model. We asked what happens to neighborhoods after a Starbucks arrives, focusing on neighborhoods that, before the company's arrival, had no coffee shops. Our question was whether the arrival stimulated entrepreneurship. Our inquiry faced a problem, however. Starbucks spends a lot of time, energy and resources deciding where to locate. Even if we were to see a rise in entrepreneurship following Starbucks' arrival, we would not have known whether the cause was Starbucks' impact or other factors we did not observe that convinced Starbucks to select the neighborhood in the first place. So we designed a quasi-experiment, taking advantage of the fact that sometimes, Starbucks identifies a neighborhood and tries to enter but fails to do so — because of community opposition or other idiosyncratic reasons. Therefore, rather than studying all neighborhoods without coffee shops, we compared those where Starbucks opened to those where Starbucks had planned to open but failed to do so. We found that neighborhoods gaining a Starbucks experienced 5% to 18% increases in new firm registrations annually, for each of the subsequent seven years. **WhatMagic's got to do with it** Another interesting initiative helped us answer our question: Starbucks' partnership with basketball legend Earvin "Magic" Johnson to establish cafés in underserved urban neighborhoods. In 1987, Johnson started a company focused on urban redevelopment. One of the things he did was convince Schultz to open shops in the kinds of neighborhoods that Starbucks, to that point, had typically avoided. Starbucks tended to open shops in highly affluent parts of cities and suburbs, not high-poverty neighborhoods. Johnson convinced Schultz to broaden its reach. When the first coffee shops from the Johnson-Starbucks partnership debuted in Ladera Heights, California, in 1999, Johnson expressed its community role: "The store accomplishes exactly what we hoped — providing not only the best coffee, but also the best hangout spot in town." The location evolved into a neighborhood institution where people worked on their computers, played chess, networked with potential clients and built connections. We compared neighborhoods where coffee shops from the Johnson-Starbucks partnership opened to demographically similar neighborhoods where they did not. We found that neighborhoods that open a Starbucks increase the number of new registered businesses by almost 30% per year. We interpret this as evidence that those areas most desperately needing social spaces reaped larger entrepreneurial benefits from these third places. **Networks, not just signals** These and other analyses convinced us that something happened to neighborhoods after Starbucks arrived that helped entrepreneurship flourish. But still, we had work to do to isolate what that effect might be. The coffee shops could be benefiting neighborhoods through several different mechanisms. The presence of Starbucks might attract other businesses or indicate rising real estate values, both of which might stimulate entrepreneurship. In addition, features such as Wi-Fi might help entrepreneurs at the coffee shop get on the internet and start their business. These features have nothing to do with the networks people might form in the cafés, so if they were the driving forces of growth, they'd challenge our hypothesis. So next, we focused on coffee shops themselves. Unlike Starbucks, Dunkin' Brands, the company behind Dunkin' Donuts, did not invest in warmly lit, comfortable spaces for people to spend hours at a time. Instead, they stuck to the quick turnover model. If networks are playing a role, then it would follow that the arrival of a Dunkin' coffee shop should have no impact on entrepreneurship. That is exactly what we found. In contrast, we examined another company that embraces the third-place philosophy like Starbucks, a smaller coffee shop chain called Caribou Coffee. We found an effect comparable in size to that of Starbucks. In addition, Starbucks locations that encourage more people to socialize — those with heavier foot traffic or larger floor space — had stronger impacts on entrepreneurship than smaller ones. And the entrepreneurial growth spanned beyond the retail, food or real estate sectors, suggesting effects extending beyond the local retail economy. Finally, we saw our positive estimate remained of a similar order of magnitude before 2010, when Starbucks first introduced unlimited free Wi-Fi; before 2008, when Starbucks first introduced two hours of Wi-Fi for Starbucks Rewards members; and before 2002, when Starbucks first introduced paid Wi-Fi. **What it all adds up to** Social spaces are crucial to revitalizing neighborhoods. They contribute to the local community, to quality of life and to civic engagement. Our research suggests that, provided they are truly social, they also contribute to economic development. And while we haven't researched this part yet, it stands to reason that the significance of coffee shops and similar places might increase as remote work increases and traditional office-based socialization declines. Starbucks has been criticized as an agent of gentrification, and our research neither engages nor disputes that conclusion. Instead, our research adds elements to understand what is clearly a more complicated reality. In neighborhoods severely lacking social spaces, a Starbucks, or any other coffee shop committed to a "third place" model, strengthens the local economy through enhanced social networks. Ironically, as Starbucks has struggled financially over the past few years, some have attributed its challenges to abandoning the "third place" model that originally powered its success. Many locations now prioritize online ordering and quick service over functioning as community-gathering spaces. Whether the company can reconnect with its neighborhood-centric roots remains uncertain. In a world increasingly dominated by digital interactions, physical third places such as coffee shops continue to matter mightily. It's face-to-face connections that ignite innovation, entrepreneurship and community vitality. When we invest in these spaces — through public initiatives or private enterprise — we strengthen the social infrastructure that enables neighborhoods to flourish. ### What Really Drives Gun Violence? Matthew Yglesias and Jens Ludwig in Conversation URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-really-drives-gun-violence-matthew-yglesias-and-jens-ludwig-in-conversation/ Last updated: 2026-01-22T11:18:23.000Z What if everything we thought we knew about gun violence was wrong? Vital City, NYU Wagner School, and the Institute for Public Knowledge are hosting a conversation between journalist Matthew Yglesias and University of Chicago behavioral economist Jens Ludwig exploring Ludwig’s new book, “Unforgiving Places: The Unexpected Origins of American Gun Violence.” Drawing on decades of research and immersive fieldwork in Chicago, Ludwig shows that most gun violence is the result of fleeting, emotionally charged moments — and that the solutions can be simple, sidestepping the political debates that have hampered progress on one of the United States’ most intractable problems. Speakers: - Jens Ludwig is the Edwin A. and Betty L. Bergman Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, Pritzker Director of the University of Chicago’s Crime Lab, co-director of the Education Lab and co-director of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s working group on the economics of crime. - Matt Yglesias is the author of "Slow Boring," a Substack of pragmatic takes on politics and public policy. ### Getting Government Under Comptrol URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/getting-government-under-comptrol/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:04.000Z *A revealing conversation about power, politics and the future of New York City with Manhattan Borough President Mark Levine. We dive deep into his campaign for city comptroller — an office responsible for managing $280 billion in pension funds, overseeing city contracts and providing crucial checks on mayoral power — and his vision for leveraging the office's substantial powers to tackle New York's affordability crisis. With Manhattan rents rising to an average of $5,300 monthly and vacancy rates at historic lows, Levine reveals his strategy to finance desperately needed affordable housing through pension fund investments. Plus, he makes the case for universal childcare as a $2 billion investment that could transform family economics across the five boroughs.* *You can listen to this episode, “Getting Government Under Comptrol,” on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/getting-government-under-comptrol/id1794619189?i=1000702799762&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/6gYKflu4jGqAvv6seGGbVh?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* **Jamie:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City Podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. **Molly:** Is that Patrick Ewing? Behind you? **Jamie:** It is Patrick Ewing, Knicks all star, legendary center. You wanna know why he's here? **Molly:** I do. **Jamie:** When I started my new job — not night shift, but my actual *job* job — since I was going to be managing people and having new partners, I figured I have learned enough about myself to know that I have some very minor flaws and, um…and…. You're supposed to say, “No, you don’t.” **Molly:** I would if I could, but I can't. **Jamie:** There we go. So I found myself an executive coach and I said, “Okay, here's my deal. I'm starting a new job. I need to make sure I don't go in and destroy all my relationships before I get started.” One of the things he said to me was: put three things in your office. Something that reflects your personal values, something that is a family thing, and something that reflects personality or other interests or something like that. So I put my family—I’ve got pictures of my family all over the place. For my personal values, I have a bunch of things about government work that I've done, and I figure that's sort of sufficient to show people that I care about public interest or whatever. **Molly:** Or whatever. **Jamie:** And then Patrick Ewing. I was like, I'm a Knicks fan. I have some interests that don’t require me to work all the time. **Molly:** Oh, so this is just to prove that you're a human who exists outside of the office. **Jamie:** Correct. **Molly:** But you are a Knicks fan. **Jamie:** Yeah, I didn't have to make it up. **Molly:** I mean, that would be sad if you had to make up your Knicks fandom just to seem human. **Jamie:** No, it’s conveniently true. A byproduct of it is Patrick was part of the ‘90s Knicks teams that were super enforcers. They were mean and nasty and they were vicious defenders. They were just rough, and he was kind of the leader of that. So arguably I'm sending people a signal by having him up there. **Molly:** That you're vicious and rough. **Jamie:** I just said I can be unpleasant. **Molly:** I don't think you need Patrick to show that. But tell me about your Knicks fandom. Where did this come from? **Jamie:** I grew up in the ‘70s and early ‘80s, basically. **Molly:** Yeah. We know you're old. We got it. **Jamie:** I'm super old and I was a Knicks fan that whole time. I was also a Yankees fan, but I was a big Knicks fan because they were — **Molly:** Wait, I thought you were a Mets fan now. **Jamie:** Nope, no Mets. **Molly:** Whoa. Okay. This is over. I'm out. I'm speechless. But all right, so we're Knicks fans. **Jamie:** Avidly following the Knicks. It's great. They're going to go to the playoffs this year. It's just fun. It's fun to go to the Knicks games. And you see a lot of people. You see Spike Lee. Years ago I saw somebody fall into Mike Bloomberg. That was pretty funny. **Molly:** Oh. **Jamie:** I've never seen Eric Adams at a game, which I just don't understand. It's yet another example of how he's not figured out how to do the easy things. Just go to a Knicks game. Everybody loves the Knicks these days. **Molly:** It's true. They’re not divisive like the Mets or the Yankees. There's just the Knicks. **Jamie:** I think he's probably afraid he'd be booed, to be honest … well, he might be. That's usually why politicians don't go to things like that. **Molly:** Yeah. **Jamie:** Yep. But nobody would boo the comptrollers. **Molly:** Oh. Nice pivot. **Jamie:** Mm-hmm. Nobody boos a comptroller. **Molly:** For most people, I don't think comptroller means very much. **Jamie:** No, it doesn't. **Molly:** Why does it matter? **Jamie:** It's this very interesting job. He's got a very important job in the governance of New York City. He's supposed to stand for fiscal responsibility, but also policymaking, and he's in charge of the future wellbeing of millions of New York City retirees from the public sector, which is obviously very, very important. **Molly:** Is that why we're talking to Mark Levine? **Jamie:** It is. He's a candidate for New York City comptroller. He is the borough president of Manhattan. He's a long time city councilman and he's an interesting guy to talk to. **Molly:** Let the games begin. \--- **Jamie:** Mark, thanks for being here. **Mark:** Thank you, Jamie. Thrilled to be here. **Jamie:** Excellent. Why don't we start by talking about who you are and what your background is. We can talk about what you're doing here specifically after that, but how about how you got here? **Mark:** A windy route. I actually majored in physics in college. That was the plan. By the time I graduated, I decided I didn't want to live in a lab and I wanted to be out in the world having an impact. And I became a science teacher in the South Bronx at a junior high school. I actually taught bilingual math and science. **Jamie:** This was not a gifted and talented school. It was a public school. **Mark:** It was a neighborhood high school in the early ‘90s. There were definitely gifted and talented kids in the school, and kids who were really struggling. The whole range. Almost without fail, the families were pretty disconnected from the formal financial system, relying really on loan sharks and pawn shops and check cashing stores for their banking services, if you will. And I decided to do something about it. I started a nonprofit based in Uptown Manhattan and Washington Heights that opened a community development credit union, basically a nonprofit bank. It's called Neighborhood Trust. It's still going strong on 166th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue. **Jamie:** I think I met you for the first time when you were still running the credit union. **Mark:** That is when we met. Right? **Jamie:** Yeah, exactly. So it was like early, early ‘90s. What does a non-profit credit union look like when you start up? **Mark:** We got a hold of an old abandoned bank branch. Chase had closed a branch on 179th and Fort Washington. It had been empty for five years, so it was in bad shape. But they said, “Don't worry, we have a branch that we're just closing now in the Bronx, and if you can go there in the next 24 hours, anything you can take out is yours.” We rented a truck, got a bunch of buddies with tools, and we took out all the furniture. We unscrewed all the bulletproof glass, which would've cost us a fortune. We packed all the money-counting machines and all of that. We took everything to this abandoned facility on Fort Washington Avenue in Washington Heights, and we were able to open up in 1997 in what felt like a bank branch. But it was cooperatively owned by the members. So when residents of the community came in, they became shareholders and they voted for the board of directors. If there were any extra earnings in the institution, it was returned to them as dividends. It's a very empowering model, and I'm really proud that this credit union, Neighborhood Trust, is still going strong. Over the years, it’s made $100 million dollars of small loans, helping people do everything from buying a home computer to paying for education to starting a small business to getting a mortgage. The repayment rate has been something like 98%. What's really just blossomed over the years is a financial literacy education program — teaching people how to manage a checking account, how to save for retirement, how to apply for a mortgage, all in English and Spanish. It’s something that I'm thinking a lot about. As I'm running for an office related to this work, I want to take this citywide. I want every young person and every adult to have access to these kinds of educational services. **Jamie:** How many people do they educate a year? **Mark:** Tens of thousands. **Jamie:** Really? That’s remarkable. And you can see the results, in lack of loan losses, for example? **Mark:** It helps the credit union in its financial services, because people are going to be less likely to bounce a check, more likely to make their loan payments and more likely to succeed if they borrow to start a small business. But more importantly, it helps people in their personal lives to avoid bankruptcy and develop a credit history. Financial literacy is underappreciated in being absolutely key to getting ahead in life, and we're not helping the next generation of New Yorkers acquire these skills. Something we did at the credit union: we had school banking where we would go into local elementary and middle schools and open no-fee, no-minimum savings accounts, and then have a teller there once a week. **Jamie:** For the students? **Mark:** Yeah, for the kids. They would bring in $1.75 a week or whatever, but over the year they could save maybe a hundred, couple hundred bucks. We would pay interest and they would learn about how to calculate the interest and how to read a statement. For some of them, the parents didn't have accounts. So then the parents would see that the kids had accounts and they would come in and open one. Why don’t we do this in schools all over New York City today? **Jamie:** That's remarkable. So you fast forward: you ran the credit union. You and I met when you wanted to run for office, and I told you you were crazy. **Mark:** Yep. **Jamie:** You tried how many times before you actually got in? **Mark:** I lost twice spectacularly before finally winning in 2013. **Jamie:** Right. A city council seat. **Mark:** Yes. Chair of the Parks Committee one term. I'm really passionate about green space and fighting for more equity in the park system. I chaired the Health Committee my second term, when we were hit by the pandemic. Based on my work in the council, I was very lucky to win borough-wide in 2021 and now serve as the Manhattan Borough President, where I have really made affordability and housing my number one priority. **Jamie:** Let's play a game: most and least important jobs in New York City government. What's the most important job? **Mark:** Elected job? **Jamie:** Yeah. **Mark:** Can you compete with the mayor? **Jamie:** No, I'm not sure. **Mark:** Okay. So the mayor, but the comptroller is the second most important job. **Jamie:** What’s the least important job? **Mark:** I don't want to get any of my colleagues hating me, Jamie, come on man. **Jamie:** I was looking for borough president. **Mark:** No, no, no. It's a great gig. **Jamie:** Okay. Give me one sentence as to why it's a great gig. **Mark:** Well, real power over land use. **Jamie:** Okay. **Mark:** The question of what you can build and where is the existential question of New York City today, right? And I've put my all into leveraging those powers to try and address our housing shortage. It's also a pretty big bully pulpit as well. I learned this when I took office in 2022 and Putin was invading Ukraine. **Jamie:** Oh, I remember Putin called you out specifically? **Mark:** Not quite, but I did call for seizure of the oligarchs’ apartments in Manhattan, where they're parking money for asset protection purposes. And it went global. Jamie, I was getting called by the BBC and then Al Jazeera. None of them knew or particularly cared that the Manhattan Borough President has no power at all to actually implement that policy. Doesn't matter. They didn't care because I had a good title and I was calling for something bold. I learned that one of the most important powers of the job is to move the narrative on policy, and it’s something I've really tried to do on housing. **Jamie:** You've been running for office off and on and winning sometimes, losing sometimes for 25 years, basically. And I would not have said at the beginning that you were a politician. The fact that you thought to call for the seizure knowing full well that you have no power to implement the seizure means to me that you learned something about politics. **Mark:** I can't tell if this is a compliment or not. **Jamie:** I think politics is important. How do you execute your policies if you're not in politics? What would you say is one thing you've learned about politics? **Mark:** I think the most important currency in politics is that people want to be seen. That's true when you're talking to them one-on-one. It's also true if you're doing public speaking. People want to know that you understand who you're talking to, what they care about, what their concerns and priorities are. **Jamie:** To me, that sounds exactly right, and it's consistent with what you hear about on the national level. When people start with these autopsies of the Democratic party, a lot of that is what keeps coming back. Okay, so now you’re running for city comptroller. It's a little amorphous \[as a job\] in the sense that it's got several different pieces to it. Break it into a couple of pieces for people who don't know. **Mark:** This is not a ceremonial job. It's the custodian of the city's pension funds, which amounts to a pretty mind blowing number: $280 billion. That's our money. It's not a small piece of the American economy, and it can be used, I think, more productively to advance goals within the five boroughs of New York City. The comptroller also manages the city's debt and has to review and certify all contracts — the city procures $40 billion in private contracts every year, and all that runs through the comptroller's office. The office also oversees tort claims, so if you sue the city because you've been harmed, that’s actually adjudicated out of the comptroller's office. **Jamie:** That can't be where it's tried? **Mark:** Well, ideally it doesn't go to trial. The idea is that before you're allowed to sue the city, you have to go through a claims process. **Jamie:** Ah, I didn't know that. **Mark:** It's different from suing a private corporation. The comptroller also manages enforcement of wage laws. And then there is oversight investigations, auditing and, if necessary, subpoena power over the mayor and every city agency. It really is the job of the comptroller to be a check on the mayor, to hold the mayor accountable, to hold every city agency accountable. The comptroller can also move a broader agenda because of all those levers. **Jamie:** Do you believe the job is in part to partner with the mayor? **Mark:** I think the job is to be independent of the mayor so that you support the mayor when he or she is doing the right thing. You don't want to be permanently oppositional, but you also need to be able to push back right when the mayor needs to be called out. **Jamie:** Of the mayoral candidates, I'm gonna list— **Mark:** You know I'm not going to endorse on this podcast. **Jamie:** I'm not asking for endorsement, no, but what I wanna know is, of the mayoral candidates that I'll list: do you have a relationship with them, and if so, why? Okay. Jessica Ramos. **Mark:** As a colleague in government today, yeah. **Jamie:** Okay. I'm looking for independents. Zellnor Myrie. **Mark:** Same — I'm friends with most of the people who are running. **Jamie:** Oh, you're friends with everybody, but that’s because you’re a politician. **Mark:** Well, I'm a nice guy. (laughs) **Jamie:** The Mark Levine I used to know would have had enemies everywhere. Okay. So you're friends with everybody so far? Zohran Mamdani. **Mark:** I know him the least of those who are running, probably, and certainly have some policy differences with him, but I’ve run into him through my policy work. **Jamie:** And Andrew Cuomo. **Mark:** When he was governor, I was a city council member, so I was a little too junior to interact a lot with him directly. But I served in government at the same time and I've certainly watched his career very closely. **Jamie:** It's interesting, you and Andrew are probably the two people that I would have most closely associated with Covid response. You were very outspoken on the meaning of the data that we were seeing. **Mark:** At that point, I had been Chair of the Health Committee for two years, so I felt I had good relationships deep in the health department and among epidemiologists and in hospital ERs, because I've been doing the work. I had people that I trusted and, maybe just as importantly, who trusted me. When shit started to really get bad, I had trusted conversations with people and I knew when they were scared that it was time to sound the alarm. And look, I took a lot of hits from the right for that — still do to some extent. **Jamie:** Because of the idea of closure, basically. **Mark:** All of it: closure and testing and vaccination. **Jamie:** Let's talk about the nursing homes. For Andrew, this is one of his three or four big issues that he has to overcome if he's going to be elected mayor. They call it a nursing home scandal, but it's his approach to nursing homes during Covid. I was talking to a friend of mine who was from Italy the other day. He said, “Why is he getting blamed for this? This is what Europe did basically. They took people out and they put the old people back in the nursing homes.” They got very sick. But wasn't out of line with what was being done elsewhere. I don’t know if that's true or not. Do you have a view about what the right thing to have done would've been? **Mark:** I was so focused on city government, and this was a state government issue that certainly at the time I was not in deep. I heard the alarms being raised, but the hospital system was in bad shape at the time, I'll say that. The hospital system was running out of capacity, and essentially every hospital bed in New York City needed to be turned into a COVID ICU bed. **Jamie:** I wasn't in the government at the time, obviously. I was watching it like everybody else. I don't know that I had a view then. I don't even know that I have a view now, but I agree with you. It's very hard to make very difficult decisions like that, particularly under that kind of pressure. I don't really know why he would've made a decision like that for any reason other than to try to save lives. It is always the aftermath that turns worse. But in that case, I don't know. I think you're basically right. Just to finish off on public health for a second. It doesn't really get talked about much on the campaign trail, which is sort of odd to me. We're four years after a major public health crisis. And I think we would all agree that the federal government is not better prepared to deal with a major public health crisis. Do you have a sense of what that means for the city? **Mark:** I'm really worried about this. And I was wrong. I thought that COVID would permanently change how the public thought about public health. After 9/11, national security became anti-terrorism — became this permanent institution, in excess in some ways. I thought that would happen with public health after COVID. And it didn't. In some ways, we're weaker than we were, because public health has been more politicized. And that's before a figure of the caliber of RFK Jr. became HHS Secretary. I am really worried about our capacity to deal with the next crisis. The tough year we're having on measles is just a tiny indication of what's at risk. By the way, vaccination rates for measles are down in New York City as well. The way you measured measles vaccinations is based on how many two year olds have had their first dose. We're now down. Now it's 81% for two year olds. This is nothing like what's happening in Texas, and not connected to that outbreak. But most of the disease control work of the city and all the disease surveillance is funded by the feds. So we need to start gaming out what happens if that's cut, and it might be cut. **Jamie:** We agree that this is really worrisome. Back to something that's maybe slightly more in our control, and more top of mind for the people that are going to elect you: affordability. Everybody talks about affordability. You talk about affordability probably more than most. What does that mean to you? Affordability of what? **Mark:** Well, housing, first and foremost. Childcare number two. But really it's about the crisis of housing affordability. With average rents in Manhattan that, as of this month's report, are over $5,300 a month for a market rate apartment. We are way beyond just pricing out low wage workers. Now we're pricing out bus drivers and social workers and nurses and teachers, certainly from Manhattan and increasingly from the outer boroughs. We have to build more affordable housing. We probably need half a million units in New York City. We have a long way to go, or it's going to be impossible for the next generation of young people to find housing here — with terrible consequences for our population, for our workforce, for economic development and for homelessness. **Jamie:** There doesn't seem to be any disagreement about the fact that we're short on housing and that rent is too high as a result. **Mark:** Well, there's definitely disagreement that we have a housing supply shortage. **Jamie:** Explain. Who do you hear it from? Constituents or your colleagues who are elected officials? **Mark:** Both. There are people who say, “There are vacant apartments, right. Why don’t we just fill those?” **Jamie:** We get that at NYCHA, too: “You have 4,000 vacancies. How come you have 4,000 vacancies?” Well, we have 172,000 apartments. And of those, 4,000 are basically vacant because they're inundated with lead paint or asbestos or both. So you tell me what you'd like us to do with people in those apartments. I hear you. It's hard to argue when people see vacancies. For those folks, I assume the remedy of choice is to keep rents controlled. **Mark:** Sure. Or prevent eviction. Or, in some cases, they might want to seize the apartments through eminent domain or seize the vacant apartments. Or they might want to force the units to go back on the market. The problem is the numbers. This is a city of 8.5 million people, and while there are certainly thousands of apartments that are vacant for various reasons, the vacancy rate is minuscule. **Jamie:** 1%. **Mark:** Yeah. Which is the lowest it's been in our lifetime, literally. If you look at the vacancy rate on the lowest renting apartments it is a rounding error off zero. It is 0.39%. The first time I heard it, I thought that it was a mistake, that the decimal point was in the wrong place. It is 0.39% for apartments with a rent of, I think, $1,100 or less, which is basically because eventually apartments become vacant because someone leaves or passes away and you need a month or two to renovate it and rent it. **Jamie:** That's about $12,000 a year of rent. You figure the rent burden is supposed to be 50% of your income? **Mark:** Technically the goal is you wanna be 30% or less, but a lot of people are at 50%. **Jamie:** So that's somebody making, you know, somewhere between $25,000 and $50,000 a year, which in the city really is not much. **Mark:** There's no shortcut here. We do need more housing supply. There's no way around it. We need more affordable housing, and we need more of all housing. When I moved to New York City and I got my first apartment on my own, I had a studio on Clinton Avenue and DeKalb, in Clinton Hill, and I paid $550 a month. I didn't have to enter an HPD lottery where your odds are one in 500. We definitely need to expand the affordable supply. But we also have to expand all the supply. **Jamie:** Everything has to be expanded. I agree with you that numbers have gotten worse, but the notion that New York City has a housing shortage is not particularly new, at least since the Bloomberg era, right? We have really, really sophisticated, smart government housing mechanisms — way beyond any other city in the country. We’ve got HPD, we’ve got HDC, we have a state agency that's terrific. We've got a state financing agency that's terrific. We have a really deep cadre of affordable housing developers who are just spectacularly sophisticated. Same thing for the market rates. Can't be anything new under the sun to try to do this. **Mark:** Sure there is. As you know, Jamie, as hard as it is to find locations to build affordable housing, that is only the second biggest challenge in getting this done. The biggest challenge is financing housing. We have 300 projects across New York City right now that have been approved, that have the property and the developer, and they're waiting for financing. Mostly we rely on the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. That's the biggest source of financing. We do probably 30 of those a year and we have a 300-project backlog. So do the math. We need more ways to finance this. There's a provision in the rules around the pension fund that allows for 2% of the assets to be invested in what are called “economically-targeted investments” in New York City. Right now, only about 1% of that is actually used. **Jamie:** 2% of 250 billion? **Mark:** 280. **Jamie:** 2% of 280\. So it's… **Mark:** It's over 5 billion. We've got maybe 2 billion and change right now deployed. This can help to move affordable projects that might not have the financing. We proposed a plan that would offer mezzanine-level debt convertible to equity, at a rate that is reasonable for retirees, but also low enough that it's attractive to developers. We think you could develop tens of thousands of units that might not otherwise be financed through this plan. Look, ultimately we need more resources put into this at the city, state and federal level. And we need to mobilize the private sector too, to build more housing of all types. **Jamie:** What does “mobilize the private sector” mean though? They seem pretty mobilized to me. **Mark:** Well, we had to remove all the obstacles to getting housing built. I supported City of Yes as a way to remove some obstacles. Just to name one: to make it easier to convert vacant office buildings to housing. We had this absurd rule that buildings built after 1961 couldn’t be converted. Now that's been extended to 1990, which covers what we need in midtown Manhattan, where we have 90 million square feet of vacant office space. City of Yes will remove that obstacle and we’re going to get some buildings. The Pfizer Building on 42nd Street — it's gonna be the largest conversion in American history. 1,500 units, and I believe it'll have affordable units as well. But there are other obstacles as well: the environmental review process, which was put in place for the right reasons, is now being weaponized by people who have no interest in the environment who are stopping projects that are actually good for the environment. If you're going to build 200 units of housing on top of a subway, that is good for the environment. The alternative is that you have 200 single family homes in the suburbs. That's not a win. **Jamie:** I hear you saying that space is not the issue; financing is the first issue. I'm a finance person, so that's my valence. On the other hand, as the Chair of the Board of NYCHA, what we have to play with is space. That's what NYCHA has to offer to the housing crisis, basically. We're looking at our use of space. Do you think space is part of the solution here, and what can we do? **Mark:** Oh, absolutely. Okay. There's a myth that there's nowhere to build in Manhattan or New York City: “Manhattan is built out, so too bad.” When I got to the office of borough president, I had the land use team review every single block, every property in the borough, to find places where we can create housing. They came back with 171 sites. These are surface parking; they are unused or underused publicly owned facilities; these are single story retail buildings where we could build housing on top. There are some towers-in-a-park campuses where we could use infill to build more housing. Our projection was that those sites we identified could unleash the creation of over 70,000 units of housing. **Jamie:** And those are as of right? **Mark:** Most were as of right, some would require a rezoning. But it didn't rely on any heroic assumptions, and we didn't think any of them were politically unpalatable. Right. And that's just Manhattan; there are even more opportunities in the other four boroughs. There is room to build the housing we need in New York. It doesn't mean it won't be a political fight; it doesn't mean in some cases we're not going to have to search for financing if it's affordable. But it's a myth that there's nowhere to build in Manhattan and New York City. **Jamie:** Are there other components of affordability that you think you can deal with as comptroller? The other key component of affordability that you talk about on the campaign trail and in your plans is childcare. **Mark:** Yeah. For families with young kids, this is their second biggest expense. In some cases, it can even be the biggest expense. The going rate for childcare is over 20,000 a year, which is just impossible for a family. **Jamie:** 20,000 a year. **Mark:** Yep. **Jamie:** Wow. **Mark:** What happens is parents drop out of the workforce because they don't have the option to hire somebody or to put their kid into a program. That has an economic cost, because you're losing workers and that person would have been paying taxes. It makes economic sense to ensure everybody has free childcare if they need it. We have a model here in UPK \[Universal Pre-K\] and 3K \[for children starting at age 3\], and we should just extend that down into toddlers — I would even say newborns down to six months. We should be building on that model, relying on center-based care and school-based care. To really meet our numbers, we’re going to have much more home-based care, too. **Jamie:** And you would pay for this? **Mark:** Yeah. **Jamie:** What's the cost? **Mark:** It's probably about 2 billion a year to do it right. There's income on the upside of parents who go back to work and pay some taxes. It would be an investment, but if you're looking for a big, bold investment to solve the affordability crisis, I don't think you could find a better option than making childcare free and universal in every neighborhood. **Jamie:** Is there room for reviewing at some level? Reviewing how government works in an effort to reduce cost overall? **Mark:** 100%, or to get more out of what we are paying. In every city agency, there are antiquated systems. There are fax machines in use in New York City government still. **Jamie:** But how would you get a fax if you took out the fax machine? **Mark:** Exactly. **Jamie:** You didn't think of that, huh? **Mark:** There's still a lot done on actual pen and paper in New York City government. We certainly haven't adapted to the mobile phone revolution. To give you one example, there are probably a quarter of a million people in New York City who qualify for food stamps who don't receive them. What if instead of making them fill out a PDF with dropdown menus and all that, they could just talk to their smartphone in plain English or plain any language and enroll in food stamps? That’s not even New York City money; that's coming from the federal government. It would help families put food on the table; it would be good for local supermarkets. That would be a win. It would require building out some more modern technological systems. The comptroller's office is a really good place to push for that, and I can tell a similar story across almost every city agency where, by modernizing and tapping the tools of modern technology, we can deliver more for taxpayers and get better results for New Yorkers. **Jamie:** When you talk about what you want to do as comptroller, you actually sound like somebody who wants to be comptroller, not somebody who wants to be comptroller for a term and then go do something else. **Mark:** I'm not scared to admit it. This would be a dream job. **Jamie:** Wow. It's your dirty secret. You actually want to be comptroller. **Mark:** Well, now it's public. **Jamie:** That's fantastic. Mark Levine, thanks for being here. It was great to talk to you. **Mark:** Thank you, Jamie. Real pleasure. Thank you. **Jamie:** Here are my three takeaways from my conversation with Mark Levine. The first takeaway from my conversation with Mark was around childhood vaccination rates. In New York City, the city's vaccination rate for children below two years old is down to 81%. He said we need it to be 95% for herd immunity for any given disease, and it was 88% a few years ago. Given the number of children we're talking about in New York City, which is probably in the hundreds of thousands, that is a huge drop. There was an [opinion](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/31/opinion/measles-public-health-trust.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) piece in the *New York Times* last week by a woman who was a journalist in Texas about why she and her neighbors lost faith in the public health system and in vaccinations as a result of what they went through during COVID. It was a perfectly sensible piece, but I think *New York Times* readers in New York would've read it and thought, “Oh great, well that's Texas. It has nothing to do with New York.” That is just clearly not true. This statistic is a real eye-opener. It's crazy that what we think of as being an outlier problem is a New York City problem. The second thing that caused me to step back and think a little bit about, and think with Mark about, is what the role of the comptroller in New York City actually is. It's a very complicated job. It's got at least three distinct roles. It's got this audit and oversight role over the rest of the city government. He manages these enormous pension funds, over $200 billion of retirement pension funds for public employees. And then he’s got this quasi-policymaking role, which basically has to be exercised through persuasion and using a bully pulpit and using the tools that exist, \[unlike\] the mayor \[who can more directly be involved in\] executing policies or passing bills. The question is, which of those kinds of comptroller does Mark Levine want to be? My strong sense from talking to him is he wants to be a policy-forward comptroller, which is interesting, but he's going to have to decide which of the various tools at his disposal he feels most comfortable using to advance his policies. If I think about past comptrollers, they more often, at least longer ago, were fiscal managers for whom their first job was to make sure the pension fund does okay — make sure the city is running okay, that the city fiscal situation is solid, and then think about policy later. I think \[Mark’s is\] an interesting approach and if done well, it could be the best of all those different roles, but in some ways, it's a higher risk strategy. It requires him to be really adept politically, particularly if he ends up with the mayor as his foil or if the mayor is particularly unmanageable. Choosing the policy-slash-political route is a higher bar to clear. Maybe Mark is somebody who could do that. That's not to say that I'm endorsing Mark Levine or that I think that he would be a better comptroller than somebody else. Mark, he's a numerate guy. He is well positioned to do any of those things, and maybe he can actually knit them all together nicely. My third takeaway is specifically around a policy that Mark has put at the center of his campaign, which is the idea that the pension fund that he's going to be overseeing should invest directly in New York City affordable housing. This has some serious challenges that he is aware of, but doesn't talk about. I think it's worth understanding what they are. Moving a lot of money around inside a pension fund is really, really difficult: getting hold of the money, understanding how much there is, figuring out what it’s invested in currently, and then where you're going to reinvest it for at least as good a return (because that's your obligation to the retirees). Retirees, particularly his retirees, have strong opinions about things. His retirees are basically public union members. They sit on his boards and his investment committees, and they have strong views about not only where the pension should be invested, but about things like affordable housing — what that's going to look like, where it’s going to be, what kind of labor it’s going to be built with. Not that he can't get there, but he's going to have to get their permission to do this. That's gonna take a lot of work and convincing. And then there's the actual doing of it. If you’re talking about even a couple of billion dollars, that's like, the size of a midsize private equity fund. While he may just outsource that to somebody who already does it, he may want to build up the capability to do it in-house. I can tell you as somebody who's been in the finance world for a long time, that means hiring people — hiring good people — and building up a process to evaluate investments that are going to come flooding in. That's not a turn-it-on-overnight situation. If he's elected, he is going to be there for four years until he runs again. It could take four years to get up and running, and I don't think that's how people in his position generally think about this kind of activity. Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### Echoes of 1977 Shape 2025 Mayoral Politics in New York URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/echoes-of-1977-shape-2025-mayoral-politics-in-new-york/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:04.000Z In 1977, public safety became the decisive issue in a New York City mayoral election for the first time — and there is a strong case that has remained the case in every seriously contested mayoral election since. After more than 40 years of a liberal-labor-minority coalition dominating city politics, 1977 was also the election when a more conservative coalition helped win City Hall for Ed Koch. While history may not repeat itself, it does rhyme. That's why it is essential to understand the 1977 election, and the new era it began in New York City politics, in order to understand the 2025 mayoral race. It is easy to tick off the similarities between the 1977 race and today. A weakened incumbent due to the fiscal crisis, the state's takeover of the city's finances and a federal SEC investigation all helped to shape the 1977 election. A weakened incumbent due to a corruption crisis, the threat of a governor using her power to remove the mayor from office and a federal criminal investigation have defined the 2025 race so far. To be clear, New York is a very different city than it was in 1977\. Today, there are 1.4 million more New Yorkers. In 1977, the city was in the middle of a decade during which it lost more than 10% of its residents. Non-Latino whites made up 53% of the population back then, compared to 31% in 2024. The economy is also different. In 1977, New York had an 8.9% unemployment rate — and that was a three-year low. In 2024, the average monthly unemployment rate was 5.3%. Manufacturing, which still employed nearly a half million people in New York City in 1980, now employs fewer than 60,000 workers. While New York currently faces fiscal challenges, they are nothing like the near bankruptcy of the mid-1970s. A [2024 bond rating opinion](https://www.fitchratings.com/research/us-public-finance/fitch-rates-new-york-city-ny-1-5b-fiscal-2025-ser-d-go-bonds-aa-outlook-stable-27-09-2024?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) noted the City's economic strength and budgetary controls. And the "rules of the game" are different as well. Ranked-choice voting, publicly financed elections and a growing role for independent expenditure campaigns, all of which drive campaigns in 2025, didn't exist in 1977. While 2025 New York differs greatly from 1977 New York, the fear of returning to the mid- and late-1970s New York has shaped mayoral politics ever since. In 1977, New York seemed like it could go the way of other major U.S. cities that were in seemingly irrevocable decline — places like Cleveland and Detroit. A feeling of doom was driven by the fiscal crisis, population decline and by both the reality and the perception of crime. > While history may not repeat itself, it does rhyme. **The candidates** When Ed Koch entered the 1977 race, he was given little chance of winning. He had served on the City Council and in Congress but had dropped out of the 1973 mayoral campaign after garnering little support. Bella Abzug was a former member of Congress, a leading liberal and women's rights advocate. After narrowly losing the Democratic primary for U.S. Senate the year before, she was the first woman to seriously contend for the mayoralty. Herman Badillo was the first Puerto Rican to be elected to serve in Congress. He had previously served as Bronx Borough president and had unsuccessfully sought the mayoralty in 1969 and 1973, when he lost the Democratic runoff to Abraham Beame. Beame had been elected mayor just four years earlier with more than 60% of the vote in the Democratic runoff primary, going on to beat his closest competitor by more than 40 percentage points in the general election. Another candidate, Mario Cuomo, was the New York Secretary of State and had the backing of Gov. Hugh Carey and the Liberal Party. Percy Sutton was the Manhattan Borough president and the first Black candidate to seriously contend for the mayoralty. Despite this formidable field, Koch was able to win the top spot in the September 1977 Democratic primary and go on to win both a runoff election and the general election against Cuomo. Why? Initially, Koch sought to portray himself as the opposite of the prior two mayors who were widely blamed for the fiscal crisis — John Lindsay and Beame — on a slogan of "after eight years of charisma and four years of the clubhouse, why not competence?" That all changed as the events of the summer of 1977 played out. [A blackout in mid-July led to looting, violence and arson across the city](https://time.com/3949986/1977-blackout-new-york-history/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Police made more than 4,000 arrests, and damages totaled over $300 million. The blackout occurred as city residents were already on edge over the eight shootings carried out by the Son of Sam, a serial murderer who attacked young couples at random throughout the city, leaving six dead and seven injured. During the blackout, Koch called for the National Guard to come into the city. After the blackout, Koch regularly trumpeted his support for the death penalty, even though the mayor had virtually nothing to do with either imposition or implementation of a death penalty law. > While 2025 New York differs greatly from 1977 New York, the fear of returning to the mid- and late-1970s New York has shaped mayoral politics ever since. The results of the Democratic primary could not have been closer. The top five candidates were separated by fewer than 50,000 votes out of just over 900,000 cast. Koch — with slightly more than 180,000 votes — came in first by less than 10,000 votes over Mario Cuomo, who made it into the runoff by just 7,000 votes over Beame. An exit poll found that the fiscal crisis was the most important issue for voters, but that crime ranked second — and Koch carried the voters who ranked crime as most important. Koch was the top vote-getter in the primary, despite not winning any of the five boroughs and winning just 10 of the city's 67 Assembly districts. Just 11 days after that win, Koch went on to beat Mario Cuomo with 55% of the vote. In the general election, Koch again beat Cuomo — then running on the Liberal Party line — in a four-way race. **Perceptions of public safety** Since 1977, public safety has been a decisive issue in every contested mayoral election in New York City. Crime can be measured, but public safety is something that people feel. In 1989, the beating and murder of Yusuf Hawkins weeks before the Democratic primary helped David N. Dinkins stop Ed Koch's effort to win a fourth term. Dinkins lost his re-election bid to Rudy Giuliani in 1993 because of unease about public safety — even as crime had started to decline — driven by a riot in Crown Heights, itself the subject of a 600-page state investigation under then-Gov. Cuomo that was released in the summer of the re-election. The 2001 election was transformed by the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, which occurred on the day of the Democratic Primary, forcing the election to be postponed after voters had already started to go to the polls. In the November election, Michael Bloomberg won with the support of both Rudy Giuliani and Ed Koch in the closest mayoral election in a century. In 2013, Bill de Blasio won the mayoralty in part because of his backing of legislation and other reforms designed to curb stop-and-frisk and racial profiling by the NYPD. And Eric Adams stood out in the 2021 primary as the Democrat most focused on crime as an issue. In the 40 years before 1977, a liberal-labor-minority coalition had backed Mayors Fiorello LaGuardia, Robert Wagner and John Lindsay. After 1977, a more conservative coalition has elected Mayors Koch, Giuliani and Adams — with the mayoralties of David Dinkins and Bill de Blasio as exceptions. > Crime can be measured, but public safety is something that people feel. What will happen in 2025? Will New York elect another mayor out of the Koch-Giuliani-Bloomberg-Adams tradition, or will the city revert to its historic liberal tradition? Or will 2025, like 1977, be a pivot point for something entirely new? Sen. Charles Schumer recently noted that: "Crime is actually lower. But I talk to lots of people, they go on the subway and almost inevitably there's someone there who's not hurting people, but disruptive, and frightening them because they read in the paper that some people were hurt … New Yorkers are willing to put up with a lot to live in New York, but they want to be safe." In 1977, in his announcement of his run for mayor, Mario Cuomo cited "every filthy and violent street in Brownsville, every pothole on Queens streets … the open drug markets of Harlem and … the halls of high schools, where safety is as much sought after as is education." Nearly 50 years later, Andrew Cuomo announced his candidacy by declaring that "New York City is in trouble. You see it in the empty storefronts, the graffiti, the grime, the migrant influx, the random violence — the city just feels threatening, out of control and in crisis." A March 2025 Emerson College poll suggests that voters believe that public safety should be the top priority for the next mayor — with just under 33% citing public safety and crime compared to the 23% who cited housing. Whether voters will pick a candidate who responds to their concerns about public safety by promising more police or improved responses to street homelessness is unclear. But just as in 1977, the path to Gracie Mansion in 2025 will likely depend upon how voters view the public safety issue and the solutions offered by candidates. ### From Point A to Point Q, and Beyond URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-yorks-new-subway-map/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:04.000Z [](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?display=page&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fnew-yorks-new-subway-map)[](http://www.twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fnew-yorks-new-subway-map&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fnew-yorks-new-subway-map&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) As a cartographer and historian, I've studied more transit maps than I can count. I've also made quite a few [subway maps of my own](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/expand-the-reach-of-the-subway-system-a-2125-map). As such, I'm fascinated by the [new subway map](https://www.mta.info/map/5256?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) introduced by the MTA last week. The new map revives and rethinks a 1972 classic designed by Massimo Vignelli of Unimark International, in collaboration with Bob Noorda and Joan Charysyn. The New York Timespithilydescribed Vignelli's original map as ["The Retro NYC Subway Map Design Nerds Love."](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/02/nyregion/nyc-new-subway-map.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [The Museum of Modern Art](https://www.moma.org/collection/works/89300?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) even added a copy of the map to its permanent collection. But while design enthusiasts adored Vignelli's map at its release, straphangers of the era hated it. The map [wildly distorted the city's geography](https://www.nytransitmuseum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2007%5F42%5F14-scaled.jpg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), giving the unwary passenger the impression that Central Park is roughly a square, though the park measures two-and-a-half miles north-south and three blocks east-west. Likewise, [Vignelli's map shows Atlantic Terminal, Brooklyn, at the edge of Prospect Park](https://www.nytransitmuseum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2003%5F37%5F12%5Fdetail-2048x1300.jpg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). In reality, the two are nearly a mile apart. The map violently disrespected the neat Manhattan grid, showing [Broadway running east-west through Midtown](https://imgur.com/gLO6otq?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and putting [Second Avenue east of First](https://imgur.com/drTPC0u?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Vignelli chose to color New York's waterways a shade of beige that evoked the color of smog, and the park system was a drab grey. None of these things generated goodwill with riders, and after public outcry, Vignelli's map was phased out in 1979. Its [replacement](https://www.mta.info/map/36946?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), designed by John Tauranac and Michael Hertz, returned the city's geography to the forefront. But the design community panned the Tauranac-Hertz map. In 2003, graphic design author Mark Ovenden called Tauranac and Hertz's design "unwieldy and cluttered" in his classic book, "Metro Maps of the World*.*" But Tauranac and Hertz correctly captured straphangers' mental maps of the city. Water was blue, parks were green, and the subway lines meandered their way through the city on gentle curves. (This was by design; one of Hertz's team members, [Nobuyuki Siraisi](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/nyregion/michael-hertz-dead.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), rode every line with his eyes closed to make sure he felt the curves.) The Tauranac-Hertz map was posted in every station and subway car for four-and-a-half decades, longer than any other map to date. ![The Tauranac-Hertz subway map](https://storage.ghost.io/c/20/8c/208caa48-0e58-40ee-862f-e5f1276ae3d0/content/images/2026/04/z_acmuvxedbnozh__subwaymap-auto-format-compress-1776259709307.jpg) The Tauranac-Hertz subway map | Credit: Metropolitan Transit Authority Now, the MTA has resurrected Vignelli's map, sort of. And what they produced is a definite improvement on the Tauranac-Hertz map — with definite room for improvement. There are four key things that the new map does right, and four things that should be improved. I'll start with what the map does well. First, the neo-Vignelli map makes it much clearer which trains stop at which stations. The Tauranac-Hertz map uses one colored line for each Manhattan main line, relying on the user to read individual station markers to check whether the express stops there. To understand the difference, consider the example of the 1-2-3 trains between 14th Street and Penn Station. Tauranac and Hertz [condense all three routes into one line](https://imgur.com/1FdAYYH?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and riders have to look at each station marker individually to see which stops where. The neo-Vignelli map uses [one line for each train](https://imgur.com/MwH87Iw?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), using the design itself to show that the 2 and 3 skip 18th, 23rd and 28th Streets. This is a major victory for clarity, because the first task of any transit map is to get riders to their destinations. > There are four key things that the new map does right, and four things that should be improved. Second, the MTA addressed most of the design complaints directed at the Vignelli map of the 1970s. The cheerless earth tones are gone, replaced by vivid, bright colors that reflect the vitality of the city. The MTA did well to include Staten Island, outer-borough parks and beaches on the map as well. New York is so much more than just Manhattan; by adding those landmarks, the MTA subtly encourages passengers to explore beyond the slimmest and densest borough. Additionally, the neo-Vignelli map kept one of the Tauranac-Hertz map's best design decisions — [color-coding subway routes based on their route through Manhattan](https://imgur.com/El0ufBr?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — instead of having a different color for every single line. Third, by introducing a diagram with uniform angles, the MTA has brought its design language into line with the [rest](https://www.metromadrid.es/sites/default/files/documentos/Viaja%20en%20Metro/Planos/Planoesquematico.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [of](https://www.tokyometro.jp/station/pdf/202305/202305%5Fnumber%5Fen.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [the](https://metro.cdmx.gob.mx/storage/app/media/lared/MAPA%5FMI%5F3V.png?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [world](https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/dam/ltagov/getting%5Faround/public%5Ftransport/rail%5Fnetwork/pdf/SM%5FEng%5F%28Ver280225%29%5FHume.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). For decades, the New York subway was the only major system on Earth with a geographically accurate subway map. The only other remotely comparable system that used geography as heavily was [Barcelona](https://www.tmb.cat/documents/20182/45206/Pl%C3%A0nol+xarxa+de+Metro.pdf/f5578f40-5a66-46ba-907c-cf31e0d368c0?t=1743600720567&ref=vitalcitynyc.org). (Notably, like New York, the city core of Barcelona is built on an orderly grid.) This is good for visitors. That said, I'm not sure that the MTA struck the right balance between the geographical Tauranac-Hertz map and the international norm of omitting most geography. I discuss this in greater detail below. Fourth, the release of the neo-Vignelli map was coupled with administrative changes that make navigating the weekend subway significantly easier. In addition to [temporary platform signage](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DkvQfWCXgAcOxhi.jpg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the MTA now puts out a [continuously updated weekend map](https://www.mta.info/map/32906?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) with service changes, and a [live map](https://map.mta.info/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#@40.70949,-73.97853,14z) for smartphones that overlays with Google Maps. Collectively, these things mark a major improvement from the old method of [service change posters](https://bkabak.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/UnpaidLarge090910.jpg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the MTA used for decades. That said, there are four areas where the MTA could do better. First, there needs to be a more logical method of showing transfers. The neo-Vignelli map shows transfers in two different ways, using [a lozenge-shaped bubble](https://imgur.com/bbX27G1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in some places, and [a line](https://imgur.com/GIbijPg?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in others. This design language is needlessly confusing. From a passenger's perspective, both types of transfers are identical. A better way would be to distinguish between long walking transfers and short transfers, using separate icons for each. > The cheerless earth tones are gone, replaced by vivid, bright colors that reflect the vitality of the city. I'll give an example. If a passenger wants to transfer from the 1 train to the C train in Midtown Manhattan, both Columbus Circle and 42nd Street are valid transfer points. But the 1 train passes directly above the C train platforms at Columbus Circle, while at 42nd Street, the two lines are separated by a full avenue block. The Madrid metro map offers a way to solve this problem. The Madrid map [uses different icons](https://imgur.com/gwFXcSM?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for short and long transfers. In the illustration, both Callao and Embajadores-Acacias are transfer points between the green and yellow lines, and the map makes it obvious that Embajadores-Acacias is more of a walk. Second, the MTA's way of showing connections to other systems is suboptimal. The neo-Vignelli map doesn't make it clear when connecting transit is within a station complex. To contrast two examples: the 33rd Street PATH station is within the Herald Square station complex, and the subway and PATH turnstiles are less than a minute apart. To go from the LIRR Nostrand Avenue station to the A or C trains, it's a three-block walk on surface streets. The neo-Vignelli map [shows the two connections the exact same way](https://imgur.com/jI328fe?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Philadelphia's SEPTA map provides a good model for what the MTA could do: SEPTA [shows when stations are connected](https://imgur.com/DIoY1BX?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) but an additional fare is required. The third major issue is that the neo-Vignelli map doesn't show which lines run on the weekends. While service patterns do change on the weekends due to construction, the primary map should still attempt to show baseline weekend service. Instead, it repeats the error of the Tauranac-Hertz map, relegating weekend service to [an easy-to-miss box](https://imgur.com/OoZhcsE?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the corner. This is a mistake. The official map should use its design language to show that the B and W trains don't run at all, the M train doesn't run uptown of Delancey Street, and so on. (Ironically, the neo-Vignelli map does use its design language to show rush-hour express service.) Fourth, the neo-Vignelli map obscures the city's geography too much. New York's physical geography matters more than in most cities, even in the era of Google Maps. The classic angular transit diagram, pioneered by [Harry Beck](https://www.ltmuseum.co.uk/collections/stories/design/mapping-london-iconic-tube-map?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the 1930s, was created because London's streets are a [disorganized morass](https://imgur.com/RflGnLS?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), the product of two millennia of organic urban development. Beck's pioneering Tube Map brought order to London's chaos. > For decades, the New York subway was the only major system in the world with a geographically accurate subway map. But New York is not like London, because New York's street grid has been master planned for centuries. The Manhattan street grid was laid out by a three-man, state-appointed commission [in 1811](https://thegreatestgrid.mcny.org/the-1811-plan?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), when the city extended only as far as [Amity Street](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/NYC-GRID-1811.png?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in Greenwich Village (now West 3rd Street). Because of this far-sighted decision, New Yorkers know exactly how the Manhattan core is laid out, [with avenues running north-south, streets running east-west, and Broadway cutting through on a diagonal](https://imgur.com/JSn9gbI?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). This presents a unique challenge for a transit map designer, because the Tube Map style distorts a place's geography to better show the train routes. This design paradigm works [below 14th Street](https://imgur.com/gZVP6vS?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and in [the outer boroughs](https://imgur.com/WC6hRSB?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), where the street grid is less orderly, but it breaks down above 14th Street. Manhattan's grid plan means that the subway map should conform to the street grid where possible, not the other way around. If there is no impediment to clarity, the zig-zags of the map should match the street grid. It is valuable, for example, to know that the 4-5-6 trains follow Park Avenue south of 42nd Street, and Lexington Avenue north of 42nd. This is something that the Tauranac-Hertz map does well, and the neo-Vignelli map does poorly. To make an apples-to-apples comparison, looking at the [Tauranac-Hertz map](https://imgur.com/BZnPrtD?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), one gets the basics of how the G train weaves through central Brooklyn. The [neo-Vignelli map](https://imgur.com/TyVIMQa?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) omits those useful details. In other places, the neo-Vignelli map gets the geography plain wrong, often egregiously so. [Central Park is a square again](https://imgur.com/1BSPlEi?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The [Second Avenue F train station has somehow migrated eastof the First Avenue L train station](https://imgur.com/pAgw0tr?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Geographical distortions like these do little to aid the below-ground passenger, and make it harder for riders to reach their final destination once they get off the train. All in all, I give the neo-Vignelli map a B+. It is more user-friendly than its predecessor, it corrects the most egregious design decisions of its 1972 ancestor, and many of the useful innovations from the Tauranac-Hertz map, like color-coded main lines, have stayed. The MTA's introduction of live digital maps also helps. But there remains room for improvement. I look forward to seeing how the MTA refines its improved map in the coming years. ### Mayoral Candidate Forum on Public Safety and Quality of Life URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/mayoral-candidate-forum-on-public-safety-and-quality-of-life/ Last updated: 2026-01-19T10:25:30.000Z This forum, co-hosted with the Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism at CUNY, focused on [what’s actually happening with crime on the streets and subways](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/vital-signs-state-of-the-city-on-crime-2024), probing would-be mayors’ pragmatic plans to address New Yorkers’ concerns. The panel featured candidates Adrienne Adams, Brad Lander, Jessica Ramos, Scott Stringer, Whitney Tilson and Jim Walden. The event was moderated by NY1 political anchor and Newmark J-School adjunct professor (and Vital City [contributing writer](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/errol-louis)) [Errol Louis](https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/faculty/errol-louis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). He was joined by [Brigid Bergin](https://www.wnyc.org/people/brigid-bergin/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of WNYC and [Reuven Blau](https://www.thecity.nyc/author/reuven-blau/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of THE CITY. Speakers: - Errol Louis - Brigid Bergin - Reuven Blau - Adrienne Adams - Brad Lander - Jessica Ramos - Scott Stringer - Whitney Tilson - Jim Walden ### Is There Any Path to Victory for Eric Adams as an Independent? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/is-there-any-path-to-victory-for-eric-adams-as-an-independent/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:04.000Z Earlier today, New York City Mayor Eric Adams announced what most people expected: He's not running for re-election as a Democrat. He's, instead, running as an independent. Adams can read a poll as well as anyone and no matter how unfairly treated he feels, the math to win in a Democratic primary just isn't there. In a recent survey of 2,200 registered voters conducted by John Della Volpe, Adams' support stood at 12%. There likely is not a viable path for Adams as an independent either, but it's worth at least exploring what it would take for him to win. Running as an independent is always difficult. At the time I ran Mike Bloomberg's 2009 re-election campaign, Mike was an independent, and we looked hard at the idea of him not running on any party line. The numbers never added up, not even for a guy who could spend billions on paid media. In most cases, the Democratic nominee for mayor of New York City walks in with roughly 40-45% of the vote. The Republican nominee has 10-20% of the vote. Once you add those two together, there's just not enough votes left to win. But perhaps there is a scenario that changes the underlying math — making Adams (or for that matter, Jim Walden, who is also running as an independent) viable. It would look something like this. First, Andrew Cuomo would have to lose the Democratic primary. (Full disclosure: Two people who work for my consulting firm — Chris Coffey and Shontell Smith — are advising the Cuomo campaign, although the campaign itself is not a client. I am not personally involved with any of the campaigns.) Cuomo is a moderate and if he wins the primary, he will not only win most Democratic votes, he'll do very well among independents and Republicans too. Beating him in a general election is not feasible. The argument for Andrew losing in the primary is based on the path of a different Andrew four years ago — Andrew Yang. At this point in the race, Yang (who was a client of my firm) was up by a similar margin to Cuomo's. As we all know, that lead ultimately dissipated. However, knowing the Yang campaign extremely well, I do not think the same factors apply to Cuomo as did Yang. Elections, in my experience, are based in large part on the zeitgeist of the moment. For the first half of the 2021 mayoral race, the zeitgeist was about recovering from COVID. Yang was the perfect candidate for that. But once vaccines became fully available that spring, anxiety about COVID plummeted, and concerns shifted to other topics like crime. At that point, Eric Adams, a 23-year veteran of the NYPD, became the candidate who best fit the zeitgeist. > Cuomo is a moderate and if he wins the primary, he will not only win most Democratic votes, he'll do very well among independents and Republicans too. Beating him in a general election is not feasible. The zeitgeist of this election is that the city feels awful. It feels dirty, dangerous and unsafe. Crime may be trending down this year, but lots of New Yorkers are fed up. They want someone who can come in and fix the problem, and around 40% in most polls are naming Andrew Cuomo as that solution. I'm not really sure how that will change much in the next 12 weeks. But let's say, for sake of argument, it somehow does change and someone other than Cuomo does win the primary. Right now, the second-place candidate is Zohran Mamdani, a Socialist from Queens. Mamdani is the most far-left candidate in the race. He has run a dynamic campaign, capturing attention, donations and support. If Mamdani wins the primary, a lot of traditional Democratic voters will be looking for other options because his views are so extreme. Eric Adams is banking on being that other option. The same argument holds somewhat true if someone else from the left (Brad Lander, Scott Stringer, Adrienne Adams, Zellnor Myrie, Jessica Ramos) wins the primary, but all of those candidates are far more traditional and far less controversial than Mamdani, so the odds of giving Eric Adams a clear opening are a lot lower. But let's say it's Mamdani as the Democrat, Adams and Walden as independents and Curtis Sliwa as the Republican. This isn't a ranked-choice general election – a plurality is good enough to win. Let's say 42%, for the sake of argument. Based on 2021 turnout, that would require Adams to win just under 475,000 votes. To do this (again using 2021 turnout), he'd need roughly one-third of Democratic votes cast and two-thirds of Republican, independent and other party votes. That doesn't sound impossible if the opponent is someone like Mamdani, but it's still incredibly difficult. > The zeitgeist of this election is that the city feels awful. To win over that many voters and take them away from the major party candidates, Adams would have to have a massive independent expenditure run on his behalf. It would likely require tens of millions of dollars in advertising and get-out-the-vote efforts to bring out enough voters to overcome the systemic advantages held by the major party candidates. That money would have to come from a combination of major Jewish donors terrified of Mamdani's anti-Israel stance, major Wall Street donors terrified of a Socialist mayor, tech donors terrified of their New York employees wanting to leave a city possibly facing a meaningful decrease in law enforcement resources and a host of other rich people and organizations. On top of that, Donald Trump would have to be able to bring most GOP voters into Adams' column without alienating the Democratic and independent voters Adams also needs. This requires nuance and subtlety, traits that are not normally associated with Trump (or Adams). Because Adams is the incumbent, for him to have any chance at a second term, the city also has to feel better and safer to voters by Election Day. The good news is that crime has been declining. That helps. If the administration can pick up the pace of closing illegal weed shops, making sure scaffolding that isn't essential is taken down and enforcing basic quality-of-life laws like not driving e-bikes on sidewalks, that would all help too. But the macro climate is likely to be very challenging for Adams. Trump's tariffs are going to be a double whammy for the city, both increasing prices for consumers and also hammering the markets, the lifeblood of the city's economy. Adams' close ties to Trump will be reinforced by his opponents at every turn. Winning as an independent is a very tricky path that, probabilistically speaking, won't happen. But no one anticipated 9/11, and that ended up electing Mike Bloomberg. The availability of the COVID vaccines shifted the zeitgeist of the race in 2021\. Weird things happen in campaigns. And Adams clearly had no path in the Democratic primary. So if you're him, pivoting to independent, for now at least, makes sense. If he somehow draws a royal flush, maybe New York City will wind up with a competitive general election for the first time in 16 years. That in and of itself would be interesting indeed. ### What Actually Brought New York City Back from the Brink? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-brought-new-york-city-back-from-the-brink/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:33.000Z *A new book by Peter Moskos, professor at John Jay College and* [*frequent contributor to Vital City*](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/contributors/peter-moskos)*, is reigniting debate over New York City's public safety improvements in the 1990s.* [*"Back from the Brink: Inside the NYPD and New York City's Extraordinary 1990s Crime Drop,"*](https://www.amazon.com/Back-Brink-Inside-Citys-Extraordinary/dp/0197797776/?%5Fencoding=UTF8&pd%5Frd%5Fw=wWm9u&content-id=amzn1.sym.bc3ba8d1-5076-4ab7-9ba8-a5c6211e002d&pf%5Frd%5Fp=bc3ba8d1-5076-4ab7-9ba8-a5c6211e002d&pf%5Frd%5Fr=134-0071767-9681071&pd%5Frd%5Fwg=zdSUT&pd%5Frd%5Fr=ccaa4838-dbac-42cb-b085-7470ba455e4c&ref%5F=aufs%5Fap%5Fsc%5Fdsk&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *is an oral history of the role that the police department played in producing historic reductions in violence.* *While the NYPD has traditionally received the lion's share of the credit for New York's turnaround, there are many who are dubious of this narrative. One such skeptic is Andrew Karmen, the author of* [*"New York Murder Mystery: The True Story Behind the Crime Crash of the 1990s."*](https://www.amazon.com/New-York-Murder-Mystery-Behind/dp/081474804X?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *Karmen credits policing but points to a range of other factors that also contributed to the improvements in New York, including the decline of the crack epidemic, rising incarceration rates and a healthy economy.* *We recently brought Moskos and Karmen together for a conversation about what really went on in the 1990s. This debate is not just of historical interest; indeed, it has significant political implications in an election year where crime is a central issue in the mayoral race in New York City.* *The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity.* **Peter Moskos:** As a proxy for overall crime, my new book uses murder stats: from a peak of 2,262 in 1990, murders in New York City fell rapidly, dropping below 1,000 by 1996 and reaching 382 by 2024\. The book explores the changes within the NYPD and its evolving mission. I wanted to capture the inside story — how police on the ground perceived what was happening, and what they were doing differently. **Andrew Karmen:** Peter, you and I agree on the basic facts, but we may differ on causes. I generally follow the root-cause school: racism, poverty, family breakdown, poor education, chronic unemployment. Other theories include reduced lead exposure, legalization of abortion, immigration and a decline in alcohol use. Immigration, for example, helped revitalize neighborhoods. There was also a surge in higher education starting in the '70s, which bore fruit in the 90s as young adults pursued different paths. **PM:** I started graduate school in sociology at Harvard in 1995, after spending a lot of time in New York during the bad years. I saw the city change before my eyes. And yet, in academia, I was reading that policing didn't affect crime, that we had to fix root causes like poverty and racism. Meanwhile, murders were down 50% in New York City, even as social spending was cut. I thought: something's off here, the experts are wrong. That's what really planted the seed for me to get into the academic field of policing. **AK:** Crime declined nationwide, not just in New York. We need to remember that. Cities like Chicago and Los Angeles also saw reductions. But New York's decline was earlier and more dramatic, so yes, it's worth examining what was unique here. > The nature of the crack market mattered. Crack was sold in smaller, single-use amounts, meaning more transactions, more disputes and more chances for violence. **PM:** Exactly. And I think part of what happened was that New York showed what was possible. Other cities copied it. The "special sauce" wasn't secret: track crime, respond to it, prioritize public safety. When Bill Bratton became commissioner, he said the NYPD would focus on crime, disorder and fear. That alone was a radical shift. His deputy, Jack Maple, asked top brass how many people had been shot the year before. No one knew. Simply caring about violence, counting it and trying to stop it — that was the breakthrough. **AK:** In the 1990s, bullets were flying. I remember a stat: over 80 people were hit by stray bullets in one year. Crack turned drug dealing into a young man's game. The old-school dealers gave way to kids with guns and no restraint. **PM:** Right. The nature of the crack market mattered. Crack was sold in smaller, single-use amounts, meaning more transactions, more disputes and more chances for violence. You had kids slinging on corners, competing over turf. And some of the violence was directed at, or spilled over to, people who weren't involved in the drug trade at all. **AK:** The War on Drugs had police out on the front lines, but the question was: were they fighting the right battle? Could it have been won with more investment in enforcement? **PM:** I don't think we could have "won" the War on Drugs. But I do think there was a kind of war on drug-related violence that had some success. What mattered was shifting the public market. Once dealers moved inside or used delivery models, violence dropped. The drugs didn't go away — but the corner battles did. **AK:** In your book, you mention how reforms post-Serpico affected things. After the Knapp Commission, there was fear of corruption. As a result, beat cops were discouraged from engaging too deeply. They were told to avoid situations where corruption might occur. **PM:** That shaped an entire generation. Policing focused on stats: make your quota of arrests, respond to crimes, don't make waves. The department was disincentivized from proactive public-order policing. Even when there were obvious issues like graffiti on the subways, they just made arrests without addressing the root behavior. **AK:** Your book has some great "now it can be told" moments. Officers reflecting on the bad old days. Like a precinct commander who gave a patrol officer the number of a bar and told him, "Don't call me unless it's serious." **PM:** That happened more in high-crime neighborhoods. The very areas most in need of effective policing often got the least. You also had things like "collars for dollars" — making an arrest at the end of a shift to rack up overtime. Everyone knew about it. I saw it in Baltimore too when I was on the job. We called it the 9:01 Club. But that doesn't necessarily mean the arrests were wrong. There were rules. We didn't make the rules. We worked those rules. **AK:** Some precincts, like the 75th, were considered dumping grounds for problem officers. But others used that to their advantage — knowing no one would bother them. **PM:** True. In tough precincts, some cops just wanted to do the job and be left alone. I had access to a lot of officers for this book, thanks to my time at John Jay and my policing background. Many were retired, but they still felt strongly about that era. They wanted their story told. They wanted honesty — not flattery. And I did share transcripts with them for accuracy. **AK:** One powerful story comes from Ray Kelly, who was police commissioner under both David Dinkins and later Michael Bloomberg. He described how crack use fell out of favor in the 1990s. Suddenly, it wasn't cool. It was seen as pathetic. Young people didn't want to end up like their older siblings. He said the shift to "40 and a bong" — malt liquor and marijuana — marked the cultural change. That caught police leadership by surprise. **PM:** Crack violence started to decline around 1990\. But the steepest drop in murders began in 1994\. The numbers don't lie. That drop was too sharp and too fast to be explained by cultural change alone. The timing lines up with major shifts in NYPD philosophy and practice. Before the big crime drop, the crime decline started in the subways. That was Bratton's domain in 1990 before he became commissioner. Subway crime dropped while street crime was still high. That's a natural experiment showing the effects of focused policing. > There was a kind of war on drug-related violence that had some success. What mattered was shifting the public market. Once dealers moved inside or used delivery models, violence dropped. The drugs didn't go away — but the corner battles did. **AK:** That success helped Bratton get appointed. But Rudy Giuliani ousted him, reportedly because he didn't like that Bratton was getting the credit. Especially after Bratton was featured on the cover of "Time." **PM:** That cover called him a champion of community policing — which is ironic because community policing had been the mantra under Dinkins and Lee Brown. But Bratton redefined it as focusing on what communities said they wanted: less crime, less fear. Arrests did go up under Bratton. But arrests went up more in the 1980s with community policing than in the 1990s with broken windows. **AK:** Your chapter on Bryant Park, Times Square and the Port Authority Bus Terminal is fascinating. These spaces became safe through design, programming and informal control — not just arrests. **PM:** Right. I wanted to highlight the role of business improvement districts and the philosophy that laid the foundation for the crime drop. Dan Biederman in Bryant Park and Gretchen Dykstra in Times Square and Ken Philmus in the bus terminal did transformative work. They used principles from Jane Jacobs and William H. Whyte. They worked with police, but their part wasn't dependent on policing. And this happened before Giuliani. Graffiti removal on the subways happened in the late 1980s. Times Square's cleanup was already in motion when Disney signed on. Even things like squeegee men were tackled under Dinkins and Ray Kelly, but Giuliani got the credit. And Safe Streets, Safe City passed under Dinkins, hiring thousands of new cops. But it was Bratton who was able to use that manpower. **AK:** What do you hope readers take from your book? **PM:** First, I want it to be a compelling read. But also, I want readers to see police as people — working men and women, often from tough backgrounds, who see policing as a way to do good. The NYPD is a flawed, massive organization. But this is also a management story: how do you motivate civil servants? Leadership, mission and accountability made a difference. **AK:** And I got the message that police tried a lot of ideas. Some worked. Some didn't. But by the 90s, they believed they could reduce crime. That's a shift. **PM:** Cops never like the mayor, perhaps except for Ed Koch. They didn't ever care for Giuliani. But Dinkins was especially unpopular. Some of that was racial bias, but much was based on how he handled crises and policing. He was seen as ineffective. I don't talk about police legitimacy in academic terms, but in the terms that police effectiveness creates police legitimacy. **AK:** Today, morale is low. Recruitment is hard. The NYPD lowered the education requirement. Why is the job less appealing now? **PM:** Police have always complained. But since 2020, nearly every tool has been challenged: gang databases, stop-question-and-frisk, fare evasion enforcement. Laws like the diaphragm law make arrests riskier for officers. There's a feeling that the public, and the political class, doesn't want policing to succeed. That erodes morale. And if we're lowering standards, what happens 10 years from now? **AK:** In my book "Issues in Policing," I talk about three camps: law-and-order advocates, civil libertarians and racial justice activists. Some argue policing is inherently racist, rooted in slave patrols. **PM:** That's historically wrong. The NYPD was modeled on London's Metropolitan Police, not slave catchers. Yes, police have enforced racist laws. But saying policing is evil by design undercuts reform. If you believe it's slavery, you don't want to fix it. You want to abolish it. That makes recruiting good people harder. We need reformers who believe in improving policing. **AK:** And we've made progress. Fatal police shootings in New York dropped from over 100 a year in the 1970s to about 10 today. That's real change. **PM:** It is. Police transparency and accountability work. But we can't lose sight of the need for good policing. We must recognize the mistakes and build on what works. We need to keep moving forward. ### What Does Trump’s Move to Dismantle the Department of Education Mean for NYC? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/what-dismantling-the-department-of-education-means-for-nyc/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:04.000Z [](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?display=page&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fwhat-dismantling-the-department-of-education-means-for-nyc)[](http://www.twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fwhat-dismantling-the-department-of-education-means-for-nyc&ref=vitalcitynyc.org)[](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vitalcitynyc.org%2Farticles%2Fwhat-dismantling-the-department-of-education-means-for-nyc&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) After campaigning on a promise to close the U.S. Department of Education and return control of education to the states, President Donald Trump has now signed an Executive Order [to effectively close the federal Education Department](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/improving-education-outcomes-by-empowering-parents-states-and-communities/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Education Secretary Linda McMahon has shuttered some of the department's offices, laying off 1,300 career department staff and propelling an additional 600 to retire or resign. What does this mean for New York City's public schools and students? As with so many of the Trump administration's initiatives, it can be challenging to distinguish smoke from substance. Indeed, the president's order to shut down the Education Department is likely to have relatively mild effects on New York City in the short run. But the longer-term downstream effects could be scary. The U.S. Department of Education is a relatively new part of the federal bureaucracy. It was created by an act of Congress in 1980, consolidating various federal education initiatives spread across other Cabinet agencies. (My own association with the department spans its entire existence, including a stint as an employee and as a recent research grant recipient.) The two best-known functions of the department involve ensuring state compliance with federal laws and distributing dollars authorized by Congress — most notably about $19 billion flowing from Title I, which provides funds to supplement the education of economically disadvantaged students, and about $15 billion authorized by the IDEA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which ensures that students with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education. The Education Department also has managed approximately $1.5 trillion in postsecondary student loan debt incurred by more than 40 million borrowers. As the largest public school system in the U.S., educating about twice as many students as the second-largest district (Los Angeles), New York City receives hundreds of millions of dollars each year from these two sources. Of the roughly 900,000 students enrolled in New York City public schools, 22%, or nearly 200,000 students, have a disability that entitles them to special services, and 74%, or approximately 660,000 students, are economically disadvantaged. These vulnerable children and youth benefit from the more than $600 million in Title I funds that the federal Education Department sends to New York City each year, and the more than $500 million earmarked each year for students with disabilities. If you have children in the New York City schools with a disability, or know someone who does, those children are getting essential opportunities to learn that are supported by these funds. > As with so many of the Trump administration's initiatives, it can be challenging to distinguish smoke from substance. Do the Trump administration's efforts to close the Department of Education jeopardize Title I and IDEA funds? Not if the administration follows the law. Only Congress can actually close the Department of Education, and Title I and IDEA funds are specifically authorized in Congressional legislation to be administered by offices in the Department of Education. The stroke of a pen to an Executive Order doesn't close the department or cancel these outlays. Nor can the administration arbitrarily move the administration of IDEA to the Department of Health and Human Services, as some have suggested, where critics fear Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.'s skepticism about autism and other disabilities, and the agency's inexperience with public schools, could compromise the efficient flow of these essential dollars. To be clear, Title I and IDEA funds are not the only money from Washington going to the city's schools. More than $500 million each year comes to New York City via the U.S. Department of Agriculture's signature child nutrition programs, the National School Lunch Program and the School Breakfast Program. The Department of Health and Human Services' Head Start and Early Head Start, programs to provide early childhood education to low-income families, send more than $70 million each year to New York City. And New York City is able to cover some of the costs of health and medical services for students with disabilities via reimbursements from Medicaid, a federal health program that provides comprehensive health coverage for low-income New Yorkers. All of this seems like a lot of money, but only about 5% of the New York City Department of Education budget comes from federal dollars. Most of the revenues originate in state funds and local tax revenues. This is true of most states and school districts across the U.S.; only six states depend on the federal government for 20% or more of their K-12 school funding. The relatively small footprint of the federal Department of Education also pertains to day-to-day instruction in schools and classrooms; federal law prohibits the Education Department to dictate school curricula, which instead are chosen at the state and local level. > If you have children in the New York City schools with a disability, or know someone who does, those children are getting essential opportunities to learn that are supported by federal funds. The greatest threat to New York City's parents and schoolchildren arising from the massive downsizing in the federal Department of Education is the closure of the local enforcement office of the Office of Civil Rights (OCR). OCR investigates complaints against school districts and colleges and universities and ensures that schools do not discriminate on the basis of disability, sex, race or other differences. This often includes examining school district compliance with Individualized Education Programs (IEPs), the written legal documents that specify how teachers, parents, school administrators and other education service providers work together to ensure that a student needing special education and related services gets the free and appropriate public education they need, including access to services in general education settings to the greatest extent possible. Currently, there are 228 open complaint investigations by OCR in New York State and 36 for the New York City Public Schools. With the federal Department of Education on the case, these complaints will be resolved, often via voluntary changes agreed to by the New York City Department of Education. Without the intervention of the Office of Civil Rights, these complaints about unequal access and opportunity will languish for years, and the families initiating a complaint, and many other families, will suffer. For example, in 2012-13, the Office of Civil Rights initiated an investigation into how the New York City Department of Education communicated with the parents of children receiving special education services. Forty percent of the students in the New York City schools had a home language other than English, and OCR determined that the city's Department of Education did not ensure that IEPs were translated into parents' native languages, nor that appropriate interpretation services were provided during special education-related meetings or due process hearings. The case was voluntarily resolved eight years later, in 2020, with [the New York City Department of Education enacting new rules](https://www.nylpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Resolution-Agreement.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for the provision of translation and interpretation services; new guidance for ensuring competent interpretation and timely translation; staff training regarding the responsibility to provide translated documents and interpretation services to the parents of children with disabilities; and outreach to parents of students with disabilities regarding their rights to language access. This is but one concrete example of how OCR has advocated for the civil rights of children, and their parents, in the face of local contingencies. One need not demonize the city's Department of Education, nor those of other districts across the country, to recognize that when local school districts are short on money and staff, corners may be cut. Most of the complaints that OCR receives and investigates are allegations that qualified individuals with disabilities have been denied participation, benefits or services to which they are legally entitled. > Only about 5% of the New York City Department of Education budget comes from federal dollars. Was a disabled student barred from participating in a class trip? Did the school provide reasonable accommodations to enable a student in a wheelchair to participate in a particular class? Does a school act quickly and decisively when a student with a disability is subject to slurs or threats? Was a disabled student's teacher certified as a special education teacher with the specialized knowledge to customize that student's classroom experiences? New Yorkers and others across America count on the federal government to enforce the laws protecting these vulnerable children. Shuttering the federal Department of Education could hurt New Yorkers in other ways — but the ramifications wouldn't be felt for some time. For example, closing the research arm of the U.S. Department of Education, the Institute of Education Sciences (IES), robs the nation of the opportunity to monitor trends in student achievement at the national and state levels, and in urban districts such as New York City. Much of what we know about learning losses during the COVID pandemic; the performance of U.S. students relative to students in other countries; the level of mathematics and literacy proficiency over time; "what works" in promoting student literacy and the learning of science, technology and mathematics; and how to use data to inform decision-making at the state, local and school building level — all this stems from programs and projects supported by the Institute of Education Sciences, part of that very same federal bureaucracy many Republicans loathe. There's one more significant loss that's harder still to quantify. Since its inception, the U.S. Department of Education has served as a "bully pulpit," enabling a Cabinet-level agency to speak out on the importance of public education at the elementary, secondary and post-secondary levels. It has enabled the federal roles and responsibilities for education that Congress envisioned to be coordinated in fair and efficient ways, effectively giving schoolchildren a seat at the most important table in Washington. The Trump administration's current efforts to dismantle the department, including closing our nation's federal infrastructure for education research and statistics, are about institution-bulldozing, not institution-building. If Congress does not stand in the way of these staffing and funding cuts, the damage in New York City and elsewhere, while not felt immediately, will be difficult to reverse. ### Nonprofits and People in Poverty — It's Complicated URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/after-hours-with-jamie-rubin-and-majora-carter/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:05.000Z *In this episode of Vital City's podcast "After Hours with Jamie Rubin," American urban revitalization strategist Majora Carter critically examines the "nonprofit industrial complex", arguing that many social service organizations perpetuate systemic problems rather than solving them. She highlights how current nonprofit models often trap communities in poverty, using ineffective top-down approaches that prioritize maintaining the organization over creating meaningful change. Drawing from personal experience and broader research, she challenges listeners to reconsider how philanthropic efforts address social issues, advocating for more peer-based, community-driven interventions that genuinely empower marginalized populations.* *You can listen to this episode, "Nonprofits and People in Poverty: It’s Complicated," on* [*Apple Podcasts*](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/nonprofits-and-people-in-poverty-its-complicated/id1794619189?i=1000700873079&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) *or* [*Spotify*](https://open.spotify.com/episode/1pL6QcASlW7nhDYacjX4Ry?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)*.* **TRANSCRIPT:** **Jamie:** You are listening to After Hours with Jamie Rubin, a Vital City Podcast. I'm Jamie Rubin. **Molly:** So here's my question for you today. Have you ever served on a jury? **Jamie:** Um, no. I have not ever served on a jury. Gretchen, my wife, has served on two juries and she was the foreman on both of them. **Molly:** Well, that's very on brand. **Jamie:** Exactly. **Molly:** I was an alternate on a jury when I was in college, which was a fascinating experience, but I just went through jury duty last week. **Jamie:** Ah, how was it? **Molly:** I feel like jury duty is one of those things — and Gretchen clearly knows this much better than you, but — it's a drag when you are doing it, and yet if I take a step back, I think it's the most amazing thing. **Jamie:** Yeah, it is. Until we get to a regular pattern of jury nullification, maybe the last bastion of our three major institutions of government. **Molly:** True. Did you ever watch the show Jury Duty? **Jamie:** No. I heard it was very funny, but I did not watch it. No. **Molly:** Oh my god, Jamie. **Jamie:** Honestly, I'm not sure I have the appetite at this point in history for bastardized versions of real life civic institutions. I may have to wait a little while. **Molly:** No, no, no, no, no, no. This will restore your faith in humanity. **Jamie:** I mean, I'll give it a shot at some point. Right now I'm kind of sticking with, like, reruns of 30 Rock. **Molly:** Who are we talking to today? **Jamie:** Today we are talking to Majora Carter. She grew up in Hunts Point, the Bronx, which is still where she lives, and she has largely made her career as a community activist and now as a for-profit developer. She runs the Majora Carter Group, doing her best to find different ways to revitalize the neighborhood that she grew up in. **Molly:** That is very cool. Why did you wanna talk to her? **Jamie:** Majora and I grew up in New York City at really the exact same time, but in very different circumstances, and we've never met until now. It's interesting to talk to somebody who's got the same sort of historical and geographic context. Majora wrote a really provocative [piece](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-the-nonprofit-sector-fails-low-income-communities) for Vital City about what she calls the non-profit industrial complex, and I wanted to find out more about what she meant. So we had a really interesting conversation about that and all kinds of other things. **Molly:** I'm excited to hear more. **Jamie:** Majora Carter. First of all, thanks for joining us. **Majora:** Of course. **Jamie:** Excellent. **Majora:** Happy to be here. **Jamie:** You and I grew up in the city in the same era, I think, because I was born 1967\. You were born right around then, I'm guessing, right? **Majora:** Yep. ‘66. **Jamie:** Yep. Okay, perfect. So, you know, we grew up in the ‘70s. We grew up in different places, but it was the city. It was a different place \[than now\]. **Majora:** Oh yeah. **Jamie:** You grew up where? In Hunts Point? **Majora:** Hunts Point in South Bronx. Yeah. In the South Bronx. **Jamie:** What was your experience of it like? Did you feel like it was more dangerous than the rest of the city or was it just like home? **Majora:** I didn't feel like it was more dangerous. I knew if you wanted to find danger, you certainly could. I went to \[the Bronx High School of\] Science and I knew plenty of white folks in my classes and I knew they could also find danger if they wanted it in their neighborhoods as well. But their neighborhoods weren't on the nightly news. Mine was. So that was the difference. **Jamie:** What was the neighborhood like? What kind of place did you grow up in? **Majora:** I grew up in a private house — a two-family home that my father bought in the 1940s. He was part of the Great Migration — Black folks coming up… **Jamie:** Where was he? He came up from where? **Majora:** He's from America's Georgia. Southern America’s Georgia, seven miles from the man from Plains. **Jamie:** Wow. **Majora:** Yeah. Yep, yep, yep. The first time I met anybody associated with President Carter, they were like, “you know, where your people are from is only seven miles away from where President Carter is from.” Of course I know. I'm a child from not too far. Believe it or not. **Jamie:** That's incredible. So Hunts Point, your dad, you grew up in a two-family house that your dad bought? With one of the home ownership programs that were started under FDR, probably? **Majora:** Well, my dad was Black, so he wouldn't have had that much of a chance to get much of those. Proportionately, very few people got there. **Jamie:** Probably true. Yes, yes. **Majora:** My dad was able to get his house because he was a Pullman porter. He was traveling, deadheading on a train out in L.A. His main line was the New York-New Haven line, which is where he wanted to live. He was like, “My dream is to own a home,” like a lot of Americans. And he wanted to live on that line. He won $15,000 in a horse race. In California. **Jamie:** What, in Los Angeles? **Majora:** Yep. And he carried that money back home in a satchel across the country and went to that line. At that point, the Hunts Point rail station, which was right there on that line — they closed them down, but there was talk that it was gonna be reopened. He went and he found an Italian family. At that time, the neighborhood was still predominantly white. And the Sacco family sold my daddy their home. He didn't feel really good about living there, being the only Black person on the block, or bringing his soon-to-be wife, which is my mom, there either. And so he actually rented it back to them for two years. **Jamie:** There are so many strange things about that story. Among other things, what I really want to know is how the heck did he win $15,000 in 1940 or whatever? **Majora:** A horse race! With a buddy. And he did a pretty good thing with it. It provided a safe and secure place for me. I was the youngest of their 10 kids and that house really did shelter a lot of folks. He had one of those houses. **Jamie:** Where everybody would come, people who needed help or whatever? **Majora:** All the time. My dad, his last job was as a janitor at the Spofford Juvenile Detention Facility, which he hated mostly because — this is before all the studies about juvenile justice and how badly we treat kids in this country were out there — he actually knew that there were kids who were put in in jail because of stuff their parents had done. The social service safety net was not so great. It was like, well, “What are we gonna do? I guess you're gonna go to Spofford.” Fortunately some of the kids did come to stay with us, as opposed to being in jail. There were just weird ways to make that happen. On some level we got to experience that. Which was good. **Jamie:** There are a lot of different tangents we can go on here. I'm going to try to get back to the question of who you are, but I don't think we've even gotten past 1945 yet. **Majora:** Well, that's who I am. **Jamie:** It's who you are. There's no question. And that's what a lot of your work is about as well. So let me just play back what I heard. You grew up like I did in the seventies and then you went away to college. You went to Wesleyan? **Majora:** Wesleyan! I'm actually wearing that t-shirt today. **Jamie:** Hey, nice. And then what? **Majora:** I did grow up during the era that's often referred to as the Burning Bronx. There's all those years of financial disinvestment that happened — not just in the Bronx, but all over the country and urban areas. Whether it was planned shrinkage, or — oh God, what’s that other term? The backhand wave referring it to is like “negro removal.” **Jamie:** Urban renewal? **Majora:** Urban renewal. And so I watched part of my neighborhood burn. There wasn't a whole lot of investment coming in, you know, thanks to redlining. Between financial, disinvestment, redlining, not making any loans in those areas… I actually remember watching the light manufacturing that was in the neighborhood and knowing when it went away. One of the most visceral memories that I have of being a kid is actually the smell of baking bread from a commercial bakery down the street from my house, and then all of a sudden it was gone. **Jamie:** Replaced by? **Majora:** Later on, the smells, whether it was the sewage treatment plant, and then there was a sewage sludge pelletizing plant. We had a lot more truck traffic because there were more waste facilities that came to these places that were once light manufacturing places that people from the neighborhood would walk to, and that I'm sure provided jobs and wellbeing for people. But poof, that's gone. I remember feeling as a kid that something was going on. Between the fires, watching them burn, and seeing more drug use in the community — my brother was killed as a result of the drug war when I was about seven or so — \[I remember\] planning my escape from the neighborhood. Being a really bright kid, I was told — I was reading before I was four 'cause I remember reading all my birthday cards when I turned four — I was one of those kids. Even back then, we had plenty of smart kids, but it was, “you're going to grow up and be somebody and you're going to get out of here.” By the time my brother was killed, I was like, “I am going to go to a great school.” I called it a “name school” at the time. It had to be a name that would make people just go, “Wow, you're from someplace great.” Obviously that was not my neighborhood, and I got myself into the Bronx High School of Science. No, I didn't get myself in. My teachers at I 74 literally went to my mom and to the moms of other kids in the class and were just like, “These kids are not going to get in unless they get extra tutoring and we’re willing to give them tutoring.” I had a bunch of teachers—Mr. Rexel, Ms. Galvin, Mr. Nolan, Ms. Lugo, there were a few more—who every day after school for what felt like months would meet with us and go through a tutoring program. **Jamie:** And this was you and a cadre of other kids that were in that position? **Majora:** Yeah. And the idea was, “we're going to get you out of the neighborhood.” I actually did get into the ABC program, you ever hear of that? [A Better Chance](https://abetterchance.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But my mom didn't want me to leave. **Jamie:** Wow. So did you go from Wesleyan into community work? Or you went a different roundabout way? **Majora:** Totally no. I went to Wesleyan. I started in theater, and then realized I didn't really like being on stage and it was just a little too soul-bearing for me. But I ended up becoming a film major, and so I graduated and then I actually got into NYU film school. I put it off for a year. I was just going through some other crazy stuff and then I ended up having to not do it and I was just like, “I can't afford it.” I decided to instead go to NYU for creative writing, because my plan was to write the Great American Novel. **Jamie:** So whatever it is you were being taught, backed by those teachers, it didn't have a lot to do with practicality, obviously. **Majora:** Not at all. But that was my plan. I was going to write the Great American Novel. And then I was like, no, I’m not. I can't. I was still so broke that I needed to stay with my parents. I could not find a place that I could afford anywhere, so I was at Mommy and Daddy's house. I didn't want to be back in the South Bronx at all. It was such a defeat. **Jamie:** But that was a spur to go get full-time employment, I'm guessing? So where did you do that? **Majora:** I didn't get full-time employment for a while, because I was still in school. But I did — and this was the thing that changed everything — an AmeriCorps program for writers. The Bronx Council of the Arts had this program where they would have writers go out to all these different places, because of course through that we were going to like, “change the trajectory of everybody's life.” They'd send us to senior centers and schools and needle exchange programs. It was actually a beautiful, beautiful project. Once a month or so, we would meet with all the rest of the people in the cohort. There was this dude who I really liked and he was super fun. He was really creative and he kept talking about this place that had all these artists and really creative people there — in the Bronx. Come to find out that it was actually in my neighborhood. And it was on my block. **Jamie:** What was it called? **Majora:** It's called [The Point](https://www.thepoint.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). They were really vibrant at the time. Everybody \[was there\], like Arthur Avilés, who was this dancer with Bill T. Jones’s modern Dance Company. He's also from the Bronx. There were all these really, truly amazing people. And I was like, “oh my God, these people are like me — we're creative and cool. We've got all sorts of good things and we're from the Bronx.” It was the first time I really felt like we had something to offer. We always did, but it always felt like people from the Bronx would have to leave in order to find their people. **Jamie:** Because whatever it was they felt couldn't be found there. **Majora:** Right. I never for a second thought that there weren't cool people that came from the Bronx, but there was nothing that the Bronx had that could keep us there. **Jamie:** This is going to skip ahead a little bit just because you're touching on what you write about and where you work at this point: the Bronx and lots of other places like the Bronx, I think your theory is that they don't nurture the talent in a way that keeps the talent home. **Majora:** Yes. I think they would argue that they do nurture the talent — through gifted and talented programs, through creative arts after-school programs, things like that. But it's often done under the guise of, “you're going grow up and get out of here.” I certainly went through that. **Jamie:** You keep talking about “they.” Who is the “they” that is doing that? **Majora:** I would include the nonprofit industrial complex, definitely educators, the media certainly plays a role in that. Everybody loves the story about people pulling themselves up from their bootstraps, leaving a hardscrabble life and making their way someplace else. That is part of the American zeitgeist. I wanted to challenge this idea that there are some communities that are just beyond redemption. Because what does that mean for the people that are left behind? **Jamie:** At the \[New York City\] Housing Authority, one of the things that we talk about is this idea that public housing was never envisioned to be a place that was permanent housing. It was supposed to be housing for younger people or the working poor or whatever, who were on their way up. **Majora:** Right. **Jamie:** Because everybody in America was on the way up. The ladder only went in one direction. What's happened, of course, is that nobody ever leaves NYCHA. Part of the problem is the housing crisis, but there's a waiting list of 250,000 people. Nobody leaves. So what does that say? I guess it says they feel stuck. I don't think it's by choice. I don't think people brag about living in public housing right now in New York City. **Majora:** No, they don't. **Jamie:** It's not something they feel proud of. I do think that in the ‘30s and ‘40s at least, there was a certain pride in it. Not pride, necessarily, that I'm living in publicly supported housing, but like, this is it. This makes sense. This is what I've got, and this is going to be my beginning. **Majora:** If our economic situation is not changed, of course people feel stuck. That’s the thing that does trouble me because so much of it does, unfortunately, come down to racial and class lines and folks are not given an opportunity. The opportunities are unevenly applied. NYCHA and other housing authorities — that's not the cause. I'm grateful that there is a place for people to be. But it's really more about how we systematically and systemically work to create opportunity. **Jamie:** The back half of your argument is opportunity, but not opportunity to leave and never come back. **Majora:** Yeah. I mean, you could. It’s so funny, becauseNYCHA is often considered an island unto itself. **Jamie:** It looks like an island. **Majora:** And I'm sure it was designed to be that way. It's never really considered part of the community itself. That in and of itself is an enormous problem that is almost never really addressed. Whether I do urban revitalization strategy consulting or development projects myself, it's all about creating more opportunities for mixed communities. Concentrated poverty is something that statistically really does exacerbate all the other issues that we see are so prevalent in very low income communities. **Jamie:** Well, and we know this. **Majora:** When I think about the nonprofit industrial complex, I wonder: Do we really know it? **Jamie:** You've talked now a couple times about the nonprofit industrial complex. This is the article that you wrote for the *Vital City* issue on nonprofits. Let's talk about what that means, because I've never heard that one before. **Majora:** Really? **Jamie:** I mean, I know what you mean, but I've never heard the term. We talk about the defense industrial complex. So you got a whole different coinage here. **Majora:** Well, I didn't make it up. I'm sure I saw somebody else write it. I was like, “oh yeah, of course it's an industrial complex.” **Jamie:** I'll give you credit for it. Take credit for it. **Majora:** Don't give me credit for it. Somebody will come after me. **Jamie:** Tell me what the thesis of the article is and what you mean by this. **Majora:** It's an industrial complex. The whole root of anything being an industrial complex is that it exists to perpetuate itself. It really does make me laugh: I can't tell you how many times I've heard very long-time executive directors or people that are working in the field say things like, “Oh, we're working ourselves out of a job.” And I'm like, “No, you're not. You're still there.” **Jamie:** You think they mean because they're going to solve the problems? **Majora:** Yes, they're going to solve the problems. And of course it's gonna happen. When I really stopped to look and think about it, we were doing the same exact things. How can you do the same exact things and expect different results? **Jamie:** Before we get into what the problems are, is it something about the nonprofit form that creates the issue in your view? You've never been in government, right? **Majora:** No. It’s not for lack of trying. **Jamie:** Okay. All right. Well, you should try it. It's interesting. It's a good way. **Majora:** They won't let me in. I don't, I can try. **Jamie:** They take all comers. One of the things about government management — I'm not an expert, but I've done enough of it — is that you really can't motivate people particularly well. All the tools that are available to you in the private sector are not available to you in the public sector. You can't give people raises, really. I mean, we're testing that at the federal government now, but it was supposed to be very hard to fire people. So the nonprofit world, it's not organized labor in the same way, for the most part. But is there an issue with how you motivate people? **Majora:** I think you can motivate people with all sorts of wonderful benefits. If you even just think about how you treat people, that's a wonderful way to make sure people stick around, and it’s sometimes not that hard to do. The work in and of itself can be a reward. And it certainly is. I mean, Lord knows I did it long enough at a terrible disrespect to my body. But why can't we take some of those tools from the private sector? **Jamie:** It feels like you have in your mind some issue with nonprofits specifically. **Majora:** I'll give an example. I was working on the grassroots level in a disadvantaged community—we're working with a population that was there to be supported through philanthropy. A funny thing happened when it became clear that here we were doing this incredible work, getting noticed all over the world, and I administratively needed help. One of my funders — I wrote in a line item for administrative assistance, and I was told, “Do you really need that?” And I'm like, “You have an assistant. I'm the one doing the real work.” **Jamie:** How did that go over? **Majora:** Well, I wasn't that obnoxious. But I basically said just that. It took her a minute, but she had to realize, “Oh, right, it would actually be more productive for you to be doing the great, innovative work that you've been doing if you didn't have to do all the rest of this stuff that somebody else could do.” But the fact that I had to explain it to somebody was just like, y’all are tripping. Like straight up tripping. But that is totally normal. I think in the article — because it really just, just came out of nowhere — but it was just like, “Yeah, you know, here we have this great \[setup\]; I love my job; we've got great benefits. We're doing really well. I feel like I have a good work-life balance.” No grassroots leader says that, because that's not true. It's totally not true. The people who fund them can say that. Nobody wants to talk about that kind of stuff. There's an expectation, especially if when you're working at the nonprofit level, that somehow or another you're supposed to do more with less. That's the valiant, wonderful thing that you can do, because you know you're doing God's work or whatever. Who is that serving? Do you honestly expect for people who are literally killing themselves to actually do this work? **Jamie:** So the work should be its own reward in some way, in some weird way. **Majora:** And it's just like, it's not theirs. But again, no one else is expected to do that. **Jamie:** Nobody's expected to do that. **Majora:** And yet we keep that stupid moralistic thing. It peters down to the folks that are doing the work. **Jamie:** The problem that you're highlighting, I think, is the funders. You're nonprofits, so you have to have funders. The funders aren't really interested, for the most part, in supporting what it takes to be innovative. They’re interested in supporting what they always support, which is direct services. And so that’s what you get. **Majora:** Yeah. I think people love the underdog story, feeling like they're helping somebody. If you save someone or you get them out of those awful straits that they're in, then you could say you've won. What does that mean for all the folks that are left behind? **Jamie:** New York City has outsourced a lot of its social service provisions to the nonprofit sector. It's about the same size in terms of the number of people, I think. **Majora:** I was shocked at how big that number was. **Jamie:** It’s enormous. It's not going to turn around. We're not going to bring those people back into the government, and we probably shouldn't. So what do you do about that? They are providing essential services to plenty of people. **Majora:** If we play the long game, which means you have to look back and look critically, have we really created the kind of change we wanna see? And are there folks out there doing something different? An example: if you look all over the world, peer-based health support, community-related support. Everybody knows this is actually a good way to do this. **Jamie:** Explain what that means basically. **Majora:** For example, back during the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the eighties, what researchers all over the world discovered really quickly was that people got better health outcomes if they got the information from their peers. Very, very little of that is actually done in this country. It's still just the same direct service where you've got this very top-down approach. **Majora:** Even though stats show it's not really working so well. **Jamie:** To lecture to you about what you’re supposed to do. **Majora:** Lecture. Right. And ads in subways. Like on some level, they even reduce the impact of a family's influence on their child, because you can't listen to your parents — this person is telling you what's really important. **Jamie:** Oh, that's so interesting. **Majora:** And you're gonna tell me that doesn't have an impact on the social fabric of a family and thus the community that they're in? Of course it does. But again, when you look at statistically how many funds are actually spent on that type of support, those types of interventions are relatively teeny. Funders keep doing the same thing. You go to neighborhoods like the South Bronx and you see how many legs are cut off, how many limbs are cut off because of diabetes — something's not working. The roots of modern philanthropy and the nonprofit world — from the Carnegies and the rest of the families — were just to keep people in line. One of my favorite things was the Carnegie steel mills. They would do this thing where the workers in their company town who pounded the most steel, or whatever it is you do to make steel, got to take home a golden trophy that looked like a golden anvil. That was all they got, and then maybe a little bit of extra food or something. Ultimately, it's just like you literally poured your body and pounded this thing into submission. Ultimately, who was it helping? It created more profits for the steel mill. Not so much for the people that were doing the work. **Jamie:** That's pretty dark. I'm not suggesting this is where you are actually going, but a lot of the foundations you mentioned — the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Foundation — they're all named after somebody who was rich. I think it was Balzac who [said](https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191843730.001.0001/q-oro-ed5-00000746?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that behind every great fortune, there's a great crime. That's pretty dark. **Majora:** The Central Indiana Community Foundation did a major study a few years ago to see if their giving was systemically biased, and they discovered that it absolutely was. They were no different from any other major foundation in this world. Not many folks do that. It's just to check to see like, how are we doing? I've been talking about how flawed I think the nonprofit industrial complex has been and how it ultimately serves to support itself. If it was a business and you got these outcomes, the investors would fire the CEOs. **Jamie:** I was very involved with a direct services organization in the criminal justice world for a while. I got there and then shortly after, they started doing some measuring, which was in itself kind of an amazing thing. They had never done it, but they started to measure outcomes, and they were really sobering. It was mostly outcomes around recidivism, and some around their counseling \[of\] kids. And the \[results\] were basically terrible. You can argue all kinds of reasons why that is. It's an impossible job. **Majora:** Or you can look at what actually worked well in some other places, which I can share with you. **Jamie:** I'm not arguing with you, but I'm just saying that you have a lot of discussions at the board level about, “Well, the recidivism numbers are hard to make sense of because there's a lot of parole violations that are unfair.” But they're terrible numbers, and we're throwing a fair amount of money at it. It's a very, very difficult discussion to have in front of people who are doing the work all day long. Are you basically saying you're not doing any good, so why don't we just not do this anymore? **Majora:** No, I'm not saying that. **Jamie:** No, I'm not suggesting you are. **Majora:** I'm just saying that it's pervasive. The fish rots from the head, like, from the rebirth of this country. It was never designed — from the planter class, they weren't trying to be kind to anybody. Whether it was the enslaved folks or the white indentured servants, their descendants aren't doing all that great either. **Jamie:** No, they're doing terrible. **Majora:** But somehow or another. I don't get it. I *do* get it. But yeah. **Jamie:** Let's talk about climate. Was there a particular reason that you focused on climate for a while? **Majora:** I absolutely felt like there is a big connection between how our communities were planned and the environmental burdens that were placed on them because we happen to be poor communities of color. It seemed to me like a really important way you can help people both in the communities and outside of them. For us, it started as building the kind of projects and communities that, frankly, folks did not expect to see in places like the South Bronx. When I first started talking about doing project-based development, people could not understand why I was talking about doing things like transforming dumps into parks. People were like, “We have real problems.” And I was like, “I get it. We have plenty, and one of them is that nobody really cares about our community — even the people that are in it.” That was abundantly clear to me. If we didn't start creating real reasons for people to see value in our community — to literally see it, not just think about some future for themselves away from where they were, but literally see it — how are we going to get people to think about their environment and feel a value in it? **Jamie:** Circling back to some of the stuff we talked about earlier, if you don't have a community that people feel is theirs and is worth living in, the first thing you're going to want to do is get the heck out. I assume this is what your point is, that you need to create a community that people actually want to stay in. It's not a question that ever occurs to people around where I live and where I've grown up. It's not even a conscious thing we need to beautify, but you just take it for granted. **Majora:** Until we actually started to work on those types of things in our community, I didn't even know what that was like. It was like, “No, you go to other places to see that and to feel that.” **Jamie:** So tell me what you're doing now, because you've gotten out of the nonprofit industry. You broke free of the industrial complex. Where are you spending your time now? **Majora:** I’ve expanded the idea of what the environment was and what having an environmentally just community should and could be. All of our market research — surveys and focus groups that we've done — shows that people leave the community not because they're thinking about crime or anything like that, it's mostly just that there is nothing to do in their neighborhoods. When we started thinking about developing, and literally being a community developer, it was more about what people are leaving the neighborhood to experience. You talk about how being on the Upper East Side, there's an experience when you walk down the street, you know you're gonna find something that will appeal to you. It could be the park, it could be a cool place to have a drink or a bite, whatever. Building some of those things was what we had to do. I started a cafe in the community, which was an offshoot of Birch Coffee, which was all over the city. We transformed it into the [Boogie Down Grind](https://boogiedowngrind.com/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), which was much more South Bronx, the birthplace of hip hop. We leaned into that in terms of decor and music. The thing that we hear often about the space is, “Oh, wow. I feel like I'm in Brooklyn.” Oh my God! I guess I succeeded? That was not the goal. But I say that to tell you that nobody expected anything like that to be in our neighborhood. **Jamie:** So you're an owner of these places? **Majora:** Yeah. I started them. **Jamie:** Where did you get the financing from, just out of curiosity? You're not building housing yet? **Majora:** Not yet. I'm working on that. But we made plenty of money outside of New York City. I didn't understand the way folks did development, and I used all of my own money. Which, looking back, was just the dumbest thing to do, but there wasn't anybody going, “Hey, that's not how you do that” or, “Maybe we should, you know, invest in places like the South Bronx.” Nobody was gonna do that. We acquired a former rail station in Hunts Point, actually the same station that attracted my father to the area. **Jamie:** Wow. What are you gonna do with it? **Majora:** Again, using all of our own money, we got it to the point where we could open it up as an event hall. We did all the interior demolition. It's a gorgeous space designed by Cass Gilbert, the [same](https://nylandmarks.org/explore-ny/the-woolworth-building/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) architect as the Woolworth Building. Knock on wood, we’re close to underwriting to actually get the first phase done. Right now, we've only been able to operate it when the weather was nice, because we don't have HVAC. **Jamie:** Do you have a roof? **Majora:** Yeah, we have a roof. **Jamie:** Who'd you buy it from? **Majora:** Amtrak. We acquired it through Amtrak. We’re working with them now on a much larger mixed-use development. We're in pre-development for a much larger mixed-use development — home ownership and mixed-income rental housing, because I'm not trying to concentrate poverty. I will never put my name on something that I feel does that. **Jamie:** So not a hundred percent affordable? **Majora:** Absolutely not. Well, we'd like to reclaim the word affordability so that it actually takes into account people at different income ranges because there is no such thing as a completely poverty-stricken community that is actually gonna do well for itself. **Jamie:** The throughline from the place that your father had in mind is crazy. Did you do it with that in mind? **Majora:** Of course you knew the place. I knew the story. I saw the place every single day. When it became available, I was like, “Look, we are going to have Penn Station access; it's gonna be 15 minutes from this spot into Midtown. This is where we need to start thinking about development.” I don't want to do it the same way that I feel it's been done in these communities, where it's either that you're maintaining poverty or you're gentrifying the place. I think there's something a lot more creative. **Jamie:** I think that's great. Let's finish on what I hope is an optimistic note. It's kind of an odd time for people who work to try to do good things, and arguably we don't have the greatest leadership at the moment in the city. **Majora:** Oof. That is also an understatement. **Jamie:** My understatement. But you keep working, and I keep working in my own different ways. I know lots of folks; you do too. Do you do it because you feel like, “well, I've got no choice but to try?” Or do you do it because you feel like, “look, we're gonna get through whatever this is, and I don’t what's on the other side, but might as well try to hit the ground running when we get there?” **Majora:** I am only two generations out of that peculiar institution called slavery. My grandfather and my grandmother were both enslaved. Both my parents came from Jim Crow South and lived through all sorts of things. So is it the best of times right now? Is it the worst of times? No, I don't know. But we’ve lived through a lot more and I've invested a lot in all the things that we're doing right now — not just monetarily, but the mental and spiritual faith that I put into the kind of concepts and ideas that I believe will make the world a better place. So I'm not going to stop. I have work to do until I feel like I'm done. And then I'll just do something else. **Jamie:** Majora, it's so nice to talk to you. Thanks for doing this. Thank you. And for everything you do. **Majora:** Thank you. It was really nice. It was fun. **Jamie:** Here are a couple of takeaways from my conversation with Majora Carter. Majora talked about the nonprofit industrial complex, and it's an interesting idea. I’d never heard it before, but it definitely rings true to me from a couple of decades of working with nonprofits, chairing boards and working with foundations. I think we can assume that everybody in that complex means to do good things. But they're very much trapped, and I think they kind of trapped themselves in the old ways of looking at things. It's not really the fault of their organizations, for the most part, because they need the money to survive. I think there’s an argument that it’s the foundations’ fault, fundamentally. They're the ones who can make change because they dictate the terms. And it's really quite unusual — in my experience, at least — to find them constructively engaging with the people that they give money to, and to find them actually meeting the organizations where they live. You know, spending time with them, trying to figure out what they're doing right and what they're doing wrong; giving them the resources to improve; maybe bringing them some new models to consider and try to integrate into the good work that they are doing. I think that's a much better way to be a steward of the work that you're doing, as opposed to simply an all or nothing approach. My other takeaway is what Majora thinks about the community she grew up in. She chose to come back, which is great, but that's not a common occurrence in her view. And she sees the negative in that. She looks around the community where she lives now, and I think she would say that there just isn't that much there to keep people who have the ability to go somewhere else, for whatever reason. The remedy isn't necessarily what we often see — and I see this in NYCHA, for example, all the time — which is the kind of stuff that the nonprofit industrial complex and their funders often want to push into these kinds of areas. It's not building a new community center, it’s not plowing thousands and millions of dollars into services necessarily — although that's helpful. Maybe they would really like a supermarket. It boggles my mind that we never forced them to build supermarkets, which we are now going to do. Or a store, or something. Majora, the way she told it in our discussion, could trace back her decision to return to the neighborhood when she found this incredible arts center right around the corner from where she grew up and had no idea it was there. It's that kind of little gem that makes a neighborhood. Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back soon with another episode of After Hours with Jamie Rubin. ### Yes to Abundance, Yes to Nuance, Yes to Excellence URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/abundance-ezra-klein-derek-thompson-book-review/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:05.000Z For those feeling lost on the left, a light is flickering in the darkness. It's called abundance. Want to fight authoritarianism? Build lives people can afford, unlike what America is doing today — or, more ominously, unlike what Weimar Germany did during the hyperinflation of the 1920s. Want to help the working class? Build lots of working-class housing, unlike the trickle of new, often luxury housing we see underway in New York and California. Want clean energy, better mass transit, universal broadband and ubiquitous EV charging stations? Build them all, unlike what we did under President Biden, which was to pass extraordinary bipartisan federal legislation to fund them, but without the streamlined means to quickly deliver them locally. If President Trump wants to drill baby drill, a movement is coalescing that wants to build baby build. Many progressives, still in shock from November, need to stop believing that everyone who voted differently than them are craven misogynist racists. A lot of people, including those in over 200 counties that voted twice for Obama before they voted for Trump in 2016, are desperate for tangible results that improve their lives. Addressing their needs is not only long overdue, it could be the calling that shifts our national politics. Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson are making a version of this argument in their new [book](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Abundance/Ezra-Klein/9781668023488?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), "Abundance." But the literature around abundance is suddenly now, well, abundant. There is Marc Dunkelman's more philosophical volume, ["Why Nothing Works — Who Killed Progress and How to Bring it Back,"](https://home.watson.brown.edu/research/research-briefs/why-nothing-works?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Yoni Applebaum's controversial [writings](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2025/03/american-geographic-social-mobility/681439/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), and the widespread [works](https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2025/01/why-people-are-nimbys/681225/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of Jerusalem Demsas, who brings some much-needed diversity to the group. The Atlantic has made itself the epicenter of this movement, which has clearly reached the ears of new leaders like the searingly articulate Massachusetts congressman Jake Auchincloss. Nonprofits such as Open New York have formed around the abundance agenda nationwide, representing youth activism for policies such as deregulating housing production to meet the needs of the next generation. I've advocated along similar lines for well over a [decade](https://www.artbook.com/blog-press-vishaan-chakrabarti-crains.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), but in this case, the phoenix of "abundance" arose from the ashes of the pandemic — an agenda intended to counter the right's advocacy of austerity, scarcity and all that Hobbes believed in terms of individuals fighting over the scraps of a resource-constrained, zero-sum, Malthusian world — a world so fraught that might must make right. > While the right primarily focuses on the prerogatives of power, the left primarily focuses on the protections of process. Abundance emerges partly as a reaction to the often racially-charged grievances of today's GOP: Can't afford rent? It's because migrants are stealing your housing. Social Security going bankrupt? It's because "welfare queens" are stealing your money. The local factory shut down? It's because foreigners are stealing your jobs. Forget our topsy-turvy taxation that famously allows billionaire [Warren Buffett to pay a lower tax rate than his assistant Debbie Bosanek](http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2012/01/warren-buffett-and-his-secretary-talk-taxes?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) — it's the shiny ball threat of thievery by *the other*, against which you must bear arms. But it's also a reaction to the bureaucratic forces on the left that have so slowed down government that it sometimes takes a decade or more to approve and build projects that communities actively support, such as my own affordable housing [work](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/nyregion/christian-cultural-center-parking-lot.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in East New York. Reform will be difficult to accomplish. Going after even the most obviously problematic regulations, such as lengthy, costly and unsustainable environmental impact reports, will not happen overnight. While the right primarily focuses on the prerogatives of power, the left primarily focuses on the protections of process. It is no shock then that the primary [detractors](https://prospect.org/economy/2024-11-26-abundance-agenda-neoliberalisms-rebrand/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the abundance movement come from the far left — who, like the far right, excel at criticizing everyone but themselves. Despite these naysayers, the abundance movement largely gets things right in terms of the critiques it poses and the solutions it proposes. Still, it would benefit from more knowledge and nuance. For a group of authors so focused on building, they rarely seem to speak to builders who know firsthand what the obstacles are. Those of us on the frontlines of efforts to create new workforce housing, build climate resilience or fix dilapidated infrastructure like Penn Station might have a suggestion or two, not only about the how but the who and the what. > The hardest part of this debate is having to jettison the 20th-century binary of regulation versus deregulation. We understand, for example, that the NIMBY vs. YIMBY debate is an oversimplified caricature. I count among many of my dearest friends preservationists who have fought hard to maintain the character of our historic fabric, and I find those who lampoon that movement as the main obstacle to housing production to be wildly ill-informed. Sure, a few zealots take the protections too far, wanting to save gas stations in SoHo to prevent new housing, for instance — but from my experience, to frame preservation or other reasonable safeguards against bad development as the source of the scarcity problem writ large is to fiddle while Rome burns. We are asking to build in people's communities, and we need to do so with both more respect and with higher standards than the chain-store widgets the development community too often promulgates. Quality is as much the problem as quantity. And as the debate evolves, we need to go beyond polemics. In my experience, the hardest part of this debate is having to jettison the 20th-century binary of regulation versus deregulation. Could we perhaps focus upon *free regulation*, meaning reforming government regulations such that they help produce the freedoms of abundance such as affordable housing and reliable transit? This would demand that we test the merits of regulations not only by what they protect us from, but by what they produce for us — it demands evaluating government not only by the harms it averts, but also by the public goods it advances. Klein, Thompson and the others do pay attention to these matters, but they demand more study and strategizing to get us from idea to implementation. > When it comes to building, quality is as much the problem as quantity. How do we pay for abundance? The answer to this is far simpler than we admit: Abundance begets abundance, as former New York City Deputy Mayor Dan Doctoroff has long [argued](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/new-york-city-and-new-localism-the-doctoroff-theory-of-change/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). He cites the fact that the City's budget consistently [increases](https://cbcny.org/research/facts-about-nyc-budget-1?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as its population grows because through hard work, innovation and entrepreneurialism, new residents bring more tax revenue than they cost in terms of public services. Neither the right, which tends to argue for austerity, nor the left, which tends to be anti-growth, understands this virtuous cycle well. Left, center, right — I wish these were all driving instructions rather than political monikers. We need to build not for the sake of growth, but for the sake of people in need across the political spectrum. Yes, we need to build an affordable world smartly, beautifully and cost-effectively, with ecologically advanced materials, employing the adaptive reuse of existing buildings where possible, in conjunction with improvements to the social infrastructure of transit, schools, healthcare, parks, and public safety. Once such meritorious characteristics are demonstrated to the government, it should get out of the way. The devil is in the demonstration of course: Who assesses such merits, through what process, and for how long? To me this is the central challenge of traditional left-leaning government, which today almost always advocates for more stakeholders, more process and more time, which in turn leads to the limited, extraordinarily expensive outcomes we see in New York and San Francisco. That era must come to an end because the lack of results for people in need has come home to roost for everyday people nationwide. These are the swing voters who determine our elections, not the hardcore base of either party. If elections keep going the way of 2024, it will not bode well for those who want cultural and environmental progress, those who want Americans to be freer from scarcity and those who want to move towards a new light. But a different outcome depends not only on different rhetoric, but on different and better results, and that is now on all of us to build. ### New York City Isn’t Ready for the Trump Stress Test URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/new-york-city-isnt-ready-for-the-trump-stress-test/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:05.000Z Pop quiz: Which of the following quotes comes from a member of the presidential administration attacking big, Democrat-run cities, and which was said by a Democrat who wants to run one of those cities? One: "It's dangerous. It's dirty… They don't want you to drive your car. They want you to take a train. If you want me to take a train, make the train safe, make it clean." Two: "Just think of the absurdity: The plan is for city taxpayers to pay for the MTA and for the migrant crisis! It's outrageous… today, people stand with their backs against the walls, away from the tracks and away from each other, on guard — afraid they might be the next victim, afraid of New York at its worst." That first hater is Trump Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, [broadly threatening](http://t/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to pull federal funds if the trains don't get safer and cleaner, as if less money would help improve things, ahead of his demand that Gov. Kathy Hochul kill congestion pricing by the end of this week before [tweeting Thursday afternoon](https://x.com/SecDuffy/status/1902783361900331100?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that New York had another 30 days but "continued noncompliance will not be taken lightly." That's a big fight in its own right, with billions on the line for the subways that are the city's circulatory system, but also a small part of the White House's much broader pressure campaign bearing down on New York City and its institutions. It also includes, so far, withholding hundreds of millions of dollars from Columbia University, the Justice Department suing New York State for not letting the feds use our driver's license database as a de facto deportation round-up list, and a [bill of attainder](https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trump-bills-of-attainder-target-law-firms-a15bf632?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) punishing Paul Weiss, one of the city's leading law firms, as explicit punishment for its lawyers representing the president's perceived enemies. New York and its institutions are also scrambling to respond to a series of executive orders, written in the language of an aggrieved talk radio caller, banning federal funding of any institution touching on certain ideas ("radical gender ideology" and DEI) without so much as defining them. The idea is to bash a few unlucky or especially out-of-line losers while states, cities, universities, hospital systems and so on race to police themselves by avoiding any verbiage or information associated with those ideas. But wait, there's more: a ridiculously overbroad definition of "terrorism" already being used as a blank check for arrests by [masked federal agents](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/19/trump-deportation-georgetown-graduate-student-00239754?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), deportations and prosecutions. Returning to the subway haters I quoted at the top, the second one is Andrew Cuomo, the leading Democratic candidate to be the city's next mayor. The "outrageous absurdity" bit is from a March 2024 [New York Post op-ed he wrote](https://nypost.com/2024/03/11/opinion/andrew-cuomo-yes-i-approved-congestion-pricing-but-its-time-to-hit-the-brakes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) bashing the congestion pricing plan he'd backed as governor just before Gov. Kathy Hochul, who replaced him when he resigned before lawmakers could remove him, was about to implement it. The "New York at its worst" bit is from [the 17-minute video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPMZCi1UylE&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) he put out to announce his mayoral run. It's striking that in painting a bleak picture of a city on the brink, the leading Democratic candidate to be mayor sounds nearly identical to an agent of the Trump administration. If Cuomo or Duffy or anyone else describing the MTA as if it were [the seventh circle of Dante's Inferno](https://flaminghydra.com/hell-yes/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) is really concerned with what to do (and not to do) about subway safety, they should read [Vital City's excellent new report on just that](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/what-to-do-about-subway-safety-nyc-policy-recommendations), where the data makes clear that, while there are real problems to tackle, this is fearmongering [motivated by politics, not facts](https://x.com/VitalCityNYC/status/1902458088634118336?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). But while Cuomo has [been ginning up a "city in crisis" narrative](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/andrew-cuomo-sees-a-city-in-crisis-do-new-york-voters) about real but manageable public safety and order problems as part of his political comeback bid, New York is staring at an actual crisis courtesy of President Trump, who's been hammering New York City and its institutions with much more to come. And the other candidates have collectively been trying to convince New Yorkers there's a "crisis of Cuomo" that demands voters don't rank him at all, while saying little about how they'd deal with the much less hypothetical crisis of Trump. > Lander and the other contenders seem more interested in sniping at Cuomo and Adams for supposedly being compromised by the president than in laying out what they would do themselves as mayor about him. The city and its mayor are facing completely unprecedented financial and legal and regulatory pressures that won't go away with Mayor Eric Adams' almost certain exit at the end of the year. The next mayor will need to make tough decisions about when to resist Washington's diktats and when to comply, and painful decisions about how to spend each city dollar as federal support dries up. That takes more than performative protests, or whistling past the graveyard, but that's mostly what the mayoral field has offered so far. Political coverage so far has largely focused on Adams' efforts to suck up to Trump and his administration, which he's vowed to work with and not publicly criticize, as the Justice Department in turn moves to drop the criminal corruption case against Hizzoner. Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani got some attention for yelling questions at Trump's "border czar" Tom Homan when he was in Albany last week, but that's cheap-seat stuff. As I write this, State Sen. Zellnor Myrie is holding a press conference saying Cuomo is compromised, sort of like Adams, by the criminal referral to the Justice Department from House Republicans related to nursing home deaths during COVID. None of that speaks to what these candidates would themselves do as mayor to respond to Trump and protect New Yorkers. In a crowded ranked-choice election where the candidates have mostly struggled so far to build name recognition and distinguish themselves, is there one among them with the courage and integrity to speak honestly to New Yorkers about the rough years to come and how they'd lead the city through them? Nearly $8 billion of New York City's budget comes directly from Washington, according to [a report from city Comptroller and mayoral candidate Brad Lander](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/nycs-federal-funding-outlook-under-trump/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=The%20City's%20latest%20FY%202025%20November%20budget,June%20Adopted%20budget%20amount%20of%20$7.9%20billion.&text=In%20the%20September%202024%20Capital%20Commitment%20Plan,$941%20million%20anticipated%20in%20FY%202025%20alone.) (who proposes adding a billion dollars to the City's reserves as a buffer). And that's not counting federal money that trickles down from Albany or support for NYCHA, the MTA, CUNY and NYC Health + Hospitals. But Lander and the other contenders seem more interested in sniping at Cuomo and Adams for supposedly being compromised by the president than in laying out what, exactly, they'd commit to doing as mayor about him, starting with the money but also the chaos and pressure. If [FEMA intends to do less and leave localities to handle their own emergencies](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-achieves-efficiency-through-state-and-local-preparedness/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), will they put new resources into [the Office of Emergency Management](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/03/14/trump-budget-slashing-puts-more-than-60-percent-of-nyc-emergency-management-jobs-at-risk/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or try to have it do more with less? If education aid dries up, what schools and services is the Department of Education committed to maintaining and what could be scrapped? And on and on and on. > The next mayor is going to have to make hard decisions not only about what they want to add to the services the city provides, but about what they're willing to cut. It's easy to make big promises from the campaign trail. But the next mayor is going to have to make hard decisions not only about what they want to add to the services the city provides, but about what they're willing to *cut*. And they're going to have to do so while Trump officials are testing New York's "sanctuary city" status, its subway system and any and every other pain and pressure point they can find. You'd hardly know the first thing about any of that listening to the candidates talk about the new housing they're going to create or the new cops they're going to hire. Of course candidates want to run on what they're going to give, not what they may have to stop giving. And of course Democrats in a ranked-choice primary are going to start by ripping the frontrunners for what they're not saying about Trump rather than say more themselves about what will be difficult decisions about when to resist and when to comply with an administration, if that's even the word for it, that's governing through grievance and extortion, that speaks loudly and carries a big stick. But New Yorkers aren't stupid. If one of the candidates has the courage to separate themselves from the pack and speak honestly about the crisis the city is facing and how they'd approach it, their voice would stand out. So far, none of them are. ### Can New York Still Build Transformative Infrastructure? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/can-new-york-still-build-transformative-infrastructure/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:42:33.000Z Three new books by liberal urbanists explore why it's gotten so tough to build multi-family housing, high-speed rail lines and large-scale renewable energy plants. Beyond lamenting the state of things, the authors urge Democrats and progressives to shake off more than a half-century of accumulated rules and regulations that have helped make major civic infrastructure prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. It's fitting that ["Why Nothing Works"](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/marc-j-dunkelman/why-nothing-works/9781541700215/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by Marc J. Dunkelman, ["Abundance"](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Abundance/Ezra-Klein/9781668023488?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson and ["Stuck"](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/700580/stuck-by-yoni-appelbaum/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) by Yoni Appelbaum have stirred discussion in this 200th year since New Yorkers celebrated the first massive American public works project: the transformational Erie Canal right here in New York. As these writers try to build a new consensus for the current moment, the history of the canal offers important lessons about the cultural and political conditions necessary to build bigger and more efficiently. The key difference then was that a critical mass of Americans concurred on what progress meant, while today there is little cultural or political agreement on whether the cost, disruption and sacrifices involved in building big are worth incurring. While there have certainly been many left-leaning advocates of building big, those on that side of the political spectrum typically fragment into a half dozen camps on whether the benefits of a given development outweigh the costs. It's not as though the Erie Canal was universally supported — its construction was indeed contentious — but back then, progress was largely understood by the middle classes to be synonymous with producing some major piece of infrastructure that advanced the nation's economy and the common good. Now, many on the left define progress variously as an incremental increase in the wages of workers, or a shrinking in emissions that might make climate change fractionally less likely, or reducing entrenched inequalities. Almost overnight, the mother of all canals in the young republic supercharged the economy of the state and inspired canal construction in and beyond New York. The Erie Canal opened access to the agricultural lands of the Midwest, providing reliable and lower-cost shipping from Buffalo at Lake Erie all the way to the Hudson River at Albany. No longer, as a consequence of this project, were the Appalachian Mountains and other natural barriers to stand in the way of an unfettered flow of commerce and migration into the interior. The canal's principal booster was the powerful DeWitt Clinton, nephew of the state's first governor, George Clinton, who smoothed the way to his nephew's appointment as mayor of formerly British-occupied New York City in 1803, when the city's population numbered just 62,000\. A former U.S. senator by then, the younger Clinton served 10 single-year terms as mayor and went on to more than three terms as governor, with the canal's legislative approval materializing as he pursued the first in 1816. Clinton was among many politicians who opposed a dominant federal government, warning that it would foster aristocracy. Among his lasting accomplishments, the New Yorker advanced the European-style street grid for New York City to guide future development and helped establish free public education. But he's best remembered for the Erie Canal, which he championed through war, national debt, financial panic and high-level questions about the project's potential cost, feasibility as well as constitutionality. He held strongly expansionist views. > Considered a marvel and soon after to inspire similar projects in New York and the western interior, the canal was completed two years ahead of schedule. That was a result that would be virtually impossible today. The plan that opponents called "Clinton's big ditch" was formulated in 1810, when Clinton trekked around the state to plot the canal's route through rude burgs, rocky hills and deep ravines with his surveyor general/cousin, an assistant in the surveyor's office, the owner of a lock-navigation concern, and a wealthy congressman and land speculator. The respectable quintet's 700-mile-long journey, lasting 53 days, convinced Clinton of the upstate landscape's particular geographic suitability for the kind of artificial river he and other politicians had in mind. As the American historian Henry Adams would later observe, Pennsylvania, Virginia and the Carolinas had to build roads and canals "across a hundred miles of mountains," whereas New York State "had but to people a level and fertile district, nowhere fifty miles from navigable water, in order to reach the great Lake system." The average canal in the former British colonies of the Atlantic basin at the time of the journey was only two miles long. This canal would stretch a distance of 363 miles. Still, the dream was stalled by the War of 1812, which quadrupled federal spending. Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury, proved unwilling to part with grants of revenue or even federal land. President James Madison — no fan of Clinton, who ran against him as the candidate of both the Federalist Party and a small group of antiwar Democratic-Republicans —questioned the constitutionality of using the federal purse to pay for a state's internal improvements. Madison's predecessor, Thomas Jefferson, who envisioned America's economic future and liberty would have yeoman farmers at the center, had told an early advocate of a major new waterway for New York that constructing a more-than 350-mile-long canal through wilderness was "a little short of madness" and best left to 100 years hence. Some upstate legislators were especially cool to the planned canal tolls. Downstate officials, including the Tammany Society, which was closely tied to Clinton's foe Aaron Burr, could not envision benefits reaching 150 miles down the Hudson to New York City. They fretted about "cheap competition" from goods arriving from out west. After what amounted to six years of commissions, explorations, land surveys and debates, the commissioners' final report in February 1817 recommended that work on the project be limited at first to a mid-section 75 miles in length. Because of the relatively level landscape there, engineering would be simpler and costs lower — and this work, too, could serve to demonstrate the project's technical feasibility. And with that, the Assembly approved the canal bill two months later. The clincher came in the state Senate, where Martin Van Buren, a leading Republican, had tried to keep Clinton from winning the recent gubernatorial special election. Van Buren surprised virtually everyone in the chamber by abandoning his long-held objections to the canal, calling the project a salve for unemployment and "essential for the defense of the United States." The Senate gave final approval, and the legislature agreed to cover the staggering total estimated price of $7 million ($225 million in today's money) by selling bonds, then a novel form of state financing, as Peter L. Bernstein explains in his history of the canal, ["Wedding of the Waters."](https://www.amazon.com/Wedding-Waters-Canal-Making-Nation/dp/0393327957?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Since commercial banks and wealthy individual investors held back for fear the project could fail and they'd lose their money, a group of canal proponents recommended a novel savings bank that would draw deposits from working people and was restricted to investing in government-backed securities. The legislature chartered the bank in 1819. Considered a marvel and soon after to inspire similar projects in New York and the western interior, the canal was completed two years ahead of schedule. That was a result that would be virtually impossible today, to hear Dunkelman, Klein, Thompson and Appelbaum describe the present-day obstacles to civic modernization. These new Democratic apostles of government efficiency and "abundance" are understandably impatient with the party's difficulty in getting major infrastructure work done. They attribute the problem to the overriding centrality of zoning laws, local permits, bidding requirements and other red tape. Dating back to the 1960s and 1970s, the defensive layers of bureaucracy were well-intentioned — meant to protect middle- and lower-class communities from noise, traffic, pollution and unaccountable mega-builders. In the years since Robert Moses rammed a highway through the heart of the working-class South Bronx, though, environmental permitting rules have generally privileged local veto over final approval. It's an outgrowth, says Dunkelman, of "a deep-seated aversion to power." Ironically, wealthy communities and their lawyers have since used these laws and regulations to protect their enclaves from development and projects designed to improve housing affordability and expand transit for the middle class and the poor. Meanwhile, gridlock feeds into the conservative view that *government* is the problem — indeed, the Trump administration just proposed a rollback of air-quality protections that were enacted by Congress, displaying brash [disregard for the environment and public health](https://apnews.com/article/trump-epa-climate-zeldin-power-plants-feb184286a7a9419aefddce293362e6b?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). These new books argue that Democrats and the left must overcome the type of political parochialism that initially stood in the way of the Erie Canal, when some legislators objected to the proposed route because it bypassed their districts, while others resisted because they did not want it in their backyard. > Technology has greatly enlarged our capacity since New Deal projects like the Hoover Dam, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Interstate Highway System; Why have our civic ambitions and accomplishments stalled? The economic spillovers from the canal were in fact widespread and dramatic, turning detractors into supporters. New York City's harbor was transformed into a major hub for agricultural harvests, salted meats and, later, anthracite coal from the north and west, with boatloads of domestic cereal grains sold to England at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Galvanized by this colossal tide of imports, sleepy towns along the new waterway burgeoned into trading hubs and cities in their own right, whether Syracuse, Rochester, or Utica, while New York City emerged within just two decades as the country's de facto capital city. The city's economic success was fueled, and sometimes destabilized, by the resulting land speculators, international and national investors, merchants, shippers and multiple banks. While some politicians still warned about the dangers of federal power, their voices tended to be muffled by the profit-seeking and risk-taking. What was also true was that the national government girded Manhattan's capitalists with all kinds of support — from forts to protect the harbor, bans on foreign vessels and favorable postage rates, wrote historians Mike Wallace and Edwin G. Burrows in their epic synthesis of 19th-century New York City, [Gotham](https://www.amazon.com/Gotham-History-York-City-1898/dp/0195140494?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The canal was also a government-run waterway, operated by a state board. In 20th and 21st century America, the only civic projects that can compare to the Erie Canal's impact are New Deal projects like the Hoover Dam, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the electrification of the rural Hill Country in Texas, or, the Interstate Highway System that began in 1956, and like the Erie Canal, compressed time and space. But technology has greatly enlarged our capacity since then; Why have our civic ambitions and accomplishments stalled? Building major infrastructure remains staggeringly expensive. Yet one of the projects cited by those who say that contemporary priorities (like satisfying the interests of trade unions) inflate the price of major projects and make them harder to get done is the two-mile-long East Side Access rail connection to Grand Central Station. Offering transit flexibility to the densely populated metropolitan region, East Side Access tallied up at $12.5 billion at completion in January 2023 — four times the original estimate. And the time needed to mount big projects often makes bond investors uncomfortable. Opened in 2017, Manhattan's Second Avenue Subway took over 10 years to plan and another 10 to build — for just three stops to date. Bistate and private partnerships, such as a planned high-speed rail link between LA and San Francisco, drag on interminably and expensively, unlike those serving travelers in China, Spain, France and Japan. U.S. high-speed rail projects, by contrast, get snarled by the requirement of complex environmental reviews and litigation — hurdles the builders of the Erie Canal did not have to deal with. "The dream of high-speed rail in the United States has been long deferred," Eric Goldwyn of NYU's Marron Institute wrote with other researchers in [a recent report](https://transitcosts.com/highspeed-rail-final-report/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that lays out what's needed to get things moving. It's vital to protect the environment, stand up for unions and respect local objections. But "progress" exemplified by projects like the Erie Canal have a potential value that exceed the disruption of building them. It's long past time for Democrats and progressives to acknowledge that. ### Mayor Adams, Don’t Sell Out New York City’s Economy URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/migrants-give-more-than-they-take-to-new-york-citys-economy/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:05.000Z Days after federal corruption charges against him were dropped, Mayor Eric Adams[ appears poised](https://www.fox5ny.com/news/mayor-adams-border-czar-fox-and-friends?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to open New York City to President Trump's[ mass deportation agenda](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/12/12/eric-adams-trump-migrant-deportations-00193832?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in what Manhattan's federal attorney[ described](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/02/13/us/doc-annotation-letter-to-bondi.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as a "quid pro quo." Adams' posturing has[ hinted at this](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/nyregion/adams-pardon-biden-trump.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for some time: The mayor[ has framed](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/10/nyregion/adams-migrants-sanctuary-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the recent influx of asylum-seeking migrants as an economic burden that "[will destroy New York City](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/07/nyregion/adams-migrants-destroy-nyc.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org)." "The long-term consequences have yet to materialize," he[ told Tucker Carlson](https://www.fox5ny.com/news/nyc-trump-mayor-adams-tucker-carlson-interview-biden-migrants?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) on Jan. 22. In fact, [our calculations](https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vT6pndooskWv4cSClRZ3ZKfIz56iZ3LoC%5F1QhfYNuQGFe0g%5FA3FNtMTH76IT1xETudIFZDznxYu57yv/pub?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) show New York City is just beginning to reap the benefits of this influx of hardworking people. According to TRAC, [316,000 asylum seekers](https://tracreports.org/phptools/immigration/ntanew/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) have come to the city since 2022\. We project that they will contribute [$8.6 billion annually](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/0427fed3-123b-4628-9760-27ead91f8b43/Asylum%20Seeker%20Article%20Calculation%5FMethodology3.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the local economy, assuming their wages and employment rates resemble those of New York's existing undocumented population. We came to this figure using [existing estimates](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27143955?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the impact of low-education immigrant workers on business revenue and worker productivity. Much of this revenue will flow to public coffers. Using [previous studies](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=4120116&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of the fiscal impact of asylees and adjusting for differing wages and government spending in New York City, we estimate that the asylum-seeker population will pay $962 million more in taxes than they receive in benefits in a typical year. With New York bearing most of the local costs of education, healthcare and shelter, this tax windfall will primarily go to the federal government, providing revenue for programs like Medicare and Social Security. If ICE is allowed to wreak havoc on New York City, all these benefits will be lost. Previous waves of immigrants have similarly fled desperate situations, arrived with limited resources, faced nativist backlash and yet still became[ vital contributors](https://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/NYCImmigrationReport2014.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to the city's economy and culture. There's no reason to believe today's newcomers should be any different. With New York's[ U.S.-born population declining](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/reports/osdc/pdf/report-15-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and demand for workers[ growing fastest](https://cmsny.org/high-growth-occupations-reliant-undocumented-immigrant-workers-nys/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the industries most reliant on immigrant labor, they are arriving at an opportune time. It is true that New York City has spent substantial amounts on services for asylum seekers — a combined[ $5.2 billion](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/for-the-public/accounting-for-asylum-seeker-services/asylum-seeker-census/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in fiscal years 2023 and 2024, with another[ $4.5 billion](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/comments-on-new-york-citys-fiscal-year-2025-adopted-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) budgeted for FY 2025\. These costs doubtless have been inflated by Adams' "emergency"[ decision](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/rethinking-emergency-procurements/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to suspend competitive bidding requirements for contractors providing such services.[ The city comptroller's investigation](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/asylum-seeker-staffing-contract-comparison-and-review/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#%5Fftn11) found several egregious examples of overpayment. One contractor received $117 per hour for security guards and $201 per hour for off-site managers. In total, budgeted spending on asylum seekers made up 4.2% of the[ FY 2025 budget](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/comments-on-new-york-citys-fiscal-year-2025-adopted-budget/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). After a few months, the majority will stop receiving emergency housing and help and become self-sufficient. As we mentioned above, they will contribute about $8.6 billion yearly to the local economy once they are established. Thus, in pure economic cost-benefit terms, the money spent on their reception is an investment in the future of the city. > With New York's[ U.S.-born population declining](https://www.osc.ny.gov/files/reports/osdc/pdf/report-15-2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and demand for workers[ growing fastest](https://cmsny.org/high-growth-occupations-reliant-undocumented-immigrant-workers-nys/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in the industries most reliant on immigrant labor, newcomers are arriving at an opportune time. Importantly, the upfront costs are not the product of an "open border." People coming to New York City from abroad is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the city's undocumented population was at its [highest](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/immigrants/downloads/pdf/MOIA-Annual-Report-2023%5FFinal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in 2012 at 611,000 and fell to 412,000 by [2022](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/immigrants/downloads/pdf/MOIA-Annual-Report-2023%5FFinal.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), according to the Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs. Nor is the scale of the current influx unusual in recent times — during the 1990s, the city's[ foreign-born population](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/nny2013/chapter2.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) grew at a higher annual rate than it has during the 2020s. Rather, the recent difficulty housing asylum seekers is a unique case created by a confluence of factors: a[ political stunt](https://www.texastribune.org/series/operation-lone-star/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that brought people in [busses](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=4346168&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to cities where they lacked connections, a pre-existing[ housing shortage](https://cbcny.org/building-crisis?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=New%20York%20City's%20housing%20shortage%20is%20caused%20by%20a%20mismatch,%2C%20not%20people%2C%20consume%20housing.); an[ already-struggling](https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/MD22-105S.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org),[ poorly run](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/press-releases/2024/October/39DHSRptRelease10.17.2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) shelter system unequipped to house new arrivals from humanitarian crises; lacking services for those experiencing homelessness; a[ lack of legal immigration pathways](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/why-legal-immigration-nearly-impossible?ref=vitalcitynyc.org); and[ laws](https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2024/06/legal-work-authorization-still-eludes-most-migrants-new-york/397650/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that prevent asylum seekers from working as soon as they apply for asylum. In order to get a sense of how their economic integration is going, our research team at the [Immigration Lab](https://theimmigrationlab.org/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) talked to asylum seekers outside shelters in Manhattan and in immigrant neighborhoods like Corona and Bushwick. We interviewed 50 people from eleven different countries over the course of December 2024 and January 2025\. These conversations indicated that migrants are steadily finding work and housing in spite of numerous obstacles. Before claiming asylum, people must physically come to the U.S. For nearly everyone we spoke to, this involved taking on substantial debt to finance a deadly, months-long overland journey. This debt can be a major obstacle as people try to establish themselves in New York. In 2023, John borrowed nearly $30,000 to bring his family of five from Ecuador to the US-Mexico border. A mechanic by trade, he quickly found work repairing e-bikes at a workshop in Queens, earning $1,200 a week. Yet over half of each paycheck goes to repaying his creditors back home (who have threatened to kill his parents should he miss a payment), leaving him unable to afford rent and trapping his family in the shelter system in the short term. He says he'll have paid off enough debt to move to an apartment in New Jersey in three months. Lacking a sponsor in the U.S., crossing the border was John's only way to come. Had he been able to come directly from Quito to New York, his spending power would have been going to New York businesses instead of to human smugglers. After applying for asylum, people must[ wait 180 days](https://www.uscis.gov/eadautoextend?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) before receiving a work permit. Unless they have connections to support them, this effectively forces people without family already in the U.S. or an off-the-books job offer to live off the state for six months. In practice, our interviews have made it clear that it's often much longer. In 2023, New York City began limiting stays in any one shelter to 60 days, forcing people to[ shuffle between different facilities](https://gothamist.com/news/more-nyc-migrant-families-relocated-to-shelters-in-other-boroughs-new-data-shows?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Many migrants are not informed that[ failing to report](https://www.boundless.com/immigration-resources/report-change-address-uscis/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org#:~:text=Most%20foreign%20nationals%2C%20as%20well,organizations%20%28G%20visas%29;%20and) this change of address to USCIS within 10 days is a misdemeanor and can delay or derail their ability to get documents. The experience of Carlos, who we spoke to outside a Manhattan shelter, exemplifies the[ bureaucratic absurdities](https://www.npr.org/2024/07/11/1197967640/nyc-asylum-seekers-navigate-work-authorization?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that hold migrants back. Bused to New York City from Texas in late 2023 as part of Operation Lone Star, he immediately applied for asylum, citing political persecution in Venezuela. While waiting for his work permit, he bounced between different shelters and worked temporary construction and moving gigs. He says his lack of documentation allowed these employers to exploit him, frequently not paying him in full. Carlos told us that a relative in Oklahoma had found him a job in trucking, his original profession. "The moment my papers arrive, I'm going to Oklahoma," he says. "They're waiting for me." He was supposed to get his work permit months ago but had to restart the process when his address changed. He was most recently told his papers should arrive in 90 days. So people itching to work linger in shelters at a financial cost while crucial jobs across the country[ remain unfilled](https://www.shrm.org/topics-tools/news/hr-quarterly/us-labor-shortage-looms-who-will-do-work?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). The Independent Budget Office[ estimates](https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/executive-budget-may-2024.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the cost of missed work authorizations for asylum seekers at up to $1 billion in 2024 alone. Even so, with U.S.-born workers[ rapidly aging](https://econofact.org/immigration-and-waning-us-labor-force-growth?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), rising immigration has done much to ease post-pandemic[ labor shortages](https://www.uschamber.com/workforce/america-works-data-center?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), helping[ reduce inflation](https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/economic-bulletin/rising-immigration-has-helped-cool-an-overheated-labor-market/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) while maintaining[ economic growth](https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2024/0702?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). And asylum seekers are quietly integrating into the city's economy. Of the 232,000 migrants who have passed through the shelter system, around 187,000 (81%) [had moved out](https://gothamist.com/news/nycs-era-of-migrant-megashelters-is-drawing-to-a-close?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) as of February 24, 2024. Many interviewees had recently gotten their work permits and found employment. They expressed excitement to begin living independently and working towards the various dreams that kept them going through sweltering jungles and deserts. As asylum seekers increasingly fill the jobs that keep New York's service-based economy moving, the investments made are paying off. It would be a human tragedy and an economic catastrophe for deportations to derail asylum seekers' budding lives as New Yorkers. Contrary to his early statements, Mayor Adams seems to better understand the situation today. Mayor Adams correctly said under oath in his [opening statement](https://youtu.be/oPaUfXYk8N8?t=2235&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) during the congressional hearing on sanctuary cities on March 5, 2025, crime in the city has declined, and "to be clear, a sanctuary city classification does not mean our city will ever be a safe haven for violent criminals. It also does not give New York City the authority to violate federal immigration laws… Immigrant New Yorkers, including those who are undocumented, pay billions of dollars in taxes and contribute billions more in spending power to our economy. Immigrants also play a vital role in the functioning of our city. This was on full display during the COVID-19 pandemic… various immigrant residents of our city worked to keep the city moving… many other businesses were able to function because of the commitment of our immigrant population." In the same way, New York has to keep its commitment to immigrants and asylum seekers as the newest New Yorkers. ### Andrew Cuomo Sees a City in Crisis. Do Voters? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/andrew-cuomo-sees-a-city-in-crisis-do-new-york-voters/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:06.000Z "New York is the greatest city in the world and everything is wrong with it." That sounds a lot like former Gov. Andrew Cuomo, finally opening his long-anticipated mayoral campaign on Saturday with [a nearly 18-minute long video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPMZCi1UylE&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that quickly dispensed with pleasantries: "Let me start with telling you what you already know: New York City is the greatest city in the world and there is no other place like it." From there, he launched into a second-person narration about how "we know that today, our New York City is in trouble. You feel it when you walk down the street and try not to make eye contact with a mentally ill homeless person, or when the anxiety rises up in your chest as you're walking down into the subway. You see it in the empty storefronts, the graffiti, the grime, the migrant influx, the random violence. The city just feels threatening, out of control, and in crisis." The career politician blamed that on career politicians, naturally. It's a case Cuomo has been making behind the scenes since just after his resignation, out of some mix of genuine concern and political opportunism. Recall, Mayor Eric Adams was elected in 2021 in a promise to make the city feel safe again, yet the polling over his term shows that New Yorkers, including many Democrats, don't think he's delivered on that agenda and still want somebody to do so. When Cuomo, [who hadn't been registered to vote in New York City for nearly 20 years](https://www.cityandstateny.com/personality/2024/08/where-state-andrew-cuomo-living/398818/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), says that "the city just feels threatening, out of control, and in crisis," the word "feels" is doing a lot of work. Yes, crime remains higher than it was before the COVID pandemic destabilized so much, and felony assaults have gone up significantly. But New York remains [much safer](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/vital-signs-state-of-the-city-on-crime-2024) than most other big cities — and than it was not so long ago. Cuomo enters the race as the clear frontrunner given his name recognition and reputation as a can-do public-sector manager, but he still needs to make the case for why a politician who resigned not even four years ago — saying "I have been too familiar with people. My sense of humor can be insensitive and off-putting… No excuses" — is offering himself today as the break-glass-in-case-of-emergency answer New York City needs. Never mind the [Buffalo Billion debacle that only paid off for Elon Musk's company](https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/cuomos-buffalo-billion-was-beyond-corrupt/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) or the [prematurely shuttered](https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/moreland-commission-what-happened?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Moreland Commission to investigate public corruption, or the corruption conviction (later overturned) of Joe Percoco, a long-time aide to Mario and then Andrew who once called him "my father's third son." Forget about the nursing home death undercount during COVID and [his involvement in shaping a related state Health Department report](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/19/nyregion/cuomo-nursing-homes-covid.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) he [conveniently forgot about while testifying before Congress](https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/cuomos-house-testimony-added-new-misinformation/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), or [shutting down the city and in-person school](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/13/world/reopening-timeline-nyc-schools.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). Forget about the [$5 million deal](https://www.thecity.nyc/2021/11/22/cuomo-staffers-work-pandemic-book-investigators-charge/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) for a book on COVID that government staffers were helping to write in his name as he often seemed [at least as concerned with tormenting the then-Mayor Bill de Blasio as he was with protecting the city.](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/10/19/andrew-cuomo-the-king-of-new-york?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Forget about how Cuomo in 2020 said [defunding the police was a "legitimate school of thought"](https://nypost.com/2025/03/04/us-news/andrew-cuomo-blasts-defund-the-police-in-interview-with-stephen-a-smith-despite-once-calling-movement-legitimate/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) before declaring in 2025 that those were the three stupidest words in the English language, or how he signed into law many of the criminal justice reforms he's now bashing, or how he played the central role in making congestion pricing law before distancing himself once it was on Gov. Kathy Hochul to see it through. He and his people can and will deliver exhausting chapter and verse on how the critics are wrong and he was right about each and every one of these things — and that's not to mention the workplace sexual harassment findings that led to his resignation. They'll go on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on and — well, if 17 "ons" is tiring to read and 17 minutes of monologue is tiring to hear, think about how long the following four years could be. There's almost a zombie movie feeling here if no single issue, including the one that forced him to resign, is a political kill-shot in this race. Still, there are reasons Cuomo was dominating the polls even before he entered the race. His centrist Democratic agenda is what city voters went for in 2021, with the leading leftist in that race placing third. They turned on Adams not because they changed their minds about his agenda but because they don't think he got enough stuff done. The next mayor will almost certainly be decided in a ranked-choice primary only open to registered Democrats, a weird system that seems like a big advantage for a candidate who begins with a big head start in profile, resources and polling position. If Cuomo's opponents can't convince an awful lot of voters to leave him off their ballots entirely, he's in a very strong position, even before using his frontrunner's prerogative to cherry-pick from their plans and [applause lines](https://x.com/zellnor4ny/status/1897340919403438443?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). When the challengers finally force the frontrunner to share a stage and confront him about all the messes he was involved in, he's going to reply, briefly, something like: "They want to talk about the past because they don't have a plan for the future, and I'll get stuff done because I have." But past is often prologue in politics. Mayoral candidate and state Sen. Zellnor Myrie [told Vanity Fair's Chris Smith](https://www.vanityfair.com/news/story/andrew-cuomo-nyc-mayor-race-eric-adams?srsltid=AfmBOopgHoo07z0sXqboSx4oZCeTNRX7eZ4FtT%5FoVRGsySKk-KJ3lCKM&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that the former governor has a "Wizard of Oz effect": "I want to remind people that he cut funding for our schools during COVID. I want to remind people he cut rental assistance and we saw a spike in homelessness. The MTA was cut! He hurt the city because he didn't like the last mayor. That is not the leadership that we need in this moment." Ranked choice also means the "dwarves," as one Cuomo aide called the other candidates running to replace Adams, can try to swarm the former governor with different attacks and see what sticks. That "New York is the greatest city in the world and everything is wrong with it" line at the top of the column isn't from Cuomo, who's echoing it now, but the opening salvo of an award winning "City in Crisis" investigative series that launched in January of 1965 in the New York Herald-Tribune and was later reprinted [as a book with the subtitle "A Study in Depth of Urban Sickness."](https://www.amazon.com/-/zh%5FTW/New-York-Herald-Tribune/dp/B071J2DKR5?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) [It detailed how](https://www.amazon.com/-/zh%5FTW/New-York-Herald-Tribune/dp/B071J2DKR5?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) the gap between rich and poor had grown much too large, the streets no longer felt safe, racial tension was on the rise and the budget was out of whack as smug machine Democrats failed to deliver for ordinary New Yorkers. Sound familiar? [But there were 634 murders in New York City in 1965](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/dataviz/new-york-city-homicides-and-homicide-rates-1800-2023). When Mayor John Lindsay left office eight years later, there were 1,680\. He won office talking about a city in crisis, and by the time he left there really was one. There were [377 murders in New York City in 2024](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/vital-signs-state-of-the-city-on-crime-2024) — half the 1965 rate, accounting for population growth. Cuomo hoped to have someone else banging a City in Crisis drum ahead of his I-alone-can-fix-it mayoral appeal. That message clearly has resonance to many Democratic voters who are understandably suspicious of the candidates to his left suddenly preaching a gospel of public safety — while largely answering to the same interest groups and seeming almost interchangeable. I've been writing for years about many of the problems Cuomo is talking about, and share his doubts about Democratic Party regulars' willingness and ability to get big things done. But while the city has felt increasingly precarious since COVID, in part because of how Cuomo shut things down, there's really not a crisis — just a grim vibe and an upcoming election. Rupert Murdoch's New York Post, which helped elect Adams and generally tries to own the "common sense" lane Cuomo hopes to control, would seem like the natural fit to boost his campaign, but it has long-standing, deep-rooted beefs with the former governor and grabbed a lot of attention with a brutal editorial just after he announced his run titled ["Behold! Biggest Liar in New York wants to be mayor."](https://nypost.com/2025/03/01/opinion/behold-biggest-liar-in-new-york-wants-to-be-mayor/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) So Cuomo is banging his own crisis drum. Democrats working out how to rank their ballots will need to think seriously about whether or not they want to break the glass and list Cuomo. ### Want to Fix the Subway? Stop Asking It To Be What It’s Not URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/want-to-fix-the-subway-stop-asking-it-to-be-something-its-not/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:05.000Z It's a New York tradition for politicians to refer to the subway system as "the lifeblood of the city" and the "economic engine of our region." They're right, but they're hardly stepping out on a ledge: The New York City subway is the largest in North America, moving millions of people each day and allowing the city to generate billions in economic activity. The system is inarguably the most important entity in the city — more important than any roadway, bridge, financial institution, single employer or other economic driver. But you'll know New York elected officials are actually serious about our subway when they stop sweeping our most intractable policy challenges — homelessness, serious mental illness, poverty — into the stations and onto subway platforms and instead commit New York City Transit to something challenging enough: providing 8 million people with safe, efficient transportation from one place to another. If you think this is already New York City Transit's mission, let me assure you, it's not. And I say this as someone who ran the system in 2020 and 2021. Currently the system is serving a purpose (against its will) that it is in no way built to serve — as a host of last resort for people seeking shelter, food and sleep, or as a place to sell goods of questionable origin, use drugs, relieve themselves. It's a place where the city's deficiencies in social services, crime prevention, vendor licensing and treating mental illness all show up. For political actors, there's an obvious convenience to allowing your hardest policy problems to fester in the subways. Underground is out of sight from many (including some elected officials who rarely use the system, preferring their black SUVs) and it's harder to get blamed for problems that are allowed to manifest in this not-exactly-public-but-not-exactly-private-either space. But political negligence has enormous costs. Thousands of people aren't getting the treatment or services they deserve and desperately need. The seriously mentally ill are pushed out of hospital emergency rooms because they can be a challenging population to deal with (and are unlikely to pay the resulting bill). The lack of supportive housing has left people feeling hopeless, that they have nowhere else to go. Homeless shelters can be breeding grounds for theft and violence. So it should be no surprise that the subway system has become the catch-all for many of those who have been failed by New York in one way or another. The result is there are thousands of individuals who choose to spend much of their time in the transit system. The system offers warmth and relief from the elements. Dark tunnels provide places to sleep or set up house if you are desperate or suffering enough from mental illness to choose the risk of death with every passing train. End-to-end train rides are long, and can offer uninterrupted semi-warmth in winter (and [recent reporting shows](https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2025/03/03/investigation-nypd-nixed-thousands-of-calls-at-coney-island-station-before-horrifying-fire-attack?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) you're unlikely to be asked to leave the train even when it reaches its endpoint, despite transit rules). The generosity of commuters and outreach workers means individuals are likely to find food, water and other sustenance in the system. If someone wants to drink or use drugs, the transit system offers thousands of places to do so. But what about the people who the system was built to serve in the first place? The vast majority of the people in the transit system are the millions of New Yorkers who rely on the subway to commute each day, and hundreds of thousands of New York City schoolchildren. Complicating the inevitable interaction between these groups of people is the fact that they are forced to compete for space on narrow, 100-year-old platforms stretching between active, electrified tracks, with trains made up of tons of unforgiving steel racing through every few minutes. It's an environment with high stakes, and zero room for error. Most days, and on most commutes, tragedy is avoided and the system actually works pretty well. But "works pretty well" doesn't mean that it works in a way that makes any sense — and when something goes wrong, it can go very wrong. Simply put, this is no way to run a railroad. And yet here we are, mostly because our elected officials have allowed it to get to this point. It is the inevitable result of our leaders being either uninterested, or insufficiently motivated, to do the hard work of addressing the challenges of housing, crime, mental illness — or at a minimum, they've refused to protect the system millions depend upon from the results of their inaction. But we may finally be reaching a tipping point. Stubbornly high crime numbers, a frightening increase in homicides, and prevalent disorder and chaos within the system have inspired New York's elected officials to admit there are real crime and quality of life challenges playing out every day in the transit system — and that they must be addressed. (We are also being helped by the election calendar, which never ceases in its quadrennial ability to focus the minds of those who seek higher office.) The tacit acknowledgement of the problem, and the accompanying end to the transit rider gaslighting, are welcome — as is the rush to announce grand plans to fix housing, mental illness and crime. But forgive New Yorkers who remain skeptical of the likelihood of our elected officials finally ending street homelessness, changing the laws to force treatment for the seriously mentally ill or suddenly being able to build enough supportive housing after decades of failure. So perhaps the best next step is actually a much simpler one: While politicians solve for the hardest challenges facing the city, they should agree to remove those challenges from the subways in the meantime. Simply put, while the vulnerable individuals seeking shelter in the transit system deserve the City's help, the riders equally deserve a safe system for getting to and from work and school. Our elected leaders must come together with a clear message: The transit system's purpose is to move people from one place to another safely and efficiently; we should not tolerate it being used for other purposes that interfere with that core mission. It really is that simple. Executing on that promise is harder — but it is also not as difficult as our recent history would suggest. > The transit system's purpose is to move people from one place to another safely and efficiently; we should not tolerate it being used for other purposes that interfere with that core mission. Execution ultimately rests with the governor, who controls the MTA, and the mayor, who represents the vast majority of the riders and who oversees the police department — but it will also require discipline from other elected officials to stand together and assert that we will no longer ask the system to be more than it should ever have been. But how to execute? By asking, urging, then requiring, people not using the system for transport to leave. An increase in policing, security and outreach staffing will be required in the beginning to make the new rules of the road clear. And those public servants will need to be focused, engaged and helpful. (Not standing in the corner looking at their phones, and not insisting that dealing with a vulnerable population is not part of their job description.) To be clear: We cannot, and should not, try to arrest or ticket our way out of this problem. This is not about what is legal or what is grounds for arrest — it is about finally taking action based not on politics, but based on what is right for the city, and what we deem to be an acceptable use of the system that keeps our economy running and moves our children. Police, outreach professionals and security contractors are more than equipped to approach those who are not using the system for transportation and remind them that they cannot stay. It's just as countless librarians, bartenders, and security guards have said to millions of us: "you don't have to go home," (or even to a shelter) "but you cannot stay here." Yes, some people will become angry and frustrated. But the vast majority will simply exit the system. For those who refuse, the police need to be part of the solution, but those interactions need not end in arrest or ticketing either. Just as fare evasion is best nipped by closing off the ability to enter the system without paying, the use of the system for things other than transport can best be nipped by simply not allowing it to be used for anything else: "I'm sorry sir, not here, but let me tell you about the other many options available to you." And for those who feel this is cruel, a reminder: It is much more cruel to turn away. We are a city that professes compassion, and a desire to assist those who need help. And we put billions of our hard-earned tax dollars toward trying to solve these problems. But our leaders fail repeatedly to take the next step, which is to actually push people successfully towards these resources. I am not an expert on housing or mental health. But I know that when options are narrowed, decisions become easier. When the transit system is no longer an option for our most vulnerable, many will make a safer and healthier decision — to seek help or supportive services. At a minimum, they will relocate themselves to a place that is safer. Mental health crises may continue until an individual can get the help they need, but those crises will take place less frequently on narrow platforms or in the path of an approaching train. Does New York City have a long-term solution for each individual that will be asked to leave the subway? Politicians will say we do not, but that answer displays the same lack of agency and will that got us here in the first place. The reality is that there are only a few thousand individuals who need a long-term path of exit from the system. And so yes, politicians must do the hard work of addressing the housing crisis and the mental illness crisis. But in the meantime, don't tell me the city and state bureaucracies of New York are incapable of taking care of a few thousand individuals in crisis. So politicians, please, stop hiding your problems in the subway. Fix them. Show the riders your political courage. Commit New York City Transit to a responsibility that is plenty demanding: providing 8 million people with safe, efficient transportation from one place to another. Let the subway system be the subway system. If you can do it, the lifeblood of the city will thrive. ### What Role Should Nonprofits Play in Cities? URL: https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/editors-note-what-role-should-nonprofits-play-in-cities/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T13:37:06.000Z > While mayors come and go every few years, there is a core group of large nonprofit social service providers that remains the same no matter who runs the city. A [halo effect](https://www.philanthropy.com/article/leaders-must-confront-declining-trust-in-the-nonprofit-world-before-its-too-late?sra=true&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) has long surrounded American charities and the people who work for them. Individual nonprofits might be accused of being misguided, corrupt or ineffectual, but generally, people assumed that nonprofits had good intentions and were trying to make the world a better place. No longer. In recent years, nonprofits have been accused of all manner of offenses, including being more interested in self-perpetuation than solving social problems. Exorbitant nonprofit CEO salaries and high-profile cases of fraud routinely generate outrage on social media. The New York Times has even hired [a reporter](https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-a-fahrenthold?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) specifically to investigate nonprofit abuse. All of this is crucial context for the claim, recently articulated by Crain's New York Business, among others, that nonprofits in New York City amount to a ["shadow government"](https://www.crainsnewyork.com/politics-policy/new-yorks-nonprofit-shadow-government?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) operating with little public scrutiny or accountability. This argument is based on the fact that, while mayors come and go every few years, there is a core group of large nonprofit social service providers that remains the same no matter who runs the city. You can find their executive directors serving on the transition committees for mayor and other important elected offices. You can also find their executive directors going back and forth between government and the nonprofit sector, often taking leadership positions (prominent examples from Mayor Eric Adams' administration include Ashwin Vasan, Sheena Wright, Jess Dannhauser, Anne Williams-Isom and Sue Donoghue, among others). The intimate relationship between government and nonprofit service providers is both personal and financial. The City of New York spends billions paying nonprofits to provide childcare, housing, drug treatment and other human services. Many of these grants and contracts go to the same organizations year after year. To many observers, it all looks rather cozy. (You can add the City of New York to the list of those concerned with the arrangement: At the end of 2024, the Department of Investigation announced [findings](https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doi/press-releases/2024/October/39DHSRptRelease10.17.2024.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) from an investigation into dozens of City-funded nonprofits that found, among other things, conflicts of interest, nepotism and concerns about excessive pay for CEOs.) > While mayors come and go every few years, there is a core group of large nonprofit social service providers that remains the same no matter who runs the city. There are numerous reasons why cities turn to nonprofits. But high on the list is the fact that nonprofits are free of a number of constraints that encumber government. Over the generations, government agencies have become barnacled with thousands of restrictions — civil service rules, legislative mandates, collective bargaining agreements and more. As [Matt Yglesias](https://www.slowboring.com/p/new-year-new-mailbag-33f?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) argues, the outsourcing of core government functions to nonprofits is "downstream of public sector labor issues. Policymakers place a large premium on finding ways to do things outside of civil service and collective bargaining rules, which means they should maybe be looking at changing those rules rather than contracting out everything." Picking up on this theme, blogger [Noah Smith](https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/nonprofits-are-sapping-the-progressive?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) suggests that government outsourcing amounts to the privatization of City services and the undermining of state capacity. He also believes that outsourcing invites corruption and patronage from unscrupulous politicians. Yglesias and Smith are far from the only critics who have been asking tough questions about American nonprofits of late. A prominent example of a right-wing critique of the nonprofit sector is Jonathan Ireland's ["The Nonprofit Industrial Complex and the Corruption of the American City"](https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2024/05/the-nonprofit-industrial-complex-and-the-corruption-of-the-american-city/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) in American Affairs. Ireland bemoans the billions of dollars of public funds that are "effectively stolen" from taxpayers and given to nonprofits with "glaringly insufficient safeguards to ensure that the money is used in a manner likely to serve the public interest." According to Ireland, it all amounts to "money for nothing." On the left, critics argue that the notion that nonprofits comprise an "independent sector" is a misnomer — they are essentially in the pocket of the state. For these detractors, nonprofits siphon money and energy away from the kinds of radical organizing that might upend existing power dynamics. In response, proponents of the nonprofit sector argue that, far from "money for nothing," nonprofit service providers give City government enormous bang for their buck. Indeed, because nonprofit workers often make less than their peers in government — and because nonprofits are not subject to the same burdensome regulations or collective bargaining agreements that constrain City agencies — they can often offer higher levels of service delivery for less money. One nonprofit leader told [City & State](https://www.cityandstateny.com/opinion/2023/09/are-nonprofits-permanent-government-new-york-city/390761/?oref=csny-author-river&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) that critics of the nonprofit sector should "be careful what they wish for — if we were to eliminate all of New York's nonprofit service providers and replace them with government workers tomorrow, the quality of life in New York would go down, not up." Since Alexis de Tocqueville first identified civic associations as one of the distinguishing features of American democracy, nonprofit groups have served as part of the backbone of civil society in the United States. Viewed from this perspective, the fact that New York City has a particularly vibrant nonprofit sector is one of the city's core strengths — and an important bulwark against calamity. In good times and bad, nonprofits help knit the city together, operating as an important bridge between the state and individual citizens. > Since Alexis de Tocqueville first identified civic associations as one of the distinguishing features of American democracy, nonprofit groups have served as part of the backbone of civil society in the United States. In recent years, nonprofit advocates have come to feel that the relationship between the nonprofit sector and local government is broken — but not for the reasons that critics outline. For example, a coalition of New York nonprofits has argued that both the city and the state have systematically held down wages at the organizations they contract with. They claim that workers at nonprofit service providers ["generally make about 71% of what government employees make, and 82% of what private sector workers receive for the same role."](https://www.justpayny.org/facts-and-research?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) Fair pay is one problem. Timely pay is another. According to [John MacIntosh](https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2023/10/will-nycs-nonprofit-procurement-process-ever-be-functional/390798/?oref=csny-author-river&ref=vitalcitynyc.org) of SeaChange Capital Partners, about 35% of the City of New York's total budget is spent on goods and services from third parties. The largest share of this is spent on human services from nonprofit organizations — about $9.9 billion in fiscal year 2023\. Unfortunately, the City has a very hard time executing contracts and paying its bills in a timely fashion. As a result, many nonprofits must essentially perform the work first, then wait for months to get paid. This places enormous stress on organizations, forcing them to take out cash flow loans just to make payroll. Episodic efforts are made by the City to reform its procurement process — the Adams administration has created a special [Office for Nonprofit Services](https://www.nyc.gov/site/nonprofits/index.page?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) to help ensure timely payments, for example — but these issues remain a regular source of exasperation for all too many New York City nonprofits. Indeed, according to the City Comptroller's Office, [things have actually gotten worse of late](https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/02/06/nonprofits-city-hall-contract-delays-comptroller/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org). What should the relationship between government and the nonprofit sector look like? Are there things that nonprofits do better than government? Do nonprofits have too much power in New York City — or not enough? In this issue of Vital City, we take a closer look at the "nonprofit industrial complex," asking what role nonprofits should play in urban governance and New York City in particular. In our first section, "Historical Lessons," we explore the intersection of the public and independent sectors over time with the help of [Leslie Lenkowsky](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-paradox-of-nonprofit-trustworthiness), [Daniel Stid](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/alexis-de-tocqueville-and-the-art-of-association), [Michael Woodsworth](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-enduring-power-of-poverty-pimps) and [Benjamin Soskis](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/nonprofits-and-the-city). As these authors make clear, for good and for ill, American nonprofits have been inextricably connected to the state for quite some time. Next, we turn to "The Great Debate," asking several experts from government, academia and the nonprofit sector to wrestle with the pluses and minuses of government reliance on nonprofit service delivery. These authors lay out the negatives, including, as [Majora Carter](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-the-nonprofit-sector-fails-low-income-communities) points out, a long tradition of nonprofits that seem to profit from public and private grants without meaningfully improving the conditions of life in low-income neighborhoods. But the positives of the current model also come into sharp focus as well, with several contributors, including [Mindy Tarlow](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-permanent-government-of-new-york-how-the-public-and-nonprofit-sectors-strengthen-the-city) and [Jessica Katz](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-nonprofit-model-of-social-service-delivery-makes-sense-for-new-york), pointing to the advantages that nonprofits have over government when it comes to being responsive to the idiosyncratic needs of discrete populations. Finally, we turn to "Currents," where we look at recent developments and emerging trends in the nonprofit sector. Among other things, [Justine Olderman](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/in-defense-of-social-justice-upheaval-at-nonprofits) details the lessons she learned from managing young staffers intensely focused on issues of social justice. [Robert Pondiscio](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/charter-schools-at-the-crossroads) describes how charter schools have reached an inflection point. And [Rich Leimsider](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/artificial-intelligence-and-the-nonprofit-sector) reveals the perils and potential of artificial intelligence. > What should the relationship between government and the nonprofit sector look like? Are there things that nonprofits do better than government? Do nonprofits have too much power in New York City — or not enough? The tensions between government and the nonprofit sector have been with us for a long time. But change may be in the air. Nonprofit advocates like [John MacIntosh](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/the-trump-administration-poses-a-real-threat-to-nonprofits-in-new-york-and-beyond) and [Doug Bauer](https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/service-delivery-is-not-enough-advocacy-should-be-central-to-every-nonprofit) believe that the Trump administration poses a number of threats to the sector, including potential cuts in funding and politicized reviews of organizations' tax-exempt status. How many of these threats will come to fruition is anyone's guess, but the first few weeks of the new administration have been ominous. In particular, Trump's orders to [review all grants to nonprofits](https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/02/10/trumps-misguided-war-on-nonprofits/?ref=vitalcitynyc.org), to temporarily [freeze federal funding](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/us/politics/grant-funding-freeze-nonprofits.html?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) and to target diversity, equity and inclusion programs are real and credible dangers to many American nonprofits. While battles to defeat all of these initiatives will be waged in the courts and on Capitol Hill, Trump has already succeeded in disrupting the nonprofit sector, sowing chaos and stifling the public discourse. We had commissioned an essay on DEI for this issue but it wound up being pulled by its author because they were concerned about potential blowback for their organization. That's not a sign of a healthy public square. But even as nonprofits figure out how and when to fight the Trump administration, they would be wise to keep one eye on the issue of public accountability, which is where right-wing and left-wing critiques of the sector converge. In an era of [declining confidence in all manner of institutions,](https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/2025%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report%5F01.23.25.pdf?ref=vitalcitynyc.org) nonprofits can no longer take public trust for granted. _Truncated after 5 MiB. Use `/sitemap.xml` for the complete archive of public content._